Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rbsp20

Introduction to the Special Issue, People on Streets.

Critical Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance

Marieke Borren & Maria Robaszkiewicz

To cite this article: Marieke Borren & Maria Robaszkiewicz (2024) Introduction to the Special
Issue, People on Streets. Critical Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance, Journal of the British
Society for Phenomenology, 55:1, 5-11, DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2024.2306041

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2024.2306041

Published online: 02 Feb 2024.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 200

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbsp20
THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY
2024, VOL. 55, NO. 1, 5–11
https://doi.org/10.1080/00071773.2024.2306041

EDITORIAL

Introduction to the Special Issue, People on Streets. Critical

Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance

The last few years have seen the emergence of critical phenomenology as an exciting para-
digm in phenomenology and beyond, spanning disciplines such as anthropology, urban
studies, gender studies and literature, with ‘founding mothers’ like Alia Al-Saji, Lisa
Guenther, Gayle Salamon, and Gail Weiss. Puncta, the journal of critical phenomenology,
was established in 2018; in 2019, the programmatic volume 50 Concepts for a Critical
Phenomenology was published. Ever since, apart from many articles, several monographs
and edited volumes have been published and conferences held under this heading.
Even if the very term, ‘critical phenomenology,’ is relatively recent, it is certainly not an
entirely novel project, as evidenced by the overlap between its current proponents and its pre-
decessors. Critical phenomenology, as we know it today, does not have a single point of
origin. It can be traced back not only to its beginnings in early twentieth century phenomen-
ology (most notably the work of Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, Martin Heidegger, and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty) but also to feminist phenomenology and critical phenomenology
of race that were first established in the mid-twentieth century, in the work of Simone de
Beauvoir and Frantz Fanon respectively, and, from the 1970s, developed by Iris Marion
Young, Sandra Bartky, Gloria Anzaldua, Maria Lugones, Linda Alcoff, George Yancy,
Robert Bernasconi, Lewis Gordon, Sara Ahmed, Henri Rubin and Gayle Salamon—to
name but a few feminist, queer, trans, critical race, and intersectional phenomenologists.
Like any paradigm, field of inquiry, or methodological frame in-the-making (to use a
phrase coined by Latour), critical phenomenology has not yet reached provisional closure,
such as consensus about its method. Hence, we will not even try and provide a definition.
Instead, we approach critical phenomenology more indirectly. To illuminate the methodo-
logical challenges involved, we will unpack two foundational debates, pertaining to the key
questions: “What is phenomenological about critical phenomenology?”1 and “What is critical
about critical phenomenology?” Subsequently, we will point to its relation to social and pol-
itical struggles and protest.

Foundational Debates
Regarding the question of what is typically phenomenological about critical phenomenology,
it should be noted that critical phenomenology shares several methodological and conceptual
features with any other phenomenological approach, irrespective of “any specific philoso-
pher’s incarnation” of it.2
First, like any phenomenologist, critical phenomenologists aim at providing rich descrip-
tions of lived experience or first-person perspectives of subjectivity, selfhood or Dasein. In the
case of critical phenomenologists, this is typically embodied experience. Similar to classical
phenomenology, critical phenomenology pursues an inquiry into the conditions of possibility

1
As reads the title of an article by Laferté-Coutu.
2
Davis, “The Phenomenological Method,” 3.
© 2024 The British Society for Phenomenology
6 EDITORIAL

