Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1975 Woltjer Dutch Privileges
1975 Woltjer Dutch Privileges
2 Verbaal van Johan van der Does e.a. omtrent de opening van de toren te
Gouda 5 januari 1575. Algemeen Rijksarchief's Gravenhage [hereafter
A.R.A.J, Archief Staten van Holland 1572-1795, no. 2581. This verbaal is
unsigned.
3 P. J. Blok, Geschiedenis eener Hollandsche stad (4 vols., The Hague,
1910-18), III, 150.
4 P. Valkenier, 't Verwerd Europa (Amsterdam, 1742), appendix, p. 139;
In essence, these proVInces fought in the Eighty Years War not for liberty but
for liberties. In the Middle Ages the liberties of the cities and the provinces
were the privileges, the special rights and prerogatives that the cities and
provinces had obtained from the prince. 7
9 This provision of course had its disadvantages, not only due to the wide
diversity of the law applied but also because the central government did not
have sufficient means to settle local conflicts and factional disputes or other
undesirable situations. In 1557 the stadholder of Holland thought it would be
impossible to choose suitable magistrates in Amsterdam as long as the
Amsterdam privileges were accepted as binding (Cf. J. J. Woltjer, 'Het con-
flict tussen Willem Bardes en Hendrick Dirckszoon', Bijdragen en
mededelingen betreffende de geschiendenis der Nederlanden, LXXXVI
(1971), 196). But the government in Brussels evidently shrank from such
severe intervention. It was not until 1565 that it took certain steps, but these
went no further than an extension of the regulations concerning members of
the same family who were not permitted to hold an office at the same time: J.
E. Elias. Geschiedems van het Amsterdamsche regentenpatriciaat (The
Hague, 1923), p. 12.
10 By this privilege people could not normally be cited before courts out-
side the town or province where they resided.
11 I think It is misleading to reduce persons as different from, even as op-
posed to, each other as Calvin, Servetus, Flacius IlIyricus and Menno Simons
to the same common denominator.
DUTCH PRIVILEGES, REAL AND IMAGINARY 23
imperturbability. Thanks, however, to the moderation of many
magistrates, the degree of actual persecution varied widely with place
and time. The relentless strictness demanded of the authorities, for in-
stance by the edict of 1529, very soon encountered difficulties in prac-
tice, and in 1531 the courts received permission to apply lighter
punishments than were stipulated in the edict whenever there were
mitigating circumstances. The Grand Conseil (supreme court) at
Malines, the Court of Holland, and the Court of Friesland made use of
this provision. 12 This instruction was intended solely for the judges; as
far as the public was concerned, the edicts remained in all their
severity.
Concrete experiences strongly influenced the development of public
opinion about the persecution of heretics and above all the attitude of
the judges responsible for enforcing the edicts. The disturbances
caused by the Anabaptists in 1534-1535 at Munster and elsewhere
convinced many of the need to fight heresy with fire and sword; the in-
terrogation of peaceful Mennonites, on the contrary, convinced
several magistrates by the 1550s that it was barbaric to apply the
death penalty to them. In the Court of Friesland, for instance, many
justices wished to stop the execution of Mennonites on the ground that
they were merely misled in their beliefs and did not commit crimes. In
Tournai, also, the municipal magistrates showed a distinct
repugnance for the burning of heretics as early as 1544.13 After the
alarm created by the Munsterite Anabaptists had subsided, public
opinion seems to have rejected the persecution of heretics. In 1549, for
example, in Friesland the delivery of an heretical vicar from prison
was signalled 'myt clockslach ende andere Quade manieren' [by the
ringing of the tocsin and other unseemly practices]. Five years later, in
the same province, three men who had been arrested were forcibly
delivered from the servants of justice. In March 1558 a riot developed
at the execution of five Anabaptists in Rotterdam (the first execution
of Anabaptists there for many years), as a result of which the schout,
together with the burgomasters and aldermen, had to take refuge in
the tower of the Town Hall and were forced to free four of the
the ground that laws and privileges existed for the benefit of the people,
not to oppress them. When circumstances required, laws could be
ignored. 19
Quite correctly, the representatives of the States General at the
peace negotiations in Cologne in 1579 argued that the States had not
insisted too rigidly on their rights and privileges as long as the
sovereign ruler and his governors had treated their subjects with
humanity, goodwill and moderation, and had upheld good law. But
when the States perceived hlat the governors and the king's coun-
cillors had taken away all the old rights, levied new taxes, sold offices
to inexperienced and unworthy persons, and that justice was badly ad-
mi.nistered, they had been forced not only to take up arms to defend
themselves but also 'to promote and protect their rights and privileges
with more diligence'.2o The privileges were a weapon in the struggle,
not the main objective. 21
Nonetheless, in the course of the struggle the privileges acquired
such sanctity that they became an end in themselves, even to an extent
that seriously hampered the conduct of the rebel government. When in
October 1577 Ghent requested the restoration of the privileges
abolished in 1540, the States granted this almost immediately. The
Frisians were reluctant to sign the Pacification of Ghent until the
States General had issued an act de non prejudicando guaranteeing
their fiscal privileges. Even though the government of the archduke
Matthias was in desperate need of money for the common struggle
19 R. Fruin, 'Het beleg en ontzet der stad Leiden in 1574', in R. Fruin,
Verspreide geschriften (II vols., The Hague, 1900-5), II, 485.
20 Acta pacijicationis quae coram Caesareae Majestatis commissariis ...
Coloniae habita sunt (Antwerp. 1580), pp. 127-8.
