Intro To Law Readings (Official)

Unit title
Law in General
Title of the Lesson
L1: Law Defined

L2: Law and Morals
L3: Law and Customs
L4: Law and its General Classifications and Nature
Duration
6 hours
Introduction
This module is intended for those students who are taking up legal management course
as a pre-law subject. In this course, we will aim to open their minds as to what do they
need to expect as students of law and a brief introduction about the legal profession.
An introduction to the Philippine Legal System, its history and sources as well as the
Philippine legal traditions. In this module, students can have a clear understanding of
the basic legal concepts and legal principles in the areas of law and legal profession.
There will also be discussions about eight bar subjects that are vital areas in the legal
profession and related doctrines and jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court.
Objective/Competencies
● To provide the students with the basic knowledge of what is law and the legal
profession;
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● To have a clear understanding of the basic legal concepts;
● To make the students familiar with the different areas of law and subjects that are
covered by it;
● To have an in-depth study of the jurisprudential rules and other legal doctrines
and principles of law
Pre-test
Answer the following questions:
1. What makes law different from morals?
2. What is meant by positive law?
3. Can you give examples of Individual or private law?
4. What makes substantive law different from procedural law?
5. The legal profession follows a set of legal principles to ensure that those admitted in the
bar follows the proper legal ethics. As students of legal management, what do you think
is the most important aspect of the legal profession?
Lesson Proper/Course Methodology
Lesson Proper
A basic understanding of the law and the legal process promotes better understanding
of society in general. Law is not a body of static rules to be obeyed by all citizens
subject to its sanctions.
Law is a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by the competent authority for the
common good of a people or nation, which constitutes an obligatory rule of conduct for
all its members-Sanchez Roman
Concept of Law:
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1. General or abstract
2. Specific sense or material sense
General/abstract:
In this sense, law has been defined as “the science of moral rules, founded on the
rational nature of man, which govern his free activity, for the realization of the individual
and social ends, of a nature both demandable and reciprocal.” (1 Sanchez Roman 3)
Briefly, it is the mass of obligatory rules established for the purpose of governing the
relations of persons in society. (1 Salvat 1-3)
Specific/ Material sense:
In this sense, law has been defined as a “juridical proposition or an aggregate of
juridical propositions, promulgated and published by the competent organs of the State
in accordance with the Constitution.” (1-I Ennecerus, Kipp & Wolf 136) It is a norm of
human conduct in social life, established by a sovereign organization and imposed for
the compulsory observance of all. (1 Ruggiero 5-6).
Foundations of Law:
Law is a product of social life and is a creation of human nature. It was intended by man
to serve man. It regulates the relations of human beings so that harmony can be
maintained in the social group, by placing restrictions on individual liberty in order to
make co-existence possible. Law, therefore, rests upon the concepts of order,
co-existence, and liberty.
Characteristics of Law:
(1) It is a rule of human conduct;

(2) Promulgated by competent authority;
(3) Obligatory, and;
(4) General observance;
ACTIVITY
Let us now try to answer some of the questions raised in our pre-test as part of our
activity for this module. Students must be able to give their own view as to what makes
law different from morals.
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Law vs. Morals:
1. Law and morals have a common ethical basis and spring from the same source –
the social conscience.
2. The law in many cases takes into account moral concepts; however, not all moral
duties have been converted into juridical obligations.
3. The field of morals is more extensive than that of law.
4. Law covers only social activities, or the relations of man to his fellow-man; but
the field of morals includes, not only the duties of man to his fellow-being, but
also those to himself and to his God.
5. The purpose of law and morals is basically the same: happiness, which cannot
exist for man, except through a permanent and stable equilibrium between
human personalities.
6. An act may be entirely in conformity with law but contrary to morals; and vice
versa, conduct may be justifiable from the point of view of morals but contrary to
law
General Divisions of Law:
1. Divine law
2. Human Law
2.1 General or Public
2.2. Individual or Private
Analysis:
Let us try to analyze what makes this classifications and sub-classifications different
from one another and be able to grasp the different concepts behind these laws.
Let us start with general or public law, it has been said that it includes the following
areas of law that we will later on be dealing in this module as part of our study:
1. Constitutional law
2. Criminal law
3. International law
4. Administrative law
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Private/Individual law:
1. Civil law
2. Mercantile law
3. Procedural law
Law, in the specific sense, is generally classified into:
1. Mandatory Law
2. Prohibitory Law
3. Permissive Law
In one sense, every law command because it is obligatory; but it commands in

three different ways:
(1) it commands that something be done, in which case it is mandatory;

(2) it commands that something should not be done, in which case it is prohibitory;
and
(3) it commands that what it permits to be done should be tolerated or respected, in
which case it is permissive. (3 Fabres 90)
Abstraction
Now that we have presented some basic legal concepts as to what laws are, its kinds
and classifications as well analysis on the distinctions between these general laws and
private laws, we will now proceed with the reason behind the codifications of these laws
and its importance in our study.
Codification
- is the systematic organization of the law into one or more codes.
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Code
- is a collection of laws of the same kind;
Body of legal provisions
-refers to a particular branch of the law.
Reason for Codification of Laws:
(1) The necessity of simplifying and arranging the many juridical rules scattered in
several laws and customs;
(2) The necessity of unifying various legislations in the same country; and
(3) The necessity of introducing reforms occasioned by social changes. (1 Ruggiero 102)
Codification in the Philippines
The first step towards codification of private law in the Philippines was taken by
President Manuel L. Quezon in 1940, when he created a Code Committee to formulate
a civil code for the Philippines. This committee was headed by Supreme Court Chief
Justice Ramon Avancena, with the following as members: Justice Jose P. Laurel,
Justice Antonio Villareal, Dr. Jorge Bocobo, and Dr. Pedro Ylagan. In June 1941,
Justiice Alex Reyes and Justice Mariano A. Albert were appointed as additional
members. The Department of Justice assigned then Judge Roberto Concepcion and
First Assistant Solicitor General Jose B.L. Reyes, now retired Chief Justice and retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, respectively as General Consultants to the
Committee.
During the military occupation of the Philippines, the Code Committee was retained as
an office in the Japanese-sponsored government. The members were reappointed on
March 12, 1942; but on June 6, 1942, former Supreme Court Justices Anacleto Diaz
and Antonio Horilleno were added as new members. Attorney Godofredo Reyes was
also appointed member on August 10, 1942, thereby increasing the membership to ten.
The Code Committee had begun its work of codification of the civil code; but its records
were destroyed in the battle for the liberation of Manila in 1945.
On March 20, 1947, by Executive Order No. 48, President Manuel A. Roxas created a
new Code Commission, composed of five members, in view of the ‘need for immediate
revision of all existing substantive laws of the Philippines and of codifying them in
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conformity with the customs, traditions and idiosyncracies of the Filipino people and with
modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law.”
The four original members appointed were: Dr. Jorge Bocobo, as chairman, and Judge
Guillermo B. Guevarra, Dr. Pedro Y. Ylagan, and Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, as
members. The present writer (Dr. Tolentino) was appointed as the fifth member of this
Code Commission on February 29, 1948; but he resigned in 1949 due to his election as
member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines in January,
1948, and approved on June 18, 1949, as Republic Act No. 386.
Application
In this part of the module, students must have a clear understanding of the legal
concepts discussed and are expected to have a thorough understanding of what these
laws are and how they have been enacted and codified.
The faculty is encouraged to ask questions if the students have some clarifications or
legal principles that they find hard to comprehend or understand so that it can be given
emphasis and be expounded further for better understanding of the lessons. Students
may raise questions, give their arguments, points and legal opinion on certain views.
Reflection/Learning Insights
To determine if the students understood what had been discussed in the topics stated in
this module prior this part, students are ask to provide a summary of the topics they
learned and be able to express their views and opinion thereof in writing and submit the
same in a document or pdf format.
Post Test
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Answer the following questions.
1. How would you define the term “law”?

2. Give the distinction between law and morals?
3. Enumerate the four characteristics of law.
4. Give the classification of human laws.
5. What is the purpose of codification of laws?
Final Requirements
Revalida or Participant (Students)Verification Process

A required interview or (can be in the form of short essay given the writing prompt) to:
● validate if course submissions are really done by the learners themselves; and
determine their course significant learning insights
Other Parts
SUGGESTED READINGS AND WEBSITES
GLOSSARY
ANSWER KEY
References:
● Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines by Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino, Ph.B., D.C.L., pp. 1-10)
● https://cybaroperations.wordpress.com/notes-on-philippine-civil-law/
Unit title
LEGAL ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
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Title of the Lesson
L1: Legal Ethics defined

L2: Sources of Ethical Standards for the Judiciary
L3: Practice of Law and the Legal Profession
L4: Nature of the Practice of Law
Duration
6 HOURS
Introduction
In this unit, we will be discussing about legal ethics and the legal profession, practice,
laws and procedures, as well as related jurisprudence on the matter.
The sources of ethical standards for lawyers and judges as well as the nature of the
practice of law. The students must be able to have a grasp of what the legal profession
is all about and how legal ethics form a very important part in its study and practice.
Related jurisprudence decided by the Supreme Court,

Landmark cases and other legal matters and procedure shall be provided as well for
better understanding of the topics and discussions.
To understand the concept of ethical standards in the legal profession;
To gain familiarity with the sources of such ethical standards under the rules as
promulgated by the Supreme Court;
To make the student familiar with the terminologies and legal practices that surround the
legal profession;
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To be able to gain knowledge on related laws and jurisprudence that are relevant in our
study;
Pre-test
1. What do you understand by ethical standards?

