CHAPTER 4 Foucault’ Biopower Kay Peggs and Barry Smart Introduction When reflecting on his earlier works Discipline and Punish? and the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault commented that ‘the question at the center of everything was: what is power? And to be more specific: how is it exercised, what exactly happens when someone exercises power over another?” He exposed the complexities associated with assem- bling answers to these questions when he engaged analytically with the dis- cursive and institutional traces inscribed by multifaceted relations of power on ‘the living’. Following Foucault’s analyses of the multiple relations, networks, and mechanisms of power, through which conduct is governed, action is structured, and forms of subjectivity are constituted, a notion of biopower’ and an associated term, ‘biopolitics’, have become prominent for discussions of his work and in subsequent analyses of the adminis- ration of life and government of the living.‘ The primary focus of this chapter is these interrelated notions of biopower and biopolitics, notions that ate of considerable import both for understanding the development of Foucault's work and for trying to make some sense of the complex, species- entangled world in which we live. We seek to take issue with anthropo- centric conceptualizations of biopower by suggesting that both Foucault's own, and much current, thinking has failed to adequately address ‘the fun- damental biological fact chat human beings are a species’.‘ This is exempli- fied by the relative neglect in his work of human and non-human animal species relations, which often resemble ‘states of domination’, as we will explore in the concluding sections of the chapter: ‘Modern civilization has generated ‘the most complex system of knowl- edge, the most sophisticated structures of power’.© Power, in Foucault's terms, is relational and relations of power are multiple and exist every- where, It is to the various ways in which Foucault considers power is manifested and exercised that our attention is initially directed.” Given on62 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART that Foucault's consideration of relations of power extends across the complex interconnections among sovereign, disciplinary, and biopolitical forms, we contemplate (1) the juridical framework of sovereign power, as well as disciplinary technologies of power. We then proceed to consider (2) the loose designation of the ‘new technology of power ... biopolitics biopower’,' including the development of a series of ‘apparatuses’ through which power is exercised over life, where ‘life’ appears to be species-spe- cific, and is addressed in terms of human forms alone. This leads us, finally, to reflect on (3) the question of human and non-human animal relations in respect of the exercise of biopower and the government of the living. Sovereignty, Discipline, and Power over Life Ina series of interviews and other texts, Foucault reflected on the prev- alence of a particular conception of power as repressive, as negative: ‘posed ... in terms of constitution, sovereignty, etc., chat is, in juridical terms’ He comments that, within political philosophy, the tendency has been for power to be thought about and discussed principally in terms of law and sovereignty to the relative neglect of other complex, multiple, capillary power relations that are ‘technical and positive’. Consequently, he directed attention to such complex, multiple, positive, and produc- tive relations of power, articulated within ‘a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements’ as truth. Ie is clear that what interested Foucault the most was to explore the previously ignored workings of forms of relations of power that are not obviously coercive, repressive, or bound up with the agency of a sovereign or state exercising jurisdiction over legal subjects." In a series of lectures delivered in 1973, and subsequently published under the title “Truth and Juridical Forms’, Foucault described how he aimed to bring to light ‘the power relations that permeate the whole fabric of our existence’. Following a description in these lectures of the development of mechanisms and effects of sovereign or juridical power, he describes the subsequent gradual diffusion of disciplinary methods and power relations, leading to the establishment of ‘disciplinary society’. The term ‘disciplinary society’ is employed to begin to outline relations of power of a different order from sovereign power, relations of power articulated with, and between, living beings. A disciplinary society is concerned with relations of knowledge and power, issuing from a range of institutions, chat constitute individuals and act upon their potentialities throughout their lives. These includeFoucault’ Biopower 6 ‘pedagogic institutions such as the school, psychological or psychiatric institutions such as the hospital, the asylum, the police, and so on. Foucault argues that with disciplinary society a new era commences: ‘We ... enter the age of what I would call social orthopedics. I'm talking about a form of power, a type of society that I term ‘disciplinary society’ in contrast to the penal societies known hitherto, This is the age of social con- trol. Among the theorists I cited earlier, there was one who in a sense foresaw and presented a kind of diagram of this society of supervision [surveillance], of this great social orthopedics ~ I'm thinking of Jeremy Bentham.” Bentham is credited with having conceptualized the relations of power to which modern individuals are subject, as having provided a ‘model of this society of generalized orthopedics’, and as having identified the signifi- cance of the architectural