Sa Bed Colleg of Law

POLITICAL LAW REVIEWER

“Therefore, my dear brothers and sisters, in eminent domain, the

stand firm. Let nothing move you. Always
give yourselves fully to the work of the
Lord, because you know that your labor in
the Lord is not in vain.”
1 Corinthians 15:58
PART 6
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
3 INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE
1. Police power;
2. Power of eminent domain; and
3. Power of taxation
WHAT IS POLICE POWER?
● It is the power of the State to
regulate liberty, and property for
the promotion of general welfare.
WHAT IS POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN?
● It is the power of the State to
forcibly acquire private property,
upon payment of just
compensation, for some for public
use.
compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken;
in taxation, the compensation that
the taxpayer gets from the taxes
paid is public service, protection
and infrastructure
3. Police power and power of
taxation can only be exercised by
the government - Congress,
President, and other
administrative agencies; while
power of eminent domain can be
delegated to private entities or
quasi-public corporation
4. In police power, while property
can be taken, only properties
which are noxious or intended for
noxious purposes can be taken.
The taking is for destruction or
condemnation; while in taxation
and power of eminent domain, the
property taken is wholesome and
the purpose is for public use or
public purpose
1. POLICE POWER

WHAT IS POWER OF TAXATION? DEFINITION

● It is the power to demand from the ● The state’s authority to enact
members of society their legislation that may interfere with
proportionate share or personal liberty or property for
contribution in the maintenance of the common good
the government. ● The power to promote the general
welfare by restraining or
SIMILARITIES regulating the use of liberty and
1. They are inherent - do not need property (Professor Freund)
express constitutional conferment
2. They are means by which the State ELEMENTS
interferes with property rights 1. An imposition of restraint upon
3. They presupposes equivalent liberty or property; and
compensation 2. The purpose is for the common
4. They are exercised primarily by good
the legislature
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF POLICE
DIFFERENCES POWER IN THE CASE OF PASEI VS
1. Police power covers both liberty DRILON?
and property, while the other 2 ● The power of the state to promote
inherent powers only cover public welfare by regulating or
property rights restraining the use of liberty or
2. In police power, the just private property
compensation is the altruistic
feeling that the individual has
contributed to the common good;

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IN THE CASE OF PASEI VS DRILON, THE
SC SAID THAT POLICE POWER IS NOT
CAPABLE OF EXACT DEFINITION. WHY?
● In order to underscore its
all-comprehensive embrace.
Note: The police power of the State
is a power coextensive with
self-protection, and it is not inaptly
termed the 'law of overwhelming
necessity’
THE SC SAID IN PASEI VS DRILON THAT
POLICE POWER CONSTITUTES AN
IMPLIED LIMITATION TO THE BILL OF
RIGHTS. WHY?
● Because even the Bill of rights
does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and
liberties. Even liberty itself is not
an unrestricted license to act
according to one’s will.
IS RIGHT TO TRAVEL IN THE CASE OF
PASEI VS DRILON, A LAWFUL EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER?
● Yes it is within the scope of police
power
CAN THIS EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
BE DELEGATED?
● Yes while it is inherent in
congress, this power may be
delegated under a valid delegation.
PASEI v. DRILON
FACTS: The petitioner, Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and
Employment, in the character of
"GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC
AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,".
Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;"
that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;" and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being
legislative, and not executive, in
character.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on
March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in
the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway,
Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting
the validity of the challenged "guidelines,"
the Solicitor General invokes the police
power of the Philippine State.
ISSUE: Whether or not Department
Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police
power measure
HELD: YES. The concept of police power
is well-established in this jurisdiction. It
has been defined as the "state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined,
it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to
foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to
anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.
It finds no specific Constitutional grant
for the plain reason that it does not owe
its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is
inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute
of government that has enabled it to
perform the most vital functions of
governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the
State "to govern its citizens."
The police power of the State ... is
a power coextensive with self- protection,
and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to
be that inherent and plenary power in the
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State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.
It constitutes an implied limitation
on the Bill of Rights. According to
Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception
that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations
to safeguard constitutional rights did not
intend thereby to enable an individual
citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and
welfare." Significantly, the Bill of Rights
itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act
according to one's will." It is subject to the
far more overriding demands and
requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive
sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised
arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise,
and in that event, it defeats the purpose
for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the
power is used to further private interests
at the expense of the citizenry, there is a
clear misuse of the power.
4 CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICE
POWER
1. Most positive and active of all
government processes
2. Most essential
3. Insistent
4. Illimitable
THE SUPREME COURT SAID THAT
THERE CAN BE NO ABSOLUTE POWER
AND YET THERE COULD BE NO
ABSOLUTE LIBERTY. WHY?
● Because there can be no absolute
power, whoever exercises it, for
that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and
anarchy.
WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF POLICE
POWER?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● The Police power of the state is far
reaching in scope. It is co
extensive with self-protection and
preservation and as such it is the
most positive existent and
illimitable.
ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
Police power is far-reaching in
scope, and it is almost impossible to limit
its sweep. It derives its existence from the
very existence of the State itself, and does
not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope. It is said to be co-extensive with
self-protection and survival, and as such
it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the
demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police
power has become almost boundless, just
as the fields of public interest and public
welfare have become almost
all-embracing and have transcended
human foresight.
The conflict between police power
and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more
apparent than real. Properly related, the
power and the guarantees are supposed
to coexist. The balancing is the essence,
or the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no
absolute power, whoever exercises it, for
that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would
mean license and anarchy. So the State
can deprive persons of life, liberty or
property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into
classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The
test or standard, as always, is the reason.
The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must
exist between purposes and means. And if
a distinction or classification has been
made, there must be a reasonable basis
for said distinction.
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Police power is subject to limitations. It
can be exercised as long as it is not
arbitrary or unreasonable
IN THE CASE OF ICHONG VS
HERNANDEZ THE ISSUE HERE IS THE
VALIDITY OF THE RETAIL TRADE ACT
WHICH REGULATE RETAIL TRADE AND
LOCALIZE THE RETAIL TRADE. WHY IS
IT A VALID GOVERNMENTAL ACT?
● Because it is a vital industry. There
is a high risk if it would rest in the
hands of alien retailers.
HOW ABOUT COMMERCIAL
DOCUMENTS LIKE CHECK ACCORDING
TO THE CASE OF LOZANO?
● Yes because it is considered as
substitutes for money and for the
government not to regulate these
commercial documents would
have the effect of impairing the
dignity of banking transaction
2 TESTS FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER (Lozano v. Martinez)
1. Lawful subject
● The interest of the public
generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular
class, requires the
interference of the state
2. Lawful means
● There must be a rational
connection between the
object of the law and the
means employed. It must
not be unduly oppressive
upon individuals
IS IT ENOUGH FOR A GOVERNMENTAL
ACT TO PASS ONLY ONE OF THE 2
TESTS?
● NO. Both tests must concur. (Ynot
v. IAC)
IN THE CASE OF YNOT, UNDER EO 626
ONLY 7 YEAR OLD MALE CARABAO MAY
BE SLAUGHTERED, ONLY 11 YEAR OLD
CARABAO MAY BE SLAUGHTERED. EO
626 A, HAS THE SAME OBJECTIVE AS
THAT OF EO 626 WHICH HAVE
ALREADY BEEN SUSTAINED BY THE SC,
EO 626 A SHOULD ALSO BE
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
CONSIDERED AS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER. DID THE SC AGREE?
● No. Under EO 626 A there is no
rational connection between the
object of the law and the means
employed. The objective of the law
is to prevent the indiscriminate
slaughtering of Carabaos and the
means employed by EO 626 A is
the prohibition of transportation
of Carabaos and Carabeefs from
one province to another. There is
no nexus between the two since
for the carabao to stay in one
province does not increase in
protection because it can be
slaughtered in that province easily
as in any other province. In the
same manner, the transfer of the
carabao does not increase the risk
of slaughter.
YNOT v. IAC
A similar prohibition was
challenged in United States v. Toribio,
where a law regulating the registration,
branding and slaughter of large cattle was
claimed to be a deprivation of property
without due process of law. The
defendant had been convicted thereunder
for having slaughtered his own carabao
without the required permit, and he
appealed to the Supreme Court. The
conviction was affirmed. The law was
sustained as a valid police measure to
prevent the indiscriminate killing of
carabaos, which were then badly needed
by farmers. An epidemic had stricken
many of these animals and the reduction
of their number had resulted in an acute
decline in agricultural output, which in
turn had caused an incipient famine.
Furthermore, because of the scarcity of
the animals and the consequent increase
in their price, cattle-rustling had spread
alarmingly, necessitating more effective
measures for the registration and
branding of these animals. The Court held
that the questioned statute was a valid
exercise of the police power and declared
in part as follows:
"To justify the State in thus
interposing its authority in behalf of
the public, it must appear, first, that
the interests of the public generally,
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as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose,
and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
"From what has been said, we think
it is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by `the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a
particular class' and that the
prohibition of the slaughter of
carabaos for human consumption,
so long as these animals are fit for
agricultural work or draft purposes
was a `reasonably necessary'
limitation on private ownership, to
protect the community from the
loss of the services of such animals
by their slaughter by improvident
owners, tempted either by greed of
momentary gain, or by a desire to
enjoy the luxury of animal food,
even when by so doing the
productive power of the
community may be measurably and
dangerously affected."
