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Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

Why do individuals respond to fraudulent scam

communications and lose money? The psychological
determinants of scam compliance
Peter Fischer1, Stephen E. G. Lea2, Kath M. Evans2
1
University of Regensburg
2
Social, Economic and Organizational Research Group, School of Psychology, University of Exeter

Correspondence concerning this article should Abstract

be addressed to Peter Fischer, Department of
Psychology, Social- and Organizational
Psychology, University of Regensburg,
Universitätsstr. 31, 93053 Regensburg,
Germany. E-mail:
peter.fischer@psychologie.uni-regensburg.de
doi: 10.1111/jasp.12158
Why do so many people all over the world, so often, react to completely worthless
scam offers? In two questionnaire studies, one of which included the distribution of
an experimentally manipulated simulated scam, we investigated differences between
respondents who did and did not report past compliance with scams. We found that
the principal differences were in their response to very high-value incentives, in the
extent to which they reacted with positive emotions to the thought of winning a large
prize, in their reliance on signs of official authority, and in their self-confidence. The
first two of these can be regarded as forms of visceral processing. Some of these dif-
ferences suggested a dispositional difference between victims and non-victims.

The psychology of scam compliance
“AWARD NOTIFICATION, FINAL NOTICE. This
is to inform you on the release of the EUROMIL-
LION LOTTERY INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION
PROGRAM in conjunction with INTERNATIONAL
CREDITS COMPANY and WORLD DIRECTORIES
held on the 10™ OF SEPTEMBER 2007. Your name
attached to ticket number 031-1127 with serial
number 3214-07 drew the lucky numbers of 22-37-39-
41-49-19-2, which consequently won the lottery in the
3* category. You have therefore been approved for
a lump sum payout of €1.9I5.000 (ONE MILLION
NINE HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN THOUSAND
EUROS). CONGRATULATIONS!!”
(adapted from a scam which was provided by the U.K.
Office of Fair Trading)
Have you ever received something like that? If so, you received
a scam, as millions of people do every day. According to the
U.K. Office of Fair Trading (OFT) a scam is “a misleading or
deceptive business practice where you receive an unsolicited
or uninvited contact (e.g. by email, letter, phone, or ad) and
false promises are made to con you out of money” (Office of
Fair Trading, 2006, p. 12). Examples of common scams
include bogus lotteries, deceptive prize draws and sweep-
stakes, fake psychics,“miracle”health cures, advance fee“419”
frauds and “get-rich-quick” schemes. The Office of Fair
Trading (2006) estimates that 3.2 million people in the U.K.
alone fall victim to scams, and lose more than £3.5 billion1
every year. The present research tries to highlight core
psychological processes that are involved when individuals
respond to fraudulent scam offers.
Complying with a scam is clearly a nonoptimal decision,
and the high incidence of scam compliance is a clear demon-
stration, if further demonstration was needed, that real
economic agents are not always rational optimizers. Scam
compliance can be seen as a result of our bounded rationality:
although using simple heuristics (i.e., cognitive shortcuts)
to take economic decisions may generally make us smart
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999), it may also make us vulnerable to
exploitation by fraudsters (because heuristics sometimes do
not lead to optimal decisions). Most empirical investigations
of scam compliance recipients have been attempts to discover
which groups within society are most vulnerable, to scams in
general or to particular types of scam (e.g., AARP, 1996a,b,c;
Grimes, Hough, & Signorella, 2007; Office of Fair Trading,
2006), and the results support the idea that scam compliance
results from limitations on rational decision making. There
are reliable individual differences in vulnerability, of the sort
that would be predicted from general research on susceptibil-
ity to interpersonal influence (see, e.g., Bearden, Netemeyer,
1
At the time the research was conducted, £1 exchanged for approximately
$1.95US.

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

Fischer et al.
& Teel, 1989). Thus the elderly, less well educated, and socially
isolated are particularly vulnerable to scams. In the United
Kingdom, the OFT found that older victims (aged 55 and
over) were likely to lose nearly twice as much per scam com-
pared with younger age groups. However all studies also agree
that scam compliance is in no way confined to the more vul-
nerable groups, and that demographically speaking, anyone
might be a victim.
The aim of the present research was to improve our
psychological understanding of why people fall victim to
scams. Scams are a form of fraud, but they differ from more
typical frauds in that they are not embedded within an exist-
ing commercial transaction, but rather attempt to create a
transaction within which the fraud can be perpetrated. The
initial scam approach is thus a form of marketing offer, distin-
guished from legitimate marketing by the fact that the con-
sumer will never actually receive any product or service.
Indeed, the fact that in the United Kingdom it is the OFT that
is the lead government agency for trying to limit the damage
caused by scams derives from the fact that it is responsible
for regulating misleading advertisements. Accordingly, the
limited existing literature on the psychology of scam compli-
ance (surveyed by Shadel & Schweitzer-Pak, 2007) has drawn
largely on what we know about the psychology of response to
marketing and to persuasive communication generally.
In the theoretical literature, among the psychological pro-
cesses that have been mainly suggested as underlying scam
compliance are:
1. Deterioration of decision making in the presence of high
motivation. Many scams appeal to strong motivators such
as huge sums of money or the promise of cures of chronic
or terminal disease. The quality of decision-making and
associated information processing is reduced when people
are in strong motivational states (e.g., Fischer, Jonas,
Frey, & Kastenmuller, 2008; Frey, 1986; Schwarz, Frey, &
Kumpf, 1980). People in such a psychological state do not
elaborate the pros and cons of a decision sufficiently, and
neglect possible shortcomings in decision alternatives’
longer-term consequences. Recent experiments by Ariely,
Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2009) have confirmed
that decision making deteriorates when the sums of
money involved are so large as to be outside people’s
normal experience. Loewenstein (1996) has argued that
strong motivations elicit “visceral processes” of decision
making, and Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) suggest that
under conditions of high visceral influence it is less likely
that clues to the scam status of a message (“scam alerts”)
will be noticed. Rusch (1999) also argues that fraudsters
aim to engage peripheral (emotional and superficial)
rather than central (logical and systematic) decision pro-
cesses (cf. Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). Cukier, Nesselroth,
and Cody (2007) carried out analyses of the content of 111
“Nigerian Scam Letters.” They found that key elements in
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2061
the letters were “rich narrative appeals to strong emotions
like greed, guilt and lust,” and that the scammers used
“archetypical myths of windfall fortunes” (p. 1). Specifi-
cally, the letters address feelings of greed, charity, heroism,
and other associated strong emotional cues (see also
Kienpointner, 2006). In a study carried out by the U.K.
Office of Fair Trading (2006), 30% of the interviewees who
reported having fallen for scams said that they were
caught off guard, and 13% referred to the excitement at
the prospect of getting a good deal or winning a prize.
2. Trust. Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) suggest that
victims may focus on the interpersonal interaction rather
than the content of a conversation with a scammer, so that
they are convinced by the apparent trustworthiness of the
scammer rather than recognizing the implausibility of the
content of the offer—in terms of classic communication
theory, a focus on the source rather than the message
(Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Scammers use a variety of
techniques that seem to be attempts to induce trust. For
example, scams offering “miracle” health cures or “get-
rich-quick”opportunities often use fake testimonials from
“satisfied customers” to induce trust: the recipient of the
scam message is likely to overestimate the reliability and
validity of the scam message if it has the apparent backing
of others, as well as overestimating the trustworthiness
of the scam source. Once in one-to-one contact with a
victim, scammers frequently seek to make recipients
believe that they have something in common with
them (e.g., some physical, psychological, intellectual, or
personal–history-related attribute). In addition, people
tend to trust and obey authorities, even if they are not
present in a specific situation: classic studies have shown
that authority influence can even bring people to hurt
another person severely (e.g., Milgram, 1965). The com-
munication medium and detail may increase the percep-
tion of trust and authority (especially for older people);
e.g. envelopes containing scam mailings often refer to an
“Official Notice” or “Important Documents” enclosed.
Texts are often written in machine-type letters, and official
looking seals and logos are used to increase the perceived
underlying authority of a scam. In the Office of Fair
Trading (2006) research, 32% of scam victims said that
they responded to a scam because of the legitimate and
professional appearance of its marketing.
3. Social influence techniques. Both Rusch (1999) and
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) point to the scammers’
use of social influence techniques of the kind described by
Cialdini (1984/2007), including social proof, liking and
similarity, reciprocation, commitment, and consistency.
For example, people tend to be more comfortable when
their own behavior shows consistency, just as they appreci-
ate consistency in the behavior and reactions of other
people (Festinger, 1957, 1964; Frey, 1986). It is therefore
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