form of the Panopticon. In Discipline and Punish Foucault elaborates how the architectural Panopticon enables the spatial exercise of the new mechanics of power he describes. It individualizes bodies; it distributes bodies in visible spaces; and it submits these bodies to ‘permanent, exhaustive, omnipresent surveillance’ In contrast to the juridical notion of sovereign power, which rests on the inquiry, panopticism, or discipline as a technique of power involves examination, observation, and supervision. Through these actions, forms of knowledge are generated and deployed in respect of individuals and their behaviour. Discipline as a technique of power is thus exercised as and through examination, hierarchical observation-supervision—surveillance, and normalizing judgement. It is in and through the formation of this ‘new type of power over bodies’ that knowledge is expressed and derived about the lives and bodies of individuals, and it is in this context that Foucault situates the emergence of the disciplines of the human sciences of, sociology, psychology, and psychiatry." Foucault's discussion of panopticism and discipline reveals the net- work of relations of power and knowledge to which individuals and their bodies became subject in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In his re-theorization of relations of power and the relative shift from sovercignty to discipline, Foucault's focus is on the respects in which the human body became subject to ‘“political anatomy” which was also a “mechanics of power”’, the ways in which trained, docile, and practised bodies were produced and individuals were made more useful, accommo- dating, compliant, and capable in modern societies, including in respect of the licele powers’, the techniques in and through which ‘people's bodies and their time would become labour power and labour time.”64 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART In his discussion of the emergence of biopower, Foucault focuses espe- cially closely upon the development of one ‘particular strand of panoptic disciplinary power’, namely ‘the normative medical or rehabilitative gaze’.” Panoptical power undergoes an ‘intensification’ in this case. The impor- tance for Foucault of medicine and medical intervention in the develop- ment of techniques of power exercised over life and the living is restated in a series of observations on ‘biohistory’, which recognize the ‘introduction of life into history’ in the course of which the related notion of biopolitics is introduced: Society’s control over individuals was accomplished not only through con. sciousness or ideology but also in the body and with the body. For capitalise society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, [and] the corporeal that mattered more than anything else. ‘Ihe body is a biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopolitical strategy." Biopower For Foucault biopower is the exercise of power over life (bios). It is to the first volume of The History of Sexuality that reference is generally made in considerations of Foucault's use of the term, In the final part of the text, “The Right of Death and Power over Life’, Foucault uses the term ‘biopower’ ‘to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transfor- mation of human life’. In contrast to the juridical character of sovercign power and the ‘ancient right to sake life or let live’, biopower is exercised over individuals and populations, and, in administering or governing life, it has the capacity to ‘foster life, or disallow it.» ‘The two dimensions of biopower identified, along which the exercise of power over life developed, are (a): ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’, focussed on the living body as machine, the ‘optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls’; and (2) ‘a biopolitics of the population’, focussed on the social body, the ‘species body’ and its constitutive living characteristics, which include ‘propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity’ + With the advent of biopower, what we might call a species-consciousness developed. And, as the emphasis shifted to fostering life, interrogation of and intervention in the processes of life promoted knowledge and under- standing of ‘what it meant to be a living species in a living world’. While biopower assumes many forms, the common denominator is the respectsFoucault’ Biopower 6 in which living beings (or, ro be more precise, living human beings), indi vidually and collectively, become subject to observation, calculation, sta- tistical assessments, intervention, etc., as they are inscribed ‘into the order of knowledge and power’. Ina lecture delivered on 17 March 1976 and published in Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault identifies a series of transformations associated with the exercise of power in the course of the nineteenth century. In par- ticular, he considers the ways in which sovereign power is ‘complemented’ by the complex articulation of disciplinary mechanisms and technologies of power, which emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a new technology of power, ‘biopolitics’, which appears in the closing decades of the eighteenth century. Foucault describes the latter as merging and integrating with, modifying to an extent, and ‘infiltrating ... [and] embedding itself in’ existing disciplinary techniques.