In the light of the tests mentioned
above, we hold with the Toribio Case that
the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so
to speak, has a direct relevance to the
public welfare and so is a lawful subject of
Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also
reasonably necessary for the purpose
sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There
is no doubt that by banning the slaughter
of these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven
years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will
be conserving those still fit for farm work
or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.
But while conceding that the
amendatory measure has the same lawful
subject as the original executive order, we
cannot say with equal certainty that it
complies with the second requirement,
viz., that there be a lawful method. We
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note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A
imposes an absolute ban not on the
slaughter of the carabaos but on their
movement, providing that "no carabao
regardless of age, sex, physical condition
or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to
another." The object of the prohibition
escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition
of the interprovincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in
one province than in another. Obviously,
retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any
more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them
there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition
is made to apply to it as otherwise, so
says executive order, it could be easily
circumvented by simply killing the animal.
Perhaps so. However, if the movement of
the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is
no reason either to prohibit their transfer
as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation
between the means and the end were to
be assumed, we would still have to reckon
with the sanction that the measure
applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported, to
be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio
Case, the statute was sustained because
the penalty prescribed was fine and
imprisonment, to be imposed by the court
after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed,
and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and
declared, by the measure itself, as
forfeited to the government
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WHAT IS A LAWFUL SUBJECT OF
POLICE POWER?
● Anything that affects public
interest
● Right to travel is a lawful subject of
police power (PASEI v. Drilon)
● A legitimate retail business is a
lawful subject of police power
(Ichong v. Hernandez)
● Choice of a profession is a lawful
subject of police power (DECS v.
San Diego)
DECS v. SAN DIEGO
FACTS: Respondent San Diego has
flunked the NMAT (National Medical
Admission Test) three times. When he
applied to take again, petitioner rejected
his application based on the
“three-flunk-rule”. He then filed a
petition before the RTC on the ground of
due process and equal protection and
challenging the constitutionality of the
order. The petition was granted by the
RTC therefore this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NMAT
“three-flunk-rule” order is valid and
constitutional.
HELD: YES. We see no reason why the
rationale in the Tablarin case cannot
apply to the case at bar. The issue raised
in both cases is the academic preparation
of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and,
indeed with more reliability, by the
three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be
regarded any less valid than the former in
the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the
police power of the State. Suffice it to
repeat that the power is validly exercised
if (a) the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper
exercise of the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method. The subject of the
challenged regulation is certainly within
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive.
The three-flunk rule is intended to
insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from
the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors.
While every person is entitled to
aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a
constitutional right to be a doctor. This is
true of any other calling in which the
public interest is involved; and the closer
the link, the longer the bridge to one’s
ambition. The State has the responsibility
to harness its human resources and to see
to it that they are not dissipated or, no
less worse, not used at all. These
resources must be applied in a manner
that will best promote the common good
while also giving the individual a sense of
satisfaction.
The contention that the challenged
rule violates the equal protection clause is
not well-taken. A law does not have to
operate with equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution. There can
be no question that a substantial
distinction exists between medical
students and other students who are not
subjected to the NMAT and the
three-flunk rule. The medical profession
directly affects the very lives of the
people, unlike other careers which, for
this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation. The accountant, for example,
while belonging to an equally respectable
profession, does not hold the same
delicate responsibility as that of the
physician and so need not be similarly
treated. There would be unequal
protection if some applicants who have
passed the tests are admitted and others
who have also qualified are denied
entrance. In other words, what the equal
protection requires is equality among
equals.
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ATTY GAB: the SC compared lawyer to a
plumber. Do you see any relation to the
comparison? Or just a random one?
There is an underlying message to that.
The SC did not intend to deride
plumbing as a profession because both
professions are noble. But the SC was
just telling the student that if one has
the capacity or potential to become a
problem solver, he should be advised
because what do lawyers do in the
exercise of their profession, they file
multiple cases in order to protect the
interest of their client, and what is the
result of filing cases, it clogs the court
docket. What do plumbers do? They
remove the obstruction in order to
maintain the free flow of water.
The SC is saying that if have the
capacity or potential to become a
problem solver, the State must interfere
and determine your capacity so that we
may not become a society of misfits or
square pegs in round holes
WHY? WHAT IS THE REASON GIVEN BY
THE SC IN SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY
OF THE 3 FLUNK RULE UNDER THE
NMAT TEST?
● Yes. It is the responsibility of the
state to ensure that the medical
profession will not be infiltrated
with incompetents to whom the
patients and ward entrust their
lives. A person cannot insist on
being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patient. If a person
who wants to be a lawyer may be
proved better to be a plumber, he
should be so advised. Of course he
cannot be compelled to be a
plumber and yet he cannot force
his entry into the bar.
DOES THE EXERCISE OF ONE OF THE
INHERENT POWERS EXCLUDE THE
OTHERS?