2062
argued that scammers exploit this by gaining compliance
for a small and perhaps not unreasonable request before
moving on to a larger, more unreasonable demand. The
desire for consistency probably also partly explains the
“sunk cost effect” (Arkes & Blumer, 1985), in which people
take into account past costs when taking present decisions,
despite the fact that, from the perspective of rational
choice theory, they are irrelevant. Sunk cost effects are par-
ticularly relevant to some of the most serious examples of
scam compliance, when people fall victim to an extended
scam, and keep sending money to the same scammer,
feeling that they have already invested so much that they
need to spend just a little bit more to finally obtain value
for what they have paid out in the past. An example of this
effect can be found in foreign lottery scams where victims
are repeatedly asked for further payments to release their
alleged winnings. The scammers’ attempts to establish
similarity with their victims are also an example of this
kind of social influence attempt.
4. Scarcity and urgency. Perceived scarcity can enhance the
subjective value of an offer (e.g. Lynn, 1989; Verhallen &
Robben, 1994; Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975).
Langenderfer and Shimp (2001) point out that scam mes-
sages frequently emphasize the urgency or uniqueness of
the opportunity that is being offered.
Although all these suggested processes provide plausible
accounts of scam compliance, and account for some of the
details of scam content or scam victims’ reports, their rel-
evance has not been subjected to systematic empirical tests.
Our aim in the present research was to provide more empiri-
cal information about the psychological processes underlying
scam compliance. It is not feasible to carry out a real scam on
people for research purposes. Accordingly, we examined dif-
ferences between the responses of people who, according to
their self-reports, had or had not complied with scam appeals
in the past. We carried out two studies; in both we sought
responses by a questionnaire, but in the second, the question-
naire was supported by a realistic simulation of a scam, the
content of which was manipulated experimentally. In the
light of the literature surveyed earlier, we aimed in particular
to investigate whether there was evidence that scam victims
processed information in a more visceral way, were more
influenced by misplaced trust in the scammers and their
bogus signs of authority, were more open to persuasion and
social influence, or were more influenced by considerations of
scarcity and urgency.
Preliminary investigations
Because the research literature on scam compliance is sparse,
we wished to confirm that the processes identified in the
Introduction were at least plausibly at work in the kinds of
scam currently common in the United Kingdom, the location
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The psychology of scams
for our empirical studies. We therefore carried out two quali-
tative investigations, using rapid data-mining techniques to
examine the content of (a) a sample of postal scam commu-
nications and (b) a set of interviews that we carried out with
scam victims. Because the aim of these studies was confirma-
tory, the analyses used were relatively superficial, but suffi-
cient to identify the most frequently occurring words and
psychological concepts to ensure that they were included in
our subsequent investigations.
Interviews with scam victims and
quantitative text mining
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 23 people
who self-identified as scam victims. They came from many
different places in the United Kingdom. Participants were
recruited by media advertising, from people who had
approached the OFT or Consumer Direct (a telephone con-
sumer advice service managed by the OFT) to complain
about scams, and through Wave 1 of the questionnaires used
in Study 1 (see later). The main question in these interviews
was why participants reacted to the scam. What did they think
and feel? What were their motivations and behaviors? All
interviews were conducted by the third author, who was
experienced in conducting one-to-one interviews on sensi-
tive topics. Participants received £50 for participation in the
interviews, which lasted about 1 hour. All interviews were
audiotaped and subsequently transcribed for analysis. On the
basis of the interview content, all participants were identified
as unambiguous scam victims (seven additional interviews in
which the participants did not meet this criterion were dis-
carded). Text mining was used to identify the words most fre-
quently mentioned; 42 words were identified as being both
psychologically meaningful and occurring frequently across
almost all interviews. These were then combined into psycho-
logically meaningful categories by two independent coders,
the first author and a colleague who was blind to the hypoth-
eses of the present research. Once a list of categories had been
agreed, inter-coder agreement on the placement of words
within them exceeded 95%, the remaining 5% of categoriza-
tions being resolved by discussion.
These categories that emerged from the analysis were:
emotional cues, trust and authority cues, cost–benefit consid-
erations (size of prize), behavioral commitments, sunk-cost
considerations, overconfidence, and regret considerations.
Over 87% of interview transcripts included words that we
categorized as relating to (a) cues related to positive emotions
(words like “friends” or “home”); (b) cues of trust (words
that suggest the scammer to be a trustworthy business
partner or an authoritative source, such as “information” or
“company”); (c) cost–benefit considerations (mainly words
related to the size of the prize or reward, such as “money,”
“pay” or “prize”); and (d) words trying to prompt behavioral
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

