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Separating the Activation, Integration, and Validation Components of Reading

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DOI: 10.1016/bs.plm.2016.03.004

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From O’Brien, E. J., & Cook, A. E. (2016). Separating the Activation,


Integration, and Validation Components of Reading. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), Psychology
of Learning and Motivation (pp. 249–276).
ISBN: 9780128047903
Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Academic Press
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CHAPTER SEVEN

Separating the Activation,


Integration, and Validation
Components of Reading
Edward J. O’Brien*, 1 and Anne E. Cookx
*University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, United States
x
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, United States
1
Corresponding author: E-mail: Edward.O’Brien@unh.edu

Contents
1. Introduction 249
2. The RI-Val Model of Comprehension 252
2.1 General World Knowledge Versus Contextual Influences on Comprehension 256
2.2 Mediating Influences on Validation 259
2.3 When Validation “Fails” 263
2.4 Manipulating the Coherence Threshold 268
3. Implications of the RI-Val Model 270
4. Conclusions 271
References 272

Abstract
The goal of this chapter is to build on previous models of discourse comprehension
that break reading into two components: activation and integration. We describe a
new model of comprehension, the RI-Val model, which separates out the mechanisms
involved in activation and integration, and adds an additional validation stage to pro-
cessing. The assumptions of this model have implications for the types of information
reactivated from memory, how this information can mediate subsequent processing,
and how the timing of different influences is affected. We provide evidence from
our own work to support the model and discuss broad implications of the model for
future research and theory in discourse comprehension.

1. INTRODUCTION
All models of discourse comprehension share the assumption that
readers must link incoming content with previously encoded and reactivated
informationdwhether from previously read text or from general world
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Volume 65
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knowledge. Although there have been multiple models proposed to


describe this process (eg, van den Broek, Risden, Fletcher, & Thurlow,
1996; Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Myers &
O’Brien, 1998; Sanford & Garrod, 1989), and some of the core assumptions
within various models differ, the common thread throughout all models is
that comprehension depends on two stages of processing: activation of infor-
mation from memory, and the integration of activated content with incoming
information.
Perhaps the most commonly adopted of these two-stage activation þ
integration models is the ConstructioneIntegration (CeI) model (Kintsch,
1988, 1998). The first stage, Construction, involves the development of an
associative network of concepts related to a text. This occurs through four
basic steps: forming the propositional representation of incoming text (see
Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978), elaborating this information with related con-
tent from long-term memory, inferring additional propositions, and assign-
ing connection strengths to all pairs of elements constructed. Kintsch (1988)
argued that the construction phase is passive, and “instead of precise infer-
ence rules, sloppy ones are used, resulting in an incoherent, potentially con-
tradictory output” (p. 194). The output of this construction process is
assumed to be an associative network of propositional content that is related
(but not necessarily relevant) to incoming text content. The integration
stage operates on this loosely constructed network representation. Within
the integration stage, activation spreads throughout the network until the
system stabilizes, similar to the passive convergence mechanism assumed
in connectionist models (eg, Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986). This process
typically achieves a stable state rapidly; but when it fails, the Constructione
Integration cycle may be re-initiated. The output of the integration phase is
a new activation vector, in which the most highly activated nodes are those
that constitute the up-to-date discourse representation; and those that are
irrelevant are “zeroed out.” That is, only those nodes that are related and
relevant to the current text survive the integration process; those nodes
that contain spuriously activated and/or irrelevant information are no longer
a functional part of the discourse representation. Thus, the overwhelming
benefit of the CeI model has been that it is based on passive and “dumb”
automatic processes that ultimately derive at a “smart” representation.
Many researchers and models have adopted Kintsch’s (1988, 1998)
conceptualization of two stages (activation þ integration), as well as the
inherent assumptions of those stages- in particular, the assumption that the
processes involved in construction are passive, dumb, and unrestricted

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(eg, Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien & Myers, 1999; Sanford & Garrod,
1998, 2005). All models also share the assumption that construction and
integration (ie, activation þ integration) are continuous and cyclical, such
that encoding of new information automatically initiates new construction
and integration cycles.
Long and Lea (2005; see also Long, Oppy, & Seely, 1997; Long, Seely, &
Oppy, 1996) have noted that the issue on which researchers tend to disagree
is the role of top-down, or evaluative, processes during the integration
phase. Researchers who espouse the memory-based view have traditionally
downplayed the role of strategic processing (van den Broek et al., 1996;
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992, 1998; Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien &
Myers, 1999), whereas others have argued that integration is more strategi-
cally evaluative or analytical in nature (eg, Graesser et al., 1994; Singer,
Graesser, & Trabasso, 1994; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Long and Lea
presented a compelling argument for a modified view of postactivation pro-
cessing that allowed for both passive convergence-like integration processes
as well as processes that are more strategically evaluative in nature (see also
Ferretti, Singer, & Harwood, 2013; Isberner & Richter, 2014; Singer,
2006, 2013).
Evidence from our own work (eg, Cook et al., 2014; Cook & O’Brien,
2014) has largely supported the argument that following initial integration,
there must be an additional evaluative (but not necessarily strategic) compo-
nent involved in comprehension. Cook and Myers (2004) argued that
incoming information results in the activation of related information from
memory, and that activated content is then linked to the incoming informa-
tion. However, they argued that the link is then verified, or evaluated,
against additional information in a subsequent stage. This differed from
traditional two-stage models because of the assumption that processing con-
tinues even after initial integration appears to be complete. Similarly, Cook
et al. (2014) provided evidence that the initial inference activation process is
passive and dumb; readers activated predictive inferences that were related to
outdated (ie, no longer relevant to the current discourse model) content in
the text. That is, the initial inferences activated were irrelevant to the current
status of the discourse model. In a subsequent experiment, however, Cook
et al. demonstrated that only relevant inferences (ie, those related to the cur-
rent discourse model) were integrated into the long-term memory represen-
tation of the text, whereas irrelevant inferences were “pruned” out. They
argued that there must be some process by which activated information is
evaluated against both its relatedness and relevance to the ongoing discourse

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representation (see also Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996; Singer Halldorson, Lear,
& Andrusiak, 1992; Singer, Harkness, & Stewart, 1997). These findings in
support of an evaluative stage during comprehension led us to propose
the RI-Val model outlined in the next section.

