Why Did The US Fail To Accommodate With Nasser

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Special Subject Module

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HST6759
Special Subject Module Title The Global Cold War
Dissertation Advisor Martyn Frampton
Dissertation Title Why the United States failed to accommodate with Nasser
between 1957-1963
Word Count
10912
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2
Why the United States failed to

accommodate with Nasser between
1957-1963.
HST6769
THE GLOBAL COLD WAR
3
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………..3
Literature……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….………………5
Chapter One: Ideological Differences and Territorial Rivalry (1957-1958)……………………….…………………7
Chapter Two: Anti-communism and the UAR-Israel Dilemma (1957-1958)……………………….…………….…7
Chapter Three: Kennedy’s Reconciliation and Putting Palestine in the ‘Icebox’ (1961)………….………..…7
Chapter Four: War in Yemen and Kennedy’s Assassination (1962-1963)…………………………….……………..7
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………….……..………………………………..3
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………..3
4
Introduction
This dissertation aims to uncover why relations between the United States and Egypt/United Arab
Republic failed to set out on a long-term path of reconciliation and improvement despite the
incredibly unique and significant decision of the U.S. to intervene in the 1956 Suez Crisis in support
of Egypt’s sovereignty, using economic threats to counter the join British-French-Israeli conspired
invasion despite their roles as America’s closest allies. The event had ground-breaking consequences,
gaining the admiration of the entire Arab world and beyond with its display of a United States that
sacrificed its own gains and interests in the name of international liberty and delivering a final blow
to the prestige of the decaying empires of Europe, setting the stage for the new world order based
on the influences and decisions of the United States and Soviet Union.
The relationship between the United States and Egypt was extremely complex, multi-layered, and
adaptive. In the turbulent environment of the Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa, new
events consistently rose that had the effect of enveloping neighbouring nations; very rarely was the
impact of a coup, crisis, civil war etc. contained locally and intervention from both Western and
regional powers was the norm throughout the period covered from Lebanon to Yemen. In this
context, US-Egyptian relations were responsive to such developments and by exploring how tensions
in the Middle East unfolded through the years 1957-63 chronologically, the primary factors
concerning why relations failed to positively rise are revealed with clarity and further assessment
quantifies these factors to understand their significance comparatively. The combined power of
economic threats from the U.S. and violent threats from the Soviet Union created a force that could
not be matched. Eisenhower, with expertise as a former general, knew that it was an impossible
mission from the start regardless with how rapidly they may capture the Suez Canal initially as an
“Egyptian reaction backed by assistance from the Soviet Union” could only result in an incredibly
dangerous scenario with the entire Arab and Muslim world alienated with any hope of Western
5
cooperation.1 Furthermore, Nasser’s plea for assistance the United States in October 31 proved
something important to the Americans, that despite having the perfect opportunity to demand
Soviet help Nasser chose the Americans.2 Nasser had no issue reinstating his avoidance of Soviet
strings to the United States and after the Suez Crisis did not reject future possibilities of closer
relations with the West, only that “it would have to be with US”. In some instances Eisenhower is
seen even defending Nasser’s actions, stating in a letter to Swede Hazlett, a close military friend, that
“The 1888 Treaty says nothing at all as to how the Canal is to be operated…no one could question
the legal right of Egypt to nationalize the Canal Company”.3 It is under this background that we must
ask: Why did US-Egyptian relations fail to reconcile after the 1956 Suez Crisis?
1
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, eds. Nina J. Noring
and John P. Glennon (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 42.
2
Ibid.
3
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956, eds. Nina J. Noring
6
Literature
This dissertation in US-Egyptian relations seeks to expand upon identifying the pattern and trajectory
it travelled in, quantifying the various present factors to form a consistent set of explanations as to
why relations were trapped in a fluctuating, unstable state of highs and lows. As opposed to the
more common U.S. foreign policy outlook that perceived events and nations as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’
for U.S. interests, Egypt/UAR was unique in the period discussed for revealing how both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administration conflicted internally on what label to apply to neutralists
and/or difficult national leaders like Nasser, repeatedly switching from firm beliefs of incompatibility
to optimism characterised by a willingness to accept a leader can have partial ties with the Soviets
and still a friend to the West.
The literature for this topic remains minor in quantity, but analysis and assessment that aims to
uncover why US-Egyptian relations downgraded appears regularly in literature covering US and
Middle Eastern relations and interactions, particularly as the Suez Crisis is a turning point in the
wider Cold War acting as the final demonstration of the new world order consisting of the Western
and Eastern bloc rather than Europe’s decaying empires. Whilst Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler’s 2004
‘Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt” (University Press of
Florida) provides a very detailed and the broadest account of Nasser’s political career with chapters
dedicated entirely to how Nasser interacted and formed a relationship with the United States and
another for the Soviet Union, other types of literature like Jeffrey A. Lefebvre’s 1993 “The United
States and Egypt: Confrontation and Accommodation in Northeast Africa, 19567-60” (Taylor &
Francis Ltd.) concentrate through one lens on specific aspects responsible for how US-Egyptian
relations developed, in this case Lefebvre explores territorial competition in Northeast Africa and
Nasser’s ambitions beyond the Middle East.