Fischer et al.
commitments (words that promote getting in contact with
the scammers, such as “telephone,” “contact,” “call,” “ring,”
“letter”). Following this numerical analysis, the transcripts
were read through again by the third author, to check that the
themes suggested by the word categories were indeed present
in the interviews; with minor exceptions, they were.
Thus three of the four psychological processes identified
from the previous literature as relevant to scam compliance
were detectable in the interview material. Discourse relating
to positive emotions, and to the size of prizes, both seem to
refer to visceral or peripheral information processing; trust
cues were mentioned explicitly; and the scammers’ drive to
secure behavioral commitment was also directly in evidence.
The only process for which we found little evidence was the
emphasis on scarcity or uniqueness. Although each inte-
rviewee’s story had its unique features, no additional pro-
cesses were suggested as being of widespread application,
either by our numerical data-mining or by our readings of the
interview transcripts, although it is noteworthy that the effect
of visceral cues is represented by two somewhat distinct cat-
egories, one relating directly to money values and the other to
more general emotions.
Scam content
In the second preliminary investigation, we looked at the
scam communications themselves. A corpus of 587 scam
communications (primarily mailings but also some emails
and website content) was made available by the OFT. They
represented 10 different types of scam communication:
advance fee (“419”) scams (62 mailings and emails), interna-
tional sweepstake scams (223 mailings), fake clairvoyants (46
mailings), prize draw scams (83 mailings), “get rich quick”
scams (20 mailings), bogus investment scams (6 mailings),
bogus lottery scams (68 mailings and emails),“miracle” cures
(11 mailings and website content), premium rate prize draw
scams (35 mailings), and bogus racing tipsters (29 mailings).
The text mining software was used to identify words that were
mentioned more than 10 times within at least 10 % of the
documents of the corresponding subcategory, and these were
categorized as before. These categories were emotional cues,
trust and authority cues, cost–benefit considerations (size of
prize), behavioral commitments, sunk–cost considerations,
overconfidence, regret considerations, and scarcity cues.
Inter-rater agreement on categorization was 96%, and the
remaining codings were resolved by discussion. The com-
monest categories were: behavioral commitments (words
related to the need for the recipient to take a small behavioral
step toward the scammers, e.g., “return,” “letter,” “fee;” cost–
benefit considerations (words such as e.g., “amount,”“prize,”
“cash,” “cheque,” concerned with the relationship between
financial input and output, making the prize appear large and
the input negligible); trust cues (words such as “document,”
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2063
“form,” “information,” “claim,” which aimed to increase sub-
jective trust in the scam offer, e.g., by referring to authorities
and official institutions); visceral cues (words such as
“winner,” “game,” “life,” used to excite strong emotional
experiences); and scarcity cues (words such as “time” or
“date,” relating to the time-limited nature of the offer, the
uniqueness of the opportunity). All these categories were
found in more than 95% of communications, and no other
category occurred in more than 65% of them. As with the
interviews, the materials were reread after the categorization
to ensure that the categorization of the words was appropriate
to the way they were used in context, and that no other themes
occurred frequently, although because of the size of the
corpus, only a sample of each kind of communication (at
least five, more where conclusions were not immediately
obvious) were read.
As in the interviews, the content of the scam communica-
tions supported the suggestions made in the literature con-
cerning the possible psychological processes underlying scam
compliance. Commitment and trust appeals were both repre-
sented directly. Again as in the interviews, no additional pro-
cesses were suggested, although the broad category of visceral
appeals again seemed to have two facets, those most directly
concerned with costs and benefits and those directed at other
emotions. Unlike the interview material, the scam material
included a strong emphasis on scarcity and uniqueness,
raising the possibility that this kind of appeal is something
that scammers try to use, but that does not influence
victims—or that victims are affected by such appeals, but do
not realize it.
Study 1: a questionnaire comparison
of self-reported victims and
non-victims of scams
The preliminary studies confirmed our conclusion from the
previous literature, that important factors in scam compli-
ance might be (a) a deterioration in decision quality under
conditions of high motivation; (b) overreliance on cues that
elicit trust in a message or its source; (c) social influence
techniques; and (d) response to cues of scarcity and
urgency. However, neither the previous literature nor our
preliminary studies have compared scam victims with non-
victims to look for differences between these two groups
with regard to such psychological processes. Study 1 sought
to do this. It used a questionnaire that included a list of
statements that would be typical of people who were vulner-
able to these four different kinds of psychological processes
associated with decision errors, and respondents were asked
to indicate how far they agreed with them. It also asked
people whether they had ever fallen victim to a scam. We
expected that, compared with non-victims, those who said
that they had been a scam victim would be more likely to
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