2. Is legal ethics part and parcel in the study of law?
3. Can a lawyer be disbarred for not complying with the rules on ethical standards
for the legal profession?
4. What are the two sources of ethical standards for the judiciary?
5. Give three examples of secondary sources.
6. The Code of Professional Responsibility, the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the
Rules of Court are examples of secondary or primary sources?
L1: It is a branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an attorney owes to
the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public as embodied
in the Constitution, Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canons
of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral,law and special laws (Justice George
Malcolm)
L2: Sources of Ethical Standards for the Judiciary
1. Primary Sources
2. Secondary Sources
For Primary sources we have:

Bar
Bench
Other personnel
Bar:
Code of Professional Responsibility
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Constitution
Rules of court
Bench:
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
Rules of Court
Personnel:
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
For Secondary Sources:

1. Decisions/Resolutions of the SupremeCourtb.
2. Supreme Court Circularsc.
3. Order/Resolution of other courtsd.
4. IBP Issuancese.
Treatises and Publications
Practice of Law
It means any activity, in or out of court,which requires the application of law,

legalprocedure, knowledge, training, and experience (Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No.
100113, September 3,1991
“As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed
placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
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Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final
sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or
hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence
of arrest and detention. –People v. Maceda;G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000
Essential Criteria in Determining Whether a Person is engaged in the Practice of

Law:
1. Compensation
2. Habituality
3. Attorney-client relationship
4. Application of law, legal principles, practice and procedures
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he for valuable consideration engages in
the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of

advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) the
court stated that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in
court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
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creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
Distinction between the terms Bar and Bench in the practice of law and legal
profession:
Bar- refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors
Bench- refers to the whole body of judges and justices.
Admission to the Bar
-It is the act by which one is licensed to practice before courts of a particular state or
jurisdiction after satisfying certain requirements.
Bar examinations;
1. Bar Examination
2. Period of residency; and
3. Admission on grounds of reciprocity after a period of years as member of the bar-
Pineda, 2009
Activity
As part of our activity, the students must make a distinction on the following:
1. Attorney at law v. attorney-in-fact
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2. Attorney of record v. attorney ad hoc
3. Council de oficio v. Counsel de parte
4. Amicus curiae v. Amicus curiae par excellence
5. Practicing Lawyer v. Trial Lawyer
6. Lead Counsel v. In-house Counsel
7. Public Prosecutor v. Private Prosecutor
Analysis
Give your analysis on the following legal concepts to wit:
1. The practice of law is not a natural, property or Constitutional right, but a mere
privilege. Do you agree?
2. Law is a profession, not a trade or business.
Answer: Yes. In the nature of the practice of law, it is not a right granted to anyone who
demands it, but a privilege to be to be extended or withheld, in the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. It is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain
rigid standards of metal and moral fitness.
Nota bene: It becomes a property right if there is a contract for attorney’s fees.
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
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Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court- Section 5 par. 5 of Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Admission to the Philippine Bar:
Passing the Bar examination is not sufficient for admission of a person to the Philippine
Bar. He still has to take the oath of office and sign the roll of attorneys’ as pre-requisite
to admission
Abstraction:
Important Amendments made by the Supreme Court on the Rules:
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

Applicants to the 2023 Philippine Bar examinations who have graduated from a foreign
school may be admitted to take the bar examination only upon submission to the
Supreme Court (SC) of certain certifications.
This was among the latest provisions adopted by the Supreme Court when it
issued on July 23, 2019 A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Amendment of Rule 138 Section 5 in
Relation to the Revision of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Revision).
In the latest issuance, the SC added a provision stating that”a Filipino citizen who
graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon
submission to the Supreme Court certifications showing:
(a) Completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree;
(b) Recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and;
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(c) Completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic
program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.”
This Revision is based on the amendment in B.M. No. 1153 issued on March 9, 2010.
The July 23, 2019 issuance is the latest revision to the SC en banc Resolution
dated June 25, 2019 also entitled A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Amendment of Rule 138
Section 5 in Relation to the Revision of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, which
only added “clinical legal education program” on the list of courses an applicant must
satisfactorily complete before being admitted to the bar examinations.
The SC, on June 25, 2019, adopted and promulgated A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule
138-A Law Student Practice, otherwise known as the Revised Law Student Practice
Rule (Revised Rule). The Revised Rule is an amendment to the existing provisions of
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. A salient feature of the Revised Rule is that a law
student must now be certified to be able to engage in the limited practice of law.
The amendment shall apply to the bar examination applications commencing the
2023 bar examinations.
Good Moral Character as a Continuing Requirement In the Legal Profession
Grande v. De Silva; En Banc

A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003
“It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be
accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross misconduct and the penalties for
such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
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admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good
moral character.
Since this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of
law, the maintenance thereof is equally essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege.
“Gross misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may
render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.”
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her
suspension or disbarment, because it is important that members of the legal
brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of morality.
Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action.
Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. Such
conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the bar, for a lawyers
professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and
above suspicion.
Application
Let us now apply what we learned in the discussions above by reading another case
and after which be able to explain in brief the rulings of the court in relation to the issue
on legal ethics as part of introduction to law and the legal profession.
Duty to the Court: Negligence of a lawyer
Case No. 1: In Re: Vicente Y. Bayani/ A.C. No. 5307. August 9, 2000
Facts: Atty. Vicente Bayani was the lawyer for the appellant in a criminal case. He failed
to submit his proof of service in his appellant’s brief which subsequently caused the
inability of the appellee to file his own brief. The IBP was order to investigate on the
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matter and despite repeated notices, Bayani failed to submit the proof of service and his
answer to the IBP’s query. Hence, this administrative complaint.
Held: GUILTY. Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of appellant’s brief and
his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience to the
lawful orders of the Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of
professional ethics. It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection
required of a member of the Bar.
A counsel must always remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his
clients. A lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that
representation. Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of
law and legal procedure and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted
fealty to his client’s cause.
Having been remiss in his duty to the Court and to the Bar, Atty. Bayani was suspended
from the practice of law for 3 months and until the time he complies with the Order of
the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of service.
Case No. 2: Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.” A.M.
No. 10-10-4-SC/ March 8, 2011
Facts: For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent
law professors, in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case

are as follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
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RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar
to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
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On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the lawyers who are also law professors in the case at bar, can
invoke academic freedom as a defense, in an administrative proceeding for
intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome
of a case or degrade the courts?
SC Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Applying by analogy the Court’s
past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic
freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling
in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as
lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the
legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of
expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition
in Cayetano v. Monsod:
“Lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law.
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the
same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the
Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact
that they are lawyers.”
Supreme Court held:
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In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by
certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming
that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with
good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for
law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law
school to which they belong.
Case No. 3: Basas vs Icawat : AC 4282 : August 24, 2000 : J. Quisumbing

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000
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Facts: In a letter-complaint dated June 25, 1994, complainant Teodulfo B. Basas alleged
negligence on the part of respondent lawyer Miguel I. Icawat in the handling of an illegal
dismissal case, involving complainant and several of his co-workers.
Complainant was one of several workers who filed three separate complaints before the
NLRC against their employer, FMC Engineering and Construction, in 1992 and 1993.
Respondent was their lawyer.
The matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for negligence and
unprofessional conduct for his failure to file the required memorandum of appeal before
the NLRC, and to account for all the money he received from his clients.
Both are clear violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Commission, with
an amendment for the reduction of fines.
Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC Rules of
Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. His failure to file the memorandum
clearly prejudiced the interests of his clients.
Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,