2. THE RI-VAL MODEL OF COMPREHENSION


In our RI-Val model (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien & Cook,
2016), we presented a more detailed framework of the comprehension pro-
cess. In this model, information is initially activated and any information
with sufficient activation is then linked to other information in active mem-
ory (ie, integrated). Those basic linkages are subsequently validated against
all information activated from long-term memory (this activated informa-
tion includes both information from the episodic representation of the
text, as well as general world knowledge). The RI-Val model is grounded
in the memory-based literature, and it holds many of the same assumptions
inherent in Kintsch’s (1988) CeI model. Consistent with Kintsch’s view, as
well as with other two-stage models of processing (eg, van den Broek et al.,
1996; Sanford & Garrod, 1989, 2005), we assume that upon encoding new
information, any related information is reactivated from memory (from both
earlier portions of the discourse model as well as general world knowledge)
via a passive, resonance-like process (Myers & O’Brien, 1998; O’Brien &
Myers, 1999). Within the resonance model, concepts in active memory,
which may consist of reactivated content and/or newly encoded informa-
tion, serve as cues that signal all of long-term memory. The signal, which
may vary in intensity according to degree of attention, is autonomous.
Related information in memory, regardless of whether it is from inactive
portions of the episodic discourse representation or from general world
knowledge, resonates in response to the signal as a function of the degree
of the featural match to the cue. Contacted memory elements in turn signal
to other concepts in memory. Activation builds in this manner, and when
the process stabilizes, the most active elements (ie, those that resonate the
most) enter into working memory. This resonance process is autonomous,
unrestricted, and “dumb.” Information is automatically returned to active
memory independent of its source or whether it is relevant to the current
input (ie, signal).
Following this resonance (R) stage, information that is activated above a
minimum threshold is then linked with the contents of active memory in an

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integration (I) stage. Drawing from the work by Kintsch and colleagues
(Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; Van Dijk & Kintsch,
1983), we assume that these linkages are made on the basis of general con-
ceptual overlapdor goodness of fit. Once these initial linkages have been
formed, we assume that they are then subject to validation (eg, Cook
et al., 2014; Cook & Myers, 2004; Garrod & Terras, 2000; Long & Lea,
2005). Thus, we added an additional (Val) stage to the RI-Val model.
The idea that information in text is validated against a reader’s broader
knowledge base is well supported in the research and writings of Singer
and colleagues (eg, Singer, 2006, 2013; Singer & Doering, 2014; see also
Isberner & Richter, 2014; Richter, 2015). However, considerably less
research has been devoted to understanding the specific mechanisms
involved in validation; and unpacking and exploration of the validation pro-
cess is the most important contribution of the RI-Val model.
Within the RI-Val model, the validation process is based on simple, pas-
sive, pattern-matching processes (similar pattern matching mechanisms have
been used to explain several components of comprehension; see Kintsch,
1988, 1998; Sanford, 1990). Specifically, we have adopted a mechanism
similar to that described by Reder in the partial matching assumption of
her Featural Familiarity Hypothesis (eg, Kamas & Reder, 1995; see also
Kamas, Reder, & Ayers, 1996; Reder & Kusbit, 1991). Although Reder
proposed this account to describe access of information from memory, we
have adapted her assumptions to the process through which linkages from
the I (Integration) stage are validated against the activated contents from
long-term memory. That is, initial linkages are matched against activated in-
formation at the featural level; linkages “match” activated content if they
share many clusters of features, even if the relations between the clusters
of features or the lexical items representing them are not identical. As noted
by Kamas and Reder, this processing heuristic is “quick, easy, and relatively
accurate” (p. 184), and that “a rigid comprehension system would have a
difficult time indeed” (p. 191) of handling the kind of complex linguistic
input readers and speakers are faced with on a regular basis.
When combined, the activation and integration stages of the RI-Val
model are comparable to the Construction stage in Kintsch’s (1988) CeI
model. We chose to divide this initial phase of processing into two distinct
stages to clarify that: information is activated via a purely associative reso-
nance process; and that the activated content is then linked in an integration
(I) stage to existing information in working memory on the basis of “good-
ness of fit” (primarily semantic overlap). The primary difference between

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254 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

our RI-Val model and Kintsch’s CeI model is between our Validation stage
and his Integration stage. Kintsch assumed that activation of individual link-
ages between propositions are stabilized via a connectionist convergence
mechanism. Based on previous research, we assume that these linkages are
validated, albeit passively, against activated information from memory via
a more flexible, passive pattern matching process, and that this process plays
out over time.
Prior to an in-depth discussion of the predictions and consequences of a
passive validation process, it is important to outline in more detail the critical
assumptions of the RI-Val model, which is illustrated in Fig. 1. The first crit-
ical assumption is that activation, integration, and validation are all assumed
to be passive in nature; as a consequence, once each process starts, it runs to
completion. By “completion” we assume that each process arrives at a stable
state, similar to the stabilization of activation networks and vectors assumed
in Kintsch’s (1988) CeI model. The three curves in the figure depict the
activation, integration, and validation processes assumed in the RI-Val
model. We assume that upon encoding new information, that information
sends a signal to all of memory, reactivating related information from inac-
tive portions of memory via resonance (R). As soon as activation levels rise
above a minimum threshold (horizontal dotted line), the reactivated infor-
mation has the potential to influence comprehension. Information at higher

Figure 1 The RI-Val Model of Comprehension. This figure represents the parallel asyn-
chronous nature of the Resonance, Integration and Validation stages assumed by the
model. Reprinted from O’Brien, E.J., & Cook, A.E. (2016). Coherence threshold and the
continuity of processing: the RI-Val model of comprehension. Discourse Processes,
Accepted for publication by Taylor & Francis LLC (http://www.tandfonline.com).

