DUNCANO vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713)

G.R. No. 191894

Facts:

(1) Danilo A. Duncano – then the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) with salary grade of 26
(2) March 24, 2009 – Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman filed a
case against Duncano
-violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713
-criminally fail to disclose in his SALN or Sworn Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Networth his financial and business interests/connection
in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he
and his family are registered owners
-1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle under the name of his son Vincent
Louis P. Ducano was also not disclosed

Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of 6713

Section 8: Statements and Disclosure - Public officials and employees have an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their
spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.

Section 11: Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he
holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity,
committing any violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal
depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body
or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be
prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
(3) Petitioner filed for Motion to Dismiss with Prayer the issuance of Warrant of Arrest before
respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division admitting that he is a Regional Director with a
salary grade of “26” asserting that under P.D No 1606 as amended by Section 4(a)(1) of RA No.
8249 that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.

Section 4(a)(1) RA 8249:

(a)Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
 (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

a. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and
other provincial department heads;
b. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,
city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department
heads;
c. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
d. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers
of higher rank;
e. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
f. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
g. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations
(4) The Court denied the motion arguing
- that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the
qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive
branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically enumerated
- The term “Regional Director” and “higher” are separated with conjuction “and”
signifying that these two terms are different, apart and distinct

-contended the filing of Motion to dismiss is premature considering that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over the person accused

(5) The petitioner filed for Motion of Reconsideration

(6) The OSP denied the motion and ordered for the issuance of Warrant of Arrest.

Issue:
whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only
Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled against the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan incurring serious error of
jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending
the petitioner from office as Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the violations of Section 3(a)
and (e) of RA 3019 unless committed by a public official and employees holding the position of
Regional Director and higher with a salary grade of 27 in relation to their office.

Crime: Violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 RA 6713 – failure to file Sworn Statement of
Assets, Liabilities and Networth
INOCENTES vs. PEOPLE (Violation of RA 3019)

G.R. No. 205963-64

Facts:

(1) Amando A. Inocentes – Branch Manager

Celestino Cabalitasan – Division Chief III
Ma. Victoria Leonardo – Property Appraiser III
Jerry Balagtas – Senior General Insurance Specialist

All public officers of Government Service Insurance System in Tarlac City Field Office

(2) Committed crime taking advantage of their official functions conspiring and confederating
with Jose De Guzman by giving undue preference, benefit or advantage to accused Jose De
Guzman
(3) The accused processed and approved housing loans to 491 borrowers of De Guzman’s
housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program amounting to 241, 053, 600 pesos
knowing that said borrowers are unqualified and were not under the territorial jurisdiction of
Tarlac City Field Office.
(4) As well as granting loans under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program to 53 borrowers of De
Guzman’s land development project known as Teresa Homes amounting to 52, 107, 000
pesos despite the knowledge of the fact that the lots covered were intended for commercial
purposes by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of 33, 242, 848.36 pesos of the land
and buildings offered as collateral
(5) The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause and ordered the issuance of
Warrant of Assert of the accused.
(6) Inocentes, avoiding incarceration, immediately posted bail.
(7) Inocentes filed an omnibus motion for
(a) For judicial determination of probable cause
(b) To quash information filed against him
(c) Dismiss the case for violating his right to the speedy disposition of the case

Arguments:
(1) Alleged acts were not specified
(2) No evidence of conspiracy with Jose De Guzman
(3) Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction as Inocentes is holding a position with a salary grade
of 26 and does not fall under the enumerated positions in Section 4(a) o RA 8249
specifically under the managers of GOCCs because his position as Department Manager
cannot be placed in the same category with presidents, director, trustees and managers.
(4) Case must be dismissed because his right for speedy disposition was violated since 7
years has lapsed from the time of filing of the initial complaint

Ruling:
1. Sandiganbayan denied the accused’s omnibus motion.
2. Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the accused’s motion to quash because conspiracy
was not the crime charged but only the mode of committing the crime which did not need any
specific recitations of particularities and Inocentes as department manager of GSIS, a
GOCC, falls under the Section 4(a)(1) (g) of RA8249 stating that Presidents, director or
trustees, managers of GOCCs, state universities and educational institutions despite his
salary grade of less than 27.
3. Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction the moment the accused posted bail
tantamount to voluntary surrender
 4. The Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case within a reasonable
time after it has acquired jurisdiction over the case
-The reason was the information was filed first at the RTC of Tarlac City and transfer to
Sandiganbayan took 6 years

Crime: Violation of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

EDGAR CRISOSTOMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Murder)

G.R. No. 152398

Facts:

(1) SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo – member of the Philippine National Police and jail guard in Solano
Municipal Jail
(2) Charged with the murder of Renato Suba – a detention prisoner at Solano Municipal Jail
(3) Conspired with Dominador dela Cruz, Efren Perez, Raki Anggo, Randy Lumabo, Rolando
Norberte, and Mario Calingayan who were inmates in Solano Municipal Jail
 (4) Attacked and assaulted Renato Suba using rough-surfaced instruments including fist blows,
inflicting serious injuries in his internal organs specifically the liver, stomach and messentry
resulting to his death
(5) The accused pleaded NOT GUILTY.
(6) Sandiganbayan charged Crisostomo with murder with penalty of imprisonment of 12 years, 5
months and 11 days, pricion mayosr minimum, to 18 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, maximum

Issue:

(1) Whether Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case charged against the accused
Crisostomo who at the time of the filing of information against him, was a Senior Police
Officer 1.
(2) Whether Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ruled that Crisostomo is guilty of having conspired in the murder of
Renato Suba despite the Sandiganbayan’s admission in its decision that there is lack of
evidence that will show the participation of the accused in the death of the victim

Ruling:

(1) The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the case.

-There is an intimate relation of the offense and the office of the accused. Crisostomo as a jail
guard has the to ensure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the
jail. Crisostomo could have not conspired with the inmates if he were not a “jailer”.
-This is in the relation of the Deputy Ombudsman’s resolution that
(a) Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato was killed
(b) from the time that Crisostomo assumed his duty up to the discovery of Renato’s body,
no one had entered the jail and no one could enter the jail, as it was always locked,
without the permission of the jail guard
(c)the key is always with the jail guard
(d) Renato sustained severe and multiple injuries inflicted by two or more persons
indicating conspiracy
(d) the relative position of the jail guard to the cell is in such a way that any activity
inside the cell could be heard if not seen by the jail guard

(2) However, the prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo and Calingayan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
- It must be proven beyond reasonable doubt that Crisostomo’s action and inaction were all
part of a scheme to murder Renato.
-To prove that Renato’s death is a case of homicide or murder, there should have an
inconvertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that he was deliberately killed. Intent can be
deduced from the weapons used by the malefactors, nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim and the words of the malefactors before or after the time of killing.
-in this case, prosecution established that Renato did not commit suicide
-witnesses vouched for Renato’s good health prior to his death
-Calingayan, sole witness, did not point out anything wrong with Renato prior to his death
-autopsy and exhumation reports debunked the defense’s theory that Renato committed
suicide
 -Renato’s injury were massive and grave that it would have been impossible for Renato
to self-inflict (ruptured liver, torn messentry, and torn stomach)
-the severe injuries indicated deliberate intent to kill
-the exhumation report findings stated that Renato died due to hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple organ failure that lead to the inevitable conclusion that Renato was
killed with deliberate intent
(3) Thus, acquitting Crisostomo and Calingayan.
-However, since no conspiracy was proven to exist in this case, the perpetrators of the crime
needed to be identified and their independent acts had to be proven.
-The two circumstances that were held against Calingayan are not sufficient proof that
Calingayan was one of the inmates who killed Renato

ESTEBAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (violation of Anti-Sexual Harassment Law)

G.R. Nos. 146646-49

Facts:

(1) Ana May V. Simbajon – was a casual employee of the City Government of Cabanatuan City
-was detailed in Municipal Trial Court in Cities in Branch 1 Cabanatuan City
upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Rogelio Esteban
-applied for the bookbinder position which the petitioner Esteban did not take
any action on the application
-she approached the petitioner up to his chamber to follow up on her
application but was told "Ano naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko
 rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa opisina
ko, at araw-araw, isang halik."
-refused to accede with the proposal since she considered the petitioner like
her father
(2) Petitioner, nonetheless, recommended her for the appointment. He kissed her on the left
cheek that left Ana May shocked and swear to never return or talk to the petitioner
(3) On August 5, 1997, Ana May was informed by Virginia Medina, court interpreter, that she was
being called buy the petitioner in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she
complied.
(4) Arriving at the chambers, she was then asked by the petitioner if she was receiving her salary
as a bookbinder which she answered in affirmative.
(5) The petitioner answered "Matagal na pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko?
Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?"
(6) Ana May protested to the proposal saying that the petitioner is like a father to her and is a
married man with two sons
(7) Petitioner then grabbed Ana May and started kissing her all over her face grabbing her right
breast saying her loves her.
(8) Ana May filed for two information for Violation of RA 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of
1995) in the Sandiganbayan and two information for Act of Lasciviousness
(9) Petitioner filed for Motion to Quash Information for Act of Lasciviousness on the ground that
he was been placed four times in jeopardy for the same offense
(10) The petition was denied by Sandiganbayan but directed the prosecution to determine the
charges were committed in relation to the petitioner’s function as a judge.
(11) The prosecution filed Amended information against the petitioner

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case of Act of Lasciviousness filed
against the petitioner

Argument:
Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in relation to
his office as a judge and that the fact that he is a public official is not an essential element of
the crime charged.

Ruling:
 The Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction of the case as the offense was committed in relation
to the accused’s public office. The accused would not have committed the crime if it were
not for the fact that he is the Presiding Judge of MTCC Branch 1, Cabanatuan City who has
the authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder .

BONIFACIO vs. RTC MAKATI Branch 149 (Libel)

G.R. No. 184800

Facts:

(1) Winona Bonifacio – an officer of the Parents Enabling Parents Group, Inc was charged of 13
counts of libel.
(2) The 13 counts of libel are filed by Jessie John Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and
of the Malayan Insurance, Co.
(3) PEPCI is a large group composed of disgruntled planner of PPI or Pacific Plans, Inc which was a
subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance that is owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies
who had previously purchased traditional pre-need educations plans that they are unable to
collect due to liquidity concerns.
(4) PEPCI filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for the suspension of payments in RTC
Makati.
(5) Because PPI did not honor its obligations, PEPCI provided a forum by which the planholders
can cry out their redress for their loss under the PPI policies by maintaining a website with an
address of www.pepcoalition.com
(6) Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also managed an internet blog spot under the website
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com as well as a yahoo e-group
no2pep2010@yahoogroups.com which are easily accessible on the internet.
(7) Gimenez allegedly was able to read a malicious and derogatory article against the Yuchengco
stating that Yuchengco duped the planholders and that only the Yuchengco benefitted from
the negotiation further saying that Yuchengco’s should not be trusted and that the
planholders might get killed the next time.
(8) The Makati City Prosecutor’s Office found probable cause to indict the accused filed 13
information charging them with LIBEL.
(9) Several of the accused appealed for petition to review to the Secretary of Justice.
(10) The Secretary of Justice opined that there is no “internet libel” hence the accused could not
be charged with libel under Article 353 of the RPC.
(11) The petitioner filed for Motion to Quash Information stating that it failed to vest jurisdiction
on Makati RTC and failed to allege a particular place within the trial’s court jurisdiction where the
article is printed and first published
(12) RTC Makati quashed the information as it lacked allegations that the offended parties reside
in Makati at the time of the commission of the offense.
(13) The prosecution filed an Amended Information citing the venue of the website and where the
Gimenez was able to access the libelous article.

Issues:

(1) whether petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition
dismissible
(2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s admission of the
Amended Information

Information or complains containing Libel allegation should contain whether the offended party
was a public official or a private individual, and where he was residing at the time of the
commission of the offense.

Ruling:
The respondent, Makati RTC, committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion
to quash the Amended information because for the Court to hold that the Amended Information
sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article
was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations
where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed. 1avvp
DISINI JR. vs. SECRETARY of JUSTICE (Cybercrime Act Law)

G.R. No. 203335

Facts:

(1) Cybercrime Law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for
research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general
public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from
them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
 4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock
exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.

(2) the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities
violate certain of their constitutional rights
(3) The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system
(4) The Court extended the Temporary Restraining Order to 120 days.

Issue:

(1) Whether the following provisions of the RA 10175 Cybercrime Law are constitutional
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.

Rulings:

1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.

2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet
in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
 d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the
Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and communications
technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service providers to preserve
traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination of computer data under a
court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the
expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect
to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others
who simply receive the post and react to it; and
2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes
as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4)
on System

JIMENEZ vs. SORONGON (Illegal Recruitment)

G.R. No. 178607

Facts:

(1) Petitioner Dante La. Jimenez – president of Unlad Shipping and Management Corporation
(2) Respondents Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, Markous Avgoustis are
some of the incorporators of Tsakos Maritimine Services, Inc which is a local manning
agency.
(3) Jimenez filed for complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong
City against the respondents for the alleged illegal recruitment and false representing their
stockholdings in TMSI’s article of incorporations to secure a license in operating a
recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
(4) Antzoulatos and Gaza filed for their counter-affidavit.
(5) May 4, 2004 – the 3rd Assistant Prosecutor recommended for the filing of information for
syndicated and large-scale ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT which was approved by the City
 Prosecutor and filed the criminal information in the RTC of Mandaluyong City presided by
Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali
(6) December 14, 2004 – The City Prosecutor filed a motion with RTC to withdraw the
information. The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition.
(7) August 1, 2005 – RTC denied the withdraw the information as it found a probable cause to
hold the respondents on trial ordering the issuance the Warrant of Arrest against the
respondents
(8) August 26, 2005 – Antzoulatos and Gaza filed for omnibus motion for reconsideration and for
the enforcement of warrant of arrest which was denied by the RTC reiterating that the court
is the sole judge whether a criminal case is dismissed or not
(9) September 26, 2005 – respondent Alamil filed for a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause

(10) September 29, 2005 – the petitioner filed his opposition motion to expunge, contending that
Respondent Alamil has no standing to seek relief from the RTC being a fugitive of justice.
(11) September 30, 2005 – Alamil’s motion was denied for being moot and academic
(12) October 10, 2005 – Alamil filed for motion of reconsideration and inhibition of Judge Capco-
Umali for being bias or partial.
(13) January 4, 2006 – Judge Capco-Umali voluntary inhibited herself from the case. The case
is later then re-raffled to Branch 214 which was presided by Judge Capco-Umali.

Issue:

whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition
for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.

Rulings:

RTC – motions filed by the petitioner were denied as the petitioner filed the motion to expunge
without the conformity with the Officer of Solicitor General who has the right to represent the People
of the Philippines

CA – petitioner filed notice of appeal which was denied for the lack of legal personality to file the
petition in behalf of the People of the Philippines noting that only the Office of the Solicitor General
who has the legal personality and that the petitioner is not the real offended party to institute the
case being not a victim of the crime charge but a mere competitor.

Supreme Court -
(1) The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
-the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the
main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary
interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal
action against the respondents

-This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG.

(2) Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction

-by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ (Murder – Homicide)

G.R. No. 175602

Facts:

(1) Accused PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez were tried for 3 counts of Murder
by the RTC Branch 86 in Quezon City.
(2) Convicted with penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for each count and ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim 93,000 actual damages, 50,000 civil indemnity and
50,000 moral damages.
(3) CA upheld the RTC subject to the modification that each of the accused pay the
heirs of the victim, 50,000 civil indemnity, 50,000 moral damages, 25,000
temperate damages, 25,000 exemplary damages.
(4) The accused filed their final appeal but accused Edwin Valdez filed motion to
withdraw his appeal which was granted by court.
(5) The court promulgated its judgement finding Eduardo Valdez guilty of 3 counts for
HOMICIDE and sentenced with 10 years of pricion mayor as minimum to 17 years
reclusion temporal as maximum.
(6) Accused Edwin Valdez sent a self-explanatory letter to the Court of Administrator
where he petitioned for the application of judgment on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused
(7) In his letter, he stated that he withdrew his appeal thinking that there has no hope
for him but was wrong when he read the decision of the 1 st Division of the
Supreme signed by CJ Renato Corona where he found hope.
(8) He seeks for help that the decision of the Supreme Court to his brother accused
Eduardo Valdez would also benefit him through Rule 122 Section 11(a).

Section 11(a) Rule 122:

"(a) An Appeal taken by the one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and applicable
to the latter

(9) OSG interposed no opposition to Edwin’s plea for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences.

Issue:

In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the State’s witnesses by pointing to inconsistencies and
weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between the accused; and contends that
the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling:

(1) The Supreme Court affirms the convictions but found PO2 guilty only of 3 counts of homicide due
to the failure of the information to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery
-Treachery is one element of Murder

(2) The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not in the caption, the preamble or the
specification of the law violated but by the actual recital of facts.
-The information or complaint is sufficient if the ff are stated:
(a) the name of the accused
(b) the designation of the offense given by the statute
(c)name of the offended party
(d) the acts or omissions complained constituting the offense
(e)approximate time of the commission of the offense
(f) place where the offense was committed

(3) Since there is no circumstances in modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its medium
period charging Edwin Valdez guilty of 3 counts of homicide sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment of 10 years of pricion mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal and to pay the heirs
of the victim 50,000 civil indemnity, 50,000 moral damages and 25, 000 temperate damages for
each count
MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (violation of RA 3019)

G.R. No. 172035

Facts:

(1) Petitioner Fernando Miguel, former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato,
was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in
connection to the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal
City Public Market project by then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lumido in the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao.
(2) The Ombudsman ordered the accused to file his counter-affidavit which the petitioner
complied after an extension
(3) July 29, 1999 – The Ombudsman found a probable cause against the petitioner and
some of the private individuals for violation of RA No 3019 and against the petitioner
alone the Falsification of Documents under Article 171 Part 4 of the RPC
 Article 171 Part 4 Falsification by Public Officers, Employees or Notary or Ecclesiastic Minister
(4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts

(4) In the information filed by the Ombudsman, the accused petitioner give unwarranted benefits
and advantages by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to
provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and
Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of
said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants
from participating in said prequalification
(5) The OSP conducted a reinvestigation.
(6) The petitioner filed for the moving of reinvestigation which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan.
(7) The petitioner was given 10 days extension to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP which
the petitioner asked for a 30 day-extension to submit his counter-affidavit which was again
granted.
(8) Before the petition expires, the petitioner again asked for additional 30 day-extension which
was granted. Despite the granting of extension, the petitioner again asked for a 20 day-
extension.
(9) Even with the extensions granted, the petitioner failed to submit his counter-affidavit
prompting the Prosecutor Norberto Ruiz to declare that the petitioner waived his right to
submit countervailing evidence.

Issues:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid; and

2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.

Ruling:

(1) The information of violation of RA 3019 is valid.

(2) The pre-suspension is valid through Section 13 RA 3019

Section 13 RA 3019

Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension,
unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him

- The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and
the consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other
position papers which the petitioner failed to comply with
- "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings.
 - -The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed
as a result of judicial proceedings

PEOPLE vs. SORIA (Rape by Sexual Assault)

G.R. No. 179031

Facts:

(1) Benjamin Soria was charged of Rape by Sexual Assault committed against his
daughter, a minor, age 7 years old by inserting his penis to the complainant’s
genital
(2) Accused pleaded NOT GUILTY.

Crime: Rape by Sexual Assault

 (3) RTC found the accused Guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was sentenced with
Death Penalty and had to suffer the indemnity the offended party of 75,000, moral
damages for 50,000 and exemplary damages of 25,000.
(4) CA was convinced that AAA was raped however, the prosecution failed to present
her birth certificate proving her minority concluding that the crime committed was
a simple rape and modified the penalty from Death to Reclusion Perpetua and
reduced the civil indemnity from 75,000 to 50,000.
(5) Accused filed for an appeal arguing that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO OVERTHROW
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE X X X.
II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON HIM.

-The accused appealed that he should be acquitted for the lack of evidence to establish the
fact of sexual intercourse asserting the failure to prove penile contact and the medical report
even revealed that AAA’s hymen is still intact and that there was no notable lacerations or
external injuries.

Ruling:

(1) The crime charged is Rape through Article 266-A of the RPC. Rape can be committed by
Sexual Intercourse or Sexual Assault.

Article 266-A:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

(2) Despite the information not specifying whether the rape was committed through sexual
intercourse or sexual assault, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was
committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal
of the case

(2) The Accused committed Rape by Sexual Assault.

The following are the elements of rape by sexual assault:

(1) That the offender commits an act of sexual assault;

(2) That the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means:
 (a) By inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or
(b) By inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person;
(3) That the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) By using force and intimidation;
(b) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
(d) When the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.

-We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument
or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
something was inserted into her vagina.

(3) The Accused was found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Rape by Sexual Assault with a
sentence of imprisonment of 12 years pricion mayor as minimum to 20 years reclusion temporal
as maximum and a reduced pay of 30,000 civil indemnity, 30,000 moral damages, and 30,000
exemplary damages.
"AAA" is entitled to an interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Concurring Opinion:
The Appellant-Accused should be acquitted of the crime Rape by Sexual Assault but instead be
convicted of a lesser crime and crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness because the prosecution failed
to establish reasonable doubt on the element of carnal knowledge. The evidences on record
show all the elements of the crime Acts of Lasciviousness.

-the records bear out that only AAA’s clothes were removed and not the underwear during the
incident
-the medico-legal did not point out an object or an instrument have been inserted into the victim’s
private part and notably, Dr. Supe declared that the victim’s other activities like riding a bicycle
could lead to hyperemic hymen if a friction is applied in the area further pointing out that the
victim was to be “in virgin state” thus failing to establish the medical basis for finding of rape by
sexual assault

UNION BANK vs. PEOPLE (Perjury)

G.R. No. 192565

Facts:

(1) Desi Tomas – was charged in court for Perjury under Article 183 of the RPC in
making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping
(2) The accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for writ of replevin of the MTC in
 Pasay City that the Union Bank has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency
(3) The petition stemmed from the 2 complaints filed by Union Bank against spouses
Eddie and Eliza Tamodiong and a John Doe.
(4) Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
against Forum Shopping
(5) The petitioner filed for Motion to Quash Information on two grounds:
(a) the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and
not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case
(b) the facts charged do not constitute an offense
(b.1) the third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood – was not alleged with particularity
without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency
(b.2) there was no other action or proceeding pending in
another court when the second complaint was filed
(b.3) was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while
the allegations in the Information make out perjury by making
a false affidavit.

Issues:

what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be –

Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized, or

Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court

Ruling:

(1) MeTC- Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the perjury
case against the petitioners.

Venue is determined into two-way fold:

(a) the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
(b) Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice of
having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available

- Where the offense was committed

- Where the essential ingredients of the offense took place

Perjury:

Elements:
 (a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter - the execution of the subject Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the
Information to have been committed in Makati City
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath. – the oath was also sufficiently alleged in the Information to
have been made in Makati City
(c)That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood - willful and deliberate falsehood was also sufficiently alleged to have been
committed in Makati City, not Pasay City
(d)That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose -the notarization of the Certificate of Forum Shopping was also sufficiently
alleged in the Information to have been made in Makati City

-The Information sufficiently support that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within
the territorial jurisdiction of MeTC – Makati City

-the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of
the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed
-committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given
- If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place
where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the
oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed

Crime: Perjury

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE (Reckless Imprudence)

G.R. No. 192123

Facts:

(1) Dr. Fernando Solidum – a physician anesthesiologist was charged with Reckless
Imprudence for the sustained injury of Gerald Albert Gercayo, 3 years old, at the time
of commission of the offense, in which the victim lost his sight, hearing and
movement.
 (2) Gerald Albert Gercayo was born with an imperforate anus or no anal opening who
undergone colostomy which is a surgical procedure that will bring out the end of the
large intestine through the abdominal wall enabling Gercayo to excrete in a colostomy
bag.
(3) Gercayo was admitted in the Ospital ng Maynila and undergone a pull through
operation where Dr. Solidum was the assigned anesthesiologist.
(4) During the operation, Gercayo suffered bradycardia and fell into coma which lasted
for 2 weeks but gained consciousness only after a month where he could no longer
see, hear and move.
(5) Gercayo’s mother filed a complaint for Reckless Imprudence resulting in physical
injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office in Manila against the attending physicians.
(6) The City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr. Fernando Solidum
alleging that Solidum failed and neglected to use proper care by failing to regulate and
monitor properly the level of anesthesia administered to the victim and using 100%
halothane causing the victim to fall into cardiac arrest and sustain a defect called
hypoxic encephalopathy.
(7) The information was filed first in MTC but was transferred to RTC in pursuant to
Section 5 RA 8639 or The Family Courts Act of 1997

RTC:
- Ruled that Dr. Solidum was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting to serious physical injury and sentenced with imprisonment of 10 months
and 1 day, arresto mayor as minimun and 1 year 1 month and 1 day, pricion
correctional as maximum and indemnity of 500,000 moral damages and 100,000
exemplary damages to private complainant Luz Gercayo together with Dr. Marichu
Abella and Dr. Anita So.
- Drs. So and Abella filed for reconsideration of solidary liability which was granted by
RTC and excluding them of the liabilities.

CA:
- This case is an example of Res Ipsa Loquitor

Issues:

(a) whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein
(b) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence

Ruling:

(1) The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate.

Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine.

Res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are
themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that
harm.

Applicability of Res Ipsa Loquitor:

(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and
 (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the
person injured

(2) Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury

Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act

Elements of Medical Negligence:

(a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient,

(b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the
applicable standard of care;
(c) there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent
act or omission and the resulting injury;
(d) the damages suffered by the patient

Dr. Solidum was acquitted with the crime Reckless Imprudence charged against and makes
no pronouncement on the cost of suit
-There were no factual and legal bases in finding the accused criminally liable of Reckless
Imprudence but the civil liability stems from the speculation on the cause of hypoxia

CASTILLO vs. SALVADOR (Estafa but with the civil liability in question)

G.R. No. 191240

Facts:

(1) The Accused petitioner Phillip R. Salvador was charged with the crime of Estafa
defrauding complainant Cristina B. Castillo in the amount of 100,000 US Dollar to
invest into remittance business in the name of the accused in Hongkong.
 (2) Representing to the complainant that accused will personally take charge of the
operations and marketing of the said business assuring her of huge profits
(3) The said amount was misappropriated and converted to the accused personal gain
(4) The accused together with his brother Ramon Salvador pleaded NOT GUILTY
(5) RTC Branch 202 Las Pinas City found the accused Phillip Salvador was found Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for Estafa and sentenced an imprisonment of 4 years 2
months 1-day pricion correctional to 20 years of reclusion temporal with the indemnity
of 100,000 US dollars or its equivalent to Philippine currency
(6) Ramon Salvador was acquitted for insufficient evidence
(7) Respondent appealed his conviction to CA which the CA reversing the decision of RTC and
acquitting Philip Salvador of the crime of Estafa.
(8) Petitioner Castillo filed a petition on the civil aspect of the case alleging that the trial court
was correct in convicting him of the crime that even if the court of appeals decided to acquit
the accused, it should have at least retained its award for damages.

Issue:

Whether there is a civil liability on the acquitted criminal action.

Ruling:

(1) Petitioner’s petition is denied as the Supreme Court find no reversible error committed by the
CA in its findings.

2 kinds of acquittal;
(a) acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of -This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who
has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission
(b) acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused- even if the
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only

-A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

-The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as
would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant

DY vs. PEOPLE (2 counts of Estafa and 2 counts of BP 22 or Bouncing Check Law)

G.R. No. 158312

Facts:

(1) Petitioner John Dy is distributor of W.L Foods under business Dyna Marketing and would
usually pay either in cash or check which at times entrusted to one of his drivers.
 (2) Dy’s driver went to the branch office of W.L Foods to pick up stock of foods amounting to
106, 579.60 pesos through a signed blank Far East Bank and Trust Company check with
check #553602 postdated July 1, 2022. He again picked up stock of foods amounting to 226,
794.36 through a signed blank FEBTC check with check #553615 postdated July 31, 2002.
(3) Evelyon Ong, accountant of W.L Foods filled up the amount in the checks based on the
amount of the goods delivered.
(4) When presented with the payment, FEBTC dishonored the checks for insufficiency of funds.
(5) FEBTC-Naga branch manager, Raul Gonzalez, notified Atty. Jimeno, legal counsel of W.L
Foods of the dishonor. Apparently, the available balance of Dy’s account is 2,000.
(6) Later, Gonzalez sent another letter to Atty. Jimeno advising her that FEBTC check #553602
for 106, 579. 60 was returned to the drawee bank due for the reason of stop payment order
and drawn against uncollected deposit (DAUD).
(7) William Lim, the owner of W.L Foods, phoned John Dy about the matter which the latter
explained that he cannot pay since he had no funds yet.
(8) Lim charged Dy with 2 counts of Estafa and 2 counts of violation of BP 22.
(9) Dy was arrested in Naga City and pleaded not guilty.

