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Promises, promises…
Our leaders have made a huge number of human rights commitments on
our behalf! If every guarantee that they had signed up to were to be met,
our lives would be peaceful, secure, healthy and comfortable; our legal
systems would be fair and would offer everyone the same protection; and
our political processes would be transparent and democratic and would
serve the interests of the people.
So what is going wrong? One of the small things that is going wrong is that
politicians are like the rest of us and will often take short cuts if they can get
away with it! So we need to know exactly what promises have been made
on our behalf and to start making sure that they are kept.
Question: Do you always do what you have said you will do? Even if no
one reminds you?
We know that we are entitled to have all human rights respected. The
UDHR, the ECHR and other treaties cover a wide range of different rights,
so we shall look at them in the order in which they were developed and
were recognised regionally or by the international community. The most
established way of classifying these rights is into 'first, second and third
generation' rights, so we shall follow this for the time being but, as we shall
see, such a classification has limited use and can even be misleading at
times. These categories, after all, are not clear-cut. They simply constitute
one way – amongst many – of classifying the different rights. Most rights
fall under more than one category. The right to express one's opinion, for
example, is both a civil and a political right. It is essential to participation in
political life as well as being fundamental to our personal liberty.
During the Cold War, the countries of the Soviet block were severely
criticised for their disregard of civil and political rights. These countries
responded by criticising the western democracies, in turn, for ignoring key
social and economic rights, which we shall look at next. There was at least
an element of truth in both criticisms. It also illustrates how human rights
are prone to political abuse
These rights concern how people live and work together and the basic
necessities of life. They are based on the ideas of equality and guaranteed
access to essential social and economic goods, services, and
opportunities. They became increasingly a subject of international
recognition with the effects of early industrialisation and the rise of a
working class. These led to new demands and new ideas about the
meaning of a life of dignity. People realised that human dignity required
more than the minimal lack of interference from the state as proposed by
the civil and political rights. Social, economic and cultural rights are outlined
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) and also in the European Social Charter of the Council of
Europe.
Social, economic and cultural rights are based on the ideas of equality and
guaranteed access to essential social and economic goods, services, and
opportunities.
These additions have been a result of a number of factors: they have partly
come about as a response to changing ideas about human dignity, and
partly as a result of new threats and opportunities emerging. In the case of
the specific new category of rights that have been proposed as third
generation rights, these have been the consequence of a deeper
understanding of the different types of obstacles that may stand in the way
of realising the first and second generation rights.
The idea at the basis of the third generation of rights is that of solidarity;
and the rights embrace collective rights of society or peoples, such as the
right to sustainable development, to peace or to a healthy environment. In
much of the world, conditions such as extreme poverty, war, ecological and
natural disasters have meant that there has been only very limited progress
in respect of human rights. For that reason, many people have felt that the
recognition of a new category of human rights is necessary: these rights
would ensure the appropriate conditions for societies, particularly in the
developing world, to be able to provide the first and second generation
rights that have already been recognised.
The specific rights that are most commonly included within the category of
third generation rights are the rights to development, to peace, to a healthy
environment, to share in the exploitation of the common heritage of
mankind, to communication and humanitarian assistance.
There has, however, been some debate concerning this category of rights.
Some experts object to the idea of these rights because they are ‘collective
rights', in the sense of being held by communities or even whole states.
They argue that human rights can only be held by individuals. The
argument is more than merely verbal, because some people fear such a
change in terminology could provide a "justification" for certain repressive
regimes to deny (individual) human rights in the name of these collective
human rights; for example, severely curtailing civil rights in order to secure
"economic development".
There is another concern which is sometimes expressed: since it is not the
state but the international community that is meant to safeguard third
generation rights, accountability is impossible to guarantee. Who, or what,
is supposed to be responsible for making sure that there is peace in the
Caucasus or the Middle East, or that the Amazonian rainforest is not
destroyed and that appropriate measures are taken against climate
change?
Social and economic rights had a difficult time being accepted on an equal
level with civil and political rights, for reasons which are both ideological
and political. Although it seems evident to the ordinary citizen that such
things as a minimum standard of living, housing, and reasonable conditions
of employment are all essential to human dignity, politicians have not
always been so ready to acknowledge this. One reason is undoubtedly that
ensuring basic social and economic rights for everyone worldwide would
require a massive redistribution of resources. Politicians are well aware that
that is not the type of policy that wins votes.
Such politicians therefore suggest that second generation rights are
different to first generation civil and political rights. The first claim often
made is that social and economic rights are neither realistic nor realisable,
at least in the short term, and that we should move towards them only
gradually. This is the approach that has been taken in the ICESCR:
governments only need to show that they are taking measures towards
meeting these aims at some point in the future. The claim, however, is
certainly open to dispute and appears to be based more on political
considerations than anything else. Many independent studies show that
there are sufficient resources in the world, and sufficient expertise, to
ensure that everyone's basic needs could be met if a concerted effort was
made.
A second claim is that there is a fundamental theoretical difference
between first and second generation rights: that the first type of rights
require governments only to refrain from certain activities (these are so-
called "negative" rights); while the second require positive intervention from
governments (these are "positive" rights). The argument states that it is not
realistic to expect governments to take positive steps, for example to
provide food for everyone, and that they are therefore not obliged to do so.
Without any obligation on anyone's part, there can be no right in any
meaningful sense of the word.
However, there are two basic misunderstandings in this line of reasoning.
Firstly, civil and political rights are by no means purely negative. In order,
for example, for a government to guarantee freedom from torture, it is not
enough just for government officials to refrain from torturing people!
Genuine freedom in this area often requires a system of checks and
controls to be put in place: policing systems, legal mechanisms, freedom of
information and access to places of detention – and more besides. The
same goes for securing the right to vote and for all other civil and political
rights. In other words, these rights require positive action by the
government in addition to refraining from negative action.
