SUCCESSION
It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not
JD 2B A.Y. 2023-2024
I. General Provisions
1. DKC Holdings vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118248
April 5, 2000
SUMMARY: Petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion Bartolome,
whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land, which option must be
exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract. The contract also provided that
in case the petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. Petitioner
regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her death in January
1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to Victor Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor,
however, refused to accept these payments. Petitioner served upon Victor notice that it was exercising its option
to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March. Again, Victor refused
to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property. Petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance and damages against Victor and the Register of Deeds. Petitioner prayed for the surrender
and delivery of possession of the subject land; the surrender of title for registration and annotation thereon of
the Contract; and the payment of damages and attorney’s fees. After trial on the merits, the RTC of Valenzuela
rendered its Decision dismissing the Complaint and ordering petitioner to pay Victor P30,000.00 as attorney’s
fees. On appeal to the CA, the Decision was affirmed in toto. Issue for resolution of SC: WON the Contract of
Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion Bartolome with petitioner was terminated
upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even after her demise. SC ruled that under both
Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the subject Contract of Lease
with Option to Buy.
DOCTRINE:
● Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows
○ "ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property he received from the decedent. x x x x x x x x x."
● The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
○ "Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by
provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the
obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the
obligor.
transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the
client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the
lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the
probate court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract
could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of
quantum meruit."
● In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special
knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal
qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death
of the party who is required to render such service."
● It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death
of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor’s
personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by
others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a
character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that
performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse
nonperformance.
● As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs." In 1952, it
was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the
reconveyance had not been made, the heirs can be compelled to execute the proper deed for
reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of
a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property
subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
FACTS:
● On March 16, 1988, petitioner entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Encarnacion
Bartolome, whereby petitioner was given the option to lease or lease with purchase the subject land,
which option must be exercised within a period of two years counted from the signing of the Contract.
In turn, the petitioner undertook to pay P3,000.00 a month as consideration for the reservation of its
option. Within the two-year period, petitioner shall serve formal written notice upon the lessor
Encarnacion Bartolome of its desire to exercise its option. The contract also provided that in case the
petitioner chose to lease the property, it may take actual possession of the premises. In such an event,
the lease shall be for a period of six years, renewable for another six years, and the monthly rental fee
shall be P15,000.00 for the first six years and P18,000.00 for the next six years, in case of renewal.
● Petitioner regularly paid the monthly P3,000.00 provided for by the Contract to Encarnacion until her
death in January 1990. Thereafter, petitioner coursed its payment to private respondent Victor
Bartolome, being the sole heir of Encarnacion. Victor, however, refused to accept these payments.
 ● Meanwhile, on January 10, 1990, Victor executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication over all the
properties of Encarnacion, including the subject lot. Accordingly, respondent Register of Deeds
cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37615 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title No.
V-14249 in the name of Victor Bartolome.
● On March 14, 1990, petitioner served upon Victor, via registered mail, notice that it was exercising its
option to lease the property, tendering the amount of P15,000.00 as rent for the month of March.
Again, Victor refused to accept the tendered rental fee and to surrender possession of the property to
the petitioner.
● Petitioner thus opened a savings account with the China Banking Corporation, Cubao Branch, in the
name of Victor Bartolome and deposited therein the P15,000.00 rental fee for March as well as
P6,000.00 reservation fees for the months of February and March.
● Petitioner also tried to register and annotate the Contract on the title of Victor to the property. Although
respondent Register of Deeds accepted the required fees, he nevertheless refused to register or annotate
the same or even enter it in the day book or primary register.
● Thus, on April 23, 1990, petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Victor and the Register of Deeds. Petitioner prayed for the surrender and delivery of possession of the
subject land in accordance with the Contract terms; the surrender of title for registration and annotation
thereon of the Contract; and the payment of P500,000.00 as actual damages, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and P300,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
● After trial on the merits, the RTC of Valenzuela rendered its Decision on January 4, 1993, dismissing
the Complaint and ordering petitioner to pay Victor P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees. On appeal to the
CA, the Decision was affirmed in toto.
● Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUE/S: WON the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy entered into by the late Encarnacion
Bartolome with petitioner was terminated upon her death or whether it binds her sole heir, Victor, even
after her demise.
RULING: NO.
● Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides, as follows
○ "ART. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in
cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the
property he received from the decedent. x x x x x x x x x."
● The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible
by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law.
● In the case at bar, there is neither contractual stipulation nor legal provision making the rights and
obligations under the contract intransmissible. More importantly, the nature of the rights and
obligations therein are, by their nature, transmissible.
● The nature of intransmissible rights as explained by Arturo Tolentino, an eminent civilist, is as follows:
○ "Among contracts which are intransmissible are those which are purely personal, either by
provision of law, such as in cases of partnerships and agency, or by the very nature of the
obligations arising therefrom, such as those requiring special personal qualifications of the
obligor. It may also be stated that contracts for the payment of money debts are not
transmitted to the heirs of a party, but constitute a charge against his estate. Thus, where the
client in a contract for professional services of a lawyer died, leaving minor heirs, and the
lawyer, instead of presenting his claim for professional services under the contract to the
probate court, substituted the minors as parties for his client, it was held that the contract
could not be enforced against the minors; the lawyer was limited to a recovery on the basis of
quantum meruit."
● In American jurisprudence, "(W)here acts stipulated in a contract require the exercise of special
knowledge, genius, skill, taste, ability, experience, judgment, discretion, integrity, or other personal
qualification of one or both parties, the agreement is of a personal nature, and terminates on the death
of the party who is required to render such service."
● It has also been held that a good measure for determining whether a contract terminates upon the death
of one of the parties is whether it is of such a character that it may be performed by the promissor’s
personal representative. Contracts to perform personal acts which cannot be as well performed by
others are discharged by the death of the promissor. Conversely, where the service or act is of such a
character that it may as well be performed by another, or where the contract, by its terms, shows that
performance by others was contemplated, death does not terminate the contract or excuse
nonperformance.
● In the case at bar, there is no personal act required from the late Encarnacion Bartolome. Rather, the
obligation of Encarnacion in the contract to deliver possession of the subject property to petitioner
upon the exercise by the latter of its option to lease the same may very well be performed by her heir
Victor.
● As early as 1903, it was held that "(H)e who contracts does so for himself and his heirs." In 1952, it
was ruled that if the predecessor was duty-bound to reconvey land to another, and at his death the
reconveyance had not been made, the heirs could be compelled to execute the proper deed for
reconveyance. This was grounded upon the principle that heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of
a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property
subject to the liability affecting their common ancestor.
● It is futile for Victor to insist that he is not a party to the contract because of the clear provision of
Article 1311 of the Civil Code. Indeed, being an heir of Encarnacion, there is privity of interest
 between him and his deceased mother. He only succeeds to what rights his mother had and what is
valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against him.
● In the case at bar, the subject matter of the contract is likewise a lease, which is a property right. The
death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right, and the
rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,
nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in
the subject matter of the contract.
● Under both Article 1311 of the Civil Code and jurisprudence, therefore, Victor is bound by the
subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40849 and that of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
in Civil Case No. 3337-V-90 are both SET ASIDE and a new one rendered ordering private respondent Victor
Bartolome to:
a) surrender and deliver possession of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
V-14249 by way of lease to petitioner and to perform all obligations of his predecessor-in-interest,
Encarnacion Bartolome, under the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy;
b) surrender and deliver his copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 to respondent Register of
Deeds for registration and annotation thereon of the subject Contract of Lease with Option to Buy;
c) pay costs of suit.
Respondent Register of Deeds is, accordingly, ordered to register and annotate the subject Contract of Lease
with Option to Buy at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-14249 upon submission by petitioner of a
copy thereof to his office.
2. Emnace v. Court of Appeals
370 SCRA 431
SUMMARY: Emilio Emnace, Jacinto Divinagracia, and Vicente Tabanao formed a partnership. In 1986,
Jacinto decided to leave the partnership hence they agreed to dissolve the partnership and distribute the
properties among them. However, even after Vicente’s death in 1994, Emilio never rendered an accounting to
Vicente’s heirs and he failed to turn over his ⅓ share in the total of assets. Vicente’s heirs then filed an action
against Emnace for the accounting and payment of shares. Emnace argued, among others, that the heirs are
barred by prescription, and that they do not have the capacity to sue. His motion was denied by the lower court
and the CA. SC likewise did not give merit to his petition, remanding the case to RTC to conduct appropriate
proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.
Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides: The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his
legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership
continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Emilio Emnace was partners with Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia under Ma.
Nelma Fishing Industry.
● Jacinto withdrew from the partnership in January 1986, which led them to dissolve the partnership and
execute an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them.
● Among the assets to be distributed were five fishing boats, six vehicles, two parcels of land located and
cash deposits.
● Even after Vicente's demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Vicente's heirs any statement of
assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances.
● Petitioner also failed to honor his promise to turn over to Vicente's heirs the 1/3 share in the total assets
of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000, or the sum of P10,000,000, despite formal demand for
payment thereof.
● Vicente's heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares,
division of assets and damages.
● They prayed that the petitioner/defendant render the proper accounting of all the assets and liabilities
of the partnership, and to pay to the plaintiffs respondent/plaintiff no less than 1/3 of the assets,
properties, dividends, cash, land(s), fishing vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other forms and
substance of treasures which belong and/or should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the
partnership; no less than P200,000 as moral damages; and attorney's fees equivalent to 30% of the
entire award which may resolve the plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000 for every appearance in court.
● Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Vicente to sue.
● The trial court denied the motion to dismiss; the respondents then filed an amended complaint,
incorporating that petitioner be ordered to "sell all the partnership's assets and thereafter pay to the
plaintiffs" their corresponding share in the proceeds thereof.
● Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss, raising prescription as an additional ground
warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.
 ● The trial court denied the motion, ruling that prescription begins to run only upon the dissolution of the
partnership when the final accounting is done. Hence, the prescription has not been set in the absence
of a final accounting.
● Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but CA rendered the assailed
decision and dismissed the petition for certiorari.
● Petitioner then filed for an instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents have the capacity to sue.
RULING: YES
● Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she
was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
● SC ruled that the surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as such before she can file the action.
She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente.
● A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or
administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue.
● From his immediate death, his rights and claims, insofar as the partnership and against petitioner was
concerned, were transmitted to his heirs by operation of law, more particularly by succession, for rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
● Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente
died.
● As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any
action originally pertaining to the decedent. Therefore, they have the capacity to sue and seek the
court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and
the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, which is ORDERED to
determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount that plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct
said plaintiffs to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period has not yet expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in
Civil Case No. 416-C.
OTHER ISSUES:
1. WON the action for accounting has prescribed (NO)
● Petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription, arguing that respondents' action prescribed four years after it accrued in 1986.
● The SC found that prescription had not even begun to run in the absence of a final accounting.
● The three final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3) termination
● The partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal personality is retained, at which
time it completes the winding up of its affairs, including the partitioning and distribution of the net
partnership assets to the partners.
● For as long as the partnership exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the partnership's
business. Prescription of the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when
the final accounting is done.
● Article 1842 of the Civil Code provides: The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any
partner, or his legal representative as against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the
person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary.
● Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, the above-cited provision states that the right to demand
an accounting accrues at the date of dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary.
● When a final accounting is made, it is only then that the prescription begins to run.
● In the case at bar, no final accounting has been made, and that is precisely what respondents are
seeking in their action before the trial court, since petitioner has failed or refused to render an
accounting of the partnership's business and assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by prescription.
2. WON the action for accounting was filed in an improper venue. (NO)
● Petitioner insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a real action involving a parcel of
land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a quo.
● The records indubitably show that respondents are asking that the assets of the partnership be
accounted for, sold and distributed according to the agreement of the partners.
● The fact that two of the assets of the partnership are parcels of land does not materially change the
nature of the action. It is an action in personam because it is an action against a person, namely,
petitioner, on the basis of his personal liability.
● It is not an action in rem where the action is against the thing itself instead of against the person.
● This is settled in Claridades v. Mercader, et al. where the sale of the assets of the partnership did not
change the nature or character of the action, such sale being merely a necessary incident of the
liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of its process of dissolution.
● The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner but also enforcement of, and
petitioner's compliance with, the contract that the partners executed to formalize the partnership's
dissolution, as well as to implement the liquidation and partition of the partnership's assets.
● In fine, respondents' complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership
with damages is a personal action which may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties
reside.
● An action for accounting, payment of partnership shares, division of assets and damages is a personal
action which, under the Rules, may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter.
3. WON the proper docket fee was paid (NO)
● The lower court and CA having recognized that they see no attempt to cheat the courts on the part of
respondents and their evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is
inadequate is not an indication that they are trying to avoid paying the required amount, moved them to
declare that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the judgment award.
