DR RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT,

2024

P-07

DR RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT,

2024

BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT OF SESSIONS AT RAVIDASPUR, HIMACHAL

PRADESH

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH……………………………………PROSECUTION

VS

BIMAL & ORS…………………………………………………………………..DEFENCE

CASE NO. __ OF 2024

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:

SECTIONS 302, 392, 393 R.W. 34 AND 394 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,1860

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

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2024

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS..............................................................................................I

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................III

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..................................................................................VII

STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................................................VIII

ISSUES RAISED.....................................................................................................................X

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..........................................................................................XI

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................1

ISSUE 1: THE DISCUSSION OF QUANTITIES, EVEN THOUGH DIFFERENT QUANTITIES WERE

BID FOR, DOES AMOUNT TO COLLUSION...............................................................................1

1.1 The discussion of quantities amounts to agreement under the Section 3(3) of the
Competition Act.................................................................................................................1
1.1.1 The meeting of the CEO’s at the convention is a strong indication of the
formation of a collusive agreement............................................................................2
1.1.2 The parallel behaviour of the companies at the bidding establishes the
collusive nature of the meeting..................................................................................2
1.1.3 The novel nature of the Frinkonium ore rules out the possibility that
parallelism arose out of independent strategy............................................................3
1.1.4 A lack of viable substitutes to Frinkonium incentivises the formation of a
collusive arrangement................................................................................................4
1.1.5 The EV Market in Baraq is an Oligopoly.........................................................4
1.1.6 Baraq competition policy demands a lower standard of proof in proving
collusion.....................................................................................................................5
1.2 The mere exchange of information through the discussion in the absence of further
implementation is sufficient to establish collusion............................................................5
1.3 There was an appreciable adverse effect on competition............................................6
1.3.1 There exists a presumption of anti-competitive effects arising from the
establishment of an agreement...................................................................................7

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1.3.2 This presumption in this circumstance is non-rebuttable due to the presence of

anti-competitive effects arising from the collusive agreement between the
companies...................................................................................................................7
ISSUE 2: THE USAGE OF THE SAME ALGORITHM TO DETERMINE PRICES BASED ON

COMMON FACTORS, AMOUNTS TO TACIT COLLUSION.............................................................8

2.1 There exists a tacit agreement among the EV manufacturers, acting as spokes of the
collusion.............................................................................................................................8
2.1.1 The EV manufacturers were aware of the anti-competitive effects of using
Bid.AI.........................................................................................................................9
2.1.2 There exist plus factors to suggest that the EV manufacturers acted in concert.
....................................................................................................................................9
2.1.3 The EV manufacturers’ conduct could not have stemmed out of independent
action........................................................................................................................10
2.2 Bid.AI is the hub, facilitating collusion through the spokes, i.e., the EV
manufacturers..................................................................................................................12
2.2.1 Usage of the same algorithm, based on common factors, led to hampering of
independent decision-making...................................................................................12
2.2.2 Bid.AI, the hub, participated in the tacit collusive agreement........................13
2.3 The usage of the same algorithm based on common factors led to adverse effect on
competition.......................................................................................................................14
ISSUE 3: THE REMEDIES SOUGHT BY POWER AND MASON DULY ADDRESS THE POTENTIAL
HARM ARISING OUT OF THE ALLEGED CARTEL AND SUCH REMEDIES DO NOT EXCEED THE

SCOPE OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002..............................................................................14

3.1 The Commission has the authority to order for the reconduction of the auction......15
3.1.1 The remedy prescribed is within the scope of powers of BCA.......................15
3.1.2 No logistical impossibility exists in re-conducting the auction......................17
3.1.3 Re conduction of auction is a remedy proportional to the infringement.........18
3.2 The remedy of establishing a monitoring agency by the Commission is within the
scope of powers granted to the Commission...................................................................19
3.2.1 The remedy sought by the petitioner is within the powers granted to the
Commission..............................................................................................................19
3.2.2 The remedy sought by the petitioner is proportional to the infringement.......20

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

 DR RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT,
2024

PRAYER.................................................................................................................................23

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And

§ /S. Section

¶ Paragraph

A.I.R. All India Reporter

Art. Article

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourable

Ltd. Limited

No. Number

Ors. Others

Proposition Moot Proposition/Facts

SC Supreme Court

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Statutes

1. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, § 20...............................................................18

