EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING ASSESSMENT

CASE ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT

ILS LAW COLLEGE, PUNE

I-LLB, 2o23-24

SUBJECT- LAW OF CRIMES (IPC)

MANSHEKA KAR
DIVISION- 'A'
ROLL NO.- 6037

26-DECEMBER-2023
 CASE ANALYSIS ASSESSMENT

TOPIC - SECTION- 100 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE

WHEN THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE OF THE BODY EXTENDS TO
CAUSING DEATH.

INTRODUCTION
In situations where the machinery of the state is unavailable to the citizens for
Self-Defence against imminent danger, individuals are permitted to employ
force to avert such threats. This entitlement, recognised as the right of private
defence of the body, is codified under section 96-106 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC).
However, the exercise of the right is contingent upon justifiable circumstances
and is not absolute. Section 99 of the IPC imposes limitations on the right of
private defence, specifying that it cannot be invoked when ample time exists to
seek assistance from public authorities. Additionally, the right cannot be
asserted against a public servant acting in good faith within the bounds of a
legal duty, unless reasonable apprehension is provoked. Moreover, the force
used must be exceed what is necessary to repel the impending threat. Section
100 of the IPC further delineates circumstances where the right of private
defence extends to causing the death of threatening individual. To avail this
right, there must be reasonable apprehension of potential death or grievous
harm, particularly in cases of assault with intent to commit rape, abduction,
wrongful confinement, or when there is a threat of throwing or attempting to
throw acid.
Although the law permits causing death in specific instances of private defence,
it safeguards against excessive use of force. The right is only applicable when
the danger or threat is imminent, and the force employed must be proportionate
to the peril.
In this project, I will be analysing the case of Vishwanath V. The State of
Uttar Pradesh (1960)1SCR 646: AIR 1960 SC 67, with a particular focus on
Section 97 and Section 100 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). And Deo Narain V.
The State of Uttar Pradesh. 1973 AIR 473 SCR (3) 57 SCC (1)347, with
particular focus on section 100 and section 102 of Indian Penal code (IPC).
 CASE -1
VISHWANATH V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, 1960
PETITIONER:
VISHWANATH
VS.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CITAION: (1960) 1 SCR 646: AIR 1960 SC 67
DELIVERED ON: September 3, 1959
BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N IMAM, SYED JAFFER

ACT: Criminal Trial-Right of Private defence-When extends to

causing death-Whether mere abduction which is not Punishable
gives right of private defence to cause death of abductor--
Husband trying to take away wife forcibly from her father's
house-Wife's brother stabbing husband and killing him-If
protected by right of private defence-Indian Penal Code,
1860 (XLV of 1860), ss. 97, 99 and 100.

FACTS OF THE CASE

 Gopal, the deceased individual, was married to the sister of the appellant.
 The appellant and his father, Badri, lived in a railway quarter in Gorakhpur, while
Gopal's sister was married to Banarsi, residing in another nearby railway quarter.
 Due to strained familial relations, Gopal moved to Banarsi's residence about 15 days
before the incident on June 11, 1953.
 Gopal's wife continued to live with her father, and Gopal desired to reunite with her.
 A dispute between the appellant and Gopal regarding the wife occurred on June 11,
1953, at around 10 p.m.
 The appellant returned to his quarter, and Gopal sought assistance from Banarsi's
sons to retrieve his wife.
 Banarsi and his sons, along with Gopal, went to Badri's residence to bring back the
girl.
 Badri refused to allow the girl to return with her husband, and a struggle ensued as
Gopal tried to take her away.
  The appellant, present during the struggle, retrieved a knife from his pocket and
stabbed Gopal, resulting in his collapse.
 Attempts to resuscitate Gopal were futile, and he succumbed to his injuries on the
way to the hospital.
 The Sessions Judge acquitted Badri of abetment, considering he had only suggested
physical admonishment.
 The appellant was acquitted by the Sessions Judge, justifying his actions as private
defense against an assault on his sister with intent to abduct.
 Dissatisfied with the acquittal, the State appealed to the High Court.
 The High Court affirmed Badri's acquittal but overturned the appellant's acquittal,
citing that the intentional causing of death exceeded permissible limits.
 Relying on precedent, the High Court convicted the appellant under Section 304 Part
II of the Penal Code, sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment.
 Despite the denial of a certificate for appeal, the appellant sought special leave from
the Supreme Court, which was granted.

