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    Mai Anh
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    This document contains two problems about dynamic games. Problem 1 involves a 2x2 stage game that is played repeatedly for 2 or 3 rounds, asking if there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both players play A in the first round. Problem 2 involves a 3x3 stage game that is played either 27 times or infinitely many times, asking about the Nash equilibria of the stage and repeated games and if playing C every round is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

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    dynamic exercise

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    This document contains two problems about dynamic games. Problem 1 involves a 2x2 stage game that is played repeatedly for 2 or 3 rounds, asking if there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both players play A in the first round. Problem 2 involves a 3x3 stage game that is played either 27 times or infinitely many times, asking about the Nash equilibria of the stage and repeated games and if playing C every round is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    2 views1 page

    Dynamic Games

    Uploaded by

    Mai Anh
    This document contains two problems about dynamic games. Problem 1 involves a 2x2 stage game that is played repeatedly for 2 or 3 rounds, asking if there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both players play A in the first round. Problem 2 involves a 3x3 stage game that is played either 27 times or infinitely many times, asking about the Nash equilibria of the stage and repeated games and if playing C every round is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 1

    Dynamic Game

    Problem 1:

    1.Find NE in pure strategies


    2. Assume that the above stage game is played two times. After the first round, players observed
    the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the sum of the
    payoffs obtained in each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in
    which (A, A) is played in the first round?
    3. Assume that the above stage game is played three times. After the first and second round,
    players observed the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are
    the sum of the payoffs obtained in each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
    pure strategies in which (A, A) is played in the first round?

    Problem 2:

    1. Find the all the Nash equilibria of the game G.


    2. Assume that the above stage game is played 27 times. After each round, players observe
    the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated game are the sum of
    the payoffs obtained in each round. Find all the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
    repeated game.
    3. Assume that the above stage game is played infinitely many times. After each round,
    players observed the moves done by the other player. The total payoffs of the repeated
    game are the discounted (with discount factor δ = 0.9) sums of the payoffs obtained in
    each round. Is there a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which (C,
    C) is played in every round?

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