Cecile Dejongh's Notice of Motion To Dismiss and To Strike

Case 1:23-cv-10301-AS Document 72 Filed 03/15/24 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JANE DOE 1 et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case Number: 23-cv-10301-AS
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

VIRGIN ISLANDS, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE
Defendant Cecile de Jongh, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rules 8 and
12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully requests dismissal of all of
Plaintiffs’ claims against her in the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 7). Ms. de Jongh is filing
concurrently with this Motion a notice of joinder in the Government Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt Nos. 67-68, 70) and Defendant John de Jongh, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss, Transfer,
Strike (Dkt. No. 31). A memorandum of law, exhibits in support thereof, and non-argumentative
chart are attached.

Case 1:23-cv-10301-AS Document 72 Filed 03/15/24 Page 2 of 2
Dated: March 15, 2024
Amelia J. Schmidt (NYS Bar 4947131)

(admitted pro hac vice)
Matt Kaiser (admitted pro hac vice)
Courtney Forrest (admitted pro hac vice)
Kaiser PLLC
1099 14th Street NW, 8th Floor West
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 640-2850
aschmidt@kaiserlaw.com
mkaiser@kaiserlaw.com
cforrest@kaiserlaw.com
Counsel for Cecile de Jongh
2
Case 1:23-cv-10301-AS Document 72-1 Filed 03/15/24 Page 1 of 26

JANE DOE 1 et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CECILE DE JONGH’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

Kaiser PLLC
(202) 640-2850

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................1
II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................2
A. Ms. de Jongh’s Work for Mr. Epstein, 2000-19 .......................................................2
B. Ms. de Jongh’s Work as First Lady of the U.S. Virgin Islands, 2007-15 .................3
C. Ms. de Jongh’s Knee Replacement Surgeries in New York in 2017 ........................3
D. Mr. Epstein’s Death and Estate Settlements with Plaintiffs .....................................4
E. Ms. de Jongh’s Brother-in-Law’s Apartment in New York......................................5
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW................................................................................................5
A. Motion to Dismiss ....................................................................................................5
1. Insufficient Service of Process (Rule 12(b)(5)) .......................................5
2. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2)) .........................................6
3. Improper Venue (Rule 12(b)(3)) ..............................................................8
4. Failure to State a Claim (Rule 12(b)(6)) ..................................................8
B. Motion to Strike .......................................................................................................9
IV. Argument ..........................................................................................................................10
A. Ms. de Jongh Has Not Been Served Properly ........................................................10
B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh .................................... 11
1. The Long-Arm Statute Doesn’t Permit Personal Jurisdiction ...................12
2. The Due Process Clause Doesn’t Permit Personal Jurisdiction .................14
C. Venue Is Improper ..................................................................................................15
D. Whether Ms. de Jongh is Being Sued in an Official or Individual Capacity,
Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred .................................................................................16
1. All Claims Against Ms. de Jongh Have Been Released ............................17
2. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Because Ms. de Jongh Is Immune
from Plaintiffs’ Claims as First Lady of the Virgin Islands .......................17
E. Paragraphs 63 and 64 Should be Stricken ................................................................... 19
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................20
i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
218 Operating Corp. v. K/K Enterprises,
No. 89 CIV. 4987 (LLS), 1990 WL 115616 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1990) .................................. 16
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) ................................................................................................................ 8
Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton,
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ......................................................................................... 18, 19
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) ................................................................................................................ 8
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985) .............................................................................................................. 15
Detroit Coffee Co., LLC v. Soup for You, LLC,
No. 16-CV-9875 (JPO), 2018 WL 941747 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018) ..................................... 8
Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft,
671 F. Supp. 3d 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) .................................................................................. 4, 9
Follett College Stores Corp. v. Fernandez,
587 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D. Ill.1984) ......................................................................................... 16
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
592 U.S. 351 (2021) ................................................................................................................ 7
G-I Holdings Inc. v. Baron & Budd,
238 F. Supp. 2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ................................................................................ 9, 20
Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 3d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) .............................................................................. 14, 15
Giuffre v. Andrew,
579 F. Supp. 3d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) ...................................................................................... 9
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner,
417 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 2005)..................................................................................................... 8
Harris v. City of New York,
186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999)..................................................................................................... 9
In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
529 F. Supp. 3d 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) ................................................................................ 8, 12
In re Ethereummax Inv.,
2023 WL 6787827 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2023) ......................................................................... 20
Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) ................................................................................................................ 7
Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
No. 22-CV-7811 (VSB), 2023 WL 2648152 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023) ................................11
Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd.,
101 F.3d 863 (2d Cir. 1996)..................................................................................................... 7
Licci by Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL,
834 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2016)................................................................................................. 6, 7
ii
Mende v. Milestone Tech., Inc.,

269 F. Supp. 2d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) .....................................................................................11
Militinska-Lake v. Kirnon,
No. 22-2667-CV, 2023 WL 7648511 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2023) ................................................ 5
Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA,
No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 6082454 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) ........................ 15
Mortise v. U.S.,
102 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1996)................................................................................................... 20
Nat’l Rifle Ass'n. of Am. v. Vullo,
49 F.4th 700 (2d Cir. 2022) ..................................................................................................... 9
Ne. Landscape & Masonry Assocs., Inc., v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Labor,
No. 14-CV-9014, 2015 WL 8492755 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) ............................................. 8
Nwoye v. Obama,
22-CV-1791 (VEC) (RWL), 2023 WL 4631712 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5164156 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2023) ....................... 18, 19
Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield,
152 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1998)....................................................................................................... 9
Pekarsky v. Ariyoshi,
695 F.2d 352 (9th Cir.1982) .................................................................................................. 17
Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha,
609 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2010)............................................................................................. 7, 8, 12
Population Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Life Essentials, Inc.,
709 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ......................................................................................... 16
Prospect Cap. Corp. v. Bender,
No. 09 Civ. 826 (HB), 2009 WL 4907121 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) ..................................... 8
Reiss v. Steigrod,
866 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ................................................................................... 13, 14
Selman v. Harvard Medical School,
494 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ......................................................................................... 15
Taylor v. Windsor Locks Police Dep’t,
71 F. App’x 877 (2d Cir. 2003).............................................................................................. 17
Tobal v. Virgin Islands Police Dep’t,
No. CV 2010-0062, 2022 WL 136841 (D.V.I. Jan. 13, 2022) ................................................. 6
Walden v. Fiore,
571 U.S. 277 (2014) ................................................................................................................ 7
Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016)......................................................................................6, 7, 11, 12
Wilhelmshaven Acquisition Corp. v. Asher,
810 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ......................................................................................... 14
Statutes
3 U.S.C. § 105 ............................................................................................................................... 18
5 U.S.C. § 10 ................................................................................................................................. 17
iii
28 U.S.C. § 1391 ....................................................................................................................... 8, 15