2064
endorse statements consistent with being more susceptible
to these four psychological processes.
Method
Participants and design
The study took place in two waves. In Wave 1, we sent out our
questionnaire to 300 potential participants from the partici-
pant panel associated with the School of Psychology at the
University of Exeter. The panel includes local residents and
other contacts of the department (including parents of stu-
dents and former students) who have expressed a willingness
to assist the department in its research. In Wave 2, we hand-
delivered questionnaires to 1,000 households in two towns
within the same region as the university where the research
took place. Wards within these towns were chosen from
2001 U.K. census data to have age and gender distributions
close to national averages, and within those wards areas of
typical housing were selected by the distributors by direct
observation. A letter explaining the purpose and nature of the
research, and a freepost reply envelope, were enclosed with all
questionnaires.
In Wave 1, 148 completed questionnaires were returned
(49% response rate); of these, 45 had to be excluded because
the dependent measures were not completed (mostly these
came from respondents who reported no scam experience),
leaving a usable sample of 103. In Wave 2, 153 responses were
received (15% response rate) of which 85 were fully usable
(34 participants just sent back the blank questionnaire;
another 34 participants only answered the general questions
on scam responses, but not the questions relating to psycho-
logical processes).
Materials and procedure
Because of time restrictions and practical feasibility of the
studies (i.e., we anticipated that participants would only
answer and send back the questionnaire if it is short and not
too time consuming), we used self-constructed short scales to
measure each psychological construct. Participants were first
asked some general questions on scams, including open ques-
tions about the types of scam communications they had
received. Next, before answering the dependent measures on
underlying psychological processes, participants received the
following instruction: “If you have ever responded (or nearly
responded) to a scam, please indicate how you felt when
responding to it, by circling one of the numbers. If you have
never responded to a scam, then please indicate generally how
you felt about a specific scam offer you remember receiving.”
Afterwards, they responded to a series of items designed to
probe vulnerability to the four psychological processes and
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The psychology of scams
associated decision errors proposed in our scam model, using
a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (definitely).
Wordings of Wave 1 items
The impact of high motivation was measured with two items:
“I was convinced that the scam was a really worthwhile offer”
and “I felt very lucky to get this offer.” Positive emotions were
measured with three items: “I felt very positive about my per-
sonal future when I responded to the scam,” “I responded to
the scam in order to feel better,” and “I felt that responding to
the scam would make me more successful than other people.”
Trust was measured with the following two items: “I just
believed what they told me in the scam” and “I felt there was a
strong authority behind the scam.” The impact of social influ-
ence techniques was probed by a range of items, reflecting
different techniques: “I felt obliged to answer the scam,” “I
felt high commitment toward the scammers,” “I felt that
the scammers liked me, so I responded,” “Other people also
received this scam offer, so I felt that it must be genuine,”“I felt
that the scammers were like me,”“I felt that the scammers had
the same attitudes as me,”“I responded to the scam because I
felt that I have to be consistent with my expectations for my
life,”“I felt that the scammers had given me something inter-
esting, so I felt I should respond,”and“I felt that I had invested
a lot in the scam (e.g., reading time), so I responded.” The
impact of scarcity was measured by a single item, “Often I
feel that scams offer me something which is scarce.” As an
exploratory measure, additional items were included to
measure feelings of control, but this construct did not prove
useful in the analysis, and data from these items are not
reported here. Four further items were included to measure
overall positive attitude to scams, as a manipulation check. As
regular research volunteers, the participants were finally
invited to offer any comments on the wording of the
questions.
Wordings of Wave 2 items
Some items were altered for the Wave 2 questionnaire in the
light of results and comments received in Wave 1. The impact
of scarcity was not measured in this wave. The impact of high
motivation was measured with two items: “I was convinced
that the offer or deal was really worthwhile” and “Sometimes I
am rather greedy.” Trust was measured with three items: “I
was convinced that the offer or deal was really worthwhile;”“I
just believed what they told me;” and “I felt there was a strong
authority behind the letter, text, or e-mail.” Positive emotions
were measured with a single item: “Responding to an offer
can make me feel better.” Susceptibility to persuasion tech-
niques was measured with six items, reflecting different tech-
niques: “Other people were apparently taking up this offer,”“I
felt or I was personally addressed by the letter or e-mail,” “I
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

Fischer et al.
felt a high level of commitment toward the sender of the
letter, text, or e-mail,” “I felt that the sender of the letter, text,
or e-mail liked me,” “I felt that the sender had the same atti-
tudes as me,” and “I felt that I had invested a lot in dealings
with the offer.” As an exploratory measure, a number of items
dealing with other possible causes of compliance were added,
including ten that related to various aspects of overconfi-
dence. In the light of subsequent analysis, these were subse-
quently split into four groups. Two items measured a belief in
personal superiority: “I am more intelligent than the average
person” and “I am more successful in my job than the average
person.” Four items (all negatively keyed) measured excessive
self-confidence or self-reliance:“I don’t tend to read the small
print,” “The law would be able to sort my situation if I
was defrauded,” “Sometimes I have problems with judging
probabilities,” and “Sometimes, I struggle to imagine big
numbers.” Two items measured belief in the possession of rel-
evant knowledge and skills: “I believed in my abilities to make
good judgments” and “I have a lot of background knowledge
of the topic of the scam.” Finally, two items measured finan-
cial recklessness: “I am normally cautious when I take finan-
cial decisions” (negatively keyed) and “I believe in following
my gut feelings.”A few other items were included to follow up
constructs suggested as relevant by particular interviews, but
these did not yield results of any interest and they are not
reported here.
Results and discussion
Of the participants submitting usable responses, in Wave 1
65% recalled being approached by scammers within the past
2 years, while in Wave 2, 73% did. In Wave 1, 11% classified
themselves as victims (n = 14), 9% as near victims (n = 12),
and the remaining 80% (n = 77) as non-victims. Correspond-
ing figures for Wave 2 were 10%, 3% and 87%. Preliminary
analysis showed that the responses of near victims and
victims were similar, so these two categories were combined
Table 1 Study 1, Wave 1: Psychological Factors Related to Victim Status
Mean value ± standard deviation
Construct Non-victims
High motivation 0.94 ± 1.74
Positive emotions 0.64 ± 1.40
Trust 0.86 ± 1.43
Susceptibility to persuasion 0.39 ± 0.70
Scarcity 0.52 ± 1.35
Regression model χ2
Degrees of freedom
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2
*, ***p < .05, .001.
Mean scale values of the five measured constructs, high motivation, positive emotions, trust, susceptibility to persuasion, and scarcity, in the self-
reported scam victims and near victims relative to their values in those who reported that they had never been close to becoming victims; and coefficients
for each construct in a logistic regression model to predict victim status.
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2065
to simplify the analysis. In Wave 1, where manipulation
check questions were included, victims and near victims
had substantially higher mean scores on these items than
non-victims.
Wave 1 analyses
Reponses to the items concerned with social influence tech-
niques were submitted to principal components analysis fol-
lowed by oblique rotation, to investigate whether items
associated with different techniques gave different patterns of
results. The analysis provided evidence for only two factors,
quite strongly correlated (component correlation 0.54), with
no clearly interpretable grouping of items associated with
each factors. Treated as a scale of a single construct, these
items gave a Cronbach alpha of 0.91, which could not be
improved by dropping any single item. Accordingly, mean
responses to these items were treated as a measure of general
susceptibility to persuasion. The three items measuring posi-
tive emotions generated a scale with a Cronbach alpha of
0.79, which could not be improved by dropping any item.
Table 1 shows the means of the five measured constructs:
high motivation, positive emotions, trust, susceptibility to
persuasion, and scarcity, in the self-reported scam victims
and near victims relative to their values in those who reported
that they had never been close to becoming victims. All these
constructs took higher values in the victim group than in
non-victims, although bearing in mind that the response
scales allowed for values up to 10, the means were not high. As
the table shows, the differences among groups on all con-
structs were significant when they were tested individually.
However, responses on all constructs were correlated, so their
independent significance was tested using logistic regression,
in which victim status served as the dependent variable and
the five constructs as independent variables. Regression
weights and their significance are included in Table 1. It can
be seen that high motivation and trust were independently
Near-victims and victims Regression coefficient
4.44 ± 2.49 .57*
2.84 ± 2.09 −.09
4.02 ± 2.03 .60*
2.02 ± 1.65 .65
2.00 ± 2.78 −.64*
47.64***
5
.63
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2066 The psychology of scams

