Fulton County Superior Court

***EFILED***FD
Date: 11/22/2023 5:01 PM
Che Alexander, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

STATE OF GEORGIA )
) INDICTMENT NO. 22SC182969
)
) HON. KIMBERLY M. ESMOND ADAMS
JOSHUA FLEETWOOD )
IMANI LA'NAE SPEARS )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' RESPECTIVE MOTIONS FOR IMMUNITY

PURSUANT TO 0O.C.G.A. §16-3-21(a) AND 16-3-24.2
AND DISMISSING CHARGES AS TO BOTH DEFENDANTS

This matter came before the Court on September 25, 2023 for a hearing on the defendants'

separate motions seeking immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A. §16-3-21(a) and §16-

3-24.2. Present for the hearing were the State, represented by ADA Christian Adkins, Defendant

Joshua Fleetwood and his attorney, Clint Rucker, and Defendant Imani Spears and her attorney,

Anthony T. Pete.

On June 28, 2022, Defendants Joshua Fleetwood and Imani Spears were indicted by a

Fulton County Grand Jury for Violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, Murder,

Felony Murder, Aggravated Assault with raa

Deadly Weapon and Possession of a Firearm during

Commission of a Felony. Defendant Fleetwood was also charged with Possession of a Firearm by

a Convicted Felon. The charges pertained to the March 17, 2022 fatal shooting of Lakevia Jackson.

On October 3, 2022, Defendant Spears filed an Immunity Motion pursuant to O.C.G.A.§

16-3-21(a) and 16-3-24.2 claiming she acted in self-defense and was legally justified in the

shooting of Ms. Jackson. On January 27, 2023, Defendant Fleetwood filed an Immunity Motion

claiming he was legally justified in the shooting death of Ms. Jackson.

 The Court heard the testimony of Defendant Spears, Defendant Fleetwood, and three

witnesses for the State: Yaesha Jackson, Triquita Morris, and Ladondra Ellis. Surveillance videos

and a police interrogation of Defendant Spears also were tendered into evidence along with

photographs from the scene. The Court, having considered the evidence after hearing the testimony

of each witness, including the defendants, having weighed the testimony of each witness, and

comparing their testimony to the tendered surveillance footage, and photographic evidence to

assess credibility, considered the argument of counsel and applicable authority finds that both

Defendant Spears and Fleetwood are entitled to immunity from prosecution for the reasons

discussed more fully below.

FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court makes the following factual findings: (1) the defendants went to the Metro Fun

Center on Metropolitan Parkway in Southwest Atlanta to bowl in celebration of Defendant Spears'

upcoming birthday; (2) while inside the bowling center there was a disagreement about a bowling

ball which escalated to an argument between Defendant Spears and a group of women, including

the decedent, Lakevia Jackson, in which Joshua Fleetwood intervened and separated the group of

women and Defendant Spears; (3) heated words were exchanged between the defendants and the

group of women inside the bowling center but the dispute did not escalate to physical violence at

that time; (4) the defendants decided to leave the bowling center after initially leaving and then

trying to come back to finish their bowling game before exiting the building of the bowling center

for good; (5) the defendants exited the bowling center, as seen on the surveillance video, and

proceeded to their vehicle to leave before pulling into another parking space and used the GPS

navigation on their phones to travel elsewhere and continue their celebration of Defendant Spears'

upcoming birthday; (6) shortly after the defendants exited the bowling center the decedent exited

State v. Fleetwood et. al. Indictment No. 22SC182969

Order Granting Defendants' Immunity Motions Page 2 of 9
the building, followed by the decedent's friend, Thiquita Morris; (7) an unarmed Defendant Spears

testified that upon observing the decedent was alone she walked in the direction of the decedent to

speak with her and see if they could resolve their earlier dispute from inside the bowling center

because Defendant Spears frequented the bowling alley and did not want any trouble; (8)

Defendant Fleetwood followed behind Defendant Spears as she walked toward the decedent; (9)

the soundless video depicts an exchange of words between Defendant Spears and the decedent,

before the decedent turned toward her friend's vehicle in the parking lot in which she arrived and

retrieved a firearm; (10) the undisputed testimony from all of the witnesses which is also

corroborated up by the surveillance video showed that the decedent was the first person to fire a

weapon first into the air and then toward the defendants who were running away and retreating

to their vehicle; (11) Defendant Spears testified that as they ran away she ducked and continued to

hear gunshots coming in their direction before Defendant Fleetwood returned fire from his own

firearm which had been concealed in a holster up to that point; (12) the surveillance video shows

that the decedent continued to fire shots, either into the air or in the direction of the defendants

who had already retreated to their vehicle and were endeavoring to leave the parking lot of the

Metro Fun Center; (13) thereafter the surveillance footage shows a rapid exchange of gunfire

between the decedent and the defendants which is corroborated by the crime scene photos; (14)