** Elaborating on ‘this biopolitics, this biopower’, Foucault shows how, through a demographic assembly of statistics, population became an object of knowledge and target for administration, management, and control.” ‘This led to a series of developments in the exercise of power over life, including a medicine focused on public hygiene, institutions and campaigns to organize and promote medical care by teaching hygiene, as well as other interventions in reproduction, mortality, old age, and ‘accidents, infirmities, and various anomalies’, to which the establishment of charities, forms of insurance, and savings and pension schemes were associated responses.” In this way, biopolitics engages with the population ‘as a problem that is at once sci- entific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem’. Biopolitics is concerned with the unpredictable, collective ‘living’ phe- nomena that vary over time and employs mechanisms such as ‘forecasts, statistical estimates and overall measures’ to provide a basis on which to intervene to achieve continuous purchase over, and regulation of, the ‘pop- ulation of living beings’ Whereas disciplinary mechanisms operate at the level of the individual body and its capacities, the technology of biopower is directed towards regulating the ‘biological processes’ of the population of living beings, Notwithstanding the complex relationships among all living beings and the dependence in various significant respects of human beings on other living beings, Foucault's consideration of the ‘technology of biopower’ is restricted to ‘the biological processes of man-as-species’» The distinctiveness of biopower is outlined succinetly by Foucault in the following terms: it is reducible neither to the sovereign theory of ‘right’, with its juridical contractual conception of the individual and society, nor to the disciplines and associated technologies of power operating66 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART upon the bodies of individuals. It is, rather, power exercised to regularize and enhance the existence of the multiplicity of living beings, following ‘a demographic explosion and industrialization’, and it includes forms of intervention calculated to reduce random events and risks, prevent accidents where possible, and diminish deficiencies ~ or at least compen- sate for such eventualities — as they bear on the ‘control of life in gen- eral’2* Such developments subsequently led Foucault to ask whether, and to what extent, ‘the general economy of power in our societies is becoming a domain of security?’ Security and Population: Power over Life and the Government of the Living The notions of biopower and biopolities are integral to subsequent lecture series delivered by Foucault in 1978 and 1979, and published in Security Territory and Population’* and The Birth of Biopolitics,” respectively. Both texts focus on the historical background and context for the development of complex forms of power over life. In Security, Territory and Population, Foucault acknowledges the relative vagueness of the term ‘biopower’ and promises further study and elab- oration of the mechanisms involved. He states in the first lecture, ‘[bly this [bio-power] I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, of, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species’ * But dis- cussion in the subsequent series of lectures offers relatively little explicit consideration of the notion of biopower. Rather, Foucault introduces a seties of additional terms with which to trace with greater precision the complex historical roots of the forms of rationality, mechanisms, and tech- nologies associated with the exercise of power over (social and economic) life, The central concern is analysis of the historical emergence of a form of political rationality and a new technique of power directed towards pop- ulation. Foucault analyzes the development of mechanisms, technologies, and ‘apparatuses (disposiifi)’ of security, population as a new collective ‘political subject’, and in due course ‘government’ as the pre-eminent form of power.” ‘What is indicated here is the emergence in the eighteenth century of new realities, new economic and political problems, a ‘different economyFoucault’ Biopower o of power’, and a ‘new political personage’ ~ the population — which became an object or target, as both human species and public, of govern- mental practice and management, and which ‘appears in a whole series of knowledges’ The emergence of ‘population’ is articulated with a series of transformations in the field of knowledge, including transitions ‘from natural history to biology’ and from ‘the analysis of wealth to political economy’, in tandem with an increasing concern with questions of gov- ernment and the governing of life and living,* In a further reconsideration of the substance of his lecture course Foucault remarks that a more appro- priate title for his deliberations would be ‘a history of governmentality’ By the latter, Foucault means analysis of the complex combination of institutions, mechanisms, techniques, and tactics that facilitate the exercise of power over population as a system of living beings, the establishment of ‘political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’ In addressing the seventeenth- and cighteenth-century roots of governmentality, which is accorded ‘pre-eminence’ over other forms of power, Foucault describes how the intention is to get behind or outside the institution of the state, to uncover the internal structures, forms of knowl- edge, and technologies of power constitutive of the ‘governmentalization of the state’ In a following set of lectures on liberalism, discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of the current book, Foucault explains that his focus had become ‘governmental reason’ or ‘governmentality’ because an analysis of biopolitics is ultimately bound up with an understanding of the com- plex ways in which problems arising from the attributes and features of population are