Envy-Freeness

Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Envy-Freeness
one of the pieces with hightest
Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?
value for that agent
Definition (Envy-Freeness)
A cake-cutting protocol is called envy-free, if every agent can ensure that she will
receive a subjectively largest piece.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Envy-Freeness
Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?
Definition (Envy-Freeness)
A cake-cutting protocol is called envy-free, if every agent can ensure that she will
receive a subjectively largest piece.

Connections between these two notions of fairness:

For n = 2 agents, we have: envy-freeness ⇔ proportionality

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Envy-Freeness
Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?
Definition (Envy-Freeness)
A cake-cutting protocol is called envy-free, if every agent can ensure that she will
receive a subjectively largest piece.

Connections between these two notions of fairness:

For n = 2 agents, we have: envy-freeness ⇔ proportionality
For n ≥ 3 agents, we only have: envy-freeness ⇒ proportionality

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Envy-Freeness
Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?
Definition (Envy-Freeness)
A cake-cutting protocol is called envy-free, if every agent can ensure that she will
receive a subjectively largest piece.

Connections between these two notions of fairness:

For n = 2 agents, we have: envy-freeness ⇔ proportionality
For n ≥ 3 agents, we only have: envy-freeness ⇒ proportionality
(From current exercise sheet)
Remark
Indeed, of our protocols only cut-and-choose guarantees envy-freeness.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Envy-Freeness
Is a proportional allocation fair for everyone?
Definition (Envy-Freeness)
A cake-cutting protocol is called envy-free, if every agent can ensure that she will
receive a subjectively largest piece.

Connections between these two notions of fairness:

For n = 2 agents, we have: envy-freeness ⇔ proportionality
For n ≥ 3 agents, we only have: envy-freeness ⇒ proportionality

Remark
Indeed, of our protocols only cut-and-choose guarantees envy-freeness.
How to find envy-free allocation for three agents?
Question
Where do the moving-knife and divide-and-conquer protocol fail to be envy-free?
Robert Bredereck (See exercises) Computational Social Choice
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Four Simultaneously Moving Knives
Stromquist (1980) found this envy-free protocol for three agents:

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Four Simultaneously Moving Knives
Stromquist (1980) found this envy-free protocol for three agents:

A referee slowly moves a sword across the cake, from left to right (supposed to
eventually cut somewhere around the 13 mark).

[W. Stromquist. How to Cut a Cake Fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644, 1980.]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Four Simultaneously Moving Knives
Stromquist (1980) found this envy-free protocol for three agents:

A referee slowly moves a sword across the cake, from left to right (supposed to
eventually cut somewhere around the 13 mark).
At the same time, each agent is moving her own knife so that it would cut the
righthand piece in half (w.r.t. her own valuation).

[W. Stromquist. How to Cut a Cake Fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644, 1980.]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Four Simultaneously Moving Knives
Stromquist (1980) found this envy-free protocol for three agents:

A referee slowly moves a sword across the cake, from left to right (supposed to
eventually cut somewhere around the 13 mark).
At the same time, each agent is moving her own knife so that it would cut the
righthand piece in half (w.r.t. her own valuation).
The first agent to call “stop” receives the piece to the left of the sword. The
righthand part is cut by the middle one of the three agent knifes. If neither of the
other two agents holds the middle knife, they each obtain the piece at which their
knife is pointing. If one of them does hold the middle knife, then the other one gets
the piece at which her knife is pointing.
[W. Stromquist. How to Cut a Cake Fairly. American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644, 1980.]

Robert Bredereck
Homework: Why is this envy-free? Computational Social Choice
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 Four Simultaneously Moving Knives
Stromquist (1980) found this envy-free protocol for three agents:

Book:
"Economics and
Computation" L R

(a) A sword is moved from the left to the right above the cake,
(hypothetically) dividing it into a left and a right piece.

L S T

(b) The players move their knives in parallel with the moving
sword, each (hypothetically) dividing R in half according to
their valuation. The middle knife’s position determines the
pieces S and T partitioning R.
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
The first discrete envy-free protocol for three agents was discovered independently by
Selfridge and Conway (around 1960). (Our exposition follows Brams and Taylor (1995).)

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
The first discrete envy-free protocol for three agents was discovered independently by
Selfridge and Conway (around 1960). (Our exposition follows Brams and Taylor (1995).)
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).

[S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
The first discrete envy-free protocol for three agents was discovered independently by
Selfridge and Conway (around 1960). (Our exposition follows Brams and Taylor (1995).)
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).

[S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
The first discrete envy-free protocol for three agents was discovered independently by
Selfridge and Conway (around 1960). (Our exposition follows Brams and Taylor (1995).)
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.
[S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
The first discrete envy-free protocol for three agents was discovered independently by
Selfridge and Conway (around 1960). (Our exposition follows Brams and Taylor (1995).)
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.
[S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.]

Remark: Contiguous pieces are not ensured.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.

Felix George Helena

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.