Defendant Fleetwood was driving away and Defendant Spears picked up the firearm from the cup

holder in the vehicle or was handed the firearm by Defendant Fleetwood; (15) Defendant Spears

returmed fire at least once and possibly two or three times from the passenger side window while

the decedent was still firing off rounds before striking the decedent and fatally wounding her; (16)

the defendants left the Metro Fun Center at a high rate of speed through the only entrance and exit

for the establishment; (17) although there was no ballistics expert called to testify, the ballistics

State v. Fleetwood et. al. Indictment No. 228C182969

Order Granting Defendants' Immunity Motions Page 3 of 9
evidence on the scene showed five (5) shell casings in the area where the defendants' car was

parked and five (5) shell casings in the area where the car from which the decedent retrieved the

gun was parked.

Although the State was able to point out some inconsistencies in the testimony of the

defendants, many were explained through witness testimony, and none refute what the Court

observed on the surveillance video of the incident. The Court, therefore, concludes that the

decedent was the first to shoot, even though there did not appear to be any provocation beyond

words exchanged and without first being fired upon or any evidence Defendant Fleetwood had a

concealed firearm holstered on his hip. The Court further finds that the decedent continued to fire

shots either in the air or in the direction of the defendants as they ran away and were endeavoring

to leave the parking lot. The Court still further concludes that Defendant Spears returned fire in

defense of herself and in defense of Defendant Fleetwood because the decedent continued to fire

at them.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Under Georgia law, "[a] person who uses threats or force in accordance with Code Section

16-3-21... shall be immune from criminal prosecution ... ."

O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2. Furthermore,

"Ta] person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the extent that he

..
reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself. . . against such

other's imminent use of unlawful force." O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 (a).

Additionally,

a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great
bodily harm only if he . . reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
prevent death or great bodily injury to himself... or to prevent the commission of
a forcible felony.

State v. Fleetwood et. al. Indictment No. 22SC182969

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Id. However,

[a] person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in
subsection (a) of this Code section if he: (1) Initially provokes the use of force
against himself with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm
upon the assailant; . . or (3) Was the aggressor . . unless he withdraws from the
encounter and effectively communicates to such other person his intent to do so and
the other, notwithstanding, continues or threatens to continue the use of unlawful
force.

0.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 (b). "It also is now well settled that [a] person who uses threats or force in

accordance with Code Section 16-3-21 ... has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or

her ground and use force . . including deadly force." O.C.G.A. 16-3-23.1

A defendant has the burden of proof and must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the

evidence that he is entitled to immunity from trial. Hughes v. State, 312 Ga. 149, 156 (2021). This

preponderance of the evidence standard does not require the "elimination of all fact disputes" and

"requires only that the finder of fact be inclined by the evidence toward one side or the other."

State v. Bunn, 288 Ga. 20, 22 (2010) (citation omitted). Further, at an immunity hearing, it is the

trial court that makes findings of fact and credibility determinations. Hughes, 312 Ga. at 156.

As stated above, Georgia law protects individuals from prosecution who are justified in

using deadly force to protect themselves from death, great bodily injury, or the commission of a

forcible felony. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 (a). Georgia Courts have previously ruled that a defendant is

entitled to immunity under similar circumstances where the decedent was the initial aggressor. See

State v. Green, 289 Ga. 802, 804 (2011) (finding that the defendant was justified in using deadly

force for self-defense where Decedent assaulted Defendant by head butting Defendant in the mouth

and behaved irrationally by attacking Defendant even though Decedent knew Defendant had a

knife for protection). See also State v. Larscheid, 367 Ga. App. 660, 666, (2023) (affirming that

consideration of video evidence, as well as testimony from the defendant and from other witnesses,

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Order Granting Defendants' Immunity Motions Page 5 of 9
provided sufficient basis for the trial court to find defendant "reasonably believed force was

necessary to defend himself against [decedent]'s unlawful imminent force").

In the instant case, when viewing the surveillance video footage taken together with the

witnesses' testimony and the ballistics evidence, the Court finds the testimony of Defendant

Fleetwood and Defendant Spears to be credible. The Court further finds that the explanation

Defendant Spears provided for the untruthful information she provided to law enforcement when

she was interviewed to be credible based on her in-court testimony. Like the decedent in Green

who initiated the use of force by head butting the defendant, the video evidence in this case

unequivocally demonstrates that Decedent fired the first shot, thereby initiating deadly force

against the defendants. Defendants were, therefore, justified in using deadly force to prevent death

or great bodily injury to themselves.