rationalized and addressed in governmental practice. In particular, endemic to the political rationality of liberalism, and later neoliberalism, there is a continual critical monitoring, measuring, and questioning of the parameters and processes of the practices of governing and associated social and economic consequences. And it is to the respects in which ‘the problems of life and population have been posed within a technology of government ... constantly haunted by the question of liber- alism’ that, Foucault concludes, attention now needs to be directed." But there are other relevant questions haunting the ways in which the exercise of power over life, over the living, has been posed and explored to which critical consideration also needs to be given. In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault remarks that ‘[fJor millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question’. It is to the complex forms of articulation of68 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART the living human, as one animal among and alongside countless animal species, that we now turn our attention. On the Government of the Living: Human and ‘Animal’ “The exercise of power over life and the government of the living invite searching questions regarding ‘life’ and ‘the living’, comparable to those posed by Foucault of ‘power’. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that in the course of the nineteenth century biological existence was increasingly ‘reflected in political existence’, such that ‘the fact of living .. passed into knowledge’s field of control and power's sphere of inter- vention’ ‘This particular passage continues with a reference to power ‘dealing ... with living beings’ and to biopower designating ‘what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations’ +* Whereas in History of Madness? and The Order of Things,® as Jeffrey Nealon notes, some consideration is given to non-human animals ~ to animal life and animality — the later discussion of the exercise of power over ‘life’ and ‘the living’ is limited merely to one form of life, to one species: humans. There is a case for arguing (as Foucault himself observed, ironically enough, in his deliberations on genealogy*) that his consideration of the forms in which power is exercised over different types of living beings has been ‘insuffi- ciently elaborated’. Forms of knowledge about non-human animals and the associated mechanisms of material coercion to which they have been subjected, and from which the lives and bodies of individual human beings and populations have benefitted in various ways, have been ‘disqualified’ and/or ‘subjugated’ Foucault observes that ‘modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question.» And he might have added (as we wish to) that, simultaneously, modern humanity's existence rou- tinely subjugates and terminates the lives of endless multitudes of non- human animals in the course of, for example, scientific research and food production/consumption. Throughout history, human existence has been inextricably articulated with other forms of life and living, in particular with other species being subjected to ‘explicit calculations’ made mani- fest in the form of ‘domestication’, genetic and other types of biolog- ical engineering, industrialized rearing and slaughtering, and episodes of extinction.» The politics, ethics, and mode(s) of living of modern humans have been predicated upon the routine subjection of virtually every other species of animal to multiple mechanisms of power — sovereign, dis- ciplinary, and biopolitical — which, on an industrial scale, have at theFoucault’ Biopower 6 minimum significantly transformed the lives and living of other species and placed their very lives in jeopardy. While Foucault clearly recognized the significance of the historical entry of ‘life’ into the order of power- knowledge, Nicole Shukin comments that ‘[aletual animals have ... been subtly displaced from the category of “species” in Foucault's ... remarks on biopower, as well as in the work of subsequent theorists of biopower But analysts are now drawing on Foucault's work to explore ‘the question of life actoss the human-animal divide’” This is because consideration of the complex biopolitical power-knowledge relations between human and non-human animals is integral to an effective understanding of biopower, the production and reproduction of ‘life’, and the government of all living beings. For example, the combination of mechanisms ‘organized around discipline and regulation’, the technologies of biopower operating to cul- tivate and manage subjugated species, and a presumed sovereign right to take life, is emblematic of ‘speciesism’, of the fateful life to which a multi- plicity of other species are consigned in fields, pens, farms, factories, labo- ratories, and slaughtethouses. Of such practices, Coetzee writes: ‘{IJet me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anyching the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” His comment is reminiscent of that attributed to “Theodor Adorno, who is alleged to have said that ‘Auschwitz begins wher- ever someone looks at a slaughterhouse and thinks: they're only animals’. Although Foucault included ‘no sustained meditation on Nazism and the Holocaust’ his clarification of a comment in The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, on genocide as ‘the dream of modern power does anticipate a relevant line of thinking that is developed in a subsequent course of lectures published as Society Must Be Defended." In the course of a series of reflections on transformations in the mechanisms of power, Foucault refers to the fact that there has been a ‘shift in the right