chapter The Making of Governmental Policy |i chapter describes the process by which governmental policy is made, exploring the phases of the policy process, examining the in- fluence of various social groups on the policy process, and accounting for the role of key orge- nizations. The public policy process is important because many social welfare policies are estab- lished by government, and decisions by federal and state agencies have a direct bearing on the administration and funding of social welfare programs that assist millions of Americans. : In an open, democratic society, it Yq, _is desirable that public policy reflect HEN om the interests ofall citizens to the great- guttepeey "est extent possible. For a variety of reasons, however, this ideal is not realized. Al- though many Americans have the right to par ticipate in the establishment of public policy, they often fail to do so. Policy made and imple- mented by the governmental sector may be per- ceived as being too far removed! from the daily ac- tivities of citizens, or too complicated to warrant the type of coordinated and persistent efforts necessary to alter it, Moreover, many Americans. With a direct interest in governmental policy are not ina position to shape it, as in thecase of chil- dren and the emotionally impaired, who must rely on others to speak on their behalf, Conse: quently, governmental policy does not necessar~ ily reflect the interests—or, for our purposes, the weltare—of the public, even though itis intended to do so, The discrepaney between what is con stitulionally prescribed in making public and the way decisions are actually made leads to two quite different understandings of the policy process. For welfare professionals concerned ‘with instituting change in social welfare, a tech: nical understanding of how policy is made is es- sential, It is equally important for them to rec- ognize that the policy process is skewed to favor powerful officials and interests rather than the interests of the uninfluential. Because both s: cial workers and their clients tend to be compar atively powerless, a critical analysis of the policy process is all the more important 206 OF Technical Aspects of the Policy Process Public policy in the United States is made ‘through a deliberative process that involves the two bodies of elected officials that make up a legislature. This applies both to the federal gov- emment and to the states—with the singular ‘exception of Nebraska, which has only one de- iberative body, n unicameral legislature. AA the federal level, a policy concern ofa leg Islator fs first developed into a legislative pro ‘posal and usually printed in the Congressional Record, Because every legislator has a party af- filiation and a constituency, legislators’ propos- als tend to reflect their individual priorities ‘Usually, several legislators will prepare proposals that are important to similar constituencies, a phase that ensures that all sides of an issue are aired. Through a subtle interaction of ideas, the media, and legislative leadership, one proposal— usually a synthesis of several—is presented as a policy alternative. Other legislators are asked to sign on as cosponsors, and the measure is offi- cially introduced. After the proposed bill is as signed to the appropriate committee, public hearings are held, and the committee convenes to "mark up” the legislation so that it incorpo- rates the concerns of committee members who have heard the public testimony. Under propi- tious circumstances, the comuittee then for- wards the legislation to the full body of the chamber that must approve it. While it is being approved by the full body of one chamber, a sim- ilar bill is often introduced in the other chamber, where it begins a parallel process, Differences be- toween the measures approved by the two cham bers are ironed out in a conference committee. ‘The proposed legislation becomes law after it is signed by the chief executive—or, ifthe executive vetoes the bill, passed by a two-thirds vote ofeach legislative chamber. This process is always tortuous and usually unsuccessful, The eventual enactment of legislation under these conditions 4s a true testament to legislative leadership. A third branch of government, the judiciary, as. ‘esses legal challenges to existing legislation. In the upper levels of the judiciary, members can hold their posts for life. The primary features of the poliey process of the feceral government are illustrated in Figure 8.1. ‘There are several critical junctures in a proposals tortuous passage into legislation—or oblivion. First, most of the details in any proposal are worked out at the committee or subcommittee level. Different versions—an in- ‘evitability in virtually every bill—are negotiated ‘and reconciled at the mark-up session, during ‘which committee members and staff write their changes into the draft. This stage offers an im- portant opportunity to inject minor, and some- ‘times major, changes into the substance of the Dill orto alter the intent of the bills originator(s) CLATEEAME the Steps Necessar ub au commitn| Gate ‘signed | "89" | Numer Headings CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Poly 207 Secénd, the viability of a proposal depends to a large extent on the mambers and weight of the ‘witnesses who testify as to its merits at subcom: mittee and cominittee heatings. Obviously, pub- lic testimony will work to the advantage of wwell-financed interests; such interests can afford to pay lobbyists to do this professionally, where- as advocates for the disedvantaged often rely on volunteers, Nevertheless, the public testimony stage is an important opportunity to clarify for the record the position that welfare profession: als may take on a given proposal. Third, budget considerations figure heavily in the likelihood of a bill's passage. Other federal spending priorities, ‘coupled with the unwillingness of elected offi- cials to raise taxes, increase the likelihood that Jegislation will be underfunded or even passed with no additional funding whatsoever. Innova- tive revenue “enhancers,” such as earmarked taxes or user fees, can make a proposal more ac- ceptable during periods of fiscal belt-tightening. ‘The policy process, then, is not necessarily ‘in Getting a Policy Proposal Enacted Into Law Budget [commit i cats Number tee ‘Assigned | omiten Hesrnge su Markup Full [commited Marko Foor | calender} rues sion |p |convited _ t PRESIDENTIAL SIGNATURE few 1 Sus Resolutoa) Fesotston}208 PART THREE / The Government Sector intended to facilitate the passage of a proposal into lave. OF some 20,000 bills presented to Con- ‘gress, in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, only 10 percent were reported out of committee and only 5 percent became lav:! Beyond this general outline of the public policy process, multiple vatia- KGEen, tions exist depending on historical and polyps. jurisdictional circumstances. In the federal government, all proposals related to taxa- ion must originate in the House of Representa- tives, @ provision the founders of the nation included in the Constitution in order tolocate rev- ‘enue retrieval in the legistative body most repre: sentative of the people. Appointments of people for key executive posts, stich as cabinet secre- taties, ambassadors, and judges, must be ratified through the advice and consent of the Senate, a body less responsive fo popular sentiment. States exhibit countless variations within the general outline ofthe tripartite balance of powers format. California, for example, has experienced chronic budget problems because the state government has been unable to raise sufficient revenue to keep up with mandated expendit sition of Proposition 13 in 1978, a two-thirds ma- jority of the California legislature is required not ‘only to raise taxes but also to establish the state budget; this isa proportion far beyond the simple majority required in other states. Under these conditions, a small number of recalcitrant repre- sentatives can easily block the budget process, As these examples suggest, understanding the intti- cacies of the policy process isan essential step to- ward mastering publie policy A few final points regarding the technical as pects ofthe policy process warrant mention. The decision-making process itself is defined by Roberts Rules of Order? a text that lays out in de- tail the rules for democratic deliberation. Al: though Robert Rules can appeat obtuse, its value should not be underappreciated. Those who have nnastered “the means of deliberation” are one step ahead of the rest of the crowd in seeing theirideas become public potiey. Social activists who are op- timistic that their proposal is working its way steadily through the legislative minefield may find their hopes exploded! by an adroit procedral move on the part of an opponent whe sidettacks «bill until the next legislative session, The elabo. sate rules of decision making, compounded by the traditions of deliberative bodies, may tend to deter citizens from participating in the demo- cratic process. Yet there are means public policy novices can employ to become better acquainted with the ways in which elected officials go about the public’ business. Citizen advocate organiza- ‘ions, particularly the League of Women Voters and Common Cause, can be help in explaining how public policy is made. Also, Congress and the legislatures ofthe larger states employ staff mem- bers as technical experts to aid them in decision making, Legislative staff are frequently the ex- perls most versed in an area of legislative activity, simply because they work through policy pro: posals on a regularbasis. Staff reports researched as part of committee deliberations can be valu. able in that they often provide the most up-to- date data on particular programs or issues. A good example of this type of resource is the "Green Book" used by the U.S, House Ways and Means Committee in its consideration of social programs, Begun in the early 1980s to help com- mittee members comprehend the vast number ‘of social programs under their jurisdict Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, AFDCITANE, SSI, and unemployment compensation, among others—the voluine, Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, became essential seading for social program analysts. Because of its convoluted tile, the volume became known by its standard-issue green paper eover, hence the Green Book. Fortunately, its popularity led to a (merciful) shortening of its title to Overview of Entitlement Programs.