7
This dissertation makes great use of available United States government archives such as The Office
of the Historian archives of U.S. foreign policy documents, Central Intelligence Reading Room, and
the online Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy libraries. These archives are very useful as the
documents are unaltered providing an insight into chosen subjects in their original form, preserved
from modification and omissions existing, making them incredibly detailed and truthful in what they
contain. National Security Council meeting memorandums, letters exchanged by Kennedy and
Nasser, and the personal views of other high-ranking officials like Dulles and Badeau are all utilised
to effectively display how both sides perceived one another throughout the period discussed,
revealing the cycle of optimism, pessimism, disappointment, and gratitude that characterised US-
Egyptian relations.
8
Chapter One:
Ideological differences and Territorial Rivalry (1957-1958)
The following year is significant in revealing the dominating factors regarding the worsening of US-
Egyptian relations after the Suez Crisis, particularly how U.S. perceptions of their ideological
differences with Nasser and Egyptian attempts to possess a stake in the Middle East and North Africa
resulted in a competitive, incompatible, and divisive relationship. Despite having little to show for
economic success and the realisation of the Free Officers’ domestic goals, the U.S. understood that
“Nasser has achieved a position of virtually unchallenged authority in Egypt” with a massive base of
popular support spreading across the Arab world who faithfully followed the Pan-Arab nationalism
and resistance to Western ‘imperialism’ that Nasser embodied.4 The January Eisenhower Doctrine
opened the new year in its firm declaration that it remains determined to protect its interests in the
Middle East, specifically that it is prepared to deploy military forces in the event of foreign-conspired
takeovers of its allies. From the viewpoint of Eisenhower’s administration, the need for the doctrine
was hastened in the belief that Egypt was already now controlled by Soviet strings noting that their
dependence on the Bloc far exceeded simple gestures of food aid with technical, financial, and
material assistance for several industrial projects accompanying a great increase in Soviet
information and cultural services in the country.5 Egypt made no attempt to hide its willingness to
interact and deal with the Communist Bloc including the Peoples Republic of China; in Egypt East
Germany constructed power plants, Hungary constructed the Helwan bridge, Czechoslovakia
constructed ceramics factories and cement plants, and an inventory of Soviet-made weapons ranging
from MIG-17 jet fighters and T-34 tanks was all enough to convince the U.S. that Egypt was following
the same path as Syria.6 It was through this line of events and thought that created the main premise
to the Eisenhower Doctrine: a combination of economic funds and military force was necessary to fill
4
United States Government. Central Intelligence Agency. 19 July 1957 MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE SUBJECT: Nasser’s Next Moves. September 12, 2000. Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
9
in the newly created power vacuum in the Middle East after the Suez Crisis brought the downfall of
European post-colonial influence.7 For the West Nasserism was not greatly distinguished from
Communism in seeking to consume its surroundings, therefore rolling back Soviet gains in the region
was just as important as rolling back the spread of Nasserite ideals. Overall, it divided the nations of
the Arab world into two opposing sides: those rejecting Western support and adhering to neutralism
represented by Egypt and Syria against traditional rulers who sustained the long-rooted Western
base of control in their nations and refused economic ties with the Bloc. The doctrine was followed
by the creation of the Royalist axis in February marked by the Iraqi crown prince and King Saud’s
meetings that put an end to old rivalries; the new power base of conservative Arab states,
emboldened by the doctrine and ‘Arab Solidarity Pact’ signed in January, delivered U.S. aims to
isolate Nasser and Syria further particularly economically, ensuring no further aid would be provided
to Egypt and for Nasser to remain “as poor as possible” in contrast to the forty million dollars Saud
gave him previously.8 Evidently, from the outset of 1957 the status quo had been effectively
maintained with Nasser and his followers continuing to fear a growing interference in their internal
affairs, driving them further from any prospect of improved US relations.9
Egyptian relations with the United States continued to worsen in another field: Competition for
influence in North-East Africa. Driven by a need to assure a large share of Nile water, Egypt faced
potential threats from the other Nile countries consisting of Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda which had
their own plans to insist on ownership of their division. Furthermore, the establishment of unity and
cooperation amongst the African Arab states was greatly desired, pushed through with a harassment
and propaganda campaign against Western-aligned administration in Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and
Ethiopia who made their ties clear to the West for their need for “arms, development skills, and
7
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII, eds. Paul
Claussen, Edward C. Keefer, Will Klingaman, and Nina J. Noring (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document
153.
8
Podeh, Elie, and Onn Winckler. Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. University
Press of Florida, 2004: pp. 102
9
Ibid., pp. 103
10
capital”.10 For Nasser it was just as significant for a breakthrough in African relations than it was for
Arab relations, stating Egypt’s perceived central role in the continent in his 1959 book titled ‘Where I
stand and why’ that “we are in Africa. The peoples of Africa will continue to look to us…”.11 Cairo’s
cultural significant in the region was well-known, a centre of “book publishing and manuscript
copying, Arab theatre, music, films, recording industry and radio” that exerted influence towards
places as far as India through the use of translations to languages ranging from Hebrew, Greek, and
Swahili.12 The power of this influence was demonstrated as revealed in a report by the Ethiopian
Foreign Ministry given to a American delegation led by Vice-President Richard Nixon in March 1957
which stated Ethiopia was a target of subversive activites “supplied from nearby territories with
funds and agents” with a distinct critic of Ethiopia’s friendliness to the West.13 Ethiopia - in moves like
granting the United States a base at Kagnew - was deemed ‘unfaithful’ to the Arab world and
Ethiopian Muslims, now facing a powerful threat from Egypt to either turn to neutralism or have
their Ogaden territory carved out to form a Greater Somaliland.27 These attacks did not go unnoticed
by the U.S., who constantly viewed Nasser’s lashing out towards their allies as a primary factor to the
worsening of their relations, seen in Secretary of State Dulles’ constant complaints that “Egypt
should also stop treating the U.S. as a country to be reviled”.14 From their standpoint, the favourable
effect that their stance had on the Suez Crisis was short-lasted as revealed by the “daily routine for
papers under government subsidy to vilify US as imperialists…just as if nothing had happened”. 15
Regardless of the effects of the Eisenhower Doctrine and Egyptian propaganda attacks against the
United States, the Eisenhower administration still desired productive relations using U.S. aid in return
for Egyptian adherence to Suez Canal responsibilities and preventive measure for peace with Israel;
10
United States Government. Central Intelligence Agency. September 12, 2000.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. “The United States and Egypt: Confrontation and Accommodation in Northeast Africa, 1956-60.”
Middle Eastern Studies (1993): pp.331
14
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, eds. Will Klingman, Aaron D.
Miller, and Nina J. Noring (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 261.
15
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XVII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, eds. Nina J. Noring and John
P. Glennon (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 101.
11
in the March 1957 Bermuda Conference, despite the pressure from British Prime Minister McMillian
for the U.S. to “wage political and economic warfare” against Nasser, Eisenhower sought to unblock
funds and offer further PL 480 aid.16 What prevented this potential outgrowth for positive change for
US-Egyptian relations came in August when the Eisenhower Doctrine was put to its first test in Syria.