of death’, away from the ‘ancient right’. But death, destruction, massacres, wars, and ‘wholesale slaughter’ have, if anything, increased in scale and scope as a ‘formidable power of death’, which is arguably most significantly exemplified by the daily, routine laboratory, factory, and slaughterhouse killing of billions of non-human animals. This ‘power of death’ presents itself as the counter- part of biopower which is ‘situated and exercised at the level of life, species, ...race, and the large-scale phenomena of population’. ‘Taking heed of transformations in the mechanisms of power, and in particular the development, extension, and increasing prominence of7o KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART biopower, Foucault asks how under such conditions it is possible to con- ceptualize the political power to kill. He asks: [since] this power's objec- tive is essentially to make live, how can it let die?” The answer is that the modern State has tended to draw on racist reasoning in 2 number of contexts, when it deemed ‘the right to take life was imperative’ (See Chapter 7 of this book for a more detailed discussion of these points.) Recourse to forms of evolutionism facilitated the differentiation of the human species into ‘races’ and subdivided populations in accordance with ascribed characteristics and qualities, which are judged and hierarchically ordered, creating ‘cacsuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower’, Such reasoning allows ‘others’ to be constituted as ‘bad’, ‘infe- rior’, a threat, and, ultimately, as expendable. As Foucault comments, ‘the death of the other ... is [represented as] something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer’, and a perceived internal of external ‘biological threat’ to the well-being of a population has led co a range of sovereign-like measures exposing those designated as ‘other’ to harm, including ‘death, increasing the risk of death ..., political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on’. Foucault notes the articulation, which developed in the nineteenth cen- tury, between a form of knowledge — biology — and associated technolo- gies of power, which through the invocation of evolutionist themes led to modern racism and which met its ‘paroxysmal development’ in the Nazi states deployment of a combination of disciplinary power, a generaliza- tion of biopower or biopolitical regulation, and a ‘murderous’ sovereign right to kill, throughout the social body.** Foucault's work contributes to our understanding of the relations of power implicated in the events of the Holocaust, and may alert us to the prospect of future holocausts.® It may also provide a basis from which to generate understanding of the complexity of human and non-human animal relations, specifically the respects in which speciesism promotes and legitimates differentiations and hierarchical orderings of living beings within ‘the domain of life that is under power’s control’, thereby fragmenting the population of species.’ But while Foucault's work may provide tools for engaging with the com- plex consequences of the multiple relations of power and knowledge through which humans differentiate themselves from non-human animals, ic is Charles Patterson who has provided a sustained analysis of the respects in which the industrialized, assembly-line slaughter of non-human animals bears comparison with the Holocaust ‘The title of Patterson's book, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, is taken from the story “The Levter Writer’, in whichFoucault’ Biopower n the author, Isaac Bashevis Singer, writes: [iJn relation to them, all people are Nazis; for the animals it is an eternal Treblinka’.” In his critical social and historical study Patterson demonstrates the complicated, and for some controversial, associations between the Holocaust and the human subju- gation of non-human animals by assembling a history of how the domi- nant species ~ human ~ objectifies, terrorizes, and mutilates non-human animals and sends them for slaughter on an industrial scale. Like Foucault, Patterson is influenced by the writings of Bentham. Unlike Foucault, who focussed on Bentham’ ‘architectural figure’ of the Panopticon, Patterson tums his attention to Bentham’ concern for the plight of non-human animals, arguing that he ‘recognized the domestication of animals as tyran- nical” Bentham hoped that ‘{tJhe day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquite those rights which never could have been withheld from them but by the hand of tyranny’. Does the industrial subjugation, chemical and genetic treatment, and slaughtering of non-human animals represent an exemplification of what Foucault identifies as ‘sovereign power’, where the right to ‘take life or Let live’ is assumed? Non-human animals on intensive ‘farms’ are born to an increasingly biogenetically designed and regulated life, co be killable, to be killed. Their lives and deaths are inextricably bound to production and consumption. Discipline produces docile bodies, bodies that may be ‘subjected, used, transformed and improved’, and, as Joel Novek argues, intensive ‘farms, like those for ‘hog production’ in Canada, routinely employ disciplinary technologies of power to produce ‘docile’ non-human animal bodies that are submissive and amenable to ‘intensive confinement’ and ‘the colonization of animal reproductive cycles’, in order to facilitate ‘greater productivity’ Biopower is also increasingly prominent in inten- sive farming practices. As Cary Wolfe notes, there is now on ‘display in the modern factory farm, as pethaps nowhere else in biopolitical history’, a range of bio-technologies of power which have as their aim ‘maximizing control over life and death (...] “making live”, in Foucault's words, through cugenics, artificial insemination and selective breeding, pharmaceutical enhancement, inoculation, and the like'.”