and basic structures of lived experience and the lifeworld in which it unfolds. Husserl’s trans-
cendental method, his way of exploring a priori structures both in what is thought (noema)
and in the act of thinking (noesis), proceeds via two so-called ‘reductions’: the phenomeno-
logical and the eidetic reduction. In his contribution to this special issue, Rasmus Dyring
makes an original contribution to the phenomenological method by suggesting adding a
third, “anarcheological,” reduction for critical purposes. Critical phenomenologists are typi-
cally attentive to embodied differences and to empirical social structures that are open to
change and to the way these differences and contingent structures impact on lived experience.
As a consequence, they are usually reluctant to fully accept the assumption of the existence of
immutable essences, as it is seen as symptomatic of false neutrality, which in practice all too
often amounts to masculinist and white supremacist bias. However, their commitment to dis-
closing something general by investigating lived experience does not set them apart from
other phenomenologists.
Second, critical phenomenologists share the general phenomenological predisposition to
distance oneself from—i.e. suspend or ‘bracket’—the preconceived ideas, prejudices, and
biases contained in the natural attitude: our everyday lived experiences, habits, acting and
interacting in the world, as well as our theoretical presuppositions. Following in the footsteps
of Merleau-Ponty, who famously asserted the impossibility of a complete epoché, critical phe-
nomenologists are faithful, if not always to the actual practice of the epoché, then to its spirit:
the methodological predisposition to denaturalize the natural attitude (Husserl), and to
uncover the everyday practical world that “normally” (i.e. usually) operates in the background
(Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). As Ann O’Byrne puts it: “rejecting the natural attitude is the first
move of any phenomenological investigation, and that means encountering the world other-
wise, undermining all at once the processes of naturalization that work to enforce the convic-
tion that how things are is the only way they can be and/or the way they ought to be.”3
There is a lively debate among critical phenomenologists about the adoption of the trans-
cendental method and about the question of whether one can abandon transcendental sub-
jectivity and still ‘do’ phenomenology at all, as opposed to, for example, qualitative empirical
social science. Critical phenomenologists typically explore how social and political—that is,
empirical and historically shifting—structures and cultural norms impact differentially on var-
iously situated people: cis and trans women, men, intersex and non-binary people, black and
white people, disabled or able-bodied people, etcetera. These empirical structures and embo-
died differences are persistent yet contingent. Lisa Guenther favours a quasi-transcendental—
or historico-transcendental—approach that unhinges the transcendental-empirical divide
itself. Structures like patriarchy and racism, are contingent yet constitutive for lived experi-
ence. As Johanna Oksala puts it, critical phenomenology is attentive to the “constitutive
importance of culture, language and historicity” for subject formation.4
Third, critical phenomenologists typically assume that the predisposition to denaturalize
the natural attitude presupposes that one takes a first-person perspective, a “perspective
from within,” or a “point of view” as a starting point for inquiry, in contrast to the predomi-
nant social scientific, constructivist and materialist accounts of, say, gender and race that
mostly take a “perspective from without” that do not inquire into the very background
beliefs that enable such accounts.5 Critical phenomenologists tend to grant priority to
3
O’Byrne, “Book Review of 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology,” 28.
4
Oksala, “A Phenomenology of Gender,” 237.
5
Within feminist phenomenology this feature of phenomenology has been valued for a long time. See for instance
Fielding, “A Feminist Phenomenology Manifesto,” Oksala, “A Phenomenology of Gender,” 239–241. The focus on
the “perspective from within,” incidentally, is what has drawn trans studies scholars to phenomenology, beginning
with Rubin, “Phenomenology as a Method in Trans Studies.” Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s work, Gayle Salamon
writes in a programmatic piece on the use of phenomenology, especially the notion of the lived body, in trans
 JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 7