$ fF A Critical Analysis of the Policy Process Experience and sophistication notwithstanding, the public policy process often proves frustrat-ing for social activists. Despite the most urgent of needs, the best of intentions, and the most strategic of proposals, the sociel welfare pro- {gram output deriving from the legislative process often appears far short of what is required. Yet to conclude from this thet public policy simply does not work would be an overstatement. A critical approach to public policy helps explain some of the limitations of the technical approach and suggests ways to make the legislative process a more effective strategy for those concerned with furthering social justice. Froma critical perspective, the policy process of a series of discrete decisions, each heavily conditioned by money and connections — nother words, by power. The extent to which gov- exnmental policy reflects the concerns of one group of citizens while neglecting those of others is ultimately a question of power and influence, Power is derived from several sources, and these have attracted the attention of philosophers over the centuries. Plato questioned the organization and execution of the civil authority of the state, Machiavelli focused on the limits of discretionary authority exercised by leaders of the state, The so- cial contract philosophers of the Enlightenment— Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—considered the moral obligations of the state toward its citizens. Later, as the Industriel Revolution proceeded unchecked, Karl Marx attributed power inequities to control over the means of production, or capi tal, Subsequently, as governmental authority ex- panded to ameliorate the economic and social dislocation brought on by industrial capitalism, Max Weber identified bureaucratic administra tors asa pivotal group. As the postindustrial era unfolded, such social crities as Marshall ‘McLuhan and Alvin Toffler emphasized how the processing and uses of information can be a source of power and influence. From these general speculations about social organization, other writ- REE ye CFS ave turned to more specific as- cis *” pects of social policy as subjects of inquiry. Several schools of thought have emerged. ‘According to the elitist orientation, individuals representing a "power structure" control social policy in order to maintain a status quo that ad- (CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Policy 209 vantages them and, in the process, excludes mat- ginal groups. In contrast, a pluralist orientation assumes that social policy in a heterogeneous de- mocratic polity is the sum total of trade-offs among different interest groups, all of which have ‘an equal opportunity to participate, At the pro- gram level, incrementalists have suggested that the more important questions about social policy are the product of bit-by-bit additions to the pub- lic social infrastructure. As counterpoint, other scholars have focused on “paradigm shifts" through which major changes, such as the incep- tion of Social Security in 1935 and the devolution of welfare to the states through the Personal Re- sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia- tion Act of 1996, have altered the very foundation of social policy. With regard to program evalua tion, rationalists have used the methods of social science to determine by objective standards to ‘what extent policy changes bring about intended ‘outcomes. By contrast, social activists use the po- Iitical process as the measure of program perfor- mance, assuming that the optimum in program assessment is continued recertification and re~ funding by public decision makers. As might be expected in the investigation of any phenomenon as complex as social policy, a comprehensive ex- planation is likely to incorporate elements of ‘more than one school of thought: Underlying these varied approaches to in- texpreting social policy are assumptions about its very nature. In this regard, two orientations have become prominent, The first orientation might be labeled the liberal evolutionary perspective. Ac cording to this orientation, social policy reflects, steady progress toward a desirable condition of Jhuman welfare for all. Most liberal analysts who have promoted the welfare state as an ideal have ‘adopted an evolutionary perspective. Believers in the evolutionary perspective expect that the na- tional government will progressively expand s0- cial programs until, eventually, the basic needs of the entire population are guaranteed as rights of citizenship. References to welfare state phi- Josophy appear in many chapters of this book. ‘The liberal evolutionary perspective dominated thinking about the U.S. welfare state from the New Deal until the rise of conservative ideology210 PARI THREE / The Governinent Secor in the 1980s, The demise of Catastrophic Health Insurance in 1989 and the devolution of AFDC/TANF (o the states in 1996 raise funde- ‘mental questions about the validity of this per spective, The liberal evolutionary perspective has been complemented by social systems theory, which assumes that welfare consists of basic in- stitutions and processes that are related and are changed to suit environmental conditions. Ref- erence to “social service delivery systems" was frequent during the 1960s and 1970s, when social programs were expanding, but this approach commanded less credibility when many public programs were thrown into chaos as a result of budiget cuts during the 1980s. What had once been coordinated service delivery systems sud- denly became disordered and fragmented clus- ters of agencies strugaing for survival A competing orientation is the conflict per: spective, which emphasizes the differences be- tween organized groups that compete for social resources, The conflict perspective views social policy and resultant programs as the produet of intense rivalry among various classes and groups. Applied to a capitalist economy and ade mocratic polity, the conflict approach goes a long way toward explaining the disparate distribution of goods, services, and opportumities within US. society, Accordingly, conflict theory is useful in ‘wo ways: Itaccounts For the quite substantial dis. advantages experienced by some Americans—the poor, minorities of color, people with disabilities, ‘women; and it shows how such groups.can be ent- powered to achieve a measure of social justice. Obviously, a conflict perspective accounts for the behavior of for-profit providers of health amd human services, which compete intensively for market share, acquire other firms, and lobby public officials to shape policy favorably. The downside of the conilict perspective is that it fails 10 offer a unifying vision of future social policy. COuestions of governmental decision making often focus on three central aspects: (1) thedegree of change in policy represented by a decision, (2) the rationality of the decision, and (3) the ex- tent to which the disadvantaged benefit. First, governmental policies vary in the extent to which they depart from the status quo, Although it can bbe argned that, in the final analysis, there are no new ideas, there are new governmental policies that have enormous implications for certain groups. Few could dispute that the Social Secu rity Act and the Civil Rights Act were radical de- partures from the status quo and substantially changed the circumstances of older people and African Americans, respectively. On the other hand, such radical departures occur only under fairly unusual circumstances, and therefore rarely. As Charles Lindblom has observed, the great bulk of decision making is “incremental,” representing only marginal improvements in so- cial policy already in place.