associated with victim status in the expected way; Positive
emotions and susceptibility to persuasion did not contribute
any additional explanatory power; and scarcity had a signifi-
cant association in the direction opposite to its first-order
effect. We conclude that the primary factors associated with
becoming a scam victim or near victim are affected by the
high values of the rewards offered, and showing a high degree
of trust in the scammers. With those factors taken into
account, the apparent scarcity of the rewards offered had a
negative effect on victimhood, perhaps because it aroused the
potential victim’s suspicions.
Wave 2 analyses
The three items measuring trust generated a scale with a
Cronbach alpha of 0.78, which could not be improved by
dropping any item. Responses to the items concerned with
social influence techniques and overconfidence were submit-
ted to principal components analyses followed by oblique
rotation. For persuasion techniques, the analysis provided
no evidence that more than a single factor underlay the
responses. Treated as a scale of a single construct, these items
gave a Cronbach alpha of 0.77, which could not be improved
by dropping any single item. Accordingly, as in Wave 1, mean
responses to these items were treated as a measure of general
susceptibility to persuasion. For the overconfidence items, the
responses were clearly multifactorial, and in the light of the
results of the analysis, these items were split into the four
groups noted earlier.
Table 2 shows the means of the five measured constructs,
high motivation, positive emotions, trust, susceptibility to
persuasion, and overconfidence, in the self-reported scam
victims and near victims relative to their values in those who
reported that they had never been close to becoming victims.
Results for overconfidence are also shown for the four subdi-
visions, suggested by the factor analyses. The four constructs
found to be associated with reported scam compliance in the
Wave 1 analyses, high motivation, positive emotions, trust,
and susceptibility to persuasion, all again took significantly
higher values in the victim group than in non-victims,
although again the means were not high even in the victim
group. Total overconfidence was significantly lower in the
victim group than in the non-victims, but there were no sig-
nificant differences on any of the components identified in
the factor analysis. The independent significance of the con-
structs was tested using logistic regression with victim status
as the dependent variable. Separate analyses were carried out
using total Overconfidence (Model 1 in Table 2) and its four
components (Model 2) as regressors, in each case along with
the four constructs carried forward from Wave 1. It can be
seen from Table 2 that trust was significantly associated with
victim status in both analyses; high motivation and positive
emotions were on the margins of significance, and suscep-
tibility to persuasion again failed to contribute any additional
explanatory power. When overconfidence was treated as a
single construct, it was negatively and significantly associated
with scam compliance, but when it was broken down into
components, two of its components (self-confidence and
recklessness) showed a positive association with reported
compliance, and the other two (personal superiority and
belief in knowledge of the field) showed negative associa-
tions. A final stepwise analysis identified as the best predictive
model one that included high motivation, positive emotion,
trust, self-confidence, and belief in personal superiority, the

Table 2 Study 1, Wave 2: Psychological Factors Related to Victim Status

Mean value Regression coefficients

Construct Non-victims Near-victims and victims Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

High motivation 1.59 ± 1.98 3.97 ± 2.05 .33 .57+ .57+

Positive emotions 0.59 ± 1.22 2.87 ± 2.92 .45 .38 .44+
Trust 1.12 ± 1.53 4.39 ± 3.02 .81** .50* .57**
Susceptibility to persuasion 1.82 ± 1.59 3.60 ± 2.25 −.06 .14
Overconfidence 5.52 ± 1.32 4.47 ± 1.17 −2.05**
Personal superiority 4.57 ± 2.96 3.33 ± 2.40 −.30 −.36*
Self-confidence/self-reliance: 8.84 ± 1.83 8.25 ± 1.85 .74+ .76*
Relevant knowledge and skills 5.78 ± 2.82 4.97 ± 1.80 −.14
Financial recklessness: 4.53 ± 1.88 4.57 ± 1.33 .06
Regression model χ2 43.12*** 34.54*** 36.18***
Degrees of freedom 5 8 5
Nagelkerke pseudo-R2 .66 .58 .58

+, *, **, *** p < .10, .05, .01, .001.

Mean scale values for the five measured constructs, high motivation, positive emotions, trust, susceptibility to persuasion, and overconfidence, in the
self-reported scam victims and near victims compared with their values among non-victims; and coefficients for each construct in logistic regression
models constructed to predict victim status.

