Celebrating Science in Ancient Greece and Rome

Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257
brill.com/nun
Celebrating Science in Ancient Greece and Rome

Liba Taub
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge,
and Newnham College, Cambridge
lct1001@cam.ac.uk
Abstract
Current ideas about the aims and value of scientific work and knowledge may be part of
our inherited legacy from Greco-Roman antiquity. While financial rewards were impor-
tant in the past and are important today, when we look at individual ancient Greeks
and Romans known for their scientific ideas and achievement, we see that a number
of these were avowedly pursuing science for a gain which was very specific, but not
financial. Motivations might include intellectual curiosity and a desire for personal
improvement, including increased understanding, as well as an interest in gaining rep-
utation and influencing posterity. In Greco-Roman antiquity there were various ways
in which an individual’s scientific achievements could be celebrated, commemorated,
honoured and memorialised; several are considered here.
Keywords
Greco-Roman science – reward – reputation
In “Rewarding Science in Ancient Greece and Rome,” Serafina Cuomo has given
us a rich and provocative consideration of the compensations associated with
undertaking scientific work, relevant not only for thinking about Greco-Roman
antiquity, but also for contemplating scientific enterprise and its incentives
and returns today.1 Indeed, questions relating to the rewards and benefits of
1 Cuomo rightly included technē/ars as well as epistēmē/scientia in her consideration of ancient

Greek and Roman scientific work; due to limitations of space, I am not able to be as inclusive
here.
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celebrating science in ancient greece and rome 247
science, and issues linked to the financing of science, are a matter of con-
cern not only for scientists, politicians and funding bodies today, but are being
brought to the fore by members of the public as well. The international “March
for Science” has attracted many thousands of people in various cities around
the world to protest cuts to funding for scientific research and what has been
seen as a “rejection” of science.2
Cuomo has emphasized that some of our current ideas about the aims and
value of scientific work and knowledge are part of our inherited legacy from
Greco-Roman antiquity.3 She focuses primarily on views relating to possible
financial rewards, as well as what sort of work might have led to financial gain.
I will return to this point, and the question of what sorts of rewards for sci-
ence were on offer in Greco-Roman antiquity. For while financial rewards were
and are important, in Greco-Roman antiquity – as today – there were vari-
ous ways in which an individual’s scientific achievements could be celebrated,
commemorated, honoured and memorialised.
Before turning to these various types of rewards, I would like to consider
Cuomo’s suggestion that fourth-century Athens was the birthplace of the idea
of what she refers to as “disinterested science,” that is, the pursuit of science
as its own reward. She reminds us that this can be understood as a fundamen-
tally aristocratic and anti-democratic notion, antithetical to the possibility of
achievement of (upward) social mobility through gaining, and being rewarded
for, expertise. I agree with Cuomo that “the notion of disinterested science
[being] opposed to mercenary knowledge may have been formulated in order
to uphold specific social and political hierarchies.”4
However, I am not certain that even Plato would have described what we
term “science” as “disinterested” (taking “science” to refer to something like
epistēmē or scientia).5 I would argue that even if “science” (or natural philoso-
2 See www.marchforscience.com (accessed 3 May 2019): “The March for Science champions
robustly funded and publicly communicated science as a pillar of human freedom and pros-
perity.”
3 I would argue that this legacy includes (not only ancient) ideas about what was valued in
Greece and Rome, but also later interpretations about what was meant by individual ancient
writers on “scientific” knowledge.
4 See Cuomo, “Rewarding Science in Ancient Greece and Rome” (in this issue).
5 I have elsewhere discussed issues related to our use of the terms “science,” “scientific” and
“scientist” to refer to activities, texts and people in pre-modern periods; see Liba Taub,
Science Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017),
pp. 7–9. Part of the problem is due to the changing understanding – by modern practition-
ers, historians and philosophers – of what constitutes science. On ancient natural philos-
ophy and “science” see Michiel Meeusen, Luc van der Stockt, “Introducing Plutarch’s Natu-
ral Philosophy,” in Natural Spectaculars: Aspects of Plutarch’s Natural Philosophy, edited by
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248 taub
phy, or mathematics) did not lead to financial gain, that was not always the goal
to which knowledge-seekers aspired. Indeed, in Plato’s Republic 7, the point of
doing mathematics – including arithmetic, geometry, harmonics, astronomy
and stereometry – is as part of one’s training to be a philosopher-king, to guide
the polis. By my reading – and here I believe Cuomo agrees – that is not actu-
ally “knowledge for its own sake,” but knowledge with the purpose of ruling the
city.6
Indeed, when we look at some of the great names associated with scien-
tific ideas and achievement in Greco-Roman antiquity, we see that a num-
ber of these individuals were avowedly pursuing science for a gain that was
very specific, but not financial. In the case of Epicurus and Lucretius – two
authors whose works survive – it is clear that a primary reason to do sci-
ence, specifically physics, was to alleviate fear of the unknown, to be able
to offer a rational account of potentially frightening things without having
recourse to irrationally-acting gods. Indeed, Epicurus cautioned against gain-
ing too detailed knowledge about phenomena: such knowledge may lead to
further anxiety and fail to contribute to peace of mind. For example, astro-
nomical knowledge cannot contribute to happiness; for this reason, he does
not advocate the detailed mathematical study of the motions of the heavenly
bodies. He argued that
those who are well-informed about such matters and yet are ignorant
what the heavenly bodies really are, and what are the most important
causes of phenomena, feel quite as much fear as those who have no such
special information – nay, perhaps even greater fear, when the curiosity
excited by this additional knowledge cannot find a solution or understand
the subordination of these phenomena to the highest causes.7
Indeed, Epicurus emphasised that it is not necessary to know the cause of

