Asian Security

ISSN: 1479-9855 (Print) 1555-2764 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fasi20

A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance

of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping

Angela Poh & Mingjiang Li

To cite this article: Angela Poh & Mingjiang Li (2017) A China in Transition: The Rhetoric
and Substance of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping, Asian Security, 13:2, 84-97, DOI:
10.1080/14799855.2017.1286163

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1286163

Published online: 17 Feb 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 8775

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 12 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fasi20
ASIAN SECURITY
2017, VOL. 13, NO. 2, 84–97
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1286163

ARTICLES

A China in Transition: The Rhetoric and Substance of Chinese

Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping
Angela Poh and Mingjiang Li

ABSTRACT
Has China under Xi Jinping bid an official farewell to Deng Xiaoping’s “lying
low” international strategy (taoguang yanghui) in pursuit of a more ambi-
tious foreign policy agenda? In this article, we contend that Xi’s foreign
policy is indeed beginning to show signs of departure from that of his
predecessors. Beijing has displayed intentions to gradually create new rules
in international politics and reform major international institutions to better
suit Chinese interests. However, Chinese foreign policy in the first term of
Xi’s administration has remained in a transitory phase. Continued domestic
preoccupations, China’s lack of experience in undertaking more interna-
tional responsibilities, as well as conflicting economic and security impera-
tives in China’s neighborhood have constrained the Chinese leadership’s
ability to completely abandon its “lying low” international strategy.

Introduction
In November 2012, Xi Jinping as the then-newly appointed General Secretary of the Communist
Party of China Central Committee (CPCCC) visited “The Road Toward Renewal” exhibition on
display at the National Museum of China and proclaimed that “to realize the great renewal of the
Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.”1 This first reference
to a “China Dream” (zhongguo meng) by Xi was subsequently reinforced in his inaugural speech as
Chinese President at the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2013, and reiterated on
multiple occasions by Chinese officials at all levels.2 This slogan of a “China Dream” invokes the
American equivalent and appears to be a stark contrast from Deng Xiaoping’s famous dictum for
China to “hide [its] capabilities and lie low” (taoguang yanghui). Many scholars, policymakers, and
journalists both within and outside of China have suggested that Xi has brought back “strongman
politics” since Deng and Mao Zedong, and that China was bidding an official farewell to Deng’s
“lying low” international strategy.3 How accurate is such a characterization? Has Chinese foreign
policy undergone a fundamental change since Xi took over the Party’s helm?
While a predominant view within policy and academic communities is that China has been
increasingly vocal in articulating its foreign and security interests in recent years, there has not been
a consensus on whether China has truly adopted a more assertive foreign policy posture.4 This article
seeks to weigh in on these debates by examining the rhetoric and substance of Chinese foreign policy
since Xi assumed the top appointments as General Secretary of the CPCCC and President of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and more
recently, as Commander-in-Chief of the CMC Joint Battle Command Center.5 The main argument
developed in this article is that Chinese foreign policy in the first-term of Xi’s administration has
remained in a transitory – instead of a brand new and clearly defined – phase. We acknowledge that
the incumbent Chinese leadership is increasingly serious about expanding Beijing’s international
influence and transforming China from a regional power to a global power. To this end, China has

CONTACT Angela Poh mpoh001@e.ntu.edu.sg S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Block
S4, Level B4, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
 ASIAN SECURITY 85

engaged in a rhetorical campaign centered on “China dream” and “community of common destiny.”
It has also developed new approaches to international relations, adopted a more active posture
towards global governance, strengthened its emphasis on forging networks of partnerships, made
initial attempts to alter the regional order in East Asia, undertaken tougher stance in protecting
China’s security interest, and used its growing economic power for the expansion of its geopolitical
influence. While these efforts are not entirely new in Chinese foreign relations, the growing intensity
of these policy moves does constitute limited departure from Beijing’s erstwhile foreign policy and is
an effort to facilitate the gradual emergence of a genuinely globally oriented Chinese foreign policy
in the mid to long term. This notwithstanding, significant unresolved challenges and policy dilem-
mas continue to constrain the Chinese leadership’s ability to completely abandon its “lying low”
international strategy.
This article proceeds in three sections. First, we examine the vocabulary that has emerged in
Chinese official discourse since Xi assumed political leadership. We suggest that such discourse cannot
be dismissed as mere propaganda or political rhetoric, as it offers important clues about the Chinese
leadership’s inclinations as well as China’s growing ambitions. Second, we assess the substance of
Chinese foreign policy since Xi’s appointment in November 2012. We argue that China has in recent
years made significant efforts to reshape the global and regional order in its favor, especially in the
trade and economic arena. Nevertheless, despite lofty pronouncements, China remains a “conflicted
great power,” given continued domestic preoccupations, a relatively fixed mindset among the Chinese
elite on China’s role in world affairs, and China’s lack of capabilities and experience in undertaking
more international responsibilities.6 In the Asia-Pacific region, regional insecurity over China’s rise, as
well as overlapping territorial claims, have posed major obstacles to China’s political ambitions. In the
final section, we summarize our findings and analyze the implications of Xi’s transitory foreign policy
for China’s international role and the rest of the world.

Emergence of a new discourse

There have been discernible changes to Chinese official foreign policy discourse since 2012,
particularly after Xi laid out his vision of a “China Dream,” referring to the specific objectives of
bringing about “a moderately prosperous society in all respects” when the CPC celebrates its
centenary in 2021, and an “affluent, strong, civilized and harmonious socialist modern country”
by 2049 when the PRC marks its centenary.7 Xi and other Chinese leaders have subsequently
explicitly linked China’s diplomacy efforts to this core vision.
A series of high-level speeches have followed since, which have shed light on this seemingly
platitudinous rhetoric. Since the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Xi has in various international and
domestic platforms continuously emphasized his vision of developing a “community of common
destiny” (minyun gongtongti). This phrase has been included in important Chinese policy statements
and documents, including those concerning cyber security as well as China’s relations with other
countries.8 Most notably, in November 2014, Xi addressed the Central Conference on Work Relating
to Foreign Affairs and called for China to “develop a distinctive diplomatic approach befitting its role
of a major country…[and sum up] past practice and experience [in order to] conduct diplomacy
with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision.”9 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expanded
on this notion of a “major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (zhongguo tese de daguo
waijiao) at the Symposium on the International Development and China’s Diplomacy held in
December 2014. According to Wang, this entailed the following: (a) building a new type of
international relations with win-win cooperation (gongying wei hexin de xinxing guoji guanxi); (b)
building a global network of partnerships (quanqiu huoban guanxi wangluo); (c) pursuing an Asia-
Pacific dream (yatai meng); and (d) pursuing a vision of Asian security (yazhou anquanguan).
Defining the future of Chinese diplomacy as an “unprecedented undertaking,” Wang echoed Xi’s
emphasis on the importance of retaining Chinese characteristics in diplomacy, referring specifically
to the following elements: an “unequivocal support of the social system and development path,”
86 A. POH AND M. LI