2. The Competition Act, 2002, § 18...........................................................................19, 22, 23
3. The Competition Act, 2002, § 19(3)(b).............................................................................16
4. The Competition Act, 2002, § 2(b)......................................................................................9
5. The Competition Act, 2002, § 27.......................................................................................18
6. The Competition Act, 2002..........................................................................................19, 22

Other Authorities

7. Competition Commission of India, Competition Advocacy,

https://www.cci.gov.in/images/publications_booklet/en/competition-advocacy-booklet-in-
english1659336902.pdf......................................................................................................13
8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Oligopoly,
DAFFE/CLP(99)25 (March 6, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/1920526.pdf.
..............................................................................................................................................5
9. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Algorithms and
Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (September 14, 2017), https://web-
archive.oecd.org/2019-02-17/449397-Algorithms-and-colllusion-competition-policy-in-
the-digital-age.pdf..............................................................................................................10
10. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Executive
Summary of the Roundtable on Hub-and-Spoke Arrangements,
DAF/COMP/M(2019)2/ANN4/FINAL (9 September, 2020)............................................13
11. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement,
OECD/LEGAL/0396 (2024), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-
LEGAL-0411...................................................................................................................2, 4
12. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Remedies and
Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases (Policy Roundtable), DAF/COMP(2006)19 (15
May, 2007), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/38623413.pdf...................................18

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13. United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,
Annotated Provisional Agenda and Organization of Work, Item 6(a), TD/RBP/CONF.7/1
(30 August, 2010).........................................................................................................16, 18

Rules

1. The Competition Commission of India (Commitment) Regulations, 2023, Rule 9..........20

Books and Journals

1. Abha Yadav & Tarun Donadi, Tacit Collusion and Artificial Intelligence, 1 INDIAN
J.ARTIFICIAL INTEL. & L. 18 (2021)..................................................................................11
2. Bradley C. Weber, Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies: Can Big Data and Pricing Algorithm
Form the Rim?, 26(1) SMU SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW 25, 84–59 (2023).
................................................................................................................................12, 13, 21
3. John Handoll, Establishing Breach of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 “The Indian
Bid Rigging Cases”, 27(2) NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW 147, 156-10
(2015)...................................................................................................................................4
4. Pablo Ibanez Colomo, On the Application of Competition Law as Regulation: Elements
for a Theory, 29(1) YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 261, 306–45 (2010)...................18, 19
5. Sofia Oliveira Pais, Hub-and-Spoke Agreements and Tacit Collusion: Recent National
Decisions and the Competition Market Authority Paper on Algorithms, Competition, and
Consumer Harm, 5 (1) MARKET AND COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 169, 193–24 (2021)..12
6. William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21 st Century, 9(2)
LOYOLA CONSUMER LAW REVIEW 97, 112 – 15 (1997)...................................................11

Indian Cases

1. Alleged Cartelisation in Flashlights Market in India v. Eveready Industries India Ltd.,

2018 SCC OnLine CCI 98...................................................................................................6
2. Anti-competitive Conduct in the Paper Manufacturing Industry v. Banwari Paper Mills
Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine CCI 74...........................................................................................6
3. Builders Ass’n of India v. Cement Manufacturers’ Ass’n, 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 21. 1, 2,
10
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4. C.I.T. v. East Coast Commercial Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 768 (India).................................5
5. Cartelisation in Industrial & Automotive Bearings v. A.B.C. Bearings Ltd., 2020 SCC
OnLine CCI 19.....................................................................................................................6
6. CIT v. East Coast Commercial Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 768 (India)....................................1
7. Delhi Jal Board v. Grasim Industries Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 48...............................2
8. Director General (Supplied and Disposals) v. M/s Puja Enterprises Basti & Ors., Case No.
01 of 2012 (CCI)................................................................................................................11
9. In Re: Suo Motu Case against LPG cylinder manufacturers, Suo Moto Case No. 03 of
2011 (CCI)...................................................................................................................10, 11
10. International Cylinder (P) Ltd. v. CCI, 2012 SCC OnLine Comp AT 35.........................10
11. International Cylinder v. CCI, 2014 CompLR 184..............................................................5
12. Monsanto Holdings (P) Ltd. v. CCI, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 598.....................................21
13. Rajasthan Cylinders & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 615 (India).5, 8,
10, 18
14. Sandhya Drug Agency v. Assam Drug Dealers Ass’n, 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 84............7
15. Shri Jyoti Swaroop Arora v. Tulip Infratech Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine CCI 26....................8
16. Subhas Chandra Das Mushib v. Ganga Prosad Das Mushib, (1967) 1 SCR 331 (India)... .8
17. Surendra Prasad v. Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine CCI
86..........................................................................................................................................2
18. V. C. Rangachari v. D. Gopalan, 1979 AIR 281 (India)....................................................16
19. Western Coalfields Ltd. v. S.S.V. Coal Carriers Private Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 45. 2