● The traditional principle of the
inherent powers is that they are
mutually exclusive. The exercise of
police power would be to the
exclusion of eminent domain and
power of taxation. (City of Baguio
v. NAWASA)
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● HOWEVER, the traditional
principle has already been
abandoned in the case of Lutz v.
Araneta. Thus, the 3 inherent
powers can co-exist or be used
simultaneously as an implement or
complement each other.
LUTZ v. ARANETA
FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his
capacity as judicial administrator of the
intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,
sought to recover from the CIR the sum
of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes,
under section 3 of the CA 567 or the Sugar
Adjustment Act thereby assailing its
constitutionality, for it provided for an
increase of the existing tax on the
manufacture of sugar, alleging that such
enactment is not being levied for a public
purpose but solely and exclusively for the
aid and support of the sugar industry thus
making it void and unconstitutional. The
sugar industry situation at the time of the
enactment was in an imminent threat of
loss and needed to be stabilized by
imposition of emergency measures.
ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite
its being allegedly violative of the equal
protection clause, the purpose of which is
not for the benefit of the general public
but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar
industry?
HELD: Yes. The basic defect in the
plaintiff's position is his assumption that
the tax provided for in Commonwealth
Act No. 567 is a pure exercise of the
taxing power. Analysis of the Act, and
particularly of section 6 (heretofore
quoted in full), will show that the tax is
levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar
industry. In other words, the act is
primarily an exercise of the police power.
This Court can take judicial notice
of the fact that sugar production is one of
the great industries of our nation, sugar
occupying a leading position among its
export products; that it gives employment
to thousands of laborers in fields and
factories; that it is a great source of the
state's wealth, is one of the important
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sources of foreign exchange needed by
our government, and is thus pivotal in the
plans of a regime committed to a policy of
currency stability. Its promotion,
protection and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Hence it was competent for the
legislature to find that the general welfare
demanded that the sugar industry should
be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field
of its police power, the law-making body
could provide that the distribution of
benefits therefrom be readjusted among
its components to enable it to resist the
added strain of the increase in taxes that
it had to sustain.
Once it is conceded, as it must,
that the protection and promotion of the
sugar industry is a matter of public
concern, it follows that the Legislature
may determine within reasonable bounds
what is necessary for its protection and
expedient for its promotion. Here, the
legislative discretion must be allowed full
play, subject only to the test of
reasonableness; and it is not contended
that the means provided in section 6 of
the law (above quoted) bear no relation to
the objective pursued or are oppressive in
character. If objective and methods are
alike constitutionally valid, no reason is
seen why the state may not be levy taxes
to raise funds for their prosecution and
attainment. Taxation may be made the
implement of the state's police power.
WHEN CAN WE SAY THAT A TAX
MEASURE IS ENACTED BY THE STATE
IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE
POWER USING ITS POWER OF
TAXATION AS AN IMPLEMENT AND
WHEN CAN WE SAY THAT IT IS ONLY
AN EXERCISE OF POWER OF
TAXATION?
● If the objective of a tax measure is
to regulate an activity or a taxable
article, it is in exercise of police
power, using only the power of
taxation as an implement. If the
objective is to raise revenue, the
tax measure is enacted in the
discharge of exclusive and pure
power of taxation.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
SMALL LANDOWNERS v. SAR
There are traditional distinctions
between the police power and the power
of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the
same time on the same subject. In the
case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for
example, where a law required the
transfer of all municipal waterworks
systems to the NAWASA in exchange for
its assets of equivalent value, the Court
held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for
a public use. Property condemned under
the police power is noxious or intended
for a noxious purpose, such as a building
on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals.
The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the
owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, Justice Holmes laid down
the limits of the police power in a famous
aphorism: "The general rule at least is that
while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law
prohibiting mining which might cause the
subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land
surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a
deed to the land over its mine but
reserved all mining rights thereunder,
with the grantee assuming all risks and
waiving any damage claim. The Court held
the law could not be sustained without
compensating the grantor. Justice
Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he
argued that there was a valid exercise of
the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of
property imposed in the exercise of
the police power deprives the owner
of some right theretofore enjoyed,
and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the State of rights in property
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without making compensation. But
restriction imposed to protect the
public health, safety or morals from
dangers threatened is not a taking.
The restriction here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious
use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its
owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it.
The state merely prevents the owner
from making a use which interferes
with paramount rights of the public.
Whenever the use prohibited ceases
to be noxious — as it may because of
further changes in local or social
conditions — the restriction will
have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his
property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would
indicate not a polarization but a mingling
of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being
used as an implement of the former like
the power of taxation. The employment of
the taxing power to achieve a police
purpose has long been accepted. As for
the power of expropriation, Prof. John J.