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) ...................................................................................................................... 16
3 V.I.C. § 541(c) ............................................................................................................................ 18
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4........................................................................................................................... 5, 6
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8............................................................................................................................. 17
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.................................................................................................................... passim
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 .......................................................................................................... 7, 12, 13, 14
N.Y. C.P.L.R 308 ............................................................................................................................. 6
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 318 ............................................................................................................................ 6
iv
I. INTRODUCTION
For nineteen years, Cecile de Jongh worked as Jeffrey Epstein’s office manager in the
U.S. Virgin Islands. For eight of those years—from 2007 to 2015—her husband, John de Jongh
Jr., was the governor of the territory, and she served as First Lady.
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Epstein sexually assaulted them in the Virgin Islands—some as
early as 2003 or 2004, and others don’t allege even the year their assaults occurred. Mr. Epstein
died in 2019 and is not named a party to this suit. Plaintiffs executed broad releases with Mr.
Epstein’s estate, which included releases of all claims against Mr. Epstein’s employees and
anyone who had otherwise worked for Mr. Epstein. Plaintiffs now seek to hold USVI
government officials liable for Mr. Epstein’s conduct—and include Ms. de Jongh because she
was the First Lady during some of this time.
The Complaint is a 225-paragraph mess of vague and scattershot allegations, mostly
involving unidentified women who aren’t parties to this lawsuit, and often not specifying the
year when a given allegation occurred. It raises only two allegations, in two paragraphs, about
Ms. de Jongh’s conduct in relation to the Plaintiffs themselves: that, on two occasions between
2000 and 2004, Mr. Epstein assaulted two of the Plaintiffs in his office in the Virgin Islands and
that Ms. de Jongh would have heard those assaults and yet did nothing. These allegations are
false; they are also immaterial to the causes of action, highly prejudicial, and should be stricken.
But none of the allegations, even if true, are actionable against Ms. de Jongh in this
Court. She has lived and worked in the Virgin Islands for virtually her entire life; she has not
been served, and she is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Venue, too, is improper.
1
Moreover, the claims against Ms. de Jongh aren’t actionable in any federal court. To the
extent Plaintiffs seek to sue her as a government official, she is immune; and lawsuits against her
in any capacity have been released pursuant to Plaintiffs’ settlements with Mr. Epstein’s estate.
For these, the reasons set forth below—and the reasons set forth in Ms. de Jongh’s co-
defendants’ motions to dismiss, in which she also joins—Ms. de Jongh respectfully requests that
the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against her.
II. BACKGROUND
Ms. de Jongh has lived and worked in the U.S. Virgin Islands for nearly her entire life.
She was born in Indiana, where her father was stationed for military service; when she was
eleven months old, her parents (both from the U.S. Virgin Islands), returned there with her
family. Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Cecile de Jongh (“CDJ Decl.”)) ¶ 3. Apart from her attendance
at Marquette University and one year in Puerto Rico for professional training, she has lived in
the Virgin Islands ever since. CDJ Decl. ¶ 4.
A. Ms. de Jongh’s Work for Mr. Epstein, 2000-19
When Mr. Epstein hired Ms. de Jongh in 2000, she was working for JPMorgan Chase as
vice president of commercial and consumer lending in the Virgin Islands. CDJ Decl. ¶ 6. At that
time, she was looking for a job that would allow her to spend more time caring for her three
young children and ailing aunt. CDJ Decl. ¶ 6.
After interviewing her, Mr. Epstein hired her as his office manager for Financial Trust
Company, which had an office in the U.S. Virgin Islands. CDJ Decl. ¶ 6. In or around 2013,
Financial Trust Company became Southern Trust Company, and Ms. de Jongh continued
working for Southern Trust Company until 2019. CDJ Decl. ¶ 7. Both companies were owned
and controlled by Jeffrey Epstein at all times. CDJ Decl. ¶ 7. As office manager for both
2
companies, Ms. de Jongh had numerous administrative responsibilities. Those included
furnishing the physical office, overseeing its operations and budget, and hiring staff, including
bookkeepers and a controller. CDJ Decl. ¶ 8.
B. Ms. de Jongh’s Work as First Lady of the U.S. Virgin Islands, 2007-15
In 2007—seven years after Ms. de Jongh was hired by Mr. Epstein—Mr. de Jongh Jr. was
elected governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands, serving until 2015. CDJ Decl. ¶ 13. Ms. de Jongh
continued to work for Mr. Epstein during this period, but she also assumed numerous additional
responsibilities as First Lady. CDJ Decl. ¶ 14, 15. These responsibilities included helping to
organize and host social events at Government House (the U.S. Virgin Islands governor’s office),
spearheading public-interest projects, and giving speeches around the territory. CDJ Decl. ¶ 14.
As First Lady, she had an official Twitter account, Facebook account (which specifically labels
the page as “Government Official”) (Exhibit 1-1)), and website as First Lady, which a
government staffer would have posted from occasionally for her. CDJ Decl. ¶ 15.
C. Ms. de Jongh’s Knee Replacement Surgeries in New York in 2017
In 2017, Ms. de Jongh needed knee-replacement surgeries for both of her knees. CDJ
Decl. ¶ 16. None of the U.S. Virgin Islands hospitals were offering those surgeries, so it was
necessary for her to travel to New York to receive them—the first in June 2017 and the second in
September 2017. CDJ Decl. ¶¶ 16-17. Ms. de Jongh also needed to find a place in New York
where she could recuperate in the weeks that followed. CDJ Decl. ¶ 18. At some point, she
learned that Mr. Epstein owned an apartment he did not live in but offered for his employees’ use
when they were in New York. CDJ Decl. ¶ 19. Ms. de Jongh arranged to stay there, and did so,
following both her surgeries. CDJ Decl. ¶ 19.
3
During both stays, Ms. de Jongh was on medical leave as she was largely unable to work.
CDJ Decl. ¶ 20. During her second stay in New York in September 2017, she had to submit
paperwork to Southern Trust Company’s insurer to support the company’s claims for hurricane
damage. CDJ Decl. ¶ 20; see Exhibit 1-2. But as a general matter, she was not working during
her stays in New York. CDJ Decl. ¶ 20.
D. Mr. Epstein’s Death and Estate Settlements with Plaintiffs
After Mr. Epstein’s death in 2019, Plaintiffs resolved their claims against his estate by
entering into settlement agreements. While Plaintiffs’ counsel have not provided copies of the
specific releases their clients executed with Mr. Epstein’s estate, they (1) confirmed by email
(attached as Exhibit 2) that Plaintiffs executed releases; and (2) those releases were
“substantively identical” to the one publicly-filed (and redacted) by a plaintiff in related
litigation, Doe 1 v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, 671 F. Supp. 3d 387, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2023), Dkt. No. 45-1, which is attached as Exhibit 3 and referred to herein as “the Release.”
The Release generally provided for payment of settlement amounts in exchange for a
release of “Claims” against, inter alia, “any entities owned or controlled in whole or in part by
Jeffrey Epstein,” including those entities’ current and former employees, and any “individuals
who are or have ever . . . worked in any capacity for Jeffrey E. Epstein and/or the Epstein
Estate[.]” Exhibit 3 at 1. “Claims” included “claims, demands, actions, causes of actions, suits . .
. whether sounding in equity, tort, common law . . . statute . . . or otherwise[.]” Id. The Release
further stated that it was “a broad release of any and all Claims . . . against any and all Releasees,
including without limitation any and all causes of action, lawsuits, claims . . . damages and
liability whatsoever, and . . . including without limitation . . . any and all such claims against any
and all Releasees as co-conspirators[.]” Id.
4
E. Ms. de Jongh’s Brother-in-Law’s Apartment in New York
Ms. de Jongh has never owned property in New York. CDJ Decl. ¶ 21. Her husband’s
brother, Sydney de Jongh, owns Apartment 6C at 885 West End Avenue, New York, NY, 10025.
CDJ Decl. ¶ 22. On or about January 15, 2024, Sydney contacted Ms. de Jongh’s husband and
told him that the doorman at his (Sydney’s) building in New York had called Sydney to say that
he had allowed an individual to leave papers outside Sydney’s apartment. CDJ Decl. ¶ 23. Ms. de
Jongh was in the USVI at the time. CDJ Decl. ¶ 23. She never spoke with the doorman, nor did
she authorize him, or Sydney, or anyone else to accept service on her behalf. CDJ Decl. ¶ 24 .
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for, inter
alia, (1) insufficient service of process, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, (3) improper venue, and
(4) failure to state a claim.
1. Insufficient Service of Process (Rule 12(b)(5))
If the plaintiff fails to effect proper service, dismissal is warranted. Plaintiffs “bear[] the
burden of proving adequate service.” Militinska-Lake v. Kirnon, No. 22-2667-CV, 2023 WL
7648511, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2023).
The rules for service differ depending on whether the defendant is being sued in her
individual or official capacity. If a plaintiff is suing a defendant in her individual capacity, Rule
4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiff serve the complaint by either: (1)
using one of the methods prescribed by applicable state law; or (2) through other specified
methods that weren’t used here. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) with Muataz Ahmad Affidavit of
5
Service (Dkt. No. 57-2) (“Ahmad Aff.”). New York law authorizes several ways to serve an
individual defendant, including delivering the summons:
• to the defendant in-state (N.Y. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(1));
• in New York “to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of
business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served and by
either mailing the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known
residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served
at his or her actual place of business[.]” (NY CPLR § 308(2)); or
• to a registered agent (NY CPLR §§ 308(3); 318).
If a plaintiff is suing a defendant in her capacity as a U.S. Virgin Islands official, Rule
4(j)(2) requires service be made by either (1) “delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to its chief executive officer”; here, the governor of the Virgin Islands; or (2) “serving
a copy of each in the manner prescribed by” Virgin Islands law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2); see also
Tobal v. Virgin Islands Police Dep’t, No. 2010-0062, 2022 WL 136841, at **7-8 (D.V.I. Jan. 13,
2022). Where the government of the Virgin Islands itself is a named defendant, Virgin Islands
law requires service on both the governor and any individual government official sued in her
official capacity. See V.I.R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1); Tobal, 2022 WL 136841, at *9 n.6.
2. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2))
“To exercise personal jurisdiction lawfully, three requirements must be met.” Waldman v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 327 (2d Cir. 2016). First, the defendant must be
properly served (i.e., the same analysis in Section III.A supra applies). Id. Second, if the
defendant isn’t a resident of New York, there has to be a basis for jurisdiction under the long-arm
statute. Id. Third, personal jurisdiction “must comport with constitutional due process
principles.” Id. “Although courts are generally limited to examining the sufficiency of the
pleadings on a motion to dismiss, on a challenge to a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
6
the court may also resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues by reference to evidence outside the
pleadings.” Licci by Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, 834 F.3d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 2016).
New York’s long-arm statute authorizes jurisdiction over a nonresident who, inter alia:
• “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state . . .” or
• “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within
the state . . . if he (i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably
expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce.”
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1), (3). Any of these actions also must have given rise to the cause(s) of
action for the long-arm statute to apply. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(c).
Even if the long-arm statute provides a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction,
exercising personal jurisdiction also must comport with the Due Process Clause. To do that, the
defendant must have had “such ‘contacts’ with the forum State” that the suit “does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. 351, 358
(quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 362 U.S. 310 (1945)). The cause of action also “must
arise out of or relate to those contacts.” Ford Motor, 592 U.S. at 361-62. What controls are “the
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who
reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Waldman, 835 F.3d at 334 (citing Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865
(2d Cir. 1996)). This includes alleging “facts that, if credited[,] would suffice to establish
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34-35
(2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, “group pleading is not permitted”; a plaintiff must “establish personal
7
jurisdiction separately over each defendant.” In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 529 F. Supp. 3d 111, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
3. Improper Venue (Rule 12(b)(3))
Plaintiffs are permitted to file suit in any district court “in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2). However, the
venue statute must be “strictly” construed. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d
Cir. 2005). “[F]or venue to be proper, significant events or omissions material to the plaintiff’s
claim must have occurred in the district in question, even if other material events occurred
elsewhere.” Id. (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading venue. Detroit
Coffee Co. v. Soup for You, LLC, 2018 WL 941747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Group pleading is not
permitted: “[V]enue analysis ‘must focus on where the defendant’s acts or omissions occurred.’”
Ne. Landscape & Masonry Assocs., Inc., v. State of Conn. Dep’t of Labor, No. 14-CV-9014, 2015
WL 8492755, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (quoting Prospect Capital Corp. v. Bender, No. 09