Moreover, the Court rejects the State's argument that Defendant Fleetwood provoked the

use of force against him by instigating a confrontation as an excuse to inflict bodily harm on the

assailant, as the State's theory is not supported by the evidence. In fact, the evidence shows that

Defendant Fleetwood de-escalated the initial verbal altercation between Defendant Spears and the

group of women inside the bowling alley. Georgia Courts have previously held that even where

an individual is the source of a minor provocation, the individual may still defend themselves

against a felonious attack. See Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479, 484-85 (1967) (finding "[i]fa

person provokes a difficulty and the provocation amounts to no more than a mere trespass, it would

not put him in the wrong in resisting or defending himself against a felonious attack on account of

the provocation"). See also Crawley v. State, 7 Ga. App. 95 (1909) (holding "when the [decedent]

made an assault of greater degree than the opprobrious words would justify, he put himself in the

wrong, and placed himself in the same attitude as if he were the aggressor ab initio ") Here,

State v. Fleetwood et. al. Indictment No. 225C182969

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the facts demonstrate that Defendant Fleetwood initially attempted to de-escalate the altercation

and did not provoke the decedent. Even if Defendant Fleetwood or Defendant Spears used

opprobrious words at some point, the decedent placed herself in the wrong when she began using

force of a greater degree than the words would justify. Crawley, 7 Ga. App. 95 (1909).

The evidence further shows that Defendant Fleetwood never showed or physically

threatened the decedent with his holstered gun, and did not, in fact, discharge his firearm until after

the decedent first discharged two rounds from the firearm she retrieved from the car in which she

was riding. Defendant Spears did not fire rea

weapon until Decedent had fired multiple rounds as

well. In Mullins v. State, the Court found that a defendant's mere belief that the victim had a gun

was insufficient to justify defendant fatally shooting the victim as the victim attempted to exit his

own vehicle after making a verbal threat. 287 Ga. 302, 303 (2010). The key issue is whether a

defendant has actual knowledge that an alleged victim possesses a firearm such that his belief of

the need to use potentially-lethal force in order to prevent serious imminent harm to himself or

third-parties is reasonable. See State v. Brown, 314 Ga. 588, 594-95 (2022) (affirming a grant of

immunity for a defendant who not only opened fire first, but who also unintentionally struck a

bystander who was in the line of fire, on the basis that the defendant had acted upon a reasonable

belief that the force was necessary to prevent the infliction of death or serious bodily harm after

he saw the alleged victim point a gun at a third party), See also State v. Jenkins, 355 Ga. App. 39,

45 (2020) (holding despite having fired the first shot Defendant's claim of self-defense was

nevertheless supported in part because the victim was "the first person to wield a gun and that [the

victim] 'became aggressive with the firearm, waiving [sic] it around and pointing it at [a third

party]"). Here, Defendant Fleetwood did not even remove his gun from its holster until after

decedent began shooting. Furthermore, Defendant Spears did not fire the weapon until after

State v. Fleetwood et. al. Indictment No. 22SC182969

Order Granting Defendants' Immunity Motions Page 7 of 9
Decedent both brandished her weapon and fired multiple rounds at which point their belief that

they were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm was clearly reasonable.

The State further argues that the decedent and Defendants were engaged in mutual combat

such that Defendants are not entitled to avail themselves of self-defense. See Giddens v. State,

276 Ga. App. 353 (2005) (holding that the evidence presented two viable scenarios that negate

Defendant's self-defense claim because the defendant either "instigated a confrontation with

[victim] and used that confrontation as an excuse to shoot him... or "the two were engaged in

mutual combat from which Giddens did not withdraw."). The only possible scenario involving

mutual combat could be Defendant Spears' willingness to engage in a fist fight with the decedent,

if need be, as Defendant Spears testified because Defendant Spears did not approach the decedent

with a gun, which is uncontroverted, and she testified she never intended to use a gun. But see

Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 7, 10 n.3 (1992) (noting that a charge of mutual combat is "generally

given only where both parties are armed with deadly weapons and mutually agree or intend to fight

with those weapons") (emphasis added). Accordingly, I find the facts in this case insufficient to

establish mutual combat.

CONCLUSION
After weighing the evidence presented at the pre-trial hearing, making credibility

determinations, considering the arguments of Counsel and applying the law to the facts as the

Court found them to be, the Court finds that Defendant Fleetwood and Defendant Spears have

established by a preponderance of the evidence that each was acting in self-defense and defense

of others and is, therefore, entitled to immunity from prosecution pursuant to O.C.G.A.§16-3-24.2.

Accordingly, Defendant Fleetwood's motion is GRANTED, and Defendant Spear's motion is

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Order Granting Defendants' Immunity Motions Page 8 of 9
GRANTED. The Court hereby DISMISSES the charges against these defendants. The Clerk of

Court is DIRECTED to mark this matter as CLOSED.

SO ORDERED, this 24: day of , 2023.

H BLE M ESMOND ADAMS

SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
ATLANTA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Distribution List: Filed and Served Electronically via eFileGA

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