Foreign Cases

1. American Needle Inc. v. N.F.L., 560 U.S. 183 (2010)....................................11, 12, 13, 21
2. Case AT.39759, A.R.A. Foreclosure (20 September, 2016)..............................................18
3. Case AT.39813, Baltic Rail, O.J. C. 383 (2 October, 2017)..............................................19
4. Case C- 48/69, I.C.I. Ltd. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70, ¶ 66 (14 July, 1972)..........10
5. Case C-48-69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European
Communities, ECLI:EU:C:1972:70 (14 July, 1972)............................................................8
6. Case C-74/14, Eturas U.A.B. and others v. Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, ¶ 51 (21 January, 2016).....................................................................9

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7. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:

T:2007:289 (17 September, 2007).....................................................................................20
8. Case T-612/17, Google and Alphabet v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU: T:2021:763 (10 November,
2021)..................................................................................................................................22
9. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).............................................................17
10. India Glycols Ltd. v. Indian Sugar Mills Ass’n, 2018 SCC OnLine CCI 32.......................2
11. R.R.T.A. v. W.H. Smith, [1969] 3 All ER 1065..................................................................1
12. Technip S.A. v. SMS Holding, (2005) 5 SCC 465 (India)..................................................1
13. Tesco v. Office of Fair Trading, [2012] CAT 31.................................................................9
14. Theatre Enter. Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540.........................10
15. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d. 638 (2nd Cir. 2015)...................................13

Blogs

1. Olivier Heckmann, Changes to Google Shopping in Europe, GOOGLE ADS & COMMERCE
BLOG (27 September 2017), https://blog.google/products/ads/changes-to-google-
shopping-in-europe/#:~:text=Starting%20today%2C%20Comparison%20Shopping
%20Services,Shopping%20Services%20on%20equal%20terms......................................22

Other Authorities

1. Competition Commission of India, Competition Advocacy,

https://www.cci.gov.in/images/publications_booklet/en/competition-advocacy-booklet-in-
english1659336902.pdf......................................................................................................13
2. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Oligopoly,
DAFFE/CLP(99)25 (March 6, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/1920526.pdf.
..............................................................................................................................................5
3. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Algorithms and
Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (September 14, 2017), https://web-
archive.oecd.org/2019-02-17/449397-Algorithms-and-colllusion-competition-policy-in-
the-digital-age.pdf..............................................................................................................10

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4. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Executive

Summary of the Roundtable on Hub-and-Spoke Arrangements,
DAF/COMP/M(2019)2/ANN4/FINAL (9 September, 2020)............................................13
5. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement,
OECD/LEGAL/0396 (2024), https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-
LEGAL-0411...................................................................................................................2, 4
6. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Remedies and
Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases (Policy Roundtable), DAF/COMP(2006)19 (15
May, 2007), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/38623413.pdf...................................18
7. United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices,
Annotated Provisional Agenda and Organization of Work, Item 6(a), TD/RBP/CONF.7/1
(30 August, 2010).........................................................................................................16, 18