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Components of Reading 255

levels of activation has a greater potential for influence on comprehension;


activation builds over time, peaks, and then ultimately decays below the
threshold for influence. Integration (ie, initial linkages) cannot begin until
the activation stage has made available a minimum of two concepts (or
ideas); and validation cannot begin until activation has made available a min-
imum of two concepts, and a linkage has been formed that can then be vali-
dated against memory.
The second critical assumption of the RI-Val model is that activation,
integration, and validation are parallel, asynchronous processes. Each process
operates on the output of the previous stage; however, once each process
starts, all three processes run in parallel. Thus, reactivation processes may still
be activating new concepts when integration begins, and integration may
still be producing new linkages when validation begins. And because the
latter processes are ultimately dependent on the output of the reactivation
process, they must be mediated by factors that influence activation. That
is, information that is more highly related to the current input is more likely
to be reactivated, integrated, and validated before information that has a
weaker relation to current input.
The third critical assumption of the RI-Val model regards the extent to
which the activation, integration, and validation processes need to run
before readers move on in the text. We have defined this point on the pro-
cessing functions as the coherence threshold (see O’Brien & Cook, 2016).
This is a refinement of one component of the more general concept of
“standards of coherence,” developed by van den Broek and colleagues
(eg, van den Broek, Bohn-Gettler, Kendeou, Carlson, & White, 2011;
van den Broek, Risden, & Husbye-Hartman, 1995; van den Broek, Virtue,
Everson, Tzeng, & Sung, 2002). We assume that this threshold (vertical
dashed line in Fig. 1) marks the point in time at which the degree of match
assessed by the validation process has resulted in sufficient coherence and
comprehension for the reader to move on in the text. Because the three pro-
cesses (ie, activation, integration, and validation) are continuous processes
that run to completion, the coherence threshold is just a point on that con-
tinuum at which readers have gained enough information to shift their
attention to subsequent text. This raises the possibility that observable
processing effects may be observed on either side of the threshold. That
is, processing may be observed immediately upon encoding (on the target
sentence), both immediately and after a delay (on the target sentence and
on a subsequent “spillover” sentence), or only after a delay (only after the
reader has moved on from the sentence containing the target information

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256 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

to subsequent text) (O’Brien & Cook, 2016). This flexible account of the
timing of validation effects is a consequence of the assumption that the vali-
dation process is continuous. This differs from other instantiations of valida-
tion in which the process is assumed to be discrete (eg, Richter, 2015;
Singer, 2006, 2013). We assume that validation begins immediately after in-
formation is reactivated above threshold and integrated with active memory;
but more importantly, we assume that validation processes continue to oper-
ate even after a reader has accrued sufficient activation, integration, and vali-
dation (ie, reached their coherence threshold) and moved on in a text.
In the following sections, we will review evidence from our work that
supports these assumptions. Section 2.1 will focus on the passive and unre-
stricted nature of activation, which allows for a “race” for initial reactivation,
integration, and validation between information reactivated from general
world knowledge and previously encoded context. Section 2.2 will provide
evidence that the factors that influence reactivation of information also
mediate subsequent validation processes. Section 2.3 will describe new ev-
idence regarding validation when readers are faced with semantic anomalies.
And Section 2.4 will focus on the role of the coherence threshold. After
describing this evidence, we will end with a discussion of broader implica-
tions of the RI-Val model regarding current and future research in discourse
comprehension.

2.1 General World Knowledge Versus Contextual Influences


on Comprehension
Two important characteristics of the activation process (ie, resonance)
assumed in the RI-Val model are that it is both passive and unrestricted;
any information in long-term memory that shares sufficient overlap with
newly encoded content has the potential to be reactivated, regardless of
whether it is from the episodic memory trace of the text or from general
world knowledge. It is commonly assumed that general world knowledge
will be accessed first and therefore have the strongest initial influence (eg,
Garrod & Terras, 2000; Kintsch, 1988; Sanford & Garrod, 1989), because
information in general world knowledge is strongly encoded, elaborated,
and interconnected in long-term memory (Cook & Guéraud, 2005). How-
ever, because resonance is unrestricted, either type of information (ie,
contextual information from the episodic memory trace or general world
knowledge) may exert greater initial influence on processing, depending
on the strength of the memory trace and its featural overlap with incoming
information (Albrecht & O’Brien, 1991; Cook & Guéraud, 2005; Myers,