Costonis of the University of Illinois
College of Law (referring to the earlier
case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US
365, which sustained a zoning law under
the police power) makes the following
significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an
era when judges located the police
and eminent domain powers on
different planets. Generally
speaking, they viewed eminent
domain as encompassing public
acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be
available for "public use," literally
construed. To the police power, on
the other hand, they assigned the
less intrusive task of preventing
harmful externalities, a point
reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance
law to bolster its support of zoning.
So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible
relation to some legitimate "public
purpose," the pertinent measure
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
need have afforded no
compensation whatever. With the
progressive growth of government's
involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers
has contracted considerably. Today
government often employs eminent
domain interchangeably with or as a
useful complement to the police
power — a trend expressly approved
in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision
in Berman v. Parker, which
broadened the reach of eminent
domain's "public use" test to match
that of the police power's standard
of "public purpose."
The cases before us present no
knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of the police power
for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own
in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is
not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of
the said excess and all beneficial rights
accruing to the owner in favor of the
farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.
WHEN CAN WE SAY THAT A TAX
MEASURE IS ENACTED IN THE
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER USING
ONLY THE POWER OF TAXATION AS AN
IMPLEMENT? WHEN CAN WE SAY THAT
A TAX MEASURE IS ENACTED IN THE
EXERCISE OF POWER OF TAXATION?
● It depends on the objective. If the
objective is to regulate an activity
or an article, the power exercised
by the Congress is police power
using the power of taxation as an
instrument. If the purpose of the
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tax measure is to raise revenue,
the power involved in this case is
the power of taxation.
SINCE POWER OF TAXATION CAN BE
USED AS AN INSTRUMENT OR
IMPLEMENT, CAN WE ALSO SAY THE
SAME THING WITH RESPECT TO
EMINENT DOMAIN?
● Power of eminent domain cannot
be used as an implement, but as a
complement, of police power.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IMPLEMENT
AND COMPLEMENT
● Implement means that the power
is used only as an instrument;
complement on the other hand
means it is used simultaneously
together with another power. Read
Association of Small Landowners
v. SEC of DAR
CAN POLICE POWER BE EXERCISED TO
TAKE OR CONFISCATE PROPERTY?
● YES. However, there are only
specific types of property that can
be taken in the exercise of police
power
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ
The police power of the state has
been described as "the most essential,
insistent and illimitable of powers" which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
It is a power not emanating from or
conferred by the constitution, but
inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably
vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon
the government limitations to safeguard
constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable individual citizens or
group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures to ensure communal
peace, safety, good order and welfare."
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC v. ERICTA
FACTS: An ordinance was promulgated in
Quezon city which approved the
regulation of establishment of private
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
cemeteries in the said city. According to
the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the
private memorial park shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents
of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking
or confiscation of property restricts the
use of property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of
his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police
power, since the properties taken in the
exercise of police power are destroyed
and not for the benefit of the public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance
made by Quezon City is a valid taking of
private property
HELD: NO. An examination of the Charter
of Quezon City (Rep. Act No. 537), does
not reveal any provision that would justify
the ordinance in question except the
provision granting police power to the
City. Section 9 cannot be justified under
the power granted to Quezon City to tax,
fix the license fee, and regulate such
other business, trades, and occupation as
may be established or practised in the
City. The power to regulate does not
include the power to prohibit or
confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.
The expropriation without
compensation of a portion of private
cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t)
of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter
of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead
within the center of population of the city
and to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general
law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in
Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may “provide for the burial of
the dead in such place and in such
manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriate private properties to
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construct public cemeteries. This has
been the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance
is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities
from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to
home-owners.
The police power being the most
active power of the government and the
due process clause being the broadest
limitation on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of
government and the due process clause of
the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing
authorities that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation
or restriction in the use of liberty or
property for the promotion of the general
welfare. It does not involve the taking or
confiscation of property with the
exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property
in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for
instance, the confiscation of an illegally
possessed article, such as opium and
firearms.
It seems to the court that Section
9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police
regulation but an outright confiscation. It
deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even
without compensation.
CURRENTLY WE HAVE A LAW WHICH
PROHIBITS THE POSSESSION OF
ILLEGAL SUBSTANCES AND ANYONE
FOUND TO BE IN POSSESSION OF
THESE SUBSTANCES MAY FACE
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
CRIMINAL SANCTION. IS THAT
REGULATION OR IS THAT TAKING?
● Properties may not only be
regulated but may also be taken in
the exercise of police power. The
only difference is that only
properties intended for noxious
purpose may be taken under police
power.
IN THE CASE OF QUEZON CITY VS
ERICTA, THE LGU IMPOSED A
COMPULSORY DONATION OF 6% OF
TOTAL AREA OF EVERY MEMORIAL
PARK IN THE CITY TO BE USED FOR
THE BURIAL OF THE PAUPER
RESIDENTS. IT INTENDS TO EXERCISE
ITS POLICE POWER FOR THE
COMPULSORY DONATION. DID THE SC
ALLOW IT?