September 22, 1999:
"Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve
the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that
Page 22 of 106
his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy
or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession."
For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the P280.00 he received from his clients -
which he later on claimed to be insufficient for an "old experienced lawyer", whether the
amount be P180.00 or P280.00 - respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility: "A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client." law library
Case No. 3: Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles
Page 23 of 106
A.C. No. 2519. August 29, 2000: Legal Ethics Case Digests – Duty of Lawyer to
Client/Proper Conduct
Facts: Atty. Sergio Angeles was the legal counsel of Teodoro Rivera and 2 others in a
civil case. Rivera and his 2 co-plaintiffs received a favorable decision. Atty. Angeles
received almost PhP 50,000 from one of the defendants in the case as partial fulfillment
of the judgement against the latter. Atty. Angeles, however, never told his clients of the
amount he had received and never remitted the same to him, leaving them to discover
such fact on their own. Rivera and his co-plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Angeles.
Held: GUILTY.
Atty. Angeles was not disbarred but the Court ruled that his act amounted to
serious misconduct. The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice
of his profession.
For it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. The Court
is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended
to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to
himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the
victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer. For deceit in
dealing with his client, Atty. Angeles was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
CASE NO. 5: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P.
Salayon/A.C. No. 4690. August 29, 2000
Page 24 of 106
Facts: Attys. Antonio Llorente and Ligaya Salayon were election officers of the
COMELEC and held the position of Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively for the
Pasig City Board of Candidates. The respondents helped conduct and oversee the 1995
elections. Then Senatorial candidate Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. alleged that the respondents
tampered with the votes received by them by either adding more votes for particular
candidates in their Statement of Votes (SoV) or reducing the number of votes of
particular candidates in their SoV. Pimentel filed an administrative complaint for their
disbarment. Respondents argued that the discrepancies were due to honest mistake,
oversight and fatigue. Respondents also argued that the IBP Board of Governors had
already exonerated them from any offense and that the motion for reconsideration filed
by Pimentel was not filed in time.
Held: GUILTY.
Respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing
of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such
irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or
fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the
SoVs. There is a limit, we believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or
oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the
error renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible
and simply unacceptable. Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of
mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election
returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs but a
systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of
the petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member

of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of

Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
Page 25 of 106
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a
breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in
“unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6,
this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise
violated their oath of office as lawyers to “do no falsehood.” The Court found the
respondents guilty of misconduct and fined them PhP 10,000 each and issued a stern
warning that similar conduct in the future will be severely punished.
Case No. 6: IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562, 02/18/1970)
FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of

Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a
great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Page 26 of 106
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas
for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy."
He alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,
saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue
the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices
that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that a
resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned
attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future
and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume
the practice of the noblest profession.
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay
vs. Antonio H. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he
moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion,
but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile,
on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse
party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry
return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the
plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen must surrender his
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title.
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HELD: It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance. Well-recognized therefore is the right
of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right,
nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges,
which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is
suspended from the practice of law until further orders.
CASE NO. 7: G.R. No. L-21965 August 30, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO S.
GERVACIO, ET AL., defendants.
Page 28 of 106
FACTS: On Sept. 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged SImplicio
Villanueva with crime of Malicious Mischiedf, before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said Municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de oficio, but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was representry by
City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as
private-prosecutor, having secuting the permission of the the Secretary of Justice.
Counsel for the accused presented a “Motion in inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as
Private prosecutor in this case, “this time invoking sec. 32, Rule 127, now sec. 35,
Rule 138, Revised Rules, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Fule violated Sec. 32 of Rule 127, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing
Held: No. The court believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law.
As the Solicitor General stated in his observation, the word private practice of law
implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
Page 29 of 106
CASE NO. 8: Landmark Case: CHUA – QUA vs. CLAVE
G.R. No. L-49549 August 30, 1990
(Case Digest)
A truly remarkable case wherein the Supreme Court ruled in favor of “love”. The setting
of the case was in when marriage between minors was still legal, way before the
Family Code. In this case, a 30 year old teacher had married her student which
prompted the school to terminate her. And against all odds the Supreme Court Ruled in
favor of her, hence, creating this Landmark Case. “truism that the heart has reasons
of its own which reason does not know.”
FACTS:
This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial
and unique situation that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to
her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school
authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.
The case was about an affair and marriage of 30 years old teacher Evelyn Chua in
Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City to her 16 years old student. The petitioner
teacher was suspended without pay and was terminated of his employment “for
Abusive and Unethical Conduct Unbecoming of a Dignified School Teacher” which
was filed by a public respondent as a clearance for termination.
ISSUE:
1. Was her dismissal valid?
2. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts
which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute
immorality and or grave misconduct?
Page 30 of 106
RULING:
The Supreme Court declared the dismissal illegal saying:
“Private respondent [the school] utterly failed to show that petitioner [30-year old lady
teacher] took advantage of her position to court her student [16-year old]. If the two
eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this
only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which
reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is
not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of
their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of
contemporary social mores.”
Finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that
the alleged violation of Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis.
Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to
court her student. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual
societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.
● Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as
counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law.
● It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Well-recognized therefore is the right of
a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
● A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member

of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.
Page 31 of 106
● However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such character as to
affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
● The Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral
character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice of his profession.
Post Test
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,

PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN
THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
● As students of law, how would you explain and justify Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility? What are some of the programs that lawyers as
legal professionals and members of the bar engage in to continue their legal
education? What does MCLE stands for?
● What is meant by jurisprudence? How important are jurisprudence in the study of

law?
● Is the Code of Professional Responsibility an important aspect of the legal

profession?
● How are ethical standard affect the legal profession?
● Can you cite one case that we had cited in this module –actual case stated
above, and explain the doctrine and the legal principles behind it
Page 32 of 106
Final Requirements
Other Parts
Suggested Readings: Code of Professional Responsibility –attachment

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it
will admit of a fair settlement.
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN

EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse
to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to
safeguard the latter's rights.
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Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed
unless the circumstances so warrant.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE

ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be
used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that
the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased.
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the firm and
his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law
currently.
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM
AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,
PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN
THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICES IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict
but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses
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capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is
cause for disciplinary action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any
person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other
relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS

AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL
AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
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Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of
any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good standing.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or
to persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased

lawyer; or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even
if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO

THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.
Page 36 of 106
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities
only.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS

DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order
of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison
with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in
the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument,
and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
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REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency
of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the
latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the
guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client
unless: (a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or
between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional
fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying
clients.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN

ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own
interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect
of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
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Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion
on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public
official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or
in another capacity.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof
as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interest
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE

SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should
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know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the
consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent
on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of
the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call
upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship
with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the
case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
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(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled
to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or
other compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone
other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or
fraud.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF

HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage
or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information
from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical,
bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or
associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those
whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of
the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even
with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular
case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
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CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD
CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the
client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Glossary
Assumpsit (2006 Bar)
Literally means “he has undertaken.”

It is an action for the recovery of damages by reason of the breach or non-performance
of a simple contract, either express or implied, whether made orally or in writing.
Assumpsit is the word always used in pleadings by the plaintiff to set forth the
defendant’s undertaking or promise.
Pro Se
A party to a lawsuit, who represents himself, is appearing in the case "pro se."
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NOTE:
When there is prohibition to practice law, it refers to all other cases except where such
person would appear in court to defend himself
(Pro Se).
Advocate
It is a lawyer who pleads on behalf of someone else. He pleads the cause of another
before a tribunal or judicial court (Pineda, 2009).
Barrister
He is a person entitled to practice law as an advocate or counsel in superior courts

(Pineda, 2009)
References:
1. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/5726/
2. https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/tag/legal-ethics-case-digests-lawyer-duty-to-the-c
ourtnegligence-of-a-lawyer/
3. https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2000/aug2000/ac_4282.php
4. https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/category/legal-ethics/
5. https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/2014/08/21/legal-ethics-case-digests-duty-of-lawy
er-to-clientproper-conduct/
6. https://lawphilreviewer.wordpress.com/?s=In+re+almacen
7. https://www.scribd.com/document/398458472/People-v-Villanueva-Case-Digest
8. https://batasnatin.com/law-library/legal-ethics-and-practical-exercises/legal-ethics/2005-p
eople-v-villanueva-disbarment.html
9. https://www.chanrobles.com/codeofprofessionalresponsibility.html#.X0IWwChKjMw
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Unit title
Introduction to Law and Legal Profession:

Constitutional Law
Title of the Lesson
1. Important Concepts under the Constitution that are part and parcel of law
and the legal profession
2. Provisions in the Bill of Rights that are important part and parcel of our
Constitutional law and the legal profession to wit:
2.1 Concepts of Due Process Clause and Equal Protection

2.2 Validity of Search Warrant and Warrants of Arrest
2.3 Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
2.4. Freedom of Information
2.5 Freedom of Expression
2.6 Validity of Search Warrant
2.7 Freedom of Expression
2.8 Freedom of Religion
2.9 Liberty of Abode and Travel
3. Related Jurisprudence on the Matter
Duration
9 hours
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Introduction
This part of the module will discuss about introduction to law in relation to
Constitutional law and basic constitutional rights of every Filipino under Article III
Sections 1-22 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and other pertinent law and
jurisprudence.
The main focus of this unit of the module is to discuss the important salient
provisions of the Bill of Rights that are part of Constitutional law and the important
doctrine and legal principle and jurisprudence that are part thereof. The module was
presented in such a way as to give the students a clear idea of the law and the
decisions of the Supreme Court that are part of the law of the land.
Other pertinent provisions, in relation to the discussions will also be mentioned

and stressed out for better understanding of the subject matter. After this unit, students
will have a clear grasp of the basic constitutional rights, jurisprudence and legal
doctrines that are tools for learning the law and understanding of the legal profession.
● To give the students an overview of the basic constitutional rights under Article III
of the Bill of Rights, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution;
● To make the students familiar with these basic legal concepts and the related
jurisprudence applicable therein;
● To have an overview of the concepts of political law and the importance of

understanding these legal principles;
● To be knowledgeable of the recent pronouncements of the court, updates and

decisions of the Supreme Court and land mark cases that will help students to
get acquainted with the law
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Pre-test
Answer the following questions:
1. What do you understand by the concept of due process

under Section 1 Article III of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution?
2. What is the meaning of probable cause under Section 2
Article III of the Bill of Rights in so far as the issuance of a
search warrant or warrant of arrest is in issue?
3. Are the constitutional rights provided in Article III absolute
and without limitations?
4. What makes substantive due process different from
procedural due process?
Political law is a branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operations of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the
State with the inhabitants of its territory- People of the Philippines v. Perfecto, 43 Phil.
88, 1922.
Scope of Political Law
The entire field of political law may be subdivided into:
● The law of public administration