things, just simply to understand that a rational explanation (or two, or three or
more) can be given, in principle.8 Epicurus and Lucretius – and also the Stoics,
Michiel Meeusen, Luc van der Stockt (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2015), pp. 11–25: 12–
14.
6 Cuomo points out that, in Plato’s Republic, even those who have achieved knowledge seem
not to have achieved much personal benefit, and must nevertheless suffer the realities of
worldly life.
7 Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 79, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans-
lated by Robert D. Hicks, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William
Heinemann Ltd, 1925), vol. 2, p. 609.
8 Epicurus advocated considering multiple explanations, rather than adhering to only
Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257

their competitors in the philosophical marketplace – offered elaborate physi-

cal theories, with the primary aim of achieving ataraxia, freedom from worry.
Such freedom from worry was a key goal for many Hellenistic philosophers who
offered theories of nature, not knowledge of nature for its own sake. And while
this might be the sort of knowledge that can set one free, as it were, it may also
be an important example of “applied” science, and not purely theoretical or
“blue-skies” thinking.
Turning to a more specialist practitioner and author, the second-century
mathematician, Claudius Ptolemy, I have argued elsewhere that he advocated
the pursuit of astronomy not for “its own sake,” but rather because by doing
astronomy one can become a better person, in harmony with the universe.9
That astronomical bodies have special significance for the human soul is an
idea that Ptolemy introduced in his astronomical work the Mathematical Syn-
taxis (also known as the Almagest). He regarded the astronomical bodies – the
Sun, Moon and wandering planets – as divine, and argued that their study is
an ethical endeavour, because by studying and emulating the motions of the
celestial bodies astronomy enables us to become as similar to the divine as
is humanly possible. For Ptolemy, mathematics was the highest form of phi-
losophy, and astronomy was a branch of mathematics. For him, the practice
of astronomy had an ethical dimension, and – crucially – the improvement
of humans is possible because of the physical structure of the cosmos, which
reinforces and enables influences (and analogies) between the celestial and the
earthly, between the divine and the human. By studying these relations – which
are literally embodied in the physical world which we perceive visually in the
sky above us and aurally through musical sounds – and by describing them
mathematically, we too can achieve some measure of that divinity present in
the cosmos. For Ptolemy, the value of pursuing mathematical astronomy was
not restricted to the pursuit of theoretical knowledge. Rather, in his view, math-
ematics (including astronomy) “above all things, could make men see clearly;
from the constancy, order, symmetry, and calm which are associated with the
divine, it makes its followers lovers of this divine beauty, accustoming them
and reforming their natures, as it were, to a similar spiritual state.”10 The reward
one. See Liba Taub, “Cosmology and Meteorology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Epi-
cureanism, edited by James Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
pp. 105–124.
9 Liba Taub, Ptolemy’s Universe: The Natural Philosophical and Ethical Foundations of
Ptolemy’s Astronomy (Chicago: Open Court, 1993).
10 Ptolemy, Mathematical Syntaxis 1.1, in Ptolemy’s Almagest, translated by Gerald J. Toomer
(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1984), p. 37.