upholding “the independent foreign policy of peace, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and other fine traditions in China’s
diplomacy,” adhering to principles such as “standing for reason and justice and acting in equal-
footed way,” and prioritizing “domestic development, reform and opening-up.”10 Taken together,
these statements illustrate the determination of the top Chinese leadership to expand China’s
influence both within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The explicit link between China’s
diplomatic initiatives and Xi’s vision of a “China Dream” has also officially become a new facet of
Chinese foreign policy.11
The rhetoric that has emerged under Xi’s regime has notably been marked by a strong sense of
China’s civilization achievements and historical experiences, which we argue reflects a relatively new
two-pronged “carrot-and-stick” approach to Chinese diplomacy. First, the top Chinese leadership
under Xi has attempted to put forward a benign vision of foreign policy that is distinctly differ-
entiated from the Western model of diplomacy based on values of liberal democracy. Xi had in
various speeches recalled China’s “Century of Humiliation” and asserted that China’s stated intent of
pursuing peaceful development was not mere diplomatic rhetoric but a “conclusion reached based
on an objective assessment of China’s history, present and future.”12 Xi’s emphasis on building “a
new type of international relations” (xinxing guoji guanxi) is also juxtaposed against what the
Chinese leaders characterize as an “old colonial system,” distinguished by “confrontations between
blocs as during the Cold War,”13 and represented by military alliances with a “hypothetical enemy”
and specifically “targeted at a third party.”14 In this regard, China’s declaration of building a “global
network of partnerships while abiding by the principles of non-alignment”15 also represents a more
pragmatic approach to disregard political and ideological differences among countries in order to
pursue common economic benefits.
On the other hand, however, Xi has also made clear through various high-profile visits to the
respective People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units that China will adopt a more assertive stance –
including the possible employment of military force – in order to defend what Beijing perceives as
China’s “core interests” (hexin liyi).16 At a study session with members of the Political Bureau of the
CPCCC in January 2013, Xi stressed the following: “[China] will stick to the road of peaceful
development, but will never give up [its] legitimate rights and will never sacrifice [its] national
core interests. No country should presume that [China] will trade [its] core interests or will allow
harm to be done to [China’s] sovereignty, security or development interests.”17 Xi also claimed that
China was prepared to “cope with complexities, enhance the nation’s capacity in safeguarding
maritime rights and interests, and resolutely safeguard the nation’s maritime rights and
interests.”18 While China’s resolve to safeguard its sovereignty and core interests is not new, Xi
has certainly portrayed a much tougher image compared to that of his predecessors. This has
included showing his full control over the PLA by assuming command of the new CMC Joint
Battle Command Center, in addition to his existing appointment as Chairman of the CMC, as well as
his unwavering support toward building a much stronger military to achieve these stated objectives.
Xi’s eagerness to sketch out a vision of foreign policy distinctly different from that of the West
illustrates China’s growing confidence and aspirations to play a much larger role on the world stage.
A “grand strategy” could be sketched out from recent Chinese official discourse – a “carrot and
stick” approach to Chinese diplomacy in order to achieve Xi’s vision of a “China Dream.” Chinese
scholars and analysts have debated on whether this meant that China has moved away from its
overall strategy of keeping a low profile on matters concerning foreign policy in order to reshape the
global and regional order in accordance with its values and interests. Some have suggested that
Chinese foreign policy in recent years has departed from the “lying low” international strategy
championed by Xi’s predecessors and reflected an era of “new diplomacy” (waijiao xinzheng).19
Others are more circumspect, claiming that China’s overall strategy has not changed very substan-
tively despite more assertive rhetoric.20 In the next section, we examine the substance of China’s
foreign policy at the global and regional levels. We suggest that China under Xi has rolled out
various new initiatives to expand China’s influence at the global and regional levels. At the same
 ASIAN SECURITY 87

time, however, several longstanding challenges and policy dilemmas will continue to play a sig-
nificant role in constraining China’s newfound confidence and ambitions.

Reviewing Xi’s first-term administration: Major changes in Chinese foreign policy

An increasingly engaged China
China’s efforts to transform itself from a regional to a global power are not entirely new, and
could be traced back to the last few years of the Hu Jintao administration. Since the 2008–09
global financial crisis, there has been a prevalent view among the Chinese elite that China had
gained ground vis-a-vis the established Western powers, and that it was opportune for China to
make its mark on the world stage, including by gradually shaping global norms and structures to
China’s benefit.21 And indeed, China has in recent years played a more active role in the United
Nations (UN) and has been extremely supportive of multilateral institutions such as the G20 and
BRICS grouping, which it sees as crucial platforms to position itself as a responsible great
power.22
In line with these efforts, China has stepped up its contributions to international peace in recent
years. Beijing has announced the setting up of a US$1 billion Peace and Development Fund for the
next ten years, as well as the establishment of an 8,000-troop strong regular peace-keeping force.23
There have also been visible changes to China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations around the
world. In late 2013, China sent an infantry detachment to serve in the UN peacekeeping mission in
Mali.24 This represents a marked departure from China’s earlier policies to only send personnel in
support functions such as logistics and contingents of doctors to peacekeeping missions. In early
2015, China deployed 700 combat troops to South Sudan, arguably a significant shift from China’s
traditional non-interference policy.25 Subsequently, in April 2015, a Chinese naval frigate evacuated
225 foreign citizens of ten different nationalities from Yemen, marking the first time that the
Chinese military was involved in evacuating foreigners from a conflict zone.26 During Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Pakistan in February 2015, he also indicated China’s willingness
to play a much larger role in the Afghanistan reconstruction process.27 Beijing has thus far pledged
US$327 million in economic aid to Kabul through 2017 and has also stepped up efforts to explore
ways of enhancing Afghanistan’s security as the US and its allies began to withdraw from the region.
This includes proposals to set up a forum that would facilitate stalled peace talks between the
Afghanistan government and the Taliban.28 Such initiatives are clear signs of a more confident and
capable China keen to enhance its international standing and possibly challenging the US – albeit in
a limited manner – as the primary provider of global security.
In September 2016, Xi gathered all the Politburo members to examine issues relating to global
governance, marking the first time such an event was held at the highest level of the Chinese
political leadership. In a clear indication of Beijing’s shifting approach, Xi declared that it was
time for China to play a more active role in global governance. While Xi lauded China’s critical
position in the UN, as well as slight enhancements to China’s role in the IMF and World Bank in
recent years, Xi also emphasized that China should proactively participate in shaping interna-
tional rules on emerging global issues such as those in the maritime domain, cyber security, outer
space, nuclear safety, polar issues, anti-corruption, and climate change.29 Since the 18th Party
Congress, China’s interest in the G20 has also continued to grow. Beijing has been keen to keep
the momentum of the G20 and has succeeded in keeping issues such as energy, food security,
climate change, anti-corruption, and infrastructure development on the G20 agenda. Of note, the
G20 Hangzhou summit in September 2016 provided China with a valuable opportunity to
strengthen its role in global governance.30 These are all signs of China attempting to gradually
transform itself from a passive recipient of rules to becoming an active player in shaping global
norms and rules.31
88 A. POH AND M. LI