During the summer of 1957, the CIA formed ‘Operation Wappen’ – a covert operation with the goal
of uplifting right-wing dissidents inside the Syrian army to organise a coup d’état and reverse Syrian
efforts in neutralism and progressing Soviet ties.17 When Syrian authorities uncovered the plot, the
U.S. rushed to rally the pro-West neighbouring allies to precipitate action against Damascus but were
met with uninterest and reluctance in fear of being seen as a stooge of the West.18 On the other
hand, Turkey shared the anxieties of a Soviet controlled Syria and was quick to mass troops along the
Syrian border prompting the USSR to threaten Ankara – a NATO member – transforming the crisis
from regional to international. Nasser defied the choice of either West or East and took an
independent route that won the hearts of the Arab world by sending a minor symbolic number of
troops to Syria on 13 October.19 The Defence Pact between Egypt and Syria signed in 1955 was
formally activated putting both the Soviets and US in a dilemma where military action was no longer
an option, nor was the threat of it.20 Proving that an Arab nation did not need to turn to the great
powers for help in moments of crisis but can rely on its regional and cultural neighbours was a
powerful gain for Nasser and his ideology, especially Pan-Arabism. This served another, more
constructive, purpose for Eisenhower by revealing how useful of an ally Nasser would be in moments
of Soviet gains in the Middle East.21
16
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Madeline Chi,
Stephen Harper, Nancy Johnson, Margaret Kohutanycz, and Lorraine Lees (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010),
Document 265.
17
Little, Douglas. “Mission Impossible: The CIA and the Cult of Covert Action in the Middle East.” Diplomatic History (2004):
pp. 677
18
Podeh, Elie, and Onn Winckler 2004, pp. 212
19
Ibid., 212-213
20
Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. (1993), pp. 104-105
21
12
In January 1958, the members of the Baghdad Pact including Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Britain saw the
implications of an Egyptian-Syrian union as the work of the Soviets which Nasser welcomed “to
obtain domination over the Arab world”.22 The United States shared these anxieties and the
spontaneous nature in which plans for the union arose put a doubt in the preparedness of their
containment policy, their first step was to look towards its Baghdad Pact friends to support “any
feasible common plan…to thwart or otherwise oppose the union of Egypt and Syria” but were met
with little success, a replication of the reluctance displayed during the Syrian Crisis of the previous
year.2324 At the heart of this formation, the U.S. recognised that Nasser was at the pinnacle of
popularity with no pro-Western counterpart matching his popular appeal as further revealed by allies
like Iran who complained that popular support was not limited to Egypt and Syria but in Iraq too. 25
Intra-Arab relations was evidently volatile expressed in events such as the Arab Federation’s sudden
dismemberment, King Saud’s association with a plot to remove Syria from Egyptian influence, and a
constant barrage of attacks through national media that saw Iraqi officials target the UAR and Nasser
deliver blows to Saudi Arabia that included regular references to the eventual demise of pro-Western
Arab leaders and Israel.26 Additionally, the United States noted that Nasser’s negative impact on their
allies manifested in ways more significant than vocal critic, contributing to major internal security
problems in Jordan and Lebanon where the possibility of a regime overthrow was real, as seen in “a
shift in allegiance of major elements in the Jordan army” and Lebanese politicians echoing Nasserite
policies in opposition to President Chamoun’s re-election.27 In recognition of this intensely divided
situation in the Middle East, the United States maintained its policy of not explicitly declaring Nasser
an enemy but rather seek to foster moderate alternatives to Nasserism that can garner popular
22
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, eds.
Edward C. Keefer and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 9.
23
24
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa,
eds. Suzanne E. Coffman and Charles S. Sampson (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 194.
25
26
27
Ibid.
13
support and “stiffen the spines” of its allies to be self-sufficient in maintaining their stability via a
background of reforms that would keep prospects of growing internal dissent at bay.28 Despite
clarifications from Shukri al-Quwatli – the first president of post-independence Syria – that the
United States has confused nationalism with communism and that they would like to see more
significant American efforts in competing with the Soviets (such as in bidding for Syrian oil refineries),
US-Egyptian relations remained sour with no sight of improvement. This desire for closer interactions
with the West additionally came as a result of ideological clashes, most evident during a two-week
tour of the USSR in April-May 1961 by a UAR delegation led by Anwar al-Sadat where Khrushchev
lectured them on their ideological errors: “[W]e are communists and you are not connected with this
word. But history will teach you… If our people live better than you under the communist banner,
then how can you declare yourselves adverse to communism?”.29
The second half of 1958 demonstrated the United States’ fears regarding Nasser’s capability to
uproot their allies and force concessions, placing the U.S. at a dilemma where intervention was
exceedingly risky and inaction disturbed its allies. By June it became clear that “there has been
undoubted subversion and infiltration from [the] UAR” in Lebanon which stoked internal
dissatisfaction at Chamoun’s determination to obtain a second six-year term as President providing a
foundation for “near rebellion”.30 Despite recognizing that Chamoun’s political ambitions provided
“the spark” in the present situation, Eisenhower’s administration viewed UAR interference in
Lebanon’s affairs as an offense against international law and placed the blame against them for the
violent escalation that saw factions based on the varying religions, ideologies, ethnicities, and
regions of Lebanon use armed struggle to carve their own spheres of influence and control, with a
strong pro-Nasser presence.31 The Eisenhower Doctrine remained inactivated due to the U.S. holding
onto its desire for its Arab allies to be self-reliant, expressed in its repeated pushbacks against
28
Ibid.
29
30
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XI, Lebanon and Jordan, eds. Louis J. Smith and John P.
Glennon (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 56.
31
14
Chamoun’s pleas for introducing foreign forces in Lebanon and attempting to mediate between him
and Nasser a peace plan which crumbled when Chamoun rejected Nasser’s proposals due to mistrust
stating “his complete distrust of Nasser…each time his deeds had belief his words”.3233 Furthermore,
intervention would have granted Nasser an easy victory, solidifying Lebanon’s opposition and proving
their exclamations that Lebanon was a puppet of the West correct; Lebanon’s integrity had to be
maintained by the Lebanese and Eisenhower saw it no other way.34
This perception was shattered in July 14 Iraq coup when the combined forces of republicans,
nationalists, Nasserites, communists and other leftists became collapsed on the constitutional
monarchy under King Faisal and prime minister Nuri al-Said.35 Immediately, blame was directed at
Nasser and fears of a domino collapse of conversative nations took hold of U.S. foreign policymaking,
Eisenhower himself believing now “that the Nasser elements, having taken Iraq, would find Jordan a
weakness” and that Lebanon must be ‘pulled out’ before it suffers the same fate.36 The U.S. firmly
believed that Iraq, in an instant, was lost and its new government simply maintained a “façade” of
friendship with the West directed by Nasser who himself was controlled by the USSR. 37 The non-
interventionist approach to Lebanon was immediately replaced with the landing of military units on
Lebanon soil, to Chamoun’s relief.38 It was the primary cause behind Eisenhower’s decision to sign
‘NSC Resolution 5820’ which recognised the demanding need for a new approach to the Middle East,
acknowledging Nasser’s use as a bulwark against communism in the region and that non-aligned
nations are compatible with US interests.39 The case for intervention was believed to be made,
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
15
reinforced by over a hundred acts to aid rebels from the UAR, and statements such as Vice President
Nixon’s “we will not stand by to allow civil war to deliver a country even to Nasser” become
representative of the new hardened view.4041 Furthermore, it convinced the U.S. that Nasser’s efforts
to destabilise their interests had to be countered using the same means. Eisenhower was keen to