* ‘As our foregoing observations indicate, the forms of articulation between sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopolitical power seem to be particularly complex and evident in respect of relations between human and non-human animals, These relations are multifaceted, and there are important distinctions that need to be made between the relations of power between humans and non-human animals in different contexts For example, there are significant differences between the uses of power72 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART to which non-human animals are subjected in scientific laboratories and industrialized agricultural factory farms and the power relations to which companion animals are exposed, as Wolfe and Donna Haraway consider in different ways.” In a discussion of the relationships between human and non-human animal species in scientific laboratories and in houschold contexts, Haraway acknowledges the relevance of Foucault's work on ‘biopower and the proliferative powers of biological discourses’. Disturbing features of Haraway's discussion include the particular attributes she ascribes to non-human animals in scientific laboratories, who are accorded the status of ‘workers’ and are ascribed ‘freedoms’. In a series of clarifications, she argues that as ‘lab actors’, non-human animals in laboratories ‘have many degrees of freedom’ in the sense that if they ‘do not cooperate’, then the experiments will not work. She adds: ‘factory meat industries have to face the disaster of chickens’ or pigs’ refusal to live when their cooperation is utterly disregarded in an excess of human engineering arrogance’.”” Haraway’s account of human and non-human animal power relations seems to draw on Foucault's view that ‘freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power’, since, for Foucault, resistance or recaleitrance is as integral to the working of power relations as the attempt to bring power to bear on a subject. Yet, we might ask (unlike Haraway): What does this look like when applied to extreme or limit cases? About the exercise of power, Foucault writes that ‘in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely’. Elsewhere, he returns to a consideration of such extremes, describing relations of power that have become ‘blocked, frozen’, ot immobilized, and where ‘any reversibility of movement’ is prevented." Foucault refers to these as ‘situations or states of domination’ and adds that in such circumstances ‘practices of freedom do not exist or exist only unilaterally or are extremely constrained or limited’. It is pre- cisely the states of domination imposed on non-human animals, who are forced to conform to the human way of life, whether in the laboratory, the factory farm, or as houschold companions, that Haraway disregards. Concluding Remarks Non-human animals are central to society. A consideration of relations of power exercised over life and living beings needs to address human and non-human animal relations if it is to engage fully with the implications of Foucault's observation that humans are merely one species among many, a species whose being is closely bound up in a myriad of ways with the livesFoucault’ Biopower B of other beings. In his references to the exercise of power over life, Foucault draws a contrast between the sovereign power to take life and biopower understood as a series of interventions, predicated upon and generative of knowledge, that seck to make live and to improve life. However, the life in question, the lives discussed as being disciplined, managed, and regularized, are those of an undifferentiated ‘man-as-species.."" Foucault does not address, in this context at least, the complex forms of articulation between species, the relations of power between the lives of humans and the multiple species of non-human animals, which have a significant bearing on, to take one example, the development of medicine, Nevertheless, his work on forms of power is integral to a critical study of the techniques through which (1) ‘states of domination’ that prevail in human and non- human animal relations ‘ate established and maintained’, and (2) a ‘right to decide life and death’ continues to be exercised over multitudes of non-human animals, and indeed has been extended in scale and scope within late modern intensive factory farms, slaughterhouses, and scientific laboratories." Notes 1 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Allen Lane, 1977 [1975]) 2. Foucault, A History of Sexuality, Vol. x: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin. 1979 [1976]). 3 Foucault On Power’, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Osher Writings 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (London: Routledge 1988 (1978]) 96-109: 101-102. Sce also Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-76 (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 24; 31-32. 