* Amitai Etzioni has proposed the term mixed seaming to vefer to the ‘way decision makers take a quick overview of a situation, weigh a range of alternatives—some in- cremental, some radical—and ultimately select the one that satisfies the most important factors impinging at the moment.S Thus, major shifts in public poliey are the exception, rather than the rule, Most social policy changes consist of rela- tively minor technical adjustments in program administration and budgeting, Second, social poliey does order Siig human affairs, and tothat extent thera AOE oy tionality or logic undertying the policy ieee is of great significance. Historically, two basic forms of rationality have served to justify social policy: bureaucratic rationality and market ratio nality* Bureaucratic rationality refers to the or- dering of social affairs by governmental agencies. Since Max Weber's work on the modern bureau- racy, this form of rationality has been central to governmental policy and hence to the mainte- nance of the welfare state. According to bureau- cratic rationality, civil servants can objectively define social problems, develop strategies to ad: ress them, and deploy programs in an equitable and nonpartisan manner: Bureaucratic rationality takes its authority from power vested in the state, and bureaucracies have become predominant in social welfare at the federal (through the Depart ment of Health and Human Services) and state levels. A characteristic of bureaucratic rationality is a reliance on social planning, Several social planning methods have been developed to antici pate future problems and deal with existing ones.Generally, these can be classified wer two head ings: technomethodological and sociopolitical ‘Technomethodological planning methods emphasize databases from which projections about ture progeam needs can bederived. Such methods place a premium on relatively sophisti- cated social research methods and work best with programs that can be quantified and rou- tinized, as inthe case of cash payments through the Social Security program. Soclopolitical planning approaches ate more interactive, in- ‘volving groups likely tobe fected by aprogram. Comnninity development activities, for example, frequentiy feature planners’ bringing together neighborhood residents, businesspeople, and Tocal officials to create a plan that is relevant to the needs of a particular area.” Regardless of planning method, itis important to recognize the power and influence that governmental agencies have assured in social welfare policy, much of by exercise of bureaucratic rationality. Market rationality refers to are- ance on the supply of and demand Bethcon for goods and services as a method of Tee” ordering social affairs. While on the fitepday” surface this may appear to be anti thetical to the meaning of rationality high de- sree of social ordering in fact occurs within capitalism. Such organization is implicit in the very ides of market, entailing lange number of prospective consumers that businesses seek to exploit, In a modern market economy, the suc- cets of a business depends on the ability of managers to survey the market, merchandise goods and services, shape consumer preferences through advertising, and reduce competition by buying or outmanewering competitors, Of course, market rationality is not a panacea for providing, social welfare—because the market- place is not particularly responsive to those who ray not fully participate in it, such as minorities, women, children, and eldery or disabled people. “Yet market rationality cannot be dismissed as 8 rationale for delivering social welfare benefits. Approximately half of Americans get their hcalth and welfare needs met through employer-pro vided benefits that are ultimately derived from the market Since the late 1980s, commercial CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Policy 211 firms have conducted an ambitious campaign to ration health care benefits through “managed care,” an idea that has become anathema to health and human service professionals. Another example of the impact of the market on social welfare benefits is the practice by governmental Jurisdictions of contracting out certain human services to private sector businesses, usually with the rationale of reducing costs by taking advan- tage of efficiencies associated with the market.? The third aspect of governmental decision making addresses disadvantaged populations. It is entirely possible, of course, for social policy to introduce radical change that is based on data but is contrary to the well-being of important groups. The 1996 welfare reform legislation, for example, ended the 60-year entitlement to in- come for poor families on the basis of evaluations, of state welfare demonstrations allegedly show- ing that states could provide public assistance better if the federal government were not in- volved. Fearing the consequences of such welfare reform for poor minority children, advocacy groups such as the Children’s Defense Fund lob- bied ardently against the proposal, but to no avail. Of primary concern among children’s ad- vvocates was the consequence of time limits on the receipt of welfare for poor children. Analysts from public and private research agencies pro- jected that 1 to 4 million children would be ter- ‘inated from public assistance if five-year tine limit on receipt of aid were imposed. The 1996 ‘welfare reform legislation did include provisions for chronically welfare dependent families— ‘exempting 20 percent of the AFDC/TANF case- load from time Iimits—but children’s advocates claimed these were inadequate, The 1996 welfare reform Iegislation was not welfare “reform,” claimed children’s advocates; it was welfare ter- mination. Rather than benefiting poor families, the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Op: portunity Reconciliation Act would eventually kick millions of poor children out of the safety net and into the underclass.!° Clearly, the degree of change represented by ‘any change in publie policy, the extent to which it js rational with respect to bureaucratic or matket criteria, and the consequences for disadvantaged212 PART THREE / The Government Sector populations make the social policy process a dy. namic and sometimes volatile area of activity While this process may be intimidating for the uninitiated, i is the primary route to social jus- fice within the governmental sector, ~The Policy Process A critical analysis of the poliey process highlights the social stratification of the society, the phases Uhrough which policy is formulated, and the or ganizational entities that have evolved as insiru- menial in the decision-making process. This section will describe and chart these factors in order to clarify how welfare policy is created in the United States. Social Stratification $ A variety of social. stratifleation ties analyses differentiate groups with in- mag" fluence from those lacking it. The Stakes most simple ofthese schemes consists of a dual stratification: for instance, capitalists and the proletariat, such as Mars used. A strat fication familiar to Americans defines three Parts: an upper class, a middle class, and a lower class. Placement of individuals inthe appropri. ate class is usually made on the basis of income, education, and occupational status, This three part stratification is limited in its capacity to cxplain very much about American social wel. fare, however If asked, mast Americans identify themselves as middle class, even if by objective criteria they belong to another class. Further, the designation lower class is not patticularly infor. mative about the social conditions of large por tion oF the population with which welfare professionals are concerned,!! Amore informative stratification was devel- oped by social psychologist Dexter Dunphy, who identified six social groups, which he different ated according to wealth internal solidarity, al control over the environment,!? Dunphy’ for- mulation is adapted in Table 8.1 ‘As Dunphy's social stratification indicates, some groups—old wealth and executives ~are able to influence the environment, but other groups—the working/welfare poor and. the underclass-have virtually no influence. This distinction has important implications for so- cial welfare, because those who are of lower status tend to be the recipients of welfare ben. efits that are the procuct of a social policy process in which they de not participate. The way in which these various groups inflience the social policy process will be discussed in greater detail below. With these clarifications in mind, the policy process can be divided into four stages: for- mulation, legislation, implementation, and evaluation, Although these terms are somewhat self-explanatory, during the decision-making process different organizational entities exert their influence, making the process an uneven one that is frequently characterized by fits and starts, Organizations correspond to the strati cation groups that figure prominently in their organizational activities and thereby in the pok ley process, Formulation Before the nineteenth century it would have been accurate to state that policy formulation in this, country began with the legislative phase. Clearly, this was the situation envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution; but theirs was a largely agrarian society with comparatively litte inst. tutional specialization, With industrialization many complexities were injected into the society, and in time special institutions emerged to assist the legislature in evaluating social conditions and prepating policy options. Eventually, even constitutionally established bodies such as Con: gress lapsed into a reactive role, largely respon- sive to other entities that formulated policy! Initially institutions of