RTC: John Dy was found Guilty beyond reasonable doubt

2 counts of Estafa:
CCN. Q-93-46711 - 10 years 1 day to 12 years of pricion mayor as minimum to 20
years of reclusion perpetua as maximum
CCN. Q-93-46713 - 10 years 1 day to 12 years pricion mayor as minimum to 30
years reclusion perpetua

2 counts of violation of BP 22: 1 year imprisonment and a fine of 333, 373.96

Plus, and interest of 12% per annum from September 28, 1992 until fully paid.

CA: Affirmed the court but modified the sentence and deleted the payment of interests.

2 counts of Estafa:
CCN. Q-93-46711 - imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum plus eight (8)
years in excess of [P]22,000.00
CCN. Q-93-46713 - imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to thirty (30) years as maximum

2 counts of violation of BP 22:

CCN Q-93-46712 - suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify W.L. Food
Products the amount of 106, 579.60
CCN Q-93-46714 - imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify W.L. Food Products
the amount of 226, 794.35

Issue:

whether John Dy is liable for estafa and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Ruling:

(1) Is Petitioner guilty of Estafa?

 Petitioner is guilty of estafa with regard to FEBTC Check No. 553615 for P226,794.36.

But not with FEBTC Check No. 553602 for P106,579.60.

-Petitioner had P160,659.39 in his savings deposit account ledger as of July 22, 1992
which was sufficient for payment at the time.
-There is no prima facie evidence of deceit in this instance because the check was not
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds but of uncollected deposit.

Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code

Estafa is committed when a check is dishonored for being drawn against
insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit.

(2) Is Petitioner liable for BP 22?

Undoubtedly, Dy violated B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553615. When said check
was dishonored for insufficient funds and stop payment order, petitioner did not pay or make
arrangements with the bank for its payment in full within five (5) banking days.

Petitioner should be exonerated, however, for issuing FEBTC Check No. 553602, which was
dishonored for the reason DAUD or drawn against uncollected deposit. When the check was
presented for payment, it was dishonored by the bank because the check deposit made by
petitioner, which would make petitioner's bank account balance more than enough to cover the
face value of the subject check, had not been collected by the bank.

To be liable under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The petitioner was ACQUITTED from CCN. Q-93-64711 and CCN Q-93-64712 but was
ORDERED to pay W.L Foods the amount of 106,579.60 for the goods.

CCN Q-93-64713 - indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to
thirty (30) years of reclusión perpetua, as maximum.

CCN Q-93-64714 - one (1) year imprisonment and ordered to indemnify W.L. Foods in the
amount
of P226,794.36.

LIM vs. KOU CO PING (Estafa with civil liablities)

G.R. No. 175256

Facts:
 (1) The Petitioner Lily Lim was sold 50,000 bags of cement for 64.00 pesos each amounting to
3.2M by accused Kou Co Ping
(2) Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja),
sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of ₱
3.15 million or ₱ 63.00 per bag.
(3) Lim withdraw the bags on a staggering basis.
(4) She withdrew 2,800 bags of cement and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities
covering 10,000 bags to Co.
(5) FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal
authorities.
(6) Lim filed complaint against Co charging the accused of Estafa with the intent to defraud her.
(7) Lim paid 2,380,800 for the 37,200 bags of cement under the obligation to deliver the 37,200
bags
(8) Co did not comply with his obligation and misappropriated and failed to return the said
amount.
(9) RTC Branch 154 of Pasig City acquitted Co of the Estafa charge for insufficient evidence and
relieved Co of the civil liability to Lim.
(10) Lim filed for reconsideration which was denied and filed her notice of appeal on the civil
aspect
of the criminal case

(a) BREACH OF CONTRACT

(b) ABUSE OF RIGHTS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(c) MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES and ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
OF SUIT

Issue:

Whether Lim committed Forum Shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and
damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa

Ruling:

Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 (reversal of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138)
is GRANTED.

The assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Lily Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals
is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.

Charlie Co’s Petition G.R. No. 179160 is DENIED. The assailed April 10, 2007 Decision of the
Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93395 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Civil Liabilities:

-A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender
 (a) civil liability ex delicto - civil liability arising from the criminal offense
under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
- If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until
the final outcome of the criminal action
(b) independent civil liability - civil liability that may be pursued
independently
of the criminal proceedings

(b.1) when the civil action is based on an

obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as felony
(b.2) cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries

CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA (Reckless Imprudence with civil liability)

G.R. No. 145391

Facts:

(1) Two drivers, the petitioner Roberto Capitulo and Avelino Casupanan and the accused
Mario Llavore Laroya were involved in an accident.
(2) Two cases were filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Capas, Tarlac.
(3) The respondent Laroya filed a criminal case of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
damage property against Capitulo and Casupanan while petitioners Capitulo and
Casupanan for civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict.
(4) The civil case was filed while the criminal case was on its preliminary investigation.
(5) Laroya filed for motion to dismiss civil case on the ground of Forum Shopping which
was granted by the MCTC.
(6) Capitulo and Casupanan filed for Motion of Reconsideration insisting that the civil
case filed is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case.
(7) The MCTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
(8) Capitulo and Casupanan filed for petition of certiorari under Rule 65 Rules of Court
before RTC Branch 66 Capas, Tarlac assailing the MCTC’s dismissal.
(9) Capas RTC denied the petition for certiorari for lack of merit stating that the proper
remedy is an appeal.
(10) Capitulo and Casupanan filed for another motion for reconsideration which was again
denied by the Capas RTC.

Issue:

Whether the accused in appending criminal case for reckless imprudence can file simultaneously
and independently a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case

Ruling:

The petition was Granted and Civil Case No 2089 is Reinstated.

- the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission(civil ex-delicto and civil
case for quasi-delict)

-the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case as expressly allowed in Section 1(6) of Rule 111

Section 6(1) Rule 111:

No counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.

CATERPILLAR INC. vs. SAMSON (Unfair Competition under the Intellectual Property Code)
G.R. No. 205972

G.R. No. 164352

Facts:

(1) Caterpillar is a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and distribution of footwear,
clothing and related items, among others.
(2) Samson, doing business under the names and styles of Itti Shoes Corporation, Kolm's
Manufacturing Corporation and Caterpillar Boutique and General Merchandise, is the
proprietor of various retail outlets in the Philippines selling footwear, bags, clothing, and
related items under the trademark "CATERPILLAR", registered in 1997 under Trademark
Registration No. 64705 issued by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO).

Issues:

(1) whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court a quo did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in suspending the criminal proceedings on account of a
prejudicial question
(2) whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary
of Justice finding that there was no probable cause to charge Samson with unfair
competition

Ruling:

(1) The Court grants the Petition to review G.R. No. 164352
- Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud, and such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
-Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 did not operate as a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-108043-44
- At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other
- a civil action for damages and cancellation of trademark cannot be considered a
prejudicial question by which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases for
unfair competition

Prejudicial Question:
which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issues to be determined in the criminal case

Elements:
(a) a previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar to or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed

(2) DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 205972
- the petition for review under Rule 43 was erroneous, and the egregious error
warranted the denial of the appeal
- the Secretary of Justice, in the review of the findings of probable cause by the
investigating public prosecutor, was not exercising a quasi-judicial function, but
performing an executive function
- grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction
PEOPLE vs. ROMERO (Estafa and violation of BP 22)

G.R. No. 112985

Facts:

(1) The accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto Rodriguez, being the General Manager and
Operation Manager of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation
(SAIDECOR), respectively, in conspiracy defraud Ernesto A. Ruiz to invest his money
amounting to 150,000 with a promise of 800% return within 21 days in the issuance of
Butuan City Rural Bank Check #158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount of
1,200,000.
(2) The said check was dishonored for insufficient fund and the accused failed and refused to
pay or redeem the check. The amount in words indicated in the said check was 1,000, 200
instead of the amount in figures 1,200,000.
(3) The City Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed for information against accused Martin Romero and
Ernesto Rodriguez with RTC Butuan City with charge of Estafa as well 2 counts of violation
of BP 22.
(4) The accused pleaded not guilty.
(5) Complainant Ernesto Ruiz and Daphne Parrocho, usher and collector, testified for the
prosecution.

RTC Butuan ruling:

(1) Accused Romero and Rodriguez are acquitted from the violation of BP 22.
(2) Accused Romero and Rodriguez are Guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case
3808 Estafa under PD 1689 for widescale swindling and sentenced with life
imprisonment and ordered jointly to return to Ruiz the amount of 150,000 with interest of
12% and 10,000 moral damages.
(6) The accused filed for notice of appeal.
(7) During the pendency of appeal, Ernesto Rodriguez died extinguishing his criminal and civil
liability ex delicto.

Issue:
Whether accused Romero criminally liable for Estafa under PD 1689
Whether accused Rodriguez is still liable for civil liability in his death

Ruling:

Article 315 Paragraph 2(d) states that:

Elements of Estafa:
1) a check was postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time it was issued;
2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check
3) damage to the payee thereof

Deceit is a specific of fraud. It is actual fraud, and consists in any false representation or contrivance
whereby one person overreaches and misleads another, to his hurt. Deceit excludes the idea of
mistake.
There was deception when accused fraudulently represented to complainant that his investment with
the corporation would have an 800% return in 15 or 21 days.

Ambiguity in the amount in words and figures in checks:

The rule in the Negotiable Instruments Law is that when there is ambiguity in the amount in
words and the amount in figures, it would be the amount in words that would prevail. In this
case.

It is to be noted that one of the accused-appellant, Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal.

The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted on a
source of obligation other than delicit.

The Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the appealed judgement.

-indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of pricion mayor as minimum to 16 years and 1
day reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz amounting to 150,000
with an interest of 6% to paid starting from September 14, 1989 until fully paid, 20,000 for
moral damages and 15,000 exemplary damages

- the prosecution failed to clearly establish that the corporation was a syndicate, as defined under
the law. The penalty of life imprisonment cannot be imposed.

What would be applicable in the present case is the second paragraph of a Presidential Decree No.
1689, Section 1, which provides that:

When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty imposable shall
be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount of the fraud exceeds
100,000 pesos.
MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE (Perjury with Prejudicial Question)

G.R. No. 148072

Facts:

(1) Accused Francisco Magestrado was charged with Perjury by Elena M. Librojo with the
Office of Prosecutor of Quezon City for subscribing and swearing to Affidavit of Loss
before Notary Public Erlinda B. Espejo of Quezon City falsely alleging that he lost
Owner’s Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163 which document was used in
support of a Petition for Issuance of New Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Certificate of
Title.
(2) The property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title N-173163 was mortgaged to Elena
M. Librojo as a collateral for a loan in the amount of 758, 134.42.
(3) The petitioner filed for motion to suspend proceedings based on prejudicial
questions.
(4) There are still two civil cases filed that must be resolved first before proceeding since the
issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the
criminal action.

Civil Cases:
(a) Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84
(b) Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and
Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Orders of Judge Estrella T. Estrada dated March 14, 2000 denying petitioner’s
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and her subsequent Order dated
December 21, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed can only be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals thru appeal under Section 10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

2. Whether or not Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City,
had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in denying
the Petition for Certiorari and petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration on the ground of a
prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the prevailing jurisprudence.

Ruling:

(1) The assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
(2) The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with
the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings
therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against petitioner.
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL (Frustrated Parricide with Annulment of Marriage)

G.R. No. 172060

Facts:

(1) Petitioner Joselito Pimentel is charged of Frustrated Parricide filed by his wife Maria
Chrysantine Pimentel before the RTC of Quezon City branch 223 docketed Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415
(2) The petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo City Branch 72
for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 for the Nullity of Marriage under Section
36 of Family Code on the ground of Psychological Incapacity.
(3) The petitioner filed for urgent motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of the
existence of prejudicial question asserting the relationship of the offender and victim
is a key element of parricide which the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have
a bearing on the criminal case filed against him.

RTC Quezon City ruling:

The pendency of the case before RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case filed before it. The issues in the Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are
the injuries sustained by the respondent and whether the case could be tried even the validity of the
marriage is in question.

(4) The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals

CA ruling:

CA dismissed the petition ruled that:

Criminal case of Parricide: the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the
crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance

Civil Case for Annulment of Marriage: the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations

Issue:

whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

Ruling:

The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of
the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
J.M DOMINGUEZ vs. LICLICAN (QUALIFIED THEFT)

G.R. No. 208587

Facts:

(1) Petitioner JM Dominguez, Helen Dagdagan, Kenneth Pacis and Patrick Pacis filed for
complaint against respondents Cecilia Liclican and Norma Isip before the RTC of
Baguio City for nullification of meetings, elections and acts of directors and officers.
(2) JMD represented by Dagdagan and Pacis filed for Affidavit Complaint charging
Liclican and Isip of Qualified Theft on the ground of in conspiracy, withdrew the
amount 852, 024.19 from the corporation’s saving account with Equitable-PCI Bank
and issued check amounting to 200,000, payable to cash and to be drawn against
JMD’s account in Robinson’s Savings Bank.

Issues:

whether or not there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal proceedings for
qualified theft against respondents

Ruling:

Civil Case No. 6623-R, the intra-corporate dispute, posed a prejudicial question to Criminal Case
Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R. Civil Case No. 6623-R involves the same parties herein, and is for
nullification of JMD's meetings, election and acts of its directors and officers, among others.

Without Civil Case No. 6623-R's resolution, petitioners' authority to commence and prosecute
Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R against respondents for qualified theft in JMD's behalf
remained questionable, warranting the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
FENEQUITO VS. VERGARA, JR

FACTS:

An Information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against petitioners Rosa Fenequito et al.

The petitioners filed for a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The respondent then
filed for Opposition but was dismissed by the MTC on the ground of lack of probable cause.

Aggrieved, respondent, with the express conformity of the public prosecutor, appealed the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.

The RTC rendered judgment setting aside the decision of the MeTC and ordered to proceed with the trial.

The petitioners then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals for review under Section 3 (b), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was denied by the CA as the decision of the RTC is interlocutory in
nature and thus, unappealable.

A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by the respondent but was again denied by the CA.

Hence, the instant petition of the petitioner Rosa Fenequito on the ground that the CA erred in outrightly
dismissing the Petition for Review on the ground that the remedy availed of by petitioners is improper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the remedy availed by the petitioners improper

RULING:

Yes, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 resorted to by petitioners is improper. The petitioners did not comply
with the Rules in the filing of an appeal.

An appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. Petitioners had all
the opportunity to comply with the Rules. Nonetheless, they remained obstinate in their non-observance even
when they sought reconsideration of the ruling of the CA dismissing their petition. Such obstinacy is incongruous
with their late plea for liberality in construing the Rules.

Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states:

Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals

The above provisions contemplate of an appeal from a final decision or order of the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.

The RTC Decision is not final, but interlocutory in nature.

A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something
more to be done upon its merits.

The RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners' motion to quash
because it leaves something more to be done x x x, i.e ., the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the
guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Specifically, the MeTC has yet to arraign the petitioners, then
proceed to trial and finally render the proper judgment.

The assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial
by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it
did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.

The facts of the case would readily show that there exist just and compelling reasons to warrant the relaxation
of the rules in the interest of substantial justice.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION vs. REYES

FACTS:

The petitioner Burgundy Realty Corporation filed a criminal complaint of Estafa against respondent Josefa “Jing”
Reyes for the misappropriation of funds amounting to 23, 423, 327.50 which was supposed to be for buying the
parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna who were owned by the alleged clients of the respondent.

Reyes admitted that she acted as a real estate agent for the petitioner but denied that she misappropriated the
involved amount of money. She alleged that the money was paid for the downpayments of the landowners but
it was still not enough and the petitioner knew that the the initial or down payment for each lot represented
only 50% of the purchase price such that the remaining balance had to be paid within a period of thirty (30) days
from the date of receipt of the initial payment. She then received an information that her sub-broker Mateo
Elejorde was depositing the involved amount of money to his personal account. She filed a criminal charge of
Estafa against Elejorde.

After the preliminary investigation conducted by the Assistant Prosecutor of Makati City, it was recommended
that Reyes be indicted of Estafa.

An information was then filed against her. She filed for a petition for review to the DOJ which was dismissed. A
Motion of Reconsideration was then filed by her which was granted. The resolution of the DOJ was then
reversed and set aside.

Petitioner then filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary of Justice. Eventually, a
petition for certiorari was filed to the CA which was also denied with CA affirming the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice.

Hence, the petition. The petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that the DOJ committed a grave
mistake in disregarding the evidence of the existence of probable cause against the respondent for the case of
Estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a probable cause that caused the case to be dismissed

RULING:

Yes, there was a probable cause.

A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all
the elements of the crime of estafa.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter
is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.

The finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary
investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether
(a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof.

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards
of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.

The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation
does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow
the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.

ABANADO vs. BAYONA

FACTS:

The complainant City Prosecutor Armando Abanado filed an administrative complaint for ignorance of law
against respondent Judge Abraham Bayona.

This stemmed when Judge Bayona insisted for the submission of Memorandum of Transfer of case from the
investigating prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis Jarder despite the impossibility of its submission.
Abanado explained that the letter stated Jarder Resolution is no longer part of the records of the case as it was
disapproved by complainant and that as stated by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño stated in his letter, all
resolutions prepared by an Investigating Prosecutor after preliminary investigation shall form part of the record
of the case. But if they have been disapproved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor, the same shall not be released
to the parties and/or their counsels. Thus, only resolutions approved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor for
promulgation and release to the parties shall be made known to the parties and/or their counsel.

Judge Bayona did not accept the explanation and required Abanado to file his explanation within 5 days why he
should be not be cited for contempt.

Abanado requested for an extension of 10 days for his explanation but was denied by the respondent. Judge
Bayona then set a hearing for contempt charges.

Abanado filed for inhibition against respondent as well as a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent from proceeding.

Judge Gellada granted the petition citing that when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating
assisting city or provincial prosecutor, it is no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case
during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by the judge.

Hence, the administrative charge against respondent which was found the OCA guilty of gross ignorance of law,
or procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 12.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent administratively liable for gross ignorance of law, gross misconduct and
violation of SCC Ordinance No. 12.
RULING:

No. The respondent was not liable for the administrative charges. However, he erred in insisting on the
production of the Jarder Resolution when all other pertinent documents regarding the preliminary investigation
have been submitted to his court, and in going so far as to motu proprio initiating a proceeding for contempt
against complainant.

The guidelines for the documentation of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor, who after conducting
preliminary investigation, finds no probable cause and recommends a dismissal of the criminal complaint, can be
summed as follows:

(1) the investigating prosecutor prepares a resolution recommending the dismissal and containing the
following:
a. summary of the facts of the case;
b. concise statement of the issues therein; and
c. his findings and recommendations.

(2) within five days from the date of his resolution, the investigating fiscal shall forward his resolution
to the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, as the case may be, for review;

(3) if the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is reversed by the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor, the latter may file the information himself or direct another assistant prosecutor or state
prosecutor to do so;

(4) the resolution of the investigating prosecutor shall be strictly confidential and may not be released
to the parties, their counsels and/or any other unauthorized person until the same shall have been
finally acted upon by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor or his duly authorized assistant and
approved for promulgation and release to the parties; and

(5) that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the complainant's affidavit, the sworn
statements of the prosecution's witnesses, the respondent's counter-affidavit and the sworn
statements of his witnesses and such other evidence, as far as practicable, shall be attached to the
information.

There is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the removal of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of a criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor.

Nonetheless, attaching such a resolution to an information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned
manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to
the information only "as far as practicable." Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the
rules.
HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA vs. OBIAS

FACTS:

The petitioners, heirs of the deceased victim Engr. Nestor Tria, filed a petition for review for the resolution
issued by the Court of Appeals in denying their petition for mandamus/certiorari for the grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the President in modifying the findings of the DOJ instead of ordering the
Secretary of Justice to reopen/review the case in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 58.

The case stemmed on the death of the victim, Engr. Nestor Tria, who was then the Regional Director of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd
Engineering District of Camarines Sur. Allegedly, Tria was shot by a gunman, Aclan and Ona, hired by the
respondent Atty. Epifania Obias, a very close friend of the victim. Atty. Obias was alleged to have conspired with
Aclan and Ona for the killing of Tria due to the double sale of the property bought by the Tria couple and sold by
the respondent to a third party for a higher price without turning over the family the deed of sale.

The Department of Justice was convinced that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct before, during
and after the killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona.

Respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration on the DOJ’s resolution which was then denied by the DOJ.
Meanwhile, an information charging Aclan and Ona was already filed in the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur but was
transferred to the RTC of Quezon City. An amended information was filed by the prosecution to include
respondent as one of the accused for the murder of Tria.

Respondent then filed for notice of appeal to the DOJ but was denied on the ground that in pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 58, an appeal to OP where the penalty prescribed for the offense charged is
"reclusion perpetua to death," shall be taken by petition for review.

The RTC issued an amended information indicting the respondent in which the respondent filed for Motion for
Reconsideration with Prayer for the Suspension of the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. The petition was denied by
the DOJ stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not
before the DOJ making the case closed and terminated.

However, the DOJ directed the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the records of the case to the OP. Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores adopted the findings of facts and conclusions of law in the appealed
Resolutions of the DOJ, and affirmed the same.

Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reversed the
DOJ resolutions on the ground that mere close relationship without any corroborative evidence showing intent
to perpetrate the crime is not enough probable cause. The case was dismissed for the insufficient evidence as
the interlocking circumstantial evidence of the respondent’s acts before, during and after the death of Tria did
not establish conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.

Petitioners filed for Motion for Reconsideration to the OP but was denied. A petition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court was then filed to the CA which also denied the petition. On the issue of the alleged grave abuse
committed by the OP in modifying the findings of the DOJ instead of ordering the Secretary of Justice to
reopen/review the case in accordance with Memorandum Circular No. 58, the CA held that it was not
mandatory for the OP to do so.
As for the evaluation of factual matters and credence to be accorded to the testimonies of respondent and her
witnesses, the CA declared that these are not proper grounds in a petition for certiorari which is confined only to
the correction of errors of jurisdiction.

Hence, the petition for certiorari of the petitioners contending that the CA manifestly overlooked relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and argued that since the preliminary
investigation and review of the resolution finding probable cause have already been terminated years before
respondent’s appeal to the OP -- more so with the earlier denial of the said appeal for failing to raise any new
issue not raised before the DOJ -- the alleged new affidavits should have been referred to the DOJ for
reinvestigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA and OP erred in dismissing the decision of the DOJ finding a probable cause for the case
at hand

RULING:

Yes. The OP and CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In resolving the issue of whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s reversal of the ruling
of the Secretary of Justice, it is necessary to determine whether probable cause exists to charge the respondent
for conspiracy in the murder of Engr. Tria.

The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the
power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor, after which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties.

The determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court as it is an executive function and only the
Executive Department can exercise.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause
merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an
inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a
crime.

In the evaluation, the Court finds no such grave abuse when the Secretary of Justice found probable cause to
charge the respondent with murder in conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.
PEOPLE vs. VALENCIA

FACTS:

Accused-Appellant Alejandro Valencia was charged with Homicide for the death of Anabelle Jimenez, 5 years
old, and Less Serious Physical Injuries for the injuries sustained by Samuel Jimenez, 3 years old, children of Arlyn
Jimenez.

Allegedly, Valencia was seen by Arlyn Jimenez standing 5 steps away from their house holding a homemade
shotgun called “sumpak”. Arlyn, fearing the sumpak, closed the door of her house. Few minutes later, she heard
gunshot wounds from the outside and heard cries of pain. She saw her children, Anabelle and Samuel bloodied
and hurt with gunshot wounds.

She immediately went outside to shout for help. Once she opened the door, she saw Valencia running away
holding the sumpak. With the help of her neighbors, she was able to bring her injured children in the Philippine
General Hospital.

That same evening, Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the hospital
about the shooting incident. But she wasn’t able to identify the appellant to the interview as she was still in
shock.

Acting on a report of a barangay tanod, 3 patrolmen conducted an investigation of the shooting incident. One of
the patrolmen was able to interview the mother and brother of the appellant who then identify that Valencia
was the gun wielder.

Moreover, the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the
circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at the
crime scene.

The next morning, three policemen went with Rolando Valencia, brother of the appellant, to the residence of
Sonia Castillo who was their aunt and where the appellant was sleeping. Valencia was then apprehended and
brought to the Ong Detachment for the initial investigation.

Later in the afternoon, Anabelle, one of the victims, died due to the gunshot wounds she sustained. While
Samuel, was discharged after a week but still needed a 2-week recovery.

Valencia denied his participation in the shooting and assailed the credibility of the testimony of Arlyn Jimenez,
insufficient evidence that he was the wielder of the unlicensed firearm as the prosecution already dismissed the
case of illegal possession of firearm and, that there was no preliminary investigation conducted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a preliminary investigation is required in lawful arrest

RULING:

No. Section 7 Rule 112 states that a prosecuting officer can file an information even without a preliminary
investigation in a lawful arrest.
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the
case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, it can be
concluded that the appellant is waiving his right for a preliminary investigation.
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that it has no eyewitness to the actual commission of the two offenses
herein charged or that it did not present any. Stated otherwise, its case is anchored on circumstantial evidence
and such is mostly supplied by the victim’s mother.

The evidences are sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

PCGG vs. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ

FACTS:

The petitioner Presidential Commission for Good Government or PCGG filed an Affidavit-Complaint through
Rene B. Gorospe, the Legal Consultant in-charge of reviewing behest loan cases – against former
officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) who are the respondents of the case at
hand.

PCGG alleged that, through the Ad Hoc Committee which was created through Administrative Order No. 13
issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos, the loans/accommodations obtained by the Galleon from DBP
positively possessed the characteristics of behest loans, considering that:

(a) Galleon was undercapitalized;

(b) the loan itself was undercollateralized;
(c) the major stockholders of Galleon were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and
(d) certain documents pertaining to the loan account were found to bear "marginal notes" of
President Marcos himself.

PCGG filed criminal complaints against the individual respondents.

Except for Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell, the other individual respondents impleaded in the
affidavit-complaint did not file their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.

The Ombudsman ruled that there was no probable cause against private respondents and dismissed
the case. The pieces of evidences attached to the case records were not sufficient to establish
probable cause against the individual respondents, considering that the documents presented by the
PCGG consisted mostly of executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-
serving, and of little probative value and that PCGG failed to present the documents that would
directly establish the alleged illegal transactions like:

1. the Loan Agreement between DBP and Galleon;

2. the approved Board Resolutions by the DBP officers/board of directors; and,
3. the participation/voting that transpired at the board meetings wherein the alleged behest
loans were granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the OMB committed grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
respondents violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.

RULING:
Yes. The OMB gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal
complaint against the respondents.

There is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual or positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable
cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

The elements of R.A 3019 were present as per review of the records.

(a) its guarantee accommodation request covers 100% of its project cost, which is in excess of DBP’s
normal practice of financing only 80% of such cost;
(b) its net profit margin was experiencing a steady decrease due to high operating costs;
(c) its paid-up capital is only ₱9.95 Million; and
(d) aside from its proposal to source the increase in equity from the expected profits from the
operations of the vessels to be acquired, Galleon has not shown any concrete proof on how it will be
funding its equity build-up.

DE LIMA vs. REYES

FACTS:

Petitioners Leila De Lima et al filed for petition for review on the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, which
rendered null and void Department of Justice Order No. 710 3 issued by the Secretary of Justice which created a
second panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation on a murder case in view of the first panel’s failure to
admit the complainant’s additional evidence.

The case was about the killing of Dr. Gerardo Ortega also known as Doc Gerry, a veterinarian who was shot dead
inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-Ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. The gunman Marlo B.
Recamata was arrested after a chase with the police officers. Recamata admitted that he shot Dr. Ortega.
Moreover, he implicated three other men.

One of the implicated men, Rodolfo Edrad, in his signed Sinumpaang Salaysay, allegedly implicated Governor
Mario Reyes as the one who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors. It was
the First Panel of prosecutors.

Dr. Patria Ortega, wife of the victim, filed for a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating Governor Mario
Reyes as the mastermind of her husband’s murder. The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and
dismissed the Affidavit-Complaint.
Dr. Patria filed for Motion to Re-open Partial Investigation to admit another evidence in the form a mobile
phone which allegedly was containing the communication of Edrad and Gov. Reyes but it was denied.

The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a second panel of prosecutors to conduct a
reinvestigation and address the additional evidence denied by the First Panel.

The Second Panel issued a subpoena to Governor Reyes and required him to submit his counter-affidavit and
supporting evidence.

Governor Reyes field a Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals assailing the creation of the Second Panel
and that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused it discretion in conduction a reinvestigation.

The Second Panel issued its resolution finding a probable cause and recommending the filing of information in
the RTC of Palawan. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued against Gov. Reyes.

The respondent filed for petition assailing that the RTC cannot enforce the resolution of the Second Panel.

The Court of Appeals declared Department Order No. 710 as null and void and that the Secretary of Justice
gravely abused its discretion in creating the Second Panel. That it should have reversed or modified the
Resolution of the First Panel in pursuant to 2000 NPS Rule on Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in creating a second panel of
prosecutors for the reinvestigation of the murder case

RULING:

No. The Secretary of Justice did not commit gravely abused its discretion in conducting a reinvestigation.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor. Accordingly, it may step in and order a reinvestigation even without
a prior motion or petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.