● Constitutional law
● Administrative law
● The law on public corporations
Constitutional Law
-it designates the law embodied in the Constitution and the legal principle growing out of
the interpretation and application of its provisions by the courts in specific cases. It is
the study of the maintenance of the proper balance between the authority as
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represented by the three inherent powers of the state and liberty as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights.
Types of Constitutional Law
In general there are three different types of Constitutional law, namely:
● English Type
● European Continental Type
● American Type
Classification of Constitutions
1. Written or unwritten
2. Enacted/conventional v. Evolved/Cumulative
3. Rigid or Flexible
The 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite held on the same date, and not on the date its ratification was proclaimed –De
Leon v. Esguerra No. L-78059, August 31, 1987.
Parts of the Constitution:
1. Constitution of Government
2. Constitution of Sovereignty
3. Constitution of Liberty
Constitution of Government
- Establishes the structure of the government, its branches and their operation
Constitution of Sovereignty
- Provides how the Constitution maybe changed.
Constitution of Liberty
- States the fundamental rights of the people –Lambino vs. Comelec, October 25,
2006
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution
Article III Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
CASE NO. 1: G.R. No. 128845 INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF

EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING 333 SCRA 13
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. QUISUMBING
333 SCRA 13
G.R. No. 128845
June 1, 2000
FACTS:
International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires both foreign and local
teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and
(2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires
including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance
and a salary rate 25% more than local hires based on “significant economic
disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires.
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires
constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity.
RULING:
Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
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who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under
similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
If an employer accords the employees the same position and rank, the presumption is
that these employees perform equal work. If the employer pays one employee less than
the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence
here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.
Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to
justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires.
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ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995
May 31, 1957
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main
provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
among others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial
declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
● It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
● The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
● The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted

principles.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the
Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and
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with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute
equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a.Police power. — What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process
and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the
legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts?
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become
almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence
of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to
be coextensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and
active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope
of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and
welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the
scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the
limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the
equal protection clause.
B. Limitations on police power. — The basic limitations of due process and equal
protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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(Article III, Phil. Constitution) These constitutional guarantees which embody the
essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens
alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. — The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. — The due process clause has to do with the
reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power.
Activity: Let us discuss the important points on the case of Inchong.
These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
● Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved?

● Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive?
● Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or
has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power?
● Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an
unjustified interference with private interest?
ANALYSIS:
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
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said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction. e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the
courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the
constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining
the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the
police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest.
On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right,
have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative
prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable
arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative.
Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never
inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied with the above considerations in mind,

we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation
were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls
within the legitimate scope of legislative power.
But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein.
The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or
occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and
indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State
insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
Page 53 of 106
ABSTRACTION:
VI. Equal Protection Limitation
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications
among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The
legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In
addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey
vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly
defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as
contrary thereto:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of
the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is
without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results
in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at
the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. — The question as to

whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States.
In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No.
2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting
the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens
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of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was
held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights.
The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of
Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held
that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality.
In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in

coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the
law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said
decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case
of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows: "Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are
universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of
spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms
part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and
place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every
commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a
countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole
legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American
character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act
of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished
from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the
revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected." The rule in general
is as follows: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the
lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a
class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.) In
Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the
licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license
unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was
held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the
business of those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and
happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and
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conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors,
was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to
discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted
with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid.
In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S.
Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens.
It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not
follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and
that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be
allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice
of methods for controlling an apprehended evil.
The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one
at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of
pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting
it to citizens is within the scope of police power.
A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained
in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van
Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to
have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the
prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool,
billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights.
In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902),
a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the
decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not
in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community
In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law
which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons
over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no
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reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage
of an employee. d. Authorities contra explained. — It is true that some decisions of the
Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction
between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision
the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious,
or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no
question of public interest involved or pursued.
In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme
Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account
in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main
reasons for the decisions are:
(1) That if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of
distribution, and
(2) That the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real
reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be
derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese
of something indispensable for carrying on their business.
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. And
the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall
not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained.
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial
determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. (Nebbia vs. New York, 78
L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Page 57 of 106
Another authority states the principle thus:
“Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering

the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to
determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to
inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the
Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on
such rights.
A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must
not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. It was also held:
“To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear,
A. First, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and;
B. Second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes
this test of constitutionality: In determining whether a given act of the Legislature,
passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is
or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is
whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection
with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that
power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general
welfare of the public.
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all

circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged
by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
Page 58 of 106
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom
from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power.
The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and
power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people,
their freedom and liberty.
Article III OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Search Warrant
RULE 126
Search and Seizure
Section 1. Search warrant defined. — A search warrant is an order in writing issued in

the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it
before the court. (1)
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. — An application
for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the
crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.
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However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made
in the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)
Section 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted. (4a)
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the
form prescribed by these Rules. (5a)
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. (6)
Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two
witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except
in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. (7a)
Section 9. Time of making search. — The warrant must direct that it be served in the
day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
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ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night. (8)
Section 10. Validity of search warrant. — A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10)
days from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. — The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises
in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such
occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property. (10a)
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon. — (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11
of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized
be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been
complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of
the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return,
the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute
proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. —
A motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may
be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a
criminal case is subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court.
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Validity of Search Warrants- Jurisprudence
Case: Tambasen v. People G.R. No. 89103
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search
warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in his
possession at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles
(Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks
and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for
illegal purposes]. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in
the application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team
searched the house of petitioner and seized among others, 2 envelopes containing cash
in the total amount of Php 14,000.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized articles. MTCC issued an
order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day,
Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in
contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be
required to submit a complete and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter,
Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the search
warrant, he was not present when it was served. On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed
before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and
that the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC ruled in favor of the petitioner,
however the Solicitor General alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had
been invalid, petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating that
pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should
remain in custodia legis.
Page 62 of 106
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one
specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two
special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was
therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People v. Court of Appeals,
216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search
warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant
should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The presumption juris tantum of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759)
As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in
the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors."
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in
violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Page 63 of 106
Privacy of Communication and Correspondence
Article III OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, SECTION 3 par. 1
of the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding
Case: ZULUETA VS. CA
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
Decision Date: 1996-02-20
GR Number: G.R. No. 107383
Summary:
Cecilia Zulueta broke into her husband’s office and obtained his alleged private
correspondence with his paramours. What happened next will shock you! RTC, CA, and
SC all rendered the evidence as inadmissible.
Doctrine:
The Law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
in privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the otheras to any communication received in confidence by one
from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is
freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
Page 64 of 106
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.
Facts:
● The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
● The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law.
(Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3,
Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)
● The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity.
● A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
● The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,
Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the
other,as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of
Court)
Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence is admissible. – The Supreme Court answered

in the negative.
● The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and

correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
● The only exception to the provision in the constitution is if there is a lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise as provide by law.
Page 65 of 106
(Sec.3, Par.1, Art. III, 1987 Constitution).-Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3,
Par.2, Art. III,1987 Constitution)
● The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
tell-tale evidence of marital infidelity.
● A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him
or to her.
● The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,
Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the
other ,as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of
Court)
Dispositive:
CA decision AFFIRMED
Page 66 of 106
Freedom of Expression
Article III of the Bill of Rights, Section 4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after
letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the school
paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to the
disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement
to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants,
instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they
alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through with the investigation
ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them disciplinary
sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with preliminary injunction on
said decision of the Committee questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over
the defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.
Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS and
the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section 5 (2),
Page 67 of 106
Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide
for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion
or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.
Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate upon
them good values, ideals and attitude.
The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students.
Further, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot
suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when
such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others. Therefore, the court ruled that the power of the school to investigate
is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly
educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend
or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College has the authority
to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.1âw
Indirect contempt: Wild accusations against the Court maybe the basis for
indirect contempt.
While the courts are passive instruments of justice, it may act on unverified accusations
against it or its members, bordering on contempt or indirect contempt.
Jomar, a reporter of the Manila Times, published on March 8, 2016 in the online and
printed publication of Manila Times an article where he alleged that the Supreme Court
justices were each offered P50 Million to disqualify Senator Grace Poe. The offer
allegedly came from persons “very close” to then President Benigno Aquino III and
presidential candidate Manuel “Mar” Roxas. The article further stated that the source
pointed to a female lawyer who now works in private practice, and another high ranking
Page 68 of 106
member of the Liberal Part as being behind the offers. Jomar alleged in the article that
he tried to reach out to the Justices but no one granted him an interview. But a
magistrate who asked not to be identified stressed that the tribunal will not bow to any
pressure to decide on the case in exchange for cash.
In a resolution on March 16, 2016, the Court directed Jomas to explain in writing within
five days from receipt why should not be punished with indirect contempt because
certain statements and innuendoes in Mr. Jomar Canlas’ news report tend, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the
purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Jomar, in his explanation, alleged that the disqualification cases against Grace Poe
(Poe) have generated national interest and any attempt to bribe Justices to influence
their decision is a matter of public interest and is a legitimate subject for any journalist.
He added that he was moved by a sense of civic duty, and he was prodded by his
responsibility as a newspaperman. Thus, he proceeded “to expose and denounce what
he perceived [as] an insidious attempt to sway the justices in their decision over the
case.”. Jomar alleged that he never made any accusation or criticism against the Court
or any of the Justices, but he only reported about the failed attempts to bribe certain
Justices and how the attempts were rebuffed. He tried to reach out to the justices but no
one would grant him an interview. He in fact reported that one of the magistrates
stressed that the tribunal will not bow to any pressure to decide on the case in
exchange for cash.
Issue: Whether or not Jomar is guilty of indirect contempt.
Ruling:
The legitimate exercise of freedom of speech and of the press is a protected