higher education pro: led technica} intelligence to assist the legisla- Live branch, and some still do. For example, the University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty provides analyses on important welfare policies.!4‘CHAPTER 8 /The Making of Governmental Policy 213 TABLE 8.1 = Social Stratification of the Population nto Six Groups awe OF GROUP ies aAnAcTERsTCs (ld neath Upper eles theindependenty —__Onineip of resourees isthe mein source wed, lage stockholders of power contol oer goss is very hgh, bot contol over mens is through oxgana rs (eects). ecatives Top adminisatrs inbusiness; __Cxgniitiona soarty facies effective peopl in goverment andthe __polyimplementaon; thee i some con anitery trol oer goals and high degree of cai over meats. Professionals Middelers managers tecmial Environment encourages limited solide, pers, pte pracitones,com- cont over means sigh, and gal seting many eaders canbe influenced it colecive acon is undertaken Organized workes _Semsled workers people in Eavtonment encourages slaty groups Chic and political dubs and socal have ome conto ver the eas by action organs hich gal re elived, Woskngfwelare poor Temporary and parttime workers “People ate ina subugaed poston with no earing minimum wage and wo contol aver the envionment frastaion is usewele as wage supplement shared and inetina, and explosive behav iorcan rest Urierdass Unemployables and iterates People aren a subjugated postion with no dsebled substance abusers; itiernts, ters, migrant werkers Cont ver he environment a sense of flue coupled wih mobity reduces socal interaction and leads to eet Seurce: Adapted om Deter C Dunphy, The itary Group: Hondbook or Anas ond Fld Rescrch, © S72, pp. 42-4 Reped by pein of Prec Hal, in. Egieoad CT, NL ‘That legislators atthe federal level, as well as ‘those in the larger states, would rely on experts toassess social conditions and develop policy op- tions is not surprising, given the fact that each legislator must attend to multiple committee and subcommittee assignments requiring expertise in particular matters, while at thesame time con- tending with the general concems of @ large constituency. A typical day in the life of a legis- lator has been reconstructed by Charles Peters, a longtime Washington observer: The most striking feature of a congressman's life is its hectic jurnble of votes, meetings, ap- ointments, and visits from folks from back home who just drop by. From an 8 a.m. break- fast conference with a group of union leaders, atypical morning will take him to his office ‘around 9, where the waiting room will be filled with people who want to see hint From 9 until 10:30 or so, he will try to give the inte pression that he is devoting his entire atten tion to.a businessman from his state with a tax problem; to a delegation protesting their town’ loss of air or rail service; toa cont. stituent and his three children, who are in town for the day and want to say hello: and 10 a couple of staff members whose morale will collapse if they don't have five minutes alone to go over essential business with hie As he sirives to project one-on-one sincerity to all these people, he is fielding phone calls at the214 PART THREE / the Government Secor ste of ene every five minutes anu checking a press release that has to ge ot in tne to make the afierioon papers in his district. He leaves this madiouse 10 po t0.4 con ‘mittee meeting, accompanied by his legit tive aide, who tries to brief him on the business before the committee meeting be sins. The meeting started at 10, so he strug. es to catch the thread of questioning, while 4 committee staff member whispers in his ea ‘Anal so the day continues. The typical day... usually ends around 11:30 1, asthe congressman leaves ait em bassy party, af whicls he has been hustling as it wereu key precines on election eve, He is 40 tied 10 talk about any but the most trivial matters, to tired usually to do anything but fall into bed and goto sleop."8 ‘As @ result of competing demands, legisla- tors pay somewhat less attention to the policy process than their public image would have you believe, leaving much of the work to their staffs. Even then, public policy tends to get short shift Because reelection is a primary concern for leg- islators, their staffs are frequently assigned to solve the relatively minor problems presented by constituents, Tn fact, placating unhappy con stituents has become so prominent a concern that one legislative observer notes that con- stituency services—called "casework" by elected officials—have become “more important than issues" for representatives.!6 & Gradually institutions have begun (specialize in providing the social in SEP *"0n (elligence necessary for policy formmu- itttgere lation, These policy institutes, som limes called think tanks, now wield substanti Pi fsinute Urban Brookings American for Policy Insite Insttaion —— Enterpiise Sluges Intute oral -————. (et influence in the soctal policy process. Not unlike Drestigious colleges, think tanks maintain multi- disciplinary staffs of scholars who prepare posi tion papers on a range of social issues. With mul timillion-dollar budgets and connections with national and state capitals, think tanks are well positioned to shape social policy. Generally, fi- nancial support for these institutes comes from wealthy individuals and corporations with par- ticular ideological inclinations that are evidenced by the types of think tanks they support. Several prominent policy institutes are located on the ideological continuum in Figure 8.2 Within policy institutes, prominent scholars, casually identified as senior fellows, hold ent dowed chairs, having often served in cabinet level positions within the executive branch, For example, when a Republican administration comes into power; large numbers of senior fel- lows from conservative policy institutes assume cabinet appointinents; their Democratic coun- crparts return to iberal institutes, where senior chairs await them, For junior staffers, an ap- pointment in a think tank can provide invaluable experience in how the governmental policy process actually works, Despite theirinfluence in public policy, however, it is important to recog hive that think tanks are private, nongovern- ‘mental institutions. Through much of the twentieth century, a first generation of largely liberal policy insti- tutes, such as the Brookings Institution, con- Gibuted to the formulation of governmental welfare policy. Their role was essentially passive, in that they provided technical expertise to legis lators and governmental agencies upon request. By the mid-1970s, however, a second gencration EGISUEEERE Places on the ideological Continuum of Six Policy Institutes Hettago Garo Foundation inalituto > conservative ‘ighof conservative policy institutes, such as the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, moved aggressively forward to shape a public philosophy that was more consis- tent with their own values. The elections of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush did much to further the influence of these organizations, and the work of scholars from these policy insti- tutes became important to the implementation and continuation of the “Reagan revolution."”7 A third generation of policy institutes emerged later to promote programs for the poor. The Chil- dren's Defense Fund and the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities endevor to reassert the needs of the disadvantaged in social welfare policy!® The election of Bill Clinton to the pres- ‘dency in 1992 brought to the forefront the Pro- {gressive Policy Institute, a think tank responsible for much of the policy research Clinton used dur ing the campaign, and later influential in estab- lishing domestic policy. Legislation ‘The legislative phase involves two 434, primary groups: the legislature and Sele special interest groups that are sub- classified as lobbies and political ac- tlon committees (PACs). Much public policy work is conducted by legislators who are ap- pointed to committees and subcommittees on the basis of their particular interests. An impor- tant and often unappreciated component of the legislative phase is the role played by the staffs of commitices and subcommittees. Former legisla- tive staffers are definitive experts in the subject area of a committee and are prized as lobbyists for special interest groups.!? As a result ofthe in- creasing complexity of the policy process, the number of legislative staff has multiplied. In the Tate 1980s, 24,000 staff members served Con- gress, more than double the number in the late 1970s. Committees are the loci of testimony on. issues, and legislative hearings provide an op- portunity for the official and sometitnes the only input from the public on some matters. Accord: ingly, representatives of advocacy groups make it a point to testify before certain committees in CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Policy 215 order to ensure that their views are heard. At the federal level, the primary committees dealing ‘with social welfare in 2000 are the following:#! Senate Finance Commitee. Subcommittees: Medicaid and Health Care for Low-Income Families; Medicare, Long-Term Care, and Health Insurance; Social Security and Family Policy Agriculture, Subcommittee: Research, Nutrition, and General Legislation