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

Fischer et al.
last with a negative effect. Results of this analysis are also
included in Table 2, as Model 3.
Discussion
From the Wave 1 results, we concluded that the primary
factors positively associated with becoming a scam victim or
near victim are being affected by the high values of the
rewards offered, and showing a high degree of trust in the
scammers. The Wave 2 results confirmed these conclusions,
and add the information that excessive self-confidence is a
risk factor for scam compliance. The negative association of
compliance with feelings of personal superiority seems likely
to be a consequential effect; it is plausible that becoming a
scam victim would reduce one’s sense of self-worth, as other
ways of being duped do (Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007). In
both waves, mean levels of agreement with all the statements
were low, even among scam victims.
Not all the variables identified in the literature and in our
preliminary investigations had independent associations
with scam compliance. In Wave 1, we found no independent
positive effect of either scarcity or susceptibility to social
influence. To keep the questionnaire short, scarcity was not
tested again in Wave 2, but in the light of the strong prior indi-
cations that behavioral commitments have an impact on
scam compliance, we did repeat the test of susceptibility to
social influence, within which this variable was located.
However, once again, no independent effect was found. A
possible explanation would be that susceptibility is strongly
correlated with one or more of the other variables, but exami-
nation of the correlations between constructs did not suggest
that it was exceptional in this respect. Alternatively, it may be
that the effects of social influence apply equally to victims and
non-victims. This could happen if they play a part at later
stages in the compliance process, not at the key early stage
where someone either becomes a victim or does not.
Study 2: experimental manipulation
of scam content and its impact on
self-reported victims and non-victims
of scams
Study 1 succeeded in demonstrating some differences in the
responses of people who did, or did not, self-identify as past
scam victims. However, it had a number of limitations. In any
questionnaire study, participants may distort their responses
to make a specific social impression on the researchers
(impression management) or to respond in the way they
believe the researchers want them to (demand effect), and it is
particularly likely such effects will occur in the context of a
behavior such as scam compliance, which must make the
respondent feel foolish. Furthermore, in Study 1, we were
asking retrospective questions, with the additional risk that
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2067
self-serving distortions will have occurred in the scam
victims’ memories. Finally, the only way we had of finding out
whether a variable was relevant to scam compliance was to
look at differences between compliers and non-compliers.
This methodology would not detect a factor that plays a part
in scam compliance after a crucial first stage in the process.
In Study 2 we sought to overcome these limitations. We
again used a postal questionnaire, but to eliminate the
unwanted effects of retrospection, we presented respondents
with a simulated postal scam, and in the questionnaire, we
asked them for their reactions to it. This procedure also
enabled us to directly manipulate the extent to which the
scam contained cues that would be expected to trigger key
processes that are thought to play a part in scam compliance.
Using the results of Study 1, we focused on three variables that
were independently associated with self-reports of scam
compliance, and that could be triggered to varying degrees by
changing the scam content. These variables were high moti-
vation (varied by manipulating the amount of money osten-
sibly available in the scam), positive emotion (varied by
including or omitting triggers to contemplate how receiving
the money would make the recipient feel), and trust (varied
by including or omitting conventional symbols of authority
on the scam). In addition, we manipulated the format in
which the simulated scam was sent out. In one condition, we
simply sent members of the public a letter that enclosed a
simulated scam and a questionnaire that asked for their reac-
tions to it. We expected this to elicit “cold” responses in which
people would tell us what they thought they would be likely
to do if they received such a communication from a real
scammer. In the second condition, we used almost the same
materials, but altered the packing order, so that people
opening the mailing would first encounter the simulated
scam. Only if they took enough interest in it to open it would
they find the explanatory letter and questionnaire, which
asked for reactions in the same way. We hoped that this tech-
nique would elicit at least some “hot” responses, reports of
how people felt at the time of opening, when they were still
treating the scam at its face value, and not as a communica-
tion from researchers. We would see evidence for that if
responses to the two formats differed.
All combinations of these four independent variables
(three dimensions of scam content, plus delivery format)
were used, so that we could look for interactions between
them. The questionnaire accompanying the scam investi-
gated how people felt about the simulated scam, and in par-
ticular whether they thought they would have complied with
it. It also asked about respondents’ previous experience of
scam compliance, so we could compare the impacts of the
simulated scam on victims and non-victims. An additional
dependent measure was whether or not people responded to
the mailing, since any differences would presumably reflect
their immediate reaction to the scam content.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

2068
We expected that enhanced triggers for high motivation,
positive emotions, and trust would increase participants’
intention to respond to the scam. In addition, we expected
that these effects would be more pronounced for previous
scam victims and for participants in the “hot response
condition.”
Method
Participants
A total of 10,000 scam simulations and questionnaires were
sent out. Addresses were taken from two mailing lists,
obtained commercially: a general public sample, expected to
be typical of U.K. consumers, and a sample of people who
were known to have participated in postal lotteries. The two
samples were equally represented in the different types
of mailing described later. Their responses were not
distinguished.
Materials and research design
Eight different scam formats were generated, by varying the
three content factors outlined earlier factorially. The experi-
mental conditions were manipulated as follows. High motiva-
tion: In the low-prize condition, participants were informed
that they won £5,000; in the high-prize condition, they were
informed that they had won £50,000. Positive emotion: Par-
ticipants in the positive emotion trigger condition were asked
in the scam text to imagine how they would feel when they
had received the prize; this additional cue was not given in the
no-trigger condition. Trust: In the high-trust condition, the
scam contained references to official institutions; in the low-
trust condition, this cue did not exist.
Two delivery formats were used. In the “cold” delivery
format, we sent recipients a letter that enclosed a simulated
scam and a questionnaire that asked for their reactions to it.
In the “hot” delivery format, we sent the same materials, but
altered the packing order, so that people opening the mailing
would first encounter the simulated scam. Only if they took
enough interest in it to open it would they find the explana-
tory letter, which asked them to fill in the questionnaire about
their response to the scam. In both formats, the mailing
included a debriefing about the purposes of the experiment,
the researchers’ thanks to the recipients for taking part, and a
freepost envelope for return of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire was based (with some modifications)
on those used in Study 1. First, it asked respondents whether
they had ever fallen victim to a scam. It then asked for their
reactions to the simulated scam. The following items were
used on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (definitely): “I felt very
positive about responding to the letter;”“Reading it made me
think about positive future with all that money;” “I thought
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The psychology of scams
the letter was very boring;”“The letter made me feel I’d really
like to have that much money, so I wanted to respond;” “The
thought of the winnings really gave me a kick;”“I really didn’t
even think about the offer made in the letter;”“The size of the
prize really intrigued me;”“I felt very negative about respond-
ing to the letter;” “This was a chance to get a big prize for
doing almost nothing;” “I believed the letter came from an
official institution;”“I was very doubtful about the content of
the letter;”“The content of the letter really sounded very offi-
cial;” “I thought in detail about what I could do with all that
money;” and “The letter seemed very unreliable to me.”
Thus we employed a 2 (high motivation: £50,000 vs.
£5,000) × 2 (positive emotion prompt: included vs. omitted) ×
2 (trust cues: included vs. omitted) × 2 (delivery format: hot
vs. cold response) × 2 (self-reported previous scam victim: yes
vs. no) factorial design, with randomized assignment of par-
ticipants for the first four factors and self-selection for the last
factor.
Results
Return rates
In all, 1,054 responses were received, of which 422 (8.4% of
the number delivered) could be determined as coming from
the “cold” delivery format and 525 (10.5% of the number
delivered) from the“hot”delivery format; the remainder were
incomplete. Table 3 shows the numbers from each delivery
format returned that could be classified as coming from the
eight different kinds of scam. The difference in classifiable
return rates for the two formats was significant, χ2(1) = 12.14,
p < .0005. For every scam type, except one, the “hot” delivery
format produced more returns than the “cold” format. Under
the “hot” delivery conditions, but not under the “cold” condi-
tions, responding to the questionnaire could possibly be
interpreted as the consequence of a risk behavior, because the
safest behavior on opening any communication that looks
like a scam is to discard it unexamined. Accordingly, the vari-
ation in return rates across scam types was examined sepa-
rately for the two formats; however, it was not significant
for either format (“hot,” χ2(7) = 5.66, “cold,” χ2(7) = 7.44,
p > .05). The response rates did not show any simple pattern
as a function of the content of the scam, suggesting that the
content factors may interact in complex ways to make a scam
more or less likely to gain attention, although it is notable that
regardless of delivery mode, the condition in which a high
prize was offered, but there were no symbols of authority or
cues to positive emotion, gave a markedly higher response
rate than other conditions.
Overall, 15.8% of respondents said that they had previ-
ously responded to a scam in some way, either by replying to it
or by losing money. This proportion did not show any signifi-
cant variation as a function of delivery mode or scam
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Fischer et al. 2069