● Petitioner argued that they erred in condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing
the same to become a lien on the monetary or property judgment. The Court gave merit to this.
● The third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that: The legal fees shall be a
lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the pauper-litigant.
● Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it specifically applies to
pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are litigating as paupers, and
as such are exempted from the payment of court fees.
● The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which defines
the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable; and (2) those which cannot
be immediately ascertained as to the exact amount.
● This second class of claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally determined by the courts
based on evidence presented, falls squarely under the third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which
provides: In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance
with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may be.
● In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court pronounced that the above
provision "clearly contemplates an Initial payment of the filing fees corresponding to the estimated
amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be proved."
● The payment of filing fees cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an
initial payment of the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the
filing of the complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the judgment
later turn out to be adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs.
● In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, the Court held that when the specific claim
"has been left for the determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment and it shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee."
● The rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial payment of filing and docket fees based on the
estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only when there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted
on the judgment award until such additional fee is collected.
● Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright despite their
failure to pay the proper docket fees.
● Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to
secure a just and speedy disposition of an action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in
the proper amount should be adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly construed.
● In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester doctrine, allowing the
plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
● In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if
the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees
within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime.
● Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may
allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement,
the defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel.
In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the
plaintiff will be considered a lien or any award he may obtain in his favor.
3. Parulan vs. Garcia
G.R. No. 184148,
June 9, 2014
SUMMARY: In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, respondents Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang claimed ownership of a parcel of land
acquired from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, while petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B.
Calalang contested this ownership. The respondents argued that their father, Pedro Calalang, sold the land to
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan without their consent. However, the court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating that
succession rights are vested only at the time of death, according to Article 777 of the New Civil Code. As Pedro
Calalang's heirs only acquired their inheritances upon his death in 1989, they had no legal basis to challenge the
sale made prior to that time. The court emphasized that fraud must be proven with clear and convincing
evidence, which was not present in this case. Therefore, the Complaint for Annulment of Sale and
Reconveyance of Property was dismissed.
FACTS:
● In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed, the respondents Rosario
Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a
certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said
lot was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through
succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.
● According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this
marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
● On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who
then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it
was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for a free patent over the parcel of
land with the Bureau of Lands.
 ● On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
On December 27, 1989, Pedro Calalang died.
● The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 arguing that the sale of the land was void
because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co-owners of the
same.
ISSUE: WON the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by reason of the sale.
RULING:
● NO. It is a hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article
777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent." In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,we proclaimed the
fundamental tenets of succession:
● The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and
the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
● Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the
sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro
Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported
by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right
to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived them of their
respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere
preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. The Complaint for Annulment of Sale
and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21,
2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for Annulment of Sale
and Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Malolos,
Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
4. San Agustin vs. Court of Appeals
371 SCRA 348
SUMMARY: Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) sold to a certain Macaria Vda. de Caiquep a parcel
of residential land evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. The following encumbrance was annotated at the
back of the title, not to sell, convey, lease or sublease, or otherwise encumber the property. A day after the
issuance of TCT Macaria Vda. de Caiquep sold the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Said TCT was lost, but the private respondent subsequently obtained a
duplicate after judicial proceedings. Petitioner was not notified. Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of the private
respondent.
DOCTRINE:
● Pari Delicto; Estoppel; Where both parties are equally guilty, neither is entitled to complain against
the other - having entered into the transaction with open eyes, and having benefit from it, said
parties should be held in estoppel to assail and annul their own deliberate acts. - In the case of
Sarmiento vs. Salud, the Court held that “Even if the transaction between the original awardee and
herein petitioner were wrongful, still, as between themselves, the purchaser and the seller were both in
part delicto, being participes criminis as it were.” As in Sarmiento, in this case both were aware of the
existence of the stipulated condition in favor of the original seller, GSIS, yet both entered into an
agreement violating said condition and nullifying its effects. Similarly, as Acting Chief Justice JBL
Reyes concluded in Sarmiento, “Both parties being equally guilty, neither is entitled to complain
against the other. Having entered into the transaction with open eyes, and having benefited from it, said
parties should be held in estoppel to assail and annul their own deliberate acts.”
FACTS:
● On February 11, 1974, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was sold to a certain Macaria
Vda. de Caiquep, a parcel of residential land with an area of 168 square meters located in Rosario,
Pasig City. The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. On February 19, 1974, the Register of
Deeds of Rizal issued in the name of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
436465 with the encumbrance, among others, that vendee must not sell or lease the property within
five (5) years after full ownership over the said property is vested on the vendee.
● A day after the issuance of TCT No. 436465, or on February 20, 1974, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep sold
the subject lot to private respondent, Maximo Menez, Jr., as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
The said deed was lost when military men ransacked his house in Cainta, Rizal. Upon consulting a new
counsel, an Affidavit of Loss was filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig and a certified copy of TCT
No. 436465 was issued. Private respondent also declared the property for tax purposes and obtained a
certification thereof from the Assessor’s Office.
 ● Private respondent sent notices to the registered owner at her address appearing in the title and in the
Deed of Sale. With his counsel, he searched for the registered owner in Metro Manila and Rizal and as
far as Samar, Leyte, Calbayog City, Tacloban City, and in Eastern and Northern Samar. However, their
search proved futile.
● On July 8, 1992, private respondent filed a petition docketed as LRC Case No. R4659 with the RTC,
Branch 154, Pasig, Metro Manila for the issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 436465 to
replace the lost one. On September 18, 1992, there being no opposition, Menez presented his evidence
ex-parte. The trial court granted his petition in its decision dated September 30, 1992.
● On October 13, 1992, herein petitioner, Jesus San Agustin, received a copy of the trial court’s decision.
He claimed this was the first time he became aware of the case of her aunt, Macaria Vda. de Caiquep
who, according to him, died sometime in 1974. Claiming that he was the present occupant of the
property and the heir of Macaria, he filed his “Motion to Reopen Reconstitution Proceedings” on
October 27, 1992. On December 3, 1992, RTC issued an order denying said motion. Petitioner filed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals which was denied in its decision of May 19, 1995. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, but it was denied in a resolution dated September 11, 1995.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is correct in assailing the Deed of Sale between Macaria Vda. de
Caiquep and private respondent is null and void in accordance with Par.7 Art.1409 of the New Civil
Code.
RULING: NO.
● Petitioner’s contention is less than meritorious. In this case, the GSIS, the proper party, has not filed
any action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale between them and Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, nor for
the forfeiture of the lot in question. The contract of sale remains valid between the parties, unless and
until annulled in the proper suit filed by the rightful party, the GSIS. The said contract of sale is
binding upon the heirs of Macaria Vda. de Caiquep, including petitioner who alleges to be one of her
heirs, in line with the rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest. Since, both were aware of the existence of the stipulated condition in favor of
the original seller, GSIS, yet both entered into an agreement violating said condition and nullifying its
effects, said parties should be held in estoppel to assail and annul their own deliberate acts.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.
5. Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals
334 SCRA 522
June 29, 2000
SUMMARY: Aleja left a Will with a codicil attached to it, wherein she left the subject lot to Dr. Jorge, with the
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to Respondent Maria annually, else the lot will be seized by Maria and
given to Aleja’s near descendants. When Dr. Jorge died, Petitioner Johnny, his son, succeeded him. Maria filed a
complaint against Dr. Jorge’s heirs for noncompliance with the obligation to deliver to Maria. RTC dismissed
the complaint for being prematurely filed as no cause of action against the Rabadillas has as yet arose in favor
of Maria Marlena. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC ruling that evidence on record established Maria
Marlena's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually from the Rabadillas, which right was violated by the
Rabadillas' failure to comply with the terms of the Codicil. SC affirmed that Maria has the right to seize the lot
because Johnny Rabadilla , as Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s modal heir, inherited the obligation under the Codicil.
DOCTRINE: Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death.
FACTS:
● Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of Lot 1392 in Bacolod. The codicil was duly probated
and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental. The Codicil included the following:
- Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is instituted as devisee of the said property;
- Should Dr. Rabadilla die ahead of Belleza, said property shall be inherited by Dr. Rabadilla's chilren
and spouse;
- Once Dr. Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said property, he shall have the
obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza, 75 piculs of export
sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar (or 100 piculs of sugar in total) until the said Maria Marlena
Coscolluela y Belleza dies;
- Should Dr. Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give the subject property shall have the obligation
to still give yearly, 100 piculs of sugar as specified in the testament, to Maria Marlena Coscolluela y
Belleza on the month of December of each year;
- In the event that Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs shall later sell, lease, mortgage the subject property, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall also have the obligation to respect and deliver yearly 100 piculs of
sugar to Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of December until Maria Marlena shall
die; and
 - Should Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs or the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee of the said property fail to deliver
100 piculs of sugar to Maria Marlena, the latter shall immediately seize the property and turn it over to
Belleza's near descendant.
● Pursuant to the same Codicil. the property was transferred to Dr. Rabadilla, who subsequently died in
1983, leaving the property to his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia, and
Zenaida.
● In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint before the Bacolod RTC against the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla
to enforce the provisions of the Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the Rabadillas violated the
conditions of the Codicil:
- Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants
and sister of the testatrix.
- Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar (75
piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena from sugar crop years
1985 up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for
compliance.
- The banks failed to comply with the Codicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage
of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs
of sugar per crop year to Maria Marlena.
● Also, a memorandum of agreement to enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.
● The RTC dismissed the complaint for being prematurely filed as no cause of action against the
Rabadillas has as yet arose in favor of Maria Marlena.
● The CA reversed the decision of the RT ruling that evidence on record established Maria Marlena's
right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually from the Rabadillas, which right was violated by the
Rabadillas' failure to comply with the terms of the Codicil. Consequently, the subject property is seized
and ordered to be reconveyed back to the estate of Aleja Belleza to be distributed to her legal heirs.
ISSUES:
1.WON the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil are inherited by his heirs.
2. WON there was substitution and not a modal institution.
RULING:
1. YES.
● It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. The
legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower,
are compulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
● Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by
virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since
obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the
obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to
his compulsory heirs upon his death.
● In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the
condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent every year.
Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the
said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved
to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right
of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being
demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a
cause of action against petitioner.
2. NO.
● Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,or (2) leave
his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
● In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil
do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation,
the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to
shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
● Further, The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law
of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator,
or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir
or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspen . To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
 ● From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix
intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded that the
testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest to deliver one
hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the
effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is
clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the
testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is
evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however,
affecting the efficacy of such institution.
● Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon
the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was
the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.
FACTS:
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
6. Genato vs. Bayhon
G.R. No. 171035
August 24, 2009
SUMMARY: The loan in this case was contracted by respondent Bayhon. He died while the case was pending
before the Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his
estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first been
satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has been amply represented by the heirs
of the deceased, who are also his co-parties in the Civil Case.
DOCTRINE:
● As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. Article 1311, par.1 of the Civil
Code provides:
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he
received from the decedent.
● In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc.,26 the Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one)
expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
"ART. 774. — Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his
death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law."
"ART. 776. — The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death."27 (Emphasis supplied)
● The Court proceeded further to state the general rule: Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that
a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
● On October 18, 1990, respondents Benjamin M. Bayhon, Melanie Bayhon, Benjamin Bayhon Jr.,
Brenda Bayhon, Alina Bayhon-Campos, Irene Bayhon-Tolosa and the minor Gino Bayhon, as
represented by his mother Jesusita M. Bayhon, filed an action before the RTC. In their Complaint,
respondents sought the declaration of nullity of a dacion en pago allegedly executed by respondent
Benjamin Bayhon in favor of petitioner William Ong Genato.
● Respondent Benjamin Bayhon alleged that he obtained from the petitioner a loan amounting and that to
cover the loan, he executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the property. However, the execution
of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was conditioned upon the personal assurance of the petitioner that
the said instrument is only a private memorandum of indebtedness and that it would neither be
notarized nor enforced according to its tenor.
● Respondent further alleged that he filed a separate proceeding for the reconstitution of the TCT of the
property before the RTC. Petitioner William Ong Genato filed an Answer in Intervention in the said
proceeding and attached a copy of an alleged dacion en pago covering said lot. Respondent assailed the
dacion en pago as a forgery alleging that neither he nor his wife, who had died 3 years earlier, had
executed it.
● In his Answer, petitioner Genato denied the claim of the respondent regarding the death of the latter’s
wife. He alleged that on the date that the real estate mortgage was to be signed, respondent introduced
to him a woman as his wife. He alleged that the respondent signed the dacion en pago and that the
execution of the instrument was above-board.