Constitutional right. Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
In In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Macasaet Published
in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, the Court once again recognized
the role of the mass media in a democratic government. In that case, the court stated:
Page 69 of 106
The mass media in a society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens
with relevant information to help them make informed decisions about public issues
affecting their lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for
the necessary exchange of ideas through fair and open debate. As the fourth Estate in
our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against
infringement. Over the year, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of being
the “freest and liveliest” in Asia.
Members of the Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been
protective and assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials
and agencies. They have been adversarial when they relate with any of the three
branches of government. They uphold the citizen’s right to know, and make public
officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds and misdeeds.
Through their watchdog function, the media motivate the public to be vigilant in
exercising the citizen’s right to an effective, efficient and corrupt free government.[5]
The freedom of speech and of the press, however, is not absolute.
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled:
[F]reedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not

absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning
of the administration of justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.
Once again, we are confronted with the issue of balancing the role of the
media vis-a-vis judicial independence.
Page 70 of 106
The Court has used two formulas to balance the constitutional guarantee of free speech
and of the press and judicial independence. As early as 1957, this Court sustained the
view that:
Two theoretical formulas had been devised in the determination of conflicting rights of
similar import in an attempt to draw the proper constitutional boundary between freedom
of expression and independence of the judiciary. These are the “clear and present
danger” rule and the “dangerous tendency” rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of
cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
“extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the “substantive evil” sought to
be prevented. And this evil is primarily the “disorderly and unfair administration of
justice.” This test establishes a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion
as to what words may be published. Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and present danger that such
advocacy will harm the administration of justice.
Thus, speaking of the extent and scope of the application of this rule, the Supreme
Court of the United States said “Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a
result of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom and press only if the evils are extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. x x x. A )public utterance or
publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon
the theory that in such a case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair
administration of justice.[“]
xxxx
The “dangerous tendency” rule, on the other hand, has been adopted in cases where
extreme difficulty is confronted in determining where the freedom of expression ends
and the right of courts to protect their independence begins. There must be a remedy to
borderline cases and the basic principle of this rule lies in that the freedom of speech
and of the press, as well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while
guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are subject to restrictions and
limitations, one of them being the protection of the courts against contempt
(Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325).
Page 71 of 106
This rule may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered created a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness
be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of
force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable
effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652)
The substantive evil sought to be prevented to warrant the restriction upon freedom of
expression or of the press must be serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high. In the application of the clear and present danger test in relation to freedom of the
press, good faith or absence of intent to harm the courts is a valid defense.Here, Canlas
claimed that his article was written with good motives and for justifiable ends.
We do not agree. Canlas reported about alleged attempts to buy off the Justices in the
Poe cases. The offer was allegedly P50 million for each vote to disqualify Poe. Canlas
claimed that he tried to get the side of the Justices on the alleged attempts but he was
unsuccessful. He did not elaborate on his attempts to verify the story. However, he
quoted an unnamed Justice who allegedly said that the Court will not bow to any
pressure in deciding the case in exchange for money. Canlas claimed that his article
painted the Court in a good light as it showed that the Court is incorruptible. We do not
find his explanation acceptable.
First, the Court notes that the statement of the unnamed Justice did not confirm the
allegation of bribery; the unnamed Justice only stated that the Court will not allow itself
to be pressured by anyone. Second, the legitimacy of the news article is misleading and
has not been sufficiently established. Third, a reading of the article shows its intention to
sensationalize. The news article reports of grave accusations that were not shown to
have been verified. It imputed bribery charges against a female lawyer, who was a
former Malacañang lawyer and who supported the candidacy of Mar Roxas; a member
of the Liberal Party; and a businessman, who is close to Roxas and President Benigno
Aquino III. It gave a false impression against the Justices who did not vote in favor of
Poe. It compared the bribery attempts to the one that allegedly occurred during the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. The article, in full, emphasizes the
bad that overshadows the short disclaimer that the Justices refused the bribe. Again,
because of the close voting in the Poe cases, the article created a doubt in the minds of
the readers, against some of the Justices and in the process, the Court as a whole.
Page 72 of 106
In In Re Emil P. Jurado, where Jurado was cited for contempt for publishing serious
accusations against members of the Judiciary without ascertaining their veracity, the
Court expressed that –
[F]alse reports about a public official or other person are not shielded from
sanction by the cardinal right to free speech enshrined in the Constitution. Even the
most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods,
specially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. The U.S. Supreme
Court, while asserting that”[u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea,” and that “[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction
not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas” (citing
a passage from the first Inaugural Address of Thomas Jefferson), nonetheless made the
firm announcement that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of facts,”
and “the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection [although]
x x x nevertheless inevitable m free debate.” “Neither the intentional lie nor careless
error,” it said, “materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhabited, robust, and
wide-pen’ debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 us,l at 270, 11 L
Ed 2d 686, 95 ALR2d 1412. They belong to that category of utterances which ‘are no[t]
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.’ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572,
86 LEd 1031,62 S Ct 766 (1942).”
The Court is not immune from criticisms, and it is the duty of the press to expose all
government agencies and officials and to hold them responsible for their actions.
However, the press cannot just throw accusations without verifying the truthfulness of
their reports. The perfunctory apology of Canlas does not detract from the fact that the
article, directly or indirectly, tends to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.
In lieu of a monetary fine on Canlas, we are severely reprimanding him to stress that a
person’s reputation is priceless, and so are the reputations of the Justices of this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jomar Canlas GUILTY of Indirect Contempt of Court in
accordance with Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, and
hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDS him with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
Page 73 of 106
DENMARK S. VALMORES, PETITIONER, VS. DR. CRISTINA ACHACOSO, IN HER
CAPACITY AS DEAN OF THE COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, AND DR. GIOVANNI
CABILDO, FACULTY OF THE MINDANAO STATE UNIVERSITY, RESPONDENTS.
Source: © Supreme Court E-Library 2019
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus[1] filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Petition), seeking the enforcement of Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Memorandum[2] dated November 15, 2010 (2010 CHED Memorandum) by herein
respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso (Achacoso) and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo (Cabildo)
(collectively, "respondents"). Respondents are being sued in their respective capacities
as Dean and faculty member of the Mindanao State University (MSU)-College of
Medicine.[3]
Antecedent Facts
The facts culled from the records follow.
Petitioner Denmark S. Valmores (Valmores) is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist

Church,[4] whose fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a
sacred day.[5] As such, petitioner Valmores joins the faithful in worshipping and resting
on Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and refrains from non-religious undertakings
from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday.[6]
Prior to the instant controversy, petitioner Valmores was enrolled as a first-year student
at the MSU-College of Medicine for Academic Year 2014-2015.[7] To avoid potential
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conflict between his academic schedule and his church's Saturday worship, petitioner
Valmores wrote a letter[8] to respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from
attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a
Saturday. At the same time, petitioner Valmores expressed his willingness to make up
for any missed activity or session due to his absence.[9]
Between the months of June to August 2014, some of petitioner Valmores' classes and
examinations were moved from weekdays to Saturdays.[10] In one instance, petitioner
Valmores was unable to take his Histo-Pathology laboratory examination held on
September 13, 2015, a Saturday.[11] Respondent Cabildo was his professor for the said
subject.[12] Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of
the respondents. As a result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that
particular module and was considered ineligible to retake the exam.[13]
Thereafter, several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day Adventist Church sent a
letter[14] to respondent Achacoso, requesting for a possible audience with the members
of the MSU school board. In addition, the church, through Pastor Hanani P. Nietes,
issued a Certification[15] dated September 15, 2014 in connection with petitioner
Valmores' request for exemption.
The Certification dated September 15, 2014 reads in part:
This is to certify that DENMARK S. VALMORES is a bona fide member of the