Table 3 Study 2: Response to Simulated Scams as a Function of Scam Content and Self-Reports of Previous Scam Victim Status

Mean scale values

Scam content “Intention to respond” “Dislike of scams”

Symbols of Triggers for Usable return

Delivery mode Prize offered authority Positive emotion rate (%) Non-victims Victims Non-victims Victims

Cold Low Absent Absent 7.4 0.67 1.72 6.32 4.64

Cold Low Absent Present 8.8 1.02 3.18 5.37 3.49
Cold Low Present Absent 8.0 1.19 2.55 6.27 4.28
Cold Low Present Present 9.1 0.73 0.94 5.59 5.00
Cold High Absent Absent 10.9 0.72 2.98 5.90 4.73
Cold High Absent Present 8.3 0.65 4.37 7.07 3.93
Cold High Present Absent 7.7 0.84 3.33 6.18 4.47
Cold High Present Present 7.4 0.89 3.48 6.80 4.67
Hot Low Absent Absent 9.9 1.27 3.16 5.67 4.84
Hot Low Absent Present 11.5 1.54 2.90 5.72 4.85
Hot Low Present Absent 10.4 0.86 1.91 6.05 3.80
Hot Low Present Present 9.0 0.86 3.82 5.93 4.03
Hot High Absent Absent 12.2 1.06 4.16 6.17 4.82
Hot High Absent Present 9.4 1.56 2.26 5.86 3.48
Hot High Present Absent 11.2 0.53 2.33 5.81 5.91
Hot High Present Present 9.8 1.19 3.45 6.19 5.58

type (delivery mode, χ2(1) = 0.17; scam type, χ2(7) = 5.64, significance of the differences between these means was
p > .05). tested with a 2 (Delivery mode) × (Scam victim) × 2 (Visceral
cue) × 2 (Trust cue) × 2 (Cost–benefit cue) analysis of vari-
Factor analysis of questionnaire responses ance. The analysis revealed a significant main effects for scam
victim status, F(1, 896) = 125.89, p < .001, η2 = .12, and for
We examined the correlations between the responses to the
high motivation (value of prize), F(1, 896) = 3.92, p = .048,
questionnaire items (other than the item about previous
η2 = .004. The two-way interaction between these factors was
scam compliance) using principal axis factoring followed by
also significant, F(1, 896) = 6.22, p = .013, η2 = .01. Examina-
oblique rotation. We found two distinct factors with initial
tion of the means for these conditions across the other factors
eigenvalues of 5.57 and 2.14. All other eigenvalues were below
showed that there was a substantial effect of the level of prize
1.0. In addition, all items loaded at above 0.4 on one of the
offered for participants who were previous victims (means of
two strong factors, and none loaded at above 0.3 on both. The
3.23 vs. 2.69), while for non-victims the difference was negli-
two factors correlated modestly (r = −.26). Thus the ques-
gible, and the means were much lower (1.03 vs. 0.92). Table 3
tionnaire responses could be efficiently summarized in terms
shows some variations among the other conditions, and these
of the respondents’ mean responses to two groups of items.
were reflected in some significant three- and four-way interac-
One group included nine items concerned that were all
tions in the analysis of variance, but there were no other con-
concerned with participants’ intention and likelihood of
sistent or readily interpreted effects.
responding to a scam like the one they had been sent. The
other group included five items that were all concerned with
how the scam made participants feel. Below, we refer to the Dislike of scam
mean scores on these two groups of items as “Response inten-
Table 3 also shows the mean scores on our dislike of scam
tion”and“Dislike of scam”(the great majority of feelings elic-
scale for respondents who received each kind of simulated
ited were negative, and the items were keyed so that higher
scam under each delivery mode, separately for those who did
scores indicate greater negativity).
and did not report previous compliance with a scam. The sig-
nificance of the differences between these means was tested
Response intention
with an analysis of variance as before. The analysis revealed a
Table 3 shows the mean scores on our response intention scale significant main effect for scam victim, F(1, 900) = 32.07,
for respondents who received each kind of simulated scam p < .001, η2 = .034, indicating that previous scam victims
under each delivery mode, separately for those who did (overall mean = 4.56, standard deviation [SD] = 2.66)
and did not report previous compliance with a scam. The expressed less dislike of the scam communication than