Secondly, social and economic rights, just like civil and political rights, also
require that governments refrain from certain activities: for example, from
giving large tax breaks to companies, or encouraging development in
regions that already possess a relative advantage, or imposing trade tariffs
which penalise developing countries – and so on.
Question: What positive action does a government need to authorise in
order to ensure genuinely free and fair elections?
In actual fact, the different types of rights are far more closely connected
with each other than their labels suggest. Economic rights merge into
political rights; civil rights are often undistinguishable from social rights. The
labels can be useful in giving a broad picture but they can also be very
misleading. Many rights can fall into either category and rights from one
category may depend in their realisation on the fulfilment of rights in
another category.
It is therefore fitting to recall the understanding captured in the 1993 Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, in which paragraph 5 recognises
that:
Another area where new rights are being acknowledged is in health and
medical science. New scientific discoveries have opened up a number of
questions relating to ethics and human rights, in particular in the fields of
genetic engineering, and concerning the transplant of organs and tissues.
Questions on the very nature of life have had to be addressed as a result of
technical advances in each of these fields.
The Council of Europe responded to some of these challenges with a new
international treaty: The 1997 Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of
Biology and Medicine ("Oviedo Convention"). This convention has been
signed by 30 member states of the Council of Europe and ratified by ten. It
sets out guidelines for some of the problematic issues raised in the
previous section.
Promises, promises
What are our Rights?
The advance of science
CHAPTERS
Contents
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(Top)
First-generation human rights
Second-generation human rights
Third-generation human rights
Fourth generation
Commentary
See also
Notes
Tools
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Rights
Theoretical distinctions
Human rights
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Accused
Animals
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Humans
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Kings
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Civil liberties
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Fair trial
Food
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Repair
Reproductive
Rest and leisure
Self defense
Self-determination of people
Sexuality
Speech
Water and sanitation
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e
The division of human rights into three generations was initially proposed in 1979 by
the Czech jurist Karel Vasak at the International Institute of Human
Rights in Strasbourg. He used the term at least as early as November 1977.[1] Vasak's
theories have primarily taken root in European law.
In a speech two years later, his divisions follow the three watchwords of the French
Revolution: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.[2] The three generations are reflected in some of
the rubrics of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.[citation needed] While
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists first- and second-generation rights, the
document itself does not specifically order them in accordance with Vasak's framework.
Commentary[edit]
Maurice Cranston argued that scarcity means that supposed second-generation and
third-generation rights are not really rights at all.[23] If one person has a right, others have
a duty to respect that right, but governments lack the resources necessary to fulfill the
duties implied by citizens' supposed second- and third-generation rights.
Charles Kesler, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and senior
fellow of the Claremont Institute, has argued that second- and third-generation human
rights serve as an attempt to cloak political goals, which the majority may well agree are
good things in and of themselves, in the language of rights, and thus grant those
political goals inappropriate connotations. In his opinion, calling socio-economic goods
"rights" inherently creates a related concept of "duties", so that other citizens have to be
coerced by the government to give things to other people in order to fulfill these new
rights. He also has stated that, in the U.S., the new rights create a "nationalization" of
political decision-making at the federal level in violation of federalism.[24] In his book Soft
Despotism, Democracy's Drift, Paul Rahe, professor at Hillsdale College, wrote that
focusing on equality-based rights leads to a subordination of the initial civil rights to an
ever-expanding government, which would be too incompetent to provide for its citizens
correctly and would merely seek to subordinate more rights.[25]
19th century philosopher Frederic Bastiat summarized the conflict between
these negative and positive rights by saying:
M. de Lamartine wrote me one day: "Your doctrine is only the half of my program; you
have stopped at liberty; I go on to fraternity." I answered him: "The second half of your
program will destroy the first half." And, in fact, it is quite impossible for me to separate
the word "fraternity" from the word "voluntary". It is quite impossible for me to conceive
of fraternity as legally enforced, without liberty being legally destroyed, and justice being
legally trampled underfoot.[26]
Economist Friedrich Hayek has argued that the second generation concept of "social
justice" cannot have any practical political meaning:
No state of affairs as such is just or unjust: it is only when we assume that somebody is
responsible for having brought it about ... In the same sense, a spontaneously working
market, where prices act as guides to action, cannot take account of what people in any
sense need or deserve, because it creates a distribution which nobody has designed,
and something which has not been designed, a mere state of affairs as such, cannot be
just or unjust. And the idea that things ought to be designed in a "just" manner means,
in effect, that we must abandon the market and turn to a planned economy in which
somebody decides how much each ought to have, and that means, of course, that we
can only have it at the price of the complete abolition of personal liberty. [27]
New York University School of Law professor of law Jeremy Waldron has written in
response to critics of the second-generation rights:
In any case, the argument from first-generation to second-generation rights was never
supposed to be a matter of conceptual analysis. It was rather this: if one is really
concerned to secure civil or political liberty for a person, that commitment should be
accompanied by a further concern about the conditions of the person's life that make it
possible for him to enjoy and exercise that liberty. Why on earth would it be worth
fighting for this person's liberty (say, his liberty to choose between A and B) if he were
left in a situation in which the choice between A and B meant nothing to him, or in which
his choosing one rather than the other would have no impact on his life?"[28]
Hungarian socialist and political economist Karl Polanyi made the antithetical argument
to Hayek in the book The Great Transformation. Polanyi wrote that an uncontrolled free
market would lead to repressive economic concentration and then to a co-opting of
democratic governance that degrades civil rights.[29]
The World Conference on Human Rights in 1993 opposed the distinction between civil
and political rights (negative rights) and economic, social and cultural rights (positive
rights) that resulted in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action proclaiming that
"all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated".[30]