Civ. 826(HB), 2009 WL 4907121, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009)) (emphasis in original).
4. Failure to State a Claim (Rule 12(b)(6))
Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of a
cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements,” cannot survive a motion
to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the facts do not permit [the Court] to ‘infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct,’ the complaint has not plausibly alleged a claim.” Nat’l
Rifle Assoc. of Am. v. Vullo, 49 F.4th 700, 713 (2d Cir. 2022).
8
Affirmative defenses, including prior settlement agreements that bar a plaintiff’s claims,
also “‘may be raised by a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . if the defense
appears on the face of the complaint.’” Giuffre v. Andrew, 579 F. Supp. 3d 429, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2022) (quoting Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1998)). The
Court has “discretion to consider even at this early stage an affirmative defense that presents a
straightforward issue of law[.]” Doe 1, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (citing Harris v. City of New York,
186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)). Two other courts in this District considered—in other
lawsuits brought by other alleged victims of Mr. Epstein—at the motion-to-dismiss stage
whether releases the plaintiff(s) had executed with Mr. Epstein or his estate barred their claims.
See Doe 1, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (Rakoff, J.); Giuffre, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (Kaplan, J.).
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel has confirmed that the release at issue in Doe 1 is substantively
identical to the releases their clients entered into with Mr. Epstein’s estate. Exhibit 2. In Doe 1,
Judge Rakoff held that “[w]hile the Settlement Agreement is not mentioned in . . . Doe’s
complaint . . . Deutsche Bank’s argument [that the agreement barred her claims] presents an
unfettered question of law that can be resolved on a motion to dismiss and should not be
deferred.” Doe 1, 671 F. Supp. 3d at 401 (citing Giuffre, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 438).
B. Motion to Strike
“[A] court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Allegations that “have no
real bearing on the case, will likely prejudice the movant, or . . . have criminal overtones” should
be stricken. G-I Holdings v. Baron & Budd, 238 F. Supp. 2d 521, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
9
IV. ARGUMENT
The Complaint has so many legally insufficient—and in some cases, factually untrue—
allegations that untangling and responding to all of them is virtually impossible at this stage,
particularly since Plaintiffs’ identities have not yet been disclosed to the defense. Mindful of the
page limits imposed by the Court, Ms. de Jongh is also filing a notice of joinder in the arguments
that the other defendants have raised and incorporates those arguments by reference therein. 1 See
Motion to Dismiss by John de Jongh, Jr. (Dkt. No. 31) (“JDJ Mot.”); Motion to Dismiss by the
Government 2 (Dkt. Nos. 67, 68) (“USVI Mot.”); see also Notice of Joinder/Incorporation by
John de Jongh (Dkt. No. 69) (joining in USVI motion). The Complaint also must be dismissed
against Ms. de Jongh specifically for (1) insufficient service of process, (2) lack of personal
jurisdiction, (3) improper venue, and (4) failure to state a claim.
Additionally, to the extent the Court does not dismiss the Complaint, Paragraphs 63 and
64 should be stricken.
A. Ms. de Jongh Has Not Been Served Properly
Whether Ms. de Jongh is being sued in her individual capacity or her official capacity,
she has not been served properly under the service rules. The Complaint should be dismissed
under Rule 12(b)(5) on that basis alone.
1
The only argument in which Ms. de Jongh expressly does not join is the government’s position
that she is not a government official. See USVI Mot. at 19-21. Nevertheless, even if the Court
should agree with the government that Ms. de Jongh is not a government official, to the extent
she is being sued in her individual capacity, Plaintiffs’ claims against her are barred by their
releases of all claims against Mr. Epstein’s employees.
2
“The Government” herein refers collectively to Defendants Government of the U.S. Virgin
Islands, Attorney General Vincent Frazer, and Governor Kenneth Mapp.
10
Plaintiffs have submitted an affidavit of service in which their server states that Ms. de
Jongh was served at 885 West End Avenue. Ahmad Aff. The server stated that the “doorman
called [Ms. de Jongh] . . . and spoke with her personally, she informed the doorman that she is
out of town and instructed him to accept service.” Ahmad Aff.
Ms. de Jongh has provided a sworn declaration refuting this. She neither owns nor resides
at any property in New York, including the property where Plaintiffs’ server apparently delivered
a copy of the summons and Complaint. Compare CDJ Decl. ¶¶ 21-24 with Ahmad Aff. Her
brother-in-law owns that property, not Mrs. de Jongh, who was at home in the Virgin Islands on
that date. CDJ Decl. ¶¶ 21-23. She never spoke with the doorman of the building where
Plaintiffs’ server delivered a copy of the Complaint and summons, and she never authorized him
(or anyone else) to accept service on her behalf. CDJ Decl. ¶ 24.
“[A]ctual notice of a lawsuit does not cure improper service.” Jean-Baptiste v. U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, NO. 22-CV-7811, 2023 WL 2648152, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023). Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to show that Ms. de Jongh was served as New York law and the Rules of
Civil Procedure require. See Mende v. Milestone Tech., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The Complaint as to Ms. de Jongh should be dismissed for insufficient service.
B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh
Even if Plaintiffs had served Ms. de Jongh properly—they haven’t—the Complaint also
must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because it fails to meet the other two
requirements: (1) compliance with the long-arm statute; and (2) satisfaction of the Due Process
Clause. See Waldman, 835 F.3d at 327.
The Complaint makes no allegations about why Ms. de Jongh—or any of the other
defendants, for that matter—is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Remarkably, the section
11
in the Complaint entitled “Jurisdiction, Venue, and Timeliness,” make no reference to personal
jurisdiction whatsoever. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-8.
It is Plaintiffs’ burden to plead jurisdiction, and to plead personal jurisdiction over each
specific defendant. See, e.g., Waldman, 835 F.3d at 334; Penguin Grp., 609 F.3d at 34-35;
Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, 529 F. Supp. 3d at 135. Plaintiffs don’t even attempt to do
that here, and their Complaint should be dismissed on this basis alone.
But the allegations themselves make clear that this Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh, a lifelong resident of the U.S. Virgin Islands who has never lived
in New York. The Complaint’s only allegation connecting Ms. de Jongh to New York is one
brief stay in Mr. Epstein’s apartment, years after what Plaintiffs allege is the relevant timeframe,
i.e., 2007-15. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. The evidence shows that Ms. de Jongh had to travel to New
York for knee-replacement surgery; her travel had nothing to do with her work for Mr. Epstein.
That’s not enough under the long-arm statute or the Due Process Clause to justify the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh in New York.
1. The Long-Arm Statute Doesn’t Permit Personal Jurisdiction
Of the four provisions under New York’s long-arm statute, a generous reading of the
Complaint might be understood to allege two: “transacting business” in New York, N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1), or “committing a tortious act from without the state,” id. § 302(a)(3). But the
allegations don’t satisfy either of these provisions. The Complaint alleges conduct that almost
exclusively occurred in the U.S. Virgin Islands, not New York. For all of the reasons cited in Mr.
de Jongh Jr.’s and the Government’s briefs, the alleged conduct that took place in the U.S. Virgin
Islands doesn’t support an exercise of personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3). Ms. de
Jongh adopts and incorporates those arguments by reference in this Motion.
12
That leaves only Section 302(a)(1)’s authorization of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who “transact[ed] business” in New York, if that transaction gave rise to
the cause(s) of action in the complaint. Id. § 302(c). Plaintiffs’ Complaint also fails to satisfy this
prong of the long-arm statute, either.
Ms. de Jongh has never transacted business in New York. Plaintiffs allege in a single
paragraph that, for an unspecified “month in 2017,” Ms. de Jongh “stayed in one of Epstein’s
apartments in New York . . . to advise and assist him in securing the USVI’s cooperation as a safe
harbor for his sex-trafficking ring.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4(vi). This is demonstrably untrue. Ms. de
Jongh stayed in Mr. Epstein’s apartment for medical reasons unrelated to any of the allegations in
the Complaint. CDJ Decl. ¶¶ 17-20. As Ms. de Jongh notes—as best she can recall seven years
later—she did not work during either stay. The only exception she recalls was submitting urgent
documentation to the company’s insurer in September 2017 for claims for property damage that
resulted from Hurricanes Irma and Maria. CDJ Decl. ¶ 20; Exhibit 1-2.
Neither of these trips—nor the extremely limited work described in Ms. de Jongh’s
declaration—confers personal jurisdiction under any provision of the long-arm statute. This
travel occurred in 2017, i.e., two years after the relevant timeline alleged in the Complaint. CDJ
Decl. ¶¶ 17-20. Even if it were within the relevant timeframe, visits to New York for medical
procedures and recovery do not constitute transacting business in the state, nor do they relate to
any acts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. In Reiss v. Steigrod, 866 F. Supp. 747, 750 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), then-District Court Judge Sotomayor held that multiple trips a defendant allegedly made
to New York, any of which “could” have been made “for a multitude of personal reasons,” was
not transacting business under the long-arm statute. Judge Sotomayor further held that personal
jurisdiction was unwarranted under the long-arm statute because the plaintiff “failed to allege . . .
13
that defendant’s trips or phone call to New York were related to the alleged false statements that
give rise to this cause of action.” 866 F. Supp. at 750 (citing CPLR § 302(c)) (emphasis added).
Wilhelmshaven Acquisition Corp. v. Asher, 810 F. Supp. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y.1992), the
case then-Judge Sotomayor cited in Reiss, reached a similar result. In Wilhelmshaven, a UK
defendant had visited the New York apartment of an interested third party in the deal that was
the subject of the dispute. The plaintiff alleged that visit was transacting business under the long-
arm statute because: (1) the witness testified that business had been discussed for “ten to fifteen
minutes” but he couldn’t remember details, and (2) defendant had submitted travel vouchers for
his drive to the apartment as a business expense. The court found that these were “not
sufficiently business related to carry jurisdictional weight.” Id.
Here, Ms. de Jongh has clearly demonstrated that the reason for her travel to New York
in 2017 was medical and that her stays in Mr. Epstein’s apartment were to recuperate from her
surgery. While she may have performed occasional urgent work that could not be postponed
until her return—namely, submitting insurance paperwork for hurricane damage to the office—
none of that is sufficient to “transact business” as the courts have construed it under the long-arm
statute, and it certainly did not give rise to the causes of action in the Complaint.
2. The Due Process Clause Doesn’t Permit Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh also would not comport with the Due Process
Clause. Even if her travel to New York in 2017 satisfied the long-arm statute—it does not—New
York courts have consistently held that infrequent travel that’s not related to the cause(s) of
action isn’t enough to satisfy due process.
First, in Gilbert v. Indeed, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 3d 374, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), a plaintiff
alleged that her former manager, who lived and worked in Texas, assaulted her in Texas.
14
Plaintiff alleged that the manager’s occasional work travel to New York was sufficient for
personal jurisdiction. The court in this District rejected that argument, finding that the manager’s
“infrequent” travel for trainings “cannot serve as a basis for personal jurisdiction.” Id.
Second, in Selman v. Harvard Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), a
plaintiff sought to challenge the admissions procedures of several U.S. medical schools and their
employees, including several individuals who lived in California. Those individuals submitted
affidavits; two confirmed that they had, on occasion, visited New York to raise funds for their
respective schools. Id. The court found that these visits were not sufficient under the Due Process
Clause, given the “occasional” nature of the visits and the fact that the visits were “unrelated to
the admission procedures which plaintiff challenges[.]” Id.
Ms. de Jongh’s travel is exactly the kind that courts in this District have held does not
meet the minimum-contacts requirement. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 2012 WL 6082454,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2012) (“A defendant may not be subject to jurisdiction based on
‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated contacts.’”) (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 475 (1985)). If anything, exercising personal jurisdiction in Ms. de Jongh’s case would
offend due process even more deeply than it would have in the above cases. She traveled to New
York twice to seek medical care and stayed in Mr. Epstein’s apartment solely to recuperate. Not
only does that not meet the minimum-contacts requirement, using this travel as a basis to hale
her into court in New York would do real violence to notions of fair play and substantial justice.
C. Venue Is Improper
For similar reasons, the Complaint should be dismissed for improper venue. Ms. de Jongh
adopts and incorporates by reference the other defendants’ motions on this issue. Even
construing the Complaint to allege that venue is proper because she traveled to New York in
15
2017, that happened two years after the alleged relevant timeframe and does not come close to
meeting Section 1391’s requirement that venue must be where a “substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” See 218 Operating Corp. v. K/K Enterprises, No.
89 CIV. 4987 (LLS), 1990 WL 115616, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1990) (citing Population
Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Life Essentials, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D.N.Y.1989); Follett
College Stores Corp. v. Fernandez, 587 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (N.D. Ill.1984)).
While the Court may transfer the action to the proper venue if doing so is “in the interest
of justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), for the same reasons advanced in Mr. de Jongh Jr.’s and the
Government’s motions, dismissal is the proper resolution here.
D. Whether Ms. de Jongh Is Being Sued in an Official or Individual Capacity,

Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Barred
Plaintiffs don’t specify whether they’re suing Ms. de Jongh in her official or her
individual capacity. The Complaint lists her as “First Lady Cecile de Jongh” in the caption and
alleges that, “at all relevant times, Ms. de Jongh was First Lady.” Am. Compl. ¶ 30 (emphasis
added). It repeatedly refers to her as “First Lady de Jongh” and to “the Defendants,” including
her, as “government employees.” See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 202, 204.
It ultimately does not matter, because Plaintiffs have released any claims they may have
had against in her individual or official capacity. The Release—which clearly covers claims
against her in her individual capacity—is so broad that it should be read to include official-
capacity lawsuits, too. But even if the Court disagrees that the Release bars official-capacity
claims, as a government official, Ms. de Jongh is immune from the claims in the Complaint.
1. All Claims Against Ms. de Jongh Have Been Released
As an employee of Mr. Epstein’s for nearly two decades, any claims against Ms. de
Jongh in her individual capacity are clearly within the scope of the Release. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16
8(c)(1); Exhibit 3. But the language also is so broad that it should be read to include a release of
all claims against Ms. de Jongh, regardless of the capacity she’s being sued in.
The Second Circuit has construed a much more narrowly worded release to bar both
individual-capacity and official-capacity claims. In Taylor v. Windsor Locks Police Dep’t, 71 F.
App’x 877, 879 (2d Cir. 2003), the district court dismissed the appellant’s individual-capacity
claims against a defendant but allowed the official-capacity claims to proceed to trial. The
appellant settled before trial, but appealed the individual-capacity claims that the district court
had dismissed. The Second Circuit found that his release barred the individual-capacity claims
because the most “reasonable” reading of the release of “‘all, and all manner of action, causes of
action, controversies, ... claims and demands whatsoever in law or in equity” was that it barred
lawsuits in both capacities. Id. (citing Pekarsky v. Ariyoshi, 695 F.2d 352, 354 (9th Cir.1982)).
This Release is even broader than the one at issue in Taylor. It covers claims against any
“individuals who are or have ever . . . worked in any capacity for Jeffrey E. Epstein and/or the
Epstein Estate[.]” Exhibit 3 at 1 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs appear to allege that Ms. de Jongh
(and the other defendants) effectively worked for Mr. Epstein during their tenure as government
officials. If that’s the case, reading the Release to cover any claims against Ms. de Jongh “in any
capacity,” individual or official, is clearly the most reasonable read of the Release.
2. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Because Ms. de Jongh Is