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Prosecution has approached the Ld. Sessions Judge under section 26 r/w section 28 r/w
schedule I of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as hereunder:
S. 26. Courts by which offences are triable:
Subject to the other provisions of this Code, -
(a) Any offence under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) may be tried by-
(1) ...
(ii) The Court of Session
(iii)...
S. 28. Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass:
(1) ...
(2) A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law;
but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the
High court
(3) ...
It sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case in the jurisdiction of
the Hon’ble Court.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Ravidaspur is a small town in the terai of Himalayan region in Himachal Pradesh. The
town has a bank Himachal Cooperative Bank Limited (HCBL). The bank is the
central banking institution of the town for all commercial and noncommercial needs
of the people of the town. HCBL bank is housed in two-storied building and in the
basement of the bank there is a strong room wherein often cash is stacked for banking
business.
2. On 25th September, 2023 several youths aged around 32 to 35 years named as Bimal
and Rakesh barge in the bank with sophisticated weapons in their hand. The group
arrives at the bank armed with weapons, disguised with joker masks to conceal their
identities. They start threatening the customers and the banking staff to stand still and
keep silent. The customers and staff get threatened due to this outrageous act. Bimal
goes to the cash counter and demands to hand over her all the cash to him. Rakesh
approaches the bank manager Miss Ramola and asks her to take him to the strong
room. Ramola takes the keys and approaches the strong room. While these two are in
Bank, one of their friend Rajesh is waiting outside the bank with a car which is
started.
3. Ramola while approaching the strong room cleverly puts on the alarm and the alarm
and hooter makes a very loud noise and the police of the concerned area approaches
the crime scene immediately. On seeing the Police Bimal, Rakesh and Rajesh in car
become panic and Rakesh immediately shoots Ramola who dies on spot. They try to
flee the crime scene and customers muster courage to stop them. One of the customer
Anany who tries to intervene the running Bimal and Rakesh is obstructed by another
customer Pranav. However, during the robbery, one of the guards tries to resist, and in
the ensuing struggle, he is fatally injured.
4. The group manages to escape with a substantial amount of cash before the police
arrive. However, their getaway vehicle is later found abandoned on the outskirts of
the town, along with some of the stolen money.

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5. The police launch an investigation into the robbery and to apprehend all youths based
on CCTV footage, eyewitness accounts, and forensic evidence. Police seals the border
of the town and after due combating and raids, nab Bimal, Rakesh and Rajesh from a
hotel and charges them for the murder of Ramola under section 34 r.w.302 of IPC and
393 of IPC r.w. section 34. Police also charges Pranav under S. 302 and 393 r/w 34.

ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE YOUTHS CAN BE CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF

ROBBERY UNDER SECTIONS 302, 392 AND 393 R/W 34 OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE?

2. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON INTENTION UNDER

SECTION 34 OF THE IPC IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE?

3. WHAT ARE THE LIABILITIES OF EACH YOUTH UNDER THE

PRINCIPLE OF COMMON INTENTION, CONSIDERING THEIR ROLES
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ROBBERY & MURDER PLAN?

4. WHETHER THE FATAL INJURY CAUSED TO THE SECURITY GUARD

DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE ROBBERY WILL ATTRACT
ADDITIONAL CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. WHETHER THE YOUTHS CAN BE CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF

ROBBERY UNDER SECTIONS 302, 392 AND 393 R/W 34 OF THE INDIAN
PENAL CODE?
It is humbly submitted before the Session Court that it is Robbery under sections 390
r.w. section 34, 392, and murder under section 302 of IPC 1860. The accused
committed robbery with common intention; as there are sufficient grounds for proving
a common intention for robbery between the accused hence, they all should be jointly
liable for robbery as well as murder in this case.

2. WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON INTENTION UNDER

SECTION 34 OF THE IPC IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE?

3. WHAT ARE THE LIABILITIES OF EACH YOUTH UNDER THE

PRINCIPLE OF COMMON INTENTION, CONSIDERING THEIR ROLES
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE ROBBERY & MURDER PLAN?

4. WHETHER THE FATAL INJURY CAUSED TO THE SECURITY GUARD

DURING THE COMMISSION OF THE ROBBERY WILL ATTRACT
ADDITIONAL CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED?

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1) Whether the youths can be charged with the offense of robbery under Sections
302, 392 and 393 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)?

It is humbly submitted before the Session Court that it is Robbery under sections 390 r.w.
section 34, 392, and murder under section 302 of IPC 1860. The accused committed robbery
with common intention; as there are sufficient grounds for proving a common intention for
robbery between the accused hence, they all should be jointly liable for robbery as well as
murder in this case.

1.1. There was a common intention between the accused

It is humbly submitted that 1Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention. —When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the
common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone.