4 See Vernon W. Cisney and Nicolae Moras, ‘Introduction: Why Biopower? Why Now?’ in Biopower: Foucault and Beyond, ed. Cisney and Morar (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 1-25; Patricia Ticineto Clough and Craig Willse, eds., Beyond Biopolities: Essays on the Governance of Life and Death (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); Thomas Lemke, Biopolitics: An Advanced Introduction (New York, NY: New York University Press, 2011); and Jeffery T. Nealon, Foucault beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since ‘1984 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 5 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population ~ Lectures at the Collége de France 1977— 78, ed. Michel Senellart (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1 6 Foucault, “Two Lectures, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980a {1977)), 78-108, and Foucault, ‘Onines et Singulatim’, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterling M. McMurrin (London: University of Utah Press, 1981), 224-254: 239-240.74 10 1 5 4 15 16 7 8 19 20 a 2 3 a4 25 26 27 28 29 30 3 3 3B 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin. 1979 [1976]), 93; and Foucault, “The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Vol. 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (London, Penguin 2000), 281-301: 283. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-76 (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 43, and Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Foucault “Truth and Power’, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: ‘The Harvester Press, 1980 [1977]), 109-133: 15 Foucault, “Truth and Power’, 133. Foucault, “Two Lectures’, 36. Foucault, Truth and Juridical Forms’, in Michel Foucault: Power — Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion (London, Penguin 2002 [1973]), 1-89: 17. Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms’, 52 Ibid., 57, and Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 36-40. Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms’, 57-58. Ibid., 58. Foucault, Discipline, 214, Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms’, 59, and Foucault, Discipline, 191 and 193, Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms’, 86-87. Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault, 46-47 Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms’, 137; emphasis added, Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 143. Ibid., 158-139. Ibid., 39. Ibid., 142-145. Ibid., 142. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Ibid., 242. Ibid., 243. Ibid., 244 Ibid., 245. Ibid., 245-246. Ibid., 247. Ibid., 249 and 253. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population,xo. Ibid. Foucault, The Birth of BioPolitics— Lectures at the Collége de France 1978-79, ed. Michel Senellart (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 1. Ibid., 6, 17, and 108. Ibid., 67, 70, and 76.Foucault’ Biopower 75 om 2 33 54 ss 56 57 8 9 60 Cs & 6 64 Foucault, Birth of BioPoitics. Ibid., 323-324. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 143. Ibid., 143, Ibid., 142-143 Foucault, History of Madness (London: Routledge, 2006 [1961]). Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974 [1966]). Jeffrery T. Nealon, “The Archaeology of Biopower: From Plant to Animal Life in The Order of Things’, in Cisney and Morar, eds., Biopower: Foucault and Beyond, 138-157. Foucault, “Two Lectures’, 82 Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 143 David Nibert’s term ‘domesecration’, is more appropriate as it refers to the ‘systemic practice of violence in which social animals are enslaved and bio- logically manipulated, resulting in their objectification, subordination, and oppression’. See David Nibert, Animal Oppression and Human Violence: Domesecration, Capitalism, and Global Conflict (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 12 See Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (London: Vintage. 2012) and Nealon, ‘Archacology of Biopower’ Nicole Shukin, Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 9-10. See ‘Thomas Lemke, ‘New Materialisms: Foucault and the “Government of Things”’, Theory. Culture & Society, 32:4, 2015, 3-25; Jefftey, T. Nealon, Plant Theory: Biopower and Vegetable Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); Jonathan Tran, Foucault and Theology (London: T&T Clark International, 2011); and Carey Wolfe, Before the Law: Humans and Other Animals in a Biopolitical Frame (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2013). J. M. Coctwee, The Lives of Animals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1999), 21. Despite rigorous searches we have found ic impossible co find an original source of the comment attributed to Adorno. Patterson (2002) does not pro- vide one in his book Charles Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, (New York, NY: Lantern Books, 2002), 53. ‘Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, ‘Michel Foucault and the Genealogy of the Holocaust’, in The European Legacy, 2:4, 1997, 697-699: 697. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, 143. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended. Foucault History of Sexuality, Vol. 1,137 Tbid., 137.76 KAY PEGGS AND BARRY SMART 65 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254. 66 Ibid., 257. 67 Ibid., 255-256. 68 Ibid, 259. 65 Milchman and Rosenberg ‘Genealogy of the Holocaust’, 659. 70 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254-255. 71 Patterson, Eternal Treblinka, vi. 72 Ibid., 12. 73 Quoted in ibid., 12. 74 Foucault, Discipline, 136. 75 Joel Novek, ‘Pigs and People: Sociological Perspectives on the Discipline of Nonhuman Animals in Intensive Confinement’, in Society and Animals 13:3, 2005, 221-244, 76 Wolte, Before the Law, 46. 77 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet (Posthumanities) (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). 78 Ibid., 59. 79 Ibid., 72-73. 80 Foucault, “The Subject and Power’, in Critical Inquiry, 8:4, 1982, 777-795: 790. &r Ibid, 789. 82, Foucault, ‘Ethics of the Concern’, 283. 83 Ibid, 283, 84 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 247. 85 Foucault, ‘Ethics of the Concern’, 299, and Foucault, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 Bs.