intersubjectivity over subjectivity, to the first-person plural over the singular, and to co-exist-
ence over existence. Lisa Guenther puts it this way:
By critical phenomenology I mean a method that is rooted in first-person accounts of
experience but also critical of classical phenomenology’s claim that the first-person singular
is absolutely prior to intersubjectivity and to the complex textures of social life … the
method of critical phenomenology … both continues the phenomenological tradition of
taking first-person experience as the starting point for philosophical reflection and also
resists the tendency of phenomenologists to privilege transcendental subjectivity over trans-
cendental intersubjectivity.6
Fourth, critical phenomenologists align themselves with a relational or interactive ontology.
According to a general phenomenological assumption, self, others, and the world are inter-
twined, fundamentally related.7 This follows from the basic phenomenological principle of
intentionality: our consciousness is always consciousness of something, which means that it
is not something inside us that is separate from the external world. The subject or self
always gestures beyond itself. Existential and hermeneutic phenomenologists such as Hei-
degger, Merleau-Ponty, and Beauvoir represent a modification of the principle of intention-
ality, broadening it beyond Husserl’s focus on consciousness. They posit that the self is
embodied and always “in the world”—that is, embedded in a historical, cultural, and
social world comprised of other people and things. Even if, with the obvious exception
of Beauvoir, these phenomenologists themselves are not committed to critical phenomen-
ology, their work is often felt to lend itself better to productive appropriations in the service
of critical theory than Husserlian phenomenology. By partially or entirely abandoning the
epoché and focusing on humans’ practical and embodied “being in the world,” they throw
into relief the self’s irrevocable social situatedness. This opens up the possibility of account-
ing for social, political and cultural norms and structures as more than merely empirical
restraints.
In addition to methods, the phenomenological tradition also offers a repository of con-
ceptual resources that have been creatively appropriated and reworked for understanding
and challenging social structures.8 Phenomenological concepts that have successfully
been put to use for critical phenomenology include the “lived body” (Merleau-Ponty, Beau-
voir, Fanon), “habit” (Merleau-Ponty), the Leib-Körper distinction and “orientation”
(Husserl), “being in the world” (Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty), “horizon” and the figure/
ground structure of perception (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer), “situation” (Beauvoir,
Merleau-Ponty), “historicity,” “facticity”, “thrownness” (Heidegger), “natality” (Arendt),
etcetera.
Overall, we agree with the authors of the first Introduction to critical phenomenology (dis-
cussed in the book review by Tris Hedges in the present issue), Elisa Magrì and Paddy
McQueen, who argue that the divergence between critical and classical phenomenology
should not be exaggerated.9 However, if critical phenomenology is considered as one of
the latest branches of the phenomenological tree, then what constitutes the uniqueness of
this branch? This question brings us to the second foundational debate, about the nature

studies: “The phenomenological claim that the body is not just something I have or use, not merely an object I haul
around, but is rather something that I am allows an understanding of the body as defined and constituted by what I
feel and not simply what others see.” (Salamon, “Phenomenology,” 154)
6
Guenther, Solitary Confinement, xiii, xv.
7
Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood; idem, “Intersubjectivity,”; Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference.
8
Many of the contributions in 50 Concepts follow this type of appropriating phenomenology. Also see Dickel’s recently
published monograph, Embodying Difference.
9
Magrì and McQueen, Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction, 23.
8 EDITORIAL

of the critical aspect of critical phenomenology.10 Critical phenomenologists suspend the

