Rule 110
Prosecution of Offenses
Section 1. Institution of criminal actions. — Criminal actions shall be instituted as
follows:
(a) For offenses where a preliminary investigation is required pursuant to section 1 of
Rule 112, by filing the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose of conducting
the requisite preliminary investigation.
(b) For all other offenses, by filing the complaint or information directly with the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, or the complaint with the
office of the prosecutor. In Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint shall be
filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running period of prescription
of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws. (1a)
Section 2. The Complaint or information. — The complaint or information shall be in
writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who
appear to be responsible for the offense involved. (2a)
Section 3. Complaint defined. — A complaint is a sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other
public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. (3)
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in writing charging
a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. (4a)
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced
by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended
party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law
violated may prosecute the case. This authority cease upon actual intervention of the
prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. (This Section
was repealed by A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC effective May 1, 2002)
The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both alive, nor, in any case, if the
offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by any of them. If the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before
she can file the complaint, and she has no known parents, grandparents or guardian,
the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution of the
offenses of seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness independently of her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing
so. Where the offended party, who is a minor, fails to file the complaint, her parents,
grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right to file the action granted to
parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be
exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the
preceding paragraph.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of the offenses
mentioned above shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint filed
by the offended party. (5a)
The prosecution for violation of special laws shall be governed by the provisions
thereof. (n)
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information. (6a)
Section 7. Name of the accused. — The complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has
been or is known. If his name cannot be ascertained, he must be described under a
fictitious name with a statement that his true name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter disclosed by him or appears in some
other manner to the court, such true name shall be inserted in the complaint or
information and record. (7a)
Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a)
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (9a)
Section 10. Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or information is
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed
or some of the essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential
element of the offense or is necessary for its identification. (10a)
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. — It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. (11a)
Section 12. Name of the offended party. — The complaint or information must state
the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has
been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described
under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
(b) If the true name of the of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause
the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any
name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without
need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with
law. (12a)
Section 13. Duplicity of the offense. — A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various
offenses. (13a)
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its
order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19,
Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (14a)
Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle
while in the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed
during such its trip, including the place of its departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of
any municipality or territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to
the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the
Revised Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first
filed. (15a)
Section 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
(16a)
Delineation of DOJ/Court authority re information -
Crespo vs Mogul - G.R. No. L-53373
Facts:
April 1977, Asst. Fiscal de Gala with approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estafa against Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a motion to defer arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Sec. of
Justice for the filing of the information; which was denied. A motion for
reconsideration was denied too in order but the arraignment was referred to August
18, 1997 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction
was filed by the accused in the CA, then CA restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding
with arraignment until further orders.
On March 22, 1978 undersecretary of justice MAcaraig reversed the resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss was then filed by the Provincial
Fiscal with the trial court attaching Macaraig's letter. On November 1978, judge
denied the motion and set arraignment.= stating that the motion thrust induce the
court to resolve the innocence of the accused on evidence not before it but on that
adduced before the undersecretary that disregards the requirements of due process
but also erodes court's independence and integrity, motion denied.
Crespo then filed a petition certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition in the CA. Praying that the decision to move
on with arraignment be reversed and set aside declaring the information filed not
valid and of no legal force and effect and to dismiss the case and declare Crespo's
obligation as purely civil.
Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by
the provincial fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case
was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment
and trial on the merits.
Ruling: Petition denied.
(1) It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal.
The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the
fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It
cannot be controlled by the complainant.
(2) However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or
control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief
state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the
Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or
opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion
to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in
Court.
(3) The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The
Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and
determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the
purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution
of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
(4) Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a
reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion
to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may
grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.
(5) It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted.