construct “a strong powerful voice speaking in the Mid East” to battle a campaign of hatred,
admitting that the people were on Nasser’s side, and that by not investing in propaganda and
information war the U.S. has only strengthened its opponent, this included plans to jam hostile
broadcasts in key areas like Beirut and Amman.424344
Despite this development, the U.S. had no intent to directly uproot Nasserism which would in turn
further demonise their position in the Arab world, they still understood the strained state of
American-Egyptian relations to be largely the result of being outcompeted by the Soviets and Nasser
to be a mere opportunist.45 The optimal next step was to “shake Nasser loose from his convictions
that his only friends are the Soviets” as ideologically Eisenhower and his officials had no inherent
opposition to Arab nationalism given if it looks inward for self-development and avoids ambitions of
external influence.46 Nasser acted to reaffirm this perception, making it clear in diplomatic talks that
he only went to the USSR when the U.S. refused to win him over, with UAR Ambassador Kamel
claiming that they were prepared to cease any arms transactions with the USSR should the US
government provide an appropriate deal.47 Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal – a close confidant of
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
16
Nasser – visualised what a joint US-UAR productive relationship would look like, bonded by “the
greatest interest in ensuring… a stable, anti-communist government”, forming a new perimeter that
the Soviets could not cross into.48 By the end of the year, Nasser was negotiating requests for PL 480
food aid, particularly wheat, in return for taking a “stronger line on [the] Commie issue” and was
viewed more positively by U.S. officials who regarded the opportunity not just a “wheat deal but [a]
transaction in fundamental foreign relations”.49 In addition, a new common ground was found in Iraq
where President Qassim’s rule fostered the Arab world’s strongest communist force, both sides were
prepared to forget the quarrel in Lebanon to cooperate in countering a shared threat. Surprisingly,
Eisenhower seriously comprehended the prospects of having Nasser as the bulwark against Soviet
influence in the Middle East and believing “it might be good policy to help the UAR take over in Iraq”,
recognising that the UAR and Kremlin were far more incompatible than was initially believed.50
Evidently, 1958 marked a turning point in US-Egyptian relations where Nasser was willing to
moderate policies deemed offensive to the United States in return for their understanding and
cooperation in limiting Israeli arm sales, blocking off Soviet interventions, and aid in Egypt’s
modernisation.
48
49
50
17
Chapter Two:
Anti-communism and the UAR-Israel dilemma (1959-1960)
For the first time since the initial period after the 1956 Suez Crisis, US-Egyptian relations were on a
positive rise. In 1959, anti-communism is a significant factor in relation to how relations continued to
improve alongside the U.S. loosening its strict view of neutralism being a façade for communism. This
is most evident in how both nations approached Iraq where they shared a belief that it was victim to
an “effective Communist drive toward power” as a result of Prime Minister Qassim’s inability to
stabilise the balance of power between nationalists, Nasserites, and communists.51 At the ‘393d
Meeting of the National Security Council’ in January 15, this development was expressed best by Mr.
Gray - Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: “we would not prevent Nasser
from moving promptly to counter Communist Gains…Nasser was certainly the lesser of two evils”.52
This took place alongside the UAR’s firm anti-communist stance materialising in a political crackdown
on Egypt and Syria’s Communists which the US felt “heartened” by, noting that a new balanced
approach that kept Nasser at bay but acknowledged his usefulness was needed.5354 This was assisted
by other Arab leaders such as the Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karame who advised the U.S. that
Nasser should not be mistook as anything other than a neutralist.55 Another significant factor was the
U.S. felt isolated in its perception of Iraq’s dangerous potential of becoming a communist stronghold
due to the United Kingdom displaying little alarm, Saudi Arabia being torn between a hatred of
Communism and Nasserism, and Turkey preferring to defend Iraq in the case of UAR intervention;
51
52
53
Ibid
54
55
18
this factor further demonstrated the necessity for an ally like Nasser.56 Eisenhower at times led this
reconciliatory view, searching for “what encouragement or what money” they could give Nasser to
counter Iraq which would in turn deter another crisis that the U.S. would have to intervene in. 57 In
recognition of Nasser’s wide set of resources at his disposal, a network of loyal agents and friends,
authority and influence that captured the entire region through a powerful propaganda machine,
and the fact that he already made an attempt to overthrow the Qassim government, Eisenhower and
his administration were prepared to abandon its policy of isolating Egypt and bring it to the wider
fold.58 This was extended to the Chief of Naval Operations – Arleigh A. Burke – who assured the U.S.
Navy’s services to Nasser “in specific amounts” to keep Iraq non-communist in spite of Nasser being
“not a reliable man”.59 By the later half of the year, these factors only strengthened with an
attempted assassination on Qassim by nationalist conspirators pushing him further towards
communist allies as expressed by a six-hour press conference where his denunciation of the
nationalists played into Eisenhower and Nasser’s fears.60
By the opening of 1960, the United States found itself increasingly more occupied with Cuba where a
revolutionary Castro and Guevara were effectively seizing the island’s lands and asset. Reflections of
Nasser were expressed in this anxiety as evident in MacMillan’s letter to Eisenhower in July 22
referring to Castro as “your Nasser” and the determination from Cuban diplomats to establish a close
relationship with the UAR by efforts such as interviewing Nasser.6162 Additionally, the UAR maintained
strong ties to the USSR with regard to its role as the sole supplier of military equipment and
economic assistance for the grander UAR projects, despite a continuance of Iraq’s position as the
56
57
58
59
60
61
Ibid.
62
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba, eds. John P. Glennon and Ronald D. Landa
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 551.
19
headquarters of Soviet activity in this period.6364 However, this was a lesser issue to Eisenhower and
his administration than it was previously, now in the belief that “Nasser is fully determined…[to] non-
alignment and would react sharply to any Soviet effort [to] exploit its position”, enforced by Nasser’s
reaffirmations that Egypt only remained a recipient of USSR aid (with no ideological ties) in the
absence of the United States.65
Above all else, American-Egyptian relations in 1960 became redefined by the growing tensions of
Israel’s dual existence as the closest ally to the U.S. in the Middle East but also a significant
impairment to the improvement of US-Arab relations. By April, the Ambassador to the UAR – G.
Frederick Reinhardt – was warning that the United States’ favourable stance to Israel which included
consistent personal visits, conversations with Eisenhower, and its success in obtaining Western arms
was leading to a “deep seated fear of and alleged US partiality towards Israel” from the UAR that
crippled recent progress.66 This dilemma for the U.S. only worsened from Israeli efforts which
sustained an intense pressure on Eisenhower for increased aid and formal security declarations citing
Nasser’s supposed obsessive fixation with conquering Israel to “exterminate the Jews just as Hitler
exterminated them in Germany”.67 Aggravated by Nasser’s rhetoric such as indicating that the Jews
would meet the same fate as the crusaders in a recent speech, Ben-Gurion continued to insist on the
delivery of advanced weaponry including ‘Hawk’ missiles to guarantee Israel’s safety.6869 In an effort
to avoid any an arms race and a declaration to one side of the conflict, the U.S. repeated that it only
63
64
Eisenhower Library. NSC Staff Papers, Disaster File, Box 66, Iraq. “MFR re Meeting of Special Committee on Iraq, January
13, 1960”. Declassified Documents – Fiscal Year 2011.
65
66
67
68
69
20
served to act as a mediator in disputes and aid to UAR remained purely technical.70 The Arab world
was entirely unconvinced of the U.S. existing as a mere mediator and matters worsened with
developments such as the Douglas-Keating “Freedom of the Seas” amendment which sought to
punish participants of the Arab boycott of Israel by restricting access to assistance under the Mutual