It is clear that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 because she had reason to believe that
the First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of justice to the
parties.

It was created not to overturn the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the
evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was investigated. Therefore, the
Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility."

LUZ vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

The accused Rodel Luz was flagged down while coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City for the violation of municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers must
wear helmet while driving the said motor vehicle.
He was invited inside the sub-station by PO2 Emmanuel Alteza while he and SPO1 Brillante were issuing citation
ticket for the violation of municipal ordinance. Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy and kept getting something
from his jacket. He was alerted and ordered the accused to take out the contents of his jacket. The accused
obliged and take out the contents which were a
1. nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size
2. two (2) cellphones
3. one (1) pair of scissors and
4. one (1) Swiss knife

Upon seeing the can, Alteza asked the accused to open it and spill the contents. From the can, there were 4
packets of sachets, 2 of which are empty and the other 2 were suspected to contain shabu.

Luz was then charged with illegal possession of drugs. The RTC found the accused guilty and that the evidence of
the prosecution show that he had been lawfully arrested.

The CA affirmed the rulings of RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was lawfully arrested and the search and seizure was valid

RULING:

No. The accused was not lawfully arrested hence, the search and seizure were invalid.

When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission
of an offense.

It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the
part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

1. a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2.
2. search of evidence in "plain view;" 3.
3. search of a moving vehicle;
4. consented warrantless search; 5.
5. customs search;
6. a "stop and frisk" search; and,
7. exigent and emergency circumstances.

The evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress
or coercion.

Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given:
(1) the age of the defendant;
(2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location;
(3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.

While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the
crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused.

ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Accused Geroge Antiquera was charged with illegal possession of paraphernalia of dangerous drugs by PO1
Gregorio and PO1 Lawrence Cabutihan.

Allegedly, while on a police visibility patrol in David Street, Pasay City, PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw two
unidentified men rushing out from House Number 107-C and boarded a jeep.

Suspecting a crime has been committed, they approached the house where the men came in and peeked
through the partially open door. They then saw the accused holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter
while his live-in partner was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. This prompted the officers to
enter the house, introduced themselves and arrest them.

While inspecting the place, they saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table which contained an improvised burner,
wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop,
and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. They were confiscated and brought to the Drug Enforcement Unit of
the PNP in Pasay City for further investigation and testing.

A forensic chemical officer examined the drug paraphernalia and found positive traces of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu.”

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as proven by the prosecution catching the accused in
the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in their possession.

The CA affirmed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was lawfully arrested as they were seen by the officers in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.

RULING:

No. The accused was not lawfully arrested.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.

However, the circumstances constituting the crime does not make out a case of arrest in Flagrante Delicto.

The officers had to push the door for them to able to see what is going inside the house. In this case, a search
warrant should have been issued by the officers.

No crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused
Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search
and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE vs. VASQUEZ

FACTS:

Accused Donald Vasquez was charged with crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs under
Section 15 and 16 Article II of RA 6425.

The said accused not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully and knowingly sell or offer for sale, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute 6 transparent sachets containing white crystalline substance which was confirmed as
shabu with a total weight of 247.98 grams.

The said accused without being authorized by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 12 transparent
plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which was also confirmed as shabu with a total weight of
4.03 grams.

The accused was arrested through a buy-bust operation conducted by P/Insp. Jean Fajardo and her team which
was formed when a confidential informant reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug
activity claiming that he was an employee of NBI. Allegedly, the informant was offered commission by Vasquez
if he would present a buyer.
After the report, P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to P/Supt. Domantay who then ordered her to form a
team and conduct a buy-bust operation.

There and then, the accused was arrested.

The RTC ruled that accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated
drugs which then the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of the accused was legal without a warrant of arrest nor a search warrant.

RULING:

Yes. The arrest was legal despite the absence of warrant of arrest and search warrant.

The appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation falling within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an
arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.

The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit:

(1) arrest in flagrante delicto,
(2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and
(3) arrest of escaped prisoners

Moreover, the accused can no longer assail the validity of his arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the
information against them before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality
of their arrest.

ZUNO vs. CABEBE

FACTS:

Petitioner Chief State Jovencito Zuno filed an administrative charge against Judge Alejandrino Cabebe for
granting bail to the accused without conducting the required hearing.

The respondent denied the charges and argued that the granting of bail to the accused was premised on the
constitutional right of speedy trial. That there was a delay on the proceedings due to the complainant frequent
absences and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in court, resulting in the cancellation of the
hearings.

Moreover, he contends that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge violated the rules of court in granting bail without conducting hearing.

RULING:

Yes. The respondent judge violated the rules of court in granting the bail without conducting hearing.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in
violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It
must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not
the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge.

In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be
held.

We laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
(Section 19, id.); otherwise, the petition should be denied.

GOVT OF HK SPEC. ADM. REGION VS. OLALIA

FACTS:

The petitioner Government of HK Special Administrative represented by Department of Justice filed a petition
for certiorari for the review of the bail granted to the private respondent Juan Antonio Munoz by Hon.
Felixberto Olalia on the ground that Munoz is an extraditee.

Private respondent Munoz was charged before the Hongkong Court with 3 counts of the offense of "accepting
an advantage as agent," and 7 counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud penalized by the common law of
Hongkong.

The Hongkong Department of Justice requested the DOJ for a provisional arrest of the private respondent which
then the DOJ forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation which then filed an application of
provisional arrest of Munoz.

Munoz was then arrested and detained by the issuance of the Order of Arrest by the NBI. He filed with the Court
of Appeals questioning the validity of the arrest.

His arrest was found void by the Court of Appeals at first but eventually, after upon review filed by the DOJ, was
arrested.
Munoz filed for motion for bail but was denied by the previous presiding judge on the ground that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." He then filed
for Motion for Reconsideration for the application of his bail and was eventually granted by the new presiding
judge where the case was re-raffled. The bail came with conditions.

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will
appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to
orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking,
the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold
departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to
the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this
Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with
the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Hence, the petition of the petitioner alleging that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing
that a potential extradite has the right to bail.

Private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a potential extraditee has the right to bail in accordance to the right of due process of law and
deprivation of one’s liberty

RULING:

Yes, a potential extradite has the right to bail.

Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the
surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the
other state to surrender him to the demanding state.

It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow extradition.

It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action,
but one that is merely administrative in character.

The right to bail of a prospective extradite is viewed in light of the various treaties of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights which under these treaties, the presumption lies in
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines must see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Records show that the private respondent has been arrested for two years without being convicted of a crime.
By any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to
liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him
bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a
new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with Murder for the killing of Rafael de las Alas. Allegedly, he was
granted bail for 300,000 for the charge of Murder which was at the time of the commission of offense is
punishable of reclusion perpetua but the lower court then convicted Leviste of Homicide for failure of the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of Murder which he was sentenced with
imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day reclusion temporal as
maximum.

He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. While his appeal is pending, he filed for urgent admission to
bail pending appeal citing his advanced age, frail health and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part.

Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail invoking the bedrock principle in the matter of bail
pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave
caution and only for strong reasons."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal means that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court

RULING:

No. The grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.

There are two scenarios in the granting of bail for offenses punishable of imprisonment of exceeding 6 years.

1. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph not present.
2. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances .
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following
rules:

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but
not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other
similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);

f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years
but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5)

Moreover, Section 3 Article of the Constitution provides that:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may
be provided by law.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with Plunder on the basis of his involvement in the diversion and
misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). He filed for Omnibus Motion
and Supplemental Opposition praying that he may be granted bail should probable cause be found against him
which were denied by Sandiganbayan on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.

Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director Magalong of CIDG on the day that he was issued with warrant of
arrest, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination. He then filed for Motion to Fix Bail arguing that he should be allowed to post bail because the
prosecution has not yet established that the evidence of guilt is strong, the possible penalty of the crime
charged against him is reclusion temporal, and he was not a flight risk due to his age and health condition.

His motion was denied disposing in a resolution that it is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused
Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right and that the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken
into consideration for purposes of bail.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile should be granted bail taking into consideration his advanced age
and poor health

RULING:

Yes, the fragile state of the petitioner presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail.
The national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

The Court balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.

NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Petitioner Janet Napoles was charged with Plunder for misappropriating former Senator Enrile's Priority
Development Assistant Fund (PDAF) through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected
without the required bidding procedure.

The Special Panel Investigators of Ombudsman was able to find probable cause to indict Napoles with 1 count of
Plunder and 15 counts of violation of RA 3019. She filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied.

After being charged with Plunder, Napoles filed for petition for bail arguing that the evidence of the prosecution
is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State
witnesses (otherwise referred to as whistle blowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with bias, and
baseless.

The Sandiganbayan conducted bail hearings where the prosecution presented the witnesses.

After the presentation of the evidences of the prosecution, Napoles did not present any evidence for her bail
application.

The Sandiganbayan denied Napoles’ petition for bail for lack of merit. Napoles filed for motion for
reconsideration but was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Hence, the petition for certiorari alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying her bail application and insisting that the prosecution wasn’t able to
prove that the evidence of guilt is strong.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s bail application on the
ground that there was no sufficient evidence to show guilt is strong

RULING:

No, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s bail application.
The Sandiganbayan, upon receiving Napoles' Petition for Bail, scheduled hearings to allow the parties to submit
their respective pieces of evidence. The prosecution submitted numerous testimonial and documentary
evidence, endeavoring to establish evident proof of Napoles' guilt.

Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish with evident proof that petitioner was involved in a conspiracy
to misappropriate funds and acquire ill-gotten wealth. The implied conspiracy among Napoles and her co-
accused was proven through various documentary and testimonial evidence showing that they acted towards
the common goal of misappropriating the PDAF of former Senator Enrile.

ALTOBANO-RUIZ vs. JUDGE PICHAY

FACTS:

Respondent Judge Ramsey Pichay was charged with administrative case for gross ignorance of law and gross
misconduct by petitioner Teodora Altobano-Ruiz.

The petition stemmed from the improper granting of bail to one Francis Paran.

The petitioner together with Paran were accused of adultery which was pending in MTCC Trece Martires, Cavite.

Paran was apprehended in his residence in Quezon City by police authorities from Paranaque City by virtue of
warrant of arrest of Judge Mapili.

Paran filed for an application of bail which was granted by respondent Judge Pichay after the accused posted a
cash bond of 12,000.

Altobano-Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to grant the bail since Paran already had a pending
criminal case for adultery in another court and he was arrested in Quezon City which was outside Judge Pichay’s
jurisdiction.

In his comment, Judge Pichay insisted on his court's jurisdiction over accused Paran's application for bail
because the latter was detained at the Parañaque City Police Station, that he acted on the bail application on
the same date that it was filed, which was a Saturday, in order to give effect to the accused's constitutional right
to bail. Finally, Judge Pichay asserted that his action was neither tainted with malice nor did he receive financial
gain in resolving the application with dispatch.

The Office of Court Administrator found Judge Pichay guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was fined
amounting to 5,000.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Pichay’s granting of bail to accused Paran improper to constitute as a gross ignorance of
the law.

RULING:
Yes, Judge Pichay incorrectly granted bail to accused Paran.

Accused Paran was detained at the Station Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police Station, but was arrested at his
residence in Quezon City. Considering that Paran was arrested in Quezon City, he could also file his bail
application before any branch at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and in the absence of any judge
thereat, then before any branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran could have also filed his
bail application before the MTCC, Trece Martires City, where his case was pending.

Section 17 Rule 114 states that:

Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is
pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal
trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

Hold Departure Order

A Hold Departure Order (HDO) is a directive issued by the Secretary of Justice and the Regional Trial Courts (RTC)
that prohibits individuals from leaving the Philippines.

It contains the following information:

 The complete name of the person against whom a Hold Departure Order has been issued
 Aliases, if any
 Date and place of birth
 Place of last residence of the person against whom the HDO is issued
 Passport details
 Recent photograph, if available
 The complete title and docket number of the case in which the HDO was issued
 The specific nature of the case
 The date of the Hold Departure Order

An HDO may be issued when:

 The accused, regardless of nationality, has a pending criminal case before the RTC
 The presence of an alien is required for a case pending litigation or before any other administrative
agency of the government
 The accused needs to be held in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health

Watch List Order

A Watch List Order (WLO) prohibits people from leaving the Philippines without first getting clearance from the
Department of Justice. Like the HDO, a WLO is issued by the RTC. The information contained in the WLO is the
same as that of the HDO.

A WLO can be lifted or cancelled when:

 The validity of the WLO expires

 The person under a WLO has been acquitted of the charge
 The person under a WLO has been allowed by the court to leave the country during the pendency of the
case
 The preliminary investigation or petition for review or motion for reconsideration is terminated

Allow Departure Order

An Allow Departure Order (ADO) is a directive that permits a person to leave the Philippines. To file for an ADO,
submit an application to the Commissioner of Immigration and the appropriate government agency.

For an ADO to be issued, the following requirements must be submitted:

 An affidavit clearly stating the purpose and inclusive period of the intended travel, and a stipulation to
immediately report to the Department of Justice upon return
 An authority to travel or a travel clearance from any of the following:
o The court
o The appropriate government office where the case upon which the issued HDO and/or WLO
was based
o The investigating prosecutor in charge of the subject case

In some cases, a person with an HDO or named in a WLO can be issued an Allow Departure Order. To apply for
an ADO, the person must provide an exceptional reason for leaving and subsequently take an oath before the
Secretary of Justice.

When filing for an ADO, the following must be submitted:

 Duly notarized letter-request

 Affidavit of undertaking stating the purpose and the inclusive period of the intended travel
 Authority to travel from the appropriate office where the case is pending (for those under HDO)
 Authority to travel from the investigating prosecutor where the case is pending (for those under WLO)

NEW RULES ON HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER

With the new rule on issuing precautionary hold departure orders, a person, then, can be barred from leaving
the country despite the absence of the filing of an Information against him, or pending preliminary investigation
and the determination of probable cause showing that he probably have committed an offense.

MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE (With Search Warrant)

FACTS:

Special Investigator Ray Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Unit filed for 2 applications of 2 search warrants
seeking permission to search the petitioner’s house (Marimla spouse) in Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and the
premises on Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta Cruz, Porac, Pampanga.

The search warrants are for the violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 or Illegal
Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.

Allegedly, the issuance of the search warrants was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness
Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a test buy made at
petitioners’ house.

The following items are to be searched and seized according to the issued search warrants:
1. Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "SHABU,"
2. "MARIJUANA,"
3. weighing scale,
4. plastic sachets,
5. tooters,
6. burner,
7. rolling papers, and
8. paraphernalia, all of which articles/items are being used or intended to be used in Violation of Republic
Act 6425

SI Lagasca and Fernandez were examined in writing and under oath by Executive Judge Mario Guariña III through
searching of questions and answers. He found that based on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and
Fernandez, petitioners had in their possession and control inside their house an undetermined amount of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu and marijuana.

In pursuant of the findings, Judge Guariña III issued a search warrant commanding any peach officer to to make
immediate search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from date of the premises and seize and
take possession of the properties subject of the offense and bring to his court said properties.

Si Lagasca together with the members of his team, searched the petitioner’s house and was able to seize the ff:

1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a packing tape = net weight - 491.5 grams
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped in a newsprint = net weight - 491.5 grams
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen (16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a
newsprint = net weight - 127.9 grams
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9) plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic
bag = net weight - 18.2736 grams

An information was then filed against the petitioner charging them with violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659

Petitioners filed Motion to Quash Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized on the ground that:

1. the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the
court where the alleged crime was committed
2. the court which issued the questioned search warrant cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial
jurisdiction;
3. the questioned search warrant is void ab initio
 4. the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in
evidence.

Petitioners claim that the issuance of Search Warrant was defective considering the application was not personally
endorsed by NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco and that the latter’s signature in the authorization letter is different
from that as appearing in the identification card.

In his comment, the search warrant did not fall under the provision in Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure but under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC which authorized the Executive Judges and Vice Executive
Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous
drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

He also claims that it was NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation Fermin Nasol who signed the authorization
letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for him to apply for a search warrant.
The petition of Motion to Quash of the petitioner was denied on the ground that it lacks merit.

Hence, the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants, containing only the signature of NBI Deputy Director Fermin Nasol as an
authorizing officer, and issued outside the jurisdiction of where the alleged crime was committed, valid

RULING:

Yes, they were valid.

A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and
illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.

That the applications shall be personally endorsed by the Heads of the said agencies.

On the other hand, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for search
warrant shall be filed with:

(a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and
(b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

The contention of the petitioner that the search warrant was defective because it only contains the signature of
NBI Deputy Director Nasol and not by NBI Director Wycoco is incorrect because there is nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-
09-SC that prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of
endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads.

PEOPLE vs. PUNZALAN (With Search Warrant)

FACTS:

Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandalan (IA1 Sandalan) and her team implemented a search warrant issued by then
Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to
 (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house of the accused appellants who are all
residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City
(ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs,
including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the court

A sketch of the compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant
since there are three houses inside the compound.

The PDEA team then conducted the search. But before proceeding with the search, they passed by the barangay
hall to coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon and
brought with them a media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation.

When they arrived, IA Sandalan knocked on the door of the house of the petitioners. A woman, later identified as
Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When the PDEA introduced themselves as agents and informed them
that they have a search warrant, Punzalan, immediately closed the door. But she was not successful as the agents
were able to push the door.

Once inside, the agents saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. They were able to seize:

1. nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets,

2. two (2) square-shaped transparent plastic containers
3. a small round plastic container

All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of
suspected shabu. There were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale.

The petitioners were then arrested after informing them of their constitutional rights.

After the search in the first floor, they searched the second and third floors but found nothing.

Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination were then conducted.

After, an information was then charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession
of 40.78 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

RTC ruling:

1. the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of different persons named therein is valid as there
is no requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity
2. the address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately described -
A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached to the records and such
description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to
3. the implementation of the search warrant sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law
4. there were 2 phases of the search – 1st phase: ground floor while the 2nd phase: second & third floors

CA ruling:

Affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. There was a valid search and seizure conducted and the seized
items are admissible in evidence.
The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

Hence, the petition by the petitioners alleging that the search warrant was illegally procured and unlawfully
implemented claiming that the PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the
requirements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of the PDEA Director General and
the RTC that issued the warrant had no authority to issue as it was outside its territorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant illegally and unlawfully procured and implemented

RULING:

No, the search warrant was legal and lawfully implemented.

The search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the
issuance.

1. there is probable cause

2. there are good and sufficient reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous
drugs, particularly shabu, including the proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to be used by the
respondents as a means of committing the offense

Moreover, RTC of Manila, Branch 17, was authorized by the A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC which authorizes the Executive
Judges and the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants to be served
in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

Furthermore, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants themselves despite the absence of the barangay
officials during the search.

The chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets
were seized and marked by 101 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon
City.

Chain of custody rule:

a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be

The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the
integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants.

PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS (Consented Warrantless Search)

FACTS:
The respondents Jesus Nuevas, Reynaldo Din, and Fernando Inocencio were charged for illegal possession of
marijuana.

PO3 Teofilo B. Fami and SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling were conducting a surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug
trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City when they received an information that certain
male person, more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and
usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

While being stationed, they saw a man who fitted the description, carrying a plastic bag, who was later identified
as accused-appellant Jesus Nuevas, alighting from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and informed him that
they are police officers. They asked where Nuevas was going. Nuevas, at first, arrogantly answered Fami but they
eventually conversed in Waray dialect which Nuevas then formed him that there was other stuff in the possession
of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the police officers a
plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth and
disclosed that there were two other male persons who would make a delivery of marijuana weighing more or less
5 kilos.

Fami and Cabling then proceeded where the other 2 male persons were. From there, they saw Inocencio with Din
who was carrying a light blue plastic bag. Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami took the bag and
inspected it and found marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein.

Fami consficated the items and brought the three accused-appellants the police office for proper investigation.

He testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling and that a field test was duly conducted on
the confiscated items. A joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the accused and the confiscation of the
items was executed by Fami and Cabling.

The accused-appellants were found guilty by the trial court which was then affirmed by the CA.

Accused-appellants Din and Inocencio that they were found guilty based only on the testimonies of the arresting
officers and their constitutional rights were violated which was denied by the CA.

Accused-appellant Nuevas withdrew his appeal.

CA:

CA restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial court’s assessment is entitled
to great weight, even finality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of
some fact or circumstance of weight or influence.

The search in the instant case is exempted from the requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves
waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The exclusionary rule does not apply because
according to Fami and Cabling, Nuevas voluntarily surrendered the bag.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure conducted by Fami and Cabling valid

RULING:

No, the warrantless search and seizure was not valid.

Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure become "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

However, it is not absolute as there are instances where a warrantless search and seizure is applicable.

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

2. Search of evidence in "plain view."
3. Search of a moving vehicle.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’ case was made with his consent. In Din’s case, there was
none.

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.
It must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and
search.

Following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given:

(1) the age of the defendant;

(2) whether he was in a public or secluded location;
(3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on;
(4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
(7) the nature of the police questioning;
(8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting

In Nuevas’s case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating bag to the police
officers.

However, in the case of Din and Inocencio, the prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.

It is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that:

(1) the right exists;

(2) the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and
(3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Inspite of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the appellants,
Din more specifically, as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful.

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.
An acquittal is warranted despite the prosecution’s insistence that the appellants have effectively waived any
defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by their active participation in the trial of the case.

VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE (Stop and Frisk)

FACTS:

PO3 Esteves received a call from one concerned citizen informing him that a certain alias “Baho” who was later
identified as the petitioner Mario Veridiano, was on his way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

Upon receiving the information, he relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara)
who were both on duty. They were then instructed by the Chief of Police to set up a checkpoint at Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers personally knew Veridiano. They then eventually chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeep. They flagged down the jeep and asked the passengers to disembark. They instructed the passengers to raise
their t-shirts to check for possible hidden weapons and remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers were able to recover from Veridiano a “tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.”
PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was then arrested and brought to the
police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO1
Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory which tested positive for marijuana.

Veridiano was then found guilty of illegal possession of marijuana by the lower court.

He filed for an appeal assailing the legality of his arrest. He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is
"inadmissible in evidence for being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'"

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused and that Veridiano already waived his right to question the irregularity of the
arrest.
With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search, the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive
deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless search.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court finding the accused “in flagrante delicto” for the
possession of marijuana. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the warrantless
search because he did not protest when the police asked him to remove the contents of his pocket

Hence, the petition of Veridiano.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search valid

RULING:
No, it was invalid.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk"
searches.

They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received.

They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip.

Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception.

The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the
exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.

There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

PEOPLE vs. COSGAFA

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Gio Cosgafa, Jimmy Agang, and Allan Aplacador were charged with murder for the killing of
Nathaniel Asombrado, Sr.

The witnesses were at the house of the victim for fiesta. After dinner, they finished half a gallon of Bahalina, an
aged native coco-wine. The following day, the group decided to go to the disco held at a nearby school . On their
way thereto, the group stopped by a sari-sari store owned by a retired police officer Pedrito Lapiz (Lapiz) to talk to
a certain person who called the victim.

While waiting, Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo proceeded to the bridge, about seven meters away, and sat on the
railings. The accused-appellants were already sitting on the railings across them. While waiting, Rosbill, Joseph, and
Panfilo proceeded to the bridge, about seven meters away, and sat on the railings.

While waiting, Rosbill, Joseph, and Panfilo proceeded to the bridge, about seven meters away, and sat on the
railings. When the victim fell on the ground, the accused-appellants ran away.

The victim was then brought to the hospital but was declared dead. In an examination conducted to the body, the
Dra. Torregosa, found that the victim sustained nine stab wounds, four incised wounds, and one contusion.

During Dra. Torregosa's testimony in court, she declared that wounds 1 to 6, which were circular in shape and one
centimeter in diameter, could have been inflicted by a sharp pointed instrument like an ice pick; wounds 7 and 8
located at the hypochondriac region, which could have been inflicted by a sharp pointed weapon such as
a Batangas knife, were deeply penetrating and pierced the liver; also, wounds 9 to 13 could have been inflicted by
a Batangas knife; while the contusion, wound 14, on the victim's forehead could have been inflicted by a fist or
any hard object such as the handle of a screwdriver.

PO3 Mascariñas and SPO 1 Sabang testified that while posted as security in the school where the disco was being
held, they responded to a report by Barangay Tanod Nicandro Cabug-os, about a stabbing incident nearby. Upon
inquiry around the area, they learned from Lapiz that accused-appellants were the ones responsible for the crime.
They immediately conducted a hot pursuit, which resulted to the accused-appellants' arrest.
The accused admitted that they killed the victim but it was out of self-defense and that Allan, one of the accused,
has no part in killing the victim.

Jimmy, one of the accused, even led the police officers to his house to surrender the Batangas knife that he used
on the victim. It was wrapped in a white shirt with brownish blood-like stains when recovered. A Batangas knife
was also recovered from Allan. An unidentified person also handed to the police officers an ice pick (screwdriver
with sharpened tip) found at the crime scene.

RTC:

Found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder

CA:

sustained the conviction of the accused-appellants with modification of civil liabilities

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admissibility of the knife recovered from Allan despite its being a product of an invalid search a
sufficient ground for him to be implicated

RULING:

Yes, Allan is guilty of participating in the killing of the victim.

As can be gleaned from the factual backdrop of this case, the arrest of Allan and his co-accused resulted from a hot
pursuit, immediately conducted by the police officers in the area upon learning, through a report from
Barangay Tanod Cabug-os, and investigating about the incident that just occurred.

Thus, the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be pursued and
arrested are responsible for the crime that had just been committed.

The arresting officers had probable cause to pursue the accused-appellants based on the information from
witnesses in the area that they gathered from their immediate investigation.

It is, thus, readily apparent that the knife seized from Allan is admissible in evidence, the same having been
recovered from him incidental to a lawful arrest, contrary to the defense's argument.

MIGUEL vs. PEOPLE (Warrantless Search Incidental to Lawful Arrest)

FACTS:

Petitioner Jeffrey Miguel was taken to the police station by 2 Bantay Bata operatives, Reynaldo Bahoyo and
Mark Anthony Velasquez, after a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of
rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves were seized from him.
Bahoyo was doing rounds when he received a report of a man showing off his private parts in Kaong Street. He and
his fellow BB operative, Velasquez went to the said place and found the petitioner Jeffrey Miguel, visibly
intoxicated, urinating and displaying his private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot.

They approached him and asked where he was lived. Miguel answered Kaong Street. Bahoyo said that he also lived
in Kaong Street but he was unfamiliar of him. He asked for Miguel’s identification card which Miguel failed to
produce. BB Velaquez asked again for an identification card but Miguel instead emptied his pockets revealing a
pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana
leaves.

This prompted Bahoyo and Velasquez to seize the items, take Miguel to the police station and turn over the seized
items to SPO3 Rafael Castillo.

SP03 Castillo then inventoried, marked, and photographed the seized items, all in the presence of BB Bahoyo and
BB Velasquez, and thereafter, prepared an inventory report and a request for qualitative examination of the seized
two (2) pieces of rolled paper and for petitioner to undergo drug testing.

After examination, it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous drugs.

RTC:

The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of drugs.

The RTC found that BB Bahoyo and BB Velasquez conducted a valid warrantless arrest, as petitioner was
scandalously showing his private parts at the time of his arrest. Therefore, the resultant search incidental to such
arrest which yielded the seized marijuana in petitioner's possession was also lawful.

CA:

The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction.

It held that the search made on petitioner which yielded the seized marijuana was validly made as it was done
incidental to his arrest for exhibiting his private parts on public. The said seized marijuana is admissible in evidence
and, thus, sufficient to convict him for the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest of the petitioner valid

RULING:

No, the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest is invalid.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made- the process cannot be reversed.

A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant.

There are 3 instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are:
 (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto;
(b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been
committed; and
(c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another

The circumstances identified during the cross-examination do not justify the conduct of an in flagrante
delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed by petitioner in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. Neither do these circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless
arrest as the arresting Bantay Bayan operatives do not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had
just committed an offense.

The Court simply finds highly implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on
petitioner on account of the alleged public display of his private parts because if it was indeed the case, then the
proper charge should have been filed against him.

Records are bereft of any showing that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs - thereby strengthening the view that no prior arrest was made on petitioner which
led to a search incidental thereto.
DIMAL vs. PEOPLE (Validity of Search Warrant – Inadmissibility of Items Seized as Evidence)

FACTS:

Petitioner Jaylord Dimal was charged with Kidnapping and Multiple Murder for the kidnapping and killing the
victims Lucio Pua, Rosemarie Pua and Gemma Eugenio.

Allegedly, the victims were scheduled to visit the compound of petitioner in Echague, Isabela, to negotiate for the
sale of palay. However, they were not able to come back. Lucio's nephew, Edison Pua, went to Dimal's compound,
asking for information as to the whereabouts of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. Dimal informed Edison that they
had left.

Unable to locate his relatives, Edison went to the police station in Alicia, Isabela, to report that they were missing,
then proceeded to seek assistance from the police station in Echague.

Edison was escorted by two policemen to Dimal's compound, where they allegedly stayed and observed the
premises in the absence of Dimal. Edison and the two policemen supposedly searched without a warrant Dimal's
compound, but found no evidence linking him to the disappearances.