(6) The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the
same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
Pp vs Goyala - G.R. No. 224650, July 15, 2020
FACTS:
This appeal by certiorari challenges the Decision1and Resolution2 promulgated
by the Court ofAppeals (CA), it then ordered the RTC to (a) hold inabeyance
further proceedings in said case andremand the same to the prosecution for
purposesof completing the preliminary investigation; (b)revoke the
implementation of the Warrant ofArrest; and (c) continue the proceedings only
afterthe finality of the preliminary investigation andafter proper
endorsement.AAA,5 a minor, executed with the assistance of hermother a sworn
statement accusing Adolfo A.Goyala, Jr., (respondent) of statutory rape.After due
endorsement to the Office of the CityProsecutor of Pasig City (OCP-Pasig
City), thecomplaint was docketed as IS No. XV-14-INV-13F-02337 and assigned to
Assistant City ProsecutorPedro M. Oribe (ACP Oribe) as
InvestigatingProsecutor for preliminary investigation.Respondfent executed his
Counter-Affidavitinstituted a civil complaint for damages againstAAA and her
mother.Respondent filed a Petition for Suspension on theGround of Prejudicial
Question before ACP Oribe.Motion was denied in a Resolution.Oribe issued a
Resolution finding probable causeagainst respondent and recommending the
filingof an Information for Statutory Rape Respondent filed an Initial Urgent Ex-Parte
Motionfor Reconsideration and a Main Motion forReconsideration with
Motion to Disqualify ACPOribe before the OCP-Pasig City.10Respondent filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedingsand to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrant
ofArrest before the RTC.Pasig City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang issued a
1stIndorsement dated 18 December 2013 forwardingthe entire record of IS No. XV-
14-INV-13F-02337 tothe Department of Justice (DOJ) for furtherproceedings
and inhibited himself from resolvingthe Motion for Reconsideration.Justice Secretary
Leila de Lima issued DepartmentOrder No. 173 designating Senior Assistant
CityProsecutor Josefa D. Laurente (SACP Laurente) asActing Prosecutor of
Pasig City to resolve withfinality Warrant of Arrest was issued by RTCCA
declared void and set aside Orders of the RTC.ordered the RTC to hold in
abeyance furtherproceedings and remand the case to the OCP-Pasig City
for the purpose of resolving with finalitythe preliminary investigation. Ordered the
RTC toresume the proceedings in the criminal case onlyupon finality of the
preliminary investigation andafter due indorsement thereof.Respondent was
deprived of his right to a fullpreliminary investigation preparatory to the filingof
the Information against him. The proceedingsbefore the RTC should be held in
abeyance untilcompletion of the preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent should be arraigned
RULING:
A person's rights in a preliminary investigation aresubject to the limitations of
procedural law. Theserights are statutory, not constitutional. In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the 60-day period provided under Sec. 11(c), Rule 116 ofthe 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure hadalready lapsed. Thus, there is no
longer anyreason to hold in abeyance the criminalproceedings in the case
for statutory rape againstrespondent.60-day limitation in Sec. 11(c), Rule 116
is notmerely directoryIn Samson v. Judge Daway, the Court explainedthat
while the pendency of a petition for review isa ground for suspension of the
arraignment, theaforecited provision limits the deferment of thearraignment to
a period of 60 days reckoned fromthe filing of the petition with the reviewing office.It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration ofsaid period, the trial court is
bound to arraign theaccused or to deny the motion to deferarraignment.In
Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, it was heldthat while rules of procedure
are liberallyconstrued, the provisions on reglementary periodsare strictly applied,
indispensable as they are tothe prevention of needless delays, and
arenecessary to the orderly and speedy discharge ofjudicial business. After all, rules
of procedure donot exist for the convenience of the litigants, andthey are not to be
trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience of invoking
"substantialjustice." Relaxation or suspension of proceduralrules, or the
exemption of a case from theiroperation, is warranted only by
compellingreasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.The pending Motion
for Reconsiderationquestioning the finding of probable cause wasresolved
against respondent in an Undated Order.The petition was filed on October 5,
2015.56Obviously, the 60-day period had long expired andtrial must proceed in due
course.Hence, given the fact that the period has expiredand regardless of the status
of the appeal beforethe DOJ, the court has no discretion but to proceedwith the
arraignment. ORDERS the RTC to continue with the proceedingsin Criminal Case.
Prescription-
PP vs Pangilinan G.R. No. 152662
Facts:
Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9
checks with the aggregate amount of P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But,
upon Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored. So, on Sept.
16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against
Pangilinan.
On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Later, Pangilinan
also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground
of Prejudicial Question".
On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended
Pangilinan's petition which was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ.
On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution
of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22
in connection with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks, the charges involving the
other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov.
18, 1999, were filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon
City.
On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31,
Quezon City, alleging that the criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of
prescription. The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC
reversed the decision of the MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet
prescribed "considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings
having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997".
Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was
referred to the CA "for appropriate action".
On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the filing of the informations.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP
Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.
Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22
cases, “[v]iolations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:… after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years.” Under
Section 2 of the same Act, “[t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February
2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed
by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground
of “prejudicial question”. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after
the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after
the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg.
22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
Jadewell vs Lidua G.R. No. 169588
FACTS:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City
Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to
render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is
illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru its General Manager Norma
Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and Renato B. Dulay alleged in their
affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto
Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the
left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin
Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and unattended at a Loading and
Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell which was allegedly
forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00. The fines of P500.00 for illegal
parking and the declamping fee of P500.00 were also not paid by the respondents
herein.
Jadewell filed two cases against respondents for Robbery it was filed with the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. A preliminary investigation
took place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a case
charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's employees with
Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion.
On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003.