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Cook, Kambe, Mason, & O’Brien, 2000). This implies that strong contex-
tual information (eg, elaborated or causally connected content) has the po-
tential to influence initial processing (see, for example, Colbert-Getz &
Cook, 2013; Kendeou, Smith, & O’Brien, 2013). But because processing
is continuous, general world knowledge will still be contacted, reactivated,
and will eventually influence comprehension, albeit after a delay. This view
that either source of information can dominate initial processing differs from
other accounts in the literature that assume that general world knowledge
has a stronger influence on initial processing than contextual information
(eg, Garrod & Terras, 2000; Kintsch, 1988; Sanford & Garrod, 1989), or
vice versa (eg, Hess, Foss, & Carroll, 1995; Nieuwland & Van Berkum,
2006; Van Berkum, 2008).
Rizzella and O’Brien (2002) examined this issue in the context of script-
based texts and narratives. Script-based texts naturally rely heavily on general
world knowledge, whereas narratives are more strongly driven by contextual
information. They measured the accessibility of concepts that were either
central or peripheral to both kinds of texts. For example, in a short narrative
passage about “Memories of a Marriage,” they embedded a concept that
was central to the narrative (eg, train) and a concept that was peripheral to
the narrative (eg, ladder). Consistent with prior work (eg, Albrecht &
O’Brien, 1991), they found that in a subsequent recognition test, central
concepts were correctly recognized more quickly than peripheral concepts.
Within the context of RI-Val, this occurred because contextual information
tends to dominate narratives and accessibility was driven by context. Indeed,
because narratives tend to be unique, the amount of activation from general
world knowledge would be low relative to the activation from the episodic
memory trace. As a result, access should be dominated by activation
emanating from the episodic memory trace (ie, context), leading to easier
retrieval of central concepts than peripheral concepts.
However, Rizzella and O’Brien (2002) also used a script-based passage
about “Going to a Restaurant” in which they embedded a concept that
was central to the script (eg, waiter) and a concept that was peripheral to
the script (eg, spoon). They found the opposite pattern: peripheral concepts
were recognized more quickly than central concepts. According to RI-Val,
the strong link between the script and general world knowledge led to the
activation of concepts from both the episodic memory trace of the script (ie,
context) as well as from general world knowledge (ie, script-based knowl-
edge). Further, the activation from general world knowledge would be
greater for central concepts than peripheral concepts. The activation

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258 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

emanating from general world knowledge created source confusion, making


it more difficult to validate the presence of central concepts than peripheral
concepts. These results support the view that either source of information
can be reactivated and thus have the potential to influence subsequent vali-
dation, but which source “wins” will depend on the strength of the relation
between the to-be-reactivated content and incoming information, as well as
the support for to-be-reactivated content in the text.
This competition between general world knowledge and contextual in-
formation for influence on processing was also examined by Cook and
Myers (2004). As shown in Table 1, they created scripted narratives (eg, a
rock band context) in which the initial encounter with a role filler was either
appropriate (song was played by a guitarist) or inappropriate (song was
played by the manager); consistent with the view that general world knowl-
edge is quickly activated and influential on integration and validation,
reading times for the role filler were longer in the inappropriate condition.
The second encounter with the role filler in the narrative was also either
appropriate or inappropriate with respect to general script-based informa-
tion. Cook and Myers found that when the second encounter matched
the first encounter, regardless of whether it was appropriate or not, initial
processing of this encounter was facilitated. An important consequence of
the passive nature of processing in the RI-Val model, though, is that

Table 1 Sample Passage from Cook and Myers (2004)

Introduction
The fans at the rock concert were going wild. They quieted down when the next
song
First encounter
Appropriate (AI): was played by the band’s guitarist.
Inappropriate (Il): was played by the band’s manager.
Background
The concert was being held in an outdoor stadium, and there were about ten
thousand screaming fans in attendance. They were mostly all hysterical teenage
girls. Some even cried as they
Second encounter
Appropriate (A2): listened to the guitarist.
Inappropriate (12): listened to the manager.
Conclusion
play a slow and heartfelt love song. The song was about a love affair that ended
badly.

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processes run to completion regardless of whether the reader has moved on


in the text. Consistent with this view, Cook and Myers found a delayed ef-
fect of appropriateness, such that readers showed increased regressions and
longer second pass reading times for the inappropriate role fillers. In general,
their results, in combination with those of Rizzella and O’Brien (2002), sup-
port a view in which either general world knowledge or context has the po-
tential to be reactivated and influence initial processing. More importantly,
these influences may continue even if the reader’s attention has moved on in
the text. Thus, which source of information is more influential (context or
general world knowledge) can shift after the reader has moved on in the
text. Moreover, the outcome of the “race” between these two sources for
initial influence is not set in stone but is decided by a number of interacting
variables (Colbert-Getz & Cook, 2013; Cook & Guéraud, 2005; Myers
et al., 2000). The next section will discuss how these variables can in turn
mediate the validation process.

2.2 Mediating Influences on Validation


As noted earlier, the second assumption of the RI-Val model is that activa-
tion, integration, and validation are asynchronous, but dependent, in nature.
Because we assume that the reactivation process (R) is passive, unrestricted
and dumb (see also Kintsch, 1988), information that is related, but not
necessarily relevant, to the current input has the potential to be reactivated
and influences subsequent phases of processing. The strongest evidence for
this has been from studies that have demonstrated the continued influence of
outdated or irrelevant information (eg, Cook, Halleran, & O’Brien, 1998;
Cook et al., 2014; Guéraud, Harmon, & Peracchi, 2005; Kendeou et al.,
2013; O’Brien, Cook, & Guéraud, 2010; O’Brien, Cook, & Peracchi,
2004; O’Brien, Rizzella, Albrecht, & Halleran, 1998). Presumably, informa-
tion is passively reactivated (R), linked with newly encoded content (I), and
then subjected to validation (Val). Irrelevant, but related, information may
be activated sufficiently to influence comprehension but it is ultimately
rejected upon further validation.
We have also demonstrated that some information that is activated dur-
ing reading may not exert any influence on processing until it is linked to
current context and validated against the reader’s broader knowledge base.
One example of this is the activation of basic featural information during
reading (Cook, Colbert-Getz, & Kircher, 2013; Cook & Guéraud, 2005;
Wei & Cook, 2016). For example, Wei and Cook demonstrated that
information about an object’s semantic size is activated during reading

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260 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