● No it is not in the exercise of
Police Power. The taking of private
property is for public use, it
amounts to taking in the exercise
of Eminent Domain.
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF TAKING IN
POLICE POWER?
● The purpose is for regulation and
for the property to be destroyed.
IN THE CASE OF MANILA MEMORIAL
PARK VS. DSWD, THIS INVOLVES THE
GRANT OF DISCOUNT TO SENIOR
CITIZEN, PRIOR TO ITS AMENDMENT,
ANY DISCOUNT EXTENDED BY A
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE TO SENIOR
CITIZEN WILL BE CONSIDERED AS TAX
CREDIT. SO MEANING WHEN THE
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EXTENDED 20
PESOS DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZEN,
THAT 20 PESOS DISCOUNT WILL BE
DEDUCTED FROM THEIR TAX DUE, BUT
WHEN THE LAW WAS AMENDED THE
DISCOUNT WAS ONLY TREATED AS
DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE PRIOR TO TAX
WHICH MEANS THAT THE PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE WILL NOT RECOVER
EVERYTHING, IT CAN ONLY RECOVER
UPTO 32%. 68% EXTENDED WILL NOT
BE RECOVERED ANYMORE SO THE
PETITIONER CONTEND THAT THERE IS
UNDUE TAKING WITHOUT PAYMENT
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OF COMPENSATION. DID THE SC
AGREE?
● No the SC said that there was no
taking involved. The regulation is
in the exercise of police power.
The court held that while the
Constitution protects property
rights, the petitioners must accept
the realities of business and the
State, in the exercise of police
power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of
property rights in the process.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. DSWD
FACTS: RA 7432 was passed into law
(amended by RA 9257), granting senior
citizens 20% discount on certain
establishments.
To implement the tax provisions of
RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance and the
DSWD issued its own Rules and
Regulations.
Petitioners are not questioning the
20% discount granted to senior citizens
but are only assailing the constitutionality
of the tax deduction scheme prescribed
under RA 9257 and the implementing
rules and regulations issued by the DSWD
and the DOF.
Petitioners posit that the tax
deduction scheme contravenes Article III,
Section 9 of the Constitution, which
provides that: "private property shall not
be taken for public use without just
compensation."
Respondents maintain that the tax
deduction scheme is a legitimate exercise
of the State’s police power.
ISSUE: Is the imposition of 20% discount
for senior citizens an exercise of the
power of eminent domain, which requires
the payment of just compensation?
HELD: NO. The present case, thus, affords
an opportunity for us to clarify the
above-quoted statements in Central
Luzon Drug Corporation, 456 SCRA 414
(2005) and Carlos Superdrug Corporation,
526 SCRA 130 (2007). First, we note that
the abovequoted disquisition on eminent
domain in Central Luzon Drug
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Corporation is obiter dicta and, thus, not
binding precedent. As stated earlier, in
Central Luzon Drug Corporation, we
ruled that the BIR acted ultra vires when
it effectively treated the 20% discount as
a tax deduction, under Sections 2.i and 4
of RR No. 2- 94, despite the clear wording
of the previous law that the same should
be treated as a tax credit. We were,
therefore, not confronted in that case
with the issue as to whether the 20%
discount is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain. Second, although we
adverted to Central Luzon Drug
Corporation in our ruling in Carlos
Superdrug Corporation, this referred only
to preliminary matters. A fair reading of
Carlos Superdrug Corporation would
show that we categorically ruled therein
that the 20% discount is a valid exercise
of police power. Thus, even if the current
law, through its tax deduction scheme
(which abandoned the tax credit scheme
under the previous law), does not provide
for a peso for peso reimbursement of the
20% discount given by private
establishments, no constitutional
infirmity obtains because, being a valid
exercise of police power, payment of just
compensation is not warranted. We have
carefully reviewed the basis of our ruling
in Carlos Superdrug Corporation and we
find no cogent reason to overturn, modify
or abandon it. We also note that
petitioners’ arguments are a mere
reiteration of those raised and resolved in
Carlos Superdrug Corporation. Thus, we
sustain Carlos Superdrug Corporation.
Police power is the inherent power
of the State to regulate or to restrain the
use of liberty and property for public
welfare. The only limitation is that the
restriction imposed should be reasonable,
not oppressive. In other words, to be a
valid exercise of police power, it must
have a lawful subject or objective and a
lawful method of accomplishing the goal.
Under the police power of the State,
“property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the
government.” The State “may interfere
with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare [as long as] the
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interference [is] reasonable and not
arbitrary.” Eminent domain, on the other
hand, is the inherent power of the State
to take or appropriate private property
for public use. The Constitution, however,
requires that private property shall not be
taken without due process of law and the
payment of just compensation.