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for undertaking scientific work will be becoming as much like the divine as is
humanly possible. This is a programme of personal improvement, of ethical
gain, not of “knowledge for its own sake.”
If we are looking to blame or credit someone for the idea of “knowledge
for its own sake,” perhaps that might be Aristotle, who in the beginning of the
Metaphysics (1.980a) asserts that “by nature, all men desire to know.” (Of course,
by “men,” Aristotle probably meant free-born men, not slaves, or women.) Yet,
there are experts on Aristotle who would claim that his primary interest was
not especially “knowledge for its own sake,” but rather a deep desire to under-
stand the reason, the purpose, the telos of things. And, here, Aristotle may have
been partly showing his allegiance to his teacher Plato’s philosophical teach-
ings. In Plato’s Phaedo (96a), Socrates expresses disappointment that the study
of nature (physis) in his day seemed to be focused on identifying the material
causes of things rather than the reason why they exist. He recalls his own youth-
ful interest in scientific subjects: “when I was young I was remarkably keen
on the branch of knowledge that they call the investigation of nature. For it
seemed to me a splendid thing to know the causes of why each thing comes into
being, why it perishes and why it exists.”11 This concern with teleology – “why
something is,” that is, understanding the telos or purpose (or “end”) of things –
was a central question for many philosophers, including – especially? – Aris-
totle. Perhaps this desire to know the telos may be “disinterested,” wishing to
know the “why.”
Let’s now consider the idea of doing science just for oneself, because it is
interesting, pleasant or enjoyable, and the notion that this interest, pleasure
and enjoyment motivated what we might term “scientific” activities. I do not
know of many clear statements from Greek or Roman authors of this sort
of motivation for pursuing science. One that does spring to mind is Seneca’s
claim in his Natural Questions, written when he was well on in years, that he
had been interested in meteorology since he was young. The Natural Ques-
tions is addressed to his life-long friend Lucilius, also interested in such topics
(and the recipient of a letter from Seneca quoted by Cuomo). Given the detail
with which Seneca discussed the various meteorological phenomena and their
causes, and his confessed long-standing fascination with the subject, it seems
likely that Seneca had a genuine curiosity about meteorology and was deeply
interested in understanding the phenomena. This is indicated also in a letter he
11 Plato, Phaedo, in Plato: Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo, translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones,
William Preddy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann
Ltd, 2017), p. 443.
Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257

addressed to his mother, aiming to console her while he was in exile (41–49 CE,
many years before the writing of the Natural Questions):
I am as happy and cheerful as when circumstances were best. Indeed, they

are now best, since my mind, free from all other engrossment, has leisure
for its own tasks, and now finds joy in lighter studies, now, being eager for
the truth, mounts to the consideration of its own nature and the nature
of the universe. It seeks knowledge, first, of the lands and where they lie,
then of the laws that govern the encompassing sea with its alternations of
ebb and glow. Then it takes ken of all the expanse, charged with terrors,
that lies between heaven and earth – this nearer space, disturbed by thun-
der, lightning, blasts of winds, and the downfall of rain and snow and hail.
Finally, having traversed the lower spaces, it burst through to the heights
above, and there enjoys the noblest spectacle of things divine, and, mind-
ful of its own immortality, it proceeds to all that has been and will ever be
throughout the ages of all time.12
However, not many Roman authors suggested that they were pursuing sci-
ence simply because they were curious and enjoyed thinking about the natural
world. When we read the writings of some other Romans, including Pliny the
Elder and Columella (who wrote on agronomy), much of the motivation for
engaging in scientific activity was to have some control over nature (as agricul-
ture aims to do), and also to harness the power and value of nature for Rome,
for the present and for posterity.13
In the Almagest, Ptolemy (whose first name Claudius indicates that he was
a Roman, even if he wrote in Greek)14 stated clearly that he was interested in
posterity, and in making a contribution to benefit the future. One can assume
that he hoped that he would be remembered for his contribution, as indeed he
is. And, he deliberately took steps to ensure that his contribution was known.
First of all, Ptolemy, like Plato, Epicurus, Lucretius, the Stoics, and many oth-
ers ancient authors who thought about science and technology, ensured that
12 Seneca, To Helvia his Mother on Consolation 20.1–2, in Seneca: Moral Essays, translated by
John W. Basore, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heine-
mann Ltd, 1932), vol. 2, pp. 487–489. See also Gareth D. Williams, The Cosmic Viewpoint: A
Study of Seneca’s Natural Questions (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
13 Liba Taub, Science Writing (cit. note 5), pp. 72–85.
14 Daryn Lehoux, What Did the Romans Know? An Inquiry into Science and Worldmaking
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 5–6, makes a case for describing some
Greeks, writing in Greek (such as Ptolemy and Galen), as having been engaged in “Roman
science.”