Petitioner Allan Castillo was accosted by the Echague Police, and allegedly tortured to implicate Dimal in the killing
of Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma. A certain Eduardo Sapipi was arrested due to the supposed statement made by
Castillo. Sapipi purportedly made an uncounseled confession that Dimal shot the three victims, and ordered him,
Castillo and one Michael Miranda to cover up the crime by throwing the bodies in a river.

Dimal was arrested by the Echague Police. A criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder
was filed against petitioners.

Police Inspector (P/lnsp.) Roy Michael S. Malixi, a commissioned officer of the Philippine National Police, filed an
application of search warrant in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of Lucio, Rosemarie and
Gemma. After the hearing of the application, Judge Bonifacio T. Ong of the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 17,
issued a Search Warrant.
Property to search: premises of Felix Gumpal Compound located at Ipil Junction, Echague, Isabela
Items to seize:
blood-stained clothes of Rosemarie Pua, Lucio Pua, and Gemma Eugenio,
either to take the 1,600 sacks of palay or just to photograph the same, and
the 9mm caliber pistol

The search was conducted in the presence of owner/custodian Carlos Dimal, Barangay Captain Florencio
Miguel, Barangay Kagawads Rodolfo Vergara and Mariano Seriban, and BOMBO Radyo reporter Romy Santos.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that:

1. invalid because it was issued in connection with, not just one single offense, but two crimes
2. there was no probable cause
3. invalidly implemented because the raiding team failed to comply with the requisite presence of two
witnesses during a search of premises; and,
4. the items seized which are not covered by the search warrant

RTC:

Denied the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 for lack of merit.
Ruled that the application for search warrant reveals that it was issued by the RTC of Ilagan, Isabela, after
conducting searching and probing questions upon the persons of the applicant P/Insp. Malixi, and his witnesses
Edison, Shaira Mae and more particularly Villador, and finding probable cause based on their personal knowledge.

CA:

The CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the subject search warrant was validly issue

Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issued search warrant valid for being issued in connection with two unrelated offenses,
without a finding of probable cause, and without specifying the place to be searched and the items to be seized.

RULING:

Yes, the search warrant was valid.

Two unrelated offenses

There is no dispute that the Search Warrant was applied for and issued in connection with the crime of kidnapping
with murder. A search warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-
specific-offense rule.
Probable Cause

Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a search warrant after a searching and probing personal examination of
applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses, Edison, Shaira Mae and Villador.

Their testimonies jointly and collectively show a reasonable ground to believe that the 3 victims went to Dimal's
compound to sell palay, but were probably killed by Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within
its premises.

Judge Ong was also able to draw corroborative testimonies from P/lnsp. Malixi's witnesses.

While it may be noted that applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses Shaira Mae and Edison have no personal
knowledge how the crimes of kidnapping and multiple murder were committed, their testimonies corroborated
that of Villador, who petitioners admitted to have known about the incidents surrounding the commission of such
crimes.

Villador revealed that:

(1) when Dimal called him inside the house to receive his payment as classifier of palay, he
saw them [Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma] talking to each other; and
(2) later in the day, Dimal called him to ask for help, but he backed out upon seeing that Dimal
was holding a black 0.9 mm pistol amidst people lying bloody on the ground

Records clearly show that Judge Ong personally examined under oath applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses,
Edwin, Shaira Mae and Villador, whose collective testimonies would prompt a reasonably discreet person to
believe that the crime of kidnapping with murder was committed at the Felix GumpaL Compound on September 6,
2010, and that specific personal properties sought in connection with the crime could be found in the said place
sought to be searched.

Identification of property and things

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized

(1) when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or
(2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure;
(3) and when the things to be described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offenses for which the warrant is being issued.

In Search Warrant No. 10-11, only two things were particularly described and sought to be seized in connection
with the special complex crime of kidnapping with murder:

(1) blood-stained clothes of Gemma Eugenio consisting of a faded pink long sleeves jacket
and a black tshirt, and
(2) a 0.9mm caliber pistol

Personal Properties are said to be:

(a) subject of the offense;

(b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
(c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the
 proper subject of a search warrant.

Despite the fact that the search warrant is valid, the items seized are inadmissible in evidence since only 2 items
were particularly described on the face of the search warrant.

Plain view doctrine is not applicable as the 2nd and 3rd requisites were absent.

(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to
(c) the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure

Notwithstanding the inadmissibility in evidence of the items listed above, the Court sustains the validity of Search
Warrant No. 10-11 and the admissibility of the items seized which were particularly described in the warrant

REYES vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson Monteras (PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc,
Cardona, Rizal when two (2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon
tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog.

After a few minutes, a woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like
liquor passed by the police officers.

PO1 Monteras asked if Reyes if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out.

Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and at that point, turned her back, pulled
something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand.

PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station where he marked it with
"LRC-1."

He prepared the necessary documents, conducted the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain
Manolito Angeles.

PO1 Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item for examination
to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed 10 that the substance inside the sachet
tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

RTC:

The RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 od the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and thereupon, found to be in possession
of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police officers upon her arrest

CA:

The CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime charged.

It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was valid as she was caught in
flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on account thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the plastic sachet allegedly is shabu valid

RULING:

No, the seizure was invalid.

In order to deem as valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no
uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent thereof established by clear
and positive proof.

There being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from Reyes on account of the
search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

PEOPLE vs. SAPLA

FACTS:

An officer on duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office
that a certain male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela.

PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called
KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a possible joint operation.

PSI Ngoslab immediately organized a team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer,
PO3 Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security and backup. The
said officers then proceeded to the Talaca detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the subject male
person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
[was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived wherein the police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said
vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road.
Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw accused-appellant Sapla seated at the rear side
of the vehicle. The police officers asked accused-appellant Sapla if he was the owner of the blue sack in front of
him, which the latter answered in the affirmative.

The said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After [accused-appellant Sapla]
opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped
in newspaper and an old calendar.

PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest and his
constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized items, one (1) blue
sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer placed his signature on the
said items.
PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case, PO2 Alexander Oman
(hereinafter referred to as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and proper disposition.

Further investigation revealed that he tried to conceal his true identity by using a fictitious name - Eric Mallari
Salibad.

RTC:

Convicted accused-appellant Sapla for violating Section 5 of R.A. 9165.

The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the crime.

CA:

The CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's Decision with modifications.

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was without a search
warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and
seizure

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers in a moving vehicle

RULING:

No, it was invalid.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."
On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the operation
undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right against unreasonable
searches, the search must be limited to the following:

a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fairgrounds;
(b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors;
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (f) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches
in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a
mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched."
PEOPLE vs CARINO

FACTS:

SPO2 Navarro and his team, which included SPO2 Andasan and a certain Jay Mallari (Mallari), conducted a
surveillance operation around the vicinity of appellant's house.

SPO2 Navarro was stationed at the highway, SPO2 Andasan along Block 3, and another team member at Block 4.

According to SPO2 Navarro, he saw three persons inside appellant's house, later identified as Noel
Manianglung (Manianglung), Alma Bucao (Bucao), and Milagros Soliman (Soliman), who were also in the "drug
list."

SPO2 Navarro saw appellant come out of his house and head towards the house of a certain Tikong Dulay (Dulay).

SPO2 Navarro followed him and he saw appellant hand some money to Dulay in exchange for four sachets of
shabu.

Appellant went back to his house, with SPO2 Navarro following and returning to his position at the highway. He
signaled Mallari to move closer to appellant's house. A few minutes later, Mallari gave a signal to SPO2 Navarro
that a "pot session" was taking place inside appellant's house.

Appellant then came out of his house. At that point, SPO2 Navarro approached appellant and told him he was
being arrested for delivering shabu and maintaining a drug den.

After the arrest, SPO2 Navarro stooped to look inside the house and confirmed that Noel Manianglung was heating
foil with a lighter and a woman was holding a rolled aluminum foil and using it as a "tooter."

SPO2 Navarro and his team then entered appellant's house.

He found on top of a table:

1. one (1) opened or used small plastic sachet (marked as ETN-1);

2. two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance (marked as ETN-2
and ETN-3);
3. seven (7) aluminum foils inside a cigarette pack (marked as ETN-4); and
4. three (3) disposable lighters (marked as ETN-5, ETN-6, and ETN-7).

At the place of arrest, SPO2 Navarro prepared a receipt of property seized, which was signed by Edizon Dizon,
barangay chairman of San Nicolas, and Owen Policarpio, representative of the Department of
Justice (DOJ). Appellant refused to sign the inventory. The seized items were also photographed.

Appellant was charged in three separate informations with illegal sale of dangerous drugs (0.08 gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)), maintenance of a drug den, and illegal possession of dangerous drugs

RTC:

The RTC acquitted appellant of the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the police officers conducted
only a surveillance, not a buy-bust operation.

Convicted him for maintenance of a drug den.

CA:

The CA affirmed appellant's conviction.

It ruled that the drugs seized were admissible since they were the result of a valid warrantless search and seizure
under the "plain view doctrine."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless search valid under the “plain view doctrine”.

RULING:

No, the warrantless search is invalid under the “plain view doctrine”.

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur:

(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification
for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely:

(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
 committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer

In this case, appellant was not doing anything beforehand when he was arrested by SPO2 Navarro. Certainly, it
does not satisfy the elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) of Rule 113 because SPO2 Navarro
had no probable cause before the arrest that appellant was committing or had just committed the crime of
maintenance of a drug den.

It was only after his arrest that SPO2 Navarro purportedly saw the drugs being used inside appellant's house.
Again, the finding of probable cause cannot apply after the warrantless arrest had been made.

The questionable and invalid arrest thus makes the subsequent search in the house of appellant also invalid, the
exclusionary rule or the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree applies.

Due to the failure to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti, appellant cannot be
convicted of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

TUATES vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Katehlene Bundang (Bundang), a Jail Guard at the Provincial Jail of Zambales, was assigned to frisk women visitors
at the jail.

TUATES, the petitioner and a former detainee, went to the Provincial Jail to visit her boyfriend, Samuel Elamparo
(Elamparo), who was charged with Violation of the Dangerous [Drugs] Act.

Bundang conducted a body search on TUATES, and while searching the lower part of her body, Bundang found a
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance tucked on the left side of the latter's waist.

Bundang took the sachet and went to the Office of the Jail Warden to report the matter. Thereat, Bundang wrote
her initials "KAB" on the sachet in the presence of another Jail Guard, a certain Randy, as well as Police Officer 2
Virgilio Fennolar (Fennolar).

Forthwith, Bundang and Fennolar went to the crime laboratory to have the seized specimen examined. The plastic
sachet with markings "KAB" was found positive for Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

RTC:

The RTC concluded that the evidence sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

CA:
The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Tuates, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the elements of the
crimes charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and frisk conducted by Bundang a valid form of warrantless search and arrest.

RULING:

No, the search and frisk conducted by jail guard Bundang is invalid because Bundang did not follow the prescribed
procedure.

1. To perform a pat/frisk/rub search, the jail officer shall accomplish the following:
a. Instruct the subject to remove items from pockets, shoes, jackets, or any extra clothing.
b. Search the subject top to bottom being systematic:
1. Shake out his/her hair;
2. Grasp the collar and feel for any hidden items.
3. Search each of the arms separately.
4. Run hands down the shirt front, checking the pocket and stopping at the beltline. Then
check the back using the same process.
5. Once satisfied that all areas above the waist - the neck, arms, chest, and back are clear,
check the waistline to feel for any small articles hidden.
6. From the waistline, run hands down the subject's buttocks.
7. Then move both hands to one leg. Repeat process on the other leg
8. Finally, run hands over the subject's lower abdomen and crotch carefully, feeling for
concealed articles that may be taped to these areas

c. If during the pat/frisk/rub search the jail officer develops probable cause that contraband is
being hidden by the subject which is not likely to be discovered, the Jail Officer shall request
for a conduct of strip search/visual body cavity search.

What requires pat/frisk searches and rub searches to be done is over the jail visitor's clothing. Bundang admitted
twice that what she instead did was to raise Tuates' shirt.

Further, a strip search may only be done after the visitor agrees in writing, which is a requirement to shield the jail
officer performing the search from harassment complaints.
Del Castillo vs. People (Presumption of Innocence)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo alyas “Boy Castillo” was charged with violation of Section 16 Article III of
R.A. 6425 or Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs.

A search and seizure were conducted by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of Ruben Del Castillo, the petitioner. The petitioner was staying in the 2 nd floor of a two-
storey house. Masnayon and his team went upstairs where they were met by Del Castillo’s wife informing her that
they will be implementing the search warrant. But before they were able to search the area, Masnayon claimed
that he saw the petitioner run in a nipa hut. He and his team tried to chase the petitioner but to no avail since they
were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.

Masnayon ang his team went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. He then requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men
returned with two barangay tanods.

In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly del
Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His
men did not find anything but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance which were then proven to be positive for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

Defense of petitioner:

The small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his
older brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

RTC Ruling:

Petitioner is GUILTY.

CA Ruling:

Affirmed RTC ruling

OSG:

 Search Warrant is valid.

 The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are admissible in evidence against him.
  Dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in
a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that
such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is
sufficient to convict.
 Assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the
same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA 6425 for the presumption arising from the
finding of items seized from the nipa hut allegedly owned by the petitioner.

RULING:

The Court acquitted the petitioner, Ruben Del Castillo.

A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 20 specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched.

However, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the
petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant,
can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The OSG argues that assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was
a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure being applicable only against government authorities.

This was devoid of merit.

In the cross-examination conducted, it was testified by the police officers who effected the search warrant that
they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods.

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who
effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.

Agents of Person in Authority (Article 152 of RPC and Section 338 of Local Government Code)

-any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority

-charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority,
shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a
person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

Moreover, the elements of the crime Illegal Possession of Drugs must be established:

(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug;

(b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and
(c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug

The prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.

Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary.

Actual Possession

-exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused

Constructive Possession

-exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found

While ownership of the property seized is not necessary, the prosecution must establish that it is in the accused’s
possession or control.

The CA referred to the possession of the drugs as Constructive Possession.

However, there was no any evidence to show that the nipa hut was owned by the petitioner.

Both RTC and CA merely presumed that petitioner used the structure due to the presence of electrical materials,
the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof as to the ownership of
the structure where the seized articles were found.

SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was an electrical shop but denied that it was owned by petitioner.

The prosecution failed to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's control and dominion.

In criminal cases, an accused is presumed innocent unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

Miguel vs. Sandiganbayan (Right to be Heard)

FACTS:
Petitioner Fernando Q. Miguel, City Mayor of Koronadal City, South Cotabato, was charged with violation of RA.
3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido for the alleged
taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the private individuals acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits and advantages to said accused, by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to
provide the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of the
proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general
circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification.

Two of the co-accused filed separate motions which the Sandiganbayan ordered the OSP to conduct a
reinvestigation. Miguel orally moved for a reinvestigation which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. He was given
10 days to file his counter-affidavit to the OSP.

Miguel asked for three extensions for the filing of his counter-affidavit.

1. 30-day extension
2. Shortly before the expiry of the first 30-day extension, another 30-day extension was requested
3. Another 20-day extension

However, despite the extension granted, petitioner still did not submit his counter-affidavit. This prompted
Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence
which was then approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved.

An arraignment and trial for the petitioners were then requested by Prosecutor Ruiz to the Sandiganbayan.

After several extensions, petitioner Miguel filed a Motion to Quash Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against
him which was denied by the Sandiganbayan because of the pending OSP reinvestigation despite the OSP’s earlier
termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit.

Miguel was arraigned. OSP filed for Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite. Miguel filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based
on the "obvious and fatal defect of the information" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and
advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution which Miguel was then suspended from office as the City
Mayor for a period of 90 days.

Miguel filed for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied bewailing the lack of hearing before the issuance of his
suspension order claiming that "nowhere in the records of the case can one see any order or resolution requiring
the petitioner to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended." That the
requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to
settle the "defect" in the information.

OSP:

Argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the
suspension order already satisfied the purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing.

The petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when
the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the suspension of the petitioner valid in the absence of the pre-suspension hearing

RULING:

Yes. The pre-suspension order is valid.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing
to determine "the validity of the information" filed against him, "taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction."

The accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be
issued includes the right to challenge the:

(i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and
(ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A.
No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code

While there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Information that had been filed
against petitioners, the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of the procedure.

The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the
court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no
denial of procedural due process exists.

PEOPLE vs. LARA (Right to Counsel)

FACTS:

Accused-Appellant Arturo Lara was charged with robbery with homicide for the death of the victim Joselito M.
Bautista.

According to the witnesses of the prosecution, the victim and Enrique Sumulong, an accounting staff of San
Sebastian Allied Services, Inc., after withdrawing cash amounting to 230,000 from Metrobank Mabini-branch, Pasig
City, while in an intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, the accused-appellant Lara suddenly
appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and pointed a gun at Sumulong asking for the money inside the
bag. Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted not to give the bag which Sumulong then threw it at Bautista
who then alighted from the pick-up and ran. Lara went after Bautista while firing his gun.

Sumulong then ran for the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident. Going back to where the pick-up was
parked, he saw blood on the ground of the rear portion of the pick-up. A bystander informed him that Bautista was
shot and that the bag was taken away from him. When barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2)
other companions were brought to the police station for investigation.

Months after, Lara was arrested by the police officers while walking along the Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San
Miguel, Pasig City. He was then identified to be the one to shot Bautista and robbed the money of San Sebastian.

Defense of Accused:
In his defense, Lara testified that he was a plumber residing at Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City
and that during the incident, he was constructing a comfort room working from 8am to 3pm.

He was unlawfully arrested without a warrant. He was not assisted by a counsel when he was placed in a police
line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution claiming that a police line-up is part of the custodial
investigation and a counsel must have been attached. And that the prosecution failed to establish his guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by failing to present a witness who actually saw him commit the alleged acts.

RTC Ruling:

Convicted Lara with Robbery with Homicide

CA Ruling:

Affirmed Lara’s conviction.

1. Illegality of arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash before entering plea otherwise, it is deemed
waived.
2. An accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a
part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention
at the start of the investigation. Appellant was identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group
of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a
statement or confession was extracted from him.
3. There were circumstantial evidence to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
a. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, appellant
suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to
produce the bag containing the money.
b. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the backseat of
the vehicle.
c. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
d. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
e. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
f. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.
4. Failure of alibi to convince - alibi the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of
the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime

Physical impossibility

-refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where
it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of the assistance of a counsel for accused Arturo Lara in a police line-up a ground for
inadmissibility of Sumulong’s identification of Lara

RULING:
No, the absence of counsel for accused Arturo Lara when he was place in a police line-up does not invalidate the
proceedings and did not render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible.

The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only
by a person while he is under custodial investigation.

Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.

Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

PEOPLE vs. AYSON (Right to Self-Incrimination)

FACTS:

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was charged with Estafa for allegedly defrauding the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
Baguio branch by misappropriating the value of tickets amounting to 76,000 pesos instead of remitting all the
proceeds of the sale.

Ramos was a freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. The PAL management
conducted an investigation in regard to the irregularities in the sales of plane tickets which he was involved with. It
was in accordance with PAL’s Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it
with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.

On the day before the investigation, Ramos gave his superiors handwritten notes stating that he was willing to
settle irregularities charged against him subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL.

At the investigation, Ramos admitted that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit
Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him although he was planning to pay back the money by
a staggering basis but had been prevented from doing so due to shame.

During the arraignment, Ramos pleaded not guilty.

The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence including the statement of accused Ramos however,
respondent Hon. Judge Ruben Ayson rejected on the ground that the accused Ramos was not reminded of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. Ramos’ statement was also found inadmissible as it was
made without the assistance of counsel.

He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of
allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage
of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation was
administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision
cited."
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Hon. Judge Ayson misapprehended the nature and imports of right to self-incrimination in
excluding the statement and admission of private respondent Ramos in the evidence to be presented by the
private prosecutor

RULING:

Yes, Hon. Judge has misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights of a defendant in a criminal
case.

He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has
grossly erred.

Right against Self-Incrimination

It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply
secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refute to answer any particular incriminatory
question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime.

However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is only when a
particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. If not
claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be
waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

Right for Custodial Investigation

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere,

resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right,
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him; and
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Custodial interrogation is meant to be "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."

Right of Defendant in Criminal Cases

It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial
interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of
the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office).

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself' signifies that he
cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the
accused.
He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot be required
to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself.

The defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be
sworn, answer any question. That "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be
used against him."

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which might
incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which
he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-
incrimination.

Following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence:

1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.

It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record
having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A,
just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not
been accorded to Ramos.

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE (Right to Speedy, Impartial, and Public Trial)

FACTS:

The case is a revisit of the decision made by the Court involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing.

Respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of the court.

The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide,
while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries.

The Court also upheld the decision of CA and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr.
(Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated.

The case involved stemmed from the death of Lenny Villa who was one of the freshmen law students of Ateneo De
Manila University who joined the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). Together with other 6 freshmen
law students, they were subjected to the traditional initiation rites of the Aquilian initiation rites.

Accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
demanded that the rites be reopened. The neophytes were then subjected to paddling and additional rounds of
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the
ground.

Villa was then heard to be shivering and mumbling incoherent. He was brought to the hospital which he was
pronounced dead on arrival.

A criminal case of homicide was charged against the 35 members of the fraternity.

However, only 25 out of the 35 members remained to be sentenced. 19 were acquitted; 4 were convicted were
slight physical injuries including Tecson; and Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were convicted with homicide.

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa filed Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the CA committed grave abuse
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona et al on the
ground of violating the right to speedy trial.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial

RULING:

No, the CA did not err in dismissing the case for violation of the right to speedy trial.

The CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal, and that any appeal or
reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double jeopardy.

No basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused
was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law.

PEOPLE vs. ESTOMACA (Proper Procedure of Arraignment – Language used)

FACTS:

The crux of the controversy in both is identically the validity vel non of the arraignment conducted by the same
trial court which followed closely equivalent procedures in conducting the questioned proceedings.
Accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca was charged with 5 counts of rape for allegedly raping his 15-year-old
daughter, Estelita Estomaca.

There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what really took place in June 14, 1994 during the
arraignment of appellant, assisted by his government counsel de oficio, Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera.

Accused pleaded guilty to 2 of the criminal cases and not guilty for the other three criminal cases.

In the proceedings, the accused waived the presentation of evidence for his defense , requiring the prosecution to
adduce evidence to establish accused’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a non-compliance of procedural rules that will invalidate the arraignment of the accused

RULING:

Yes, the arraignment was invalid due to the non-compliance of the trial court with the procedural rules.

Section 1(a) Rule 116 requires:

1. The arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of
court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of
witnesses stated therein
2. Reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him
3. Asking him what his plea is to the charge.

The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a
mandatory requirement. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important
constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal
thereof.

 The arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints.

 There is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each
complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and comply with
his responsibilities.

 Appellant was not specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be
given the death penalty under the "New Law," and

 Appellant was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance
affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously advised.

A "searching inquiry," under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term
(because the accused is aware of that) but so also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the
certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony.

Allegedly, the language used in reading the complaint was Ilonggo/local dialect in the presumption that Ilonggo or
Hiligaynon is a regional language spoken in a major part of Iloilo province, Negros Occidental and, with variations,
in Capiz.
Kinaray-a was the local dialect spoken in the central and northwestern part of Iloilo province and all the way up to
and throughout Antique, including necessarily San Joaquin where the offenses were committed and of which
appellant and his family are natives

Section 3 Rule 116

The bottom line of the rule is that a plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment.
Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on:
(1) the voluntariness of the plea; and
(2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea.

No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN (Arraignment by Trial Court’s Jurisdiction Over the Person Accused)

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Alfredo Pangilinan was charged with 2 counts of rape for unlawfully having sexual intercourse
with his daughter, AAA, 11 years old at the time of the commission of offense.

Pangilinan’s first attempt happened in September 1995 while they were asleep. AAA was sleeping when she felt
her father approached their bed, remove her shorts, and lay on top of her. She couldn’t move. Appellant continued
to remove her clothes. AAA struggled with all her strength even though her hands were pinned over her head. She
shouted for help but her mouth was quickly covered by the appellant. When appellant attempted to insert his
penis into her vagina, AAA unceasingly resisted until appellant finally stopped his attack and left her.

The next incident happened the following night where the appellant once again crawled beside AAA while she was
asleep beside her siblings. He removed all her clothes. When AAA woke up, she resisted appellant with all her
strength and shouted for her grandmother’s help, but he quickly covered her mouth, thus stifling her cries.
Appellant, who was naked, mounted AAA and kissed her on different parts of her body. After a while, AAA’s energy
waned. AAA felt excruciating pain when appellant forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina and had sexual
intercourse with her. The following morning, AAA was feverish. She saw blood oozing out of her vagina. Scared and
confused, AAA confided to her eight (8) year-old brother CCC that appellant raped her the previous night.

This happened repeatedly for 2 years not until AAA’s mother arrived from Singapore and her grandmother told her
mother not to leave her for, she was being sexually abusing her.

The mother then confronted the appellant and decided to leave him. She brought AAA to the Dinalupihan District
Hospital for an examination which then revealed that AAA had a non-parous introitus with an old healed hymenal
laceration at the 4 o’clock position.

RTC Ruling:

Found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of Rape and sentenced with Death Penalty
Found private complainant to be immature, innocent, naïve, unfamiliar with sex and incapable of inventing or
fabricating charges against her own father when the sexual assaults were committed
The one responsible for bringing the matter to the attention of the mother who later reported to the police was no
less than the mother of the accused who as a mother, would not allow herself to be used to make her son suffer,
especially if the charges are fabricated.

CA Ruling:
Affirmed RTC ruling but modified the amount of damages awarded
Elevated the case to Supreme Court for automatic review

Defense of Appellant:

Appellant argued that he was being seduced by AAA despite his refusals.
He was not properly arraigned for the offenses charged against him for he was not informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him before the evidence before the prosecution was presented.
Allegedly, he was only arraigned after the case was submitted for decision, a procedural error, which is a prejudice
and denial of his constitutional right. He claims that the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person
at the time the petition for bail was heard.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court had the jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Alfredo Pangilinan to
properly arraigned him

RULING:

Yes, the trial court had the jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Alfredo Pangilinan to properly
arraigned him.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance.

The trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the appellant when he was arrested on 19
March 1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the trial court jurisdiction over his person. When the
hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the trial court had already acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting
arm of the State is mobilized against him.

Appellant was arraigned after the case was submitted for decision. Appellant’s belated arraignment did not
prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
objection that his client had yet to be arraigned. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear
indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when appellant was subsequently arraigned.
The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court.

DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Plea Bargaining/Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense)

FACTS:

The petitioner Joselito Daan, together with Benedicto Kuizon, was charged with 3 counts of Malversation of Public
Funds and 3 counts of Falsification of Documents by a Public Officer or employee which they purportedly tried to
conceal by falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on
the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon
when, in truth and in fact, they did not.

The accused proposed three Plea Bargains for the offenses charged against him:

1. To withdraw his plea of “Not Guilty” and substitute it with a plea of “Guilty” provided, the mitigating
circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their favor;
2. To substitute his “Not Guilty” plea for the crime of Falsification of Documents by a Public Officer or
employee to a plea of “Guilty” for lesser offense for the crime of Falsification of Documents by Private
Individual.
3. To substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of
an accountable officer to render accounts.
The prosecution found the propositions amenable since accused Daan was able to restitute the total amount of
18,860 pesos as seen in the official receipt issued by the Provincial Government of Leyte. The damage caused to
the government has already been restituted.

However, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Plea Bargain on the ground that there was no cogent
reason to justify its approval. It claims that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the proposals would be for
the benefit of the public. And that their approval would send wrong signals to potential grafters in public office
that the penalties they are likely to face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that
the economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh the risks they face in
committing them.

Petitioner filed for the petition for certiorari on the ground that he is not an accountable officer and only assigned
to affixed signature on the payrolls on a routinary basis and that the amount involved has already been restituted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plea-bargaining offer of the petitioner Daan valid

RULING:

Yes, the plea-bargaining offer of the petitioner Joselito Daan is valid.

The allegations in the Information filed against petitioner are sufficient to hold petitioner liable for the lesser
offenses.

Thus, in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official
position in allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.

In the same vein, with regard to the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, while the information contains
allegations which make out a case for Malversation against petitioner, nevertheless, absent the element of
conversion, theoretically, petitioner may still be held liable for Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer
if it is shown that the failure to render account was in violation of a law or regulation that requires him to render
such an accounting within the prescribed period.

Given, therefore, that some of the essential elements of offenses charged in this case likewise constitute the lesser
offenses, then petitioner may plead guilty to such lesser offenses.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence
than that for the graver charge.

It is authorized under Section 2 Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the
pre-trial conference.

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence
and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre-
trial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

Requisites which plea bargaining may be made:

1. it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor
2. the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged

The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of
right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Moreover, the lesser offenses of Falsification by Private Individuals and Failure to Render Account by an
Accountable Officer are necessarily included in the crimes of Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of
Public Funds, respectively, with which petitioner was originally charged.