Taking on the US: Trade, security, global partnerships

At the same time, China has demonstrated increasing impatience toward the US’s seeming reluc-
tance to grant China more influence over existing global governance structures and to agree to a
more equitable international political and economic order. Through its Foreign Ministry, China has
formally expressed regret over the US Congress’s failure to pass a reform legislation that grants
emerging markets and developing countries with more voting power and governance authority at the
IMF.32 Among other initiatives, China under Xi has played a major role in the establishment of the
BRICS development bank, including contributing substantively to its total capital endowment. In
September 2013, Xi announced during a visit to Kazakhstan that China and Central Asia should
cooperate to build a “Silk Road Economic Belt,” which would “bring together China, Central Asia,
Russia and Europe (the Baltic states), linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea
through Central Asia and the Indian Ocean.”33 One month later in Indonesia, Xi announced the
proposal of a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” which would “go from China’s coast to Europe
through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the
South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.”34
Since then, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has evolved into a major domestic and foreign policy
issue for China. Various Chinese agencies have spared no effort to promote this initiative in China as well
as in many other countries. According to official Chinese documents, the BRI seeks to promote policy
coordination, enhance connectivity and trade, as well as facilitate financial integration and people-to-
people exchanges among more than 60 countries. Six economic corridors have been envisioned: a new
Eurasian Land Bridge, China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–West Asia, China–Indochina
Peninsula, China–Pakistan, and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar economic corridors.35 Thus
far, the China–Pakistan economic corridor has been officially initiated, with Beijing pledging an
investment of US$64 billion in Pakistan. While the actual impact of the BRI in facilitating integration
in Asia and beyond remains to be seen, China’s investments in and trading accounts with many Eurasian
countries can be expected to significantly increase in the coming years. The Chinese Ministry of
Commerce announced that from between late 2013 when the BRI was first initiated to July 2016,
China’s investments in countries covered in the BRI reached US$51.1 billion.36 China is likely to play
a major role in the construction of various infrastructure projects in many of these countries. These
initiatives are a clear illustration of a more confident China that would not hesitate to directly challenge
the US and other established Western powers if necessary, especially in the economics and trade arena.
Such confidence and assertiveness is even more visible in the Asia–Pacific region, which China sees
as its “backyard” and which stability is crucial for China’s continued growth. Since Xi took over the
reins of leadership, China has invested substantial resources to reshape the regional economic order.
For example, China has been pursuing a new round of “charm offensive” in the Asia-Pacific region.
China has contributed US$40 billion to set up a Silk Road Fund to “strengthen connectivity and
improve cooperation in [China’s] neighbourhood.”37 This is expected to boost maritime connectivity
and provide substantial investment opportunities for Chinese and foreign companies, especially in the
infrastructure construction, manufacturing and services sectors. China’s attempt to advocate for the
Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) – widely seen as a direct challenge to the currently shelved
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – has also frustrated US policymakers under the Obama administra-
tion, who were concerned that the FTAAP would deflect attention from the TPP negotiations, which
had from an early stage been plagued with problems. According to a widely quoted economic study,
the FTAAP was expected to make gains almost eight times that of the TPP.38
At the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015, Xi declared that the newly launched Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which was established in a bid to improve the infrastructure of
Asia, would “advance complementary and coordinated development” with other multilateral institutions
such as the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank.39 It was subsequently established on June 29,
2015, when 57 states signed the agreement. With 26.06 percent of voting power, China became the largest
shareholder of this financial institution. The US has seen this as a direct challenge to undercut existing
 ASIAN SECURITY 89