(ie, whether it is large or small), but that size information did not influence
processing unless it was incongruent with the surrounding context. More-
over, these incongruence effects only showed up in measures of processing
that are clearly postintegration in nature, lending support to the idea that
validation occurs after, and depends on output of the reactivation and inte-
gration stages.
The RI-Val model’s asynchrony assumption also means that validation
should be mediated by factors that influence earlier-occurring processes.
This hypothesis was tested by Cook (2014). As illustrated in Table 2, she
created passages in which an anaphor (eg, cello) was either a correct refer-
ence to a previously encountered antecedent (eg, cello), an incorrect but
highly related reference to the earlier antecedent (eg, violin), or an incorrect
and low-related reference to the antecedent (eg, oboe). Time to process the
target sentence containing the anaphor was a function of the relation be-
tween the anaphor and the antecedent; correct anaphors yielded faster
reading times than incorrect high-related anaphors, and incorrect high-
related anaphors yielded faster reading times than incorrect low-related ana-
phors. And consistent with the first assumption of RI-Val that processing
runs to completion, the difficulty associated with the incorrect anaphors
continued into the spillover sentence that followed the target sentence.
Although both incorrect anaphors resulted in initial processing difficulty,
it was mediated by the underlying semantic relation between the anaphor
and the antecedent. Cook’s findings demonstrate that validation is mediated
by factors that influence reactivation of information (ie, underlying semantic
relation between a cue and a target), as well as the degree of contextual sup-
port for that underlying relation in the text.
The same factors that influence reactivation should mediate subsequent
processes. This implies that information in long-term memory (either earlier
portions of the discourse model or general world knowledge) that is strongly
related to incoming information should be reactivated quickly and should
have an earlier and stronger influence on validation than information that
is weakly related to incoming information. Weakly related information
may influence validation, but these effects may not be evident immediately;
instead, the impact of weakly related information is likely to be delayed until
after the reader has already moved on in the textdthat is, until after the
coherence threshold has been met. Consider the example passage in Table 3.
Using the inconsistency paradigm developed by O’Brien and colleagues (eg,
Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992), Cook and O’Brien
(2014) manipulated the underlying relation between a critical characteristic

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Table 2 Sample Passage from Cook (2014)

Introduction
Terry loved classical music. She spent most of her waking hours listening to it, either
in her room or in the car.
Correct Antecedent
Terry decided that it would be fun to teach herself how to play. She drove to a
music shop located in the next town. As she entered the store she saw a beautiful
cello. The large instrument was almost bigger than she was. Terry decided she
wanted to learn how to play it. She imagined herself sitting down to play the
heavy instrument. Terry asked the salesman for a price. After thinking for a few
minutes, she decided to buy it that afternoon. Just then, Jill walked over to where
Terry was standing.
IncorrecteHigh-Overlap Condition
Terry decided to teach herself how to play. She and her friend Jill drove to a music
shop located in the next town. As they entered the store, Terry saw a beautiful
violin. The small instrument fit perfectly between her chin and shoulder. Terry
decided she wanted to learn how to play it. She imagined herself dancing as she
played the lightweight instrument. After thinking for a few minutes, she decided
to buy it. Just then, Jill walked over to where Terry was standing.
IncorrecteLow-Overlap Condition
Terry decided to teach herself how to play. She and her friend Jill drove to a music
shop located in the next town. As they entered the store, Terry saw a beautiful
oboe. The keys were bright and shiny, and the case was lined in black velvet.
Terry decided she wanted to learn how to play it. She imagined herself fingering
the keys to create perfect notes. After thinking for a few minutes, she decided to
buy it. Just then, Jill walked over to where Terry was standing.
Background
Jill told Terry she wanted to stop at the craft store on the way home. She had been
making a bunch of candle holders and had run out of supplies. She ran down her
list and told Terry that she needed some paint, glue, glitter, and brushes. She also
wanted to look to see if they had any stencils. After Jill finished her shopping,
they went home and unloaded all of their purchases.
Reinstatement and Spillover Sentences
Terry showed Jill the cello she bought.
She even tried to play a few notes.
Closing
Terry told Jill that she was going to start practicing that very evening.

of the protagonist (eg, Mary was a vegetarian) and information that was
inconsistent with this characteristic in the target sentence. In the high-
related condition, Mary ordered a cheeseburger; which is highly related to
the concept of “being a vegetarian.” In the low-related condition, Mary
orders a tuna salad, which is arguably more weakly related to the concept

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262 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

Table 3 Sample Passage from Cook and O’Brien (2014)

Introduction
Today Mary was meeting a friend for lunch. She arrived early at the restaurant and
decided to get a table. After she sat down, she started looking at the menu.
Consistent Elaboration
This was Mary’s favorite restaurant because it had fantastic meat dishes. She enjoyed
eating anything that was quick and easy to fix. In fact, she ate at McDonald’s at
least 3 times a week. She never worried about her diet and saw no reason to limit
what she ate.
Inconsistent Elaboration
This was her favorite restaurant because it had fantastic health food. She, a health
nut, had been a strict vegetarian for 10 years. Her favorite food was cauliflower.
She was so serious about her diet that she refused to eat anything which was fried
or cooked in grease.
Background
After about ten minutes, Mary’s friend arrived. It had been a few months since they
had seen each other. Because of this they had a lot to talk about and chatted for
over a half hour. Finally, Mary signaled the waiter to come take their orders.
Mary checked the menu one more time. She had a hard time figuring out what
to have for lunch.
Target Sentences
High-related: Mary decided to order a cheeseburger.
Low-related: Mary decided to order a tuna salad.
She handed the menu back to the waiter.
Closing
Her friend didn’t have as much trouble deciding what she wanted. She ordered and
they began to chat again. They didn’t realize there was so much for them to catch
up on.

of “being a vegetarian.” The relation between “vegetarian” and “cheese-


burger” or “tuna salad” is mediated by the underlying concept “meat,”
which does not appear anywhere in the text but resides in the reader’s gen-
eral world knowledge in long-term memory. This relation is stronger in the
high-related (cheeseburger) condition than in the low-related (tuna salad)
condition. We predicted that “vegetarian” should be reactivated more
quickly, and thus available for integration and validation more quickly, in
the high-related condition than in the low-related condition. Thus, the
inconsistency between Mary’s eating habits and food choice may become
apparent in the high-related condition earlier than in the low-related con-
dition. Specifically, we predicted that the inconsistency effect in the high-
related condition would appear on the target sentence, before the reader