Appropriations, Subcommittee: Labor, Health and Human Services, Education Labor and Human Resources. Subcommnit tees: Aging; Children and Families; Dist ity Policy Special Aging. House of Representatives Ways and Means. Subcommittees: Health; Human Resources; Social Security Economic and Educational Opportunites. Subcommittees: Early Childhood, Youth, ‘and Families; Employer/Employee Relations; Postsecondary Education, Training, and Lifelong Learning; Workforce Protections Appropriations, Subcommittee: Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education ‘The procedure by which an idea becomes legislation was described earlier, in the discussion ‘on technical aspects of the’ policy process. ‘Throughout the process, representatives of spe- ial interests attempt to shape any given proposal 0 that it is more congruent with priorities of theirmemibers. Special interests can be classified according to the natute of their activities: Before elections, interest groups can influence the com- position of legislatures by establishing PACs, in between elections, interests can exert pressure strategically through lobbying. As special inte ests earned to skirt federal campaign regulations, increasing amounts of “soft money" (nonregulated donations) influenced election activity22 As Tables 8.2-8.4 in- Kira dicate, substantial funds are funneled sets)TABLE 8.2 PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates, 1999-2000 i Pac sEcton NUMDEROF ES TOTAL CONTRBUTONS fe labor 23 $25,489,562 i Finance insurance, ard al etate a 20700775 Heath 185 9787568 Siseteneous business 308 889325 Energy ané natural esures 268 as7mn0 Fenspetaion w 8352784 ie Commutation leans 20 7589715 ie Agsibusiness 2» 756483 a Lavoyersand lobbyists “7 5589/21 | onsttion wl 41035 i Delense 7 3.636200 f ee a TABLE 83 “Soft Money’ Contributions to Political Parties, 1999 it REPUBLICAN TY DeNocRae mt | I Rank —__Orgoneaion Amount Organization -Arnount i 1 Philp Mons 293928 ASCE $2,786704 j 2 ‘American Frenil Group 630000 own 2,686250 i 3 wer sna sau 1999700 ti 4 oway 1317300 Peter Butt 1385500 i 5 PUR Nabisco 105,365 Lora Space and Communications 1358000 h 6 Fred tac 1080800 Nationa Edvation Associaton 1254800 i 7 Mics 016.729 ‘Anetcn Federation of Teaches az00 Hh te TABLE 8.4 » Top Lobbyists, 1997 and 1998 qe mK RN ‘asrbvrenomRes—— pU erNORRES ™ i 2 Php Moris 15,8000000, 25009000 i 5 Bl ante 572880 aiz69000 i ‘ US. Chamber of Commerce ¥4240,000 70000 ) ; 5 ‘rnesicen Medical Assction 1.280000 16820000 he 6 Ford Motor Company 1365, 153,207,000 i 7 uses Roundie saanpoo nig1q00 ee 8 eon ec sie lopz0on0 ngeocn0 Hr 9 -anericen Hospital Associaton 860000 ‘szo000 ! 0 Blue Gioss/ueShild 9761836 sansnthrough PACs, “soft money.” and lobbying in order to influence elections for the purpose of shaping public policy. An examination of campaign fi= iq, nance might lead a cynie to conclude [iieiden that democracy in the United States biiyas "produces the best politics that money can buy. Yet individual contributions continue to represent the bulk of party revenues. During the 1997-98 election cycle, the Federal Election Commission reported that 71 percent of Demo- cratic Party contributions of $74 million, and 87 percent of Republican Party contributions of $156.3 million, came from individuals.?? Indi vidual contributions notwithstanding, strategi- cally targoted gifts from organized groups have disproportionate impact; hence the concern about PACs, “soft money," and lobbyists, The Center for Responsive Politics has ranked the ‘major PACs by sector. With the exception of the Labor and Lawyers and Lobbyists sectors, PAC contributions have favored Republicans over Democrats by a factor more than two to one; thus, PACs have tended to reflect conservative influences in social policy. Soft money funds~funds that are not re- stricted by federal campaign Jaw—have increased substantially in recent years. For example, soft ‘money contributions to the major Political par- ties roughly tripled from $79.1 million in 1991-92 to $220.7 million in 1997-98. According to Common Cause, 1999 soft money contributions by business eclipsed those of labor by a factor of 40. A ranking of the top 10 soft money contribu- tors to the major parties compiled by Common Cause reveals the typical ideological division: Business contributes to the Republican Party, and Jabor gives to the Democrats. In anticipation of the 2000 election, labor broke new ground, do- nating §15 million in soft money, almost all of it to Democratic candidates.*8 For 1999, Common Cause reported that the Democtatic Party re- ceived $124 million in soft money all told—an amount eclipsed by the Republicans, who re- ceived $159 million. As the 2000 election heated ‘up, interest groups donated soft money in un- precedented amounts, rivaling traditional expen ditures on the part of lobbyists. CHAPTER B / The Making of Governmental Policy 217 che Center for Responsive Politicsrantked the top lobbying organizations for 1997 and 1998, and the magnitude of their influence on Congress isapparent. Foremost, total expenditures bya sin- ale firm, such as British American Tobacco, rivals soft money as well as PAC contributions on the part of major sectors of the economy—and swamps most contributors altogether. In addi- tion, major lobbying organizations can shift major amounts of cash depending on their par ticular needs. Inthe face of antismoking litigation and legislation, British American Tobacco quin- tupled its lobbying expenditures in only one year! Note that 3 of the top 10 lobbying onganizations represent the rapidly expanding health industry. In national politics, the Key to influence is choreographing the resources of PACs, soft money, and lobbyists to attain party objectives By way of illustration, having won control of Congress as a result of the 1994 midterm elec- tions, Republicans moved swiftly to divert the flow of PAC money from the Democratic Party. Leading the effort was Representative Dick ‘Armey, house majority leader, who, in April 1995, sent a letter to Fortune 500 CEOs complaining that their contributions tosuch “liberal” charities as the American Cancer Society were contrary to Republican intentions in social reform, In ordex to clarify his intentions, Armeys staif let PAC contributors know that contributions to Repub- lican ventures were expected and that those to Democrats would also be tallied, Special inter- cats secking access to the new Republican lead~ ership should be zeroing out their contributions to Democrats. In the annals of special interest politics, Armey's brazen tactics broke new ground: “By imposing an ideological test on sivers they have introduced a new level of coer- clon,” observed journalist Ken Auletta.®® Yet Armeys strategy violated no laws, and the money. rolled in, In the first eight months of 1995 the Republican party received $60 million in contri- butions, up from just $36 million in 1993.77 ‘Compared to business, labor, and lobbyists, social advocacy groups bring few assets to bear ‘on the political process. Limited by meager resources, social advocacy groups tsually rely on volunteer lobbyists. In addition to NASW, there218 PART THREE / The Government Secor are several advocacy groups within social welfare that have been instrumental in advancing legisla- tion to assist vulnerable populations—among them the American Public Welfare Association, the Child Welfare League of America, the Na- tional Association for the Advancement of Col- ‘ored People, the National Urban League, the National Assembly of Voluntary Health and Wel- fare Associations, and the National Organization for Women. OF these advocacy groups only one, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), ranks among the top 100 lobbyists on Capitol Hill. Despite the number of welfare advo- cacy organizations and their successful record! in evolving more comprehensive social legislation, changes in the policy process are making their ‘work more difficult. Jncreases in the number of governmental agencies as well as in their staffs make it difficult to track policy developments and changes in administrative procedures. Worse, the escalating cost of influencing social policy, evi- dent in the number of paid lobbyists and in the contributions lavished by PACs, is simply beyond the means of welfare advocacy organizations. [As one Democratic candidate for the Senate lamented, “only the well-heeled have PACs—not the poor, the unemployed, the minorities or even ‘most consumers."2* Compared to more affluent interests, human service professionals have little clout. In social work, the PAC that provides as tance to candidates is Political Action for Candi- date Blection, or PACE, “the political arm of the National Association of Social Workers.” PACE uses. variety of tactics to “expand social workers’ activity in politics,” including voter registration, support for political campaigns, and analysis of incumbents’ voting records.” For the 1999-2000 election cycle, PACE budgeted total contributions ‘of $225,000 to $240,000 to candidates running for national office °° an amount, though not insignif- icant to candidates who received assistance, pales in comparison to the amounts wielded by more influential PACS. This is not to say that proponents of social Justice have been ineffectual. Despite their dis- advantageous status, welfare advocacy groups were able to mobilize grassroots