institutions led by the US and its allies, and has voiced concerns that the new bank under China’s leadership
would not meet governance standards of other international institutions, especially on issues concerning
the environment and anti-corruption. However, notwithstanding Washington’s lobbying, many of the US’s
closest allies have joined the AIIB, including Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and South Korea,
surprising even China and severely delegitimizing the US’s position on this issue.40 All these have pointed
to some success in the Chinese leadership’s attempts to gradually reshape the regional order to expand
China’s influence, especially vis-à-vis the US.
The establishment of the AIIB was indeed a significant event in contemporary Chinese foreign
affairs. It may become a useful policy tool for Beijing for the pursuit of political and even security
interests, particularly in China’s neighborhood in Asia. Some Chinese scholars have suggested that
the AIIB would help proffer more financial resources to the global financial system, improve the
structure of global financial governance, and reform some rules in international financial
governance.41 Others have argued that the AIIB’s most significant impact is likely to be the further
internationalization of Renminbi through channels such as international trade, Chinese outward
investments, and changes in other countries’ foreign reserve policies.42 While one Chinese study
acknowledged that the AIIB is unlikely to have any major impact on the operations and practices of
other major development banks led by other players in the world development financing system, it
remained positive that the establishment of AIIB would make China a major player in the global
development banking system after the US, Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.43
In addition to issues concerning economics and trade, Xi has also highlighted in a notable
keynote address at the 4th Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia
Summit held in Shanghai in May 2014 that, “[it] is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia,
solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”44 Xi has also attempted to initiate a
“New Asian Security Concept,” which is an ambitious attempt to establish a new regional security
cooperation framework that is distinctly different from the current US-led regional security
architecture.45 These remarks and proposals reflect Xi’s long-term political ambitions for China to
play a much more significant role in the Asia-Pacific region, potentially overtaking the US as the
dominant player in both the economics and security arena in the longer term.46
Forging global networks of partnerships has also become a salient feature in China’s foreign
relations. Since the 1990s, Beijing has worked strenuously to establish various partnership relation-
ships with many countries in the world, and is now attempting to connect these separate partnerships
into “networks” throughout different regions in the world, particularly in Africa, Central and Eastern
Europe (CE), as well as in Latin America. For example, during former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s
visit to Poland, China forged a partnership with 16 Central and Eastern European countries. Twelve
major cooperation measures were announced. China would provide US$10 billion of special loans, a
China–CE Europe investment cooperation fund would be established, as well as joint industrial parks,
infrastructure projects, and various socio-cultural and educational exchanges. China pledged to
provide 5,000 scholarship opportunities for students from these countries within five years. A joint
secretariat for China–CE European cooperation was set up at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs –
an unprecedented practice in Chinese foreign affairs. Since then, interactions between the two sides
have become institutionalized, including the annual heads of government summit and ministerial
meetings in many sectors.47 At the latest China–CE Europe summit in Latvia, Chinese premier Li
Keqiang proposed that the bilateral cooperation would focus on five areas: expansion of trade ties,
infrastructure connectivity, industrial cooperation, financial innovation, and tourism. A China–CE
Europe Fund, with 10 billion Euros as the initial amount of capital, was also set up.48 This was similarly
the case in Latin America. In July 2014, Xi had a group meeting with leaders of the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States, and the China–CELAC Forum (CCF) was established, comprising
China and 33 other countries. The first CCF Ministerial Meeting was convened in Beijing in
January 2015, and forums on infrastructure, business relations, agriculture, science and technology,
youth exchanges, and cultural programs were subsequently held. China also announced its intention to
invest a total US$35 billion in key projects in CELAC countries.49
90 A. POH AND M. LI

Challenges and policy dilemmas

There is, however, another side to this story, suggesting that the Chinese leadership remains
conflicted over whether China should abandon its “lying low” international strategy and take on a
much larger role on the world stage. First, notwithstanding lofty pronouncements and the afore-
mentioned changes to its foreign policy, Chinese leaders continue to be preoccupied with long-
standing concerns such as sustaining China’s economic growth and mounting domestic
problems. Second, Chinese leaders and decision makers have a fairly fixed mindset on China’s
role in international relations. They remain reluctant to commit substantive resources or accept too
much international responsibility, especially when China’s national interests are not directly at stake.
Third, China’s capabilities and experience in dealing with international challenges remain very
limited compared to that of the US. Fourth, in the Asia-Pacific region, China’s foreign policy is
plagued with conflicting economic and security imperatives, i.e., its attempt to portray an image of a
benign great power on the one hand and the strong desire to “flex its muscles” to maximize its
interests over disputed territories on the other. We elaborate on each of these factors in the following
and show how they will continue to present significant challenges for China’s political ambitions.

Domestic preoccupations
Xi’s administration has continued to be confronted with significant domestic challenges, including a
widening urban–rural divide that threatens China’s social stability, the need for delicate handling
over Xi’s widespread anti-corruption campaign, a rapidly aging population that could disrupt
China’s economic development, economic practices that could be unsustainable for China’s long-
term development, and massive obstacles to China’s ambitious economic reform plans. The Chinese
leadership’s priorities and preoccupation over these domestic challenges were reflected at the NPC
session in March 2015, which focused on pursuing overarching reforms in order for China to
gradually transit into a consumer and service economy, as well as to tighten administrative rule, curb
corruption, inefficiency, and incompetency within its sprawling bureaucracy.50 These broad and
challenging domestic reforms are likely to constrain the willingness and ability of Chinese leaders to
concurrently pursue an overly ambitious foreign policy.
While the new initiatives under Xi – as described in the previous section – to some extent demonstrate
an increasingly assertive China attempting to gain more global influence and diplomatic leverage by
reshaping the existing system in pursuit of a multipolar international order, as well as a more balanced
global distribution of geopolitical and strategic influence,51 China’s major media outlets such as People’s
Daily, Xinhua, and the Global Times, as well as Chinese policymakers and analysts, have repeatedly
highlighted the importance of these initiatives to China’s domestic economy.52 It remains to be seen
whether China will take on global responsibilities or leadership roles in multilateral institutions if they do
not bring about direct domestic benefits. Such sentiment was alluded to by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s
comment at the NPC in March 2015 that China was not a free rider and was “working with other
countries in pursuing common progress,” but that China was “still a developing country in every sense,
with around 200 million Chinese people living in poverty.”53 This conflicting sense of identity as being
concurrently a global power and a developing country with pressing domestic challenges will continue to
present significant policy dilemmas for the Chinese leadership.

On global governance
We have previously discussed some notable shifts to China’s overall approach toward global
governance in recent years. This notwithstanding, there remain substantial dilemmas and disagree-
ments among the Chinese elite over whether China should assume a leadership role in global
governance.54 This is in large part due to differences in the assessment of China’s power status in
the international system today. As earlier mentioned, in an effort to expand its political influence
 ASIAN SECURITY 91