● Meanwhile, petitioner William Ong Genato filed a separate Civil Case for specific performance, before
the RTC. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent obtained a loan from him and that
respondent failed to pay the loan and executed a dacion en pago in favor of the petitioner. The dacion
en pago was inscribed and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
 ● The two cases were consolidated. RTC found that respondent obtained a loan in the amount of PhP
1,000,000.00 from the petitioner. The trial court likewise found that at the time of the execution of the
real estate mortgage, the wife of respondent, Amparo Mercado, was already dead. It held that the
property covered by TCT No. 38052 was owned in common by the respondents and not by respondent
Benjamin Bayhon alone. It concluded that the said lot could not have been validly mortgaged by the
respondent alone; the deed of mortgage was not enforceable and only served as evidence of the
obligation of the respondent.
● The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that the
real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were both void. The appellate court ruled that at the time
the real estate mortgage and the dacion en pago were executed, the wife of respondent Benjamin
Bayhon was already dead. Thus, she could not have participated in the execution of the two
documents. The Court of Appeals held further that while the principal obligation is valid, the death of
respondent Benjamin Bayhon extinguished it. The heirs could not be ordered to pay the debts left by
the deceased.
● Petitioner now comes before this Court assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/S: WON the obligation was transmissible to the heirs of the deceased and the CA erred in ruling
that the liability of the respondents were extinguished by the death of Benjamin Bayhon?
RULING: YES.
● As a general rule, obligations derived from a contract are transmissible. In Estate of Hemady v. Luzon
Surety Co., Inc., the Court, through Justice JBL Reyes, held:
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact
that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations.
Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one)
expressly so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.
● The Court proceeded further to state the general rule:
Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
"depersonalization" of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco,
has characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from
person to person, the obligation has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with
the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where the
obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its
performance by a specific person and by no other. The transition is marked by the
disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.
● The loan in this case was contracted by respondent. He died while the case was pending before the
Court of Appeals. While he may no longer be compelled to pay the loan, the debt subsists against his
estate. No property or portion of the inheritance may be transmitted to his heirs unless the debt has first
been satisfied. Notably, throughout the appellate stage of this case, the estate has been amply
represented by the heirs of the deceased, who are also his co-parties in the Civil Case.
FALLO: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 16, 2005 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the obligation to pay the principal loan and interest contracted by the deceased
Benjamin Bayhon subsists against his estate and is computed at PhP 3,050,682.00.
7. Dr. Nixon L. Treyes vs. Antonio L. Larlar, et. al.
G.R. No. 232579
September 8, 2020
SUMMARY:
Rosie Larlar-Treyes, wife of the petitioner Dr. Treyes passed away, without a will leaving behind several real
estate that she and her husband acquired as part of their conjugal property. The spouses have no children but
Rosie have 7 siblings. Sometime after her death the respondents (siblings of Rosie) found out that petitioner
Treyes filed an affidavit of Self-Adjudication on the property and transferred the titles under his name claiming
that he is the sole heir of the decedent. The respondents filed a case against Treyes before the court praying for
nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the cancellation of the TCTs issued in favor to the petitioner. In
his defense the petitioner contended that the case be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction stating that the respondent
need to prove their status as legitimate heir to the decedent in a special proceeding before an ordinary civil
procedure filed by the respondent may proceed.
(issue) WoN the respondent are required to have special proceedings for declaration determining the legal status
of an heir to the decedent before they file an ordinary civil case seeking for the protection of their right as an
heir.
(Ruling) No, article 777 provides that the right for succession is transmitted at the moment of death of the
decedent. Since it has been proven that the respondent are brothers and sister to the decedent they are not
required to have a special proceeding since the purpose of their complaint is to protect their successional rights
that was transmitted to them as legal heirs by operation of law upon the death of the decedent.
FACTS:
● Sometime on May 1, 2008 Rosie Larlar-Treyes, wife of the petitioner Dr. Nixon Treyes passed away
without any will. The couple had no children but Rosie left behind seven siblings, (respondents
Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy and Yvonne.)
● At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties in various location in the county
which she owned together with the petitioner as their conjugal property.
● Subsequently, petitioner Treyes filed two affidavits of Self-adjudication on the properties and
transferred the said properties onto himself claiming that he is the sole heir of his deceased spouse.
● Allegedly the respondents sent a couple of letters on two separate occasions addressed to Dr. Trayes
requesting for a conference to discuss the settlement of the estate of their deceased sister but they did
not receive any response form the latter.
● Sometime on 2012 the respondents found out that some of the properties of Rosie and Dr. Treyes was
already canceled and the new title was already issued the name of the petitioner on the basis of the
Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.
● Hence, the respondents filed a complaint before the RTC alleging the following:
1. Petitioner Treyes had fraudulently caused the transfer of the subject property to himself by executing
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and refuse to reconvey the share of the respondents being Brothers and
Sister and legal heirs to the deceased. Therefore, asking for the nullity of the said Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication.
2. The respondents also prayed for the cancellation of the TCTs issued in favor of the petitioner;
3. Reconveyance of the private respondents of their successional share in the estate of Rosie;
4. Partition of the said estate; and
5. Damages against the petitioner.
● Petitioner Treyes through his counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss the respondent’s complaint on the
following grounds;
1. Improper Venue;
2. Prescription; and
3. Lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter.
● The in its order ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint’s third cause of action
(partition of the estate). However, the court has jurisdiction over the first, second and fourth causes.
● Unsatisfied, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to reconsider the Resolution and to defer filing of
answer.
● In response the respondent filed their Opposition to the Omnibus Motion of Treyes to which the latter
responded with his Reply.
● In its order, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion and ordered petitioner Trayes to file his responsive
pleading within 15 days.
● Petitioner Treyes then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with urgent prayer for
an issuance of TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asserting that the RTC’s denial of his Motion to
Dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
● The CA then denied his motion stating that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner Trayes’ motion to dismiss. Since the complaint primarily seeks to annul the
petitioner’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, CA also held that since the case was and ordinary civil
action RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the private respondent’s complaint. The court also held
that the case is not barred with prescription.
● Treyes filed a petition for reconsideration which was subsequently denied by the CA.
● Petitioner Treyes' Petition – that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the subject matter
of the private respondents' Complaint because the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a
separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property instituted by the legal heirs.
ISSUE: WON a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir in a separate special
proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement of
ownership rights given by the law of succession.
RULING: NO
● The judicial determination of a status as a legal and compulsory heir is not prerequisite to an ordinary
civil action seeking for the protection and enforcement successional right of the heir.
● In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed by the private
respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination of their status as heirs, as it was
their position that their status as heirs was already established without the need of any judicial
confirmation.
● The complaint alleges that the private respondents’ right over the subject properties by virtue of their
being sibling to the deceased.
● Article 1001 of the civil code provides that brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brother and sisters
or their children to the other half.
● Hence, the main point of differentiation between a civil action and special proceedings is that in the
former, a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right which the party claims he/she
is entitled to.
● Applying the foregoing to ordinary civil action for the cancellation of a deed or instrument and
reconveyance of property on the basis of relationship with the decedent, the respondents does not
really seek to establish their rights as an heir, in truth they seek the enforcement of their rights brought
about for them being an heir by operations of law.
● Article 777 of the civil code states that; the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent. Therefore, the heirs had deemed to have acquired ownership of his/her share
from the moment of the death of the decedent.
● Hence, the court held that the title or rights to the deceased person’s property are immediately passed
to the heirs upon death.
● In the case of Bonilla vs Barcena, the court held that; form the moment of death of the decedent the
 heirs become absolute owner of his property subject to the rights and obligation, the rights of the heirs
to the property of the deceased vest in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs to the
testate or intestate proceedings.
● The court further states that a prior declaration of heirship in a special proceeding should not be
required before an heir may assert successional rights in an ordinary civil action aimed only to protect
his or her interests in the estate. Indeed, the legal heirs of a decedent should not be rendered helpless to
rightfully protect their interests in the estate while there is yet no special proceeding. The successional
rights of the legal heirs of Rosie are not merely contingent or expectant they vest upon the death of the
decedent. By being legal heirs, they are entitled to institute an action to protect their ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession and are thus real parties in interest in the instant case.
● As viewed by Justice Bernabe, the more recent strands of jurisprudence correctly recognized that the
legal effect of Article 777 of the Civil Code, and thus adequately provided for remedies for the heirs to
protect their successional right over the estate of the decedent even prior to the institution of a special
proceedings for its settlement.
● Accordingly, the rule laid down in Ypon, Yaptinchay, Portugal, Reyes, Heirs of Gabatan v. Court of
Appeals, and other similar cases, which requires a prior determination of heirship in a separate special
proceeding as a prerequisite before one can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession, is abandoned.
● Henceforth, the rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's
estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an
ordinary civil action to declare the nullity of a deed or instrument, and for recovery of property, or any
other action in the enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of succession, without the
necessity of a prior and separate judicial declaration of their status as such.
● Therefore, the Court is in total agreement with the CA that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner Treyes' second Motion to
Dismiss.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
hereby Denied
II-A. Testamentary Successions
1. IN RE: Testate Estate of Edward Christensen vs. Helen Christensen Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
SUMMARY: Edward, a citizen of California but domiciled in the Philippines, executed a will which states that
aside from a sum of 3,600 given to Helen, the remainder of his properties shall be given to his only named
daughter, Lucy. The executor made a partition plan in accordance to the provisions of the will but was opposed
by Helen stating that it deprived her of her legitime given that she was already acknowledged as a natural child
of Edward in a separate case. The lower court approved the partition, ruling that the will shall be governed by
California law, which allows a testator to dispose of his property as he sees fit. WON the lower court erred in its
decision. YES. If the conflict rules under the national law of the deceased refer the matter to the law of the
domicile and the foreigner was domiciled in the Philippines at the moment of death, our courts will have to
apply the Philippine internal law on succession. Article 946 of the Civil Code of California states that “personal
property is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.” The case was
remanded to the lower court and ordered the partition plan be made in accordance with Philippine laws on
succession.
DOCTRINE: General rule on the Nationality Principle: the national law of the decedent, that is, the law of his
country or nationality, regardless of the place of execution or the place of death, shall govern. Exemption: When
the conflict rules under the national law of the deceased refer the matter to the law of the domicile AND the
foreigner was domiciled in the Philippines at the moment of death, our courts will have to apply the Philippine
internal law on succession.
FACTS:
● Edward E. Christensen (Edward), born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine
years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for
short visits. Edward executed a will in Manila containing the following provisions:
○ Declaring Maria Lucy Chritensen (Lucy), his named daughter, as his only descendant.
○ Bequeathing unto Maria Helen Christensen (Helen) the sum of three thousand six hundred
pesos while declaring that “notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not
in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me.”
○ That all the remaining properties are to be given to his only named daughter, Lucy.
● In accordance with the will, the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the
payment of only P3,600 to Helen and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his
daughter, Lucy.
● Helen opposed insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, having been
declared in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward.
● The Court of First Instance approved the final accounts stating that the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions of Edward’s will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance
with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of
absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable. Helen, through counsel, filed various
motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S: WON the lower court erred in failing to recognize that under international law, particularly
under the renvoi doctrine, the intrinsic validity of the testamentary disposition of the distribution of the
estate of the deceased should be governed by the laws of the philippines.
RULING: YES.
● There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death. Hence, The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, “Real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.”
● The lower court cited that the "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above can refer
to no other than the private law of the State of California wherein under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires.
● Helen, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
“If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.” should be applicable, and
in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which
is the Philippines.
● The Supreme Court held that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while
the rule relied upon by the lower court is its internal law. The laws of California have prescribed two
sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Hence, Article 946 should apply to such citizens who are not domiciled in California but
in other jurisdictions.
● Following the Doctrine of the Renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in
question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile. As in this case, the conflict of
laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back to the case, when a decedent is
not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed,
with costs against appellees.
2. Labrador vs. CA
184 SCRA 170
April 5, 1990
SUMMARY:
Melecio Labrador died, leaving behind a parcel of land which was partitioned among his nine heirs through a
holographic will. Sagrado, one of his heirs, filed a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of
Melecio Labrador. However, Jesus and Gaudencio, also heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition
on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law alleging therein that before
Melecio’s death, he executed a deed of absolute sale, selling, transferring, and conveying in favor of Jesus and
Gaudencio, the parcel of land. The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and
void the Deed of Absolute Sale. On appeal, CA denied probate on the ground that it was undated.
DOCTRINE: Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
FACTS:
● On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died, leaving a parcel of land which was partitioned among his
nine heirs through a holographic will.
● In July 1975, Sagrado Labrador, one of his heirs, filed in court a petition for the probate of the alleged
holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
● Subsequently, Jesus Labrador and Gaudencio Labrador, filed an opposition to the petition on the
ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on
Sept. 1971, before Melecio’s death, testator Melecio executed a deed of absolute sale selling,
transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio.