support to beat back some of the more regressive proposals of the Reagan administration. In the early 1980s, for example, scholars from the conservative Cato Institute and the Heritage Foundation proposed cutting the Social Security program, They were trounced by an effective lobbying campaign mounted by the AARP under the leadership of the late Congressman Claude Pepper (who was then in his eighties). Unfortunately, other social welfare programs did not fare as well, At the same time that Social Security was spared bud get cuts, social programs for the poor were re- duced by significant margins. Among the newer advocacy organizations, the Children’s Defense Fund (CDF) hoped to benefit significantly from the election of Bill Clinton; First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton had been a former chair ofits board of directors, and Clinton's Health and Human Services (SHS) secretary, Donna Sha- lala, had succeeded Rodham Clinton at CDF CDF did claim a substantial victory with incor- poration of the Children's Taitiative in the Clin- ton 1993 economic package, but in 1996 children’s advocates were distraught when Clin- ton signed a the PRWORA that they thought was injurious to poor children, Implementation ‘The fact that a policy has been enacted does not necessarily mean it will be im- 4, plemented, Often governmental poli Rabon cies fail to provide for adequate at frpimeaon thority, personnel, or funding to accomplish their stated purposes. This has been a chronic problem for social welfare programs. Itis also possible that 4 governmental policy initiative will not be en- forced even after it has been established, Many Jocal jurisdictions have correctional and child welfare institutions now operating under court supervision because judges have agreed with so ial advocates that these institutions are not in ‘compliance with state or federal law. Implementation, difficult enough in the nor ial course of events, s that much more difficult when the public is disaffected with governmen tal institutions. The episodic nature of public en- dorsement of governmental mas has been studied extensively by Albert 0. Hirschman. InShifting Involvements Hirschman investigated the relationship between "private interest and public action.” According to Hirschman, public endorsement of governmental institutions is @ fundamental problem for industrialized capital- ist societies, which emphasize individual com- petitiveness while generating social and eco nomic dislocations that require collective action. "Western societies,” Hirschman observes, “ap- pear to be condemned to long periods of privati- zation during which they live through an impov- crished ‘atrophy of public meanings,’ followed by spasmodic outbursts of ‘publicness’ that are hardly likely to be constructive."™! Disenchant- ment with governmental solutions to social prob- ems mekes public welfare programs valnerable to their critics, leading to reductions in staff and fiscal support, often followed by an escalation in the social problem for which the social program ‘vas initially designed. Thus, the episodic nature of public support for programs designed to alle- viate social problems further impedes effective implementation. Evaluation ‘The expansion of governmental wel- (S%, fare policies has spawned a veritable AGssGeen jndustry in program evaluation, be Stung by the abuses of the executive branch during Watergate and the Vietnam War, Congress established additional oversight agen- cies to review federal programs. As a result, multiple units within the executive and legisla- tive branches of government have the evalua- tion of programs as their primary mission. At the federal level, the most important of these in- clude the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). State governments have similar untts. In addition, departments have evaluation units that monitor program activities for which they are responsi- ble. Finally, federal and state levels of govern- ‘ment commonly contract with nongovernmental ‘organizations for evaluations of specific. pro- ‘grams. Asa result, many universities provide im- CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Policy 219 portant research services 10 government. The University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty is distinguished for its research in social welfare, More recently, private consulting firms, such as the Manpower Demonstration and Research Corporation, Abt Associates, Max: imus, and Mathematica, have entered the field, often hiring former government officials and capitalizing on their connections in order to se- cure lucrative research contracts. Of course, any politicization of the research process is frowned upon, because it raises questions about the im partiality of the evaluation. Is @ former govern- ment official willing to assess rigorously and impartially a program run by an agency in which he or she was employed in the past or ‘would like to be employed in the future? Ques- tions about the closeness between governmen- tal agencies and research firms and the validity of evaluation studies have become so common that the consulting firms located near the ex- pressway surrounding Washington, D.C., are often referred to as “the beltway bandits.” Investigations by program evaluation orga- nizations can be characterized as applied (as op- posed to “pute”) research, the objective being to optimize program operations. As a result of this, ‘emphasis on the function of programs, evalua tion studies frequently focus on waste, cost- effectiveness, and goal attainment. Owing to the contradictory objectives of many welfare poli- cies, the constant readjustments in programs, and the limitations in the art of evaluation re~ search, evaluations frequently conclude that any ‘given program has mixed results. Rarely does a ‘program evaluation provide a clear indication for future action. Often the results of a single program evaluation are used by both critics and defenders in their efforts to dismantle or to ad ‘vance the program. ‘The very inconelusiveness of program evaluation contributes to the partisan use to which evaluation research can be put, It is not ‘uncommon for decision makers to engage in sta- tistical arguments that have a great influence on social welfare policy. Of recent "stat wars,” sev- cral relate directly to social welfare. One example is the question whether underemployed and220 PART THREE / The Government Sector discouraged workers should be included in the ‘unemployment rate. Currently, the Department ‘of Labor defines as unemployed only those who ave out of work and actively looking for jabs; and it considers part-time workers as employed. As a result, many African Americans, Hispanic Amer ‘cans, young adults, and women are not consid- ered unemployed, even though advocates for these groups contend that they are not fully employed. Liberals argue that inchiding under- employed and discouraged workers in the tn- employmentrate would produce a more accurate measure of the employment experience of disad- vantaged groups. Conservatives arguc that the employment rate is not a good indicator of em ployment opportunity anyway, citing the millions of undocumented workers who come to the United States illegally every year to take menial jobs. Further, including underemployed andl dis- couraged workers would inerease the unemploy- ment rate by as much as $0 percent and would prove unacceptably expensive, because exten sions in the number of quarters for which work- ets are eligible for unemployment compensation are tied to the unemployment rate. Predictably, evaluations of employment programs vary con: siderably, Consultants have generated consider- able data about the results of state and local welfarc-to-work initiatives. Their studies evince a general theme: Although welfare eascloads have dropped as emach as 50 percent, heads of house- holds who have found work (1) tend to remain stuck in sub-poverty-level wages but (2) lose ben- efits such as food stamps and Medicaid—even though they remain eligible—because of efforts at eascload reduction. Such research serves ide- ological purposes, of course, Conservatives trum pet the reduction in welfare dependeney, and liberals worry about the fate of families who con- tinue to be poor despite fulltime work. *; Non—Decision Making somewhat irregular and irrational, it is also un- representative, As Figure 8.3 illustrates, groups in the upper levels of the social stratification popu late the institutions through which policy is made, Inthe case of welfare policy, welfare ben. eficiaries must adjust to rales established by other social groups. ‘Thepriimary players in the social policy game are executives and professionals. Old wealth is able to opt out, eavingiits social obligations in the hands of executives. Groups lower on the social stratification scale have les and less influence on governmental policy The interesis ofthese groups are left in the hands of professionals who work through advocacy organizations or “eabals,” al- though occasional «unrest on the part of work- ing/welfare poor can result in increased weléare benefits. Thus, the lover socioeconomic groups! lack of influence in the social policy process is vir tually built into governmental decision making, ‘The term non-decision making has been coined to describe this phenomenon—the systems