natural attitude, which includes the—historical, contingent—social structures and norms
informing experience that we usually take for granted in everyday life. Typically assumed
to be shot through with power relations, these structures and norms are considered both
exclusionary and constitutive at the same time. Critical phenomenologists “not only [to]
make visible ‘normal’ experiences of embodied beings but also [to] do so without parsing
out that which makes ‘normal’ experiences possible.”11 The aim of the subsequent phenom-
enological description is to interrogate these norms and structures. In the words of the editors
of 50 Concepts, critical phenomenology “mobilizes phenomenological description in the
service of a reflexive inquiry into how power relations structure experience as well as our
ability to analyze that experience.”12
Uncontroversially, critical phenomenology is a normatively engaged project, that delves
into social structures and norms that are seen as unjust, oppressive, or exclusive. It discloses
how hegemonic norms foster some embodied forms of life, while foreclosing or troubling
others—mostly by naturalizing the former. Critical phenomenologists uncover what has
been obscured because it presents itself as normal or natural, as it constitutes the horizon
or background of lived experience without itself appearing, such as systemic structures of
oppression. They reveal, more or less systematically, commonplace pre-understanding,
including gender-based prejudices and racialized or racist bias. As such, these constitutive
structures and pre-understandings are made available as objects of critical scrutiny—and
hence to the possibility of change, amelioration, or repair. Description itself may thus
weaken the normative hold of these structures. For example, uncovering the habitual
nature of sexist and/or racist perception robs the sexed and racialized body of its naturalness
and opens up practices of perceiving the social world and the bodies inhabiting it otherwise.
Thus, critical phenomenology is a project of social critique. However, there is no agree-
ment as to how critical phenomenology relates to transformative social or political action.
More precisely, scholars take different stances with respect to Marx’s 11th thesis on Feuerbach.
Some view phenomenological description as a build-up to “changing the world,” that is, to
ultimately acting into and transforming the political and social structures and norms that
the critical phenomenologist describes and interrogates. A case in point is Lisa Guenther,
who concludes her chapter in 50 Concepts with a reference to Marx’s thesis: “The ultimate
goal of critical phenomenology is not just to interpret the world, but also to change it”.13
Others, such as Alia Al-Saji, renounce such an ‘activist’ approach. She develops a phenomen-
ology of racialized affect that proposes dwelling on the wounds of colonial duration.14 Gayle
Salamon helpfully recalls the phenomenological imperative to “describe what one sees in
order to see it anew.”15 In other words, perhaps we should consider phenomenological
description itself to be a mode of action. This is what the editors of 50 Concepts, in their Intro-
duction, call “transformative description”—to re-describe the world to disclose it in a novel
way.16 As Anne O’Byrne puts it: “Change requires interpretation, which requires attentive
experience, which at its best broadens and deepens our sense of the world.”17
10
“What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?” is the title of an article by Salamon in the inaugural issue of Puncta;
also see Guenther, “Six Senses of Critique for a Critical Phenomenology” and Magrì and McQueen, Critical Phenomen-
ology, Chapter 1.
11
Cohen Shabot and Landry, “The Water We Swim In,” 2.
12
Weiss, Murphy and Salamon, “Introduction: Transformative Descriptions,” xiv.
13
“Six Senses,” 16.
14
Al-Saji, “Frantz Fanon,” 208.
15
Salamon, “What is Critical About Critical Phenomenology?,” 12.
16
Weiss, Murphy, and Salamon, “Introduction: Transformative Descriptions.”
17
O’Byrne, “Book Review 50 Concepts,” 35.
 JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 9

Critical Phenomenology and Embodied Resistance

There is an intimate relation between critical phenomenology and social struggles: critical
phenomenology may itself be qualified as a mode of transformative social or political
action. Yet another relation pertains to the genetic or historical ties that connect critical phe-
nomenology with social struggles and movements. Critical phenomenology is largely a con-
tinuation of feminist phenomenology and critical phenomenology of race that were first
established, in the mid-twentieth century. Each of them engages in phenomenological
description of first person lived experience of oppression, domination, or exclusion,
against the background of patriarchal, racist, and capitalist societies, along with the progress-
ive social struggles aiming at transforming or subverting them. Today, embodied differences
are no longer thought just along the lines of sex, gender and race, but are increasingly
extended to include other differences that reflect the development of new struggles and
social movements, such as those related to health and dis/ability, neurodiversity, age, to
queerness, and trans- and cis-embodied experiences, and even to species, that is, to the so-
called ‘anthropological difference’ between human and non-human animals.18
The contributions to the present special issue originate from the conference “People on
Streets. Critical Phenomenologies of Embodied Resistance” that took place in May 2022 at
Paderborn University and was organized by Maria Robaszkiewicz, Marieke Borren, Katja
Čičigoj and Sara Cohen Shabot. These papers make explicit the genetic relation between criti-
cal phenomenologies and embodied protests; the authors delve into various causes, struggles,
and movements across the globe, providing new perspectives on the spectrum from liberal
democracies to illiberal populist and autocratic regimes. The contributors tackle struggles
such as anti-government protests in autocratic regimes (Dyring, Shchyttsova), anti-Black
racism (Borren, Corrias), queer activism (Herrmann), feminism (Robaszkiewicz), the early
labour movement (Smyth), climate activism (Herrmann), and more. The geographical diver-
sity of the papers, set in locations ranging from Argentina and Poland to the US, Tunisia, and
Belarus, reflects the global relevance and resonance of critical phenomenology.
The issue brings different, more or less canonical, strands within phenomenology to bear
on the project of critical phenomenology—hence more aptly, critical phenomenologies, in the
plural—such as Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (Dyring, Hermann), Waldenfels’
responsive phenomenology (Corrias, Dyring), Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodi-
ment (Borren, Smyth), Patocka’s phenomenological account of the “solidarity of the
shaken” (Shchyttsova) and Arendt’s political phenomenology (Borren, Herrmann, Robasz-
kiewicz). In addition, it is informed by insights from critical theory, in particular by
Butler’s work on vulnerability and the performative politics of assembly (Borren, Herrmann,
Shchyttsova) and borrows from other traditions in philosophy, such as speech act theory,
legal philosophy and aesthetic theory (Corrias, Shchyttsova). Finally, critical phenomenolo-
gies bear the legacy of political activists-cum-theorists such as Luxemburg (Smyth),
Gandhi and Thoreau (Herrmann), Gago (Robaszkiewicz) and a variety of BLM protagonists
(Corrias).
The present issue explores the basic structures of human existence and co-existence as dis-
closed in social and political protests, particular in relation to embodiment, bodily
18
Respectively, e.g., queerness: Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology; trans embodiment: Salamon, The Life and Death of Latisha
King, Rubin, “Phenomenology as Method in Trans Studies;” health: Cooper, Dolezal and Rose, COVID-19 and Shame;
disability: Reynolds, The Meaning of Disability, Garland-Thomson, “Misfits”, Hall, “Limping Along: Toward a Crip Phe-
nomenology”; age: Eilenberger, Halsema and Slatman, “Age Difference in the Clinical Encounter”; neurodiversity:
Chapman and Carel, “Neurodiversity, Epistemic Injustice, and the Good Human Life,” Fernandez, “From Phenomeno-
logical Psychopathology to Neurodiversity and Mad Pride;” species: Dufourcq, The Imaginary of Animals, Veit and
Browning, “Phenomenology Applied to Animal Health and Suffering.”
10 EDITORIAL