Immune from Plaintiffs’ Claims as First Lady of the Virgin Islands
There are very few cases addressing whether the spouse of a government executive may
be considered a government official. But the D.C. Circuit—perhaps the Circuit best-positioned to
answer the question—has held that the wife of the President of the United States may be sued as
a government official.
17
In Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 911 (D.C. Cir.
1993), various health-care organizations brought a lawsuit against then-First Lady Hillary
Clinton and other government officials after her husband had appointed her to his health-care
reform task force. The plaintiff organizations sought access to the task force meetings under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act. Id. at 903 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 10). The defendants argued that
their task force was exempt from FACA’s requirement to make meetings publicly-available
because its members, including Ms. Clinton, were all full-time government employees or
officers. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 997 F.2d at 903.
The D.C. Circuit held that Ms. Clinton qualified as a full-time employee or officer under
FACA. The D.C. Circuit considered that Congress had authorized “[a]ssistance and services . . .
to be provided to the spouse of the President in connection with assistance . . . in the discharge of
the President’s duties and responsibilities.” Id. at 904 (citing 3 U.S.C. § 105.) By this, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned, Congress recognized the First Lady as “the functional equivalent of an assistant
to the President” and a “de facto officer or employee[.]” Id. at 904-05.
At least one court in this District has found that reasoning persuasive and construed it to
mean that a First Lady is likely immune from suit. In Nwoye v. Obama, 22-CV-1791 (VEC)
(RWL), 2023 WL 4631712, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,
2023 WL 5164156 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2023), a law student sued then-First Lady Michelle
Obama and her husband for breach of an implied contract arising out of work which the law
student had done as a firm summer associate on a program involving the Obamas. The court
18
dismissed the case on other grounds but also concluded that immunity “likely” extended to Ms.
Obama and cited Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons in support of that conclusion. Id. 3
While Ms. de Jongh was the wife of the USVI governor, not the President, she also
served as “the functional equivalent of an assistant” to him during his tenure as governor. Ass’n
of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, 997 F.2d at 904-05. She had numerous public-facing
responsibilities as his spouse. She helped organize numerous social functions and gave numerous
speeches as First Lady during Mr. de Jongh Jr.’s tenure as governor. CDJ Decl. ¶ 14. She had an
official Twitter account, a Facebook account (which specifically labels the page as “Government
Official”) (Exhibit 1-1)), and website as First Lady. CDJ Decl. ¶ 15. She was clearly expected to
be “the functional equivalent of an assistant” to the governor, Ass’n of Am. Physicians &
Surgeons, 997 F.2d at 903-05; the U.S. Virgin Islands government held her out as such on
multiple social media accounts, and its employees assisted her in those functions. She functioned
as a government official and therefore is immune from suits against her in her official capacity.
See Nwoye v. Obama, 22-CV-1791, 2023 WL 4631712, at *8; USVI Mot. at 22; JDJ Mot. at 17.
E. Paragraphs 63 and 64 Should Be Stricken
Paragraphs 63 and 64 of the Complaint allege that Ms. de Jongh witnessed sexual
assaults on two of the Plaintiffs in Mr. Epstein’s office between approximately 2002 and 2004:
• Mr. Epstein sexually assaulted Jane Doe 4 in his office, where Ms. de Jongh “was
sitting . . . with her desk positioned adjacent against the exterior wall of Epstein’s
office” and “heard the sexual assault, yet looked at Jane Doe 4 . . . from her desk
and did nothing” (Am. Compl. ¶ 63); and
• Mr. Epstein assaulted Jane Doe 1 in the same office in 2002, that Ms. de Jongh
“was sitting behind” the same desk, and therefore “was in very close proximity . .
. and heard the vicious assault yet did nothing to stop it” (Am. Compl. ¶ 64).
3
In support of its contention that Ms. de Jongh is not a government official, the only legal
authority the Government cites is 3 V.I.C. § 541(c), which is a statute that relates to pension and
compensation determinations and does not apply in this specific context. Gov. MTD at 20.
19
These allegations are untrue. Ms. de Jongh did work in that office during that timeframe
and is familiar with the described desk outside Mr. Epstein’s office. But she never sat there, and
she never witnessed or heard Mr. Epstein sexually assault anyone. CDJ Decl. ¶¶ 10-12. 4
Regardless, these allegations should be stricken under Rule 8 because they “have no real
bearing on the case [and] likely prejudice the movant[.]” G-I Holdings, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 555;
see also In re Ethereummax Inv., 2023 WL 6787827, at *43 (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2023) (“To the
extent the allegations . . . appear to be included solely to demonstrate [Ms. de Jongh’s]
willingness to violate applicable laws, the allegations are ‘scandalous’ and ‘immaterial’ and are
appropriate targets of a motion to strike.”).
First, Plaintiffs themselves have alleged that the relevant timeframe is Ms. de Jongh’s
tenure as First Lady, i.e., 2007-15. These allegations fall well outside that timeframe.
Second, the allegations at paragraphs 63 and 64 do not give rise to any cause of action
against Ms. de Jongh. Plaintiffs don’t even allege as much. None of the counts in the Complaint
reference the allegations in Paragraphs 63 or 64. Indeed, bystanders cannot be held liable in tort
in New York, subject to two narrow exceptions, neither of which the Complaint alleges. See
Mortise v. U.S., 102 F.3d 693, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1996). Even if the allegations in Paragraphs 63
and 64 were true—which, again, they are not—they are immaterial and impertinent to any of the
causes of action. They serve no purpose but to prejudice Ms. de Jongh, and should be stricken.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these and all the foregoing reasons, Cecile de Jongh respectfully requests that the
Complaint against her be dismissed.
4
Ms. de Jongh also adopts and joins in Mr. de Jongh Jr.’s motion to strike the allegations in the
Complaint regarding payments and loans from Mr. Epstein to Mr. de Jongh Jr. JDJ Mot. at 25-26.
20
Dated: March 15, 2024