● Sagrado thereupon filed against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported
Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise
from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will, being premised on the fact that the
aforesaid Deed of Absolute sale if fictitious.
● The trial court allowed the probate of the holographic will and declared null and void the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
● On appeal, CA denied probate on the ground that it was undated.
ISSUE: WON the alleged holographic will of Melecio Labrador is dated.
RULING:
● ·Yes. The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article
810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:
 ■ And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said
fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this writing is none other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
● The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.
● The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of
the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by the petitioner, the will was not an agreement
but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The
act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to
be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be
disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his
estate.
FALLO: PREMISES CONSIDERED; the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby
REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private
respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). SO
ORDERED.
3. IN RE: WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE DECEASED REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL,
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
Validity of a will is to be judged by the law enforced at the time the instrument was executed.
FACTS:
● On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document
purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked Exhibit "A. He left properties estimated at
P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its
probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate
of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
● During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without
contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in
longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on
he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his
writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
● The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will; that it was in the
handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's
death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when
the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force. Said trial court admitted to probate
Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing
from that decision ; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified
to us by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Should the will be admitted to probate?
RULING: No.
● The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides that a person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated and signed by the testator himself and
need not be witnessed. It is a fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and
at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the law at the
time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering correlatively each
page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three
attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back pages
of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by the testator and were not
numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were signed only by the testator. Failure of the testator
and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page is radical and totally vitiates the
testament.
● The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time
the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at
the time the instrument was executed. Although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or
bequest then becomes a completed act.
● However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title
of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause of
the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution
of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon
 his death he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate. The general rule is that the
Legislature cannot validate void wills.
FALLO: In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is denied probate.
4. Miciano vs. Brimo
50 Phis 867
FACTS
● Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial
administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo‘s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts
into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo‘s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition.
RULING
● Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the
disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the
testator‘s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code.Though the last
part of the second clause of the will expressly said that ―it be made and disposed of in accordance
with the laws in force in the Philippine Islandǁ, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
● Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law
of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
● The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as
to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
5. Bellis vs. Bellis
20 SCRA 358
RECIT-READY CASE SUMMARY: (F) The testator, Amos G. Ellis executed a will in the Philippines
despite being a foreign national. Upon his death, the assigned executor of the will distributed his remaining
estate accordingly but was opposed by some of his illegitimate children. (I) WON the Philippine laws, insofar
as testamentary succession is concerned, is applicable. (R) NO, a will observing Philippine laws instead of the
national law of the testator is void, being contrary to Article 16 of the New Civil Code.
FACTS:
● Amos G. Ellis was born and is a resident of Texas, USA. He was married to Mary E. Mallen, as his
first wife, whom he divorced. They had five legitimate children, namely: (1) Edward A. Bellis, (2)
Henry A. Bellis, (3) Alexander Bellis, (4) Anna Bellis Allsman, and (5) George Bellis (who died in
infancy).
● In addition, by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, he had three legitimate children, namely: (6) Edwin
G. Bellis, (7) Walter S. Bellis, and (8) Dorothy Bellis.
● Finally, he had three illegitimate children, namely: (9) Amos Bellis Jr., (10) Maria Cristina Bellis, and
(11) Miriam Palma Bellis.
● In August 1952, Amos G. Ellis executed a will in the Philippines, stating therein that his estate shall
be distributed in the following order and manner:
(a) $240,000.00 to his 1st wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each; and
(c) after the two conditions have been met, the remainder shall be distributed among his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives in equal shares.
● As a result of Amos G. Ellis's death in July 1958, while being a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA,
his will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila in September 1958.
● Subsequently, according to his will, the assigned executor of the will The People’s Bank and Trust
Company, distributed $240,000.00, in the form of shares, to Mary E. Mallen; and the total amount of
P120,000.00 distributed equally, or P40,000.00 each among the illegitimate children, Amos Bellis Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palama Bellis.
● The remaining estate was divided into seven equal portions for the benefit of the seven legitimate
children by the testator’s first and second marriage as project partition by the said executor according
to the will.
● Dissatisfied, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palama Bellis opposed the said project partition,
arguing that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children as heirs of the deceased
which was later denied by the lower court and further approving the executor’s project partition based
on Art. 16 of the Civil Code observing the national law of the decedent, which in this case the Texas
law, further which did not provide for legitimes.
● Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the Philippine law, insofar as testamentary succession is concerned, is applicable in this case.
RULING: NO, the Philippine law is not applicable.
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctr ine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the
decedent is a national of one country and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent
was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So, even assuming that Texas has a
conflict rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflict rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the Philippines. ● Dr. Jose executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife “all the remainder” of his real and
personal property at the time of his death “wheresoever situated”. In the event he would survive his
Same; Foreign laws.— In the absence of proof as to the conflict rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
same as our local conflict rule.
as trustee. Four days later, Dr. Evelyn executed her own last will and testament, containing the same
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeed— The decedent's national law governs provisions as that of her husband.
the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, and
the capacity to succeed. ● On January 9, 1982, Dr. Jose and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted
their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.— Whatever public policy and good customs may proceedings for the probate thereof in the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. The
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
foreign nationals. It has specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
● On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn, filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be governed by law other Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York.
than his national law is void.— A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in She also asked that she be appointed as special administratix of the estate of the deceased couple
accordance with Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to Article 16 consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan to which was granted.
of the New Civil Code.
● The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose opposed and asked to be notified of the proceedings as heirs of Dr.
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to the estate of a citizen of Texas.— Where the decedent was a
Jose F. Cunanan. But their status as heirs were disputed by Salud, who said that they were only
citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot
be applied to the succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the collaterals and not heirs as “heirship is only by institution” under a will or by operation of the law of
decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law. New York. Since the will of Dr. Jose provided a presumption that he predeceased his wife, his estate
passed on to his wife, Dr. Evelyn. Salud, being the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn, thus inherited the estate of
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the order of the probate court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the Cunanan spouses.
appellants. SO ORDERED.
● RTC issued an order disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner
6. Perez vs. Tolete
as special administratix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received
232 SCRA 722
by her as special administratix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. The RTC Judge
June 2, 1994
reasoned out that the petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of
wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of
DOCTRINE:
New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign
country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or
ISSUE: WON the two wills can be probated in the Philippines?
in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
RULING:
FACTS:
● No. because Salud Perez failed to submit all the necessary evidence for the reprobate of the will.
● Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who both became American citizens,
established a successful medical practice in New York, USA.
 ● The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
● Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.
● The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of
the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2)
the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the
laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for the first and last
requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
● The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country
is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
● While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules on evidence,
the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan
spouses.
7. Ajero vs. C.A.
G.R. No. 106720
September 15, 1994
SUMMARY: Petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time
of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and
was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. It contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent. The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. On
appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of the decedent's will was dismissed. The Court
of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." Issue: WON
non-compliance of Articles 813 and 814 of the Civil Code will result to the disallowance of the probate
proceedings. The SC ruled that this is erroneous. Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement
affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
DOCTRINE: Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate
FACTS:
● Petitioners instituted for allowance of decedent's holographic will.
● They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
● Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that:
○ Neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting;
○ It contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and,
○ The will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
● The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
● Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate.
○ No evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix.
○ The only objections raised by the oppositors are that the will was not written in the
handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not
to the question of identity of will.
○ Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound
mind when the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix.
○ The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate.
● On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed.
The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity."
ISSUE: WON non-compliance of Articles 813 and 814 of the Civil Code will result to the disallowance of the
probate proceedings.
RULING:
● NO.
● In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.
● Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
 ○ Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without
being dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
○ Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the
testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.
● In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the
New Civil Code, thus:
○ A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
● Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that
is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
● A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign
and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
● Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
● Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
FALLO: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the
invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting
to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification
as regards the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
8. Kalaw vs.Hon. Judge Benjamin Relova
G.R. No. L-40207
September 28, 1984
Facts:
● On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his
deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
However, the holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her
sole heir.
● On November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that the
holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by
the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:" Art. 814. In
case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full signature."
● ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated so
that she could be the sole heir thereunder.
● After trial, respondent Judge denied probate, finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in the
will was not authenticated by the full signature of the testator. Gregorio moved for reconsideration
arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were made by the testatrix, the denial to probate of
her holographic Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was
denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being
clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity for interpretation." This order at the same time denied the
probate proceeding of Rosa R Kalaw.
● Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be
probated or not, with her as sole heir.
RULING: YES
● The will is voided by the Trial court. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, x x the Will
is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.
● However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire
Willis voided or re
● fvoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind
of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it
in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
9. Alsua-Betts et. al. vs. CA
L-46430-31
July 30, 1979
SUMMARY: In 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and Doña Florentina Rella agreed on the extrajudicial partition of their
conjugal properties, specifying allocations for their children. In 1955, they executed holographic wills,
confirming the 1949 partition. However, Don Jesus canceled his holographic will in 1959 and created a new
notarial will in 1960. Disputes arose after his death in 1964, questioning mental capacity and compliance with
previous agreements.
The court dismissed the argument of estoppel in probate proceedings, emphasizing the public interest in
discovering the truth. It affirmed the trial court's findings that Don Jesus's will was duly executed, revoked the
1949 partition, and declared it null and void. The court concluded that the last will redistributed the estate,
preserving the legitimes of forced heirs. Claims of mental incapacity were rejected, as Don Jesus actively
participated in creating the will and demonstrated sound mind. In summary, the court upheld the probate of Don
Jesus's will, nullified the prior extrajudicial partition, validated contested property sales, and reinstated the
decision of the Court of First Instance.
FACTS:
● Don Jesus Alsua and Doña Florentina Rella agreed on the extrajudicial partition of their conjugal
properties in 1949, detailing allocations for their living children. The agreement included a
comprehensive inventory and provisions for future claims, legitimate shares, and penalties for
challenging it.
● In 1955, Don Jesus and Doña Florentina executed holographic wills, distributing conjugal assets.
Mutual codicils in 1956 confirmed the 1949 partition. Doña Tinay appointed Don Jesus as executor,
aligning with equal distribution among their children.
● Don Jesus canceled his holographic will in 1959, creating a new notarial will in 1960. It revoke
previous wills, collated properties from the 1949 partition, and designated Francisca as executrix,
outlining specific distributions and beneficiaries.
● After Don Jesus's death in 1964, Francisca filed for probate of the new will. Oppositions arose,
questioning mental capacity, alleging duress, and asserting non-compliance with previous agreements.
● Disputes emerged over the estate inventory, with oppositors contesting the inclusion of certain
properties allegedly bequeathed to Pablo and Francisca. Civil Case No. 3068 was filed to annul deeds,
jointly heard with probate proceedings.
● The Court of First Instance approved the will and validated sales. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed, denying probate and nullifying sales. The petitioner challenges this decision on errors,
including estoppel and Don Jesus's alleged inability to revoke his previous will. The legal issue centers
on the validity of the probate court's approval and the Court of Appeals' decision.
ISSUE: WON the 1959 will executed by Don Jesus revoking his prior 1949 will is valid?
RULING:
● The court dismissed the argument of estoppel, stating it's not applicable in probate proceedings.
Estoppel was considered insignificant in questioning Don Jesus's competency to execute his will.
● The court highlighted that probate proceedings serve public interest, and applying estoppel could
hinder the discovery of truth. The duty of the court in probate cases is to fulfill the deceased's wishes in
the disposition of their property upon death.
● The court accepted the trial court's findings that Don Jesus's will was duly executed, complying with
legal requirements.
● The court declared a 1949 extrajudicial partition null and void, emphasizing that Don Jesus was not
bound by it. It clarified that the partition constituted a donation inter vivos, not a valid contract.
● Don Jesus's last will explicitly revoked his previous holographic will and codicil. It included
provisions for collating properties donated in a 1949 deed and distributed the remaining estate among
his children.
● The court presumed that Don Jesus intended not to revoke the donations in the 1949 deed but to
redistribute his remaining estate, leaving the legitimes of forced heirs unimpaired. Claims of Don
Jesus's mental incapacity were dismissed. The court emphasized that testamentary capacity is
determined at the time of making the will and found Don Jesus of sound mind during its execution.
● Don Jesus actively participated in creating his will, gave detailed instructions, corrected drafts, and
displayed a clear understanding of his actions and the implications of his will.
● In summary, court affirmed the probate of Don Jesus's will, nullified a prior extrajudicial partition,
upheld the validity of contested property sales, and rejected claims of mental incapacity, emphasizing
adherence to legal requirements and the fulfillment of the deceased's intentions.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside.
The decision of the Court of First Instance Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is
hereby reinstated, with costs against respondents.