Seventh-day Adventist Church affiliated at Balongis, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.
As Seventh-day Adventists, we uphold our observance of the Saturday Sabbath as a

day of worship and rest from labor, observing the sacredness of the Lord's day from
sunset Friday to sunset Saturday. We do away [with] secular activities like working in
the office or field/attending classes/participating/attending non-religious functions during
Saturday.
This certification is issued to support his request for exemption from all his Sabbath
(from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday) classes, exams, and other non-religious
activities.[16]
On September 19, 2014, petitioner Valmores again wrote a letter[17] to respondent
Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding his situation, reiterating his willingness to
take make-up classes or their equivalent in order to complete the requirements of his
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course.
Despite the foregoing communications, petitioner Valmores' requests fell on deaf

ears.[18]
Hence, aggrieved by respondents' lack of consideration, petitioner Valmores elevated

the matter before the CHED.[19] In an Indorsement dated January 6, 2015, the CHED
Regional Office, Region X, through Mr. Roy Roque U. Agcopra, Chief Administrative
Officer, referred the matter directly to the President of MSU as well as respondent
Achacoso and requested that the office be advised of the action thus taken.[20]
In response, Dr. Macapado Abaton Muslim (Dr. Muslim), President of MSU, instructed
respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum.[21] In doing so, Dr.
Muslim sent a copy of the said memorandum to respondent Achacoso with the following
marginal note in his own handwriting:
Urgent!
For: Dean Cristina Achacoso

College of Medicine
You are hereby enjoined to enforce this CHED memo re the case of MR. DENMARK S.
VALMORES.
Thanks.[22]
Despite the foregoing correspondence, petitioner Valmores' request still went unheeded.
Thus, in a Letter[23] dated March 25, 2015, petitioner Valmores, this time through his
counsel on record, sought reconsideration from respondent Achacoso for the last time
and manifested his intention to resort to appropriate legal action should no action be
taken.
Notwithstanding the lapse of several months, no written or formal response was ever
given by respondent Achacoso.[24]
Hence, the present Petition.
Petitioner Valmores brings his cause before the Court based on his constitutional right
to freedom of religion, which he argues was violated by respondents when they refused
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to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum, as follows: (i) by refusing to excuse petitioner
Valmores from attending classes and taking examinations on Saturdays, and (ii) by
disallowing petitioner Valmores to take make-up examinations in order to comply with
the academic requirements of his course.[25]
Respondents, on the other hand, chiefly base their defense on the fact that MSU had
other students who were able to graduate from their College of Medicine despite being
members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church.[26] On this claim, respondents argued
that petitioner Valmores' case was not "unique" as to merit exceptional
treatment.[27] Respondents likewise claimed that the Certification dated September 15,
2014 submitted by petitioner Valmores was not the certification contemplated by the
2010 CHED Memorandum and therefore there was no corresponding duty on their part
to enforce the same.[28] Lastly, respondents posited that the changes in schedule were
not unreasonable as they were due to unexpected declarations of holidays as well as
unforeseen emergencies of the professors in their respective hospitals.[29]
Petitioner Valmores, in his Reply,[30] reiterated his prayer for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus against respondents and prayed for the immediate resolution of the
dispute.
Issue
The threshold issue is simple: whether mandamus lies to compel respondents to

enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum in the case of petitioner Valmores.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Strict adherence to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not absolute
Before disposing of the substantial issue, although not raised by respondents in their
Comment, a procedural matter warrants discussion.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules, a petition for mandamus is directed against a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled.[31] If the petition relates to an act or
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omission of a board, officer, or person, the same must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as may be defined by the Court.[32]
In the case at bench, petitioner Valmores questions the acts of respondents in their
capacities as Dean and faculty member of MSU-College of Medicine. As such, by
directly filing the Petition with the Court instead of the proper regional trial court, as
required by the Rules, petitioner Valmores was in error.
Strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been a longstanding policy of the
courts in determining the appropriate forum for initiatory actions.[33] While this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior courts to issue corrective writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, a party's choice of forum is by no means absolute.[34]
Needless to say, however, such rule is not without exception. Recently, in Maza v.
Turla,[35] the Court emphasized that it possesses full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues involved in the dispute.
Citing The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections[36] the Court held therein that
a direct resort is allowed in the following instances, inter alia:
(i) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time; (ii) when the questions involved are dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice; and (iii) when the circumstances require an urgent resolution.
The above exceptions are all availing in this case.
The freedom of religion enjoys a preferred status among the rights conferred to
each citizen by our fundamental charter.[37] In this case, no less than petitioner
Valmores' right to religious freedom is being threatened by respondents' failure to
accommodate his case.[38] In this regard, when confronted with a potential infringement
of fundamental rights, the Court will not hesitate, as it now does, to overlook procedural
lapses in order to fulfill its foremost duty of satisfying the higher demands of substantial
justice.
The Court is also aware of petitioner Valmores' plea for the expedient resolution of his
case, as he has yet to enroll in the MSU-College of Medicine and continue with his
studies.[39] Plainly enough, to require petitioner Valmores to hold his education in
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abeyance in the meantime that he is made to comply with the rule on hierarchy of courts
would be unduly burdensome. It is a known fact that education is a time-sensitive
endeavor, where premium is placed not only on its completion, but also on the
timeliness of its achievement. Inevitably, justice in this case must take the form of a
prompt and immediate disposition if complete relief is to be accorded.
In a related matter, the Rules also require the exhaustion of other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law before a petition for mandamus is
filed.[40] In this case, petitioner Valmores had exerted all efforts to obtain relief from
respondents, as clearly evidenced by the letters and other communications on record.
Likewise, after respondents' repeated failure to enforce the 2010 CEDED Memorandum,
petitioner Valmores elevated the matter before the CHED, which in turn directly
indorsed the matter to the President of MSU. Thus, prior to resorting to the instant
Petition, the Court finds that petitioner Valmores had satisfactorily complied with the
requirement of availing himself of other remedies under Rule 65.
On these premises, the Court finds sufficient bases to relax the foregoing procedural
rules in the broader interest of justice.
The freedom of religion vis-a-vis the 2010 CHED Memorandum
Religion as a social institution is deeply rooted in every culture; it predates laws and
survives civilizations. In the Philippines, the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions were
crafted in full acknowledgment of the contributions of religion to the country through the
enactment of various benevolent provisions.[41] In its present incarnation, our
fundamental law, by "imploring the aid of Almighty God," makes manifest the State's
respect and recognition of the collective spirituality of the Filipino.[42] Such recognition is
embodied in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution:
SEC. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
In Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos,[43] the Court discussed the two-fold nature of the

free-exercise clause enshrined in the cited provision:
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[T]he constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The
freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that
protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience,
in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may
protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community,
before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity
and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is
likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of
public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.[44]
In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the
freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary to
protect the rights of others and in the interest of public welfare.[45]
Today, religion has transcended mere rubric and has permeated into every sphere of
human undertaking. As a result, religious freedom, to a limited extent, has come under
the regulatory power of the State.
In 2010, the CHED institutionalized the framework for operationalizing Section 5, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution vis-a-vis the academic freedom of higher education
institutions (HEIs), pursuant to its statutory power to formulate policies, priorities, and
programs on higher education in both public and private HEIs.[46]
In the 2010 CHED Memorandum, the CHED laid down guidelines for the exemption of
teachers, personnel, and students from participating in school or related activities due to
compliance with religious obligations, as follows:
FOR : ALL CHED REGIONAL OFFICE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE
SUBJECT : REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO

BE EXCUSED DUE TO COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
DATE : November 15, 2010
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xxxx
Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard, the Commission is obligated to
ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to
this constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their
academic freedom also guaranteed under the Constitution.
The Commission therefore clarifies that in implementing the aforementioned policy,

[higher education institutions] shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from
attendance/participation in school or related activities if such schedule conflicts with the
exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and staff to forego
attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which
would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the affected students,
faculty, personnel and staff may be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for
absences, within the bounds of school rules and regulations without their grades being
affected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or performance
evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader
for periods of absence from classes, work or school activities.
For your guidance and strict compliance.[47]

Transposing the foregoing to this case, petitioner Valmores beseeches the Court to
direct respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum, thus allowing him to
continue taking up his medical studies at MSU.
The enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is compellable by writ of mandamus
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a tribunal,

board, officer, or person.[48] Case law requires that the petitioner should have a right to
the thing demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform
the act required; such duty need not be absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear.[49] In
this regard, a duty is considered ministerial where an officer is required to perform an
act not requiring the exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given state of
facts.[50] Conversely, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary.[51]
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MSU is an HEI created by legislative charter under Republic Act No. 1387, as amended,
and was established "to better implement the policy of the Government in the
intensification of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among the Muslims and
others belonging to the national minorities."[52] Thus, respondents herein, as faculty
members of MSU, fall under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.
The crux of the dispute therefore lies in the interpretation of the 2010 CHED
Memorandum, the contents of which are again reproduced below for closer scrutiny:
SUBJECT: REMEDIAL WORK FOR TEACHERS, PERSONNEL AND STUDENTS TO