It is humbly submitted that Bimal and Rakesh enter the bank armed with weapons, disguised
with joker masks to conceal their identities, threaten the customers and banking staff with
their outrageous act, and demand cash from the cash counter and access to the strong room.
While these two are in the Bank, one of their friends, Rajesh, is waiting outside the bank with
a car, which is started, and his presence and readiness to aid the escape of the other offenders.
As in the case of Abani K. Debnath v. State of Tripura2 observed that the common intention
can be found from circumstantial inferences. Hence, these circumstantial evidences clearly
indicate a common intention between them3.

In cases of Suresh v. State of U.P., and Prakash v. State of M.P. 4, the court held that ‘For
establishing liability under Section 34 it must be established that: (i) there was common

1
Section 34, Indian Penal code 1860.
2
Abani K. Debnath v. State of Tripura (2005) 13 SCC 422.
3
Charan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 SCC (Cri) 687; Jai Bhagwan v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 102:
1999 SCC (Cri) 388: 1999 Cri LJ 1634.
4
Prakash v. State of M.P (2006) 13 SCC 508.

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intention in the sense of a pre-arranged plan between the two; and (ii) the person sought to
be so held liable had participated in some manner in the act constituting the offence.’

It is a clear case to which section 34 of IPC applied. taking into consideration the method and
participation of every person in the bank robbery, indicating meeting of minds and all actions
towards common intention also signify a well pre-arranged plan for committing the offence.
Every person either guarding the entrance or waiting in the car or robbing and murdering
people; all were part of a same offence having an agreed common intention, hence all of them
would be liable for each and every act performed during the commencement of the offence
either running away with money or shooting and charges of murder.

It is humbly submitted that Pranav while not directly participating in the robbery itself,
obstructs a customer who attempts to intervene. This demonstrates a collective effort to
prevent interference and suggests mutual support for the criminal act. As in the case of
Vaijyanti v. State of Maharashtra5, it was inferred that common intention can be formulated
on the spot also. Hence, Pranav should be also be liable under section 302 and 392 of IPC.

1.2 Whether the youths can be charged for the offence of robbery under section 392 of
IPC.
It is humbly submitted that - Section 390 of IPC.6 When extortion is robbery. —
Extortion is “robbery” if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in
the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that
person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that
person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put
in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.
Explanation. —The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently near to put the
other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
Sec.392. Punishment for robbery. —Whoever commits robbery shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine; and, if the robbery be committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the
imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.7

Elements of Robbery in this case ⸺

5
Vaijayanti v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 13 SCC 134.
6
Section 390, Indian Penal code 1860.
7
Section 392, Indian Penal code 1860.

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1. Presence of Fear and Inducement to Deliver Property: Bimal and Rakesh intentionally put
the customers and banking staff in fear by entering the bank armed with sophisticated
weapons and threatening them. This fear of instant harm, such as death or injury, induces the
individuals in the bank to comply with their demands. Bimal demands cash from the cash
counter, and Rakesh asks the bank manager, Miss Ramola, to take him to the strong room,
indicating an intent to obtain property through coercion.

2. Immediate Delivery of Property: The property (cash from the cash counter and access to
the strong room) is delivered immediately in response to the fear induced by Bimal and
Rakesh's actions. The individuals within the bank comply with their demands and hand over
the requested property without delay.

3. Offender's Presence during Extortion: Bimal and Rakesh are physically present in the bank
at the time of committing the offense of extortion. They directly engage with the victims,
instilling fear and demanding property, thus meeting the requirement of being in the presence
of the individuals put in fear during the extortion.

It is humbly submitted that since the act of the youth fulfils these criteria hence, they all
should be collectively liable for the offence of Robbery under section390/392 of IPC.

1.2. Whether the Youth can be charged for the offence of Murder under section 302
of IPC 1860.
Section 299. Culpable homicide. —Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of
causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.

Section 300. Murder. —Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if
the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or—

2ndly. —If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—

3rdly. —If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—

4thly. —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in
all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act
without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

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It is humbly submitted that the murder of Miss Ramola can be established under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). Section 302 defines murder as the intentional causing
of death by a person with the requisite intention or knowledge. When we apply the legal
provisions on this situation:

Intentional Act: Rakesh's act of shooting Miss Ramola is deliberate and intentional, as he
aims the weapon at her and pulls the trigger, resulting in her death. This fulfills the
requirement of an intentional act as specified in Section 299 of the IPC.