Security Act, citing that those who use the means of “boycotts, blockades, and the restriction of the
use of international waterways” against other members assisted by the Act endangered the peace of
the world.71 In a rare New York meeting between US and UAR representatives including Eisenhower
and Nasser in September 26, Nasser revealed no shyness on confronting his counterparts on the
impact their closeness to Israel had on US-UAR relations, describing Israel as “the main barrier” to
improvement and the United States’ decision (alongside France and the U.K.) to exclusively sell arms
to Israel but not Egypt as objective proof of an inherent US bias.72 Referencing the discovery of
American 105mm recoilless rifles appearing in an Israeli parade, Nasser stated boldly: “I must protect
my country and my people. Israel is the barrier to good US-Arab relations”.73 In realisation that
neither Israel nor the UAR could be dismissed as allies to please the other, the U.S. could only
respond by reassuring Nasser of their dedication to be friends with all the countries in the Middle
East and that the Arab world has to accept that Israel is now a historical reality , the suggested
approach was to work together in solving the refugee problem reminding Nasser that the U.S. was
spending 23 million dollars each year on the issue.74
At the end of the year, this growing tension manifested in a vitriolic attack on the West, United
States, and its activity in Nasser’s Victory Day speech on December 23, warning that any attempt on
part of “Washington or London” to impose peace between the Arab world and Israel was doomed to
70
71
“U.S.-Israel Economic Cooperation: Fighting The Arab Boycott”. Jewish Virtual Library, 2008.
72
73
Ibid.
74
Ibid.
21
failure and if Israel acquired an atom bomb then the “UAR would get one, too, at any price”.75 U.S. aid
to Israel was at the centre of this barrage, placing blame on America for escalating the conflict by
paying for “every bullet fired to kill an Arab”.76 Other components of United States foreign policy
were targeted – primarily NATO – for its logistical support of France’s bid to tighten its grip onto an
increasingly rebellious Algeria and the United Nations regarding the Congo Crisis where Nasser
stated it was “used as [a] vehicle by big colonialist powers” to protect nationalist elements.77 The U.S.
was aware of the dangerous implications of this speech, not only would Nasser support the USSR in
the case of the Congo Crisis to alter the United Nation’s structure if the US continues to back the
“wrong people”, he would also seek to obtain the atom bomb from the Soviet Union at the cost of
their independence if Israel should be given its own by the West.78 Evidently, 1960 reveals that the
US-Israeli relationship, including broader relations with Western Europe, was one of the most
significant factors in why US-UAR relations failed to continue on a steady positive projection towards
increased co-operation and diplomacy, with the U.S. refusing to abandon its policy of reconciliation
towards the UAR to please Israeli demands for increased security measures or its policy of aid and
protection of Israel to reverse regressing UAR relations.
75
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
22
Chapter Three:
Kennedy’s Reconciliation and Putting Palestine in the ‘Icebox’ (1961)
John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on January 20, 1961, and his legacy in foreign policy remains widely
commentated on and assessed, where it is the humiliating 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion or the highly
praised 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. What is less discussed is Kennedy’s plan to reshape how the
United States approached the Middle East, using his own formula that was characterised by the need
to make the leaders of the post-colonial world turn their attention inwards addressing internal
development above external desires of regional domination. Current components like belief in the
UN and Soviet containment were maintained whilst new policies such as a highly personal diplomacy
came to define Kennedy’s international image as a charismatic friend-to-all and genuine upholder of
traditional American values. He had already begun cultivating this image before his presidential
victory, opposing Eisenhower’s support of France’s suppression of Algerian rebels and promoted an
even-handed relationship towards Arabs and Israelis.79 During the first half of 1961, Kennedy sought
to adopt a reconciliatory, co-operative and mutually beneficial relationship with the UAR that
perfected a method of minimising damage to allies offended by closer US-UAR ties whilst maximising
US gains which included achieving a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Palestine issue, raising Nasser
as a wall against Soviet penetration, securing Middle Eastern oil (primarily to protect Western Europe
which imported three quarters of its petroleum from the MENA), and reducing the intensity of anti-
Western narratives that inspired much of Arab society at the time.80
Kennedy understood how in the past U.S. actions had directly worsened its presence in the Arab
world which included the previous Democratic Presidency, where Truman’s strong partiality to Israel
caused a resurging fear that Kennedy’s administration might not be any different. In countering this
Kennedy openly stated that “if we can learn from the lessons of the past” and assure the Arabs that
79
80
Little, Douglas. “The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism.” The Journal of American History
(1988): pp. 501
23
their liberty to be neutralists and nationalists were not threatened then “the Middle East can
become an area of strength and hope”.81 In achieving this, Kennedy cultivated high-level officials in
his administration who possessed this same mindset, seen in appointing John S. Badeau – the former
president of the American University in Cairo with good contacts like Anwar El-Sadat and Nasser – as
the new US ambassador to the UAR.82 Furthermore, McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs) and Robert Komer (Middle East Specialist on the National Security Council) were
given the specific task to begin “reappraising our relations with Nasser” and the Arab world through
a reasonably balanced policy that helped countries “control their own destinies” through aid not
intended for conflict but development in the core national sectors.83 In regards with Nasser, Kennedy
understood his position as the Arab world’s foremost nationalist spokesperson and America could
only go forward - as Kennedy remarked in July 1958 - by “doing business with Nasser” and
harnessing his influence for good.84
At the centre of this reformed perception towards the UAR was Kennedy’s acceptance of neutralism
as not anathema to U.S. goals. He praised neutralism for resisting Soviet domination and enforced
the perception that Arab nationalism and Soviet long-term aims were inherent incompatible.85
Neutralist countries, Kennedy believed, were ripe to enter a new stage of “concentration on internal
problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so forth” because of their rejection to
enter the wider Cold War and dedicate resources to pursuing gains for the sake of the West or East,
this was a foundation for friendship with the U.S.86 This perception was in line with the desires of
most developing nations and soon Nasser was ready to work with Kennedy “to forsake the
microphone for the bulldozer” through a new relationship bonded by a highly personal diplomacy of
exchanged letters where Nasser often praised Kennedy on matters such as the May 6 space launch,
81
Ibid.
82
Little, Douglas (1988), pp. 505
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid.
85
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, eds. Nina J. Noring and Glenn W.
LaFantasie (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 68.
86
24
reinstated gratitude for help in Suez Crisis, and even approved of policy towards Cuba.878889
Ambassador Kamel communicated the potential good U.S. aid in development would have for their
shared relations, telling Kennedy in the summer of 1961 that “a single three-year food aid
commitment would produce far greater economic dividends for Egypt and far greater political
dividends for the United States, than all these six-month agreements”, soon after Kennedy was
instructing Rusk to “get some more meat into our UAR policy” to finalise Nasser’s switch from
fomenting revolution to nation building.90 Throughout 1961, the UAR was receiving Public Law-480
assistance, loan assistance from the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund, and
President Kennedy’s personal efforts in pledging ten million dollars in dedication of saving the
Nubian monuments when waters diverted by Russian engineers working on the Aswan Dam
threatened to “inundate the great stone pharaohs at Abu Simel”.9192 This included US commodity aid