In the exercise of police power, a
property right is impaired by regulation,
or the use of property is merely
prohibited, regulated or restricted to
promote public welfare. In such cases,
there is no compensable taking, hence,
payment of just compensation is not
required. Examples of these regulations
are property condemned for being
noxious or intended for noxious purposes
(e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to
be demolished for public safety, or
obscene materials to be destroyed in the
interest of public morals) as well as
zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of
property for purposes injurious to the
health, morals or safety of the community
(e.g., dividing a city’s territory into
residential and industrial areas). It has,
thus, been observed that, in the exercise
of police power (as distinguished from
eminent domain), although the regulation
affects the right of ownership, none of the
bundle of rights which constitute
ownership is appropriated for use by or
for the benefit of the public.
It may not always be easy to
determine whether a challenged
governmental act is an exercise of police
power or eminent domain. The very
nature of police power as elastic and
responsive to various social conditions as
well as the evolving meaning and scope of
public use and just compensation in
eminent domain evinces that these are
not static concepts. Because of the
exigencies of rapidly changing times,
Congress may be compelled to adopt or
experiment with different measures to
promote the general welfare which may
not fall squarely within the traditionally
recognized categories of police power
and eminent domain. The judicious
approach, therefore, is to look at the
nature and effects of the challenged
governmental act and decide, on the basis
thereof, whether the act is the exercise of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
police power or eminent domain. Thus,
we now look at the nature and effects of
the 20% discount to determine if it
constitutes an exercise of police power or
eminent domain.
The Dissent discusses at length the
doctrine on “taking” in police power
which occurs when private property is
destroyed or placed outside the
commerce of man. Indeed, there is a
whole class of police power measures
which justify the destruction of private
property in order to preserve public
health, morals, safety or welfare. As
earlier mentioned, these would include a
building on the verge of collapse or
confiscated obscene materials as well as
those mentioned by the Dissent with
regard to property used in violating a
criminal statute or one which constitutes
a nuisance. In such cases, no
compensation is required. However, it is
equally true that there is another class of
police power measures which do not
involve the destruction of private
property but merely regulate its use. The
minimum wage law, zoning ordinances,
price control laws, laws regulating the
operation of motels and hotels, laws
limiting the working hours to eight, and
the like would fall under this category.
The examples cited by the Dissent,
likewise, fall under this category: Article
157 of the Labor Code, Sections 19 and 18
of the Social Security Law, and Section 7
of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law. These laws
merely regulate or, to use the term of the
Dissent, burden the conduct of the affairs
of business establishments. In such cases,
payment of just compensation is not
required because they fall within the
sphere of permissible police power
measures. The senior citizen discount law
falls under this latter category.
That there may be a burden placed
on business establishments or the
consuming public as a result of the
operation of the assailed law is not, by
itself, a ground to declare it
unconstitutional for this goes into the
wisdom and expediency of the law. The
cost of most, if not all, regulatory
measures of the government on business
establishments is ultimately passed on to
the consumers but that, by itself, does not
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justify the wholesale nullification of these
measures. It is a basic postulate of our
democratic system of government that
the Constitution is a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered
their sovereign powers to the State for
the common good. All persons may be
burdened by regulatory measures
intended for the common good or to
serve some important governmental
interest, such as protecting or improving
the welfare of a special class of people for
which the Constitution affords
preferential concern. Indubitably, the one
assailing the law has the heavy burden of
proving that the regulation is
unreasonable, oppressive or confiscatory,
or has gone “too far” as to amount to a
“taking.” Yet, here, the Dissent would have
this Court nullify the law without any
proof of such nature.
Prior to the sale of goods or
services, a business establishment may be
subject to State regulations, such as the
20% senior citizen discount, which may
impact the level or amount of profits or
income/gross sales that can be generated
by such establishment. For this reason,
the validity of the discount is to be
determined based on its overall effects on
the operations of the business
establishment.
The State has, in the past,
regulated prices and profits of business
establishments. In other words, this type
of regulatory measures is traditionally
recognized as police power measures so
that the senior citizen discount may be
considered as a police power measure as
well. What is more, the substantial
distinctions between price and rate of
return on investment control laws vis-àvis
the senior citizen discount law provide
greater reason to uphold the validity of
the senior citizen discount law. As
previously discussed, the ability to adjust
prices allows the establishment subject to
the senior citizen discount to prevent or
mitigate any reduction of profits or
income/gross sales arising from the
giving of the discount. In contrast,
establishments subject to price and rate
of return on investment control laws
cannot adjust prices accordingly.
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WHAT ARE THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
WHICH CONSTITUTE THE BASIS OF
THIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER?