252 taub
their ideas were written down, to be shared. By sharing their ideas these authors
made it more likely that they would be remembered by posterity: this remem-
brance itself, and knowledge of their work, can be understood as a form of
reward. Some of these “scientific” authors became famous: an even greater
reward. And there were other ways in which one’s work could be remembered,
through citation and preservation by later ancient authors. As examples, the
various ancient histories of philosophy (including that by Diogenes Laertius),
collections of mathematical solutions attributed to individuals (such as Euto-
cius’ anthology of solutions to the problem of doubling the cube) and Vitruvius’
list of inventors of types of sundials (in his work On Architecture) memori-
alised and celebrated individuals for their scientific achievement.15 Surely such
remembrance is a type of reward, even if posthumous.
And some of the great figures associated with science in Greco-Roman antiq-
uity went further than simply ensuring that their ideas and work were written
on papyrus to share with others: several created monuments proclaiming what
they had achieved. Claudius Ptolemy erected a votive monument – the so-
called Canobic Inscription – celebrating his own work by publicising the results
of his astronomical research.16 Earlier, in the third century BCE, Eratosthenes
may have erected a votive inscription describing his instrumental solution to
the Delian problem of doubling the cube; the votive monument was described
in a letter to his patron, his ruler, Ptolemy.17 His contemporary, Archimedes,
was reported by Plutarch to have requested that a sphere inside a cylinder be
15 Diogenes Laertius, Lives. Eutocius, Commentary on Archimedes’ Sphere and Cylinder,

edited by Johan L. Heiberg, in Archimedes Opera omnia, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner,
1915), vol. 3, pp. 59–261; translated, with critical edition of the diagrams, by Reviel Netz
in The Works of Archimedes: Translation and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004), pp. 243–269 and 270–368. Vitruvius, On Architecture, translated by
Frank Granger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann
Ltd, 1934), bk. 9, ch. 8.
16 See Alexander Jones, “Canobic Inscription,” in The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, edited
by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine, Sabine R. Hueb-
ner (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2013), p. 1299; Norman T. Hamilton, Noel M. Swerd-
low, Gerald J. Toomer, “The Canobic Inscription: Ptolemy’s Earliest Work,” in From Ancient
Omens to Statistical Mechanics. Essays on the Exact Sciences Presented to Asger Aaboe,
edited by J. Lennart Berggren, Bernard R. Goldstein (Copenhagen: University Library,
1987), pp. 55–73.
17 Liba Taub, “ ‘Eratosthenes Sends Greetings to King Ptolemy’: Reading the Contents of a
‘Mathematical’ Letter,” in “Mathematics Celestial and Terrestial. Festschrift für Menso
Folkerts zum 65. Geburtstag,” edited by Joseph W. Dauben, Stefan Kirschner, Andreas
Kühne, Paul Kunitzsch, Richard P. Lorch, special issue, Acta Historica Leopoldina, 2008,
54:285–302; Max Leventhal, “Eratosthenes’ Letter to Ptolemy: the Literary Mechanics of
Empire,” American Journal of Philology, 2017, 138:43–84.
Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257