and technical cooperation such as in the Syrian region that saw USOM technicians work on joint
programs and by March 1961 a total of $140 million in loans and agricultural sales were made with
the UAR; later followed up by $432 million in PL-480 assistance to Egypt (constituting over 30 percent
of Egypt’s total supply of wheat) being approved by Kennedy in October 1961.9394
In return for this wealth of assistance, Nasser moderated his anti-Western rhetoric and soon severe
criticism transformed into either active praise or resilient silence. This less inflammatory Nasser was
most appreciated on the Israel-Palestine situation, where Egypt itself used the term “icebox” to refer
to its self-renunciation on the issue in favour of demonstrating its trust in Kennedy’s desired
87
88
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Countries. United Arab Republic: Subjects: Nasser
correspondence, 1961: May-July. JFKNSF-169-004. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Page 2.
89
90
91
correspondence, 1961: August-December. JFKNSF-169-005. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Page 3-4
92
93
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1961-1962, eds. Nina J. Noring and Glenn W.
94
25
approach which would see all resolutions arise from the United Nation.95 The United States gradually
noted that the UAR position on the Cuban question, despite being unchanged, became “cordial” and
absence of vocal attacks against the U.S. were now rare with no sign of regressing, serving to prove
“a desire on Nasser’s part to improve the atmosphere” amongst the two nations.96
This also took form in the Middle East where Nasser withheld any drastic action like military
intervention in matters where he previously had a pattern in doing so, specifically in July 1961 where
he displayed a rare restraint towards Britain’s Operation Vantage and its landing of troops in Kuwait
to protect against Iraqi aggression, effectively placing Nasser in the “same camp as the U.S.
conservative friends in the region, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.”97
The UAR’s eventual breakup during the second half of 1961 ostensibly appeared as a danger to
reverse these gains in US-UAR relations, similar to how the Congo Crisis or bubbling Israeli tensions in
1960 resulted in a more emotional Nasser and outbursts against the United States. What was
believed to be the embodiment of pan-Arab, Nasserite, republican ideals collapsed over issues
arising from the governance and political structure of the union with both sides accusing the other of
“untrustworthiness and even betrayal”, combined with what many Syrians perceived as an attempt
to ‘Egyptianize’ them and a growing Baath party influence.98 Whilst this situation would have been
viewed as a rare opportunity to isolate Nasser further or even deliver a final blow to his prestige in
1957-8, Kennedy instead was passive and offered U.S. services to both the new Syrian Kuzbari regime
and Nasser.99 On one hand, the U.S. knew that the new regime’s “failure will doubtless be followed
by something more extreme” and by succeeding it could evolve into a liberal beacon in the Arab
world contrasted by the commonly extreme Arab politics.100 Syria’s administration remained anti-
95
Ibid.
96
97
98
Gerges, Fawaz A. Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash That Shaped the Middle East. Princeton University
Press, 2018: pp.191
99
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1961-1962, eds. Nina J. Noring and Glenn W.
100
26
communist and had no expansionist ambitions or desire to elevate their dislike of Nasser to conflict;
from this viewpoint the U.S. saw no reason why they should refuse official recognition once the
situation cooled down.101102 Furthermore, Nasser whilst certainly being devastated at the UAR’s
collapse and placing blaming imperialist machinations had made a public pledge “that Arab would
not shoot Arab”, accepting the breakup as a fate he could not redivert.103104 This entirely relieved the
United States from the burden of having to adhere to a side in sacrifice of the other and letter
correspondences between Kennedy and Nasser carried on during the crisis reveal a continued
friendliness with Kennedy writing he is “highly pleased…and especially impressed with Nasser’s
statesmanlike address of September 29 in which he rejected resort to force or shedding of Arab
blood…”.105 It is in this regard that 1961 is considered the year in which positive US-UAR relations
peaked, free from any major event or crisis that regressed progress and consistent with a new
approach from both nations that effectively played on common ground and mutual benefit.
101
Ibid.
102
103
104
105
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962, eds. Nina J. Noring
and Glenn W. LaFantasie (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 119.
27
Chapter Four:
War in Yemen and Kennedy’s assassination (1962-1963)
The trajectory of US-UAR relations was the best it had been since the Suez Crisis and with no
foreseeable catastrophic events in sight, Kennedy’s administration sought to undertake more
ambitious steps in their long-term goals, primarily to finally put an end to the Palestinian refugee
problem that plagued Eisenhower. Nasser was still regarded as the best option in Egypt based on the
belief that he effectively demonstrated his dedication to positive neutralism that would allow, as
Bowles stated, “to meet us more than halfway”.106 Even when Nasser presented The National
Charter (al-Mithaq al-Watani) on May 21, 1962 which sought to comprehensively map out the aims
and principles of Egypt’s ruling government - earning Soviet praise for its reaffirmation of building a
mixed economy based on the Arab worlds own ‘Arab socialism’ - the United States remained
optimistic pointing out that the charter “strikes hard at communism” and “advocates forward
looking economic and social measures such as family planning and equality of women”. 107 This was
helped by the recognised increased distribution of power amongst Nasser and his underlings as a
consequence of the UAR breakup.108
Aid remained the foundation of US-UAR relations with Nasser reiterating his pledge to continue his
moderated political expressions particularly on the Arab-Israeli dispute which he consistently
demonstrated such as when Israel planned to divert Jordan waters, resulting in even parts of the
conservative Arab world calling out Nasser for his lack of critic that used to dominate Middle Eastern
106
107
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Countries. United Arab Republic: Subjects:
Nasser correspondence, 1962: June-July. JFKNSF-169-007. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Page 3-4.
108
28
radio stations.109110 In return, greater quantities of food aid such as recent approvals of $23 million in
PL 480 currency and more significant types of aid such as development including $17 million in
construction of grain storage silos and the provision of U.S. economic consultants were given. 111
Furthermore, this complimented the continued highly personal diplomacy between Kennedy and
Nasser which in early September included friendly messages to inform Egypt of any arms sales to
Israel which whilst resulting in a usual disappointment from Nasser, it also revealed “he was grateful
to have been informed in advance” leading to the lack of newspaper attacks or demonstrations
outside American embassy in Cairo, an appreciated rare occurrence.112 Overall, in the first half of
1962 the U.S. was firmly confident in the future of its relations with Egypt, backed by an expanding
scope of dialogue and increased cooperation.113
However, just as it was with the Lebanon Crisis, a spontaneous conflict in the Middle East interrupted
any future plans by immediately becoming a highly intervened event in which opposing sides rose in
pursuit of their own gains, using the affected local population as substitutes of their own militaries to
avoid international blame and effectively evolving minor conflicts into proxy wars. This is seen most
evidently in the 1962 Yemen War, where a combination of “Islamic sectarian schism, reformist
discontent, and tribal restiveness” exploded resulting in the September 12 overthrow of the
traditional and Saudi-backed Imam al-Badr by Col. Abdullah Sallal and his young cohort of ambitious
officers affiliated with Nasserite ideals.114 Kennedy found himself at a difficult dilemma where the
two most important Arab leaders that the U.S. had dedicated years of effort into were now
practically at war and both desired a U.S. bias.115 After Egyptian General Ali Abd’ al-Hameed’s visit to
109
Ibid.
110
111
112
113
114
115
29
Sana’a and realisation the necessity of their intervention if the new regime was to survive; He asked
Nasser for a Sa’aqah (Special Forces battalion) which arrived on October 5 and was justified using the
1956 Jeddah Pact to argue that Saudi Arabia escalated the conflict first by aiding the royalists. 116