21 This was partially perceived by both Huizinga and Ruter. After the
passage cited above, p. 21, Huizinga continues: 'It was not until the time of
the Revolt, when the concept patria, and the term Netherlands as well,
reverberated with the sound of bells and trumpets, that the limited medieval
concept of freedom grew into an Idea of common striving and suffering, an
idea more restncted and I.:ircumscribed than the eighteenth-century idea of
freedom but certamly not less pure or less effective.' Huizinga clearly means
that more was involved than simply the battIe for the privileges he
characterized, but the nature of the idea of striving together and suffering
together, which the context indicates was also an idea offreedom, is not made
clear. Ruter's remark that in the Eighty Years War the Netherlands fought
not for liberty but for liberties dates from 1941, and was perhaps influenced
by the reading of Huizinga's views published that year in 'Nederland's
beschaving in de zeventiende eeuw'. In his 1946 Inaugural address, Ruter
dropped the contrast between liberty and liberties and saw the privileges as
guarantees of freedom (Historische studies over mens en samenieving, p.
323).
DUTCH PRIVILEGES, REAL AND IMAGINARY 27
against Parma, the Frisians exploited the needs of the central govern-
ment to press far-reaching political demands before they would supply
their contribution. 22 Inconvenient as this was, the insurgents had
blamed the Spaniards so long and so indignantly for their violations of
the privileges that it was very difficult for them to resist a claim based
on the privileges.
In addition to the privileges granting certain rights at the cost of
others and to the local and regional privileges guaranteeing trial by the
proper judge, we must distinguish a third group: the privileges that
were supposed to give burghers some degree of influence on the
municipal authorities. These were the privileges referred to by the civic
guards in 1672 and 1748. But here matters were much more com-
plicated than in the case of the privileges already discussed.
Before the Revolt most of the towns of Holland were administered
by a closed oligarchy, over which body the burghers had no influence.
This was not always so outside Holland. In a city like Groningen the
burghers could make themselves felt as late as the sixteenth century
through the bouwmeesters chosen by the guildsY At Utrecht, in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the guilds had on occasion exer-
cised a very considerable influence on the government of the town.
Charles V had put an end to this when he acquired the secular powers
of the bishop of Utrecht in 1528, but the earlier situation was far from
forgotten. 24 In the towns of Holland, however, the regents had long
had a firm grasp on the helm. Everywhere, the power and the influence
originally exercised by the richest, without distinction, was now held
by a closed college, the vroedschap (council), known variously as the
Forty, the Thirty-Six. etc. according to its numerical strength. When
22 Woltjer, Friesland, pp. 249, 275. The Deputies of the Frisian States
based themselves explicitly on a treaty they said had been concluded between
the Emperor and Friesland in 1522. There had been no treaty in 1522,
however, only negotiations in which a final agreement was not reached
because the Frisian demands had been too high. One wonders whether the
Frisians bargained in good faith: did they really not know that the document
of 1522 had not been signed and that this draft was not legally binding? Or
did they only pretend not to know? Remarkably enough - and this makes it
more likely that the Frisians were dealing honestly - even the Court of
Friesland no longer knew the fine points of the matter, although it must cer-
tainly have had at its disposal the relevant archives (ibid, p. 249, no. 1). Later
too, e.g. in 1581, reference was repeatedly made to the 'privilege of 1522' (De
Vrije Fries, XVII, 214).
23 Alting, Diarium, p. x.
p.18.
30 DUTCH PRIVILEGES, REAL AND IMAGINARY
but as the power of the Protestants grew, more and more Catholics
feared that in the end the Protestants would carry off the victory.
Orange's attempts to reconcile the parties did not succeed. While the
aggressive Protestants and democrats (especially in Ghent) alienated
the Catholics, the king showed himself ready to make far-reaching
concessions. This became clear during the negotiations with the
Walloon provinces, which led in May 1579 to the Peace of Arras, as
well as during the peace negotiations between king and States General
begun in the same month at Cologne, under the Emperor's mediation.
A bitter conflict developed in many towns and provinces over the
question whether the war should be continued or the king's proposals
accepted. Now that the king had shown his willingness to repair the
political grievances, in many cities only a minority was prepared to
continue the fight under the Protestant hegemony, and this minority of
course had little desire to consult the people in any way. At one time
their participation had seemed desirable in order to broaden the basis
of moral responsibility and obtain their support; now that so many
wanted peace, their participation could only be dangerous.
In February 1581 a proposal was under discussion, in the States of
Holland, according to which all officials and inhabitants would be
released from their oath of allegiance to Philip II and the name of the
king banished from official documents. This made the chance of peace
still more remote. The council of Amsterdam decided not to apply the
States' proposal before it had been discussed with the officers of the
civic guards. 42 On 23 March, the very day when the States adopted the
proposal, they also prohibited consultations with the civic guards. It
seems likely that here too there was a connection between the two
decisions. The States were probably afraid that, as Amsterdam had
remained Catholic until 1578, the guards there would oppose the
abjuration of Philip II. Precisely because the magistrates knew that in
many cases they could count only on the active support of a minority,
the ban on consulting the guards was put into practice.
With the establishment of the rebel republic the political risks in-
herent in consulting the corporate bodies gradually diminished.
Nevertheless the town councils of Holland not only adhered to the
decision of the States to exclude the guards from provincial affairs but
extended it to include those of the towns. Of course the problem of
taking decisions remained as difficult as before, but there was still
another more general motive for excluding the guilds and guards that
remained valid after peace was concluded. In general, interference of
the people in the business of government was seen as a source of un-
47 Wille, 'Houten Boek', pp. 1162, 1166, 1173, 1266, 1268. In the
municipal archives of Gouda is still preserved a Houten Bouck with
privileges: J. E. J. Geselschap, I nventaris van het oud-archief van Gouda
(Gouda, 1965), no. 384.
34 DUTCH PRIVILEGES, REAL AND IMAGINARY