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reached the coherence threshold, but that the inconsistency effect for the
low-related condition may not appear until after the reader had already sur-
passed the coherence threshold. Our results supported these predictions.
The inconsistency effect in the high-related condition was stronger and
appeared earlier (ie, on the target sentence), whereas the inconsistency effect
in the low-related condition was weaker and appeared later (ie, after the
reader had already moved on to the spillover sentence).
In Section 2.1, we argued that validation can be influenced by informa-
tion from both general world knowledge and the episodic discourse repre-
sentation (Cook & Myers, 2004; Rizzella & O’Brien, 2002) and that the
influences of each depend on the degree to which the overall passage
context supports underlying relations in general world knowledge (Cook,
2014). We have made the point in Section 2.2 that because processing is
continuous, effects may be observed either immediately or after a delay
(Cook & O’Brien, 2014). However, the studies supporting these assump-
tions all represented cases in which validation appeared to be complete;
that is, they represented situations in which validation ultimately resulted
in the detection (whether conscious or not) of inconsistent information.
In Section 2.3, we address a scenario in which validation is often considered
incompletedsemantic anomalies.

2.3 When Validation “Fails”


Semantic anomalies involve questions or contexts in which incorrect infor-
mation is presented, but the errors often go unnoticed by participants. Pre-
vious theorists have argued that errors go unnoticed or undetected because
processing is shallow, or incomplete (Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002;
Ferreira & Patson, 2007; Sanford, 2002; Sanford & Emmott, 2012; Sanford
& Graesser, 2006; Sanford & Sturt, 2002); that is, in terms of RI-Val, readers
fail to fully validate the erroneous information against correct information
reactivated from long-term memory. An example of a semantic anomaly
is the Moses Illusion (Erickson & Mattson, 1981; Kamas et al., 1996; Reder
& Cleeremans, 1990; Reder & Kusbit, 1991), where participants frequently
fail to notice the error in the question, “How many animals of each kind did
Moses take on the Ark?” The key to the illusion lies in the underlying
strength of the relation between the erroneous term (Moses) and the correct
term (Noah) in long-term memory. Studies on semantic anomalies have
typically utilized question answering paradigms (Erickson & Mattson,
1981; Kamas et al., 1996; Reder & Cleeremans, 1990; Reder & Kusbit,
1991), change detection tasks (Sanford, Sanford, Filik, & Molle, 2005;

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264 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

Sanford, Sanford, Molle, & Emmott, 2006; Sturt, Sanford, Stewart, &
Dawydiak, 2004; Ward & Sturt, 2007), or short texts (Barton & Sanford,
1993; Bohan & Sanford, 2008; Daneman, Hannon, & Burton, 2006;
Hannon & Daneman, 2004; Sanford, Leuthold, Bohan, & Sanford, 2011)
to demonstrate that readers often fail to detect anomalies (ie, errors) unless
the anomalies represent gross distortions of meaning and/or are highlighted
via some distinguishing characteristic (eg, capitalization, syntactic focus,
etc.). Furthermore, the tasks used in these studies typically require partici-
pants to consciously detect an anomaly (ie, provide a dichotomous
response); the measure is discrete and does not allow for the possibility
that information leading to detection could continue to accrue after a
response has been made. Within the RI-Val model, the validation process
continues even after the reader has passed their coherence threshold, allow-
ing for the possibility that processing difficulty resulting from anomalies
might only become evident after a delay (cf. Bohan & Sanford, 2008;
Sanford et al., 2011).
Williams, Cook, and O’Brien (2016) developed narrative passages that
contained semantic anomalies similar to the Moses Illusion (see Table 4).
However, our task involved reading for comprehension rather than anomaly
detection. We were thus able to measure processing on the erroneous term,
but also to measure delayed processing by assessing reading on the subse-
quent line of text (ie, spillover processing). We also manipulated the extent
to which the passage provided contextual support for the underlying relation
between the erroneous (Moses) and correct (Noah) terms. When this
contextual support was high (see High ContextdUnfocused Condition
in Table 4), there were several allusions to shared features between the erro-
neous and correct terms (eg, religious figure, Old Testament, etc.). When
contextual support was low, there were only a couple of allusions to their
shared features.
We assume that when the target sentence is encoded, related informa-
tion will be reactivated from memory. The curves in Fig. 2A and B depict
the relative influences of contextual information from the text as well as
general world knowledge on the validation process for both the high-
and low-context conditions. In the high-context condition (Fig. 2A), we
assume that contextual information (ie, shared features between Moses
and Noah; solid line) would initially dominate the validation process,
with the influence of general world knowledge (dotted line) trailing but
gaining additional influence over time. Thus the first information to be
reactivated and made available for integration and validation would include

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Table 4 Sample Passage from Williams et al. (2016)