Remaining faithful to a reconciliatory and balanced approach, Kennedy and his officials assured King
Faisal of their dedication to maintaining Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty whilst promising Nasser that they
would not intervene, in return Nasser pledged he was not after a broader goal of overthrowing
Faisal.117 However, behind this balanced approach Kennedy’s administration was processing a
decision that ultimately declared their support for the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and therefore
Nasser.
Motivated by an already existing unpopularity of Imams Ahmad and al-Badr within the White House
due to their friendliness with the Soviet Union expressed in arms shipments arriving in Yemeni ports
during the 1950s and its acknowledgement of the incapability of the imamate to reform and
modernise Yemen, the U.S. early in the conflict decided they should recognise the YAR. 118 This came
at the heavy price of disapproval where Jordan’s King Hussein was an early outspoken critic of the
decision, Britain urged Kennedy to delay recognition indefinitely, Israel and its supporters at home
demanded “some action favourable to Tel Aviv in return for American recognition”, and Faisal was
“absolutely furious”.119 Matters were made worse when reports of Egyptian air strikes of Saudi
Arabian villages and shelling of Muwassam were delivered, combined with an expanding presence of
Egyptian troops in Yemen which complicated the perceived benefits of an early recognition. 120121
Regardless, Kennedy’s administration continued with its original plan that once recognition was given
to the YAR and Faisal ceased aiding the royalists, Nasser would pull his troops out effectively
116
Orkaby, Asher Aviad. 2014. The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard
University. pp. 88
117
118
Orkaby, Asher Aviad (2014), pp. 112
119
Little, Douglas (1988), pp. 501 and 514
120
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, eds. Nina J. Noring and Glenn
W. LaFantasie (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), Document 91.
121
30
reversing the conflict to a local level.122 Anxiety that if the war stalled into the next year the Soviets
would repeat similar manoeuvres done in Iraq taking advantage of the YAR’s growing desperate need
of a resolution.123 At the heart of this decision was to ensure progress made in US-UAR relations
would not be disrupted, the fruits of Kennedy’s labour “finally begun to pay handsome rewards”
such as redirecting UAR trade more towards the West and its commitment to keeping Palestine in
the icebox and this was not something the U.S. was ready to lose.124 Nasser simply did not have the
resources, manpower, or prestige to prolong his involvement with signs already in the first months
that Yemen was no more than a drain on Egyptian finances that was bound to make Egyptians more
desperate and emotional to exit whilst justifying their initial entrance, the U.S. had to avoid this if it
was to sustain positive relations.125126 As the conflict raged on at the end of the year, Kennedy
approved United States recognition of the YAR and the State Department made the formal
announcement on December 19, 1962.127
Kennedy’s administration quickly learnt that the situation was far more complex than they
anticipated and even a decision as major as U.S. early recognition of the new nationalist Arab regime
had a very short-lived appreciation. As Nasser opened the new year with another series of air strikes
on Saudi Arabian soil in response to stepped-up Saudi supplies to royalists, the U.S. was forced into
cancelling any plans of a Nasser visit to the White House and suffered from an increasingly angered
Faisal who was now calling for “US jets to protect him" and a public declaration of their stance.128 Yet
even Nasser’s refusal to comply with Kennedy’s plan of a gradual withdrawal from Yemen and
continued attacks against the most important conservative Arab ally did not deter their approach
122
Ibid.
123
124
125
126
127
128
31
with Badeau continuing to preach that the suspension or refusal of aid only worsens the situation by
humiliating Nasser and driving him to unfavourable alternatives with the Soviets, as learnt by the
Eisenhower administration.129 However, the dedication to this approach did not go unscathed and
Kennedy himself, whilst continuing his highly personal diplomacy approach, began to adopt a more
blunt and less friendly tone as seen his January 19 letter to Nasser stating “each time we have felt we
were making some progress toward disengagement, such actions as the Najran bombings have set us
back”, refusing to further adopt the often soft-spoken, dismissive tone that Kennedy used with
Nasser to avoid appearing as an uninvited attempt to lecture.130 This feeling was not limited to
Kennedy and soon the likes of Rusk, Bundy, Talbot and Komer – who all were very supportive of
Nasser’s cooperation – now reported themselves as “disillusioned with Nasser’s apparent
unwillingness” to escalate tensions by physically provoking Faisal and funnelling more resources into
Yemen.131 In respect of their own neutral policy and disapproval of Nasser’s strikes, the U.S. decided
that giving Faisal the defensive air force he wanted in February 27 (Operation Hard Surface) was the
optimal decision but with a hidden safeguard that instructed U.S. pilots that they were forbidden
from firing at UAR targets, transforming the defense as purely symbolic and into paper tigers.132
The Yemen Civil War was now characterised by its fluctuating progress and regress where the United
States remained dedicated to its plan that would see Faisal end royalist aid first then a Nasser
withdrawal. Kennedy was met with only broken promises from both sides, with Faisal’s agreement
constantly being proven to be short-lived which only led to Nasser repeatedly justifying his air strikes
and military presence.133 On one hand, Nasser’s early reassurances in April that “if the Saudi Arabians
will stop their aid to the Royalists, we will withdraw immediately” received appreciation from
Kennedy and Badeau as proof of his constructive approach, but as the war dragged on through to
129
130
131
Ibid.
132
133
32
November and Nasser kept failing his promises of withdrawal despite Faisal making good on his
cessation of aid, such as by keeping 30,000 troops by November 1 despite assurances it would be
reduced to 26,000, Nasser had significantly damaged his reputation amongst Kennedy’s
administrations as the United States’ newest friend in the Arab world.134 Furthermore, as feared
Nasser only became more reactive and emotional as the conflict lasted, soon bitterly complaining
against the American tactics of pressuring him through using aid, in which Bundy remarked “It now
seemed clear that he would have to go back to 1957” on November 11.135 Twelve days later,
Kennedy’s assassination sent the world into shock and Nasser lost the opportunity to reconcile US-
Egypt relations after the Suez Crisis forcing him to re-examine the balance of its international
relationships.136
In conclusion, US-Egypt relations beginning from the 1956 Suez Crisis ultimately failed to reconcile
through both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Nasser remained a character far too
difficult and complex for the U.S. to decipher resulting in even Kennedy’s reformation of U.S. foreign
policy towards the Middle East being incapable of accomplishing the desired positive trajectory
beyond the short-term. The only framework in which relations could have improved appears to be if
Nasser followed both Eisenhower and Kennedy’s advice to abandon external ambitions of political
ascendance and replaced the microphone for the bulldozer, effectively employing Egypt under the
camp of Arab U.S. allies who benefited from a generous package of aid ranging from food to arms to
construction. This however was never an option for Nasser, who built his entire image on being
resilient, rebellious, and unapologetically Arab, seeking an Arab solution to Arab problems which
materialised in Arab socialism, Pan-Arabism, republicanism, nationalism, and a dosage of anti-
Western rhetoric. The 1963 outcome does not conclude that the process was hopeless from the start
or insist that no success was made, Kennedy’s efforts in achieving an Arab-Israeli peace did lead into
134
135
136
33
relative peace from late 1961-1962 besides sporadic clashes between Israeli troops and Palestinian
guerrillas and for a brief but significant moment the Arab world was on a genuine path to peace
where both conservative and nationalism regimes enjoyed U.S. recognition, support, and personal
diplomacy.
34
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Diplomatic History 28, no 5 (2004).
Essays:
 Orkaby, Asher Aviad. 2014. The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1968. Doctoral
dissertation, Harvard University.
Digital Articles:
 “U.S.-Israel Economic Cooperation: Fighting The Arab Boycott”. Jewish Virtual Library, 2008.