and also portray itself as a “responsible power,” China has in recent years stepped up its involvement
in multilateral institutions and platforms such as BRICS and the G20. China has also attempted to
balance the US’s dominance in the global order by attempting to fight for more voting powers for
itself and other emerging markets. Such efforts first became noticeable when former Chinese
President Hu Jintao first advocated a new order of a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie) at the 60th
anniversary summit of the United Nations in 200555 and has accelerated since Xi assumed leader-
ship. However, many Chinese elites remain apprehensive over taking on too many international
obligations, especially if Chinese interests are not directly at stake. Such a view arises from a broad
consensus that China remains a developing country and still requires significant resources for its
mounting domestic problems and sustainable economic development. Overstretching its resources
by taking on more international responsibilities could therefore hinder China’s growth and hamper
its continued ascent in the international system.
A second notable dilemma surrounds the Chinese leadership’s vision of world order. Chinese
elites have frequently promulgated a distinctively Chinese world order with China at the center.56
This view has been alluded to by top Chinese leaders, including Xi, who have consistently empha-
sized the importance of retaining “Chinese characteristics” in all aspects of diplomacy. This has also
resulted in many Western scholars suggesting that China is seeking to eventually re-establish its
tributary system.57 Such a vision could be potentially incompatible with a multilateral order, which
includes countries with very distinct cultures and may not be tolerant of China’s long-term pursuit
of primacy. In the more immediate term, China requires the cooperation and continued growth of
other countries such as Japan and India in order to build a multipolar order that would counter-
balance the US’s dominance. At the same time, however, China is also competing with these same
countries for global and regional influence, and facilitating their growth would, in turn, dilute
China’s own power and influence. Chinese leaders need to resolve this fundamental dilemma before
a coherent multilateral policy could emerge.
These internal dilemmas and debates have been exacerbated by conflicting signals regarding the
role that Western powers want China to play in the domain of global governance. While the US had
repeatedly called on China to undertake more international responsibilities, it remains concerned
about China’s attempts to gain more influence in international institutions, such as granting China
with more decision-making powers in institutions such as the IMF. This has contributed to wide-
spread suspicions among Chinese scholars and policymakers that the US and its allies want to
“govern” and socialize China,58 as well as to deplete Chinese resources by encouraging it to under-
take responsibilities beyond its capabilities on the one hand but refuse China the influence and
decision-making powers that it deserves on the other.59

Experience and capabilities

Another key aspect that will place significant constraints on China’s ability to undertake more
international responsibilities in the immediate term is the lack of Chinese experience and capabilities
in handling issues such as international security and multilateral negotiations. China’s inability to
clearly define its power status and associated interests have made it difficult for its diplomats to adopt a
coherent position during international negotiations, resulting in, as David Shambaugh puts it, a
seemingly “confused, contested, uncertain, passive, and risk-averse” Chinese diplomacy.60 For exam-
ple, China’s longstanding rhetoric on “non-interference” has posed fundamental dilemmas and
challenges to its growing involvement in international security, particularly in conflict-ridden areas
such as Sudan and Libya where China’s economic interests are expanding. This problem is exacerbated
by relatively inexperienced Chinese diplomats, who at times find themselves “overplaying their hands”
during multilateral forums. A notable example is former Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s strong
and emotional response to former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks about the US’s
interests in the South China Sea at the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum held in Hanoi in 2010.61 Yang’s
reactions had resulted in significant international media attention, as well as a widespread belief among
92 A. POH AND M. LI

regional countries that China was unwilling and unable to engage on these issues in a constructive
manner. While the Chinese administration under Xi appears to be much more confident in engaging
on global issues, it will take some time for Chinese leaders, policymakers, and diplomats to gain
sufficient experience in order to carry out a coherent and effective diplomacy.
In addition, China remains far behind the US in terms of its overseas power projection capabil-
ities, which has imposed serious constraints on China’s ability to respond promptly to international
crises. China has in recent years been more proactive in non-combatant evacuation operations as
well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, especially through the frequent
deployment of the PLA Peace Ark hospital ship to crisis-ridden areas. Nonetheless, the PLA remains
a largely conventional force and is fairly inexperienced in such international missions. It is therefore
highly unlikely that China will be able to challenge the US as the primary provider of global security
in the near future, even if it had wanted to.

Conflicting imperatives in the Asia-Pacific region

Such dilemmas and conflicting imperatives are even more acute in the Asia-Pacific region. We have
earlier discussed China’s attempts to play a more positive role in Asia, especially through the
promotion of “win-win” economic initiatives. At the same time, however, China has also in recent
years been much more aggressive in its posture over maritime disputes with Japan and other
Southeast Asian countries. In addition to strong rhetoric emerging from the Chinese leadership,
China in the first-term of Xi’s administration has rapidly modernized its navy, created an air defense
identification zone over the East China Sea, reset the status quo over the Scarborough Shoal, and
embarked on significant reclamation activities on the disputed islands in the South China Sea. In the
diplomatic realm, China has been more willing to employ “divide and conquer” tactics to prevent the
South China Sea issue from appearing on a multilateral agenda, leading to widespread fear within
ASEAN on its ability to remain a united front.62 ASEAN countries also remain divided on how best
to deal with the reality of a rising China that demands for its voice to be heard.
The Chinese leadership under Xi has demonstrated significant will to ensure the effectiveness of
its foreign and security policymaking, as well as in implementation, in order to defend China’s
rapidly expanding “core interests.” The 3rd Plenum of the 18th National Party Congress held in
November 2013 announced the establishment of a new National Security Commission to be led
personally by Xi.63 A maritime rights leading small group was established in mid-2012, and China’s
maritime law enforcement agencies were also consolidated under the State Oceanic
Administration.64 These moves have incurred concerns among countries in the Asia-Pacific region
on whether China will be increasingly aggressive towards its smaller neighbours over maritime
disputes. Of note, China reacted strongly against an international arbitration panel’s ruling in favour
of the Philippines against China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, with its Chinese
Foreign Ministry emphasising that the ruling was “null and void” and that China would not accept
or recognize the tribunal decision.65 It remains to be seen whether China is likely to abide by existing
international rules. In this regard, China’s assertive rhetoric and actions arising from its more
immediate interests over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas will severely undercut
its attempt to portray itself as a benign and responsible power and undermine its political ambition
to overtake the US as the dominant leader in the Asia-Pacific region. Countries in the region are
already increasingly concerned about China’s assertiveness on the security front, even as they are
keen to jump on the Chinese economic bandwagon. These conflicting economic and security
imperatives, on the parts of both China as well as regional countries, has severely complicated the
bilateral relationships in the Asia-Pacific region. This trend is likely to persist, especially as the
divergence between security and economic partnerships in the region continues to widen.
 ASIAN SECURITY 93