ISSUES RAISED

WHETHER APPELLANT HAD EXCEEDED RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE OF

PERSON?

JUDGEMENT
The court determined that the appellant administered a singular strike with a knife, which
happened to be in his possession at the time. Regrettably, the blow landed directly in the
heart, resulting in the demise of Gopal. However, in light of the fact that the appellant
delivered only one blow with an ordinary knife, and considering that the outcome could have
been non-fatal with a slight deviation in trajectory, it is asserted that the appellant did not
inflict more harm than requisite for the purpose of defence. This perspective aligns with the
precedent set forth in Amjad Khan v. The State, emphasizing that such matters are not to be
scrutinized with excessive precision or an overly meticulous standard. Consequently, the
court allowed the appeal, affirming that the appellant was entitled to the right of private
defence of person under the fifth clause of Section 100, and that he did not cause more harm
than was necessary. As a result, the appellant was acquitted.

CRITICAL ANAYLYSIS OF THE CASE

Section 100 is applicable in the present matter: - The right of Private Defence of the body
extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last preceding section, to the voluntary
causing of death or of any other harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the
exercise of the right be of any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:
  Firstly- Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
 Secondly- Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
 Thirdly- An assault with the intention of committing rape;
 Fourthly- An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
 Fifthly- An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
 Sixthly- An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person under
circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will be unable
to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
 Seventhly- An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or
administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt will
otherwise be the consequence of such act.
Appellant got relief under paragraph four of Section 100 because the deceased was dragging
his sister, and this amounts to assault under Section 352. Also, the intention of the deceased
was to commit Abduction because the deceased was compelling the sister of appellant by
force to leave that place.
In Clause (5) of Section 100, the Right to Private Defence is delineated, specifically in cases
involving "an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting." The clause activates the
right the moment there is an assault with a clear intention of abduction, without requiring
consideration of further intentions outlined in Sections 364-369 of the Indian Penal Code.
The essence of Clause (5) focuses on an assault with the specific intention of abducting,
emphasizing the straightforward application of the clause without necessitating an additional
assessment of the abductor's intentions beyond the act of abduction itself.
The Right to Private Defence, as per Section 100, extends to causing death of the aggressor
but is subject to restrictions under Section 99. Section 99 restricts the exercise of this right,
stating that the infliction of harm should not exceed what is necessary for defensive purposes.
The determination of whether an accused has exceeded these bounds is a factual inquiry, as
seen in the case of George Dominic Varkey v. State of Kerela.
On June 11th, Gopal sought assistance from Banarsi's sons to retrieve his wife. In the ensuing
events, Badri resisted the return of the girl, leading to a struggle between Gopal and his wife.
The appellant, present at the scene, used a knife to inflict a single stab on Gopal, causing his
collapse.
The deceased was compelling his wife, the appellant's sister, to accompany him against her
will. Considering Section 100, expecting a person under forceful abduction to contemplate
the abductor's further malicious intent is inappropriate in self-defense. The appellant's single
blow, while fatal, is argued not to have exceeded the necessary force for Private Defence
under Section 99.
The law recognizes that individuals facing imminent threats may not calculate precise force,
permitting a defender to extend their right of Private Defence beyond what might be deemed
necessary with a composed mind. In this case, the appellant's right of Private Defence
extended to using force resulting in death to protect his sister from an assault with the intent
of forceful abduction.