BE EXCUSED DUE TO COMPLIANCE WITH RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
Our fundamental Law explicitly provides under Section 5 of the Bill of Rights that "The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed." In this regard, the Commission is obligated to
ensure that all higher education institutions render proper respect and compliance to
this constitutional right, while at the same time acknowledging the exercise of their
academic freedom also guaranteed under the Constitution.
The Commission therefore clarifies that in implementing the aforementioned policy,

[higher education institutions] shall be enjoined to: (1) excuse students from
attendance/participation in school or related activities if such schedule conflicts with the
exercise of their religious obligations, and (2) allow faculty, personnel and staff to forego
attendance during academic and related work and activities scheduled on days which
would conflict with the exercise of their religious freedom. Instead, the affected students,
faculty, personnel and staff may be allowed to do remedial work to compensate for
absences, within the bounds of school rules and regulations without their grades being
affected, or with no diminution in their salaries or leave credits or performance
evaluation/assessment, provided they submit a certification or proof of
attendance/participation duly signed by their pastor, priest, minister or religious leader
for periods of absence from classes, work or school activities.
For your guidance and strict compliance.[53] (Emphasis supplied)

Analyzed, the following are derived:
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(i) HEIs are enjoined to excuse students from attending or participating in school or
related activities, if such schedule conflicts with the students' exercise of their
religious obligations;
(ii) to compensate for absences, students may be allowed to do remedial work, which
in turn should be within the bounds of school rules and regulations and without
affecting their grades; and
(iii) to be entitled to exemption, affected students must submit a certification of

attendance duly signed by their respective minister.
At once, a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student's religious obligations takes
precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with the constitutional
guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship. Accordingly, the CHED
imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as faculty members,
from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their religious obligations.
Although the said memorandum contains the phrase "within the bounds of school rules
and regulations," the same relates only to the requirement of remedial work, which,
based on the language used, is merely optional on the part of the HEI. Neither can such
phrase be said to have conferred discretion as the use of the words "shall be enjoined"
and "strict compliance" denote a mandatory duty on the part of the HEI to excuse its
students upon submission of the certification prescribed in the same memorandum.
Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion
to grant or deny requests for exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum
only imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to require remedial work, i.e., that
the same is within the bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the
students will not be affected.
To evade liability, respondents, without delving into the specifics, made the blanket
assertion that the Certification dated September 15, 2014 submitted by petitioner
Valmores was improper:
8. That the Petitioner did submit a certification of his church that he is baptized as
Seventh day Adventist which is clearly not the intention by the CHED memorandum
(sic).[54]
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Against such deficient claim, petitioner Valmores argues that the said certification
issued by Pastor Hanani P. Nietes on behalf of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was
sufficient to satisfy the requirement in the 2010 CHED Memorandum.[55] The Court
agrees.
As a condition for exemption, the 2010 CHED Memorandum simply requires the
submission of "a certification or proof of attendance/participation duly signed by their
pastor, priest, minister or religious leader for periods of absence from classes, work or
school activities."[56] Again, the salient portions of the Certification dated September 15,
2014 reads:
As Seventh-day Adventists, we uphold our observance of the Saturday Sabbath as a

day of worship and rest from labor, observing the sacredness of the Lord's day from
sunset Friday to sunset Saturday. We do away with secular activities like working in the
office or field/attending classes/participating/attending non-religious functions during
Saturday.
This certification is issued to support his request for exemption from all his Sabbath
(from sunset Friday to sunset Saturday) classes, exams, and other non-religious
activities.[57] (Emphasis in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The cited certification needs little or no interpretation: petitioner Valmores, as a bona
fide member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, is expected to miss "all his Sabbath
x x x classes [and] exams" due to his observance of the Sabbath day as a day of
worship. There is nothing in the 2010 CHED Memorandum that prohibits the certification
from being issued before the period of absence from class. Even then, the Certification
dated September 15, 2014 is broad enough to cover both past and future Sabbath days
for which petitioner Valmores would be absent.
It is likewise well to note that respondents, by placing the sufficiency of the Certification
dated September 15, 2014 in issue, in effect admitted the ministerial nature of the duty
imposed upon HEIs. By raising such defense, respondents admitted to the existence of
a concomitant duty to exempt and that such duty on their part would have been called
for had petitioner Valmores submitted a correct certification.
Significantly, respondents never even asserted, much less mentioned, their right to
academic freedom in any of their submissions before the Court. Neither was there any
resistance to exempt petitioner Valmores from the CHED Regional Office, Region X, or
Dr. Muslim, the President of MSU, grounded on MSU's institutional independence. In
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fact, that Dr. Muslim explicitly ordered respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED
Memorandum[58] further underscores the ministerial nature of the duty of HEIs to exempt
affected students.
Thus, to recapitulate, once the required certification or proof is submitted, the concerned
HEI is enjoined to exempt the affected student from attending or participating in
school-related activities if such activities are in conflict with their religious obligations. As
to whether HEIs will require remedial work or not, the Court finds the same to be
already within their discretion, so long as the remedial work required is within the
bounds of school rules and regulations and that the same will not affect the grades of
the concerned students.
For these reasons, the Court finds that respondents were duty bound to enforce the
2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of petitioner Valmores
from academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of his Saturday worship.
Their failure to do so is therefore correctible by mandamus.
Respondents violated Petitioner Valmores' right to freedom of religion
The importance of education cannot be overstated. The Court has, on many occasions,
ruled that institutions of higher learning are bound to afford its students a fair opportunity
to complete the course they seek to pursue, barring any violation of school rules by the
students concerned.[59] In erudite fashion, the Court, in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges
of Science and Technology,[60] discussed:
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is

"better educated" than another. Nevertheless, a student's grades are an accepted
approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless
hours of study. The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting where
education is generally the gate pass to employment opportunities and better life;
such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer measures
whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular
profession or trade.
Thus, students expect that upon their payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the
set academic standards, completion of academic requirements and observance
of school rules and regulations, the school would reward them by recognizing
their "completion" of the course enrolled in.[61]
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In the landmark case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu,[62] the Court gave weight to the religious convictions of students who were
members of Jehovah's Witnesses that refused to participate in their school's flag
ceremony. Therein, the Court held that the expulsion of the affected students based on
their religious beliefs would run against the State's duty to protect and promote the right
of all its citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to all:
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the
flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our
part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and
unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education, 106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also
receive training for a vocation or profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism,
respect for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values["] (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as
part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will
bring about the very situation that this court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small
religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
duly constituted authorities.
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where
they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty of the State to "protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education x x x and to make such education
accessible to all" (Sec. 1, Art. XIV).
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72-75, we upheld the
exemption of members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, from the coverage of a closed shop
agreement between their employer and a union because it would violate the teaching of
their church not to join any labor group:
"x x x It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the
land; but when general laws conflict with scruples of conscience, exemptions ought to
Page 86 of 106
be granted unless some 'compelling state interests' intervenes." (Sherbert vs. Berner,
374 U.S. 398, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.)"
We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with
regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs,
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. x x x If they quietly stand at
attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent" (German vs. Barangan, 135
SCRA 514, 517).[63]
Here, in seeking relief, petitioner Valmores argues that he is bound by his religious
convictions to refrain from all secular activities on Saturdays, a day that is deemed holy
by his church.
On the other hand, respondents' refusal to excuse petitioner Valmores from Saturday
classes and examinations fundamentally rests only on the fact that there were other
Seventh-day Adventists who had successfully completed their studies at the
MSU-College of Medicine.[64] Respondents, in their Comment, stated thus:
14. That there are many successful doctors who are members of the Seventh day
Adventist and surely they have sacrificed before they succeeded in their calling as many
Filipinos who shone in their respective fields of study.
15. That we ask ourselves, is the case of Mr. Valmores unique in (sic) its own? Certainly
it is not because we have had students who are member (sic) of the Seventh-Day
Adventist and our College did not have a problem with them. x x x[65]
Without more, respondents' bare arguments crumble against constitutional standards.
As discussed above, the Bill of Rights guarantees citizens the freedom to act on their
individual beliefs and proscribes government intervention unless necessary to protect its
citizens from injury or when public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience requires
it.[66] Thus, as faculty members of the MSU-College of Medicine, respondents herein
were duty-bound to protect and preserve petitioner Valmores' religious freedom.
Even worse, respondents suggest that the "sacrifices" of other students of the common
faith justified their refusal to give petitioner Valmores exceptional treatment. This
Page 87 of 106
is non-sequitur. Respondents brush aside petitioner Valmores' religious beliefs as if it
were subject of compromise; one man's convictions and another man's transgressions
are theirs alone to bear. That other fellow believers have chosen to violate their creed is
irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious discipline, adherence is always the general
rule, and compromise, the exception.
While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights,
the Court fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by
the denial of petitioner Valmores' request for exemption. Neither is there any showing
that petitioner Valmores' absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the rights
of others. Precisely, the 2010 CHED Memorandum was issued to address such conflicts
and prescribes the action to be taken by HEIs should such circumstance arise.
What is certain, as gathered from the foregoing, is that respondents' concerted refusal
to accommodate petitioner Valmores rests mainly on extra-legal grounds, which cannot,
by no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter's constitutionally-enshrined rights. That
petitioner Valmores is being made by respondents to choose between honoring his
religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his religious
freedoms. As the final bulwark of fundamental rights, this Court will not allow such
violation to perpetuate any further.
Conclusion
Every person is free to tread the far territories of their conscience, no matter
where they may lead — for the freedom to believe and act on one's own
convictions and the protection of such freedom extends to all people, from the
theistic to the godless. The State must, as a matter of duty rather than
consequence, guarantee that such pursuit remains unfettered.
As representatives of the State, educational institutions are bound to safeguard the