Elements of Falsification of Public Documents:

(a) the offender makes in a document untruthful statement in a narration of facts;

(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
(c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.

Elements of Falsification by Private Individuals:

(a) the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official
position;
(b) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
(c) the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document

Elements of Malversation of Public Funds:

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) he has custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence
permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property
Elements of Failure to Render Account by an Accountable Officer:

(a) the offender is a public officer;

(b) the offender must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(c) the offender is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and
(d) the offender fails to render an account for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

PEOPLE vs. JANJALANI (Plea of Guilty to capital offense)

FACTS:

A complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder were charged against accused-appellants
Gamal Baharan a.k.a Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a Abu Zaky for the
bombing incident that happened in an RRCG bus sometime during February 14, 2005.

The witness, Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, noticed two men were running after the RRCG bus plying lying its
usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via Epifanio De Los Santos
Avenue (EDSA). The two men insisted on riding the bus so he obliged and let them in.

While in the bus, he became wary of the two men when they sat away from each other-one sat behind the driver
and the other one sat at the back. He also noticed that their eyes were reddish. He became more certain that the
two men were up to no good and a hold-up might happen when he approached the man near the driver and asked
him whether he was paying for two passengers which the man then answered stuttering while giving 20 pesos. It
became more suspicious when the men were kept asking if the bus is going to stop at Ayala Avenue. He also
noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms
hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with something.

However, he did not report the two men to the police.

The two men got off the bus upon reaching the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA despite the
reluctance of the driver. Moments after, an explosion was heard. Andales then reported the incident at Makati
Police Station.

Shortly before the explosion, Abu Solaiman, spokesperson of the Abu Sayyaf Group announced over radio station
DZBB that the group had a Valentine’s Day "gift" for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. After the bombing,
he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

Trinidad, one of the accused, confessed in an exclusive interview with the ABS-CBN Network, his participation with
the Valentine’s Day bombing incident. Baharan, another accused, likewise confessed his participation with the
incident.

On the arraignment for the multiple murder charge:

Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty.

Rohmat pled not guilty.

On the arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charges:

Asali pled guilty.
Accused Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty.
Rohmat pled not guilty.

The trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their "not guilty" pleas to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled "guilty" to the heavier charge of multiple
murder. The two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment.

Asali was discharges as state witness and confessed that he, together with the other accused, were taught how
make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the
city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of
Metro Manila.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the
accused’s plea of guilt by the trial court sufficient

RULING:

The court ruled that it was unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry as the accused’s plea of
guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.

Accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge – multiple murder – based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. Prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan
and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt – one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television
interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).

The Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, "The
manner by which the plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on
independent evidence proving the commission by the person accused of the offense charged."

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If
the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission
of the offense charged.

Trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to satisfy
themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding
of the significance, effects, and consequences of their guilty plea.

ENRILE vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile filed the petition for certiorari for the denial of the Motion for Bill of Particulars by the
Sandiganbayan.

The petition stemmed from the alleged Plunder charged against Enrile together with Janet Napoles and others for
amassing ill-gotten wealth amounting to 172, 834, 500 pesos from the proceeds of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund or otherwise known as PDAF.

Enrile, upon finding the information defective for failure to state the particularities of the crime charged against
him, filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars.

The following are the particularities Enrile requested in his motion:

1. Who among the accused acquired the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00)
2. What are the particular overt acts which constitute the combination? What are the particular overt acts
which constitute the series? Who committed those acts?
3. What was repeatedly received?
4. Name the specific person(s) who delivered the amount of Php172,834,500.00 and the specific person(s)
who received the amount
5. Breakdown of the various amounts totaling Php172,834,500.00.
6. To whom was the money given? To Enrile or Reyes? How much was given on each occasion,
the date when and the place where the amount was given.
7. Describe each project allegedly identified, how, and by whom was the project identified, the nature of
each project, where it is located and the cost of each project.
8. For each of the years 2004-2010, under what law or official document is a portion of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund identified as that of a member of Congress, in this instance, as ENRILE’s, to
be found? In what amount for each year is ENRILE’s Priority Development Assistance Fund?
9. When, and to whom, did Enrile endorse the projects in favor of Napoles non-government organizations
which became the recipients and/or target implementers of ENRILE’s PDAF projects?
10. Name Napoles non-government organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementers
of ENRILE’s PDAF projects.
11. Who paid Napoles, from whom did Napoles collect the fund for the projects which turned out to be ghosts
or fictitious? Who authorized the payments for each project?
12. What COA audits or field investigations were conducted which validated the findings that each of Enrile’s
PDAF projects in the years 2004-2010 were ghosts or spurious projects?
13. How did Enrile took undue advantage, on several occasions, of his official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines?

Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground that the details Enrile desired are substantial reiterations of the
arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information, and the details sought are evidentiary in nature that are best ventilated during the trial.

Enrile claims in this petition that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied his motion for bill of particulars despite the ambiguity and insufficiency of the
Information filed against him. He maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave of abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
for denying petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of Particulars

RULING:

Yes, Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion for denying Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion for Bill of
Particulars.

The petition was partially granted.

A.The Constitutional right of the accused to be informed

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The objective, in short, is to describe the act with
sufficient certainty to fully appraise the accused of the nature of the charge against him and to avoid
possible surprises that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the accused would be left speculating on why he
has been charged at all.
B. Procedural Sufficiency of the Information
To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.

Ultimate facts are defined as those facts which the expected evidence will support. It refers to the facts that the
evidence will prove at the trial.

Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises
that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of some other alleged and
unproven fact.

Ultimate facts are the essential and substantial facts which either form the basis of the primary right and duty or
which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant, while evidentiary facts are those which
tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.

C. Arraignment
During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that
confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the
nature of the crime imputed to him.

Moreover, the Information must provide some means of ensuring that the crime for which the accused is
brought to trial is in fact one for which he was charged, rather than some alternative crime seized upon by
the prosecution in light of subsequently discovered evidence. 43Likewise, it must indicate just what crime
or crimes an accused is being tried for, in order to avoid subsequent attempts to retry him for the same
crime or crimes.

Bill of Particulars

A bill of particulars is the further specification of the charges or claims in an action which an accused may avail of
by motion before arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
The purpose of a motion for bill of particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare his responsive
pleading properly.

Section 9. Bill of particulars. - The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him
properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information
and the details desired.

The rule requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the accused of the
crime charged with and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must be such that persons
of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what the Information means.

The general function of a bill of particulars, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard against surprises
during trial.

It has also been stated that it is the function or purpose of a bill of particulars to define, clarify, particularize, and
limit or circumscribe the issues in the case, to expedite the trial, and assist the court . A general function or
purpose of a bill of particulars is to prevent injustice or do justice in the case when that cannot be accomplished
without the aid of such a bill.

Notably, the failure of the accused to move for the specification of the details desired deprives him of the right to
object to evidence that could be introduced and admitted under an Information of more or less general terms but
which sufficiently charges the accused with a definite crime.

Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars

A Bill of Particulars presupposes a valid Information.

A Motion to Quash is a jurisdictional defect on account that the facts charged in the Information does not
constitute an offense.

A motion to quash and a motion for a bill of particulars are distinct and separate remedies, the latter
presupposing an information sufficient in law to charge an offense.

The following details are to be entitled to Enrile:

1. The Overt Acts constituting the Combination or Series under the Plunder Law

The heart of the Plunder Law lies in the phrase combination or series of overt or criminal acts.
Hence, even if the accumulated ill-gotten wealth amounts to at least P50 million, a person cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of plunder if this resulted from a single criminal act.

The several (i.e., at least 2) acts which are indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy must not
be generally stated; they should be stated with enough particularity for Enrile (and his co-accused) to be
able to prepare the corresponding refuting evidence to meet these alleged overt acts.

2. Approximate Dates of Commissions or Kickbacks

Enrile should likewise know the approximate dates, at least, of the receipt of the kickbacks and
commissions, so that he could prepare the necessary pieces of evidence, documentary or otherwise, to
disprove the allegations against him.
 The length of time involved six years will pose difficulties to Enrile in the preparation of his defense and
will render him susceptible to surprises.

3. The Projects Funded and NGOs Involved

Enrile is also entitled to particulars specifying the project that Enrile allegedly funded coupled with the
name of Napoles NGO (e.g., Pangkabuhayan Foundation, Inc.), to sufficiently inform Enrile of the
particular transactions referred to.

Under the elaborate scheme alleged to have been committed by Enrile and his co-accused, the project
identification was what started the totality of acts constituting plunder: only after a project has been
identified could Enrile have endorsed Napoles NGO to the appropriate government agency that, in turn,
would implement the supposed project using Enrile PDAF. Note that without the project identification, no
justification existed to release Enrile’s PDAF to Napoles allegedly bogus NGO.
4. The Government Agencies Serving as Conduits

The government agencies to whom Enrile endorsed Napoles NGOs are also material facts that must be
specified, since they served a necessary role in the crime charged the alleged conduits between Enrile
and Napoles NGOs. They were indispensable participants in the elaborate scheme alleged to have been
committed.

1. The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the combination or series of overt criminal acts charged in the
Information.

2. A breakdown of the amounts of the kickbacks or commissions allegedly received, stating how the amount of
P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.

3. A brief description of the identified projects where kickbacks or commissions were received.

4. The approximate dates of receipt, in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, of the alleged kickbacks and commissions
from the identified projects. At the very least, the prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and
transactions from the identified projects were received.

5. The name of Napoles non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged recipients and/or target
implementors of Enrile PDAF projects.

6. The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles NGOs. The particular person/s in each
government agency who facilitated the transactions need not be named as a particular.

SANICO vs. PEOPLE (Right to Counsel)

FACTS:

The case is a petition for review for the denial of CA on the petition for review filed by the petitioner Jose “Pepe”
Sanico in regard to the criminal cases filed against the petitioner on the ground of the following:

(a) the docket fees were not paid;

(b) there was no proper proof of service of a copy of the petition for review on the adverse party;
(c) the petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for review;
(d) there was no affidavit of service;
(e) no written explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed;
(f) the documents appended to the petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies;
(g) no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record were attached;
(h) the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement
that the allegations therein were based on the petitioner’s personal knowledge;
(i)the verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not contain competent evidence of identity of the
petitioner; and
(j) the serial number of the commission of the notary public and the office address of the notary public were not
properly indicated.

Sanico together with Marsito Basiquin was charged with Trespassing and Theft of Minerals before the MCTC Cebu.
The criminal case Trespassing was dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the Theft of Minerals and was sentenced with
imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day of Prision Correcional to 2 years 4 months and 1-day Prision Correcional, as
maximum.

Sanico’s counsel filed for a notice of appeal in MCTC. Consequently, he was ordered by the RTC to file his
memorandum on appeal which he did not comply with. Hence, RTC dismissed his appeal on the ground of his
failure to file his Memorandum of Appeal.

Another lawyer of Sanico filed for a motion of reconsideration for the dismissal of the appeal stating that Sanico
wasn’t able to file his memorandum of appeal because his wife died and that his own counsel, Atty. Baring was
suffering from a medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as
principal counsel hereof but was denied by the RTC and CA.

The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding against him his former counsel’s gross and inexcusable
negligence, thereby depriving him of his right to have the conviction reviewed by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his right to have the conviction reviewed due to his former
counsel’s gross and inexcusable negligence.

RULING:

Yes, the petitioner was deprived of his rights.

The RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely
made by the petitioner.

In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly
relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes the dismissal of the appeal once the appellant
fails to file the memorandum on appeal.

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases.

The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to
decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been
filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the
same.
Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum
on appeal.

Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was entitled to expect
that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not.

The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process to him in a
manner that occasioned severe prejudice because his conviction was not reviewed despite his first-time appeal
being a matter of right, and because his conviction was then declared to have attained finality, causing the
execution of the decision as to its civil aspect.

PEOPLE vs. LACSON

FACTS:

Respondent Panfilo Lacson filed for four motions:

A. Omnibus Motion
- to allow Associate Justices Renato C. Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. Morales, Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is in
order and to recuse them from further deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, participating in the resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration

-allegedly they were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral arguments
and after the case at bar was submitted for the decision of the Court

-assailing A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC even though is applicable to the divisions of Court only is also applicable to the case
at hand

B.Motion for Reconsideration

C.Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration
D.Motion to Set for Oral Arguments

Issues:

Whether or not the motions filed by respondent valid

Ruling:

No, all the motions filed were invalid and thus, were denied.

Omnibus Motion

The Court denied the motion.

The respondent’s reliance to AM 99-08-09 SC is misplaced because the said circular is applicable only to motions
for reconsideration in cases assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases assigned to the Court En Banc, the
policy of the Court had always been and still is, if the ponente is no longer with the Court, his replacement will act
upon the motion for reconsideration of a party and participate in the deliberations thereof.

There was also no need for its newest members to inhibit themselves from participating in the deliberation of the
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration because the stenographic notes taken during February 18, 2002 hearing
are available to the parties or to any member of the Court which informed them what transpired during the
hearing and oral arguments of the parties.

Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments

The court denied the motion.

The parties have already extensively discussed the issues involved in the case. The respondent’s motion for
reconsideration consists of no less than a hundred pages, excluding the supplement to his motion for
reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners’ comment on his motion.

Issue on Time-Bar (Prospective or Retroactive)

Respondent assailed Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that it should applied
prospectively and retroactively without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
accused.

He asserts that case law on the retroactive application of penal laws should likewise apply to criminal procedure, it
being a branch of criminal law.

The respondent insists that Section 8 was purposely crafted and included as a new provision to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.

The respondent asserts that Section 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused.

The respondent argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule of procedure, there can be no other conclusion:
the rule should have retroactive application, absent any provision therein that it should be applied prospectively.

Accordingly, prospective application thereof would in effect give the petitioners more than two years from March
29, 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases, thus violating the respondent’s right to due process and equal
protection of the law.
According to the respondent, the petitioners filed the Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 beyond the two-year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy trial, and that such filing was
designed to derail his bid for the Senate.

Petitioner’s stand:

The prospective application of Section 8 is in keeping with Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides in part that the rules of procedure which the Court may promulgate shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantial rights. While Section 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does
not and should not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice. If such right to
public justice is taken away, then Section 8 can no longer be said to be a procedural rule.

If a procedural rule impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, the said rule may not be given a
retroactive application. They contend that the right of the accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the
criminal cases applies only to outstanding and pending cases and not to cases already dismissed.

“Refiling of case” in Section 8:

The filing of the criminal complaint with the appropriate office for the purpose of conducting a
preliminary investigation, and not the actual filing of the criminal complaint or information in
court for trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, the offended parties must be given
notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases under Section 8 since the provision so
expressly states.

1. The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8 retroactively simply because it is favorable to the accused.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued the
administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the
accused only.

The retroactivity or non-retroactivity of a rule is not automatically determined by the provision of the
Constitution on which the dictate is based.

When the Court approved Section 8, it intended the new rule to be applied prospectively and not
retroactively, for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat the very purpose for which
it was intended, namely, to give the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional dismissal of
criminal cases with the express consent of the accused.

2. A judicial admission is a formal statement made either by a party or his or her attorney, in the course of
judicial proceeding which removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is a voluntary
concession of fact by a party or a party’s attorney during such judicial proceedings, including admissions in
pleadings made by a party. It may occur at any point during the litigation process. An admission in open
court is a judicial admission.

PANAGUITON vs. DOJ (BP Blg. 22)

FACTS:
Private respondents, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed money from the petitioner, Luis Panaguiton amounting to
1,979,459.00 pesos. Cawili and his business associate, Ramon Tongson, jointly issued and signed three checks in
payment of the said loans. However, the checks were dishonored for either for insufficiency of funds or by the
closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili but to no
avail.

Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violation of B.P.Blg. 22 or Bouncing Check Law in
August 24, 1995. In the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit claiming
that he was unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the
latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in appreciation of his
services, he wasoffered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson
denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.

To counter the allegations, the petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were
purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks and a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein
Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In the findings of the City Prosecutor, a probable cause was found only against Cawili dismissing the charges
against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case
against Cawili was filed before the proper court. After finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the
bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Zuno directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson.

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied for lack of merit.

Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution holding that the case has already
prescribed. Violations of BP Blg. 22 shall prescribe after 4 years.

The four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March
1993.

The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of
the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings.

Considering that from 1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet
been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the DOJ through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, but dismissed because
the case has already prescribed. He filed for a motion for reconsideration which was then granted through then
Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, declaring that the offense has not yet prescribed. 3 information were
then filed against Tongson.

However, in 2004, the DOJ ordered for the withdrawal of information justifying that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses and BP Blg. 22 as a special
act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not
Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized.
Petitioner filed a certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed for failure to attach a proper verification
and certification of non-forum shopping and that the attached resolution of DOJ is a mere photocopy. He then
moved for reconsideration attaching an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which was still
denied by the CA stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a
reconsideration of its resolution.

Petitioner’s stand:

The Court of Appeals committed a grave error for dismissing his petition on technical grounds. He submits that the
verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the
verification being intended simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct
and not a product of the imagination or a matter of speculation.

DOJ’s comment:

The CA did not commit a grave error dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court and
reiterated that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition of petitioner Panaguiton for failure to attach a
copy of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping

RULING:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for the failure to attach a copy of verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.

The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are
true and correct. The court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served. By attaching the pertinent verification to
his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.

Prescription of BP Blg. 22:

-When Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was
conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted

-Petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He
likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods.
-However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August
1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed.

-Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the
case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326.

Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the
prescriptive period for the offenses, they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.

PEOPLE v. DUMLAO (Estafa – GSIS)

FACTS:

Respondent Hermenegildo Dumlao, then being a member of GSIS, was charged with a violation of RA 3019 or Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices for entering into contract of lease-purchase with Emilio G. La’o, a private person
whereby the GSIS agreed to sell to said Emilio G. La’o, a GSIS acquired property consisting of three parcels of land
with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building and granting Emilio G. La’o the right to sub-
lease the ground floor for his own account during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in
excess of the yearly amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Assisted by his counsel, Dumlao pleaded “not guilty” during the arraignment. As agreed, upon by the prosecution
and respondent Dumlao, a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court. With
the submission by the parties of their Joint Stipulation of Facts, the pre-trial is deemed terminated.

Dumlao then filed for a Motion to Quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense arguing that the alleged approved Board Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board of
Trustees, contrary to the allegations in the information since the signatures of Fabian Ver, Roman Cruz, Aber
Canlas and Jacobo Clave did not appear in the minutes of the meeting concluding that these people did not
participate in the alleged approval of the Lease-Purchase Agreement and maintaining that there was no quorum of
the board to approve the supposed resolution authorizing the sale of the GSIS property. There being no approval
by the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be no resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The
unapproved resolution, he added, proved his innocence.

Sandiganbayan granted the motion on the ground of insufficiency of evidence holding that the resolution was not
validly passed by the Board of Trustees of GSIS since it was only signed by three (3) members of the Board. Thus, it
never had the force and effect of a valid resolution and did not in effect approve the Lease and Purchase
Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ground “insufficiency of evidence” for granting the Motion to Quash to the respondent Dumlao
by the Sandiganbayan valid
RULING:

No, the ground is not valid.

The ground raised by respondent Dumlao in his Motion to Quash/Dismiss is that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an
information is whether the facts alleged would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law.

Elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

All the elements were proven by the facts alleged in the information.

Moreover, insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash.

Grounds of a Motion to Quash:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by
law;

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case .

Assuming arguendo that the Sandiganbayan committed an error, whatever error may have been committed by the
Sandiganbayan was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Dumlao raised the defense of double
jeopardy.
Double Jeopardy:

Requisites:

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and

(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

Elements:

(1) upon a valid indictment;

(2) before a competent court;

(3) after arraignment;

(4) when a valid plea has been entered; and

(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused

In the instant case, double jeopardy has not yet set in. The first jeopardy has not yet attached. There is no question
that four of the five elements of legal jeopardy are present. However, we find the last element – valid conviction,
acquittal, dismissal or termination of the case – wanting.

There was no error of judgment but a denial of due process resulting in loss of jurisdiction.

Respondent Dumlao would not be placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the Sandiganbayan
had acted without jurisdiction. Precisely, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation,
necessarily null and void and does not exist.

SORIANO v. PEOPLE (Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents)

FACTS:

The Office of Special Investigation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas transmitted a letter to Chief State
Prosecutor Zuno attaching five affidavits which became bases for the filing of criminal charges of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents against petitioner Hilario Soriano, then President of RBSM, for ordering,
facilitation and receiving the proceeds of a loan amounting to 8 million allegedly was not applied by spouses Enrico
and Amalia Carlos and was not authorized by the Board of Directors of Rural Bank of San Miguel (RBSM). The letter
of the OSI, which was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary investigation be
conducted and the corresponding criminal charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address.

Two information were filed against the petitioner. One for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents alleging that petitioner and his co-accused, in abuse of the confidence reposed in them as RBSM
officers, caused the falsification of a number of loan documents, making it appear that one Enrico Carlos filled up
the same, and thereby succeeded in securing a loan and converting the loan proceeds for their personal gain and
benefit.

The second information filed against petitioner was for the violation of the General Banking Act referring to the
prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans alleging that, in his capacity as President of RBSM, petitioner
indirectly secured an ₱8 million loan with RBSM, for his personal use and benefit, without the written consent and
approval of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering the said transaction in the bank's records, and without
transmitting a copy of the transaction to the supervising department of the bank.

Petitioner moved to quash the two information on two grounds: (1) that the court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged, and (2) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged:

 the letter transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure
to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, such as the
statement of address of petitioner and oath and subscription

 the officers of OSI, who were the signatories to the "letter-complaint," were not authorized by the BSP
Governor, much less by the Monetary Board, to file the complaint

Facts charged do not constitute an offense:

 the commission of estafa is inherently incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law hence a person
cannot be charged for both offenses

DOSRI - the offender has to obtain a loan from his bank, without complying with procedural, reportorial, or
ceiling requirements

ESTAFA - requires the offender to misappropriate or convert something that he holds in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to return the same

RTC ruling:

The trial court denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of merit. The lower court agreed with the prosecution
that the assailed OSI letter was not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply with the requirements
under the Rules of Court. The trial court held that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter, comprised
the complaint-affidavit in the case.

Court of Appeals ruling:

Denied petition on both issues presented by petitioner.

First issue: The BSP letter was not a complaint but a transmittal or cover letter only which merely contained a
summary of the affidavits and did not contain any averment of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
that constitute the elements of the offenses charged. The five affidavits attached to the transmittal letter should be
considered as the complaint-affidavits that charged petitioner with violation of Section 83 of RA 337 and for Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents.
Second issue: The allegations in the assailed information clearly constitute the elements of Estafa thru Falsification
of Commercial Documents and Violation of DOSRI law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grounds of the petitioner for his Motion to Quash valid and a petition for certiorari a proper
remedy for the denial of motion to quash

RULING:

No, the grounds of the petitioner for his Motion to Quash were not valid.

The offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be initiated by "any
competent person" with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses who
executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of "any competent person" who may institute the complaint
for a public crime.

The letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to
the DOJ for preliminary investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. These
affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public.

It is the affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, that were intended to initiate the preliminary investigation. A
preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the
referral document, like the NBI-NCR Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant.

Moreover, the information filed against petitioner do not negate each other.

They contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime of
DOSRI violation and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

DOSRI:

(1) petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM;

(2) that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from RBSM by putting the loan in the name of depositor Enrico
Carlos; and

(3) that he did this without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements

ESTAFA thru FALSIFICATION of COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS:

(1) falsified various loan documents to make it appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of ₱8 million from
RBSM;

(2) petitioner succeeded in obtaining the loan proceeds;

(3) that he later converted the loan proceeds to his own personal gain and benefit; and
(4) that his action caused damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the BSP, and the PDIC.

Proper Remedy for Denial of Motion to Quash

Accused must enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had
invoked in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

A petition for Certiorari can only be a proper remedy if a party can establish that the denial is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

CEREZO v. PEOPLE (Double Jeopardy)

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a libel case against private respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Vicente
Afulugencia and Oscar Mapalo. Finding a probable cause, an information was filed. The respondents filed for
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecution’s Evidence. The Office of Prosecutor-QC
reversed its finding and ordered for the withdrawal of the information. Consequently, a Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC. During the intervening period, specifically on November 24, 2003,
respondents were arraigned. All of them entered a "not guilty" plea. In deference to the prosecutor’s last
resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal case dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said Order, arguing that the November 20, 2003 OP-QC
resolution has not yet attained finality, considering that the same was the subject of a Petition for Review filed
before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The RTC deferred action on the said motion to await the resolution of the
DOJ.

3 years after, the Secretary of Justice reversed the order of the OP-Qc and directed for the refiling of the
information for libel.

Accused private respondents argued that double jeopardy has set in.

RTC Ruling:

Disagrees with the argument raised by the accused that double jeopardy sets in to the picture because the order of
dismissal as well as the withdrawal of the Information was not yet final because of the timely filing of the Motion
for Reconsideration. There is no refiling of the case nor the filing of a new one. The case filed remains the same
and the order of dismissal was merely vacated because the Court finds the Motion for Reconsideration
meritorious.

Court of Appeals ruling:

All the elements of double jeopardy exist. There was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded, and that the termination of the case
was not expressly consented to by respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a double jeopardy existed when the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
conformably with the resolution of the DOJ Secretary

RULING:

No, double jeopardy did not set in.

Requisites of Double Jeopardy:

(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and

(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

Elements of the first requisite (a first jeopardy attached prior to the second):

(a) after a valid indictment;

(b) before a competent court;

(c) after arraignment;

(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary.

CO v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS (Provisional Dismissal)

FACTS:

The case filed by private respondent Elizabeth Uy, representing New Prosperity Plastic Product, against petitioner
William Co, was provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 for her and her counsel’s failure to appear in the court. Uy
received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after.
Uy filed for the revival of the criminal cases which was granted by the MeTC and denied Co’s motion for
reconsideration. Judge Ortiz then inhibited herself from the case prompting the case to be raffled to MeTC Branch
50 of Caloocan City. Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival
of the criminal cases. It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.

Co then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed by
the Supreme Court. There being no motion for reconsideration, the resolution became final and executory.

Months after, Co filed for a "Motion for Permanent Dismissal" which was opposed by respondent Uy contending
that the motion raised the same issues already resolved with finality by the Court. However, Judge Esteban V.
Gonzaga granted the motion and denied Uy’s motion for reconsideration. Uy filed a petition for certiorari before
the RTC of Caloocan City which was granted by the RTC annulling and setting aside the Orders of Judge Gonzaga.
MeTC was then directed to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.

Petitioner’s stand:

 The Provisional Dismissal should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy
trial was denied because there was already a "vexatious, capricious and oppressive" delay, from his
arraignment on March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003 holding that the entire trial period
should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial.

 Further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order, not after notice to the offended party. Insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the
trial court’s issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period.

 Even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy
received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a
leap year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the time-bar for the provisional dismissal started on July 2, 2003 when the offended party received
the notice

RULING:

Conditions to the application of Time-bar:

(1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the
case;

(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;

(3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and

(4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case

It is apparent from the records that there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of criminal cases
or of the hearing thereon which was served on the private complainant at least three days before said hearing. The
fact is that it was only in open court that Co moved for provisional dismissal "considering that, as per records,
complainant had not shown any interest to pursue her complaint."

Dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived:

-the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public
prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived
-The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order
of dismissal.

 Offended party is represented by a private counsel:

-the reckoning period should commence to run from the time such private counsel was actually notified of
the order of provisional dismissal

-notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address

The contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made
prior to the expiration of the one-year period is unsustainable.

The fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion to revive the
criminal cases. What is material instead is Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a private counsel
who only received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 3, 2003.

Since the period for filing a motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel's receipt of the order of
provisional dismissal, it necessarily follows that the reckoning period for the permanent dismissal is likewise the
private counsel's date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal.

PEOPLE v. DE LEON (Double Jeopardy)

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Bayani De Leon, et al were charged with Robbery with Homicide for the killing of Emilio A.
Prasmo who was walking along A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches together with this wife and
daughter-in-law. The accused-appellants were allegedly armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and a .38 cal
revolver to rob Prasmo.

The respondents pleaded not guilty except for Antonio De Leon.

Evidence of Prosecution:

The victim, Emilio Prasmo, together with his wife was walking along Sta. Lucia Street, Novaliches, on their way to
RP Market when the accused-appellants who are siblings, blocked their way. Accused-appellant Danilo, armed with
a "sumpak", suddenly hit Emilio with a "bakal" while accused-appellant Antonio, who was armed with a "samurai",
hacked Emilio in the forehead and struck him with a lead pipe at the right back portion of his legs and middle back
portion of his torso. Accused-appellant Danilo then took Prasmo’s money amounting to 7,000 pesos. Erlinda, the
wife, shouted for help but nobody dared to help because Bayani, armed with a gun, was shouting “walang lalapit”.
Emilio was brought to FEU Fairview Hospital where he died.