OPINION
The Vishwanath case underscores the court's commitment to a nuanced understanding of self-defence
laws. It particularly highlights the importance of Sections 97, 99, and 100 of the IPC, providing a
comprehensive framework for evaluating acts of self-defence leading to fatal outcomes.
By delving into the circumstances surrounding the attempted abduction, where a brother intervenes
fatally to protect his sister from a forceful husband, the court takes a careful approach. It examines
factors such as the immediacy of the threat faced by the sister, the singular use of force by the
appellant, and the absence of alternative means to prevent abduction.
In recognizing the contextual nature of self-defence cases, the court sets a precedent that
acknowledges the delicate interplay of necessity and proportionality. This ensures a safeguard against
arbitrary use of force while upholding the fundamental right to protect oneself or others from
imminent harm.
Ultimately, the Vishwanath case serves as a testament to the judiciary's role in ensuring justice and
fairness in situations where individuals are compelled to act in self-defence. It establishes a balanced
and principled interpretation of the law, providing valuable guidance for future cases that involve the
intricate dynamics of self-defence, immediate threat, and proportionate use of force. The ruling
reaffirms the importance of upholding legal principles while recognizing the complexity of real-world
scenarios.
 CASE -2
DEO NARAIN V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, 1960
PETITIONER:
DEO NARAIN
VS.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CITAION: 1973 AIR 473 1973 SCR (3) 57 1973 SCC (1) 347
DELIVERED ON: 11/12/1972
BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. ALAGIRISWAMI, A. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
ACT: Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), Ss. 100 and 102-Right of private defence-Scope
of.

FACTS OF THE CASE

 There was some dispute regarding the possession of certain plots of land in the
village Baruara of District Ghazipur, Uttar Pradesh.
 Various legal cases were filed by the rival parties with respect to the title and
possession of the said plot of land.
 There was a clash between the appellant and complainant parties.
 In this clash the appellant inflicted a fatal spear injury on the deceased.
o The deceased had received one lacerated wound on the right side of his skull
and one incised wound on the left shoulder with a punctured wound. The last
injury was responsible for his death.
 The trial court had acquitted the accused persons of the charges as it was concluded
after appraising the evidence that the accused persons had right of private
defence and that they were justified in exercising that right.
o According to the trial Court the complainant's party had actually gone to the
plots in question for the purpose of preventing the accused persons from
cultivating and sloughing the said land.
 The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed against the acquittal of the accused persons to
the High Court of Allahabad where the HC convicted the appellant of an offence
under Section 304 India Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and sentenced him to rigorous
imprisonment for five years.
 ISSUES RAISED

WHETHER THE PETITIONER EXCEEDED THE RIGHT OF DEFENSE?

WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS JUSTIFIED IN USING THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE

DEFENSE BY SPEAR FOR INJURY CAUSED BY LATHI?

JUDGEMENT
The appeal centered on the claim that the High Court wrongly convicted Deo Narain,
contending that he had exceeded his right of private defence. The Supreme Court underscored
the principles in Sections 100 and 102 of the Indian Penal Code, asserting that the right of
private defence arises at the reasonable apprehension of danger and lasts as long as the threat
persists.
It emphasized the preventive nature of this right, aimed at safeguarding against anticipated
unlawful aggression. The Court rejected the High Court's distinction between a lathi and a
spear, stating it as misconceived and unsupported by Section 100, IPC. The judgment
criticized the unrealistic expectation imposed by the High Court on individuals facing
aggression to make precise decisions about the force used during intense conflicts.
The Court concluded that the appellant had the right of private defence as soon as he
reasonably apprehended danger to his body, allowing him to use adequate force against the
wrongful aggressor. Finding a clear miscarriage of justice in the High Court's decision, the
Supreme Court acquitted Deo Narain, reinstating a fair and just application of the law. The
judgment clarified the principles governing the right of private defence, emphasizing its
preventive nature and rejecting unrealistic expectations in evaluating the use of force during
moments of aggression.

CRITICAL ANAYLYSIS OF THE CASE

The Deo Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh case unravels a narrative of intricate legal challenges
against the backdrop of a longstanding land dispute. The clash between the appellant and the
complainant parties, resulting in a fatal spear injury, adds layers of complexity to the evaluation
of the right of private defence. The trial court's acquittal, rooted in the finding that the accused
legitimately exercised their right to defend against an anticipated threat, frames the initial legal
landscape.