ca- pacity tokeep the interests of some groups off the decision-making agends.33 Non-decision making has a long history in the United States; genera- tions of African’ Americans and women were legally excluded from decision making prior to emancipation and suffrage. Policymakers’ attempts to increase the ine fluence of disadvantaged groups in decision making have not been well received, A classic il- lustration of this occurred during the Great So- clety initiative, when poor people were to be assured of “maxiroum feasible participation” in fhe Comumunity Action Program (CAP). This stip- ulation was interpreted to mean that one-third of the members of CAP boards of directors must be poor people—a seemingly reasonable ides— but the militaney of poor people in some cities at the time led to utter chaos in many CAPS. Asare- sult of pressure from mayors and other officials, lawmakers rescinded this requiement in order tomiake CAPs more compliant. Since then, the representation of lower socioeconomic groups in decision making has been limited, for all practi cal purposes, to an advisory capacity at best. "The governmental policy process also poses problems for administrators and practitioners, ies frequently reflect assumptions about theTay aed |,_ [Seeing upieosa Suenos | | snow } [ ‘sipuaisss pus soqranun, eqouwar09 199, Jowsopy} |8O%4 | [| Sm Peres sere | LP camer [rami] | seam eee imes007 uoe0d:00 sonn suogepunog Nea PIO Nouvntwas. NOUWINAWaTaMI = NOLWISIOTT Nou InWuOS ssapoxg ood [eHBUILAANOD aIp UI AD] JOOS XS Aq pkey s}Oy 7H, METTETTETEM 221222 PART THREE / The Government Sector human condition that may seem reasonable to the upper'soctoeconomie groups that make them but bear’ little resemblance to the reality of the lower socioeconomic groups that are supposed to be beneficiaries, For example, child support en- forcement policy assumes that fathers of childven on AFDCITANF programs have the kind of regu- lax, well-paying jobs that would allow them to rect the amounts of their court orders, whereas often their jobs are intermittent and low-wage. Consequently, support payments to children who are dependent on welfare have been relatively dis- appointing. An evaluation of Parents’ Fait Share, & program designed to increase the child support paid by men whose dependents were on AFDC, resulted in reduced child support payments de- spite the multiple interventions incorporated in the program.%* To cite another example, welfare- to-work programs assume that young women want to complete their education and gain mean- ingful employment—but their socialization often instructs them that school and work are irrelevant and that having a child may be the most mean- ingful thing they can do. For many years, AEDC/ TANF has provided financial support to poor teenaged mothers, a benefit that many conserva- tives claim has actually induced girls to become pregnant. But an evaluation of New Chance, a teen pregnancy prevention program, resulted in outcomes that were contrary to the intent of the program: Young tnothers enrolled in New Chance ‘were more likely to become pregnant again and less likely to participate in the labor market then those in the eontrol group.36In sura, the prelimi- nary studies on child support and teen pregnancy suggest that the poor do not necessarily comply with the bourgeois assumptions that are implicit or explicit in social policy, Iris not surprising, then, that welfare pro- grains are not well received by many of the peo ple who depend on them. Instead of being grateful, beneficiaries are frequently resentful. In turn, upperincome taxpayers find this ingrat tude offensive and are inclined (o make pro. grams more punitive. Ironically, beneficiaries of welfare programs tend to respond to puni policies with indifference and defiance; because, for many of them, welfare programs have never been particularly helpful. The perception that welfare programs are only minimally helpful is ‘occasionally validated! when, under exceptional circumstances, someone from an upper socio. economic group falls into the social safety net and suddenly appreciates the importance of wel- fare programs for daily survival. Not all welfare programs are perceived in such a negative light. Generally, programs that benefit persons who are solidly in the working class fare better: The social insurance programs, such as Social Security, amemployment compen. sation, and Medicare, are usually regarded more highly by beneficiaries. OF course, the insurance programs require people to first pay into the pro- gram in order to claim benefits later; so they are designed to be different from the means-tested programs intended for the poor. ‘A particular consequence of governmental policy making falls on the shoulders of welfare pn fessionals. "Workers on the front lines of the wel fare state find themselves in a corupted world of service," wrote Michael Lipsky in his award. ning Strect- Level Bureaucracy, According to Lipsky, “Workers find that the best way to keep demand within manageable proportions is to deliver a con- sistently inaccessible or inferior product.”37 In re sponse to the irrelevance often characteristic of ‘governmental welfare policies, personnel in public welfare offices consequently deny benefits to peo- ple who are eligible for them, a process labeled bu reaucratic disentitlement.2*Itshould come asno surprise, then, that public welfare programs man: dated by governmental poliey have acquired an un- desirable reputation within the professional com- munity, The executive director of the California chapter of NASW candidly stated that “Public so cial services are being abandoned by M. S. W. so cial workers. Itseems to be employment of last re- sort”? Another veleran observer was even more ‘graphic: “To work in a public ageney today is to ‘work in a bureaucratic hell"*9 Within the context Of public welfare, itis not surprising to find that ‘bumout has become pervasive among welfare pro- fessionals. The inaclequacy of public welfare poli- cies for both beneficiaries and professionals isan unfortunate consequence of the governmental pol iey process as it is currently structared.Making the public policy process more repre- sentative is a primary concern of welfare advo- cates. Since the Civil Rights movement, African ‘Americans and the poor have recognized the ‘power of the ballot, and voter registration has be- come an important strategy for advancing the influence of these groups. The registration of Hi panic Americans in the Southwest has been the mission of the Southwest Voter Research Institute, founded by the late Willie Velasquez. Under the vi sionary leadership of Velasquez, Latino voter reg- {stration grew steadily and was reflected in an {nevease in the number of Chicano elected offi- cials. Fifteen years of voter registration cam- paigning by the institute contributed to a doubling of the number of Hispanic elected officials in the Southwest by the late 19805." ‘The most visible example of the political em- powerment of people usually excluded from the decision-making process was Jesse Jackson's 1988 campaign to be the presidential nominee ‘of the Democratic Party. Expanding on the grass- roots political base built during his 1984 bid for the nomination, Jacksons 1988 Rainbow Coali tion demonstrated the support he commanded from a wide spectrum of disenfranchised Amer- icans. Thus, mobilization of the working and welfare poor, es Velasquez and Jackson have shown, can make the policy process more representative, As the attempts to increase the registration of minority voters suggest, reengaging Ameri- cans in the political process is a difficult under~ taking. In national elections, only about half of eligible U.S, voters exercise the franchise, the lowest turnout among industrialized nations. Explanations of voter apathy are multiple. ‘Within the voting population, more affluent vot- cers are more than twice as likely to exercise their franchise as are those who are poor: In 1996 65.7 percent of voters with incomes above $50,000 voted in the presidential election, versus only 28.6 percent of those with incomes less than $10,000. A survey conducted by the Pew Re- search Center for the People and the Press re- vealed that substantial majorities ofrespondents agreed with such statements as "government is inefficient and wasteful,” “politicians lose touch CHAPTER B / The Mating of Governmental Policy 223, pretty quickly.” and “government controls too much of daily life“ Such perceptions bode ill for the democratic process, of course, Some 30 million prospective voters are inactive, a group made up disproportionately of minorities and the poor Increasing the involvement of aps- thetic voters not only would make inroads against non-decision making, but also would make public social programs more responsive to their circumstances, Social Workers and Social Reform Asa result of non-decision making and voter ap: athy, advocates of social justice are instrumental in correcting for a skewed political process. ‘Throughout the history of U.S, social welfare, ad- vocstes of care for vulnerable populations have ‘been shaping social policies If we look beneath the surface of policy statements, we find a rich and often exciting account of the skirmishes fought by advocates for social justice. In some respects, social policy innovations can be looked ‘upon as individual and collective biography writ ten in official language. In an age of mass pop- Jations that are often manipulated by private and public megastructures, it is easy to forget how powerful some individuals have been in shaping Social welfare policy in the United States. Many of these leaders are known because they achieved national prominence; yet some of the more heroic acts to advance soctal justice were performed by individuals whose names are not ‘widely recognized, As just one example, not to be forgotten in this regard is Michael Schermer, 8 social worker who was murdered while working {na voter registration drive n the South during the Civil Rights movernent.