Introduction
Tom was an avid reader who enjoyed many different kinds of magazines and books.
Each morning, Tom started his day by eating a bowl of cereal and reading the
morning paper. He found this time to be both relaxing and informative. When
Tom had any free time, he would sneak away to his den and read as much as he
could. He took great pride in being well read and saw reading as a way to broaden
his world knowledge.
High ContexteUnfocused Condition
Because of his desire to understand other people’s culture, Tom decided to read
some of the bible. He began with the Old Testament and the many stories found
within its chapters. Tom read about the beginning of mankind and a great flood
that God had used to punish his people. Although Tom was not devotedly
religious, he thought that by reading about prominent religious figures he would
better understand other people’s views. One new piece of information Tom
learned was that
Low Context
Because he had the day off from work, Tom decided that he was going to spend the
majority of the day reading. Tom was excited for some quiet time. After reading
the latest sports news on the internet, he happily settled down in his study with a
book on world culture and religion. The first few chapters Tom read were
written about some of the opening stories of the bible. One new piece of
information Tom learned was that
High ContexteFocused Condition
Because of his desire to understand other people’s culture, Tom decided to read
some of the bible. He read about a great flood that God had used to punish the
evils of mankind and about the massive ship that was constructed to save the
animals from the flood. Although Tom was not devotedly religious, he thought
his readings would help him to understand other people’s views and better relate
to them. One new piece of information Tom learned was that
Target Sentence
Noah/Moses brought two animals of each kind on the ark.
Spillover Sentence
Tom enjoyed learning about the ark in the bible.
Closing
Eventually, Tom’s eyes grew tired and he got up to take a break. He made himself a
sandwich and thought about all the interesting things he had read about.

terms such as “Bible” and “religious figure.” This information would be


linked to the contents of the target sentence, and the underlying features
of concepts in this linkage would be validated via the low-level pattern
matching process. Because the featural match would be strong, processing
should not be hindered. That is, the validation process would not detect

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266 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

Figure 2 (2A and B) Relative influences of context and general world knowledge on
validation over time as a function of context condition. Immediate influences on pro-
cessing are shown to the left of the coherence threshold, whereas spillover effects
are shown to the right of the coherence threshold. Fig. 2A depicts these influences
over time in the high-context condition, and Fig. 2B depicts the influences in the
low-context condition. In both figures, CT stands for coherence threshold.

an anomaly before the reader has reached their coherence threshold. How-
ever, activation, integration, and validation processes would continue to run
even after the reader’s coherence threshold has been met and they have
moved on in the text. Thus, it is likely that other more distinguishing infor-
mation from general world knowledge would still be contacted and reacti-
vated, integrated, and validated. Because this latter information would
contain increasing amounts of distinguishing information from general

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world knowledge (eg, information specific to Moses and/or who actually


took two animals of each kind on the Ark), the featural mismatch in the
initial linkage would become evident and processing difficulty would occur.
But, again, because this accrual of information from general world knowl-
edge would take additional time, processing difficulty may not occur until
after the reader has surpassed the coherence threshold and moved on to the
spillover sentence.
In contrast, in the low-context condition (Fig. 2B), the initial influence
of contextual information would be relatively weak, and more distinguish-
ing information from general world knowledge is likely to be reactivated
first and thereby dominate initial validation processes. In this case, the fea-
tural mismatch between the contents of the target sentence and the first
reactivated information ought to be apparent early in the validation process;
processing difficulty should occur on the target sentence. Our results sup-
ported these predictions; in the high-context condition, no processing dif-
ficulty due to the distorted term occurred until readers had already moved
on to the spillover sentence. In contrast, in the low-context condition, pro-
cessing difficulty was observed on the target sentence.
In a subsequent experiment, we rewrote the high-context condition so
that it clearly focused on discriminating features (ie, features that discrimi-
nated between Noah and Moses; see High ContextdFocused Condition
in Table 4 for an example). When the high-context served to discriminate,
then both the context and general world knowledge would lead to the acti-
vation of distinguishing information in a manner that would be almost “ad-
ditive.” In this case, we would expect the high-context focused condition to
produce immediate anomaly detection whereas the unfocused high-context
condition (ie, the high-context condition used in the previous experiment)
should lead to the same delayed detection effect exhibited in the earlier
experiment. And this is exactly the obtained finding.
The results of the Williams et al. (2016) study are important because they
provide a critical test of the RI-Val model’s assumption that general world
knowledge and context compete for initial influence on processing. Also,
they support the RI-Val model’s prediction that, depending on the degree
and type of contextual support, processing difficulty can be predicted to
occur either immediately, after a delay, or in some cases not at all. Most
models of discourse comprehension have ignored “spillover” effects, treating
them as a mere by-product of processing, when in fact they can be very
informative about the nature and sequence of individual processing stages
involved in reading. Models of reading that focus on more localized

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268 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

processes, such as eye movement control, have long viewed spillover effects
as an important window into the nature of early occurring processes during
reading (eg, EZ Reader Model; Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek, 2003).
The Williams et al. (2016) experiments just described assume that readers
require a moderate level of match between reactivated content and
incoming information in order to meet the coherence threshold and
move on in the text. That is, they may wait for some, but not all, related
information to accrue and influence processing before shifting attention to
subsequent information. This coherence threshold should be somewhat
flexible in nature, such that readers may wait for relatively little information
to accrue before moving on, or they may wait for a great deal of information
to accrue before continuing in the text. This issue is considered in the next
section.

2.4 Manipulating the Coherence Threshold


Because the coherence threshold is defined as a point in time during the vali-
dation process, it is possible to also move the threshold to different points
along the continuum. If the coherence threshold, or the criterion for a
“match” between features of the linkage being validated, is set high (ie, later
in time), validation would have had more time to complete (ie, allow the
impact of general world knowledge to dominate validation) before the
reader moves on in the text. In this case, it is likely that even in the “unfo-
cused” high-context condition used in Williams et al. (2016)’s first experi-
ment, distinguishing characteristics of Moses/Noah will be reactivated and
exert an influence on validation before readers have moved on to the target
sentence (see the high Coherence Threshold (CT) in Fig. 3A). This means
that processing difficulty due to the mismatch between reactivated content
and the target sentence would be observed on the target sentencedbefore
the coherence threshold is reached. This should hold true for both the high
context (Fig. 3A) and low-context conditions (Fig. 3B). This was tested in a
third experiment. Again, our findings supported these predictions; when the
coherence threshold was set high (by requiring participants to answer more
comprehension questions per passage) processing difficulty was observed on
the target sentence in both conditions.
It is also possible to alter the coherence threshold such that very little of the
validation process completes before the reader moves on. Thus, if the coher-
ence threshold is set very low (ie, early; see the low CT in Fig. 3A and B),
readers are likely to move on in the text before validation has had a chance
to run to completion. Under these circumstances, processing difficulty may