Evidence of Defense:

According to Carmelita De Leon, mother of the accused-appellants, Emilio and his son Edgardo, attacked and
mauled his son causing the heads of Antonio and Danilo to bleed. They reported the incident to a “tanod” who told
them to return in the afternoon so they could have a meeting with Emilio and his son. However, Emilio and his son
did not appear.

In the evening, fifteen (15) men carrying firearms, who included Jerry and Edgar, sons of Emilio, stormed her house
looking for accused-appellants and threatened to kill her if she will not disclose their whereabouts.

On the way home, accused-appellant Antonio met Emilio, Erlinda, and Gina, Emilio’s daughter, walking along A.
Bonifacio Street. Emilio, upon seeing Antonio, immediately opened his jacket and tried to pull "something" out.
Antonio then instantly tried to grab that "something" from Emilio. While grappling for the possession of that
"something", which turned out to be a "sumpak", it fired.

RTC Ruling:

-The trial court found established the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, abuse of strength
absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery

-Robbery was not duly established so accused-appellants cannot be convicted with Robbery with Homicide
because robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.

-Accused-appellant were convicted with Murder by conspiracy

Court of Appeals Ruling:

-Affirmed the ruling of RTC to convict the accused-appellant with Murder

-However, Danilo was found guilty of Robbery for unlawfully divesting Emilio of ₱7,000.00, which it considered as
an action independent of and outside the original design to murder Emilio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not convicting accused-appellant Danilo De Leon with Robbery constitutes a double jeopardy

RULING:

Yes, the conviction of accused-appellant Danilo De Leon constituted double jeopardy.

Double Jeopardy:

Requisites:

(1) a valid complaint or information;

(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and

(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
Elements:

(1) a valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed;

(2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction;

(3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and

(4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had.

The acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is
precluded from ruling on the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on the
innocence or guilt of the accused of the same crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any
person "twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."

ESTIPONA v. LOBRIGO (Pre-trial)

FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador Estipona was charged with violation of RA. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
for unlawfully possessing one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu).

Estipona filed for Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement for the withdrawal of his
“not guilty plea” and instead, to enter a “guilty plea” for RA 9165 with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his
being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

The prosecution denied the motion in pursuant to the express mandate of Section 23 of RA 9165 providing that
any person charged under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to
avail of the provision on plea-bargaining.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the plea-bargaining is applicable for cases related to drug offenses

RULING:

Plea-bargaining in criminal cases

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said
lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme
Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and

(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.

Plea-bargaining is a Rule of Procedure

Plea-bargaining - "a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval."

There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. 50 The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses.

Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system - speed,
economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to
plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty
to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denote an exercise of
discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such plea.

Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution
already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not amount to a
grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the guilt of the crime charged.

It is invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

IMPERIAL v. JOSON (Speedy Trial)

CRIME: Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property

FACTS:

An Isuzu ten-wheeler truck driven by petitioner Santiago Francisco collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck which
was driven by respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr. who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or pahinante,
respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further
rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was, in turn, being driven by respondent Arnel Lazo.

There were multiple damages on the vehicles. The accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle, the owner of the
KIA Besta Van, and seven of its passengers while on the other hand, respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix and
Jasmin Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately brought to the nearest hospital for
treatment.

A criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial.

A complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco and Imperial against respondents Giganto and
Cubeta, the driver and pahinante of the Fuso six-wheeler truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja, its alleged registered
owner, and respondent Maricel Joson, its alleged present owner.

The case proceeded to mandatory pre-trial conference. Assistant Public Prosecutor Zabello had interviewed one of
the witnesses, however, did not believe the version of the events and refused to stipulate the matters. In view of
Prosecutor Zabella’s refusal, the Sariaya MTC went on to issue a pre-trial order dated 14 August 2001. As a
consequence, petitioner filed on 30 August 2001 a motion "to compel and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to
correct the pre-trial order”, which the MTC denied. Petitioner Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration and on 9
January 2002, the Sariaya MTC issued an order which directing that the pre-trial conference be set anew in view of
the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
Lucena City RTC. Likewise contending that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference on 10 and 17
October 2001, 7 November 2001, 23 January 2002, 13 March 2002, 4 September 2002, 6 November 2002, 15
January 2003 and 5 March 2003 were capricious, vexatious and oppressive, petitioner Francisco further moved for
the dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy trial had been
violated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in the case attributable to the prosecution
amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

RULING:

G.R. No. 160067

Although the Constitution concededly guarantees that "(a)ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of
their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies", 50 it is evident that petitioners’ arguments in
G.R. No. 160067 have more to do with the wisdom of the assailed rulings of the RTCs of Naga and Parañaque than
said courts’ jurisdiction to issue the same.

Consistent with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, however, the rule is settled that
errors of judgment involving the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a petition for
certiorari. Not being intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or
the facts of the case. As long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in the
exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgments, correctible by an
appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.

"Interest of justice rule"

(a) the nature of the controversy;

(b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and,

(c) other similar factors

G.R. No. 170410

Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.

Speed is not the only ingredient of a speedy trial but also an orderly and expeditious trial. It cannot be definitely
said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of
public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

Factors of Speedy Disposition of Cases:

(a) length of delay;

(b) the reason for the delay;

(c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and

(d) prejudice to the defendant.

Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the postponements of the
aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary
remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public
prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia and Joel Baligod.

People vs. Maria Cristina Sergio and Julius Lacanilao (Conditional Examination through Written Interrogatories)

CRIME: Drug Trafficking

FACTS:

The case is a transnational case wherein the victim Mary Jane Veloso was convicted in Indonesia for Drug
Trafficking allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage and sentenced with death by firing squad.

It stemmed when she was recruited by the respondent, Maria Cristina Sergio as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
However, upon arriving in Malaysia, Veloso learned that the job she was about to take was already not available.
After spending a few days in Malaysia, Cristina sent Mary Jane to Indonesia for a seven-day holiday with a promise
that she will have a job upon her return in Malaysia. Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to
bring on her trip. Upon arriving in the Adisucipto International Airport in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, she was
apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her luggage. Mary Jane and
eight other felons who were similarly convicted of drug-related offenses were brought to a prison facility in the
island of Nusakambangan, off Central Java, Indonesia, to await their execution by firing squad.

Sergio and Lacanilao were then arrested by the operatives of Anti-Human Trafficking Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation. They were charged with violation of Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Illegal Recruitment in
two separate information. Upon arraignment, Sergio and Lacanilao pleaded “not guilty”.

Representatives from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) went to Wirugonan Prison to interview Mary Jane. She
executed a document known as "Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane Fiesta Veloso. " Veloso maintained her
innocence and narrated how she was recruited by Sergio.

Narration:

She and Cristina stayed at Sun Inn Lagoon since her supposed employer was not in Malaysia. Cristina has a
boyfriend named Prince whom she conversed only by phone. Prince has a brother named "Ike. " Mary Jane and
Cristina went to the hotel parking lot and met with "Ike " who was on board a white car. They then went inside the
car wherein "Ike" handed the luggage to Cristina. When they returned to the hotel room, Cristina gave Mary Jane
the luggage. Mary Jane noticed that it was unusually heavy but, upon checking, found nothing inside. She then
asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter simply replied that because it was new. The luggage was
the same bag she used on her trip to Indonesia. It was only after she was apprehended at the airport when Mary
Jane realized that it contained prohibited drugs.

On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine Government requested the Indonesian recruiters and traffickers of
Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius.

A few hours before the scheduled execution of Mary Jane, the President of Indonesia, His Excellency Joko Widodo,
granted her an indefinite reprieve after receiving the reports about the on-going legal proceedings in the
Philippines with respect to the case of Mary Jane, and that her recruiters were already in police custody.

The Indonesian authorities deferred indefinitely the execution of Mary Jane to afford her an opportunity to
present her case against Cristina, Julius, and "Ike" who were allegedly responsible for recruiting and exploiting her
to engage in drug trafficking in pursuance to the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.

However, the Indonesian government attached conditions on the taking of Veloso’s testimony:

(a) Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

(b) No cameras shall be allowed;

(c) The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and,

(d) The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

The State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition
Upon Written Interrogatories " averring that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony through the use of deposition
upon written interrogatories is allowed under Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the
country and will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her imprisonment. The prosecution also
pointed out that Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies suppletorily in criminal proceedings and the use of
deposition upon written interrogatories in criminal cases is not expressly prohibited under the Rules of Court.

Respondent’s Contention:

Asserted that the deposition should be made before and not during the trial. The depositions under Rules 23 and
25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the witness in open court and the use
thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right
to confront the witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the 1987
Constitution.

RTC Ruling:

The trial court granted the prosecution's motion subject to the following conditions:

1. The accused, through counsel, is given a period often (10) days from receipt of this Resolution to submit
their comment to the proposed questions on the deposition upon written interrogatories for the witness
Mary Jane Veloso.

2. The Court shall schedule the taking of the deposition in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by
the undersigned trial judge. The final questions for the deposition (after ruling on the Defense objections),
shall be propounded by the Consul of the Philippines in the Republic of Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of the deponent to the written interrogatories shall be taken verbatim by a
competent staff in the Office of the Philippine Consulate in the Republic of Indonesia

3. The transcribed copy of the answers of the deponent shall be furnished the accused, through counsel,
who shall thereafter submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the Prosecution within ten
(10) days from receipt;

4. The Prosecution is given the same period often (10) days from receipt of the proposed cross interrogatory
questions of the Defense stating the ground for the objections. Upon receipt of the comment, the Court
shall promptly rule on the objections

5. The Court shall schedule the conduct of the cross-interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane
Veloso in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, which shall be presided by the undersigned trial judge.

6. Unless the Prosecution opts to conduct re-direct written interrogatories, the testimony of Mary Jane
Veloso by way of deposition upon written interrogatories shall be deemed terminated.

The respondents filed for Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Suspend Period of Time to File Comments to
Proposed Questions for Deposition of Mary Jane Veloso but was denied.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

They filed for petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was then granted reversing the resolution of
RTC and finding it committing grave abuse of discretion.
It held that, contrary to the RTC's. findings, the conditional examination of witnesses in criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by Rule 119 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil procedure is
not applicable since it only applies in civil cases.

Moreover, in pursuant to Rule 119, the taking of deposition of Mary Jane or conditional examination must be
made before the court where the case is pending and not in Indonesia and that the respondents being the accused
in the criminal proceeding must be notified so they can attend the examination. Furthermore, allowing the
prosecution to take written deposition through written interrogatories will violate the right of the accused to
confront a witness or to meet the witness face to face.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mary Jane's testimony may be validly acquired through deposition by written interrogatories

RULING:

Yes, Mary Jane’s testimony may be validly acquired through deposition by written interrogatories.

Section 15 Rule 119: Examination of witness for the prosecution

The examination shall not be taken before any court but before the court where the action is pending.

Requisites for an accused be conditionally examined:

1. a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court;

2. has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning

-Veloso’s case did not fall in either category. She is neither too sick nor infirm to appear at the trial nor has to leave
the Philippines indefinitely.

-Veloso was imprisoned in Indonesia for having been convicted by final judgment of the crime of drug trafficking, a
grave offense in the said state. She cannot even take a single step out of the prison facility of her own volition
without facing severe consequences. Her imprisonment in Indonesia and the conditions attached to her reprieve
denied her of any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before the trial court in Nueva
Ecija where the cases of the respondents were pending.

-However, the CA was demanding for the impossible impairing the substantial right of Veloso and the State. The
denial of the State’s motion for deposition through written interrogatories is akin to denial of due process since it
was impossible for Veloso to appear before the trial court of Nueva Ecija.

-The denial of CA deprived Veloso of the opportunity to prove her innocence before the Indonesian authorities and
for the Philippine Government the chance to comply the conditions set for the grant of reprieve.

Rule 23 of the Rules of Court

Instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial justice:

(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property;

(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby

“The interest of substantial justice” - not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige the Court to suspend
procedural rules

ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty - aims to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement authorities of
the state parties in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of offenses through cooperation and mutual legal
assistance in criminal matters.

Article 1 paragraph 2(a): mutual legal assistance can be rendered by the state parties in case of taking evidence or
obtaining voluntary statements from persons, among others but with limitations

-Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who
is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be
taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness.

-The Supreme Court had relaxed the procedural rules by applying suppletorily certain provisions of the Rules on
Civil Procedure in criminal proceedings.

-Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on
deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied
suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.

Rule 23

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained
over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has
been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by
deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

Section 11. Persons before whom depositions may be taken in foreign countries. In a foreign state or country,
depositions may be taken

(a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of
the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory; or
(c) the person referred to in section 14 hereof.

Section 25. Deposition upon written interrogatories; service of notice and of interrogatories. A party desiring to
take the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall serve them upon every other party with a
notice stating the name and address of the person who is to answer them and the name or descriptive title and
address of the officer before whom the deposition is to be taken. Within ten (10) days thereafter, a party so
served may serve cross-interrogatories upon the party proposing to take the deposition. Within five (5) days
thereafter, the latter may serve re-direct interrogatories upon a party who has served cross-interrogatories. Within
three (3) days after being served with re-direct interrogatories, a party may serve recross-interrogatories upon the
party proposing to take the deposition.

Violation of the Constitutional Right to Confrontation of a Witness

No infringement of constitutional right to confrontation of witness because the terms and conditions laid down by
the trial court ensure that the respondent are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Veloso by way of
written interrogatories and to file their comment and may raise objections to the proposed questions in
the written interrogatories submitted by the prosecution.

PEOPLE v. WEBB (Deposition of US Citizens as Witnesses)

CRIME: Rape with Homicide

FACTS:

The case is a review on the denial of the request of the respondent Hubert Webb to take the depositions of five (5)
citizens and residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines in Washington D.C.
and California before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of
presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the United States and may
not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.

Webb alleged that taking the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose testimonies are allegedly
"material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4 Rule 23 of
the Revised Rules of Court.

Section 4 Rule 23:

Sec. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part
or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was
present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one
of the following provisions:

(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony
of the deponent as a witness;

(b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party
may be used by an adverse party for any purpose;

(c) The deposition of a witness whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the
court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; (2) that the witness is out of the province and a greater
distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it
appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is
unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena or (5)
upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used;
 (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to
introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced and any party may introduce any other parts

The prosecution filed an opposition arguing that:

1.] Rule 23, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the representation of respondent-accused, has no
application in criminal cases;

2.] Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, being a mode of discovery, only provides for
conditional examination of witnesses for the accused before trial not during trial;

3.] Rule 19, Section 5 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination
of witnesses for the accused/defense outside Philippine Jurisdiction.

RTC Ruling:

The trial court denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24
and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Granted the petition ordering that the deposition of the following witnesses be TAKEN before the proper consular
officer of the Republic of the Philippines in Washington D.C. and California on the ground to disallow petitioner to
avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the opportunity to adequately defend
himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now pending before the public respondent and,
further, it loses sight of the object of procedure which is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims
of contending parties.

Even granting arguendo that Rule 23 is to be exclusively applied to civil actions, the taking of the deposition of
petitioner's US-based witnesses should be still allowed considering that the civil action has been impliedly
instituted in the criminal action for rape with homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take testimony by oral
depositions in the United States which would be used in the criminal case before her Court

RULING:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition allowing the depositions of the US citizen witness to be
taken

Deposition:
The testimony of a witness taken upon oral question or written interrogatories, not in open court, but in pursuance
of a commission to take testimony issued by court, or under a general law or court rule on the subject, and reduce
to writing and duly authenticated, and intended to be used in preparation and upon the trial of a civil or a criminal
prosecution.

A pretrial discovery device by which one party (through his or her attorney) ask oral questions of the other party or
of a witness for the other party.

Purposes:

1. Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury;

2. Provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses;

3. Make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved
except with great difficulty;

4. Educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses thereby
encouraging settlements;

5. Expedite litigation;

6. Safeguard against surprise;

7. Prevent delay;

8. Simplify and narrow the issues; and

9. Expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial.

The record discloses that the evidence to be obtained through the deposition-taking would be superfluous or
corroborative at best because they were already introduced and admitted into evidence by the trial court.

U.S. Department of State Certification - issued by Joan C. Hampton, Assistant Authenticating Officer of the said
agency, for and in the name of Madeleine K. Albright

Exhibits "42-H" and "42-M"- were signed by Authenticating Officer Annie R. Maddux for and in behalf of former
Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Exhibit "218-B" the same with Exhibits "42-I" and "42-N” - only differences are the dates and signatures of
deputies

Exhibit "218-F” the same with Exhibits "39-D" and "42-C” – only differences are the dates and signatures

Other applications were also already presented as defense evidence:

a.] application for Non-Commercial Driver's License;

b.] Documentary records based on Clet's Database Response;
c.] Computer-generated thumb-print;
d.] Documentary records based on still another Clet's Database Response, and
e.] The Certification issued by one Frank Zolin, Director of the State of California's Department of Motor Vehicles,
were already introduced and admitted into evidence as Defense Exhibits

The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The court may stop the
introduction of further testimony upon any particular point when the evidence upon it is already so full that more
witnesses to the same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive.

Vda. De Manguerra vs. Risos (Conditional Examination due to advanced age and sickness)

CRIME: Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents

FACTS:

Respondents Raul Risos, et al, were charged with Estafa Thru Falsification of Public Document for the falsification
of a deed of real estate mortgage where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged
property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.

Petitioner Concepcion was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment while on vacation in Manila.

Risos filed for the suspension of criminal proceedings since a prejudicial question arose when a civil action was
filed by the petitioner which was then granted by the trial court.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate
Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
Petitioner contends that her advanced age and health condition exempts her from Section 15 Rule 119.

RTC Ruling:

Granted the motion to take Concepcion’s deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City due to the advance
age of Concepcion. After several motions of change of venue of deposition-taking, the deposition was taken in
Concepcion’s residence.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Annulled RTC’s decision on the ground that Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or
the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
Moreover, the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same court is the
constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. Rule 23 could not be applied suppletory
because the situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deposition of the petitioner who was suffering from advance age should still be taken before
the court where the case is pending
RULING:

Yes, the deposition of petitioner Concepcion should be taken before the court where the case is pending.

It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is
especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties and
their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses’
demeanor.

Rule 23 to 28 – Different Modes of Discovery

Conditional Examination:

Section 15 of Rule 119 Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness
for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending.

It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending.

Rule 23 cannot be applied suppletory because Rule 119 adequately covers the situation in the instant case.

The conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.

GO v. PEOPLE (Conditional Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness)

CRIME: Other Deceits

FACTS:

Petitioners Go, et al, were charged with Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC for defrauding Highdone
Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which
they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and
raw materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan
Export Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage in favor of ML Resources and
Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE despite being already foreclosed by
China Bank Corporation.

Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from
his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial
dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.

The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was
being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice,
he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health.

MeTC Ruling:

Granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen
Ping.

RTC Ruling:

Declared the MeTC Orders null and void holding that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses
in civil cases cannot apply suppletory to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with
respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed MeTC’s ruling allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of
procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would
still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the
taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of the witness.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deposition of the witness Li Luen Ping who was in Laos, Cambodia due to ill health infringes the
constitutional right of the petitioners for a public trial

RULING:

Yes, it infringes the constitutional right of the petitioners for a public trial.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal
cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against
him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables
the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.

Rule 23 – 28 – Depositions of witnesses in Civil Cases either upon oral examination or written interrogatories,
before any judge, notary public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the
Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer
oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.

Sections 12, 13, and 15 of Rule 119 – Depositions in Criminal Cases allowing the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses."
Section 15 Rule 119 - the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than the court where
the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li
Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally examined
before the court where the case is pending. No where in the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.

The Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special
proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable
also under the circumstances. It is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent
reason to apply Rule 23 suppletory or otherwise."

WEBB CASE:

The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine
consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all residents of the United
States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the
accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the matter was raised before this Court, we
sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was no necessity
for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of deposition was considered merely corroborative of
the evidence for the defense.

-The Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings
before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004.

- At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC
pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that
the witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return.

JIMENEZ v. PEOPLE (State Witness – Conditions)

CRIME: Murder

FACTS:

A witness, Montero, former employee of the accused Jimenezes, executed a sworn statement confessing his
participation in the killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda. In his statement, he named petitioner Manuel Jimenez Jr.,
Lope Jimenez (petitioner’s younger brother), Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert)
alias "Obet," and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his coconspirators.

He provided in the details where the alleged steel casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the
recovery of a cadaver, encased in a drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that Montero pointed to.

Montero then filed a motion discharging him as an accused pursuant to the Witness Protection Program to be a
state witness.

RTC Ruling:

1st ruling by Judge Almeyda: Denied the motion on the ground that Monteros is not the guiltiest among the
accused and his statements were not corroborated by the other evidence on record.

2nd ruling by Judge Docena: Reversed the decision of Judge Almeyda ruling that the prosecution has presented
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing compliance with the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

-The crime would have remained undiscovered and unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial
confession that narrated in detail the manner of the abduction and subsequent murder of Ruby Rose. (1) there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested

-Qualified to be discharged as a state witness as he does not appear to be the guiltiest although he is a principal by
direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because, without their orders, the crime would
not have been committed. (2) Montero being a principal by direct participation does not make him the most
guilty

-(3) Montero has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of Judge Docena stating that:

(1) There was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as there was no other direct evidence other than
his testimony that is available.

(2) Montero is not the guiltiest among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty than the
principals by direct participation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in discharging Montero as a state witness

RULING:

No, the CA did not err in discharging Montero as a state witness.

Conditions of Discharging an Accused as State Witness:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a
hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:

Requisites of the trial court in Discharging an Accused as State Witness:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the guiltiest; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude

The issue of the Petitioner conditions (3) and 5(a) to (d).

1.Absolute Necessity of Montero’s Testimony

Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he or she alone has
knowledge of the crime.

Necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s
evidence.

He alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime since not one of the accused-conspirators, except
Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing.

2.Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated

The Rules only require that that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially
corroborated in its material points, not on all points.

The testimony of Montero was corroborated by the evidence consisting of:

(1) the steel casing where the cadaver was found;

(2) the drum containing the cadaver which the prosecution successfully identified (and which even the acting Judge
Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose;
(3) the spot in the sea that Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved);
(4) the apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects

3.Montero is not the most guilty

"Most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed.

-A principal by inducement is not automatically the guiltiest in a conspiracy.

What are controlling in resolving a motion on the discharge of accused as a state witness are the specific acts of
the accused in relation to the crime committed.
-While Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he
had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. His participation was limited to providing the steel box
where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside,
operating the skip or tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box containing the cadaver
into the sea.

It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’
qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms.

PEOPLE v. DOMINGUEZ (State Witness – Conditions)

CIRME: Homicide

FACTS:

On the eve of the "snap" presidential election appellant Prudencio Dominguez then Mayor of the Municipality of
Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental and his brother Roger C. Dominguez went to visit their second cousin, Judge Purita
A. Boligor. Judge Boligor was said to be promoting the candidacy of Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino, the opposition
candidate in the presidential race.

Mayor Dominguez was affiliated with the "Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan" ("KBL") and was at that time working for
the re-election of former President Marcos.

Mayor Dominguez and Roger arrived at Judge Boligor's house in Sinacaban in an Integrated National Police ("INP")
jeep driven by Felix Amis, a police officer detailed as security man of Mayor Dominguez. Rodolfo Macalisang,
brother-in-law of Mayor Dominguez, emerged on the leftside of the jeep, spoke briefly with the mayor, then
stepped aside and stayed under the shadow of a citrus (calamansi) tree. The mayor and his brother Roger
proceeded towards Judge Boligor's house and entered that house. There they met with Judge Boligor and her
brother Luther Avanceña who was then the UNIDO Chairman in Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. About ten (10)
minutes later, Rodolfo Macalisang entered Judge Boligor's house with an M-16 Armalite automatic rifle and bursts
of gunfire were heard.

The prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony of Oscar Cagod who witnessed the above sequence of
events from a store across the street which his credibility was attacked by the accused-appellant assailing that:

(1) Cagod was not a disinterested witness for having lived with Judge Boligor for almost 19 years.
(2) Cagod waited for 4 months after the death of Judge Boligor to execute his confession
(3) Cagod only executed his sworn statement when he was arrested.
(4) Cagod was already convicted for murder which is a crime involving moral turpitude when he was 12 years old.
(5) The defense assailed the testimony of Cagod as being incredible in itself.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cagod’s testimony credible as a state witness

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of Cagod as a state witness is credible.

1. Cagod was not a disinterested witness for having lived with Judge Boligor for almost 19 years.

The relationship of a witness to a party to a case does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the witness. When
there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that
they are related to the victim does not render their clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit.

2. Cagod waited for 4 months after the death of Judge Boligor to execute his confession

The delay of four (4) months before prosecution witness Cagod executed his sworn statement should not affect
the credibility of his testimony for Cagod had understandable reasons for hesitating to report to the authorities
what he had seen.

The accused in the instant case were clearly powerful and influential persons in Sinacaban - Prudencio Dominguez
was the Mayor of Sinacaban, Roger Dominguez was his brother, Rodolfo V. Macalisang was a PC Sergeant and
Civilian Home Defense Force ("CHDF") Supervisor, and Isidro Macalisang, was a Lieutenant of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines ("AFP"), while Josue Vente also an alleged co-conspirator, was a Police Sergeant and Police Station
Commander of Sinacaban.

He was also warned by Alfeo Lucing, a CHDF member and a follower of Mayor Dominguez, and by appellant
Macalisang himself, not to talk about the shooting, upon pain of dire consequences.

In People v. Bustarde, et al, the Court stated that the

failure of the witness to go to the police immediately after the killing because she feared for her
life, is a factor which is entirely human and quite understandable, and should not detract from
her testimonial credit.

3. Cagod only executed his sworn statement when he was arrested.

There was no showing that the prosecuting authorities would have included him in the criminal information. The
record is bereft of any indication that Cagod was a participant or co-conspirator in the carrying out of the
crimes. Neither was there any showing that Cagod had been promised or granted immunity from prosecution in
consideration of his executing the affidavit in question.

4.Cagod was convicted for a crime involving moral turpitude

Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

. . . Conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

5.Cagod’s testimony is incredible in itself

CABADOR v. PEOPLE (Motion to Dismiss as Demurrer to Evidence)

CRIME: Murder

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Cabador was accused by the public prosecutor of murdering in conspiracy, Atty. Jun Valerio.

Over the five years of the intermittent trial, only 5 witnesses were presented by the defense which the RTC
declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or
formal offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for three
extensions of time. However, the prosecution still did not make the required written offer.

Petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since
his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further claiming that t he trial court could
not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered pointing out that the prosecution
witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.

But unknown to Cabador, the prosecution has asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal
offer which eventually was made the day before Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.

RTC Ruling:

RTC treated Cabador’s motion to dismiss as a Demurrer to Evidence and that since the motion was made without
leave of court, his right to present evidence is deemed waived.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of RTC

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence
filed without leave of court

RULING:

No, it was not a demurrer to evidence.

Stages of Trial Proper:

1. prosecution’s presentation of evidence against the accused

2. accused’s presentation of evidence in his defense

If, after the prosecution has presented its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial
court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second stage and dismiss the criminal
action. There is no point for the trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution
bears the burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The order of dismissal amounts to an acquittal.

Demurrer to evidence

a. WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT

- shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall be considered
submitted for judgment

Considerations in determining a motion as a Demurrer to Evidence:

(1) Allegations in it are made in good faith;

(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed;

(3) the primary objective of the party filing it

Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer. He did not state what evidence the
prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the
crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness.

A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case.

Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2)
upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

After the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits, the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial
court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on
the formal offer.

Only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case.

Cabador filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the trial court
could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it could not be said that he had intended his
motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to evidence.

Petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer
to evidence.

PEOPLE v. TAN (Demurrer to Evidence – Double Jeopardy)

CRIME: Violation of Revised Securities Act

FACTS:

Respondent Dante Tan was charged with violation of Revised Securities Act for the failure to file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC
shares of which he is the beneficial owner.

After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial ensued. Petitioner made its formal
offer of evidence, consisting of Exhibits "A" to "E. Exhibits "A," "B," "W" and "X were admitted by the RTC and
denied the other exhibits.

Respondent Tan filed for Omnibus Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence and to admit the attached
Demurrer to Evidence. RTC granted the motion and admitted respondent’s attached Demurrer.

The RTC issued an Order granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Court of Appeals affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in precluding the People from prosecuting its cases against Dante Tan for the application
of Double Jeopardy

RULING:

The general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable.

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its
case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."

Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

Elements of Double Jeopardy:

(1) the complaint or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2 information were
filed)
(2) the court had jurisdiction; (RTC has jurisdiction over the criminal cases)
(3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty)
(4) the accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent (the RTC
dismissed the cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence which amounts to an
acquittal from which no appeal can be had)

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Did the RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process?

No. Petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case as gleaned from the factual antecedents
which led to the grant of respondent’s demurrer.

- ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits

- RTC granted the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for marking of certain documents and motion to admit
attached formal offer of evidence

-ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence

The prosecution never presented in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW Resources Corporation. Without
the Article of Incorporation, the Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the BW
Resources Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided and the exact holdings of Dante Tan in
the said corporation. It’s not being a prosecution’s evidence renders impossible the determination of the ten (10%)
percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no focal point to base the computation of his
holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an owner of ten (10%) percent.