10. Dacanay vs. Florendo
87 Phil 324
Dacanay v Florendo
Summary: The court dismisses the probate of a joint and reciprocal will executed by spouses, ruling that
it violates the prohibition stated in article 669 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
● The case involves a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance of La Union to probate a joint and
reciprocal will executed by the spouses Isabel V. Florendo and Tirso Dacanay on October 20, 1940.
● After the death of Isabel V. Florendo, Tirso Dacanay, the surviving spouse, seeks to probate the joint
and reciprocal will.
● The will states that whoever of the spouses survives the other shall inherit all the properties of the
deceased spouse, with an agreement on how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case
of their demise.
 ● The relatives of Isabel V. Florendo oppose the probate of the will on various statutory grounds.
Issue: Whether or not the joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses can be probated, considering the
prohibition stated in article 669 of the Civil Code.
Ruling:
● The court affirms the dismissal of the joint and reciprocal will.
● The court rules that the will violates article 669 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the expression of
wills by two or more testators in a single document and by one act.
● The court explains that the provision of article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force and not unwise.
● The court considers the wisdom of the provision and the fact that it has not been expressly repealed.
● The court notes that the provisions of article 669 are not incompatible with those of other cases, such
as the In re Will of Bilbao.
● Therefore, the court concludes that the joint and reciprocal will executed by the spouses cannot be
probated due to the prohibition stated in article 669.
11. De la Cerna, et. al. vs. Potot, et. al.
G.R. No. L-20234
December 23, 1964
Summary: The case involves a joint will executed by spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca on
May 9, 1939. The will stated that their two parcels of land, acquired during their marriage, would be given to
their niece Manuela Rebaca upon their death. The will also stated that while either of the testators was still
alive, they would continue to enjoy the fruits of the land. Bernabe de la Cerna died on August 30, 1939, and the
will was submitted for probate by Gervasia and Manuela. The Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted the will
to probate in 1939, despite the fact that joint wills were already prohibited by law at that time.
Doctrine: Article 818 of the Civil Code states that: Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the
same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
FACTS
● The spouses Bernabe Dela Cerna and Gerasisa Rebaca executed a joint will where they gave two (2)
parcels of land to Manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
● When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
● Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in 1952 but due
to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in 1954.
● The Court of First Instance held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law.
● While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of
probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
● However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by the use, and the same has continued to be used; and
when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final
order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the
provisions thereof that are not contrary to law,
● Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree
admitting his will to probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in reversing the order of the Court of First Instance that
the joint testament by the spouses is null and void
RULING: Yes
● Joint wills are considered separate wills of each testator and are prohibited by law.
● Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous, however, because it was probated by a court of
competent jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of
a will is binding upon the whole world.
● However, this is only with respect to the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife;
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.
● The joint will, insofar as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamined and adjudicated de novo
upon her death.
● The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir.
● Thus, as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.
● A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and the formal validity of the will subject to
such probate.
● The estate of the wife should pass to her intestate heirs upon her death, unless another valid will is shown to
exist in favor of the testamentary heirs or unless the testamentary heir is the only intestate heir of the wife.
FALLO: WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
23763-R is affirmed. No Costs.
12. Palaganas, et. al. vs. Palaganas
G.R. No. 169144
January 26, 2011
SUMMARY: Ruperta is a former Filipino (now American) who executed a will designating her brother Sergio
as the executor of her will. Ernesto, another brother, filed a petition with the RTC for the probate of her will and
for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. Ruperta’s nephews opposed stating that Ruperta is a
foreigner and thus her will should not be probated in the PH, but in the US where it was executed. The Court
ruled that the will of an alien who is abroad may be probated in the PH.
DOCTRINE: The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country.
FACTS:
● Ruperta Palaganas is a Filipino who became a naturalized American citizen. She died single and
childless and consequently executed a will in California designating her brother, Sergio, as the
executor of her will for she had left properties in the PH and in the US.
● Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate
of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate.
● However, Maniel and Benjamin, Ruperta’s nephews, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s
will should not be probated in the PH but in the US where she executed it. They added that, assuming
her will could be probated in the PH, it would still be invalid for having been executed under duress
and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. They further claimed that
Ernesto is not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
● The RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
● Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has
not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.
RULING: YES
● Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not
as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction.
● Art. 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
● [procedural aspect, included in case asked] Sec, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he
has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate.
● Sec. 1 and 2, Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or
destroyed.
● Wherefore, the Court denies the petition and affirms the CA decision. So ordered.
13. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868
June 8, 2006
SUMMARY:
This case involves the distribution of the estate of Audrey O'Neill Guersey, an American citizen who resided in
the Philippines. Audrey's will bequeathed her entire estate to her husband, Richard Guersey. Richard later
married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon and had two children with her.
After Richard's death, a dispute arose regarding the distribution of Audrey's estate. The trial court approved a
project of partition that divided the estate between Richard and their adopted daughter, Kyle. However, the
Court of Appeals annulled the trial court's orders, ruling that the estate should have been distributed according
to the laws of the state of Maryland, where Audrey was domiciled. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE: Settlement of Estate; Decree of Distribution; Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any
other judgment in rem.—A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of
the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730 (1951), the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
FACTS:
● Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle).
Audrey died in 1979. She left a will wherein she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard consisting of
Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate improvements at Forbes Park, current account with cash balance
and shares of stock in A/G Interiors.
● Two years after her death, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. Four years thereafter,
Richard died and left a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his shares
in A/G, which he left to his adopted daughter.
● Petitioner, as ancillary administrator in the court where Audrey’s will was admitted to probate, filed a
motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of partition of Audrey’s estate.
The motion and project of partition were granted. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator with regards
to Richard’s will also filed a project of partition, leaving 2/5 of Richard’s undivided interest in the
Forbes property was allocated to respondent Candelaria, while 3/5 thereof was allocated to their three
children.
● Respondent opposed on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, where Richard was a
native of, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject to the
legacy. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the decree of distribution may still be annulled under the circumstances.

RULING: YES.
● A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous, may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud.
● Further, in Ramon vs Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
● Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to
the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Hence, the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, must be upheld.
● While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration
of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud.
Defendant Ancheta’s omission to prove the national law of the decedent and to follow the latter’s last
will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject orders without a fair submission of
the real issues involved in the case..
● Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, wrote:
“A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect
in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word
of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the
instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the
law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in
favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said.”
● Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail over
Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect
in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
14. Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
268 SCRA 640
February 24, 1997
RECIT-READY CASE SUMMARY: Being then 94 years of age, Carmen Cañiza was declared incompetent
by judgment of the RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. The latter
was appointed as the legal guardian of her person and estate. Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot in
Quezon City. In relation thereto, she through her Evangelista commenced a suit to eject spouses Pedro and
Leonora Estrada from said premises. In the complaint, it was alleged that Cañiza was the absolute owner of the
property in question and that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses to temporarily reside in her
house, rent-free. In the answer, the respondents declared that in consideration of their faithful service, they had
been considered by Cañiza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will where she
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question. The MTC ruled in favor of Cañiza. The RTC,
however, reversed this decision. The CA upheld the RTC decision. In so ruling, it said that while said will,
unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of respondents' claim to the
property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Cañiza that respondents are to continue in their
occupancy and possession so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in
her guardian the right or authority to drive the respondents out. To this, Caniza alleges error on the part of the
CA for relying on a xerox copy of an alleged holographic will which is irrelevant to this case.
DOCTRINE: A will is essentially ambulatory—at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or
revoked, and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder; An
owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance is not inconsistent
with the former’s taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
FACTS:
● On November 20, 1989, being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Cañiza, a spinster, a retired
pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the
Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
107, in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged
because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
● Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot at No. 61 Tobias St., Quezon City. On September 17, 1990, her
guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MetroTC) of Quezon City
(Branch 35) to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint was later
amended to identify the incompetent Cañiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo
Evangelista.
● The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in
question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their
children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already
had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised
to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza
had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that
 "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they . .
(were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they . . (were) saving money
by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent . . (was) losing much money as her house could not
be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of of
first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
● In their Answer with Counterclaim, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house
since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her
own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will on September 4, 1988 by which she
"bequeathed" to the Estradas the house and lot in question.
● Judgment was rendered by the MetroTC on April 13, 1992 in Cañiza's favor, the Estradas being ordered to
vacate the premises and pay Cañiza P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
● But on appeal, the decision was reversed by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 96. By
judgment rendered on October 21, 1992, the RTC held that the "action by which the issue of defendants'
possession should be resolved is accion publiciana, the obtaining factual and legal situation . . demanding
adjudication by such plenary action for recovery of possession cognizable in the first instance by the
Regional Trial Court."
● Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of October 21, 1992, but failed in that
attempt. In a decision promulgated on June 2, 1993, the Appellate Court affirmed the RTC's judgment in
toto. It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an
accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere
tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza," as
evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and
until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, . .
it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency can not be
said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out."
● Through her guardian, Cañiza came to this Court praying for reversal of the Appellate Court's judgment.
She contends in the main that the latter erred in (a) holding that she should have pursued an accion
publiciana, and not an accion interdictal; and in (b) giving much weight to "a xerox copy of an alleged
holographic will, which is irrelevant to this case.”
● In the responsive pleading filed by them on this Court's requirement, the Estradas insist that the case
against them was really not one of unlawful detainer; they argue that since possession of the house had not
been obtained by them by any "contract, express or implied," as contemplated by Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, their occupancy of the premises could not be deemed one "terminable upon mere demand
(and hence never became unlawful) within the context of the law." Neither could the suit against them be
deemed one of forcible entry, they add, because they had been occupying the property with the prior
consent of the "real owner," Carmen Cañiza, which "occupancy can even ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will of petitioner Carmen Cañiza is admitted to probate." They conclude, on those postulates,
that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.
● Carmen Cañiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs — the aforementioned guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively — were by this Court's leave,
substituted for her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in taking into consideration the alleged will of Cañiza in deciding the
issue.
RULING:
● YES.
● The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes her intention that they
remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from
evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
● A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked; and
until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being
quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838, id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to
persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in
the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the
owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of
the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
● Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the
estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship dated December 19, 1989 clearly installed
her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full
authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it
may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties . . " By that
appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and
spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives and
friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Cañiza's property,
both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or control of
his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be
needful for this purpose.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
June 2, 1993 — affirming the Regional Trial Court's judgment and dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari
— is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 13, 1992 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 3410 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against private
respondents.
15. Vitug vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82027
March 29, 1990
FACTS:
● This case involves the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U.S.A., naming private respondent Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In a previous
decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug’s
estate with her (Mrs. Vitug’s) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending probate.
● Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell certain shares
of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the estate in the
sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the CA, the
alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax, P518,834.27 as
deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as “increment thereto.” According to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew
the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account in the Bank of America, Makati,
Metro Manila.
● Later, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
from savings account in the Bank of America were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for “concealment of funds belonging to the
estate.”
● Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970, which states that;
All money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint
savings current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of
either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors, and
shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
ISSUE: Whether or not the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis
causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the
Civil Code?
RULING:
● No. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied
in a will. A will has been defined as “a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take
effect after his death.” In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. In this case,
the monies subject of savings account were in the nature of conjugal funds.
● In the case relied on, Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship
agreement purports to deliver one party’s separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their
joint holdings.
● There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be
presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marital relations. Neither is
the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involves no
conveyance of a spouse’s own properties to the other.
● It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification of the conjugal
partnership, as held by the Court of Appeals, by “mere stipulation,” and that it is no “cloak” to
circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to
invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank accounts, more commonly
denominated in banking parlance as an “and/or” account.
● In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened a savings account, they merely put what
rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the
other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the funds
were conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or her
deposits in the money pool.
● The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its “survivor-take-all” feature, but in
reality, that contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death.
● Such agreements are permitted by the Civil Code. The fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends
on either the happening of an event which is (1) “uncertain,” (2) “which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.” A survivorship agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction
stipulating on the value of currency, and insurance have been held to fall under the first category,
while a contract for life annuity or pension under Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized
under the second. In either case, the element of risk is present. In the case at bar, the risk was the
death of one party and survivorship of the other.
● However, as we have warned:
But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or effect
may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such agreement is
a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of creditors, or to
defeat the legitime ofa forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon such grounds. No
such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement involved in this case.
● There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such
unlawful purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills,
donations, and conjugal partnership. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug
having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a vested right over the
amounts under savings account of the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their
inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the
separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
16. Abaya vs. Donata Zalamero
G.R. No. L-3907
March 12, 1908
Doctrine: The execution of a will must comply with requirements of the law in force at the time of its
execution.
Facts:
● Roman Abaya filed a petition for the allowance of the will executed by Juan Zalamero, a resident of
Pagsanhan, in said province, on the 29th of October, 1905, and produced in court the said will, which
was written in Tagalog dialect.