religious freedom of their students. Thus, to such end, our schools carry the
responsibility to restrict its own academic liberties, should they collide with
constitutionally preferred rights.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr.
Giovanni Cabildo are DIRECTED to enforce the Commission on Higher Education
Memorandum dated November 15, 2010 in the case of petitioner Denmark S. Valmores.
Page 88 of 106
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes:
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-26.
[2]
Id. at 55.
[3]
Id. at 8.
[4]
Id. at 9.
[5]
Id. at 9; Fundamental Belief No. 20, Fundamental Beliefs of Seventh-day Adventists, id. at 36-37.
[6]
Id. at 10.
[7]
Id. at 41-42.
[8]
Id. at 43.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id. at 53.
[11]
Id. at 64.
[12]
See id. at 11.
[13]
Id. at 64.
[14]
Id. at 44.
[15]
Id. at 46.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 45.
[18]
See id. at 14.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id. at 50.
[21]
Id. at 15, 51.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id. at 52-54.
[24]
Id. at 15-16.
[25]
Id. at 16.
[26]
Id. at 63, 65.
[27]
See id. at 65.
[28]
See id. at 64.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id. at 81-96.
[31]
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
[32]
Id., Sec. 4.
[33]
See Ouano v. PGTTInternational Investment Corp., 434 Phil. 28, 34 (2002).
[34]
Id.
[35]
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017, pp. 11-12.
Page 89 of 106
[36]
751 Phil. 301, 331, 333-334 (2015).
[37]
See Spouses Imbongv. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1, 99-100 and 179 (2014).
[38]
See rollo, pp. 19-21.
[39]
Id. at 93-94.
[40]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
[41]
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 37, at 167.
[42]
See id.
[43]
306 Phil. 219 (1994).
[44]
Id. at 232.
[45]
Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, G.R. Nos. 95770 and 95887, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 256, 270.
[46]
Republic Act (RA) No. 7722, entitled AN ACT CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES otherwise known as "Higher Education Act of 1994," approved on May 18,
1994.
[47]
2010 CHED Memorandum, rollo, p. 55.
[48]
See University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 819, 830 (1994).
[49]
Id.
[50]
See Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 273 Phil. 507, 513 (1991).
[51]
Carolino v. Senga, G.R. No. 189649, April 20, 2015, 756 SCRA 55, 70-71.
[52]
RA No. 1893, Sec. 1.RA No. 1893 amended RA No. 1387, further amended by RA No. 3791 and RA No. 3868.
[53]
2010 CHED Memorandum, rollo, p. 55.
[54]
Id. at 64.
[55]
Id. at 90-91.
[56]
Id. at 55.
[57]
Id. at 46.
[58]
Id. at 51.
[59]
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, 485 Phil. 446, 461 (2004).
[60]
Id.
[61]
Id. at 460-461.
[62]
Supra note 45.
[63]
Id. at 271-273.
[64]
Rollo, pp. 64-65.
[65]
Id.
[66]
Ebralinag v. Thea Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, supra note 45, at 271, 273
Page 90 of 106
Freedom of Information
Article III of the Bill of Rights, Section 7 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,

Petitioners,
vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
Page 91 of 106
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,

learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia
and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal

Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a)
Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia
and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually
the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook
friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the

minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Page 92 of 106
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Is there a right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its

users?
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the
latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,

honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined
habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access
to information about a person.
Page 93 of 106
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or

information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To

“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about
the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element
of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will
not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information

about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social Networking
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in
some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question
now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Page 94 of 106
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High
Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so
with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to
protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s
profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the
photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the
Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses,
and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook
extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities
reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about
themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to
privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.
Page 95 of 106
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their
own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to
view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that
it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by
(1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If such
were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends

to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures
or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user
who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook
friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless
of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy
setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a
post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be
said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’ argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it
was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were
mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
Page 96 of 106
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the result may
have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular
post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en
masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
Liberty of Abode and Travel

Article III of the Bill of Rights Section 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS- G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy
is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening
events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
Page 97 of 106
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese
arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to
issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s
power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that
the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property
without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives
them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution,
may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of
the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by
“executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers
by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons… (art VII sections 14-23). Although the constitution outlines
tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect
Page 98 of 106
the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcos are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcos to be allowed to return to the Philippines
cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing
liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law
which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such
request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of
the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist
factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcos in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events
and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current
problem can only be answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcos would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s
the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its
safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to
give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other
state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country.
It is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to all individuals, whether patriot,
homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Page 99 of 106
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to
national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers &
not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to
return to the Philippines.
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be
buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to
restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security,
public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited
all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears
are speculative & military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to
handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security
should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
Marcos v. Manglapus,
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
(Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven,
dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his
family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of
those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and
for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not allow the remains of
Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
Page 100 of 106

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following
arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their
country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she
had exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcos be allowed to return in
the Philippines be granted.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the NEGATIVE.
No, the Marcos were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because
of lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The
threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcos has been viewed to
provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also
called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power.
Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition;
leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power, interpreted in conformity with
other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text
(Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly
granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with
implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She
bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
Page 101 of 106

Post Test
Final Requirements
Other Parts
References:
● http://lawandbar.blogspot.com/2014/05/landmark-case-chua-qua-vs-clave-gr-no-l_2.html
● http://aularegisdigests.blogspot.com/2017/02/gr-no-128845-international-school.html
● https://casedigest.asialighttravel.com/ichong-vs-hernandez/
● http://abugasya.blogspot.com/2011/11/tambasen-vs-people.html
● https://www.lawphil.net/courts/rules/rc_110-127_crim.html
● http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/PHILIPPINE%20CONSTITUTION.pdf
● http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2017/08/2014-case-digest-vivares-v-st-theresas-colleg
e/
● http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.blogspot.com/2011/01/miriam-college-foundation-inc-v-ca-3
48.html
● https://attyrobertdivinagracia.net/tag/bill-of-rights/
● http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63337
● https://batasnatin.com/law-library/political-and-public-international-law/constitutional-law/
1423-marcos-vs-manglapus-gr-no-88211-september-15-1989.html
Page 102 of 106

Unit title
Title of the Lesson
Duration
Introduction
Page 103 of 106

Pre-test
Post Test
Final Requirements
Other Parts
DRAFT ONLY
Page 104 of 106
Page 105 of 106

Intro To Law Readings (Official)

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Intro To Law Readings (Official)

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Unit title

Title of the Lesson

L1: Law Defined

Answer the following questions:

1. What makes law different from morals?

2. What is meant by positive law?

3. Can you give examples of Individual or private law?

4. What makes substantive law different from procedural law?

Lesson Proper/Course Methodology

(1) It is a rule of human conduct;

General Divisions of Law:

Law, in the specific sense, is generally classified into:

In one sense, every law command because it is obligatory; but it commands in

(1) it commands that something be done, in which case it is mandatory;

- is the systematic organization of the law into one or more codes.

- is a collection of laws of the same kind;

Body of legal provisions

-refers to a particular branch of the law.

Reason for Codification of Laws:

Codification in the Philippines

1. How would you define the term “law”?

Revalida or Participant (Students)Verification Process

SUGGESTED READINGS AND WEBSITES

LEGAL ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

L1: Legal Ethics defined

Related jurisprudence decided by the Supreme Court,

To understand the concept of ethical standards in the legal profession;

1. What do you understand by ethical standards?

Lesson Proper/Course Methodology

L2: Sources of Ethical Standards for the Judiciary

For Primary sources we have:

For Secondary Sources:

2. Supreme Court Circularsc.

3. Order/Resolution of other courtsd.

Treatises and Publications

It means any activity, in or out of court,which requires the application of law,

Essential Criteria in Determining Whether a Person is engaged in the Practice of

Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of

Bar- refers to the whole body of attorneys and counsellors

Bench- refers to the whole body of judges and justices.

Admission to the Bar

1. Attorney at law v. attorney-in-fact

Give your analysis on the following legal concepts to wit:

Admission to the Philippine Bar:

Important Amendments made by the Supreme Court on the Rules:

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

Good Moral Character as a Continuing Requirement In the Legal Profession

Grande v. De Silva; En Banc

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

Duty to the Court: Negligence of a lawyer

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

Supreme Court held:

Case No. 3: Basas vs Icawat : AC 4282 : August 24, 2000 : J. Quisumbing

Both are clear violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Aromin, et al. v. Boncavil, A. C. No. 5135,

Case No. 3: Teodoro R. Rivera vs. Atty. Sergio Angeles

A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member

However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of

Case No. 6: IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562, 02/18/1970)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of

CASE NO. 7: G.R. No. L-21965 August 30, 1968

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or