Conclusion
Chinese official discourse on its foreign and security policy has indeed become more confident
and assertive since Xi Jinping assumed leadership over the party–state–military nexus. China’s
top leadership has also sketched out a foreign policy grand strategy that is clearly in line with the
vision and objectives of Xi’s “China Dream.” In order to back up rhetoric with action, China has
invested substantial resources to build up both its “carrots” and “sticks” of its diplomacy. On the
one hand, this includes allegedly “win-win” initiatives such as the BRI and the establishment of
the AIIB. This also includes significant investments that China has been making around the
world in recent years, particularly in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. On the other
hand, China has also rapidly built up its military and has stepped up the game in disputed
territories through the aggressive build-up of infrastructure and airstrips suitable for military
use. All these appear to point to a new phase in Chinese diplomacy that is distinctively different
from the “lying low” international strategy promulgated by Deng Xiaoping and sustained by Xi’s
predecessors for several decades.
It would, however, be misleading to conclude that Xi has ushered in a new chapter of Chinese
diplomacy and has officially abandoned the “lying low” international strategy. Notwithstanding
China’s growing political ambitions and confident pronouncements, the Chinese leadership has
continued to be constrained by significant domestic challenges in the first term of Xi’s administra-
tion. This has been exacerbated by an increasingly conflicted sense of identity, as well as fundamental
policy dilemmas that need to be resolved. More specifically, the Chinese leadership will need to
clearly define its power status in the international system, and reconcile longstanding principles such
as “non-interference” with its increasing global presence and economic stakes in conflict-ridden
countries. Xi and other Chinese leaders will also need to reconcile the temptation to perceive China
as the center of the international system, with its desire to promulgate an image of a benign and
responsible great power that could be trusted with a much larger role in the regional and global
order. We have argued in this article that the Chinese leadership under Xi has yet to reconcile these
fundamental policy dilemmas and conflicting imperatives. This has resulted in the widespread
perception that China’s foreign and security policy is ad-hoc and contradictory, and that China’s
intentions are at best unclear, if not outright suspicious.66 In this regard, it would be more apt to
describe Chinese foreign policy under the first term of Xi’s administration as going through a
transitory phase, instead of as a new chapter that has clearly deviated from the “lying low”
international strategy.
Looking ahead, it remains to be seen whether Xi’s power could be further consolidated at
the 19th National Party Congress to be held by the fall of 2017, and whether the Chinese
leadership could confront these challenges and policy dilemmas in the years to come. While
the new policies introduced under the first-term of Xi’s administration have been significant,
and could facilitate the eventual emergence of a global foreign policy in the longer term, there
is unlikely to be a coherent and grand global leadership strategy in the immediate future. This
understanding that China’s foreign policy remains in a transitory phase could help regional
countries make sense of the seeming incoherence and contradictions of Chinese foreign policy,
which should be expected to persist in the near to mid term. It will be counter-productive to
adopt a suspicious and obstructionist attitude toward all of China’s pronouncements, policies,
and proposals, as doing so would only increase the chances of conflict, as well as the potential
for regional instability. At the same time, the international community should also actively
urge China to make clear its intentions and clearly communicate how its various new
initiatives would be implemented in line with its rhetoric of “win-win cooperation.” Doing
so could help maximize the potential of China being a benign, responsible, and beneficial great
power, and avoid the great power rivalry leading to wars as was the case with many events
throughout history.
94 A. POH AND M. LI

Notes
1. “Xi Pledges Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,” Xinhua News, November 29, 2012. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm
2. “President Vows to Press Ahead with Chinese Dream,” Xinhua News, March 17, 2013. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/17/c_132239786.htm
3. See, e.g., David M. Lampton, Following the Leader: Ruling China, From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2014); Yongnian Zheng and Lance L. P. Gore,
“Introduction: China Enters Xi Era,” in Yongnian Zheng and Lance L. P. Gore, eds., China Entering the Xi
Jinping Era (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 1–16; “Xi Jinping’s Leadership: Chairman of
Everything,” The Economist, April 2, 2016. Available at http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-
exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-often-ruthless-there-are-limits-his; “Beware the Cult of Xi,” The Economist,
April 2, 2016. Available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695881-xi-jinping-stronger-his-
predecessors-his-power-damaging-country-beware-cult; Xing Qu, “2013 Zhongguo Waijiao Xinzheng [2013
China’s New Diplomacy],” Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs], Vol. 1, (2014), pp. 32–33; Yusheng Wang,
“Zhongguo de Waijiao Xinzheng [China’s New Diplomacy],” Jiefang Ribao [People’s Daily], Nov 11, 2013.
Available at http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2013-11-11/101028677031.shtml.
4. For example, Alastair I. Johnston has argued that the speed and magnitude of changes in Chinese foreign policy
have been exaggerated. See Alastair I. Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?”
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), pp. 7–48. Other scholars have suggested otherwise. See e.g., Aaron
Friedberg, “The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness,” The Washington Quarterly,
Vol. 37, No. 4 (2015), pp. 133–150; and Michael Yahuda, “China’s New Assertiveness in the South China Sea,”
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22, No. 81 (2013), pp. 446–459.
5. “Xi Stresses Joint Battle Command for Military Reform,” Xinhua News, April 20, 2016. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm.
6. We define “Chinese elite” as the political and military leadership, as well as influential retired officials,
journalists, scholars, and analysts.
7. “Xi Pledges Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,” Xinhua News, November 29, 2012. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-11/29/c_132008231.htm.
8. “Xieshou gongjian wangluo kongjian mingyun gongtongti [Working Together to Build a Cyber Community of
Common Destiny]”, Xinhua News, published November 16, 2016. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/
2016-11/17/c_135836056.htm.
9. Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2014.
Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml.
10. Wang Yi’s remarks at the Symposium on the International Development and China’s Diplomacy, December 26,
2014. Available athttp://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2014/12/26/content_281475029808332.htm.
11. This was also pointed out in Michael Swaine, “Xi Jinping’s Address to the Central Conference on Work
Relating to Foreign Affairs: Assessing and Advancing Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,”
China Leadership Monitor, No. 46 (Winter 2015), pp. 1–19.
12. Xi Jinping’s remarks to the Körber Foundation, March 28, 2014. Available at http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/
en/international-affairs/focus-new-east/xi-jinping-2014/speech-xi-jinping.html.
13. Xi Jinping’s remarks to the Körber Foundation, March 28, 2014.
14. Wang Yi’s remarks at the Symposium on the International Development and China’s Diplomacy, December 26,
2014. Available at http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2014/12/26/content_281475029808332.htm.
15. Wang Yi’s remarks at the Symposium on the International Development and China’s Diplomacy, December 26,
2014.
16. An example of such prominent visits is Xi’s grand tour of the Guangzhou military region in December 2012,
where he proclaimed that a powerful military “must be able to fight and be able to win.” “Xi Stresses Joint Battle
Command for Military Reform,” Xinhua News, April 20, 2016. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2016-04/20/c_135297662.htm. See also, John Garnaut, “Xi’s War Drums,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2013.
Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/04/29/xis-war-drums/.
17. Xi Jinping quoted in Gang An, “The Core of the Issue,” Beijing Review, August 26, 2013. Available at http://
www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2013-08/26/content_563009.htm.
18. Xi Jinping quoted in Gang An, “The Core of the Issue.”
19. Xing Qu, “2013 Zhongguo Waijiao Xinzheng [2013 China’s New Diplomacy];” Yusheng Wang, “Zhongguo de
Waijiao Xinzheng [China’s New Diplomacy].”
20. See e.g., Canrong Jin, “Wuyi ‘xiaoqingxin’ xintai kandai dangqian zhongguo waijiao huanjing [Do Not Take
Lightly the Current State of China’s External Environment],” Jiefang Ribao [People’s Daily], November 11, 2013.
Available at http://world.people.com.cn/n/2015/0107/c1002-26339478.html; Yizhou Wang, as referenced in
“Zhongguo yu quanqiu zhili luntan luomu, duowei zhuanjia jiu zhongguo waijiao jiaobai [Experts Debate
 ASIAN SECURITY 95