Respondent Benedicto Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel
Paterno Aquino filed on January 20, 2004 a Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation[8]
on February 2, 2004.
In an Order[10] dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua, Sr.,
Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, granted the
accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on February 27, 2004 responding to the February 10, 2004 Order.
Respondents argued that in Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial proceedings. Thus, this
Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor was not a judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from
the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two
months after on July 7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court on October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the cases.
The RTC of Baguio City, Branch 7 favored the respondents. In a Decision dated April
20, 2005, the RTC of Baguio City Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva,
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was denied
by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.
ISSUE:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against
respondents Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
HELD:
The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive law and
the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With regard to the
prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for
any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No
other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide
any other distinction. Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does
not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In
resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted.
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two
months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of
the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of
the prescription period.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an
ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v.
Reyes. In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal
also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that case, the offense
was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and
the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2,
1990.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information
shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or
preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the
case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed
in court and not on any date before that.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling
the prescription period.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr.
did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According
to the Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors,
an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as: SEC. 5. Information. - An
information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed
by the prosecutor, and filed with the court. The information need not be placed under
oath by the prosecutor signing the same.
Republic vs Desierto - G.R. No. 136506, January 16, 2023
Doctrine:
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be
discovered is readily available to the Public the general rule applies. Prescription
shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime
Facts:
On February 12, 1990, Petitioner Republic filed the subject Complaint against
respondents for violation of RA 3019 relative to the MOA dated November 20, 1974,
entered by the government with Agricultural Investors, Inc. (All) to implement the vital
purpose of PD 582, i.e., to produce precocious high-yielding hybrid seednuts.The
Republic averred that respondent t Cojuangco, Jr took advantage of his close
relationship with then President Marcos for his own personal and business interests
through the issuance of favorable decrees.The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint
on the grounds of prescription.
Issue:
Whether or not the offense already prescribed
Ruling:
No, the offense is not yet prescribed.The Supreme Court has held that evaluation of
jurisprudence reveals the following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning
point for the period of prescription of violations of RA 3019:1. As a general rule,
prescription begins to run from the date· of the commission of the offense. 2. If the
date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted from the date
of discovery thereof. 3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception
that should apply ina particular case, the availability or suppression of the information
relative to the crime should first be determined. If the necessary information, data, or
records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the
Public the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the
commission of the crime. Otherwise should martial law prevent the filing thereof or
should information about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance,
then the exception
Sufficiency of information –
Pp vs Valdez - G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
Facts:
The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established
facts and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms,
had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller
of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the
accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises approached to pacify
them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na kita?; that
immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises,
causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen
Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin
shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the
third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito
fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were apparently fired
from short distances.
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC
convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim actual
damages, civil indemnity, and moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the
modification of damages.
The two accused then came to the SC on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin
Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10,
2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated.
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three
counts of murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal
as maximum.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a letter which he pleaded for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground
that the judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.
Issue:
Whether the accused Edwin Valdez is entitled to the appealed judgment?
Held:
Yes, based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which relevantly
provides which provides the Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – An appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
the latter.
Although it is only the appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-
established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case
open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The
records show that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons.
However, Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal
taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to
the latter.”
Authority of officer-
Villagomez vs People - G.R. No. 216824
FACTS
The police operatives arrested the petitioner and a complaint against her was filed on
corruption of public officials under the Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code. The
same complaint inquest by the office of the City Prosecutor of Makati. Sometime on
September 21, 2010, a resolution was issued by the OCP of Makati City finding
probable cause that the petitioner might have offered P10,000.00 to both PO2 Ronnie
Aseboque in exchange for the release of her companion Cabillo and was filed by the
prosecutor. RTC dismissed and ordered the jail warden for the release of BJMP
Makati to release the petitioner. This was declared by the RTC as submitted for
decision after both parties had finished presenting their respective evidence. RTC, 2
years after issued an order without any motion from either parties the release of the
accused as the prosecutor did lack jurisdiction the case thus RTC ruled to dismiss the
case and released the accused from BJMP. Aggrieved with the result the prosecution
filed a motion for reconsideration as the RTC misappreciated the record and
misinterpreted the law as OCP’s resolution was not only signed by the city prosecutor
Aspi himself but also contained his approval for filing of the information which the
RTC denied. CA then reversed the ruling of RTC and issued a warrant for arrest. The
petitioner the filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied thus it was brought
before the supreme court.
ISSUE
Whether or not the criminal information submitted by prosecution lacked authority
RULING
No, there is no law that requires that an Information filed must be signed by the
provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor in order for trial courts to acquire jurisdiction
over a criminal case. The ruling in Villa vs. Ibanez which states that the absence of
the signature of a city, provincial, or chief state prosecutor results in a jurisdictional
defect is unconstitutional. Only a law may confer jurisdiction to courts of law. Once
jurisdiction is conferred, the jurisdiction does not cease simply because the
prosecutor who filed the Information had no authority. At worst, the absence of
authority on the part of the prosecutor who filed the Information only gives rise to a
question on his standing in court.