Felix George Helena

Robert Bredereck 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Computational Social Choice

′ 30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.
Felix George Helena

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
30
The Selfridge-Conway Protocol Homework: Why is this envy-free?
Agent 1 cuts the cake in three pieces (she considers equal).
Agent 2 either “passes” (if she thinks at least two pieces are tied for largest) or
trims one piece (to get two tied for largest pieces). — If she passed, then let agents
3, 2, 1 pick (in that order).
If agent 2 did trim, then let 3, 2, 1 pick (in that order), but require 2 to take the
trimmed piece (unless 3 did). Keep the trimmings unallocated for now (note: the
partial allocation is envy-free).
Now divide the trimmings. Whoever of 2 and 3 received the untrimmed piece does
the cutting. Let agents choose in this order: non-cutter, agent 1, cutter.
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Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

31
Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.
For n = 3 we saw two protocols, each with some drawbacks.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

31
Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.
For n = 3 we saw two protocols, each with some drawbacks.
For n = 4, no bounded protocol producing contiguous pieces was known until 2016
[H. Aziz and S. Mackenzie, STOC 2016, FOCS 2016]

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

31
Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.
For n = 3 we saw two protocols, each with some drawbacks.
For n = 4, no bounded protocol producing contiguous pieces was known until 2016
[H. Aziz and S. Mackenzie, STOC 2016, FOCS 2016]

For arbitrary n, Brams and Taylor (1995) give an envy-free protocol requiring an
unbounded number of queries in the R-W model.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

31
Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.
For n = 3 we saw two protocols, each with some drawbacks.
For n = 4, no bounded protocol producing contiguous pieces was known until 2016
[H. Aziz and S. Mackenzie, STOC 2016, FOCS 2016]

For arbitrary n, Brams and Taylor (1995) give an envy-free protocol requiring an
unbounded number of queries in the R-W model.
Theorem (Procaccia, 2009)
Any envy-free protocol requires Ω(n2 ) queries in the Robertson-Webb model.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

31
Limitations and Open Problems
Achieving envy-freeness is much harder than achieving proportionality:
For n = 2 the problem is easy: cut-and-choose does the job.
For n = 3 we saw two protocols, each with some drawbacks.
For n = 4, no bounded protocol producing contiguous pieces was known until 2016
[H. Aziz and S. Mackenzie, STOC 2016, FOCS 2016]

For arbitrary n, Brams and Taylor (1995) give an envy-free protocol requiring an
unbounded number of queries in the R-W model.
Theorem (Procaccia, 2009)
Any envy-free protocol requires Ω(n2 ) queries in the Robertson-Webb model.
n
n nn
Open what the best bound is (must be between and n2 nn ). For comparison:
proportionality only requires O(n log n) many queries.
[S.J. Brams and A.D. Taylor. An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American Mathematical Monthly, 102(1):9–18, 1995.]

Robert Bredereck [A.D. Procaccia. Thou Shalt Covet Thy Neighbor’s Cake. IJCAI-2009.] Computational Social Choice
31
Fair and Optimal Allocations
Observation
Fair (proportional, envy-free, and even equitable) allocations can be easily computed if
the valuation functions are piecewise constant and fully known to a central authority.
Homework:
Proof : (Proof How can we prove this?
at the whiteboard).

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Fair and Optimal Allocations
Observation
Fair (proportional, envy-free, and even equitable) allocations can be easily computed if
the valuation functions are piecewise constant and fully known to a central authority.
Proof : (Proof at the whiteboard).

Socially Optimal Proportional Allocation

Find a proportional allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . . .P
, An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is
optimal with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

32
Fair and Optimal Allocations
Observation
Fair (proportional, envy-free, and even equitable) allocations can be easily computed if
the valuation functions are piecewise constant and fully known to a central authority.
Proof : (Proof at the whiteboard).

Socially Optimal Proportional Allocation

Find a proportional allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . . .P
, An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is
optimal with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Theorem
A socially optimal proportional allocation can be computed in polynomial time if the
valuation functions are piecewise constant and fully known to a central authority.
Robert Bredereck Exercises Computational Social Choice
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The Price of Fairness
Consider an allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . .P
. , An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is optimal
with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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The Price of Fairness
Consider an allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . .P
. , An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is optimal
with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Observe: Such an allocation can be extremely unfair.

Homework: Show an example!

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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The Price of Fairness
Consider an allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . .P
. , An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is optimal
with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Observe: Such an allocation can be extremely unfair.

What is the price of fairness?

Compute the ratio between the social welfare of the optimal allocation A∗ and the
optimal fair allocation.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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The Price of Fairness
Consider an allocation A∗ = (A1 , A2 , . .P
. , An ), Ai ⊆ [0, 1], Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ that is optimal
with respect to social welfare, that is, i vi (Ai ) is maximal.

Observe: Such an allocation can be extremely unfair.

What is the price of fairness?

Compute the ratio between the social welfare of the optimal allocation A∗ and the
optimal fair allocation.

Theorem √
The price of proportionality is Θ( n).
Exercises
Proof : (Proof at the whiteboard).

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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