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ADMINISTATIVE LAW REPORT

ON

A.K. Karaipak v. Union of India

SUBMITTED TO: PROF. ARUSHI ANTHWAL

SUBMITTED BY:
VAISHALI SRIVASTAVA (19LLB082)
VANSHIKA GANDHI (19LLB083)
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
Facts of the Case
Issue Raised
Argument Advanced
Judgement
Critical Analysis

Facts of the case:


A Special Selection Board was established to select officers to the Indian Forest Service in
the senior and junior scales from officers serving in the forest department of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment)
Regulation, 1966, framed under r. 4(1) of the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules
made under the All India Services Act, 1951.

A Special Selection Board was established in accordance with the authority granted under
section 3 of the Indian Forest Service (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1956, which were
drafted under rule 4(1) of the Indian Forest Service (Recruitment) Rules, 1966. It stated that
the Central Government shall form a special selection board in order to make selections for
any State Cadre. The Union Public Service Commission was to make the final selections,
while the Chief Conservator of the State's Forest was to lead the selection board. Regulation
5 governs the creation of the list of qualified applicants for the position of ex-officio
chairman of the selection board.

A man by the name of Naquishbund was chosen to serve as the interim chief conservator of
forests in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He had been appointed to the said position despite
three other officers namely Basu, Baig and Kaul having more seniority. They had petitioned
the higher authorities to stop their supersession.Naquishbund was later named as the ex-
officio chairman of the selection board, which was created to recommend candidates for the
All India Forest Service.

Notably, Naquishbund was one of the applicants hoping to be chosen for the All India Forest
Service. Although he was not a member of the selection board when his name was being
considered for selection, he did sit in the board and take part in its discussions when the
names of Basu, Baig, and Kaul were being considered for selection. He also helped to create
the list of preferred candidates as required by Regulation 5 and participated in its preparation.

The final list had to be sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs because the selection board's
draught was not the final list. The Ministry of Home Affairs had sent to UPSC that list along
with its observations, and the UPSC had reviewed each officer's file before making its
recommendations.

The parties who were dissatisfied with the selection procedure petitioned the court.

Issue Raised:
 Assuming that the proceedings in this case were administrative in nature, whether
natural justice principles applied to them?
 Whether there was a violation of Principles of Natural Justice?
 Whether there is any difference between Quasi- judicial power and administrative
power?

Arguments Advanced:

Contention of Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that Rule 4 and Regulation 5 required selections to be made after
"judging" the suitability of the state service officers. Since the word "adjudge" means "to
judge or decide," it is clear that the selections board was given quasi-judicial authority.

It was argued by them that such a power is a judicial one rather than an administrative one
and that it must be used in accordance with the natural justice principles, whose violation has
rightly been charged.

They furtherly contended that Naquishband cannot serve as an adjudicator for the Indian
Forest Service because he is also a candidate for the position.

Contention of Respondents:

The respondents contented that the selection board authority is not a quasi- judicial but rather
an administrative one. To further strengthen this claim, it was acknowledged that the
selection board's proceedings were not quasi-judicial in nature because there was no "right"
for the board to decide. The board's only responsibility was to choose officers who, in their
judgement, were qualified to serve in the Forest Service.

They interpreted the term “adjudge” as “found worthy of selection”.

Furtherly, the selections board was only an advisory body and the final recommendations
were to be made by the Union Public Service Commission.

The selection committee also argued that Naquishband completely acted as a neutral member
of the board and had no influence whatsoever on their decision when it came to choosing
candidates.
Judgement:

The five-judge bench ruled that the decisions made by the Selection Committee were against
the principles of natural justice because there was a legitimate chance of prejudice because
the candidate's mere presence on the Selection Board could have an impact on other
members' opinions.

The core principle of natural justice is that a decision-making process on a particular matter
must be sensible and reasonable.Its main objective is to stop injustice from being committed.

The Honorable Court determined that the Selection Board's authority was administrative in
nature and used that finding to examine the accuracy of the choices made. It asserted that if
the State's agencies are not required to carry out their duties in a fair and just manner, the idea
of the rule of law would become less significant. Additionally, in a welfare state like India,
where the administrative bodies' jurisdiction is expanding quickly, administrative authorities
must be tasked with the responsibility of carrying out their tasks in a fair and just manner.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between an administrative power and a


quasi-judicial power. The Supreme Court ruled that even though choosing candidates for
government employment is an administrative process, the selection committee has a
responsibility to act legally.

The selection of Naquishband as a member of the selection board was ruled to have violated
the fundamental principle of "nemo judex in causa sua" by the court. Even though he did not
take part in the discussion when his name was being considered, the selection board's
decisions were greatly influenced by the fact that he was a member of the selection board and
that he also held the position of chairman. He also took part in the discussions during which
the arguments put forth by Basu, Baig, and Kaul, his rivals, were taken into account. He also
witnessed the creation of the list of preferred candidates after they had been
chosen.Therefore, it was abundantly clear that there was a conflict between his interest and
duty from the very beginning of the selection process and at every turn of his participation in
it. The court could not have believed Naquishbund could have been objective in such a
situation.

In the case of Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana 1, the court made the following
observation: "We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our

1
1987 AIR 454
jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own case and that if there is likelihood of
bias, it is in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the judge likely to be
biased should be incapacitated from sitting.

The officer who conducted the departmental inquiry, made the decision, and gave testimony
in the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh 2 case also served as the judge and
prosecutor. As a result, the Chief Justice stated in the majority opinion that the natural justice
principles had been gravely violated.

Relying on the previous judgements, the Supreme Court in this case ruled that the principles
of natural justice applied to both judicial and administrative duties. The court further
invalidated the selection procedure on the grounds that it contravened natural justice
principles.

Critical Analysis:

I believe that the selection board's authority is purely administrative and not at all quasi -
judicial in nature. The term "quasi-judicial power" primarily refers to certain authority in
resolving disputes between candidates and parties. Because the selection board's sole

2
1958 AIR 86
responsibility was to choose the officers, the court in this case ruled that the proceedings
before it could not be considered quasi-judicial.

In addition, the idea of natural justice can be defined as "judicial fairness in decision-
making," with the goal of securing justice or avoiding injustice. The two maxims "Audi
alteram partem" and "Nemo judex in causa sua" form the foundation of the principle.

The legal principle known as "Audi alteram Partem" basically states that “no one can be
condemned or punished by the court without having a fair opportunity to be heard.”

“Nemo judex in causa sua” translates to "No one should be a judge in his own
case" because it promotes bias. Bias is a behaviour that causes unfair response to a specific
case.

As a result, an administrative decision may have a bigger impact than a judicial one. As in
this instance, a biassed decision made without applying the principles of natural justice would
have had a negative impact on the careers of the officers who were not chosen. In such cases,
the rule of law would be established by keeping administrative actions out of the reach of the
rules of justice. Hence in conclusion it is observed that "No authority can absolve itself from
the liability to act in a lawful manner".

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