* Early social welfare leaders emerged during the Progressive Et, a period when eciucatel and socially conscious men 4M and women sought to create struc- Naiecen tures that would advance social justice taetei 224 PART THREE /The Government Sector in the United Siates. ‘The settlement house pained dren's Bureau, and @ manber of the National 4 reputation as the locus for reform activity, lead. ing one historian to conclude that “settlement ‘workers during the Progressive Era were probably ‘more committed to political action than any other group of welfare workers before or since.”* From this group Jane Addams quickly surfaced as a Jeader of national prominence, Through her set- tlement home, Hull House, she Fought not only for improvements in care for slum dwellers in inner city Chicago, but also for international peace. For Jane Addams, social work was social reform, In stead of focusing solely on restoration and reha- billtation, Addains claimed that there was a superior role for the profession: "It must decide ‘whether itis to remain behind in the area of ear ing for the victimized,” she argued, “or whether to press ahead into the dangerous area of contlict where the struggle must be pressed to bring to pass an order of society with few victims." In that struggle Addains served nobly, receiving an honorary degree from Yale University and serving as president of the Womer’s International League for Peace and Freedom. In 1931 Jane Addams was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, a suitable dis. tinction for a social worker who once had herself appointed a garbage collector in order to improve sanitation in the slums around Full Hlouse. Hull House proved a remarkable institution, and among its residents were women who made lasting and important contributions to the New Edith Abbott, president of the National Cone ference of Social Welfare, dean of the Univer. sity of Chicago School of Social Service Administration, and participant i the drafic ing of the Social Security Act of 1935 Grace Abbott, organizer of the first White House Conference on Children, director of the U.S. Children’s Bureau, and participant in the construction of the Social Secusity Act Julia Lathrop, developer of the first juvenile court aitd of the frst child mental health clinic in the United States, and the first di- reetor of the U.S. Children's Bureawe Florence Kelley, director of the National Con- sumer Lecgue, cofounder of the U.S, Chil- Chile! Labor Committee Brances Perkins, ditector of the New York Council of Organizations for War Services, rector of the Council on Tnmigrant Educa tion, andl the first Secretary of Labor"® The activity around Hull House was never lim- ited to those with a narrow view of reform. Areg- ular participant in the settlement was John Dewey, in his time “America’s most influential Philosopher; educator, as well as one of the most ‘outspoken champions of social reform." Sottlemnent experiences crystallized the mo- tivations of other reformers as well. Harry Hap- kins, primaty architect of the New Deal and of the social programs that made up the Social Se. ‘curity Act, had resided in New Yorks Christadora House Settlement. Ida Bell Wells-Barnett led the Negro Fellowship League to establish a seitle ment house for African Americans in Chicago. Lillian Wald, with Florence Kelley a cofounder of the USS. Children’s Bureau, had earlier estab. lished New Yous Henry Street Settlement, an in- stitution that was to achieve distinction within the African American community. Under the guidance of Mary White Ovington, a social worker; the first meetings of the National Asso- Giation for the Advancement of Colored People were held at the Henry Street Settlement 50 Early social welfare leaders. championed causes that improved the conditions of children and immigrants, but they did not always forsake African Americans, When it became apparent that Booker 7. Washington's program of “indus. {tial education” was unable 10 contend effec: tively with ubiquitous racial discrimination, social reformers Jane Addams, Ida Bell Wells. Barnett, and John Dewey joined W. B. B. Du Bois in the Niagara Movement. The enrly organiza: tions spawned by the Niagara Movement were later consolidated into the National Urban League, with George Edmund Haynes, a social worker, as one ofits codirectors. In 1910 Haynes had been the first African American to graduate from the New York School of Philanthropy, so it is not surprising that an important. Urban League program was the provision of fellowshipsfor African Americans to the school.S! Later, dur ing the height of the Civil Rights movement, the National Urban League, under the direction of social worker Whitney Young J, collaborated in organizing the August 28, 1963, march on Wash- ington, memorialized by the ringing words of Martin Luther King Jr, “Ihave a dream!”5? If the New Deal bore the imprint of social workers, the Great Society was similarly marked some 30 years later. Significantly, one leader of the War on Poverty was Wilbur Cohen, a social worker who had been the first employee of the Social Security Board created in 1935. Eventually Cohen was to be credited with some 65 innova- tions in social welfare policy, but his crowning. achievement was the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid acts in 1965, The secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare during the Johnson a ministration, Cohen was arguably the nation’s most decorated social worker, receiving 18 hon- corary degrees from U.S. universities. Es Social Work and Advocacy Organizations ‘The formulation of social welfare policy in the United States, as this chapter has shown, is a complicated and often arduous process. Much of this can be attributed to the nature of U.S. eal ture: to the competing interests inherent in a pluralistic society; to the federal system of gov- ‘emment, which authorizes decision making on several levels at once; to public and private bureaucracies that serve large numbers of consumers; to economic and technological de- velopments that lead to specialization. Under these circumstances, changing social welfare policy to improve the circumstances of dised- vantaged groups can be a daunting task. Regt tably, few welfare professionals consider social policy advocacy an enterprise worthy of under- taking. Most social workers prefer direct service activity, in which they have little opportunity for ‘CHAPTER 8 / The Making of Governmental Policy 225 irect involvement in social welfare policy. Some social workers co attain important positions in federal and state human service bureaucracies and are close to the policy process. Unfortu nately, however, these managers are often ad- ‘ministering welfare policies that have been made by legislatures and that do not necessarily repre- sent either clients or human service profession- als. Perhaps most troubling, the involvement of social workers in the formulation of social policy has been diminishing in recent years. In 2 provocative statement, June Hopps, dean of the Boston College School of Sacial Work and for- mer editor in chief of Sooia! Work, acknowledged that “Since the Iate 1960s and early 1970s, the [social work] profession has experienced a dra- matic loss of influence in the arenas where pol icy is shaped and administered.” That this should occur is not only a reversal of the profes- sion’s Progressive Era legacy, but also an abnie- gation of a rapidly expanding service sector If one indicator of good social policy is the correspondence between the pelicy and the s0- cial reality of its intended beneficiaries, then social welfare policy should be enhanced by the input of social workers. However, social workers have Jeft much of the decision making about social welfare to professionals from other disc! plines. “There are increasing numbers of non- social workers, including psychologists and ‘ban planners,” observed Eleanor Brilliant, ‘taking what might have been social work jobsin service delivery and policy analysis."®° The con- sequences of welfare professionals’ opting to leave social policy in the hands of others are im- portant, For direct service workers, these conse- quences can mean having to apply eligibility standards or procedures that, although logical in some respects, make little sense in the social con- text of many clients. For the public, they may mean a gradual disenchantment with social pro- grams that do not seem to work. The causes of the retrenchment affecting social programs since the late 1970s are complex, of course; but it is ‘worth noting that public dissatisfaction with so cial programs has escalated as welfare profes- sionals have retreated from active involvement in social welfare policy.