Kaiser PLLC
(202) 640-2850
21

JANE DOE 1 et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Defendants.
AFFIRMATION OF AMELIA J. SCHMIDT, ESQ.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Amelia J. Schmidt, declare under penalty of perjury that:
1. I am an attorney admitted to practice in New York and the District of Columbia and have
been admitted to practice pro hac vice before this Court in the above-captioned matter.
2. I am an attorney at the law firm Kaiser PLLC, and I represent Cecile de Jongh.
3. I respectfully submit this declaration in support of Ms. de Jongh’s Motion to Dismiss

(“the Motion”). Unless stated otherwise herein, I have personal knowledge of the facts
stated in this Declaration, and if called as a witness, could and would testify competently
to its contents under oath.
4. Attached to the Motion as Exhibit 1 is a declaration sworn to and signed by Cecile de

Jongh, dated March 15, 2024, with accompanying Exhibits 1-2 (a printout of First Lady
Cecile de Jongh’s Facebook page) and 2-2 (certain emails sent by and received from Ms.
de Jongh in September and/or October 2017).
5. Attached to the Motion as Exhibit 2 is an email exchange between myself and Jennifer
Plotkin, counsel for the Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter.
6. Attached to the Motion as Exhibit 3 is a copy of what I understand to be a release

executed by an unnamed plaintiff and Mr. Epstein’s estate and filed in the matter Doe 1 v.
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Case No. 22-cv-10018 (S.D.N.Y.), on or about
February 7, 2023. This is the attachment referenced in my email to Ms. Plotkin on March
8, 2023.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED: March 15, 2024
__________________
Amelia J. Schmidt
2
EXHIBIT 1
EXHIBIT 1-1
3/15/24, 8:28 AM Case 1:23-cv-10301-AS Document 72-3Facebook
Filed 03/15/24 Page 7 of 21
First Lady Cecile deJongh

1K followers • 1 following
Message Follow Search
Posts About Mentions Followers Photos Videos More
Intro
Welcome to the Official Facebook Page of Virgin Islands First Lady Cecile de Jongh. You can
learn more about the First Lady's initiatives at www.governordejongh.com/firstlady
Page · Government Official
firstlady@governordejongh.com
flickr.com/governordejongh
governordejongh.com/firstlady
Photos
https://www.facebook.com/ceciledejongh
See all photos
1/10
EXHIBIT 1-2
Re: RE: Office update
From: Cecile de Jongh (ceciledejongh@yahoo.com)

To: jabwcpa@gmail.com
Date: Friday, October 20, 2017 at 09:35 AM AST
Carmen Corsino left a message on my phone last evening. She is the person with whom O
have been leaving VM at Marshall and Sterling. She left her cell number and I called this
morning and left he a message. I did send Rich confirmation that M&S confirmed receipt of
the on-line claim.
With warm regards,
Cecile de Jongh
On ‎Friday‎, ‎October‎‎20‎, ‎2017‎‎09‎:‎30‎:‎21‎‎AM‎‎AST, Jeanne Brennnan Wiebracht <jabwcpa@gmail.com> wrote:
Have they gotten back to you on this. Rich was asking the other day
From: Cecile de Jongh [mailto:ceciledejongh@yahoo.com]

Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 3:31 PM
To: Jeanne Brennnan Wiebracht <jabwcpa@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Kahn <richardkahn12@gmail.com>; Daphne Wallace <dlbwallace@gmail.com>; Una Pascal
<upascalftcvi@gmail.com>; Jermaine Ruan <jermaine.ruan@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Office update
I filed a claim on the Marshall and Sterling website which included my phone number and email address - no
response. I left another message at their office on STX. I will continue to follow up so that we can get a date for
an adjuster.
With warm regards,
Cecile
Sent from my iPhone and misspellings courtesy of iPhone.
On Oct 4, 2017, at 2:26 PM, Jeanne Brennnan Wiebracht <jabwcpa@gmail.com> wrote:
From: Richard Kahn [mailto:richardkahn12@gmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2017 5:15 PM
To: Jeanne Brennan <jabwcpa@gmail.com>
Cc: Cecile deJongh <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com>; Daphne Wallace <dlbwallace@gmail.com>; Una Pascal
<upascalftcvi@gmail.com>; Jermaine Ruan <jermaine.ruan@gmail.com>

Subject: Re: Office update
can someone take a picture of carpet color so we can show jee? or have sample for his visit thursday?
thank you
Richard Kahn
HBRK Associates Inc.
575 Lexington Avenue 4th Floor
New York, NY 10022
tel 212-971-1306
fax 212-320-0381
cell 917-414-7584
Angela from Floor Factory just called and she has two rolls of a grey ( a little darker than what we had but
same weight and quality of the prior to IRMA one) which would be available to install right away and would not
require doing two tones throughout the office ( and that version was a lesser weight than the prior to IRMA one)
. We will have a sample tomorrow.
Any suggestions on who we should call to come treat the mold on the floors in the back office ( Angela did not
have a suggestion)
From: Jeanne Brennnan Wiebracht [mailto:jabwcpa@gmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2017 1:28 PM
To: 'Richard Kahn' <richardkahn12@gmail.com>
Cc: 'Cecile deJongh' <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com>; 'dlbwallace@gmail.com' <dlbwallace@gmail.com>; 'Una
Pascal (upascalftcvi@gmail.com)' <upascalftcvi@gmail.com>; 'jermaine.ruan@gmail.com'
<jermaine.ruan@gmail.com>
Subject: Office update
Office
Ras came to the office yesterday and is working on a quote for the ceiling tiles throughout the office.
Jeanne will contact him tomorrow to see where he is on this
Our paint is one file at paint depot. Daphne will work on getting a quote from Wally and also getting
the quantities so we can purchase the paint. Then we can determine who to use to repainting.
Carpeting: went to Floor Factory ( they did suffer substantial damage). The samples were not ready –
but they will put together samples and quantities of what they have in the warehouse and Fernando (
one of Mathias captains and Joy’s husband) will drop them out to my house this afternoon or in the
morning. Once we evaluate these – the decision can be made whether to order from the states or not.
Beth from AYH inspected the office today.. She as advised ( and took pictures) of:
Crack in the floor through the office and the floor in Cecile’s office compromised in the cornor
Warping of the exterior shutters

Continual leaks in the Kitchen and Cecile’s office
Mold issue.
Ceiling tiles that suffered damages due to the storm.
Ricoh has stopped working. Jermaine has indicated the black ink pump is gone. He is working on it
now and will update this afternoon.
Insurance
Tunick advised to submit the claim through the St. Croix office, as this was the office used to write and
Avril felt the claim would get buried in St. Thomas. Cecile submitted the claim on line and has a call into
St. Croix ( message left). It seems their phones are working. St. Thomas’s are not. Cecile also called
Janet who is forwarding the entire policy so we can determine if we have business interruption.
Payroll
The facility at first bank has been established to do direct deposit at the branch for both STC and LSJE,
until internet is resumed.
Withholding deposits have been made at the VIBIR for the month of September.
I will work on doing the EFTPS at an alternate location if Jermaine is unable to get internet here in the
next couple of days.
Server
Quick books files have been temporarily transferred to the STC server from the MAC server. As soon
as all systems are restored we will transfer these back to the MAC

Sent: Monday, October 02, 2017 5:27 PM
To: Jeanne Brennnan Wiebracht <jabwcpa@gmail.com>
Cc: Cecile deJongh <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: Office pictures
Thank you. Spoke with jee and he also wants paint and ceiling tiles done asap. Please ask tunick about
business interruption insurance or anything else that may apply on our policy. Thanks.
Richard Kahn
575 Lexington Avenue, 4th Floor
New York, NY 10022
Phone 212-971-1306
Fax 646-350-0954
Cell 917-414-7584
I created a drop box and sent you both an invitation and loaded the pictures in there.
I will go to Tunick Office in the morning and set up a claim and schedule for the adjusters to come.