intentionality and intercorporeality. The authors delve into embodied phenomena such as the
habitual body (Smyth), corporeal spontaneity (Borren, Smyth), vulnerability (Borren,
Shchyttsova), the body in its capacity as ζωή vs. βίος (Robaszkiewicz), the capable or
skilled body (Smyth, Borren) and bodies in alliance (Borren, Robaszkiewicz, Shchyttsova),
etcetera.
Other basic structures of protest that are explored in this collection include temporality (in
particular unprecedentedness as a quality of protest development: Borren, Shchyttsova,
Smyth), language (passionate utterance: Corrias), motility (walking: Borren), spatiality (the
space of appearances: Borren, Herrmann, Robaszkiewicz; the legal order: Corrias), among
many others.
What phenomenology illuminates about protests, as evidenced in these papers, pertains
most of all to the meaning and experiential structures of protest and critique, and the
values it embodies, such as justice, freedom, and peace. Issues that are addressed include
the dynamics of its development: how, for instance, do vulnerable, passive bodies (ζωή or
‘life itself’) get mobilized, transformed and politicized into βίος, when collectively brought
into the public sphere (Robaszkiewicz, Shchyttsova)? Where lies the subversive quality of
“critical experience” (Dyring)? What do “passionate utterances” such as the BLM rallying
cry “No Justice, No Peace” reveal about the nature and origins of the legal and political
order (Corrias)? How is political agency interrelated with experiences and phenomena to
which it is usually considered antithetical, such as spontaneity (Smyth), and vulnerability
(Shchyttsova)?
As guest editors to this special issue, our purpose has been to contribute to the founda-
tional debates in critical phenomenology outlined above, while also providing new insights
into the phenomenon of protest and embodied resistance. Whether the articles collected in
this issue furthermore succeed in enacting social and political protest in and of themselves
will be up to the reader to find out.