Mens Rea: Rakesh's actions demonstrate the necessary mens rea or mental state required
for murder. He intentionally shoots Miss Ramola, knowing that his actions are likely to
cause her death. This meets the criteria set forth in Section 299 of the IPC, which outlines
the mental elements of culpable homicide.

Absence of Justification or Excuse: There is no justification or excuse for Rakesh's

actions. Miss Ramola is not posing any imminent threat to him or others that would justify
the use of lethal force in self-defence. Therefore, Rakesh's act of shooting her cannot be
justified under any legal provision.

Hence, It is humbly submitted that Rakesh's actions constitute the offense of murder under
Section 302 of the IPC. (Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or [imprisonment
for life], and shall also be liable to fine ) Additionally, as the murder was committed in
furtherance of the common intention of all the offenders. As a case of Shankarlal
Kacharabhi v. state of Gujrat8 where a group of persons out of which some had lathis and
one had a gun set out towards a field with the common intention of attacking another group
and preventing them from irrigating a field from a well and attacked the other group killing
two persons and injuring others, 193 they all were held guilty of murder on account of their
common intention. Hence, each individual involved can be held equally liable for the Murder
and robbery, as per Section 34 of the IPC, which deals with acts done by several persons in
furtherance of common intention.

8
Shankarlal Kacharabbai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1260.
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2) Whether the principle of common intention under Section 34 of the IPC is applicable
in this case?

The counsels humbly on behalf of the content that section 34 of the Indian Penal code
dictates that “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common
intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were
done by him alone.” therefore, it can be understood that the elements essential to establish
guilt under section 34 are as 1) act needs to be done by several persons, 2) there should exist
a commonality of interests.9 While it is very clear from the facts of the case that the robbery
and murder was done by several persons, all of whom are accused in the current case, the
commonality of interests shall be established by the counsels in the subsequent
argumentation.

2.1 Commonality of interests in the dispute existed.

Hon’ble Courts have declared in multitude of cases 10 that in order to establish that
there existed a commonality of intent to commit a crime, only a singular inference
should be drawn from the circumstances, that should point to the fact that all the
accused had the common intention of committing a crime. Existence of a pre-planning
stage is sufficient to prove the same. In the case in hand, as per paragraph 5 of the
undisputed facts of the case, “The group arrives at the bank armed with weapons,
disguised with joker masks to conceal their identities.” implying pre-planning on part
of the accused, to commit the same crime. Therefore, since all the accused had a
commonality of interests, they shall be jointly liable for their crimes under section 34
of IPC read with relevant sections.

3) What are the liabilities of each youth under the principle of common intention,
considering their roles and participation in the robbery & murder plan?

All the accused are guilty for both robbery and murder under section 34 of the Indian Penal
code.

The counsels on the behalf of the prosecution humbly contend that according to section 34 of
the India Penal Code, “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the
common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it
were done by him alone.” The counsel humbly contends that all the accused would be equally
liable for both robbery and murder since (a) degree of participation is irrelevant in cases of
joint liability and (b)principles of joint liability can apply if reasonable expectation of
commission of crime existed.
3.1 The degree of participation is irrelevant in cases of joint liability

9
Parichhat v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 535.
10
Mehboob khan v. King emperor (1945) 47 BOM LR 941.
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The Hon’ble Supreme Court had held in Rishi Dev Pandey v state of UP 11 that “even
if the appellant did nothing as he stood outside the door, Section 34 deals with doing
of separate act, similar or diverse by several persons; if all are done in furtherance of
a common intention, each person is liable for the result of them all as if he had done
them himself.”
Based on this legal principle established in the case, merely by the act of wanting to
commit robbery and pre planning to commit the same, as it has been dictated in the
moot prop is sufficient to establish the common intent of all of the accused. Paragraph
5 of the moot prop states “several youths aged around 32 to 35 years named as Bimal
and Rakesh barge in the bank with sophisticated weapons in their hand. The group
arrives at the bank armed with weapons, disguised with joker masks to conceal their
identities. They start threatening the customers and the banking staff to stand still and
keep silent.” implies that they had together planned to rob the bank, and thus
establishes a common intent and meeting of the minds, which are the two facets of
establishing joint liability under section 34, as confirmed in Mahbub Shah v. King
Emperor.12

3.2 Principles of joint liability can apply if reasonable expectation of commission of

crime existed.