● Donata Zalamero opposed the petition, alleging that the will had been executed under pressure and
unlawful and improper influence on the part of those who were to benefit thereby, and that it had not
been executed and signed in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
● The court refused to admit the will of said Juan Zalamero, as requested by Roman Abaya. Hence
Abaya filed this appeal.
● Two points are presented during appeal:
1. First, that Juan Zalamero, while in life, executed his will on the 29th of October, 1905, under
lawful pressure and influence exercised by those who were thereby benefited; and
2. Second, that the said will was not executed and signed in accordance with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue: Whether or not the will must be probated. YES
Ruling:
● YES, since the will in question was executed with the requirements established by the law in force.
● The essential requisites prescribed by Sec. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have been
complied with are:
a. that three witnesses were present at the execution of the will of Juan Zalamero at the date
mentioned therein;
b. that they heard his statement that the said instrument, written and drawn up under his
direction, contained his last will;
c. that they saw and witnessed when, at the express request of the testator, and under his
direction, the witness, Mariano Zaguirre, wrote at the foot of the will the name and surname
of Juan Zalamero, and
d. when the latter put the cross between his written name and surname, each of the witnesses
subscribing it at the time and in the presence of each other.
17. IN RE Probate of Will of Artero Mercado vs. Juliana Lacuesta, et. al.
G.R. No. L-4067
November 29, 1951
Summary:
The case involves the disallowance of Antero Mercado's will due to a defective attestation clause, lacking
essential certifications regarding Atty. Florentino Javier wrote the testator's name under his express direction.
The Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the cross made by the testator after his name sufficed as a
signature, emphasising its lack of trustworthiness compared to a thumbmark. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, upholding the attestation clause's fatal defect and sustaining the disallowance of the will, without
addressing other deficiencies in the clause. The legal principle established is that an attestation clause must
explicitly certify the testator's direction in writing his name. The decision is affirmed with costs against the
petitioner.
Facts:
● Antero Mercado executed a will on January 3, 1943. The will is written in the Ilocano dialect which is
spoken and understood by the testator. The will also contained an attestation clause which was signed
by three witnesses.
● The attestation clause states: “We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing
testament of Antero Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this
attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of
this attestation clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the
testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them
were signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.”
● The clause lacked certifications required by law, specifically regarding Atty. Florentino Javier writing
the testator's name under his express direction. The petitioner argued that the cross made by the testator
after his name sufficed as a signature.
Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid.
Ruling:
● No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining the disallowance of
the will. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
● When the testator expressly caused another to sign the former’s name, this fact must be recited in the
attestation clause. Otherwise, the will is fatally defective. Moreover, the cross appearing on the will is
not the usual signature of Antero Mercado nor is it even one of the ways by which he signed his name.
 However, the Court rejected this argument, asserting that the cross lacks the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark.
● Thus, the cross cannot be considered a valid signature.
Fallo: Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with against the petitioner. So ordered.
18. Testate Estate of the Late Vicente Cagro vs. Pelagio Cagro, et. al.
G.R. No. L-5826
April 29, 1953
Doctrine: Wills; Attestation clause; Lack of signatures of Attesting Witnesses at Bottom of the Attestation
Clause, is Fatal Defect - Inasmuch as the signatures the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom
of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand
margin, the will is nevertheless fatally defective. The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending
the execution of the will’ required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear
their signatures.
Facts:
● Vicente Cagro, who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949, left a will.
● The oppositor-appellant’s contention is that the will is fatally defective because its attestation clause
is not signed by the attending witness.
● However, the petitioner contends that the signature on the left-hand margin conforms substantially to
the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
● The CFI granted the probate of the will, hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid. NO
Held:
● The Supreme Court held that the will is not valid.
● The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will’ required by
law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
● An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of
their signatures at the bottom thereof negates their participation.
● Moreover, the signatures affixed on the left-hand margin is not in conformance with the law. The said
signatures were merely in conformance with the legal mandate that all pages of the will must be signed
on the left-hand margin.
● Thus, if the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add
clauses to a will on subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the
witnesses.
Fallo: Wherefore, the appealed decision is reversed and the probate of the will in question denied. So ordered
with costs against the petitioner and appellee.
19. Taboada vs. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033
November 5, 1982
SUMMARY: A will of Dorotea Perez was submitted for probate by petitioner. It was denied simply because of
some technical errors not in accordance with Art. 805. The SC held that there is substantial compliance and that
it should be construed liberally in order to give the testatrix more freedom but should still with sufficient
safeguards to prevent the commission of fraud.
FACTS:
● A petition for probate was filed by Petitioner Apolonio Taboada before the Court of First Instance,
attaching therewith the last will and testament of Dorotea Perez. The will, written in Cebuano-Visayan
dialect, consisted of two (2) pages.
● On the first page, which contains the entire testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three
instrumental witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez.
● The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while Perez’ signature was
on the bottom.
● On the second page, which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement, were the
signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez.
● The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will.
● Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said will. The judge who handled the petition
was Judge Ramon Pamatian. He denied the petition and ordered the submission of names of the
intestate heirs.
● Taboada filed a motion for reconsideration but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was
transferred to another jurisdiction.
● The case was inherited by Judge Rosal who also denied the MR on the grounds that:
○ the testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of the page as
prescribed by law;
○ that the testator and the witnesses should have placed their signature in the same place
○ that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will – this,
according to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the attestation clause shall state the
number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held to
be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of
 some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to
be bequeathed.
● Judge Rosal ruled that Art. 805 of the Civil Code provides that for a notarial will to be valid, it is not
enough that only the testatrix signs at the end of the page, but also the subscribing witnesses in the
same place or at the end and of one another because attesting witnesses to a will attest not merely the
will itself but also the signature of testator.
ISSUE: WON the will is valid.
RULING: YES.
● The SC ruled in the affirmative. It held that While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable,
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of
the will is not assailed.
● The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the
provision on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but
with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the
modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will"
● Further, the failure of the will's attestation clause to state the number of pages used in writing the will
would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire
will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses.
● The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the
end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. Further, the
acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this
page.”
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the present petition is granted.
20. Azuela vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122880
April 12, 2006
DOCTRINE:
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
In this case, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures
of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario
ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."By no manner of contemplation
can those words be construed as an acknowledgment.
FACTS
● Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on
June 10, 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will consisted of two (2) pages
and written in the vernacular Pilipino. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures
on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
● The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is
a forgery and that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out
that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged.
● The RTC admitted the will to probate. The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three
(3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called
to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end
in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;"
● Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the dismissal of
the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used
in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.
RULING
● Yes, the will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an
acknowledgment.
● An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that
the same is his/her own free act and deed.
 ● It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
● Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath,
that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or
deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against
spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator.
21. IN RE Probate of Will of Enrique S. Lopez vs. Diana Jeanne Lopez
G.R. No. 189984
November 12, 2012
SUMMARY: Enrique died leaving his wife and four children: Richard, Diana, Marybeth, and Victoria as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard as
his executor and administrator. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and
testament was not executed and attested as required by law. The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for
failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. ISSUE: WON the will was executed and attested in
accordance with law - NO. The SC held that the law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages
used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
DOCTRINE: ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
one another. x x x
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. x x x
ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects
and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it
is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
FACTS:
● Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate children,
namely, Richard and the respondents Diana, Marybeth, and Victoria as compulsory heirs. Before
Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard as his executor and
administrator.
● Richard then filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament with prayer for the
issuance of letters testamentary in his favor.
● Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not executed
and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of Richard.
● Richard presented the attesting witnesses and the notary public who notarized the will. They testified
that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and every page, they also read and signed
the same in the latter's presence and of one another.
● The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code
which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is
written.
● While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which
the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion. As such, RTC disallowed the will for not having been executed and
attested in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON the will was executed and attested in accordance with law.
RULING: NO.
● The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
● The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
● While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject
last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8
pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of
the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliunde.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
22. Mitra vs. Sablan-Guevarra
G.R. No. 213994
April 18, 2018
SUMMARY: Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Legaspi
with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was alleged that the petitioner is the de facto
adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi left a notarial will, instituting the petitioner, Castro, Guevarra, and
Sablan, as her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left real and personal properties and that Legaspi named
Castro as the executor of the will. Perpetua L.Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who
claim to be Legaspi's legal heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement,
was not signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written; and that the will was
executed under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the document to be her last
will and testament. The Supreme Court Ruled that there is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805
of the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on each and
every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was complied with. When Article 805 of the Civil
Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it necessarily refers to the logical end thereof,
which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page
of the will does not contain any testamentary disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
As to whether the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause renders such will
defective, the Supreme Court cited the case of Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, wherein the Court allowed the probate
of a will notwithstanding that the number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the
Acknowledgment. What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such
omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself. An examination of the will in question
reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed to state the number of pages comprising the will. However, as
was the situation in Taboada, this omission was supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that
the will is composed of four pages, the Acknowledgment included. In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has
substantially complied with all the formalities required of a notarial will. It has been proven that Legaspi and the
instrumental witnesses signed on every page of the will, except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment
page. With regard to the omission of the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the
Acknowledgment portion of the will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA
conclusion, such omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate.
DOCTRINE:
● When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it
necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As
the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary
disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
● What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions
must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
FACTS:
● Margie Santos Mitra (petitioner) filed a petition for the probate of the notarial will of Remedios
Legaspi y Reyes (Legaspi) with prayer for issuance of letters testamentary before the RTC. It was
alleged that the petitioner is the de facto adopted daughter of Legaspi; that Legaspi left a notarial will,
instituting the petitioner, Orlando Castro, Perpetua Sablan Guevarra, and Remigio Legaspi Sablan, as
her heirs, legatees and devisees; that Legaspi left real and personal properties and that Legaspi named
Mary Ann Castro as the executor of the will.
● Perpetua L. Sablan-Guevarra and Remegio L. Sablan (respondents), who claim to be Legaspi's legal
heirs, opposed the petition. They aver that the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law; that since the last page of the will, which contained the Acknowledgement, was not
signed by Legaspi and her instrumental witnesses, the will should be declared invalid; that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written; and that the will
was executed under undue and improper pressure, thus, Legaspi could not have intended the document
to be her last will and testament.
● The RTC rendered a Decision admitting Legaspi's will to probate. The probate court explained that the
last page of the will is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgement portion, which the testator and
the witnesses are not required to sign.
● Also, it held that inasmuch as the number of pages upon which the will was written was stated in the
Acknowledgement, the will must be admitted to probate. The respondents' allegation of undue
influence or improper pressure exerted upon Legaspi was disregarded for failure on their part to adduce
evidence proving the existence thereof.
● Aggrieved, the respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the judgment of the RTC, as the CA
adhered to the view of strictly complying with the requirement of stating the number of pages of the
will in the attestation clause. Moreover, the CA detected another supposed fatal defect in the will: the
photocopy of the will submitted by the respondents on appeal did not contain the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses on each and every page thereof.
● Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in finding that the instrumental witnesses to the will failed to sign on each
and every page thereof on the left margin, except the last, as required under Article 805 of the
Civil Code
2. WON the CA erred in ruling that the failure to state the number of pages comprising the will on
the attestation clause renders such will defective
RULING:
1. YES.
● It is uncontested and can be readily gleaned that the instrumental witnesses signed on each and every
page of the will, except the last page. There is no doubt that the requirement under the Article 805 of
the Civil Code, which calls for the signature of the testator and of the instrumental witnesses on each
and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last, was complied with.
● When Article 805 of the Civil Code requires the testator to subscribe at the end of the will, it
necessarily refers to the logical end thereof, which is where the last testamentary disposition ends. As
the probate court correctly appreciated, the last page of the will does not contain any testamentary
disposition; it is but a mere continuation of the Acknowledgment.
2. YES
● In Singson vs. Florentino, the Court adopted a more liberal approach and allowed probate, even if the
number of pages of the will was mentioned in the last part of the body of the will and not in the
attestation clause. This is to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical
considerations.
● The substantial compliance rule is embodied in the Civil Code as Article 809 thereof, which provides
that:
Article 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
● Thus, in Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the
number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela vs.
CA, the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated elsewhere
in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
● What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such omissions
must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would
result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
● An examination of the will in question reveals that the attestation clause indeed failed to state the
number of pages comprising the will. However, as was the situation in Taboada, this omission was
supplied in the Acknowledgment. It was specified therein that the will is composed of four pages, the
Acknowledgment included.