The subsequent appeal to the High Court introduces a divergence in interpretation, leading to the
appellant's conviction. The crux of the matter revolves around the accusation that the appellant
exceeded the right of private defence, specifically by employing a spear in response to injuries
caused by a lathi. The Supreme Court's intervention injects a critical analysis, emphasizing the
preventive nature of the right of private defence as enshrined in Sections 100 and 102 of the IPC.
The Court dismisses distinctions between weapons, highlighting the unrealistic expectations
placed on individuals grappling with aggression.
In my analysis, the Supreme Court's nuanced approach is a judicious calibration of legal
principles and real-world complexities. The acknowledgment of the unpredictable nature of
human reactions in heightened conflicts underscores the Court's cognizance of the challenges
faced by individuals. By rejecting artificial weapon-based distinctions, the Court aligns its
interpretation with the practicalities of threat perception during intense confrontations.

The Deo Narain case, in my view, transcends its immediate legal implications. It becomes a
jurisprudential landmark, steering the course towards a more human-centric understanding of
self-defence claims. The judgment's emphasis on realistic assessments and the rejection of rigid
expectations recognizes the inherent difficulty individuals face when navigating volatile
situations. This case not only contributes to the legal discourse on the right of private defence but
also offers a poignant reminder of the need for jurisprudence to be attuned to the intricacies of
human behavior in the face of conflict.

OPINION

The Deo Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh case presents a complex scenario involving a prolonged
land dispute that escalated into a violent clash between the appellant and the complainant parties.
The fatal spear injury inflicted by the appellant brought the legitimacy of his actions into
question. The Supreme Court's judgment offered a nuanced perspective, highlighting the
preventive nature of the right of private defence. Criticizing the High Court's distinctions between
weapons, the Court emphasized that the assessment of force's legitimacy should be based on the
perceived threat rather than the type of weapon used. An essential aspect of the opinion is the
Court's recognition of the challenges individuals face in making decisions during intense
conflicts. By rejecting unrealistic expectations, the Court acknowledged the unpredictable nature
of such situations. In my opinion, the judgment strikes a delicate balance between legal principles
and practical considerations, providing valuable guidance for future cases involving self-defence
claims amidst escalating disputes. It reinforces the importance of proportionality and immediate
threat perception in evaluating the legality of force used in self-defence.

CONCLUSION

In a nuanced legal panorama, two distinct cases, Deo Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Vishwanath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, offer compelling insights into the intricate dynamics of
the right of private defence. The Deo Narain case unfolds as a compelling legal saga woven with
complexities stemming from a prolonged land dispute. The clash between parties, culminating in
a fatal spear injury, prompts a profound examination of self-defence rights. The trial court's
acquittal, upheld by the Supreme Court, reinforces the legitimacy of the accused's actions in
anticipation of a perceived threat.

The Supreme Court's critical analysis in Deo Narain, discrediting distinctions between weapons
and emphasizing the preventive nature of the right of private defence, stands as a jurisprudential
milestone. The rejection of unrealistic expectations in evaluating human reactions during intense
conflicts demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the challenges individuals face in such
situations. This case transcends its legal ramifications, offering a human-centric perspective on
self-defence claims and guiding future considerations with a pragmatic and empathetic lens. It
reinforces the importance of proportionality, immediacy, and a realistic appraisal of
circumstances in determining the legality of force used in self-defence.

In parallel, Vishwanath v. State of Uttar Pradesh presents a scenario where a wife, facing assault
and an abduction attempt by her husband, inflicts fatal injuries in self-defence. The judicial
finding affirms that she had not exceeded the bounds of her right to private defence, aligning with
Section 100, which justifies force against an assault with the intent of abduction. The case
underscores that even if the force employed results in the assailant's death, it is deemed justified if
necessary to repel imminent danger. The accused's perception of the only viable means to prevent
her abduction, given her father's restraint and the husband's associates, validates her actions in
self-defence.

These cases collectively contribute to shaping a jurisprudence that is both empathetic and
practical in understanding self-defence claims within the intricate tapestry of human interactions
and conflicts. They highlight the evolving and contextual nature of the right of private defence,
offering a nuanced perspective that navigates the delicate balance between legal principles and
the dynamic intricacies of real-world conflicts.