In the case of Birendra Kumar Ghosh v king emperor 13 several persons appeared
before the Postmaster who was counting the money on the table and demanded the
money. In the meantime, they opened fire, killed the Postmaster and ran away without
taking any money. Barendra Kumar was, however, caught with a pistol in his hand
and was handed over to the police. The accused was tried under Sections 302/34 IPC
as according to the prosecution he was one of the three men who fired at the
Postmaster. The accused denied this charge on the ground that he was simply standing
outside and had not fired at the deceased. He also pleaded that he was compelled to
stand on guard duty and had no intention to commit the murder of the Postmaster. The
trial court on being satisfied that the Postmaster was killed in furtherance of the
common intention of all, convicted the accused even if he had not fired the fatal shot.
The High Court and the Privy Council both agreed with the findings of the trial court
and held the accused guilty of murder. The Hon’ble court dictated that “Section 34
makes it clear that the liability of all the conspirators is for the criminal act actually
done and not for the common intention — the act jointly intended by them.”

Therefore, merely having reasonable apprehension that the intended act can result in
another violation of law is enough to hold all of the accused liable for both the acts. In
the present scenario, all the accused were carrying weapons that could kill and it can
be reasonably deduced from a prudent person’s perspective that an armed robbery can
very well lead end in people being fatally injured, or even dead. The liability of each
of the persons, therefore, is equal and to an extent that all the accused had committed
the wrong alone.

11
Rishi dev Pandey v State of UP AIR 1955 SC 331.
12
Mehboob khan v. King emperor (1945) 47 BOM LR 941.
13
Birendra Kumar Ghosh v king emperor, AIR 1924 CAL 545.
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4) Whether the fatal injury caused to the security guard during the commission of
the robbery will attract additional charges against the accused?
It is humbly submitted that the fatal injury caused to the security guard during the
commission of the robbery will attract additional charges against the accused under
section 326 and 394 of the IPC, 1860.
4.1 Offence under S. 326 is attracted.
It is humbly submitted that the offence under S. 326 is attracted by the accused. S.
326 states that “Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily
causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or
any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by
means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive
substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance
which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the
blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine.”14

It is humbly submitted that the essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are : (1)
voluntarily causing a hurt; (2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the
grievous hurt must have been caused by dangerous weapons or means. As was noted
in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 15 “there is no such thing as a regular or
earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a
particular article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to
be determined factually.”
It is humbly submitted that section 320 defines Grievous Hurt – The following kinds
of hurt only are designated as “grievous”- “…. Eighthly – Any hurt which endangers
life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily
pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.”
It is humbly submitted that in Prabhu vs State of Madhya Pradesh 16, “Some hurts
which are not like those hurts which are mentioned in the first seven clauses, are
14
S.326, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).
15
State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000 (7) SCC 249.
16
Prabhu vs State of Madhya Pradesh S.L.P (Crl.) No. 1418 OF 2008.
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obviously distinguished from a slight hurt, may nevertheless be more serious. Thus, a
wound may cause intense pain, prolonged disease or lasting injury to the victim,
although it does not fall within any of the first seven clauses.”
It is humbly submitted that given the nature of the robbery and the use of dangerous
weapons, it was foreseeable for the accused that there might be resistance from
security personnel or others present in the bank. Despite this foreseeability, they
proceeded with their actions, indicating a reckless disregard for the safety of others
and usage of such deadly weapons to defend themselves against the security.
It is humbly submitted that during the robbery, when one of the guards attempted to
resist, the accused engaged in a struggle with him. It resulted in the guard being
fatally injured. This indicates that the accused used force and the said weapons against
the guard, which directly led to him being grievously hurt. Hence, the accused would
attract liability under S.326.
4.2 Offence under section 394 is attracted.
It is humbly submitted that the offence under S. 394 is attracted by the accused. S.
394 states that, “if any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery,
voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in
committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to
ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”17
4.2.1 There was robbery/attempt to commit robbery.
It is humbly submitted that robbery is, “if the offender, at the time of committing the
extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by
putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful
restraint to that person or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the
person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.” 18 In Venu v.
State of Karnataka19, it was held that “Section 392 IPC provides for punishment for
robbery. The essential ingredients are as follows:

1. Accused committed theft/ extortion.

2. Accused voluntarily caused or attempted to cause
17
Section 394, Indian Penal Code, 1860(45 of 1860).
18
Section 390, Indian Penal Code, 1860(45 of 1860).
19
Venu v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 94.
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(i) death, hurt or wrongful restraint;

(ii) fear of instant death, hurt or wrongful restraint.
3. He did either act for the end
(i) to commit theft/extortion;
(ii) while committing theft/extortion;
(iii) in carrying away or in the attempt to carry away property obtained by
theft/extortion.”

It is submitted that the perpetrators entered the bank armed with sophisticated
weapons while one remained outside guarding them and ready to flee. They
threatened the customers and banking staff with their weapons, coercing them to
comply with their demands. The presence of weapons and the explicit threats created
an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, facilitating the robbery and clearly indicates
the intention to unlawfully take possession of the bank's assets. Despite the
interruption caused by the police, the perpetrators managed to escape with a
substantial amount of cash, confirming the successful execution of the robbery.

4.2.2 There was intention or probability of causing hurt.

It is humbly submitted that in Aslam vs State of Rajasthan, it was held that “Section 394
describes punishment for voluntary causing hurt in committing or attempting to commit
robbery. The offence under this section is more serious offence than one under Section 392.
Section 394 postulates and contemplates the causing of harm during commission of robbery
or in attempting to commit robbery when such causing of hurt is hardly necessary to facilitate
the commission of robbery. Section 394 applies to cases where during the course of robbery
voluntary hurt is caused. Section 394 classifies two distinct class of persons. Firstly, those
who actually cause hurt and secondly those who do not actually cause hurt but are “jointly
concerned” in the commission of offence of robbery. The second class of persons may not be
concerned in the causing of hurt, but they become liable independently of the knowledge of
its likelihood or a reasonable belief in its probability.” 20

It is humbly submitted that during the course of the robbery, there was resistance from a
security guard. In the ensuing struggle, the guard was fatally injured. 21 This indicates that
20
Aslam v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 9 SCC 227
21
Moot Prop Para 11.
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force was used by the perpetrators, namely Bimal and Rakesh, to overcome resistance and
carry out the robbery. The use of force by the perpetrators resulted in the guard's injury,
establishing a direct link between the robbery and the harm caused. The injury inflicted upon
the security guard was a direct consequence of the actions taken by the perpetrators during
the commission of the robbery. Their use of force was deliberate and intended to facilitate the
theft, thereby satisfying the criteria for a charge under Section 394 of the IPC.

It is humbly submitted that Rajesh's presence and involvement in the getaway plan 22
demonstrate his shared intention with Bimal and Rakesh to commit the robbery. His active
participation in providing logistical support to the robbers indicates his culpability in the
overall criminal act, including any violence or harm that occurred during the course of the
robbery. Rajesh, being part of the group planning the robbery, would reasonably be aware of
the potential for violence or harm during the commission of the crime. Despite this
knowledge, he willingly participated in the criminal enterprise, indicating his tacit agreement
to the use of force necessary to carry out the robbery, including any resulting injuries.

22
Moot Prop Para 8.
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 DR RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY MOOT COURT,
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PRAYER

Wherefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and cases cited, may the Hon’ble
Court be pleased to,

1. The youths can be charged with the offense of robbery under Sections 302, 392 and
393 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. The principle of common intention under Section 34 of the IPC is applicable in this
case.

3. The liabilities of each youth under the principle of common intention, considering
their roles and participation in the robbery & murder plan are joint and common.

4. The fatal injury caused to the security guard during the commission of the robbery
will attract additional charges against the accused under section 326 and 394 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860.

AND/OR

1. Declare a sentence of
rigorous imprisonment for
a term which may extend
to ten
2. years, and also be liable
to fine under Section 396 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860
And/ Or

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Pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

A LL OF WHICH IS
HUMBLY PRAYED, SD. /-

(COUNSEL FOR
THE PROSECUTION)

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