Private Crimes -
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera G.R. No. 80116
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private
respondent Erich Geiling (Geiling), a German national, in Germany. Geiling obtained
a divorce in a German court on the ground of failure of marriage.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two
complaints for adultery against petitioner alleging that, she had an affair with two
different men while their marriage subsisted.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify
as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree prior to the filing of the
criminal complaint. However, the said motion was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery
after obtaining a divorce decree
HELD:
No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after
obtaining a divorce decree.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders. Where, however, proceedings have been properly
commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the
prosecution of the criminal proceedings.
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing
to commence the adultery case.
Amendments -
Pacoy vs Cajigal - G.R. No. 157472 -- DONE
FACTS:
An Information for Homicide was filed before the RTC against petitioner SSGT. Jose
M. Pacoy committed by wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shooting his commanding
officer which caused the latter’s instantaneous death. The aggravating circumstance
of disregard of rank was alleged in said Information. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged. After the arraignment, respondent Judge Cajigal issued an order
directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view
of the aggravating circumstance alleged therein. Consequently, the prosecutor
entered his amendment by writing the word Murder instead of Homicide in the
caption and in the opening paragraph. The accusatory portion, however, remained
the same as that of the original Information. At the scheduled date for pre-trial
conference and trial, counsel for petitioner objected to be re-arraigned for the crime
of Murder on the ground that the petitioner would be placed in double jeopardy,
considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express consent.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy but was denied
by the respondent judge. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to inhibit with
attached motion for reconsideration. Respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit
but granted the motion for reconsideration. As a result of such grant, the original
information for homicide was reinstated. Hence, the present petition, seeking to annul
and set aside the orders issued by the judge denying the motion to quash and
reinstating the original information for murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the amendment of information was tantamount to acquittal and placed the
petitioner in double jeopardy.
RULING:
No because petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated
his case for homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an
acquittal, is misplaced. For the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it
must have the effect of acquittal. The respondent judge's Order was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon
the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the
last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner confuses the
effects of amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 with Section 19,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. In determining whether there should be an
amendment or a substitution of information, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is
sufficient. Otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct
and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. In the present case,
the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. A reading of the
Information shows that the only change made was in the caption of the case and in
the opening paragraph, with the crossing out of word Homicide and its replacement
by the word Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the
offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments
in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged
in the original Information for Homicide. Thus, we find that the amendment made in
the caption and preamble from Homicide to Murder as purely formal. Evidently, the
last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is
wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a
crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which
case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information
charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information,
which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first information. Homicide is necessarily included in the
crime of murder. Thus, the respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the
Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. Finally, a reading of the
Order granting petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the respondent judge granted
said motion not on the ground that double jeopardy exists but on his realization that
disregard of rank is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the
killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the
original Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not present, considering that
petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
Pp vs Reyes - G.R. No. L-32557-- DONE
Teehanke vs Madayag - G.R. No. 103102- DONE
Facts:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against
Claudio Teehankee Jr. allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence, but before the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private
prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file the amended information.
The amended information filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.
The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information contending the lack of
a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered the plea of "not guilty"
be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The
petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceedings
because of the legal issue raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to
represent the petitioner.
The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent
judge's admittance of the amended information, and to compel the judge to order
preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.
Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be admitted.
Held: Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion
of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119,
Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely
of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might
impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; 13 (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume;
and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the
accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the
execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the
latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as
qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in
both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and
proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the
informations filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the
essential elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential
ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the
original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the
nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of
the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we
hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent
thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
Pp vs Delfin - G.R. No. 201572- DONE
Absorption -
PP vs Arenas - G.R. No. 213598- DONE
PP vs Manansala - G.R. No. 175939- DONE
Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedro - G.R. No. 172716
Facts:
Sometime in August of 2004, petitioner Ivler encountered a vehicular collision where
he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City two offenses – 1.
Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property; and 2. Reckless
imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries which was scheduled for arraignment
on different dates, the latter earlier than the former. On 7 September 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence which quashal was refused
by the Honorable trial court.
Issue:
Whether the conviction on the first offense of a lesser penalty constitutes double
jeopardy on the other.
Held:
Yes. Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for
that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or
negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious
result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no
more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.

Morales vs Pp - G.R. No. 240337. January 04, 2022

Austria vs AAA and BBB - G.R. No. 205275. June 28, 2022