China’s Foreign Policy at the Global China Dialogue Series],” Huanqiuwang [Huanqiu News], December 19,
2014. Available at http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2014-12/5266381.html.
21. Mingjiang Li, “Rising from Within: China’s Search for a Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-US
Relations,” in Mingjiang Li, ed., China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions (Lanham, MD:
Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 36–37.
22. China has cast five out of its ten vetoes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the last five years
alone. On the other hand, China has also more actively supported the proposals on harsh sanctions against
North Korea in February 2016.
23. Junrong Zhang, “zhongguo jiji tuidong quanqiu zhili tixi biange” [China Actively Pushes for Reforms of Global
Governance], zhongguo shehui kexue bao [China Social Sciences Bulletin], October 12, 2016.
24. “A Look into Chinese Peacekeeping Infantry Battalion,” China Military Online, April 10, 2015. Available at
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-04/10/content_4579404.htm
25. David Smith, “China to Send 700 Combat Troops to South Sudan,” The Guardian, December 23, 2014.
Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/23/china-700-combat-troops-south-sudan-africa-
battalion-un-peacekeeping.
26. “Yemen Crisis: China Evacuates Citizens and Foreigners from Aden,” BBC News, April 3, 2015. Available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32173811.
27. Wang Yi, “Addressing the Issue of Afghanistan Requires Reinforced Support in Four Aspects,” February 12,
2015. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1238074.shtml.
28. Jessica Donati, “China Seeks Greater Role in Afghanistan with Peace Talk Push,” Reuters, November 11, 2015.
Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/11/us-afghanistan-china-idUSKCN0IV1EB20141111.
29. “Jiaqiang hezuo tuidong quanqiu zhili tixi biange [Enhancing cooperation for reforming global governance],”
People’s Daily, September 29, 2016.
30. Yuyan Zhang, “quanqiu zhili de zhongguo shijiao” [A Chinese Perspective in Global Governance], shijie jingji yu
zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics], No. 9 (2016), pp. 4–9
31. Huifang Tian, “quanqiu zhili xin geju yu zhongguo juese” [The New Structure of Global Governance and
China’s Role], zhongguo jinrong [China Finance], No. 18 (2016), pp. 28–29
32. “China Expresses Regret at US Failure to Pass IMF Reforms,” Reuters, December 12, 2014. Available at http://
news.yahoo.com/china-expresses-regret-u-failure-pass-imf-reforms-090341773–business.html.
33. “Chronology of China’s Belt Road Initiative,” Xinhua News, March 28, 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm.
34. “Chronology of China’s Belt Road Initiative,” Xinhua News.
35. For more details of the BRI, see the official Chinese document “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” Available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/
201503/t20150330_669367.html.
36. “Woguo dui ‘yidaiyilu’ xiangguan guojia de touzi leiji yi dadao 511 yi meiyuan” [China’s Investments in BRI
Countries Reach US$51.1 Billion], Available at http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/wh/slxy/31200/Document/1487819/
1487819.htm.
37. “China Pledges 40 bln USD for Silk Road Fund,” Xinhua News, November 8, 2015. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/08/c_133774993.htm.
38. Cited in Stephens, Hugh, “TPP or FTAAP: What it Means for US and the Asia Pacific Region,” November 25,
2014. Available at http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/tpp-or-ftaap-what-it-means-for-us-and-the-
asia-pacific-region/.
39. Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2015, March 28, 2015. Available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2015-03/30/c_134108646.htm.
40. Jane Perlez, “Hostility from US as China Lures Allies to New Bank,” New York Times, March 19, 2015.
Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/world/asia/hostility-from-us-as-china-lures-allies-to-new-
bank.html?_r=0.
41. Qi Tong, “lun yatouhang dui quanqiu jinrong zhili tixi de wanshan” [AIIB Helps Improve Global Financial
Governance], faxue zazhi [Journal of Legal Studies], No. 6 (2016), pp. 13–21.
42. Li Xiaofeng and Zhao Wenjia, “yidaiyilu tourongzi fuwu jingji pingtai xia de yatouhang dui renminbi guojihua
de yingxiang” [The Impact of the AIIB on Renminbi Internationalization Under the Platform of the “Belt and
Road” Investment and Service Sectors], jingji jie [Economic Affairs], No. 4 (2016), pp. 46–51.
43. Wang Weijin, “yatouhang dui guoji fazhan rongzi tixi de jiegouxing yingxiang” [The structural impact of AIIB
on the international development financing system], Journal of Sun Yat-sen University (Social science edition),
Vol. 56, No. 4 (2016), pp. 166–178
44. “Summit to Reshape Asian Security with New Concept,” Xinhua News, May 22, 2014. Available at http://en.
people.cn/n/2014/0522/c90883-8730794.html.
45. Transcript of Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence
Building Measures in Asia, May 21, 2014. Available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/
t1159951.shtml.
96 A. POH AND M. LI