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 2013, 43, pp. 2060–2072

2070
non-victims (overall mean = 6.06, SD = 2.85). No further
significant main effects or interactions were observed, all
Fs < 2.08, all ps > 0.14.
Discussion
Delivering the simulated scams in a format that meant that
the recipient saw them first, before the letter requesting
their cooperation in research, produced a markedly higher
response rate despite the fact that the great majority of the
respondents were people who had never made any kind of
compliant response to a scam. At first glance it does not seem
surprising that a format that is designed to be attention-
catching does catch attention better than a bland-looking
letter, but given the unfavorable responses almost all recipi-
ents had to the scam, it does seem paradoxical. Perhaps the
opportunity to express their dislike of this kind of material
had a motivating effect.
The questionnaire responses support the view that high
motivation is a powerful factor influencing compliance with
scam communications. However the results suggest that it has
a substantial impact only on that minority of the population
who already have a history of scam compliance. The impact
on the remaining respondents (nearly 85% of the sample)
was negligible. That may reflect a floor effect (the response
intention scores of the non-victims were very low under all
conditions), but from a practical point of view it does not
matter whether this is the explanation. Practically, what
matters is that people who are not tempted by £5,000 are not
tempted by £50,000.
The remaining two manipulations of the simulated scam
had no consistent effect. It may be that they were not suffi-
ciently obvious or powerful; the positive emotion manipula-
tion, in particular, could only be effective if the recipient read
the scam simulation quite fully. On the other hand, our High
motivation manipulation was also quite moderate; our high
prize was not at all high by the standards of some of the
figures quoted in scam communications, which can run into
billions of pounds, dollars, or euros.
In principle, our experimental manipulation could have
revealed factors that affected scam compliance without pro-
ducing a difference between compliers and non-compliers.
It did not. We did not test one of the leading candidates for
such a process, the effects of persuasion techniques such as
the elicitation of behavioral commitment, and that would
be worth investigating in future. However the tendency of
the present results is to suggest that the most important
factors in determining response to scams may be disposi-
tional rather than general. There may be a subset of the
population who are particularly susceptible to scams,
and therefore more sensitive to the manipulations that
scammers use. The present study does not allow us to offer
an estimate of the size of that subset, both because our
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The psychology of scams
recipients were not a random population sample, and
because our overall response rates were low. However the
Office of Fair Trading (2006) suggest that around 6.5% of
the U.K. population become victims of scams in each year,
and that 8% will report ever having been the victim of a
scam. The small size of the difference between the annual
and the lifetime incidence of compliance supports the idea
that most compliers fall into a highly susceptible group, and
the figures suggest that group might comprise no more than
5%–10% of the population. Given the non-random nature
of our sample, and the low overall return rate, the 15.8% of
our sample who reported having complied with a scam in
the past is not inconsistent with such a figure.
General discussion
The present research started with the basic question why so
many people all over the world, so often, react to completely
worthless scam offers. Why can 3.2 million people in the
United Kingdom not detect scam content, and so lose more
than £3.5 billion every year? Why do some scam victims even
respond repeatedly, so that some of them lose their entire
financial resources as well as their psychological health? Based
on previous literature on the psychology of scam compliance
as well as more general research on errors in decision making,
we proposed that four distinct psychological processes are
predominantly involved in scam compliance: (a) reliance on
ineffective decision techniques, which we can refer to as vis-
ceral processing, under conditions of very high incentives; (b)
overreliance on cues that elicit trust in a message or its source;
(c) social influence techniques and in particular the elicita-
tion of behavioral commitments; and (d) response to cues of
scarcity and urgency. Given that there is evidence that some
people repeatedly respond to scams, we also considered the
possibility of (e) a general trait of susceptibility to persuasion
that increases the likelihood of falling for scams. Our studies
supported these initial hypotheses to differing extents.
1. Our preliminary investigations, and the results of both our
studies, suggest that the characterization of scam compli-
ance as a consequence of visceral processing needs some
refinement. Two separate visceral processes seem to be
involved. The first is an impact of the sheer size of the
incentive, which appeared in both our studies as well as in
our preliminary interviews. This is consistent with the
results of Ariely et al. (2009), showing that the mere size of
a prize, even when it is hypothetical, can impair decision
making, at least in some people. The second is an effect of
material that induces positive emotions about possessing
the supposed prize. This may be less robust, because we
found evidence for it in Study 1, but did not detect it in
Study 2; on the other hand, it may just be less easy to
manipulate in an effective way experimentally than the
size of a prize.
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Fischer et al. 2071

2. Dependence on cues of trust and authority emerged as a
significant predictor of scam compliance in our question-
naire investigation (Study 1), but we were unable to
confirm their impact in our more experimental approach
(Study 2). This factor requires further investigation.
3. Social influence techniques obviously include a range of
possible manipulations, but both the previous literature
and our preliminary investigations suggest that the elicita-
tion of behavioral commitments might be particularly
important. However, Study 1 suggested that none of the
influence techniques we tested differentiated between
people who did and did not report a previous history of
scam compliance. Analysis of individual frauds (see
Consumer Fraud Research Group, 2006) shows that
scammers do use many of the techniques described by
Cialdini (1984/2007), particularly once they have estab-
lished personal contact with a victim. Nothing in our
results conflicts with that, but we have found no evidence
that scam victims are more susceptible to such techniques
than anyone else.
4. Our preliminary content analysis of scam communica-
tions showed considerable evidence of cues of scarcity and
uniqueness being used. But the results of Study 1 found no
evidence that they have any differential effect on victims
and non-victims. This variable could appropriately be
investigated within the kind of experimental technique we
used in Study 2, although a more sensitive procedure
might be required to detect its effects.
5. The idea that some kind of enduring personality trait
might enhance susceptibility to persuasion received
support at a number of points. Those who reported previ-
ously being victims of scams differed significantly from
our respondents in a number of ways. A few of these (e.g.,
their lower estimates of their personal superiority, as seen
in Study 1) could reasonably be seen as consequences of
knowing they had fallen victim to a scam. For others, this
was a less plausible account. In Study 1, victims and non-
victims differed on a simple construct of Susceptibility to
Persuasion on first-order analysis of both waves of the
study, but the variable did not add any independent
explanatory power to a regression model predicting
victimhood in either wave. However, in the more detailed
analysis of Wave 2, a measure of self-confidence and
self-reliance did contribute to the model predicting
victimhood. We suggest, therefore, that excessive confi-
dence in one’s own judgments may play a part in scam
compliance. Study 2 provided further evidence for a dis-
positional factor in scam compliance, in that those report-
ing they had been victims were substantially affected by
the size of the prize offered in our simulated scam, whereas
other respondents were not, and none of the manipula-
tions of scam content that we used had a main effect on
any of our response variables.
The decision-making processes that we have identified as
underlying scam compliance are part of everyday economic
decision making. It is not normally dysfunctional to be highly
motivated by very large incentives, to pay attention to
symbols of authority, or to have a certain confidence in one’s
own judgment. Scammers, we argue, seek to exploit such
everyday heuristics. Any heuristic, and therefore any practical
decision maker, is necessarily open to exploitation to some
degree, because using heuristics means not considering all the
evidence from every possible angle. Our evidence suggests
however that some heuristics and some decision makers are
more vulnerable to such exploitation than others.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported financially by the U.K. OFT. We
thank Mike Haley and Mike Lambourne from the OFT for
their invaluable help with this research and their feedback on
previous drafts of this article. The present article is based on
an internal project report to the OFT. A nonacademic version
of this report has been made available on the OFT website, in
order to inform the public about scams. However, the views
expressed in this article are entirely the responsibility of the
authors, and not of the OFT. Some of the findings reported
here were presented at the conference of the International
Association for Research in Economic Psychology at Halifax,
Nova Scotia, Canada, in July 2009, and at the Stanford/
American Association of Retired Persons summit conference
on financial fraud in October 2009. We thank Dr. Andreas
Unterreitmeier for his help with the text-mining analyses as
well as Julia Köppl for her help with the literature search.

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