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Figure 3 (3A and B) Relative influences of context and general world knowledge on
validation over time as a function of context condition and coherence threshold manip-
ulation. In both figures, CT stands for Coherence Threshold. The Low CT line represents
influences of information on immediate and delayed processing when the coherence
threshold was low, and the High CT line represents these influences when the coher-
ence threshold was high. As in Fig. 2A and B, the dotted line represents the change
in influence of general world knowledge over time, and the solid line represents
contextual information.

be delayed until the spillover sentence (or possibly missed altogether) inde-
pendent of context. In a fourth experiment, Williams et al. (2016) lowered
the coherence threshold by reducing the number of comprehension ques-
tions to one every few passages. In the high-context condition (Fig. 3A),
readers no longer experienced any observable processing difficulty on either
the target or the spillover sentence. In the low-context condition (Fig. 3B),

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270 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

processing difficulty was delayed until after readers had already passed the
coherence threshold and moved on to the spillover sentence.
Studying the role of the coherence threshold in validation is a fertile area
for research in comprehension, as relatively little is known about this stage of
processing compared to the reactivation and integration stages. Although
Williams et al. (2016) varied the coherence threshold with a relatively subtle
manipulation, it is also likely to be influenced by stronger manipulations of
task, text, or reader variables (eg, standards of coherence; van den Broek
et al., 1995, 2002, 2011). The final section of this chapter will discuss broad
implications of the RI-Val model and related questions for future research in
discourse comprehension.

3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RI-VAL MODEL


The previous sections have outlined the assumptions and evidence for
the RI-Val model of comprehension (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien &
Cook, 2016). Our goal in proposing this model was to provide a flexible ac-
count of comprehension that can explain differences in timing of processing
effects across several areas of discourse comprehension research without
appealing to strategic processes (see also O’Brien & Cook, 2015). We
have shown that the RI-Val model can explain: the interacting influences
of general world knowledge and context over time (Section 2.1); factors
that mediate both the degree and timing of influence of reactivated informa-
tion in validation (Section 2.2), situations in which validation is thought to
be shallow or incomplete (Section 2.3), and factors that influence when the
reader moves on in the text (Section 2.4). We have confined our discussions
to our own work, although O’Brien and Cook (2016) have outlined several
areas of discourse processing research that may be explained by RI-Val.
These include, but are not limited to, studies on counterfactual and fantasy
worlds (eg, Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson, Sanford,
& Leuthold, 2008), the misinformation effect (eg, Hinze, Slaten, Horton,
Jenkins, & Rapp, 2014; Jacovina, Hinze, & Rapp, 2014; Rapp, 2008;
Rapp, Hinze, Kohlhepp, & Ryskin, 2014; Rapp, Hinze, Slaten, & Horton,
2014), refutational texts (eg, Kendeou & O’Brien, 2014; Kendeou et al.,
2013; Kendeou, Walsh, Smith, & O’Brien, 2014; Kendeou & van den
Broek, 2007), and the role of individual differences in validation (eg, Singer
& Ritchot, 1996; Smith & O’Brien, 2016).
As discussed earlier, there has been a great deal of knowledge generated
in the field about the reactivation and integration stages of processing, but

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relatively little is known about validation or the role of the coherence


threshold. We view these as critical areas of focus for future directions in
discourse comprehension research. Specifically, what textual variables influ-
ence the validation process? Given our view of validation as a pattern match-
ing process, it may be that the degree of match required by the reader will be
influenced by the complexity of the content in the text (Noordman, Vonk,
& Kempff, 1992), or the granularity of focus implied by information in the
text (Sanford & Garrod, 1998, 2005).
In O’Brien and Cook (2016), we noted that the coherence threshold is a
subcomponent of the broader concept of standards of coherence. We view
the coherence threshold as a point on a continuum of processing that is
below the reader’s conscious awareness. As a result, it does not address the
strategic elements that are part of the larger construct of van den Broek’s
definition of standards of coherence (van den Broek et al., 1995, 2002,
2011) that may occur above the level of conscious awareness. We view
that point as further downstream in the time course of processing than the
stages discussed here. In order to map the transition from passive to strategic
processing onto RI-Val, it is necessary to determine what factors or events
might trigger a need for strategic processing, and at what point during the
validation process this occurs. Although some theorists have argued that
readers may in some cases engage in an “active search” (eg, Graesser et al.,
1994; Singer et al., 1994; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998), it is difficult to envi-
sion the mechanisms that would drive such a search (O’Brien & Cook,
2015). One possible alternative to a strategic search of memory may be based
on the match output of the validation process. When the validation pattern
matching process results in a mismatch this may serve to refocus the reader’s
attention, which would result in a new signal to long-term memory thereby
“rebooting” the RI-Val stages of processing (Kamas & Reder, 1995).

4. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the RI-Val model (Cook & O’Brien, 2014; O’Brien &
Cook, 2016) builds on previous two-stage activation þ integration models
(Kintsch, 1988, 1998; Long & Lea, 2005; Rizzella & O’Brien, 1996,
2002; Sanford & Garrod, 1989) by mapping on an additional validation
stage. We have relied on passive mechanisms to explain effects across the
time course of processing, without appealing to strategic actions on the
part of the reader. We consider the addition of a validation stage to common

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272 Edward J. O’Brien and Anne E. Cook

assumptions about reactivation and integration a large step forward in


models of comprehension, but we recognize that a complete model of
comprehension must address both passive and strategic components of
comprehension (O’Brien & Cook, 2015).

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