● In sum, Legaspi's last will and testament has substantially complied with all the formalities required of
a notarial will. It has been proven that Legaspi and the instrumental witnesses signed on every page of
the will, except on the last, which refers to the Acknowledgment page. With regard to the omission of
the number of pages in the attestation clause, this was supplied by the Acknowledgment portion of the
will itself without the need to resort to extrinsic evidence. Contrary to the CA conclusion, such
omission does not in any way serve as hindrance to probate.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22,2013
and Resolution dated August 15, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93671 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 128
of Caloocan City in SP. Proc. Case No. C-3450 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
23. IN RE Probate of Will of Consuelo Santiago Garcia vs. Natividad Garcia Santos
G.R. No. 204793
June 8, 2020
RECIT-READY SUMMARY:
Catalino and Ronaldo Tanchinco, grandsons of Consuelo Garcia (through her daughter Remedios who died
before her), filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Consuelo which was opposed by
Natividad (daughter of Consuelo) who alleged that a petition for the probate of Consuelo’s will was already
pending before the courts. Catalino and Ronaldo questioned the validity of the will, alleging that the same was
not known to them, that it did not conform with the formalities required under Art. 805 of the Civil Code,
specifically failing to mention the number of pages in the attestation of the will, and that it was not valid as
Consuelo’s signature therein was fraudulent, in violation of Art. 809 of the Code. Natividad alleged that the will
was found in Consuleo’s dresser after her death and that the will conformed with Art. 805 in that its
acknowledgment portion indicated the number of pages of the will. The authenticity of the signature was
corroborated by the notary public and the lawyers who signed as witness to the execution of Consuelo’s will
(who were also counsel for Natividad in the present case). The RTC ruled in favor of Catalino and Ronaldo. The
CA reversed the RTC’s decision.
W/N the will was valid despite not conforming with the requirements under Art. 805, and W/N the probate of
the will was valid despite the forged signature.
Omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of
the will being assailed. What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is
that such omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence.
FACTS:
● Consuelo Garcia was married to Anastacio Garcia and they had 2 daughters: Remedios and Natividad
Garcia.
● Remedios, who died before Consuelo, had children: Catalino, Ricardo, Ronaldo, Carmela, and
Rodolfo, all surnamed Tanchanco. Rodolfo died before Remedios, and he had 2 children: Melissa and
Gerard Tanchanco.
● On 4 April 1997, Consuelo died leaving an estate consisting of several personal and real properties.
● On 11 August 1997, Catalino filed a petition before the RTC of Pasay to settle the intestate estate of
Consuelo, praying that (1) he be appointed as the special administrator of Consuelo’s intestate estate,
(2) an inventory of Consuelo’s estate be conducted, (3) Natividad and all other heirs in possession of
the estate’s properties to surrender the same and to account for the proceeds of the properties sold by
them, (4) the heirs be prohibited from disposing any property without the court’s approval, (5)
Natividad produce Consuelo’s will to determine its validity, (6) Natividad desist from disposing the
properties of Consuelo’s estate, and (7) other reliefs and remedies be granted.
● Natividad filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that a petition for the probate of Consuelo’s Last Will and
Testament has been filed with the RTC of Pasay City and prayed that she, as the executrix of the will,
be issued letters testamentary.
● Catalino filed an Opposition to Natividad’s motion, alleging that (1) the will’s attestation clause did
not state the number of pages, (2) the will was in Tagalog and not in English, which is the language
usually used by Consuelo in her legal documents, (3) Consuelo could not have gone to Makati to have
the will notarized due to her poor health, and (4) the signature in the will was forged.
● Natividad contended that there was substantial compliance with Art. 805. Although the attestation did
not state the number of pages comprising the will, the same was indicated in the acknowledgment
portion thereof, which the adverse party rebutted stating that the number of pages should have been in
the body of the will.
● The two cases (settlement of estate and probate of last will and testament) were merged.
● The will in question was witnessed by Attys. Tantuico, Lallana, and Paras, and was notarized by Atty.
Marapao, all of Quasha Law Office.
● The said lawyers attested to the validity of the will, averring that during the execution of the will, that
she appeared active and of sound mind. They also alleged that she chose to use Tagalog in her will
because she knew there will be oppositions thereto. The witness-lawyers and the notary public were
present during the signing of the will.
● On the other hand, Ronaldo asserted that he was in a close relationship with her grandmother Consuelo
and insisted that she passed away without a will. He further alleged that in the second year of
Consuelo’s coma, he met with Natividad, and other relatives to ascertain whether a will existed. He
also stated that Consuelo intended on distributing her properties equally among her 2 daughters.
● Ronaldo conceded that the signatures in the will were similar to the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Consuelo which Ronaldo claimed as being authentic.
● Emilio Layug, the security aide of Consuelo, denied accompanying her to Quasha Law Office in
Makati City and averred that she could not leave the house without her alalays and Layug since she
could not walk alone and needed to use a wheelchair as she was weak.
● Catalino alleged that Natividad, after the burial of Consuelo, looted her properties and declared war
against them (the Tanchancos). He also alleged that during a family meeting, he discovered that
Natividad supposedly found a will in Consuelo’s dresser.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Catalino and Ronaldo Tanchanco and appointed Catalino as the
administrator of Consuelo’s intestate estate.
● The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and appointed Natividad Santos as the executor of Consuelo’s
will.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the will was valid despite the fact that it did not conform to the formalities required by law
under Article 805 of the Civil Code.
2. W/N the CA’s allowance of the probate of the will was valid despite the circumstances of bad
faith, forgery or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence attending the execution of
the will under Art. 809 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
(1)
● YES
● The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is the due execution or the
extrinsic validity of the will as provided by Section 1, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court. The probate
court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the estate by the
testator. Thus, due execution is "whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the
will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law” as mandated by Articles 805 and 806 of
the Civil Code.
● Under Article 809, the defects or imperfections must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfections would not render a
 will invalid should it be proved that the will was really executed and attested in compliance with
Article 805.
● The foregoing considerations do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that
the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation
clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated
in the attestation clause of a will.
● Furthermore, the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 x x x presupposes that the defects
in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the will or a consideration of
matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the attestation clause or
from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated in the omitted
textual requirements were actually complied with in the execution of the will. In other words, the
defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.
● It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal
and correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in
the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.
(2)
● YES
● In Taboada vs. Hon. Rosal, the Court allowed the probate of a will notwithstanding that the
number of pages was stated not in the attestation clause, but in the Acknowledgment. In Azuela
vs. CA, the Court ruled that there is substantial compliance with the requirement, if it is stated
elsewhere in the will how many pages it is comprised of.
● What is imperative for the allowance of a will despite the existence of omissions is that such
omissions must be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence. "However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence
aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."
● In the instant case, the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention the number of pages
comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission
by stating that the will has five pages, to wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima
(5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito.”
Undoubtedly, such substantially complied with Article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and
observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that
there are actually five pages even if the said information was not provided in the attestation
clause.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The assailed
June 25, 2012 Decision and December 4, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 89593 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
24. RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO
L-37453
May 25, 1979
Recit-ready Summary: Gonzales questioned the validity of Isabel Gabriel’s will because the credibility of the
witnesses were not established. The Supreme Court held that in probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses
are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. It is sufficient that the qualifications under Art. 820 are met and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 821 are present for a witness to be competent. There is no requirement that they are of
good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his
testimony is believed and accepted in court.
Doctrine: The law requires only that witnesses possess the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 821. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the
community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in
court.
FACTS:
● On June 24, 1961, herein private respondent Lutgarda Santiago (Santiago) filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased
Isabel Gabriel (Isabel) and designating therein Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
● There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel died as a widow and without issue in the
municipality of Navotas on June 7, 1961 at the age of eighty-five (85). It is likewise not controverted
that herein private respondent Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales (Gonzales) are nieces
of the deceased.
● The will submitted for probate, which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been executed in
Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel. It consists
of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the
notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel appear at the end of the will on page
four and at the left margin of all the pages.
● At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia,
Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are
their respective places of residence. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other
 pages.
● Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking
pinalaki, inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and
executor, were bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be
acquired, in her testatrix name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies.
● The petition was opposed by Gonzales. According to Gonzales, the will is not genuine and was not
executed and attested as required by law (NO PROOF THAT WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE,
CREDIBILITY NEEDS TO BE ESTABLISHED FIRST). At the time of its execution, the decedent
lacked testamentary capacity due to old age and sickness, and that it was procured through undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the principal beneficiary, and/or of some other person
for her benefit.
● The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision of
the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding
that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was absolutely
no proof that the three (3) instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the credibility of the witness needs to be proved and is material to the validity of the
will.
RULING:
● No. The Supreme Court rejected Gonzales’ contention that it must first be established in the record the
good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his
honesty and uprightness, because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is
proved otherwise by the opposing party.
● The term “credible” in the civil code is not the same as with the Naturalization Law where the law is
mandatory that the petition for naturalization must be supported by two character witnesses who must
prove their good standing in the community, reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, their
honesty and uprightness. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses
for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said
execution.
● Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo: The instrumental witnesses in Order to
be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief
and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the
witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established
otherwise.
● Celso Gimpaya was the driver of the testatrix and his wife Maria Gimpaya, merely a housekeeper, and
that Matilde Orobia was a piano teacher to a grandchild of the testatrix. But the relation of employer
and employee much less the humble or financial position of a person do not disqualify him to be a
competent testamentary witness.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Additional information:
Art. 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and
able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in article 805 of this Code.
Art. 821. The following are disqualified from being witnesses to a will:
(1) Any person not domiciled in the Philippines,
(2) Those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony.
25. Cruz vs. Hon. Judge Guillermo P. Villasor
G.R. No. L-32213
November 26, 1973
Doctrine: ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.
FACTS:
Agapita, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the will was
executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute
without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed in accordance with law.
Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this
appeal by certiorari which was given due course.
….the only question presented for the determination in the appeal by certiorari is this:
There were 3 witnesses, Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of
them, the last named, was at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was acknowledged.
Bottomline, the third witness is the notary public himself. Petitioner argues that the result is that only two
witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will which resulted to the non-compliance to
the law.
ISSUE: WON THE WILL WAS EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE TO THE FORMALITIES OF THE LAW (
Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC) REQUIRING AT LEAST 3 CREDIBLE WITNESSES TO THE WILL AND TO
BE ACKNOWLEDGE BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC?
RULING: NO!
To allow the notary public to act as a third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would
have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the
provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to the will.
Hence, the law would not be duly observed.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental
witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
To acknowledge before means:
- To avow
- To admit as his own
- To assent as genuine
If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed
the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
ISSUE: Whether or not the will was spurious. (YES)
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
RULING:
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement, That function would defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses.
For he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his
own act. It will defeat the purpose of the law.
TN: So Probate of the will was declared INVALID AND SET ASIDE.
Fallo: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the probate of the last
will and testament of Valente Z. Cruz (Exhibit "E") is declared not valid and hereby set aside.
26. Lee vs. Atty. Regino Tambago
A.C. No. 5281
February 12, 2008
FACTS:
● Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago, with violation of
Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in
nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other
witnesses.
● In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save
for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of the
complainant.
● The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before the respondent on June 30, 1965.
● Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the
acknowledgement of the will was dated January 5, 1962.
● Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor in a deed of
donation which supposedly contained his purported signature.
● Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation
were “in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from one another in all angle(s).”
● Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported
witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely
copied from their respective voter’s affidavits.
● Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of
the Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts
(NCAA).
● A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a
certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. A will may either be notarial
or holographic.
● The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of wills. The object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
● A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
● The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. In this circumstance alone,
the will must be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their
validity.
 ● The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was
segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate
provision.
● An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer
or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long
after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
● A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by the respondent invalidated the will.
● Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This
carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering
that the testator and the witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to
confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the
will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of duty
FALLO: WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer’s Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old
Notarial Law. Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary
public and as an officer of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary
public.
27. IN RE Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Deceased Brigido Alvarado vs. Hon. Gaviola, et. al.
G.R. No. 74695
September 14, 1993
SUMMARY: Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will which effectively disinherited an illegitimate son of his
and superseded a holographic will he had executed years before. A codicil was subsequently executed which
changed some dispositions made in the notarial will (in order to generate money for the testator’s Glaucoma
surgery) but retained the stipulation of disinheritance. Both the notarial will and codicil were executed in the
same manner: the documents were read aloud to the testator, with four witnesses (3 witnesses and a notary)
silently following with their own copies in hand. When the testator died, the notarial will was submitted for
probate with the illegitimate son Cesar opposing such on the ground that the testator had been blind during the
execution of the subject instruments and that the reading requirement under Art. 808 was not followed. On
appeal with the CA, the court found that the testator was not blind during the execution of the notarial will and
codicil and that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements under Art. 808. The issues are
WON testator was blind and if the double-reading required in Art. 808 had been complied with. The Court ruled
that although the testator was not totally blind, he is considered as such for the purposes of Art. 808 because it
had been established that his eyesight was very poor due to his Glaucoma, and that the law necessarily includes
persons who cannot or are unable to read their wills themselves. Second, the Court agreed with the CA that
there had been substantial compliance with the double-reading required by law – even though it was not read by
the persons listed in Art. 808. The Court here explained that it was sufficiently proven that the contents of the
will and all the dispositional matters were made known to, understood, and assented to by the testator.