46. Transcript of Xi Jinping’s remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence
Building Measures in Asia, May 21, 2014.
47. Zhu Xiaozhong, “zhongguo he zhongdong’ou guojia guanxi de fazhan” [The Development of Relations Between
China and Central-Eastern Europe], lingdao kexue luntan [Forum on Leadership Science], No. 4 (2016),
pp. 51–68.
48. Yang Shu, “zhongguo zhongdong’ou shenhua hezuo you kongjian” [More Room for the Deepening of
Cooperation between China and Central-Eastern Europe], guoji shangbao [International Business News],
November 25, 2016.
49. See the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s release for more details: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjb_673085/zzjg_
673183/ldmzs_673663/dqzz_673667/zglgtlt_685863/gk_685865/.
50. Li Keqiang’s report on the work of the government delivered at the Third Session of the 12th National People’s
Congress, Xinhua News, March 5, 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-03/16/c_
134071473.htm.
51. See e.g., Qiaoyi Li, “Making it Work: High Hopes for One Belt, One Road Initiative,” Global Times, March 10,
2015. Available at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/911258.shtml; “Zhuanjia jiedu xinchangtai xia yidai yilu:
wei zhongguo jingji dailai zhongyao zengzhang dongli [Experts analyze ‘One Belt One Road’: Bringing about
Important Economic Growth for China],” Xinhua News, March 7, 2015.
52. See e.g., Qiaoyi Li, “Making it Work: High Hopes for One Belt, One Road Initiative;” “Zhuanjia jiedu
xinchangtai xia yidai yilu: wei zhongguo jingji dailai zhongyao zengzhang dongli [Experts analyse One Belt
One Road: Bringing about Important Economic Growth for China],” Xinhua News; “Zhimian xinchangtai: yidai
yilu kaifang gongying tuoxinju [Facing the New Normal: One Belt One Road Brings About Win-Win Benefits],”
People’s Daily, March 13, 2015. Available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0313/c83083-26687854.html; and
Justin Lin and Yan Wang, “China’s Contribution to Development Cooperation: Ideas, Opportunities and
Finances,” Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international, Working Paper 119,
January 2015.
53. “China not free rider, but major contributor,” Xinhua, March 15, 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2015-03/15/c_134068161.htm.
54. See e.g., Qingguo Jia, Quanqiu zhili: baohu de zeren [Global Governance: Responsibility to Protect] (Beijing:
Xinhua Publishing House, 2014); Xuetong Yan, “The Rise of China and its Power Status,” Chinese Journal of
International Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2006), pp. 5–33; Feitao Liu, “G2 yu dangqian zhongmei guanxi de bozhe
[G2 and the Fluctuations in Sino-US Relations], shijie jingji yu zhengzhi [World Economics and Politics],”
Vol. 449, No. 3 (2010), pp. 45–46; and Chenyang Lu, “Zhongguo dui duobian waijiao de canyu ji duice sikao
[China’s Participation in Multilateral Diplomacy and Policy Suggestions],” xuexi yu tansuo [Study and
Exploration], Serial No. 175, No. 2 (2008), pp. 90–93.
55. Hao Su, “Harmonious World: The Conceived International Order in Framework of China’s International
Affairs,” in Masafumi Iida, ed., China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power (Tokyo, Japan: The National
Institute for Defence Studies, 2009), pp. 29–56.
56. See, for example, Tingyang Zhao, “Tianxia gainian yu shijie zhidu [The Concept of Tianxia and World
System],” in Yaqing Qin, ed., World Politics – Views from China: International Order (Hong Kong: Peace
Book, 2006), pp. 3–46; and Mingfu Liu, Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei
[The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Positioning of China in the Post-American Era] (Beijing:
China Friendship Press, 2010), referenced in Mingjiang Li, “Rising from Within: China’s Search for a
Multilateral World and its Implications for Sino-US Relations,” in Mingjiang Li, ed., China Joins Global
Governance: Cooperation and Contentions (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), pp. 47–48.
57. See, for example, David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2010).
58. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Relations, 1980–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2008).
59. See e.g., Zhongying Pang, “Tupo xifang ‘quanqiu zhiili’ kunjing [Breaking the Dilemma posed by Western
Global Governance],” Zhongguo shehui kexuebao [China Social Sciences Bulletin],” October 27, 2011.
60. David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 72.
61. Mark Landler, “Offering to Aid Talks, US Challenges China on Disputed Islands,” The New York Times, July 23
2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html?_r=0.
62. See e.g., Goh Sui Noi, “China’s ‘Consensus’ Statement Left ASEAN Divided,” The Straits Times, June 16, 2016.
Available at http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/chinas-consensus-statement-left-asean-divided; Tang Siew
Mun, “China’s Dangerous Divide and Conquer Game with ASEAN,” Today, April 27, 2016. Available at http://
www.todayonline.com/world/asia/chinas-dangerous-divide-and-conquer-game-asean.
63. “Xi Jinping to Lead National Security Commission,” Xinhua, January 24, 2014. Available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-01/24/c_133071876.htm.
64. “China’s New Oceanic Administration in Operation,” Xinhua, July 22, 2013. Available at http://www.china.org.
cn/china/2013-07/22/content_29491818.htm.
 ASIAN SECURITY 97

65. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the People’s Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea
Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines,” July 12, 2016. Available at http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1379492.shtml; and “Remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang
Yi on the Award of the So-called Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration,” July 12, 2016. Available
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1380003.shtml.
66. See e.g., Ernest Bower, “Osama Down, Obama Will Pivot,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
May 3, 2011. Available at http://csis.org/publication/osama-down-obama-will-pivot; and Tom Bowman, “As
China Military Grows, US Assesses Risks,” NPR, February 14, 2014. Available at http://www.npr.org/2012/02/
14/146883300/as-chinas-military-grows-u-s-assesses-risks.

Notes on contributors
Angela Poh is a doctoral candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. Her research interests are Chinese foreign policy, Asia-Pacific security and
sanctions.

Mingjiang Li is an Associate Professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. His research interests are China’s diplomatic history, Sino-US relations, Asia-
Pacific security, and domestic sources of China's foreign policy.