References
Ahmed, Sara. Queer Phenomenology. Orientations, Objects, Others. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Al-Saji, Alia. “Frantz Fanon.” The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. Eds. Hilge Landweer,
and Thomas Szanto. London and New York: Routledge, 2020. 207–14.
Chapman, Robert, and Havi Carel. “Neurodiversity, Epistemic Injustice, and the Good Human Life.” Journal
of Social Philosophy 53.4 (2022): 614–31.
Cohen Shabot, Sara, and Christina Landry. “The Water We Swim In: Why Feminist Phenomenology Today?”
Rethinking Feminist Phenomenology. Theoretical and Applied Perspectives. Eds. Sara Cohen Shabot, and
Christina Landry. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018. 1–10.
Cooper, Fred, Luna Dolezal, and Arthur Rose. COVID-19 and Shame: Political Emotions and Public Health in
the UK. London: Bloomsbury, 2023.
Davis, Duane. “The Phenomenological Method.” 50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology. Eds. Gail Weiss,
Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2020. 3–9.
Dickel, Simon. Embodying Difference. Critical Phenomenology and Narratives of Disability, Race, and
Sexuality. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022.
Dufourcq, Annabelle. The Imaginary of Animals. London and New York: Routledge, 2023.
Eilenberger, Hans-Georg, Annemie Halsema, and Jenny Slatman. “Age Difference in the Clinical Encounter:
Intersectionality and Phenomenology.” The American Journal of Bioethics 19.2 (2019): 32–4.
Fernandez, Anthony Vincent. “From Phenomenological Psychopathology to Neurodiversity and Mad Pride:
Reflections on Prejudice.” Puncta 3.2 (2020): 19–22.
Fielding, Helen. “A Feminist Phenomenology Manifesto.” Feminist Phenomenology Futures. Eds. Helen
Fielding, and Dorothea Olkowski. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017. vii–xxii.
Garland-Thompson, Rosemarie. “Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability Concept.” Hypatia 26.3 (2011):
591–609.
Guenther, Lisa. Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2013.
 JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY 11

Guenther, Lisa. “Six Senses of Critique for Critical Phenomenology.” Puncta 4.2 (2021): 5–23.
Hall, Kim Q. “Limping Along: Toward a Crip Phenomenology.” The Journal of Philosophy of Disability 1.1
(2021): 11–33.
Heinämaa, Sara. Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir. New York:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
Johanna, Oksala. “A Phenomenology of Gender.” Continental Philosophy Review 39 (2006): 229–44.
Laferté-Coutu, Mérédith. “What is Phenomenological about Critical Phenomenology?” Puncta 4.2 (2021): 89–
106.
Magrì, Elisa, and Paddy McQueen. Critical Phenomenology: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022.
O’Byrne, Ann. “Book Review 50 Concepts of a Critical Phenomenology.” Puncta 3.1 (2020): 28–36.
Reynolds, Joel Michael. The Meaning of Disability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024.
Rubin, Henry. “Phenomenology as Method in Trans Studies.” GLQ 4.2 (1998): 263–81.
Salamon, Gayle. “Phenomenology.” Transgender Studies Quarterly 1.1–2 (2014): 153–5.
Salamon, Gayle. The Life and Death of Latisha King. A Critical Phenomenology of Transphobia. New York:
New York University Press, 2018.
Salamon, Gayle. “What is Critical About Critical Phenomenology?” Puncta 1.1 (2018): 8–17.
Veit, Walter, and Heather Browning Ferrarello. “Phenomenology Applied to Animal Health and Suffering.”
Phenomenology of Bioethics: Technoethics and Lived-Experience. Ed. Susi Ferrarello. Cham: Springer, 2021.
73–88.
Weiss, Gail, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon. “Introduction: Transformative Descriptions.” 50 Concepts
for a Critical Phenomenology. Eds. Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon. Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2020. xiii–v.
Zahavi, Dan. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2005.
Zahavi, Dan. “Intersubjectivity.” Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. Eds. Sebastian Luft, and Søren
Overgaard. London and New York: Routledge, 2011. 180–9.

Marieke Borren
Faculty of Humanities, Open University, Heerlen, Netherlands
marieke.borren@ou.nl

Maria Robaszkiewicz
Department of Philosophy, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany
maria.robaszkiewicz@upb.de