DOCTRINE:
● Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing
witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.
● Application of Art. 808: This Article applies not only to blind people but to those who, for one reason
or another, are incapable of reading their wills.
● Substantial Compliance: Substantial compliance is acceptable when the purpose of the law has been
satisfied. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
order to ensure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they
do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.
FACTS:
● In 1977 Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” where he disinherited an
illegitimate son Cesar Alvarado (the petitioner) and revoked a previously executed holographic will,
which was at the time of the execution of the new will, was already pending probate with the RTC in
Laguna. The three instrumental witnesses, a notary public, and the testator’s lawyer who drafted the
will testified that:
○ the new will was not read by Alvarado himself;
○ instead it was read out aloud to him his lawyer; and,
○ the three witnesses and the notary public were reading their own respective copies as the
lawyer read it aloud.
● The holographic will was eventually admitted into probate a month after the execution of the notarial
will, and a few days later a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na
Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed
which effectively changed a number of the dispositions made in the notarial will in order to generate
cash for the testator’s eye surgery – because of Glaucoma. It must be noted that the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses of the notarial will were left unchanged. The codicil was executed in the same
 manner as the notarial will: not read by testator himself, but read aloud to him by his lawyer, and
witnesses and notary were present reading the will as well.
● Upon Alvarado’s death in 1979, the notarial will and codicil were filed for probate by the testator’s
lawyer and the petitioner filed his opposition to such. The oppositor mainly contends that: will was not
executed and attested in accordance with law; testator was mentally incapacitated; will was executed
under duress and improper pressure/influence; and, the signature of the testator was procured through
faud/trick.
● Oppositor failed to substantiate his claims before the RTC so a Probate Order was issued, which was
subsequently appealed to again by petitioner. His main contention this time was that the testator was
blind within the meaning of Art. 808 when the notarial will and codicil were executed – and since the
reading requirement under such article was not complied with, the will and codicil must be denied. The
CA denied petitioner’s appeal and ruled that the testator was not blind at the time of execution and that
there had been substantial compliance with the reading requirement under Art. 808.
ISSUE/S: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its
codicil were executed? If so, was the double reading requirement of said article complied with?
RULING:
YES, as was testified to by witnesses, the testator did not read his will himself because of his poor,
defective or blurred vision which made it necessary for his lawyer to do it for him.
● Although the testator was not totally blind during the execution of the will and subsequent codicil, his
vision on both eyes was only of “counting fingers at three feet” due to his severe Glaucoma. Dr.
Ruperto Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three feet, he could no
longer read either printed or handwritten matters as early as 1977 during the testator’s first consultation
with the doctor. The CA erroneously found that the testator was still capable of reading and seeing on
the day of the execution of the subject documents – in Garcia v. Vasquez the Court explained that:
○ the rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes
● Thus, Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who are incapable of reading their
wills. Since the testator was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil due to his poor
vision, it can be concluded that he comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808.
Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil followed his instructions.
YES, there was substantial compliance with the double-reading requirement under Art. 808.
● It is argued by Cesar that the double-reading requirement was not followed because Art. 808 requires
that the will be read to the testator by the notary public and one of the instrumental witnesses. In this
case, it was read twice but by the same person and he was neither the notary nor a witness (it was the
lawyer). However the Court agreed with the CA’s finding that there was substantial compliance and
that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege.
● Furthermore, the Court found that respondent lawyer read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. However, prior and
subsequent to such reading, the testator affirmed the contents of the will when he was asked. Only after
such affirmation did he sign and acknowledge the will. There is no evidence that the contents of the
will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, not only did the testator affirm the will on the day of its execution but also previously during
its drafting – as proven by the lawyer’s uncontradicted testimony that even before the official
execution, the testator had already expressed his assent to the contents of the notarial will days before.
● Moreover, it was not only the lawyer who read the documents, because the notary public and the
three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty.
Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the instrumental witnesses
and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document were of his own
free will, and the testator answered in the affirmative. With four persons following the reading word
for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that
what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the
terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is highlighted by the fact that the all the
witnesses were known to the testator, one being his physician and the other a friend known to him
since childhood.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this
decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
28. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS & BIBIANA ROXAS
DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS vs. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.
G.R. No. L-38338
January 28, 1985
RECIT-READY SUMMARY: After spouses Bibiana Roxas De Jesus and Andres De Jesus’ death, a special
proceeding was filed by Bibiana’s brother, Simeon Roxas, for their intestate estate. The latter was appointed as
the administrator and then submitted a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana to the court.
The holographic will was dated "FEB./61" and was entirely written and signed by Bibiana herself. Bibiana’s
children testified that the holographic will was genuine and that their mother had the testamentary capacity at
the time of its execution. However, another compulsory heir, respondent Luz Henson, opposed the probate of
the holographic will, arguing that it was not executed in accordance with Article 810 of the Civil Code because
it did not contain the day, month, and year of its execution. The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
allowed the probate of the holographic will, emphasizing that if a will has been executed in substantial
compliance with the formalities of the law and there is no evidence of fraud or bad faith, it should be admitted
to probate under the principle of substantial compliance. The order of the probate of the holographic will was
reinstated.
DOCTRINE: ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
xx However, if there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of
the Will, it can be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
FACTS:
● After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Simeon R. Roxas, the
brother of deceased Bibiana, filed a petition on the matter of the intestate estate of the spouses.
● After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner appointing him as administrator, he
delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the Bibiana.
● A hearing of the probate of the holographic will was set, where the petitioner testified that after his
appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana which contained
a letter-will addressed to her children, entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the Bibiana.
● The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be respected although it is not
written by a lawyer.”.
● This was corroborated by Bibiana’s children Pedro and Manuel Roxas de Jesus having recognized the
handwriting and signature of their mother, and testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the
holographic Will.
● They testified that their mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is
written, and that the date "FEB./61” was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.m.
● Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir, filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana because (a) it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it
was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure,
and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said
Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.
● Respondent Judge Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he
found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.
● Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged
holographic Will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law
requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be
strictly complied with.
● Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the
ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810
RULING: YES
● The petitioner's contention is that the liberal construction of the holographic will should prevail.
● While Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator
to state in his holographic Will the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code
omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated.
● On the other hand, respondent contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article
810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
holographic Wills are strictly construed.
● She further submitted that Article 810 was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and
Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required
date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is
invalid.
● The Court however agrees with the petitioner.
● In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos he emphasized that:
The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will and testament on the
ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that which the law can make.
● For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of
the decedent. Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to
guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege (Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422).
● If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the
possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted
to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
● The facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the
surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will and the instrument appears to have
been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in
the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate,
 although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect.
(Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
● If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
● The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
(Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476)
● In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will
was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720).
● In this case, there is no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution
of Wills and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas
de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her.
● There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution, and her testamentary capacity at that
time, which her children agreed on.
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus
is reinstated.
29. IN RE Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Cecilia Esguerra Cosico vs. Jose M.
Cosico, Jr., et. al,
G.R. No. 2469971
May 5, 2021
SUMMARY: The case involves the probate of Cecilia Esguerra Cosico's will, executed with the assistance of
her lawyer and witnesses despite her physical disability and illiteracy. Cecilia's half-siblings contested the will's
validity, citing non-compliance with formalities and alleging Cecilia's lack of mental capacity. The trial court
admitted the will to probate, finding it was executed freely and voluntarily, but the Court of Appeals declared it
void, citing a violation of Article 808 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court reversed the CA's decision,
emphasizing the flexibility allowed in will execution and finding that Cecilia's intentions were protected despite
a deviation from strict compliance. The Court concluded that the will fulfilled the underlying purpose of Article
808, with no evidence of fraud or trickery, thus upholding its probate.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON Article 808 was substantially complied with.
● Cecilia Esguerra Cosico (Cecilia) was born in 1932 to Jose Cosico, Sr. and Corazon Esguerra
(Corazon). She was born with a physical disability and was known in the locality as a "lumpo."
RULING:
Corazon passed away when Cecilia was just one (1) year old and the latter was left in the care and
custody of her maternal aunt, Mercedes Esguerra Guia (Mercedes). Mercedes raised Cecilia in their
home in Schetilig Avenue, San Pablo City, together with Mercedes's legally adopted daughter,
petitioner Thelma Esguerra Guia (Thelma). Because of her physical condition, Cecilia spent most of
her days in her bedroom. She never attended school nor learned to read or write.
● In 1996, Cecilia decided to execute her last will and testament. Cecilia asked Atty. Danton Q. Bueser,
then a notary public, for assistance in preparing the last will on September 8, 1996, Atty. Bueser and
Liberato wetn to Cecilia’s house. Atty. Bueser and Cecilia talked inside the latter’s bedroom while
Liberato stayed outside by the door. Liberato head Cecilia calls Mercedes whom she directed to collect
documents from the steel cabinet. Mercedes complied and handed over the documents to Atty. Beuser.
On September 10, 1996, Atty. Beuser and Liberato returned to Cecilia’s house with the finished copy
of her last will and testament.
● Renaldo Jvl Gigante and Ricardo C. Pandino were also present at Cecilia’s house that night upon her
request. Renayldo was the son of Cecilia’s helper, while Ricardo was a neighbor who regularly went to
the house to buy coconuts from Mercedes.
● In the presence of Liberato, Renayldo, and Ricardo who served as notarial witnesses to Cecilia’s
Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya, Atty. Beuser read the contents of the document to Cecilia and carefully
explained to her its effects and consequences. He then asked her if she fully understood its contents and
whether it was done according to her wishes. Cecilia Confirmed.
● On March 22, 2006, Cecilia died at the age of 74. Following her death, Mercedes obtained a copy of
the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya, had it photocopied and gaver her spouse Gomerciendo Guia and
Thelma a copy each. On May 9, 2009, Mercedes died. On July 6, 2010, Thelma filed a Petition for
probate of Cecilia’s will and for her appointment as administrator of the latter’s estate before the RTC
branch 32, San Pablo City.
● On September 23, 2010, Cecilia’s half siblings from the same father, respondents Jose M. Cosico, Jr,
Manuel M. Cosico, Minerma M. Cosico, and Eleanor M. Cosico-Chavez opposed the petition. They
essentially alleged that the formalities for the execution of a valid will under Articles 805 to 809 of the
CC were not complied with. Moreover, Cecilia was not mentally capacitated at the time she
purportedly executed her will. If at all, she signed it under duress and improper form from the
beneficiary, the alleged thumbprint of Cecilia was procured through fraud, and Cecilia did not intend
the document denominated Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya to be her last will and testament.
● The trial court granted the Special Administrator’s Motion for Segregation and admitted Cecilia’s
Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya to probate. The trial court essentially ruled that Cecilia freely and
voluntarily executed the will, during which time, she was of sound mind. The Huling Habilin at
Pagpapasiya was executed in accordance with the formal and essential requisites of law.
● By decision dated December 7, 2018, the CA reserved the decision. It ruled that Cecilia’s Huling
Habilin at Pagpapsiya was void since it violated Article 808 of the CC. While it is strictly a
requirement for blind testators, jurisprudence has, by analogy, applied the requirement of reading the
will twice. Once, by the one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged to those who, for one reason or another, are “incapable of reading
their wills.”
● YES. Though the Alvarado case seemingly extended the application of Article 808 to cover not just the
blind but also illiterates, the same case also recognized an exception to the rule of substantial
compliance. We find this exception applicable here.
● Indeed, the purpose of a will is to grant the wishes of a person upon his/her death, especially with
respect to the disposition of his/her worldly possessions. Both law and jurisprudence are consistent in
allowing a degree of flexibility with the requirement in the execution of wills, especially as to the
formal aspect.
● Here, we find that upholding respondents’ position and the CA’s ruling would only frustrate Cecilia’s
will. A review of the document itself, the testimonies of the witnesses, and the record shows that like in
Abangan, as cited in Alvarado, the intention of the testator had been established and protected from
fraud or trickery. Notably, Atty. Bueser read and explained the contents of Huling Habilin Pagpapasiya
to Cecilia.
● Meanwhile, Liberato and Renaldo listened and understood the explanation of Atty. Bueser. It is also
undisputed that Cecilia made no denial or correction to what she had heard. As such, we are convinced
that the underlying protection of Article 808 has been fulfilled here. At any rate, the Court refuses to
entertain such possibility of fraud because Atty. Beuser, aside from having observed all other
formalities, handed copies of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya to the notarial witnesses for their
signatures. This gave them the opportunity to read a short 4 page document which they all flipped
through from pages 1 to 4 to affix their respective signatures, essentially negating the possibility of
fraud, trickery, or misrepresentation.