REPUBLIC of THE PHILIPPINES v. DE BORJA (Demurrer to Evidence – Insufficiency of Evidence)

CRIME: "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages"

FACTS:

The case stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner Republic, represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government, for "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages" (Complaint) before the
SB (Civil Case No. 0003) for the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents
therein, singly or collectively, during the administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Geronimo Z.
Velasco (Velasco), one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0003, was the President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.

It appears from the records that PNOC, in the exercise of its functions, would regularly enter into charter
agreements with vessels and, pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address commissions" to
PNOC as charterer, amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight. Allegedly, during the tenure of Velasco, no
address commissions were remitted to PNOC. the percentage of the address commission no longer appeared in
the charter contracts and the words "as agreed upon" were substituted therefor, per instructions of Velasco.

The supposed address commissions were remitted to the account of Decision Research Management Company
(DRMC), one of the defendant corporations in Civil Case No. 0003 and the alleged conduit for address
commissions. Velasco was likewise alleged to have diverted government funds by entering into several
transactions involving the purchase of crude oil tankers and by reason of which he received bribes, kickbacks, or
commissions in exchange for the granting of permits, licenses, and/or charters to oil tankers to service PNOC.

Petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja, acting as a dummy/agent for Velasco, who collected these
address commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F. Verano (Verano), a
witness for petitioner Republic. Petitioner Republic submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence.

Respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date, stating therein, among others:
 (1) that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he delivered an envelope to Velasco who, in turn,
instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja;

(2) that Verano admitted that the envelope was sealed;

(3) that Verano did not open the envelope and therefore had no knowledge of the contents thereof;

(4) that Verano did not deliver the envelope personally to De Borja; and

(5) that Verano did not confirm whether De Borja in fact received the said envelope.

Sandiganbayan Ruling:

Granted De Borja’s Demurrer to Evidence for the insufficiency of evidence presented

- witness Verano admitted that although he was instructed to deliver two envelopes to the office of De Borja, he
did not know for a fact that De Borja actually received them

- witness Verano testified that after he delivered the envelopes, he did not receive any word that they did reach De
Borja, nor did Verano confirm De Borja's receipt of them

- where the plaintiff's evidence against defendant De Borja consists only of Verano's testimony and Reyes' affidavit,
no preponderance of evidence has been satisfactorily established

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to Evidence

RULING:

No, the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting respondent De Borja’s Demurrer to Evidence.

Demurrer to Evidence

- a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

- a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue

- The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to
establish a prima facie case.

- what is crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiffs evidence entitles it to the relief sought

Burden of Proof

- the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such quantum of evidence as the law demands in
the case at which the issue arises
Evidences presented by the petitioner:

a. Affidavit of Jose M. Reyes

-inadmissible due to untimely demise of the Reyes

b. Testimony of Verano

- he was not knowledgeable of the contents of the envelopes and that he also never confirmed whether
respondent De Borja had actually received them

The insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can best be described as speculative, conjectural, and
inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that
De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.

GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO v. PEOPLE (Demurrer to Evidence – Double Jeopardy)

CRIME: Plunder

FACTS:

The Ombudsman filed for Motion for Reconsideration for the Sandiganbayan granting of Demurrer to Evidence to
petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for insufficiency of evidence assailing that the decision requires additional
elements in the prosecution of Plunder like the identification of the main plunderer and personal benefits to
him/her.

The petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the charge against
them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus
delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal
benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of
plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the
case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation
against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the
information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the
case for that purpose.

The State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in court,
thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in order to
find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that was
necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting Demurrer to Evidence to petitioner Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
RULING:

The State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned essential elements of malversation in the information. The
omission from the information of factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation
highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations. Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.

The grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable.

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham.

With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would
violate the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution
and subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

PEOPLE v. TING (Demurrer of Evidence – Sufficiency of Evidence – Double Jeopardy)

CRIME: Violation of Omnibus Election Code

FACTS:

Respondents City Mayor Randolph S. Ting and City Treasurer Salvacion I. Garcia, both of Tuguegarao City in the
year 2004, were charged with violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. R81, otherwise known as the
Omnibus Election Code, for issuing a treasury warrant during the forty-five (45)-day election ban period as
payment for two (2) parcels of land to be used as a public cemetery for the city.

Upon arraignment, respondents entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.

At the pre-trial, it was stipulated and admitted that Ting, as representative of the City Government of Tuguegarao,
entered into a Contract of Sale with Dr. Anselmo D. Almazan, Angelo A. Almazan, and Anselmo A. Almazan III for
the purchase of two (2) parcels of land located in Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City.

Consequently, a complaint was filed against respondents for violation of Section 261 (v) 5 and (w)6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, but the same was eventually dismissed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) finding that
since the issuance of the treasury warrant was not for public works, no liability could arise therefrom.

In Guzman v. Commission on Elections, et al., however, the Court set aside the COMELEC's resolution and ordered
the filing of the appropriate criminal information against respondents. It found that while said issuance may not be
considered as public works under Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, there was still probable cause to
believe that Section 261 (w) of the Omnibus Election Code was violated since the provision does not require that
the undertaking be for public works.

The prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence while respondents filed Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to
Evidence and, subsequently, a Demurrer to Evidence.

RTC Ruling:
Granted the Motion and acquitted the respondents on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the
subject check was delivered to the vendors of the lots within the prohibited period. The dorsal side of the
instrument bears "May 18, 2004" as the date of payment as annotated by the drawee bank, which is beyond the
said period. The RTC added that just because the title was issued in favor of the City Government of Tuguegarao on
May 5, 2004, it does not follow that payment was in fact made on the same day. The Law on Sales provides that
payment of the purchase price is not a condition for the transfer of title, in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed RTC decision citing Negotiable Instruments Law holding that every contract on a negotiable instrument is
incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument to the payee for the purpose of giving effect thereto.
Without initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer of the check to the payee, there can be no valid and
binding contract and no liability on the instrument. Also, without delivery, the instrument cannot be deemed to
have been issued.

The date on the check, April 30, 2004, pertains to nothing more than the date of the making or drawing of the
instrument. Moreover, the CA ruled that neither can the date of notarization of the deed of sale, May 5, 2004, be
considered as the date of issuance. This is because notarization only serves to convert a private document to a
public one, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. Furthermore, it was held that
the issuance of a check is not payment until the check has been in cashed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the grant of Demurrer to Evidence valid despite the sufficiency of evidence

RULING:

First:

The subject Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 was dated April 30, 2004, which date falls within the election ban
period beginning on March 26, 2004 and ending on the election day or May 10, 2004. As such, it is deemed prima
facie to have been drawn, made, accepted, and indorsed on said date.On the basis of said presumption, it follows
that the treasury warrant was delivered to the Almazans, for delivery naturally precedes acceptance.

Second:

When said document was notarized on May 5, 2004, the same was evidence that the deed was formally executed
on or before, but not after, such date. This is pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice which provides that when a
document is notarized, the notary public subscribes that a person appeared before him, presented a document,
and affirmed the contents thereof, which in this case included the issuance of the treasury warrant as payment for
the lots.

This acknowledgement of payment in the deed of sale, coupled with the admission of respondents that the subject
check was used as payment for the lots, is evidence of its receipt by the Almazans on a date no later than May 5,
2004 for, as Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides, public documents, such as the
notarized deed of sale herein, are evidence of the facts giving rise to their execution, as well as the date of their
execution.

Third:

Actual payment of the purchase price is not an element of the offense charged herein. To repeat, the subject
provision expressly states that a person shall be guilty of an election offense if he or she issues, uses, or avails of
treasury warrants or other devices undertaking the future delivery of money, goods, or other things of value
chargeable against public funds. Clearly, the offense is committed even if the payment or the delivery of money
was made after the prohibited period. Hence, that the check was encashed on May 18, 2004, or after the
prohibited election ban period, does not render respondent’s innocent of the charges against them.

The issue in this case neither concerns the negotiability or commerciality of the treasury warrant nor the parties'
rights thereon. For as long as the device is issued, used, or availed of within the prohibited period to undertake the
future delivery of money chargeable against public funds, an election offense is committed.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned circumstances, however, we resolve to deny the petition on the principle of
double jeopardy.

The Court finds that the elements of double jeopardy are present herein. A valid information was filed against
respondents for violation of Section 261 (w)(b) of the Omnibus Election Code resulting in the institution of a
criminal case before the proper court of competent jurisdiction. Subsequently, respondents pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged and were acquitted; the dismissal of the case against them being based on a demurrer to
evidence filed after the prosecution rested its case.

No abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court so grave as to result in the reversal of its judgment of acquittal.

The RTC herein duly gave the prosecution ample opportunity to present its case by allowing the latter to submit
the pieces of evidence necessary for conviction. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the prosecution was
deprived of due process of law.

The OSG made no mention of any objection as to the manner by which the RTC conducted the proceedings.
Neither did it particularly allege a denial of its right to due process. Instead, the OSG merely argued that the RTC
granted respondents' demurrer to evidence without any clear and factual basis, failing to make a careful
consideration of its evidence and merely focusing on the highly technical provisions of the Negotiable Instruments
Law.

LLAMAS v. CA (Annulment of Judgment-Rule 47-Jurisdiction over the Offense charged)

CRIME: Other Forms of Swindling

FACTS:
The petitioner spouses Francisco and Carmelita Llamas were convicted of “other form of swindling” penalized
under Article 316 for selling their parcel of land to the complainant Conrado Avila amounting to 12, 895 despite
being already mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.

RTC Ruling:

Found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two
months and to pay the fine of ₱18,085.00 each.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of the trial court further denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners filed for petition for review which the court denied the same for petitioners’ failure to state the
material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the judgment of conviction
became final and executory.

Carmelita Llamas was arrested while Francisco Llamas was nowhere to be found. He then moved for the lifting or
recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted the
instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions. It was denied initially due to
technical grounds but upon a motion for reconsideration, was reinstated.

Eventually, with thorough evaluation, the Court denied the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 availed by the petitioners valid

RULING:

No, it was not valid.

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the
enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to
criminal cases.

Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, at the time of the filing of the
information, the applicable law was Batas Pambansa Bilang 129.

Penalty of Other Forms of Swindling is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods which is 1 month and 1
day to 4 months and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value. In this case, as alleged in the information, the value of the damage caused, or the imposable fine, is
₱12,895.00. This value falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and not to the MeTC. The MeTC could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action because at the time of the filing of the information, its jurisdiction
was limited to offenses punishable with a fine of not more than ₱4,000.00.
PEOPLE v. MONTESCLAROS (Modification of Judgment – Mitigating Circumstance & Civil Indemnity)

CRIME: Rape with Conspiracy

FACTS:

Defendants Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros were charged with two separate charges for the rape of 13-
year-old ABC. Tampus was charged with two counts of rape while Montesclaros was charged as an accomplice to
the commission of rape for agreeing to Tampus’ request to sexually assault her daughter while intoxicated.

RTC Ruling:

The defendants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. A mitigating circumstance of illness (Schizophrenia)
was appreciated in Montesclaros’ favor which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of
the consciousness of her acts.

An appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals when Tampus died dismissing his case by the third
division of the court. With the death of Tampus, the CA only dealt with appellant Montesclaros.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Gave credence to ABC testimony and affirmed the ruling of RTC but with modification.

CA found that Montesclaros failed to prove that she was completely derived of intelligence when the crime was
committed. It diminishes the will-power of Montesclaros but did not deprive her of her consciousness of the acts.

Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the modification of judgment by the CA valid

RULING:

Accomplice:

The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
 (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.

She forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.

The testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally
deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida
suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of Dr.
Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower although it did
not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.

Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's
daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not
refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase
the penalty of the offender.

Civil Indemnity

HIPOS Sr. v. BAY (Writ of Mandamus – Lack of Probable Cause – Trial Court independence)

CRIME: Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness

FACTS:

Petitioners Nilos Hipos Sr., et al, filed a writ of mandamus for the denial of the trial court on the Motion to
Withdraw Information charging accused-petitioners of rape and acts of lasciviousness to private complainants AAA
and BBB.

Private complainants AAA and BBB filed for a Motion for Reinvestigation asking respondent Judge Bay toto study if
the proper Information had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and
ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Cases before the City Prosecutor claiming that there was
no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Information filed against
petitioners and their co-accused. It was reversed by Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera holding that
there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information
before Judge Bay which was then denied.

Petitioners Nilos Hipos Sr., et al, filed a writ of mandamus for the denial of the trial court on the Motion to
Withdraw Information charging accused-petitioners of rape and acts of lasciviousness to private complainants AAA
and BBB seeking to curb the Judge Bay’s judicial discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Writ of Mandamus the proper remedy to assail the judgment of the judge

RULING:

Mandamus

is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some
other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one;
mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by
mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion.

Judge Bay denying the Motion to Withdraw Information is already an act of a judge. Therefore, no writ of
mandamus is available. If Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the Order of denying
the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for
Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or
conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court.

"Deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of
the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such
resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of
discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on
the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.

PEOPLE v. CASAS (Judgment – Failure of the Prosecution to Prove Guilt – Procedure of Police Operatives)

CRIME: Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Drugs

FACTS:
Defendant-Appellant Paterno Lorenzo was apprehended in a buy-bust operation conducted by PO3 Pineda for
allegedly selling 0.20 gram of shabu to Conrado Estanislao and illegally possessing 2.04 grams of shabu. He was
charged with Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Drugs.

According to the narrative, a confidential informant relayed information to PO3 Pineda on the alleged illegal drug
activities of Lorenzo. PO3 marked 2 100 pesos bill which were used to buy the alleged drug Casas was selling by the
informant. The buyer, Estanislao, was also apprehended after being searched and found one (1) sachet of shabu.

RTC Ruling:

Paterno Lorenzo was convicted of Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Drugs while Conrado Estanislao was
acquitted for the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt.

Lorenzo filed a petition before the Court of Appeals questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in
the seizure and custody of evidence against him i.e inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, which
raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court were indeed
retrieved from accused-appellant.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the judgment of RTC

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite the questionable
procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of evidence against him

RULING:

Yes, the prosecution’s case fails for failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral certainty.

Presumption of Innocence:

The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by
procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even
present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused
shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the burden of
evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Elements of Illegal Sale of Drugs:

(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore

Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had actually
taken place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti – the commission of the crime
charged.

Elements of Illegal Possession of Drugs:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty.
Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

Procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs (Section
21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165):

a. physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

b. Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

-PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased the shabu from accused-appellant and
that he only retrieved it from said informant.

-He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu
that were allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was done nor
who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens thereafter.

-The prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction.

-The lone prosecution witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer
were.

The totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support accused-appellant’s conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act

PEOPLE v. BARON (Modification of Judgment – Death to Reclusion Perpetua)

CRIME: Robbery with Homicide

FACTS:

According to the prosecution witnesses, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation
with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julie’s Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City when the victim,
Juanito Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and
asked if he could take him and his companions to Hacienda Caridad for ₱30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant
called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallo’s tricycle.

Another witness Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julie’s Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and
Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while the appellant was
seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan,
hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus
decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding
Berallo’s tricycle.

SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident. Together with other policemen, he
proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20
meters away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallo’s body and a tricycle
sidecar in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.

Appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallo’s tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the
sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the
house of Villatima’s aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).

Defense of the Accused-Appellant:

He acted under the impulse of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

RTC Ruling:

Found accused-appellant Baron guilty beyond reasonable doubt for complex crime of Robbery with Homicide with
aggravating circumstance of Treachery and sentenced with Death.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of RTC with modification reducing the penalty from Death to Reclusion Perpetua.

Found that the alleged threat, if at all, was not real or imminent. Appellant had every opportunity to escape but
did not take advantage of the same. Instead, he waited inside the tricycle as if he was one of the malefactors.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in failing to appreciate the exempting circumstance for convicting accused-
appellant of guilty beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

No, the trial court did not err.

A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the perpetrator.

The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant
and his co-accused conspired to commit robbery with homicide.

Elements of Robbery with Homicide:

(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another;

(2) with intent to gain;

(3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and

(4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense, was
committed.

A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing
is merely incidental to the robbery.

The prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and
his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his companions boarded the tricycle of the victim
pretending to be passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun point,
tied the hands of the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. The
victim was divested of his wallet containing ₱1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the sugarcane
plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside
the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of the accused. They proceeded to Barangay Oringao,
Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt, Natividad.

There was no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing the crime. But
there were circumstantial evidences consisting of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.

Circumstantial Evidence:

a) there is more than one circumstance;

(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established;
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Exempting Circumstance of Irresistible Force and/or Uncontrollable Fear

Requisites:

(1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear;

(2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and

(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.

Nothing in the records to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he was under duress from his co-accused in
participating in the crime.

The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more than 10 hours and
passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at least request for assistance from
the people around him.

Treachery:

Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime especially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of increasing the penalty.

Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide". Neither is it "inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide". As such, treachery may be properly considered in increasing the penalty for crime.

The presence of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance would have merited the imposition of the death
penalty. However, in view of the subsequent passage of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," we are mandated to impose on the appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

ABELLANA v. PEOPLE (Judgment of Acquittal-Civil Liability from a Crime Not Charged in the Information)

CRIME: Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document

FACTS:

Petitioner Felixberto Abellana was charged civilly liable for a crime that is not specifically charged and alleged and
which is not necessarily included in the crime or offense charged in the information.
The case stemmed from Abellana counterfeiting the signatures of private complainants spouses Diaga and Sapiaa
Alonto above their typewritten names in the Deed of Absolute Sale for the parcel of land of the spouses Alonto in
Cebu City. The falsification of the documents caused the transfer of title of the said land damaging the private
complainants.

Abellana pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.

RTC Ruling:

RTC found that the evidence presented by both parties can only convict Abellana of Falsification of Public
Document by a Private Individual and not Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document because Abellana did not
intend to defraud the private complainants and that the private complainants failed to pay their obligation.

Petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute which was actually signed by spouses Alonto but was notarized without the
private complainant personally appearing before the notary public.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Reversed and set aside the ruling of RTC convicting petitioner of Falsification of Public Document by a Private
Individual because charging the petitioner of an offense or crime alleged in the Information or one not necessarily
included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

However, it affirmed the civil liability of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can still be held civilly liable for a crime or offense not alleged in the information.

RULING:

No, the petitioner cannot be held civilly liable a crime or offense not alleged in the information.

Article 171(1)

- the falsification requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric

Article 171(2)

- occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding
when in fact such person did not so participate

A judgment of acquittal shall:

 1. state whether the evidence of the prosecution:

a. absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or

b. merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

2. determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist

When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the
court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.

The "extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any
damage to spouses Alonto.

1. The Information charged that petitioner fraudulently made it appear that spouses Alonto affixed their
signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his
favor. However, it was found with no basis since the signatures were genuine.

2. Non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements
contained in the deed. The defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid.

Moreover, alternative sentences should not be imposed as there is nothing in the law that permits its
imposition.

PEOPLE v. ASIS (Judgment of Conviction - Conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution –
Circumstantial Evidence)

CRIME: Robbery with Homicide

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento were charged with Robbery with Homicide for killing Yu Hing
Guan or Roy Ching.

As narrated by the nephew of the victim, George Huang, he discovered the dead body of his uncle on the ground
with a knife embedded on his nape. He went to his mother who was the sister of the victim to tell the incident.
They then reported the incident first in the Chinatown Police Station and thereafter, went to another station
located in Soler corner Reina Regente to report the incident again.

Allegedly both the accused and the victim were all deaf-mutes.

Diana testified that she suspected both appellants, especially Gilbert Formento, to have perpetrated the crime
because of the fact that she saw the pair of shorts of the victim in the bag of appellant Gilbert Formento. Jimmy
Pagaduan, a helper in the Yu Hing Guan Auto Supply for five years already, testified that as far as he knows, Danilo
Asis owed the victim 3,000.00 and that he saw a list thereof which the victim showed him.

SPO2 Pablo Ileto, before bringing accused Formento to the WPD Homicide Section, brought him to his house,
where Diana asked from Formento’s wife the stolen money. However, they could not understand each other, so
the wife gave Diana Yu the bag of Gilbert Formento where Diana Yu noticed the pair of shorts which belonged to
the victim. PO2 Ileto noticed what appears to be blood stains on the pair of shorts.

The accused-appellant testified through sign interpreter who assisted them.

RTC Ruling:

Found the accused-appellants guilty of Robbery with Homicide despite the absence of witnesses to the actual
killing because circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused
definitely proved that the two committed the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution valid

RULING:

No, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not enough to convict the accused.

Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial Evidences:

1. Bloodstained Trousers

-The prosecution argues that Rule 131(j) of Revised Rules of Court or the Disputable Presumptions should
apply.
 “That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership
over, are owned by him”

- The retrieval of the pair of shorts does not prove that appellants, or even just one of them, robbed the
trouser owner of cash and jewelry and also killed him, as charged in the Information. Neither does it show
that appellants, or one of them, perpetrated the aggression leading to the victim’s death.

2. Inadmissibility of Evidence

-There was an illegal arrest since there was no warrant issued during the arrest. However, since the
accused did not raise the illegality of arrest before entering their plea, the illegality of arrest was deemed
waived.

-But illegality of arrest does not bar the accused to raise the question of inadmissibility of evidence. The
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived
by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or
her behalf.

According to the prosecution, at the time the bloodstained shorts were recovered, accused Formento
together with his wife and mother, were present. Being the subject of the search, Formento should have
given his consent.

Waiver must constitute:

1. the right exists;

2. the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and

3. the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

-Accused Formento cannot consent to a warrantless search because he was deaf-mute and was not
assisted by an interpreter during the search, seizure, and arrest.

3. Bloodstained Shirt

- The bloodstain found in the accused-appellant Danilo Asis’ shirt when he was brough to the police
station should not be taken as an indication of guilt for circumstantial evidence to lead to conviction, it
must do more than just raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt

4. Motive for the Crime

-Motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt
on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it. But the prosecution’s
contention again fails, as the fact of indebtedness was never conclusively established. To show that there
was sufficient motive to commit the crime charged, the prosecution uses the testimony of Asis that he got
"madder and madder" at the victim. This statement is too speculative to deserve serious consideration.

5. The Last Persons Seen

 -The accused being the last persons the victim seen talking with raises suspicion but still insufficient to
establish their guilt because as correctly observed, the testimony that the neighbors heard shouts does
not coincide with the fact that the accused and victim are deaf-mutes.

-During the cross-examination, the accused did not point at each other as the perpetrator of the crime.
They even denied doing so.

-The elements of robbery were not present for the robbery to be charged against the accused.

Circumstantial evidence is resorted to when direct testimony would result in setting felons free and deny proper
protection to the community. The accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided the
proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

BASILONIA v. VILLARUZ (Entry of Judgment – Promulgation of Judgment – Motion of Execution)

CRIME: Murder and Frustrated Homicide

FACTS:

A decision was promulgated by the trial court convicting the petitioner Rodolfo Basilonia, et al, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder for the killing of Atty. Isagani Roblete and Frustrated Homicide committed against the
person of Rene Gonzales by petitioner Jojo Basilonia.

Petitioner filed for Notice of Appeal which was granted by the trial court but was denied by the Court of Appeals
for the failure to file their brief despite extensions of time given. The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries
of Judgment. The entire case records were remanded to the trial court.

Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming to be the
son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. Allegedly, t he judgment has
not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request.

The Assistant City Prosecutor filed Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
The trial court granted the motion for execution on and ordered the bondsmen to surrender petitioners within ten
(10) days from notice of the Order.

Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail
for their provisional liberty was ordered forfeited.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20)
years after the date of entry of judgment becomes final and executory
RULING:

Prescription of Penalties

ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five
years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties. – The period of prescription of penalties shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription.

The rule prescription of penalty states that imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the
culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

The petitioners were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment
by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor.

Extinction of Civil Liability

Section 6, Rule 39 of Revised Rules of Court

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is
barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by
the statute of limitations.

Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in conjunction with

Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(3) Upon a judgment

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.

Modes of Enforcing a Final and Executory Judgment:

1. through Motion
-Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years
from the date of its entry.

2. by Independent Action
 -mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed
Limitation:
-the action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten
(10) years from the finality of the judgment

Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the
issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. Yet, a writ issued after the
expiration of the period is null and void. The limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the stated
period, otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court.

Exceptions allowing execution of judgment despite non-observance of the time bar:

1. by agreement of the parties for a definite time,

2. by injunction,

3. by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas,

4. by the death of a party, or otherwise.

5. the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage

Private respondent Dixon Roblete did not file for a Motion for execution within the five-year period or an action to
revive the judgment within the ten-year period. There was also no persuasive and compelling reason was
presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. The instant case does not fall within the exceptions
afore-stated.

Promulgation of Judgment:

1. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a
warrant of arrest, if the accused is not yet under detention.

2. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued, the trial court
should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate transfer of
the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service
of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an appeal had been
filed, but the same had been withdrawn/dismissed/decided with finality.

3. If aside from the penalty of imprisonment the penalty of fine is likewise imposed, the trial court should
issue at once an order requiring the payment of fine within a reasonable period of time and, in case of
nonpayment and subsidiary imprisonment is imposed, he should likewise serve the subsidiary
imprisonment.

4. If, however, the penalty is only fine and the judgment has become final and executory, an order should be
issued by the trial court at once for the payment of the fine.

5. In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital offenses or convicted of
non-capital offenses where bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a mittimus or commitment order should
 be immediately issued after the promulgation of judgment by the trial court as long as the penalty
imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary.

In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

MORILLO v. PEOPLE (Dismissal/Acquittal – Jurisdiction over the offense accused)

CRIME: Violation of BP Blg. 22

FACTS:

Petitioner Armilyn Morillo filed the instant petition of certiorari for the reversal of the decision of MeTC convicting
accused Richard Natividad of violation of BP Blg. 22 by the Court of Appeals on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the case accused.

The case stemmed when accused private respondent Richard Natividad, a contractor under the name of RB
Custodio Construction, issued 2 post-dated checks drawn from Metrobank Pampanga branch for the payment of
the construction materials to the petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and
Construction Supplies.

Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of Makati City had no jurisdiction
over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic,
the venue of the action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati
City.

RTC Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of MeTC holding that BP Blg. 22 is a transitory crime which the jurisdiction may be had in
several places where one of the acts material to the crime occurred.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Reversed decision of lower court and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper venue
arguing that all of the elements of BP Blg. 22 occurred in Pampanga. Filing the case in Makati City, under the
erroneous assumption that since she deposited the subject checks in Equitable PCI Bank, Makati City, and was
informed of lite dishonor of the checks by the same bank, is erroneous.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the case on the ground of lack MeTC lacks jurisdiction over the offense
accused
RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the case.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a transitory crime meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another, the court of the place where
the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving
violations of BP 22.

However, the petition could have been dismissed due to procedural errors. It has always been the rule that in
criminal cases, an appeal for criminal cases in instances of dismissal or acquittal, must be in conformity with the
OSG. The OSG has been vested the authority to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers.

There are exceptions where the conformity of the OSG is not needed such as when the complainant appeals for
the civil aspect of the criminal case, denial of due process of law, there is a grave error committed by the judge or
when the substantial interest requires.

Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process,
thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.

In the case of the petitioner, the dismissal of the Court of Appeals does not tantamount to acquittal.

Dismissal v. Acquittal

Acquittal

- is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that
defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt

Dismissal

- terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc.

Only instance that Dismissal is an Acquittal is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
defendant moves for me dismissal and the court dismisses the ease on the ground that the evidence tails to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. In such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because
the case is decided on the merits.

Thus, when the appellate court herein dismissed the instant case on the ground that the MeTC lacked jurisdiction
over the offense charged, it did not decide the same on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of respondent's guilt
or innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. The appellate court merely dismissed the case
on the erroneous reasoning that none of the elements of BP 22 was committed within the lower court's
jurisdiction, and not because of any finding that the evidence failed to show respondent's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

ESTINO v. PEOPLE (New Trial – New and Material Evidence)

CRIME: Anti-Graft and Corruption Act & Malversation of Public Funds

FACTS:

Petitioner Munib Estino was the elected Vice-Governor of Sulu who acted as the Governor in pursuance to a status
quo issued against elected Governor Abdusakur Tan suspending his proclamation to office. While petitioner
Ernesto G. Pescadera was the Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during the stint of Estino as the Acting Governor of Sulu.

Three informations were filed against the petitioners involving anomalies of disbursing vouchers and payrolls of
the employees especially in the payment of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others for the
period starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 which was discovered by an audit conducted by COA State
Auditor II Mona U. Balabaran and her team.

1st criminal complaint:

Taking advantage of their positions as public officials and acting in relation to their official functions, failed to pay
the employees of the Government of Sulu their salary differentials, Additional Compensation Allowance (ACA),
Personal Emergency and Representation Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA), Mid-
year Bonus, Cash Gift and Clothing Allowance in the total amount of P8,435,625.34.

2nd criminal complaint:

Taking advantage of their positions as public officials and acting in relation to their official functions,
misappropriate the GSIS monthly contributions and loan amortizations collected from the provincial employees
in the amount of P4,820,365.30 for their own personal benefit or advantage.