represented on his own tomb, together with the ratio of their volumes, serv-
ing as a reference to his work.18 And a devotee of the philosophy of Epicurus,
Diogenes of Oinoanda, erected a vast stone monument publicising and detail-
ing the thoughts of his hero.19 These monuments were certainly celebrations
of scientific achievement. In some cases, even though produced by the indi-
vidual himself, they may have served as a sort of reward, a public notice of
achievement. These ancient inscribed stone monuments to scientific achieve-
ment were important material and visual signals.20 And posthumous fame
even contributed to a certain type of scientific tourism: Cicero recounts his
search for Archimedes’ tomb in Syracuse (Tusculan Disputations 5.64–66). No
medal as such was issued, but this sort of celebrity status (at least in the mind
of Cicero, and probably that of Archimedes himself, according to Plutarch) was
certainly recognition of a very special achievement.21 As another example of
the visual and material signification of status and reward, a number of “sci-
entific” thinkers – including Pythagoras – were celebrated on ancient coins;
the circulation of their images on objects of value reinforced their outstand-
ing reputations.22 (Figs. 1 and 2 show two sides of a coin, with the emperor and
Pythagoras.)
18 Plutarch, Marcellus 17. See also Mary Jaeger, Archimedes and the Roman Imagination (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 38–39; on what may have been represented
on the tomb, Dennis L. Simms, “The Trail for Archimedes’s Tomb,” Journal of the Warburg
and Courtauld Institutes, 1990, 53:281–286.
19 On Diogenes of Oinoanda, for a start, see Diskin Clay, “The Philosophical Inscription
of Diogenes of Oenoanda,” Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, 2007, 50:283–291;
Martin Ferguson Smith, The Epicurean Inscription: Diogenes of Oinoanda (Naples: Bib-
liopolis, 1993); Id., The Philosophical Inscriptions of Diogenes of Oinoanda (Vienna: Verlag
der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1996); Id., Supplement to Diogenes
of Oinoanda: The Epicurean Inscription (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2003); Jürgen Hammerstaedt,
Martin Ferguson Smith, The Epicurean Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda: Ten Years of
New Discoveries and Research (Bonn: Habelt, 2014).
20 The Watson Seminar is concerned with the Material and Visual History of Science.
21 According to his account, Cicero admired Archimedes and sought out his tomb, while
the Syracusans had let it become overgrown. The full account by Cicero celebrates Archi-
medes’ delight in intellectual inquiry (and Cicero’s own, as Jaeger has pointed out, in Id.,
Archimedes (cit. note 18), ch. 2, pp. 32–47, particularly 46–47). This may be a celebration
of the pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, and/or of the pleasure involved.
22 Walter Burkert has noted that “a striking piece of original evidence for the extraordinary
fame that surrounded Pythagoras as early as the 5th century is perhaps to be seen in
the ‘Pythagores’ coins of Abdera.” Walter Burkert, Lore and Science of Ancient Pythagore-
anism, translated by Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972),
p. 110, n. 2; Burkert provides details of the numismatic literature, as does Leonid Zhmud,
Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, translated by Kevin Windle, Rosh Ireland (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 44, notes 71–73. The coins issued in Abdera in 430–420

254 taub
figure 1 Bust of Trajan Decius. Copper alloy coin, Roman Empire.

Production place/date: Samos, 249–251. Object reference:
1844,0425.222; Image ID: 00102826001s
© The Trustees of the British Museum. All rights
reserved
Along with the celebrity status attained by some ancient scientists and
mathematicians, some may have achieved heroic significance. Pythagoras and
Epicurus are two who probably qualify for the appellation of “hero.” A “hero”
was a member of a class of beings worshipped by the ancient Greeks. Heroes
were generally conceived of as the powerful dead, and understood as forming
a class intermediate between the gods and human beings. Emily Kearns has
explained that from the fourth century BCE onwards there was great variation
in the types of honours offered to heroes, noting that “at one end of the spec-
trum it could have a strong resemblance to the offerings given to a dead relative;
bear an idealized portrait and the name ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΗΣ. Such celebration of revered individ-
uals is reminiscent of the commemorative medals discussed in this volume by Rebekah
Higgitt (related to the Royal Society) and Paolo Brenni (in the context of universal exhibi-
tions).
Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257

figure 2 Pythagoras, seated. Copper alloy coin, Roman Empire.

Production place/date: Samos, 249–251. Object reference:
1844,0425.222; Image ID: 00102828001
© The Trustees of the British Museum. All rights
reserved
at the other, it might be barely distinguishable from worship paid to a god.” In

practice, “there was a tendency in many parts of the Greek world for mourners
to depict the ordinary dead in heroic forms, to call them ‘hero,’ and even on
occasion to establish regular heroic cults and a priesthood.”23
A number of individuals associated with important scientific ideas were
regarded as heroes, including Pythagoras; some, including Heraclides of Pon-
tus, sought the status themselves. Diogenes Laertius reports that “when their
territory was visited by famine, the people of Heraclea besought the Pythian
priestess for relief, but Heraclides [of Pontus] bribed the sacred envoys as well
23 Emily Kearns, “Hero-cult,” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th ed., edited by Simon
Hornblower, Antony Spawforth, Esther Eidinow (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012);
see also Emily Kearns, The Heroes of Attica, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Sup-
plement 57 (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 1989).