Sent: Monday, October 02, 2017 4:39 PM
To: Jeanne Brennan <jabwcpa@gmail.com>
Cc: Cecile deJongh <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: Office pictures
when will we have insurance adjustor come by?
Richard Kahn
575 Lexington Avenue 4th Floor
New York, NY 10022
tel 212-971-1306
fax 212-320-0381
cell 917-414-7584
<image001.jpg> Virus-free. www.avg.com
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Fwd: Tips for Processing Your Claim from Storm Damage
From: Daphne Wallace (dlbwallace@gmail.com)
To: ceciledejongh@yahoo.com; jabwcpa@gmail.com

Date: Friday, October 20, 2017 at 09:23 AM AST
---------- Forwarded message ----------

From: Mark Roberston - Theodore Tunick & Company <communications@marshallsterling.com>
Date: Fri, Oct 20, 2017 at 8:15 AM
Subject: Tips for Processing Your Claim from Storm Damage
To: dlbwallace@gmail.com
Here are some useful tips and best practices for filing and
completing your claim from hurricane damage.
______________________________ ______________________________ ___________
As the Virgin Islands continues to recover and rebuild from the devastation of
hurricanes Irma and Maria, we want to remind our clients of the best ways to
get your claims settled as swiftly and efficiently as possible.
First and foremost, try and stabilize any damaged areas if possible, or make
whatever temporary repairs necessary to mitigate any further damage, keeping
track of all expenses for these repairs. Keep photographs you have taken of
damaged areas, buildings and property to share with insurance adjusters.
If you have not yet made an initial claim for damage to your property or
business from the storms, you may do so by:
Filling out our online claims form HERE

Visiting one of our offices - (our offices on Beltjen Road and East End
Plaza are open from 8:30 a.m. - 4:45 p.m. Our St. John office is open
from 9:00 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.)
Calling our office at 340-776-7000 - (bear in mind that, due to damage
from the storm, our office currently has just 3 of our regular 15 phones
lines operational, so please be patient if you get a busy signal when
calling.)
If you have already made your initial claims report to us, you do not need to
file another one.
After you file your initial claim, contact a licensed and properly insured
contractor to get an estimate for the necessary repairs. It is very helpful to
select the contractor for the repair work and obtain an estimate prior to the
insurance adjuster's visit to inspect the damage.
While adjusters may have the knowledge needed to quickly estimate the cost
to repair damage, it is important that you have a clear understanding that the
necessary repair work can be completed for the settlement amount being
offered by the adjuster. By obtaining an estimate of repairs from a contractor
that you have chosen, you can then better evaluate the adjusters settlement
offer. Adjusters want to settle claims quickly. Having an estimate in hand can
expedite the claims process.
Please be patient as insurance adjusters try and make contact with you. These
individuals are dealing with the same limited cell phone and computer
connectivity as everyone else on the island.
Our claims team is here to assist you should you have any questions about
your claims process. Please feel free to contact us should you need any
assistance.
Thank you,
Mark Robertson
President - Theodore Tunick & Company
______________________________ ______________________________ ___________
Our Office Locations:
1336 Beltjen Road

Charlotte Amalie
and
East End Plaza

6115 Estate Smith Bay - #6
St. Thomas
and
The Marketplace
Cruz Bay
St. John
Theodore Tunick & Company | www.theodoretunick.com
Theodore Tunick & Company | 1336 Beltjen Road, Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas USVI,
Corporate Headquarters, Poughkeepsie, NY 12601
Unsubscribe dlbwallace@gmail.com
Update Profile | About our service provider

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Southern Trust Co
From: Janet Annis (janet@ioco-columbus.com)
To: ceciledejongh@yahoo.com
Date: Tuesday, October 3, 2017 at 12:13 PM AST
Hi Cecile,
It was good to hear from you. As you requested attached you will find copies of the Southern Trust Company
policies including the Property, General Liability and Excess Liability.
Please let me know if you have any questions or need something further.
Best regards,
JANET ANNIS
Commercial Accounts
p. 614.939.5445
f. 614.939.5450
INSURANCE
OFFICE OF CENTRAL OHIO
Personal & Commercial Property & Casualty
Professional Liability • Long-Term Care Plans
Employee Benefits • Individual Life & Health
This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which they are
addressed. Any other use of this information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify our office and delete the
file immediately. Thank you.
STC Property (Part 1 of 2).pdf

1016.7kB
STC Property (Part 2 of 2).pdf
2.1MB
STC GL Renewal Cert 2017-2018.pdf
155.6kB
STC Excess Liab.pdf
795kB
Re: Business interruption insurance claim
From: Richard Kahn (richardkahn12@gmail.com)
To: ceciledejongh@yahoo.com
Cc: jabwcpa@gmail.com
Date: Wednesday, September 20, 2017 at 04:52 PM AST
Ok. Sounds good. Thank you.
Richard Kahn
New York, NY 10022
Phone 212-971-1306
Fax 646-350-0954
Cell 917-414-7584
On Sep 20, 2017, at 4:47 PM, Cecile de Jongh <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com> wrote:
Will do.
BTW - we are going to rip out the new carpeting. It was moldy and nasty after Irma, I can only imagine what it's
like now.
With warm regards,
Cecile
On Sep 20, 2017, at 4:45 PM, Richard Kahn <richardkahn12@gmail.com> wrote:
We should look into for stc as I assume we have coverage.
Richard Kahn
New York, NY 10022
Phone 212-971-1306
Fax 646-350-0954
Cell 917-414-7584
Re: Insurance
To: dlbwallace@gmail.com
Cc: jabwcpa@gmail.com; richardkahn12@gmail.com
Date: Friday, October 6, 2017 at 06:10 PM AST
Hi Daphne,
See my comments below.
With warm regards,
Cecile
On Oct 6, 2017, at 4:07 PM, Daphne Wallace <dlbwallace@gmail.com> wrote:
Greetings Cecile,
JB confirmed that she has taken photos of the damage. Jermaine has also taken photos of the damage. OK,
GREAT. LET'S PUT TOGETHER AN INSURANCE FILE. JEANNE HAS A COPY OF THE POLICY.
I have the hard copy of the quote from Ras for all repairs. Wally of First Resort Painters emailed his quote for the re-
painting of the walls only, ceiling painting of the front office will be separate due to advisement from Jimmy Fraguela
to wait to assess if further damage will be revealed. OK, I HAVE WALLY'S QUOTE AND WE SHOULD MOVE
FORWARD WITH HIM.
Floor Factory quote was emailed to you, and I verbally reported the details of their last project invoice for your
reference. YES, I REVIEWED THEIR QUOTE AND WILL ALSO GO WITH IT AS THERE IS NO OTHER CARPET
RETAILER/INSTALLER ON STT.
As per your request I contacted Toni of Silk Greenery for a quote for removal of the furniture for the re-carpeting
project. She can not do the job with her present crew, but is working on a quote from the moving company she uses.
OK, I'LL WAIT FOR YOUR FOLLOW UP.
I am awaiting a call from Beth of AYH for the possibility of using the space across the hall for the storage of the
furniture that will be removed for the carpet project. I went twice to the office and she was off property. OK.
First Resort can start on Tuesday, October 10 or if you would prefer Wednesday October 11 to use Tuesday to
prepare the office, I will call and arrange. LET'S HAVE THEM START ON WEDNESDAY SO EVERYONE CAN
PREPARE THEIR OFFICES.
If the painting is completed by Friday, October 13 or Monday, October 16, I could arrange for Dwight on Tuesday
October 17 or Wednesday , October 18. I believe it took him 2 full days the last time. LET'S GO WITH 10/18 TO
GIVE TONI TIME TO GET SOME MOVERS FOR US.
Jimmy Fraguela is sourcing with Ismael of A&I Development for the baseboard. OK
The ceiling repair has been quoted by Ras, not by Jimmy. OK
We have only one quote for the carpet, I am unaware of any other carpet companies presently operating on St.
Thomas. SEE MY COMMENT ABOVE
Please review my email and indicate what has been overlooked. I THINK THIS COVERS IT.
Please email separately when you can to Rich simply that the insurance company will in fact allow us to begin
repairs on the office and that the before photos taken by JB and JR are sufficient to ensure reimbursement by the
insurance company and it is okay to proceed with making arrangements for the painting and then the carpet
installation. I HAVE SUBMITTED A CLAIM ONLINE AS ADVISED BY TUNICK AND MARSHALL AND STERLING. I
HAVE NOW LEFT THREE MESSAGES AT THEIR OFFICE ON STX. WE SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO WAIT
UNTIL THEY GET AROUND TO US. PERHAPS JEANNE CAN GO BACK TO TUNICK ON TUESDAY TO
REGISTER A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE NON RESPONSE.
On Oct 6, 2017 3:31 PM, "Cecile de Jongh" <ceciledejongh@yahoo.com> wrote:

No, just take before pictures.
With warm regards,
Cecile
On Oct 6, 2017, at 3:06 PM, Daphne Wallace <dlbwallace@gmail.com> wrote:
Greetings Cecile,
If First Resort begins work on Tuesday, will this be a problem with the insurance?
Re: Southern Trust Co
To: Janet@ioco-columbus.com
Date: Tuesday, October 3, 2017 at 12:20 PM AST
Thank you Janet!
With warm regards,
Cecile de Jongh
On ‎Tuesday‎, ‎October‎‎3‎, ‎2017‎‎12‎:‎13‎:‎40‎‎PM‎‎AST, Janet Annis <Janet@ioco-columbus.com> wrote:
Hi Cecile,
It was good to hear from you. As you requested attached you will find copies of the Southern Trust Company
policies including the Property, General Liability and Excess Liability.
Please let me know if you have any questions or need something further.
Best regards,
JANET ANNIS
Commercial Accounts
p. 614.939.5445
f. 614.939.5450
INSURANCE
OFFICE OF CENTRAL OHIO
Personal & Commercial Property & Casualty
Professional Liability • Long-Term Care Plans
Employee Benefits • Individual Life & Health
This e-mail and any files transmitted with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to which they
are addressed. Any other use of this information is strictly prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify our
office and delete the file immediately. Thank you.
EXHIBIT 2
From: Jennifer Plotkin

To: Amelia Schmidt
Cc: Matt Kaiser; Courtney Forrest
Subject: Re: Jane Does v. USVI
Date: Friday, March 8, 2024 4:16:47 PM
[EXTERNAL EMAIL] DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you recognize the sender and know that the content is safe.
Hi Amelia,
The Releases signed by my clients are substantively identical.
Thank you,
Jennifer
On Fri, Mar 8, 2024 at 4:03 PM Amelia Schmidt <ASchmidt@kaiserlaw.com> wrote:
Jennifer,
Thanks for getting back to me about this. Are you able to confirm that the releases Jane
Does 1-6 signed were all identical to this publicly-filed one that I included in my February
29 email to you and your colleagues? (I’m reattaching it here.) If not, as proposed in my
February 29 email and discussed during our call, can you provide us with copies of the
releases with their names redacted?
Thanks,
Amelia
From: Jennifer Plotkin <jplotkin@mersonlaw.com>

Sent: Friday, March 8, 2024 3:58 PM
To: Amelia Schmidt <ASchmidt@kaiserlaw.com>
Subject: Jane Does v. USVI
[EXTERNAL EMAIL] DO NOT CLICK links or attachments unless you recognize the sender and know that the content is safe.
Dear Amelia,
As per our discussion earlier today, in lieu of providing my clients' names at this early point
in litigation, I can verify that Jane Does 1- 6 all executed a Release.
Thanks,
Jennifer
--
Jennifer C. Plotkin. Esq.
Merson Law, PLLC
950 Third Avenue, 18th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Phone: (212) 603-9100
Email: jplotkin@mersonlaw.com
--
Jennifer C. Plotkin. Esq.
Merson Law, PLLC
950 Third Avenue, 18th Floor
New York, New York 10022
Phone: (212) 603-9100
Email: jplotkin@mersonlaw.com
EXHIBIT 3
9Caseÿ1:23-cv-10301-AS
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CECILE DE JONGH’S NON-ARGUMENTATIVE FAILURE-TO-STATE-CLAIM CHART

PURSUANT TO RULE 8.G(i) OF CHAMBERS INDIVIDUAL PRACTICES
Count Cause of Action Elements Not Plausibly Alleged

1 Participating in a Sex-Trafficking Venture in That Ms. de Jongh:
Violation of Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (“TVPA”) Under 18 U.S.C. §§ (1) Was not already released from this claim by Plaintiffs;
1591(a)(2), 1595(d) (2) Is not immune from suit as a government official;
(3) Acted knowingly (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2));
(4) Participated in any venture described in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (18
U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2));
(5) Benefited, financially or by receiving anything of value, from any
above-referenced participation (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2)); or
(6) Knew, or was in reckless disregard, “that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any
combination of such means would be used to cause a person to
engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person had not attained
the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial
sex act” (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(2))
That Plaintiffs are the attorney general of any State (18 U.S.C. § 1595(d))
2 Aiding, Abetting, and Inducing a Sex- That Ms. de Jongh:

Trafficking Venture in Violation of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act Under (1) Was not already released from this claim by Plaintiffs;
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1591(a)(1) & (2), 1595 (2) Is not immune from suit as a government official; or
(3) (Or anyone) can be subject to aiding and abetting liability under the
TVPA. Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
3 Conspiracy to Commit Violations of the That Ms. de Jongh:

TVPA Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c), 1591,
1595 (1) Was not already released from this claim by Plaintiffs;
(2) Is not immune from suit as a government official;
(3) Agreed with any of the other defendants to commit any violation of
the TVPA; or
(4) (Or anyone else) may be liable for civil conspiracy as an individual
cause of action (Sahebdin v. Khelawan, No. 21-CV-2956 (MKB),
2022 WL 4451005, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2022)).
4 Negligence That Ms. de Jongh:
(1) Was not already released from this claim by Plaintiffs;

(2) Is not immune from suit as a government official;
(3) Owed any duty to any of the plaintiffs;
(4) Breached that duty; or
(5) Proximately caused any of the plaintiffs’ injuries through that
breach.

Cecile Dejongh's Notice of Motion To Dismiss and To Strike

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Case 1:23-cv-10301-AS Document 72 Filed 03/15/24 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JANE DOE 1 et al.,

v. Case Number: 23-cv-10301-AS

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NOTICE OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STRIKE

chart are attached.

Dated: March 15, 2024

Amelia J. Schmidt (NYS Bar 4947131)

Counsel for Cecile de Jongh

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

JANE DOE 1 et al.,

v. Case Number: 23-cv-10301-AS

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF CECILE DE JONGH’S

Amelia J. Schmidt (NYS Bar 4947131)

Counsel for Cecile de Jongh

Mende v. Milestone Tech., Inc.,

28 U.S.C. § 1391 ....................................................................................................................... 8, 15

was the First Lady during some of this time.

The Complaint is a 225-paragraph mess of vague and scattershot allegations, mostly

the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against her.

the Virgin Islands ever since. CDJ Decl. ¶ 4.

A. Ms. de Jongh’s Work for Mr. Epstein, 2000-19

young children and ailing aunt. CDJ Decl. ¶ 6.

companies, Ms. de Jongh had numerous administrative responsibilities. Those included

bookkeepers and a controller. CDJ Decl. ¶ 8.

C. Ms. de Jongh’s Knee Replacement Surgeries in New York in 2017

following both her surgeries. CDJ Decl. ¶ 19.

her stays in New York. CDJ Decl. ¶ 20.

D. Mr. Epstein’s Death and Estate Settlements with Plaintiffs

“substantively identical” to the one publicly-filed (and redacted) by a plaintiff in related

and all Releasees as co-conspirators[.]” Id.

E. Ms. de Jongh’s Brother-in-Law’s Apartment in New York

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

(4) failure to state a claim.

1. Insufficient Service of Process (Rule 12(b)(5))

burden of proving adequate service.” Militinska-Lake v. Kirnon, No. 22-2667-CV, 2023 WL

7648511, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 15, 2023).

individual defendant, including delivering the summons:

• to a registered agent (NY CPLR §§ 308(3); 318).

2. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Rule 12(b)(2))

pleadings on a motion to dismiss, on a challenge to a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction,

action for the long-arm statute to apply. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(c).

reside there.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

Litig., 529 F. Supp. 3d 111, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

3. Improper Venue (Rule 12(b)(3))

4. Failure to State a Claim (Rule 12(b)(6))

jurisdiction, (3) improper venue, and (4) failure to state a claim.

A. Ms. de Jongh Has Not Been Served Properly

under Rule 12(b)(5) on that basis alone.

out of town and instructed him to accept service.” Ahmad Aff.

B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh

Clause. See Waldman, 835 F.3d at 327.

jurisdiction whatsoever. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-8.

personal jurisdiction over Ms. de Jongh in New York.

1. The Long-Arm Statute Doesn’t Permit Personal Jurisdiction

Jongh adopts and incorporates those arguments by reference in this Motion.

That leaves only Section 302(a)(1)’s authorization of personal jurisdiction over a

prong of the long-arm statute, either.

case then-Judge Sotomayor cited in Reiss, reached a similar result. In Wilhelmshaven, a UK

sufficiently business related to carry jurisdictional weight.” Id.