3rd criminal complaint:

Taking advantage of their positions as public officials and acting in relation to their official functions, withdrawn
from Philippine National Bank-Jolo Branch the amount of P21.5 million on 07 May 1999 out of the Internal
Revenue Allotment of P28,268,578.00 which was deposited to the account of Sulu Provincial Government on the
same day and using the said amount to pay "various expenses" without, however, specifying what the expenses
are in violation of existing government accounting rules.

Sandiganbayan Ruling:

1st complaint: Found both Estino and Pescadera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act

2nd complaint: Found Pescadera guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the malversation of funds

3rd complaint: Both petitioners were acquitted for failure of prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Petitioners filed for a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial.

In the case of RATA, petitioners presented to Sandiganbayan the following:

1. Certification dated May 11, 2002 issued by the Provincial Auditor Abdurasad J. Undain, stating that the
RATA for the period January to May 1999 was paid to the officials entitled to it and that the GSIS
premiums pertaining to prior years were also settled by the Provincial Government of Sulu.

2. sworn statements of the provincial officials entitled to RATA, stating that they were paid such allowance
from January to May 1999 and that they did not have any complaint to its alleged nonpayment

3. 99 certified true copies of the Disbursement Vouchers showing the payment of the RATA from January to
May 1999 provided for in the 1998 reenacted budget (were only presented in their Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration and/or Motion for New Trial allegedly because they thought that the COA Report
pertained only to the benefits provided in and to be paid with the 1999 budget)

In the case of absence of signature in the RATA, petitioners explain that the actual release of RATA is the
responsibility of the cashier of the province.

Further pointing out that the Sandiganbayan justices who heard and tried their case were not the ones who
rendered the questioned decision.

Office of Special Prosecutor:

Commented that petition should be dismissed as it raises a Question of Fact not proper in an appeal by certiorari
and that even if the petition is granted, there are legal and factual bases for the conviction

-that the allowance was contemplated by the auditors in their use of the term "benefits”

-that the sworn statements of the officials on their receipt of the RATA and the certification of the Provincial
Auditor were only presented in their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration implying that the payments of
RATA were made after the conviction of the petitioners

-there were irregularities in the documents such as the documents not bearing the dorsal portion of the vouchers
or the signature of the Provincial Auditor, while others were signed by persons other than the claimants without
any proof of their authority from the principals

ISSUE:

Whether or not the new and material evidences presented by the petitioners valid for a new trial to be granted

RULING:

Yes, the new and material evidences presented by the petitioners are valid for them to be granted a new trial.

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to that petitioners
were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. It seems that they were misled
during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA
under the 1998 reenacted budget because the prosecution’s evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment of
RATA under the 1999 budget.

It is equally settled that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only
to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity to prove their claims and
thus prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.

Procedural rules can be suspended by reason of:

(1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property;

(2) counsel’s negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of the client;
(3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; and
(6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory

The Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized
in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning ‘pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.’ In proper cases,
procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be
miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules.

In the case, as per verified during the cross-examination, the budget source in the testimony of Auditor Balabaran
was the 1999 budget which was not the budget that the petitioners were tried for.

Malversation of Funds

Pescadera was not given an opportunity to explain why the GSIS premiums were not remitted. Nowhere in the
pleadings did the Special Prosecutor refute the lack of a formal demand upon Pescadera to account for the GSIS
premiums. Pescadera even denies being informed of the conduct of the audit, an assertion which was not refuted
by the prosecution. Without a formal demand, the prima facie presumption of conversion under Art. 217 cannot
be applied.

While demand is not an element of the crime of malversation, it is a requisite for the application of the
presumption. Without this presumption, the accused may still be proved guilty under Art. 217 based on direct
evidence of malversation. In this case, the prosecution failed to do so. There is no proof that Pescadera
misappropriated the amount for his personal use.

There is no proof that Pescadera used the GSIS contributions for his personal benefit. The prosecution merely
relied on the presumption of malversation which we have already disproved due to lack of notice. Hence, the
prosecution should have proven actual misappropriation by the accused.

Pescadera, however, emphasized that the GSIS premiums were applied in the meantime to the salary differentials
and loan obligations of Sulu, that is, the GSIS premiums were appropriated to another public use.
BRIONES v. PEOPLE (New Trial – Error or Mistake Committed by Counsel -New and Material Evidence)

CRIME: Robbery

FACTS:

S/G Molina, a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services, reported an incident involving Rommel
Briones, who was allegedly mauling Romulo Bersamina, somewhere in Jakarta Street. Both accused Briones
brothers were residents of BF Homes.

While stopping the mauling, Briones was able to get the .38 cal revolver of S/G Molina, which was owned by
Johnny Fuentes.

S/G Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and to SPO1 Manuel Plete. The
police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation.

Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and claimed that he was in his house
when the incident happened.

Briones presented before the Court an Affidavit of Desistance dated July 29, 2002 executed by Fuentes and an
Affidavit dated July 22, 2002 executed by Oskar Salud allegedly prove that Briones had no intent to gain and, in
fact, threw away the firearm after grabbing it from S/G Molina.

RTC Ruling:

RTC gave greater weight to the prosecution’s evidence and found Briones guilty of Simple Theft instead of Robbery
for the failure to prove the presence of elements of violence and intimidation.

Briones argued that his conviction was based solely on the testimony of S/G Gual who was not present at the scene
and did not really see what happened and that he cannot be convicted of simple theft under a criminal charge of
robbery.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

CA turned down the arguments of Briones and convict him of Robbery for the presence of force and intimidation
through the intent of taking the firearm from S/G Molina.

And also denied the Omnibus Motion (Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to
Dismiss, and Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to Dismiss)
filed by Briones.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a new trial is justified under the circumstances

RULING:

No, the circumstances did not justify a new trial.

A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or defense of a relative is effectively a change of
theory of the case brought only during appeal is not permissible by law.

There is no unlawful aggression on the part of S/G Molina when he approached Briones and stopped them.

Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for
new trial.

Furthermore, for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence , the concurrence of the
following conditions must obtain:

Newly-Discovered Evidence:

1. Recovery of Firearm

2. Affidavits executed by Fuentes and Salud

Requisites for Newly-Discovered Evidence:

(a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial;

(b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.

In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established. Evidence, to
be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below.

The discovery of the firearm cannot be considered material evidence that will affect the outcome of the case
because Briones failed to show that he had exerted reasonable diligence to locate the firearm. His allegation in his
Omnibus Motion that he told his brothers and sisters to search for the firearm, which yielded negative results, is
purely self-serving. He also now admits having taken the firearm and having immediately disposed of it at a nearby
house, adjacent to the place of the incident. Hence, even before the case went to court, he already knew the
location of the subject firearm, but did not do anything.

The admission and consideration of the affidavits executed by Fuentes and Oskar Salud will result in a different
outcome for the case.

Affidavit of Fuentes: no longer interested in pursuing the case because he has already recovered his firearm
Affidavit of Salud: found the subject firearm in his property

These affidavits were executed on the entreaties by Briones’ widowed mother to Fuentes and Salud appearing to
have been executed solely out of human compassion and for no other reason.

SALUDAGA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (New Trial – New and Material Evidence – Substituted Information)

CRIME: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

FACTS:
Petitioners Quintin Saludaga and SPO2 Fiel Genio were charged with violation of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for entering into a Pakyaw Contract with Olimpio Legua, a private individual who works as a non-
license contractor and non-accredited NGO, for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays Mac-
Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar.

Saludaga filed the petition before the Court assailing the need for a preliminary investigation for the alleged
substituted information charging a new offense of giving unwarranted benefit to private parties which occurred
when the first information did not allege and prove the number of actual damages caused the government which
was an essential element of the crime charged.

Sandiganbayan Ruling:

Denied the Motion for Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there is no substituted information or
substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.

The re-filed information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which
accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of
another preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amendment of the information justifies the granting of a new trial

RULING:

No, the amendment made in the information did not charge a new offense for a new trial be granted.

Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The Information dated August 17,
2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. Only the mode of commission was modified.

Modes of Committing RA 3019:

a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or

b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference

Each act or mode does not constitute different offenses. An accused may be charged under either mode or under
both should both modes concur.

Furthermore, the newly discovered evidence was executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly
found by the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was already in
existence prior to the re-filing of the case. In fact, such sworn affidavit was among the documents considered
during the preliminary investigation. It was the sole annexed document to petitioners’ Supplement to Motion for
Reinvestigation, offered to dispute the charge that no public bidding was conducted prior to the execution of the
subject project.

Requisites for newly discovered evidence are:

(a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation);
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted,
will probably change the judgment

LUMANOG v. PEOPLE (New Trial – “Newly-Discovered” Evidence)

CRIME: Murder

FACTS:

The case resolves the motions for reconsideration separately filed by petitioners Lenido Lumanog and Augusto
Santos, Cesar Fortuna and Rameses de Jesus assailing the decision of the Supreme Court convicting them of the
crime of murder for the killing of Col. Rolando Abadilla.

The accused-movants strongly assail the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the
lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo.

Moreover, Fortuna, one of the accused-movants presented an affidavit executed by a certain Orencio G. Jurado, Jr.
who claims to be one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contends that said
belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the police authorities in the
apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “newly-discovered” evidence presented by the accused-movants admissible for a new trial

RULING:

No, the newly-discovered evidence presented by the accused does not warrant a new trial because it is not
“newly-discovered” but an additional evidence.

During the cross-examination, Alejo merely gave the responsive answer to the question as to those persons whom
he saw actually shoot the victim who was in his car. As the question was phrased, Alejo was not being asked about
the persons who had participation or involvement in the crime, but only those who actually fired at the victim.

Moreover, any irregularity in the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court should have been manifested
before the trial judge.

As to the affidavit of Orencio G. Jurado, Jr. submitted by Fortuna, the said affiant claimed that he had a heated
argument with Inspector Roger Castillo during one of the hearings before the trial court because Inspector Castillo
was urging him (Jurado) "to confirm that those arrested by the joint team of CID and PARAK-DILG were exactly the
same people/suspects described by the guards to which [he] firmly declined". Jurado alleged that he was surprised
to see the faces of the suspects flashed on TV several days after Herbas and Alejo gave their statements at Camp
Karingal because they did not fit the description given by witnesses Herbas and Alejo. Jurado was also allegedly
prevented earlier by an unidentified policeman -- as per instruction of then DILG Secretary Robert Barbers -- from
interviewing the suspects arrested by the operatives of the CID and PARAK-DILG.

The affidavit is not a “newly-discovered” evidence but only additional evidence to support the defense argument
that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers.
To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be shown
that the evidence was "newly discovered".

Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have
been discovered before the trial.

PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN (New Trial – Newly Discovered Evidence – Errors or Irregularities prejudicial to
the substantial rights of the accused)

CRIME: Multiple Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder

FACTS:

Petitioners filed the petition of certiorari and mandamus seeking for the reversal of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan granting the Omnibus Motion for New Trial filed by the accused in criminal case entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Domiciano Cabigao, et al." Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder.

The case stemmed from the shooting incident that occurred on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. In the said incident, a composite team of Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing
Amante Payumo and wounding Teofilo Payumo, Barangay Captain of Sta. Barbara at Cabatuhan River and the
petitioners.

The Sandiganbayan convicted the accused as co-principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and
Attempted Murder, after 4 years.

The accused filed for Motion for New Trial contending that errors of law or irregularities had been committed
during and after trial which were prejudicial to their substantive and constitutional rights.

The Special Fifth Division then granted the Motion for New Trial on following reasons:

1. the November 27, 1998 Decision of the Fifth Division penned by Justice Godofredo T. Legaspi, ( Justice
Legaspi) could not have been validly promulgated and could not have acquired binding effect since Justice
Legaspi had transferred to the Second Division and, hence, he ceased to be a member of the Fifth Division
before the Decision was promulgated on February 23, 1999;

2. the trial de novo conducted has not yet been fully and completely complied with which the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses were erroneously admitted during the trial de novo

3. allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence including the records of the Judge Advocate General
Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, to shed light on the "serious allegations" also referred to
in the Cabigao case

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for New Trial to the accused

RULING:
Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in granting the Motion for New Trial to the accused.

A judgment of a division of the Sandiganbayan shall be promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the
presence of the accused and any Justice of the division which rendered the same.

Promulgation of the decision is an important part of the decision-making process. Promulgation signifies that on
the date it was made, the judge or justices who signed the decision continued to support it which could be inferred
from his silence or failure to withdraw his vote despite being able to do so. A decision or resolution of the court
becomes such, only from the moment of its promulgation.

A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. For a judgment to be
binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned it.

A judge who died, resigned, retired, had been dismissed, promoted to a higher court or appointed to another
office with inconsistent functions, would no longer be considered an incumbent member of the court and his
decision written thereafter would be invalid. One who is no longer a member of the court at the time the final
decision or resolution is signed and promulgated cannot validly take part in that decision or resolution.

Much less could he be the ponente of the decision or resolution. Also, when a judge or a member of the collegiate
court, who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of the
decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.

It was not necessary that Justice Legazpi be a member of the Fifth Division at the time the decision was
promulgated since he remained an incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan. What is important is that
the ponente in a collegiate court remains a member of said court at the time his ponencia is promulgated because,
at any time before that, he has the privilege of changing his opinion or making some last-minute changes therein
for the consideration and approval of his colleagues.

Moreover, the other two members then of the Fifth Division signed and adopted the judgment of conviction dated
November 27, 1998, and continued to support it until its promulgation on February 23, 1999. The members
reached their conclusion in consultation and, accordingly, rendered it as a collective judgment after due
deliberation. Hence, there was no procedural defect.

Furthermore, the grounds cited by the Sandiganbayan for granting the Motion for New Trial did not satisfy the
grounds for a new trial indicated in Sec. 2 Rule 121 of the Rules of Court.

An erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the
decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been
admitted; would not have changed the decision.

Neither would the presentation in evidence of the records of the JAGO warrant a new trial.

The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered
evidence that would merit a new trial.

Requisites for Newly-Discovered Evidence:

(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment

The JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence because such records could have been
easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable
diligence.

MACAPAGAL v. PEOPLE (Appeal – When/Where/How to Make an Appeal)

CRIME: Estafa

FACTS:

On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of Estafa for
misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of ₱800,000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and
unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for
reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received
on July 31, 2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29,
2010 for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial of the trial court of the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it has been filed out of
time valid

RULING:

No, the appeal of the petitioner is invalid.

There were procedural infirmities can outright dismiss the case.

First: Mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice of appeal

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when
appeal is taken.

SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:

(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law, in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court; and

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in cases decided
by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court’s decision or final
order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision
or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter
through a special civil action under Rule 65.

Second: Violation of the hierarchy of courts

Although the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this
should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which an
application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are special, important and
compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this case.

Third: Failure to comply with requirements for appeal

Petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision convicting
her of Estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. She only attached the June 29, 2010 RTC
Order denying her notice of appeal failing to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of
the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition.

Lastly: Repeated disregard of the Rules and the Court’s lawful orders

(a) an affidavit of service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General;

(b) a proper verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a
valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat
showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document issued by
an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC; and

(c) her counsel’s contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all
within five (5) days from notice

Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her counsel to show cause
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed
to file a Reply to respondent’s Comment to the petition.

The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory
origin and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise.

PEOPLE v. MORALES (Appeal – Factual findings – Credibility of Witnesses)

CRIME: Illegal Possession and Sale of Drugs

FACTS:
The accused-appellant Roldan Morales was charged with Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale of Drugs which he was
arrested during a buy-bust operation conducted by PO1 Eduardo Roy and PO3 Armando Rivera.

In the buy-bust operation, PO1 Roy acted as the poser-buyer while PO3 Rivera served as the lookout waiting at a
car parked about 20 meters from the situs of the transaction. In preparation for the said operation, he conducted a
short briefing and recorded the particulars of the operation they were about to carry out: the place of the
operation which is at the parking lot of Jollibee Philcoa; the identification of the suspect as the appellant; and the
preparation of the buy-bust money to be used. He prepared one ₱50.00 bill, two ₱20.00 bills and one ₱10.00 bill,
by making the appropriate marking on the top portion of each bill and recording their respective serial numbers.

Shortly after the transaction, Roy makes the pre-arranged signal at which point he approached the appellant to
arrest him. He recovered the marked money from the appellant and proceeded to frisk the latter. Upon conducting
the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant
was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the items seized from him were brought to the Crime
Laboratory for examination. The two sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while
the aluminum foil sheets tested negative of the aforementioned substance.

RTC Ruling:

Found Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of shabu and
for drug possession of zero point zero three (0.03) gram of shabu on the ground that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact of the buy-bust operation conducted and the corpus delicti, through the presentation in court of
the two sachets of white substance which was confirmed by the Chemistry Report to be methylamphetamine
hydrochloride ("shabu"), found in the possession of and sold by the appellant.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of RTC finding that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that
took place. Further holding that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

Accused-appellant elevated the case to this Court via Notice of Appeal assailing that the arresting officers did not
even place the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-
bust operation creating serious doubts as to the items and actual quantity of shabu recovered.

Office of Solicitor General comment:

Insists that the direct testimony of the two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal of the petitioner to the Supreme Court valid for review

RULING:

Yes, an appeal throws the whole case open for review.

Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and
material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.

The evidence of the corpus delicti was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

The procedures for the custody and disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 was not observed. The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied
with these procedures which was evident in the testimonies of the two police officers during the cross-
examination who were not able to identify the items seized because they were not marked before the presence of
the accused, made an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the presence of the appellant.
There was likewise no mention of any representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any
elected public official who participated in the operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized
items and be given copies thereof. And there was no list of items seized.

QUIDET v. PEOPLE (Appeal – Factual Findings of the Trial Court – Exception)

CRIME: Frustrated Homicide and Homicide

FACTS:

While visiting a friend in Sitio Punta, Looc, Salay, Misamis Oriental, accused Taban suddenly stabbed Andrew in the
chest. Andrew retaliated by boxing Taban. Jimmy, trying to pacify the two, was then stabbed in the abdomen. After
Jimmy fell down, Tubo threw a drinking glass at Andrew's face while petitioner boxed Andrew's jaw. Tubo stabbed
Jimmy who was then lying face down on the ground twice on the back with an ice pick after which he fled.
Petitioner then boxed Jimmy's mouth. Jimmy was brought to the clinic of Dr. Precioso Tacandang (Dr. Tacandang)
who advised to bring Jimmy to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital. However, arriving at the
hospital, Jimmy was declared dead. Meanwhile, Andrew sustained minor injuries.

The petitioner Rosie Quidet together with the other accused were charged with Frustrated Homicide with
conspiracy.

All of the accused as well as Quidet pleaded not guilty during the arraignment for frustrated homicide and
homicide. Only Taban pleaded guilty for homicide.

RTC Ruling:

All three of the accused (petitioner, Tubo, and Taban) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt ruling that there
was conspiracy among the three accused proven by the active participation of the accused and the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of the RTC but modified the judgment from Frustrated Homicide to Attempted Homicide
holding that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal
wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are guilty.
According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully
deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within five to seven days even
without medical treatment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other accused (Taban and
Tubo) in the commission of the offenses charged is in accordance with law and/or jurisprudence

RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in finding petitioner to have acted in conspiracy with the other accused in the commission of the
offenses charged.

The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is criminally liable only for
his individual acts.

As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to evaluate the testimonial
evidence, are accorded respect by the Court. But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, the Court is duty-
bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.

BALABA v. PEOPLE (Appeal – Time Prescribed to appeal within 15 days)

CRIME: Malversation of Public Funds

FACTS:

Petitioner Irenorio Balaba was charged with Malversation of Public Funds for the cash shortage of ₱56,321.04,
unaccounted cash tickets of ₱7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of ₱50,000 payable to Balaba, or a total shortage
of ₱114,186.34.

Trial Court Ruling:

Found petitioner Balaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Dismissed petitioner’s appeal declaring that they do not have the jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court.

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in dismissing the appeal.

The remedy of the petitioner should have been an appeal to Sandiganbayan who shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their
own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the
designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the
Court of Appeals.

Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:

"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall
be dismissed outright."

Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The
trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The
Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct
the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court.

PEOPLE v. OLIVO (Appeal – Factual Findings – Credibility of Witnesses)

CRIME: Robbery with Homicide

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Charmen Olivo, et al, were charged for Robbery with Homicide for the hold-up stunt in a store
owned by the victim Mariano Constantino who allegedly shot by the accused appellants.

Evidence of the Prosecution:

While Maricel Permejo, the witness, was tending the store of the late Mariano Constantino on 21 November 2000,
three (3) armed men barged in at around 6:30 o’clock in the evening and ordered her to bring out the money.
When she refused, accused Nelson Danda kicked her leg while accused Joey Zafra proceeded to get the money
amounting to P35,000.00 from the cash register.

Meanwhile, the owner Constantino entered his store and shouted. Accused Charmen Olivo pointed a gun at him.
Constantino ran to the back of the house and accused Olivo chased him. Successive gunshots were subsequently
heard.

Permejo looked for her employer and found him wounded and bloodied along the stairway of the house. She
sought help from a neighbor and the victim was brought to the Fairview General Hospital where he died.

Evidence of the Defense:

While accused Olivo was fetching water along Barangay Holy Spirit in Payatas, Quezon City on 24 November 2000,
policemen in civilian clothes mauled and arrested him sans a warrant. Together with two (2) others, they were
brought to Station 6 allegedly for violation of R.A. 6425. A woman came and accused Olivo was taken out. The
policemen asked her, "ito ba?" which she answered in the negative. The same question was repeated twice but the
answer was not changed.

After a few days, the accused were imprisoned at Camp Karingal. They were asked their names. The same woman
arrived thereat and at a distance of 1 ½ meters, accused Olivo heard the policemen telling the woman “ituro mo
na". The woman then mentioned accused Olivo’s name.

RTC Ruling:

Found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the appeal of the accused-appellant

Accused-appellant argued that their guilt has not been proved with the required quantum of evidence required to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the appeal despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.

It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness or his credibility, this Court accords
the highest respect and even finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed
palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court which has the unique
advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice of a witness while
testifying.

The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored,
misconstrued or misapplied facts and circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant
the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case.

Factual findings of trial courts, when substantiated by the evidence on record, command great weight and respect
on appeal, save only when certain material facts and circumstances were overlooked and which, if duly considered,
may vary the outcome of the case.

The trial court misconstrued and misapplied facts and circumstances of the case, warranting the modification or
reversal of the outcome of the case. The trial court grievously erred when it ruled that the lone prosecution
eyewitness categorically and positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.
The material fact and circumstance that the lone alleged eyewitness, Maricel Permejo, was not able to identify the
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, varies the outcome of this case. This circumstance was
established during the direct examination of Olivo and was not rebutted by the prosecution during cross-
examination or in its pleadings.

The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime impinges
heavily on the credibility of prosecution’s evidence. For if, indeed, the accused-appellants were the malefactors of
the crime who did not hide their faces during the robbery, the eyewitness, who had such close, traumatic
encounter with them, should automatically have recalled their faces upon seeing them. It behooves this Court to
declare that she was not able to do so positively.

Moreover, the accused-appellant were not arrested for Robbery with Homicide but were arrested in a buy-bust
operation. They were brought to Camp Karingal for dubious reasons for SPO2 had a doubtful answer during the
cross-examination when he was asked why he was called to investigate the robbery with homicide which occurred
in the Batasan area when he was in Camp Karingal. He, at first, answered that when the case is murder and
robbery and the amount is more than ₱1 million, the case will be handled by the Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU).
However, realizing his mistake that the amount taken was only ₱35,000.00 when asked the same question during
cross-examination, SPO2 Dino replied that it was SOP that if the case is murder or homicide and if there is no
available police investigator for that police station, then Camp Karingal will be the one to conduct the
investigation.

Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to the totality of evidence
before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by
the parties. It should not confine itself to oral testimony during the trial.

We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when the evidence relied
upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial
evidence.

GUASCH v. DELA CRUZ (Appeal – Reglementary Period of 15 days)

CRIME: Estafa

FACTS:

Respondent Arnaldo Dela Cruz charged petitioner Mercedita Guasch with Estafa alleging that petitioner was his
neighbor and kumadre. On several occasions, petitioner transacted business with him by exchanging cash for
checks of small amount without interest. On July 26, 1999, petitioner went to his residence requesting him to
exchange her check with cash of P3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, petitioner returned the next day
and was able to convince him to give her P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check No.
0032082 dated January 31, 2000 upon her assurance that she will have the funds and bank deposit to cover the
said check by January 2000. On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was dishonored
for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was already closed.

After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion
With Leave To Admit Demurrer to Evidence 7 with attached Demurrer to Evidence. The trial court granted the
Motion and dismissed the case.
The trial court found that respondent's assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check will be fully
funded on the maturity date was not supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt not having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.

On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July 14, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation
with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June 16, 2005 (Motion to Amend) to include a finding of civil liability
of petitioner. In the Manifestation, respondent's counsel justified his failure to file the motion within the
reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the
afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.

RTC Ruling:

Denied respondent's Motion to Amend in its Order dated September 20, 2005 finding that counsel for respondent
was inexcusably negligent; hence, the Order dated June 16, 2005 has become final and executory. Respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order dated November 7, 2005.

The Notice of Appeal was likewise denied.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Denied the petitioner’s Motion to Amend Order on the ground that matters of paramount importance outweigh
rules of procedure in this instance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied respondent's Motion to Amend

RULING:

No, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
denied respondent’s Motion to Amend.

As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly enforced as
they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial
business.

The purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold:

(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business; and,

(2) second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why courts
exist.

Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for
an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving of due course to an
appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of procedure.

Elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course:

(1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,

(2) the merits of the case,

(3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,

(4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and

(5) the other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby

Several of these elements were present in the case.

First:

Respondent did not waive, reserve, nor institute a civil action for the recovery of civil liability. As correctly
observed by the Court of Appeals, respondent's actual and active participation in the criminal proceedings through
a private prosecutor leaves no doubt with respect to his intentions to press a claim for the unpaid obligation of
petitioner in the same action.

Hence, since the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, the trial court was duty-bound to
determine the civil liability of petitioner pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.

Judgment of Acquittal:

(1) shall state whether or not the evidence of the prosecution

a. absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or

b. merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

(2) determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist

Second:

Respondent concededly has an available remedy even if his Motion to Amend was denied, which is to institute a
separate civil action to recover petitioner's civil liability. However, to require him to pursue this remedy at this
stage will only prolong the litigation between the parties which negates the avowed purpose of the strict
enforcement of reglementary periods to appeal, that is, to put an end to judicial controversies. Not only will that
course of action be a waste of time, but also a waste of the resources of both parties and the court as well.

PEOPLE v. TARUC (Appeal – Waiver of Remedy of Appeal – Escapes or Flees)

CRIME: Murder
FACTS:

Accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was charged with Murder for the killing of Emelito Sualog shooting him with
a .45 caliber.

Duly assisted by a PAO lawyer, he pleaded not guilty.

RTC Ruling:

Found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation pf the crime of MURDER and sentenced
with death

Accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief.

Considering that the Notice to File Brief addressed to accused-appellant was returned to the appellate court with
postal notation "moved out," the Court of Appeals directed accused-appellant’s counsel to furnish it with the
present and complete address of his client within five days from notice.

In compliance, the PAO lawyer concerned informed the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from
prison and he had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the accused-appellant.

the PAO lawyer asked the Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in Balanga, Bataan, to file a
certification as to the accused-appellant’s escape.

Ropadolfo Fabros Torcuato, Sr., Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail, conveyed to the
appellate court that accused-appellant was indeed committed to said jail on 10 November 2000 but escaped at
about 11:00 p.m. on 23 August 2002.

Notwithstanding the escape of accused-appellant from prison, the Court of Appeals granted PAO’s Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief. The Court of Appeals found the explanation valid, and accepted the
briefs of both the appellant and the appellee, and considered the case submitted for decision.

Court of Appeals Ruling:

Affirmed the decision of RTC but modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua

Accused-appellant, still represented by the PAO, filed a Notice of Appeal stating that he was appealing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court on questions of law and fact.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of accused-appellant can still validly avail the remedies available in the Rules of Court
against the judgment of the court

RULING:

No, the accused-appellant can no longer avail the remedies.

Given that the accused-appellant escaped from jail and eluded arrest until the present, the issue of whether he has
lost his right to appeal his conviction inexorably ensues.

An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a criminal case.

If the accused fails to appear before the trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with
Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his
last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts
over his person, viz:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel
de oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.

Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme
Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. - Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the
Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.

By escaping from jail, was not present at the promulgation by the RTC of its Decision dated 29 June 2005 in
Criminal Case No. 8010, finding him guilty of the crime of murder. Accused-appellant failed to surrender and file
the required motion within 15 days from the promulgation of the RTC Decision. This alone already deprived him of
any remedy against said judgment of conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, including
the right to appeal the same.

By escaping prison, accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal. The accused cannot be accorded the
right to appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is otherwise arrested within 15 days
from notice of the judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief from the court, as he is deemed to
have waived the appeal. Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and
unless he surrenders or submits to its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the
court.