The counsel seeks permission to approach the dias. Much obliged.

Greetings to the hon’ble bench.

May it please thee court, this is counsel 2 on behalf of petitioners who rises to continue
submissions on issue 3 and 4.
Your lordship, for the third issue which is Whether the youths can be charged under s. 302,
392 and 393 read with s. 34 of ipc, the counsel humbly submits three-pronged arguments in
this regard- firstly, there was a common intention among the accused, 2 offence under s.
392 and 393 is attracted, 3 offence under 302 is attracted.
In relation to the first submission, the counsel humbly submits that the common intention of
the accused has been established by my co-counsel. S. 34 of IPC states that “when a criminal
act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.” In the case
of Debnath vs State of Tripura, it was held that common intention can be found by
circumstantial inferences. In the present case, every person either guarding the entrance or
waiting in the car or robbing and murdering people; all were part of the same offence having
an agreed common intention, hence all of them would be liable for every act performed.
The counsel further submits that Pranav while not directly participating in the robbery itself,
obstructs a customer who attempts to intervene. This demonstrates a collective effort to prevent
interference and suggests mutual support for the criminal act. As in the case of Vaijyanti v.
State of Maharashtra5 , it was inferred that common intention can be formulated on the spot
also. Hence, Pranav’s intention can also be established similarly.
In relation to the second submission, the counsel submits that according to S. 390 of ipc,
robbery is defined as “Extortion is “robbery” if the offender, at the time of committing the
extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that
person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or
to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there
to deliver up the thing extorted.”
In the present case, the elements of robbery are fulfilled as firstly, the robbers were physically
present during the commission of the crime in the bank, secondly they put the bank employees
in fear of instant death or hurt as they were carrying sophisticated weapons including a gun and
threatened them and lastly there was a delivery of property from the victims to the robbers
according to the moot prop as the cash was handed over to them as well as the money from the
strong room was given to them. As all criteria are fulfilled, hence the accused must be held
liable for the offence of robbery.
In relation to the last submission, the counsel submits that the youth can be charged for murder.
Section 302 defines murder as the intentional causing of death by a person with the requisite
intention or knowledge. When we apply the legal provisions on this situation, it is clear that
Rakesh's act of shooting Miss Ramola is deliberate and intentional, as he aims the weapon at
her and pulls the trigger, resulting in her death. Secondly, Rakesh's actions demonstrate the
necessary mens rea or mental state required for murder. He intentionally shoots Miss Ramola,
knowing that his actions are likely to cause her death. Latly, there is no justification or excuse
for Rakesh's actions. Miss Ramola is not posing any imminent threat to him or others that
would justify the use of lethal force in self-defense.
Also, as per the case of Shankarlal Kacharabhi v. state of Gujarat, some people carried lathi
and a gun to attack some people, and one ended up killing another by shooting him, the court
held all persons involved to be liable of murder in furtherance of the common intention.
Similarly, in this case, all the youth are liable under s. 302 as well as s.392 read with 34 of the
ipc.

Your honble bench, for the fourth issue, which is whether the fatal injury caused to the guard
would attract any additional charges or not, the counsel submits two-fold arguments in this
regard- firstly, the offense under section 326 of ipc is atrracted and secondly, the offence
under s 394 is attracted.
In relation to the first submission, the counsel submits that S. 326 states that “Whoever
voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting,
or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means
of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by
means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the
human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal,
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
It is humbly submitted that the essential ingredients to attract Section 326 are (1) voluntarily
causing a hurt; (2) hurt caused must be a grievous hurt; and (3) the grievous hurt must have
been caused by dangerous weapons or means.
As was noted in State of U.P. v. Indrajeet Alias Sukhatha “there is no such thing as a regular
or earmarked weapon for committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular
article can per se cause any serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined
factually.”
The counsel humbly submits that given the nature of the robbery and the use of dangerous
weapons, it was foreseeable for the accused that there might be resistance from security
personnel or others present in the bank. Despite this foreseeability, they proceeded with their
actions, indicating a reckless disregard for the safety of others and usage of such deadly
weapons to defend themselves against the security causing him to be fatally injured. Hence,
liability under s. 326 is attracted.
In relation to the second submission, it is submitted that the offence under s. 394 of ipc is
attracted. S. 394 states that, “if any person, in committing or in attempting to commit robbery,
voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in committing or
attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.”
The two elements required to be satisfied under this section are firstly, there must be a
robbery or an attempt to rob. Secondly, hurt must be voluntarily caused. It has already been
established earlier that there was commission of robbery in the earlier issue. In relation to the
second element, it is stated that in the case of Aslam vs state of Rajasthan, it was held that “s.
394 classifies two distinct class of persons. Firstly, those who actually cause hurt and
secondly those who do not actually cause hurt but are “jointly concerned” in the commission
of offence of robbery. The second class of persons may not be concerned in the causing of
hurt, but they become liable independently of the knowledge of its likelihood or a reasonable
belief in its probability.”
The use of force by the perpetrators resulted in the guard's injury, establishing a direct link
between the robbery and the harm caused. Their use of force was deliberate and intended to
facilitate the theft, thereby satisfying the criteria for a charge under Section 394 of the IPC. It
is also submitted that Rajesh, being part of the group planning the robbery, would reasonably
be aware of the potential for violence or harm during the commission of the crime even if he
is not present inside the bank. Despite this knowledge, he willingly participated in the
criminal enterprise, indicating his agreement to the use of force necessary to carry out the
robbery, including any resulting injuries.
Hence, liability under s. 326 and 394 is attracted along with the other charges.
Therefore in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, may the
Hon’ble Court be pleased to hold, adjudge and declare that,
1. The youths can be charged with the offense of robbery under Sections 302, 392 and 393
r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
2. The principle of common intention under Section 34 of the IPC is applicable in this case.
3. The liabilities of each youth under the principle of common intention are joint and
common.
4. The fatal injury caused to the security guard will attract additional charges under section
326 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code,1860.
And pass any other order it may deem fit in the interest of justice, equity and good
conscience.