Why Did The US Fail To Accommodate With Nasser

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School of History Dissertation Coversheet

1. All dissertations must be submitted to the module’s QMplus site (HST6700)

e.g. ra12345-HST4000-Essay 1.doc

Dissertation details to be completed before submission:

Special Subject Module

Special Subject Module Title The Global Cold War

Dissertation Advisor Martyn Frampton

Why the United States failed to

Chapter One: Ideological Differences and Territorial Rivalry (1957-1958)……………………….…………………7

Chapter Two: Anti-communism and the UAR-Israel Dilemma (1957-1958)……………………….…………….…7

Chapter Four: War in Yemen and Kennedy’s Assassination (1962-1963)…………………………….……………..7

and still a friend to the West.

Nasser’s ambitions beyond the Middle East.

affairs, driving them further from any prospect of improved US relations.9

papers under government subsidy to vilify US as imperialists…just as if nothing had happened”. 15

of Soviet gains in the Middle East.21

policies in opposition to President Chamoun’s re-election.27 In recognition of this intensely divided

then how can you declare yourselves adverse to communism?”.29

dissatisfaction at Chamoun’s determination to obtain a second six-year term as President providing a

maintained by the Lebanese and Eisenhower saw it no other way.34

broadcasts in key areas like Beirut and Amman.424344

government provide an appropriate deal.47 Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal – a close confidant of

attempted assassination on Qassim by nationalist conspirators pushing him further towards

nationalists played into Eisenhower and Nasser’s fears.60

absence of the United States.65

spending 23 million dollars each year on the issue.74

protection of Israel to reverse regressing UAR relations.

Western narratives that inspired much of Arab society at the time.80

harnessing his influence for good.84

of Egypt’s total supply of wheat) being approved by Kennedy in October 1961.9394

conservative friends in the region, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.”97

statesmanlike address of September 29 in which he rejected resort to force or shedding of Arab

foreseeable catastrophic events in sight, Kennedy’s administration sought to undertake more

consequence of the UAR breakup.108

moderated political expressions particularly on the Arab-Israeli dispute which he consistently

scope of dialogue and increased cooperation.113

announcement on December 19, 1962.127

Nasser’s cooperation – now reported themselves as “disillusioned with Nasser’s apparent

materialised in Arab socialism, Pan-Arabism, republicanism, nationalism, and a dosage of anti-

National Intelligence Estimates:

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