256 taub
as the aforesaid priestess to reply that they would be rid of the calamity if
Heraclides were crowned with a crown of gold in his lifetime and after his
death received heroic honours.”24 It does not seem as if Heraclides’ desire for
heroic status was linked specifically to his scientific or astronomical work; fur-
thermore, he died soon after being crowned. As another example, Epicurus
instituted a sort of heroic veneration for himself: he established a custom of
celebrating his birthday annually with meals shared by his followers in his
school, the Garden, befitting his stature as the founding hero of the school.
His will stipulated annual feasts to celebrate his birthday after his death and
to commemorate his memory. Epicurean communities continued this tradi-
tion, and honored him as a hero;25 Lucretius celebrated him as such in his
poem De rerum natura (On the Nature of Things).26 Of course, like the erec-
tion of monuments to mark and celebrate one’s own scientific achievement,
the memorial dinners were instituted as a form of self-congratulation. Yet these
self-celebrations could serve as a public form of reward, simply by existing (to
some extent) in a public sphere. (However, as with some of the other sorts of
reward noted here, heroic status usually was conferred posthumously.)
Considering the opportunities of financial reward for engaging in scientific
work in antiquity, it is not clear what sort of public reward or recognition
was possible during one’s lifetime, even for the very distinguished and cele-
brated. Some scientists and mathematicians apparently had patrons, but to
what extent such patronage normally included financial benefit (and in what
form) is difficult to say. Yet, certainly, financial benefits for science were not
unknown. Aristotle is our source (in the Politics 1.1259a6–20) for the story of
Thales of Miletus – credited by many with being the first “scientist” – having
cornered the market on olive presses and made a financial killing, through rent-
ing them out to others during a particularly good olive harvest, which he had
predicted using astronomical knowledge. In other words, Thales was reputed
to have gained financial benefit from his scientific work. However, Aristotle
was somewhat disdainful of Thales’ financial achievement, and not because
24 Diogenes Laertius (5.91) relates how Heraclides of Pontus attempted to organise heroic
honours for himself.
25 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 10.18 reports Epicurus’ last will. For a detailed consideration of
the hero cults established by and associated with Epicurus, see Diskin Clay, Paradosis and
Survival: Three Chapters in the History of Epicurean Philosophy (Ann Arbor: The Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 75–102, originally published as “The Cults of Epicurus,”
Cronache Ercolanesi, 1986, 16:11–28.
26 The literature on Lucretius is vast. Marco Beretta, La rivoluzione culturale di Lucrezio:
Filosofia e scienza nell’ antica Roma (Rome: Carocci, 2016) provides an extensive bibliogra-
phy.
Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257

he used his scientific acumen for monetary gain – thereby sullying his “pure”
scientific knowledge. Rather, Aristotle complains that all that Thales had done
was to construct a monopoly, which in Aristotle’s view was nothing very special
in itself.
However, Aristotle also identified Thales as the first person to investigate
fundamental principles, considering the material constitution of the world,
and as the founder of natural philosophy.27 Even in antiquity, his reputation
garnered prizes: Diogenes Laertius relates what he refers to as a “well-known
story” about a tripod found by fisherman and sent by the people of Miletus,
Thales’ home-town, to all of the Wise Men in succession, as a form of recogni-
tion, and a type of “reward.” There are different versions of the story, referring
to tripods and bowls as the prize. In one, Bathycles bequeathed a bowl with the
solemn injunction that it “should be given to him who had done most good by
his wisdom.” Initially, it was presented to Thales, then was circulated to all of
the sages, and finally came back to Thales again, for he was esteemed as the wis-
est of the Greeks. Diogenes Laertius reports that he was the very first to receive
the title “Sage,”28 a glorious appellation, and certainly a special prize. Indeed,
Thales’ reward may be that we remember him in this way, and honour him as
the first scientist in the ancient Greek world. His reputation is his reward.
27 Aristotle, Metaphysics A 983b6–21. (Diogenes Laertius (1.26) also mentions Thales’ finan-
cial gains through renting oil-presses; he cites a work by Hieronymus of Rhodes (c. 290–
230 BCE), Scattered Notes, as his source.)
28 Diogenes Laertius, Lives 1.27–33; at 1.28, translated by Hicks, p. 29; first to be called “Sage,”
at 1.22.


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Nuncius 34 (2019) 246–257