1. Salus populi est suprema lex (the
interest of the state is the supreme
law)
2. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (use your own property in
such a manner as not to injure that
of another)
NOTE: Both principles call for the
subordination of private interests to the
general welfare
MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA
To be considered as a valid police
power measure, an ordinance must pass a
two-pronged test: the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance is enacted within
the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed
in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law); and the substantive
(i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and
the statutes, as well as with the
requirements of fairness and reason, and
its consistency with public policy).
The corporate powers of the local
government unit confer the basic
authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty, property,
lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote the general welfare.
Such legislative powers spring from the
delegation thereof by Congress through
either the Local Government Code or a
special law. The General Welfare Clause in
Section 16 of the Local Government Code
embodies the legislative grant that
enables the local government unit to
effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of its creation, and to
promote and maintain local autonomy.
A valid ordinance must not only be
enacted within the corporate powers of
the local government and passed
according to the procedure prescribed by
law. In order to declare it as a valid piece
of local legislation, it must also comply
with the following substantive
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requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive;
(3) it must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) it must be
general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) it must not be unreasonable
A local government unit is
considered to have properly exercised its
police powers only if it satisfies the
following requisites, to wit: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the
State; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment
of the object sought to be accomplished
and not unduly oppressive. The first
requirement refers to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
Substantive due process requires
that a valid ordinance must have a
sufficient justification for the
Government’s action. This means that in
exercising police power the local
government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the
ordinance regardless of its salutary
purpose. So long as the ordinance
realistically serves a legitimate public
purpose, and it employs means that are
reasonably necessary to achieve that
purpose without unduly oppressing the
individuals regulated, the ordinance must
survive a due process challenge.
Section 5(c) of the Local
Government Code accords a liberal
interpretation to its general welfare
provisions. The policy of liberal
construction is consistent with the spirit
of local autonomy that endows local
government units with sufficient power
and discretion to accelerate their
economic development and uplift the
quality of life for their constituents.
Because the police power of the
local government units flows from the
express delegation of power by Congress,
its exercise is to be construed in
strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the terms used in granting
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
the power should be construed against
the local legislative units.
Although the Local Government
Code vests the municipal corporations
with sufficient power to govern
themselves and manage their affairs and
activities, they definitely have no right to
enact ordinances dissonant with the
State’s laws and policy.
The Local Government Code has
been fashioned to delineate the specific
parameters and limitations to guide each
local government unit in exercising its
delegated powers with the view of making
the local government unit a fully
functioning subdivision of the State
within the constitutional and statutory
restraints. The Local Government Code is
not intended to vest in the local
government unit the blanket authority to
legislate upon any subject that it finds
proper to legislate upon in the guise of
serving the common good.
The enumerated devolved
functions to the local government units
do not include the regulation and control
of pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals. The noninclusion should
preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao
City from enacting Ordinance No.
0309-07, for otherwise it would be
arrogating unto itself the authority to
prohibit the aerial application of
pesticides in derogation of the authority
expressly vested in the FPA by
Presidential Decree No. 1144.
For sure, every local government
unit only derives its legislative authority
from Congress. In no instance can the
local government unit rise above its
source of authority. As such, its ordinance
cannot run against or contravene existing
laws, precisely because its authority is
only by virtue of the valid delegation from
Congress.
Devoid of the specific delegation
to its local legislative body, the City of
Davao exceeded its delegated authority to
enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence,
Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck
down for being an ultra vires act on the
part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao
City.
The principle of precaution
appearing in the Rules of Procedure for
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Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC) involves matters of evidence in cases
where there is a lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and
environmental effect. In such an event,
the courts may construe a set of facts as
warranting either judicial action or
inaction with the goal of preserving and
protecting the environment.
The precautionary principle shall
only be relevant if there is concurrence of
three elements, namely: uncertainty,
threat of environmental damage and
serious or irreversible harm. In
situations where the threat is relatively
certain, or that the causal link between an
action and environmental damage can be
established, or the probability of
occurrence can be calculated, only
preventive, not precautionary measures,
may be taken.
We should not apply the
precautionary approach in sustaining the
ban against aerial spraying if little or
nothing is known of the exact or potential
dangers that aerial spraying may bring to
the health of the residents within and
near the plantations and to the integrity
and balance of the environment. It is
dangerous to quickly presume that the
effects of aerial spraying would be
adverse even in the absence of evidence.
2. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
WHAT IS THIS POWER ALL ABOUT?
● It is the right, authority or power
of the State as sovereign, or of
those to whom the power has been
lawfully delegated to take private
property for public use upon
observance of due process of law
and paying for the owner a just
compensation to be ascertained
according to law.
EMINENT DOMAIN IS SOMETIMES
REFERRED TO AS THE POWER OF
EXPROPRIATION. CAN WE SAY THAT
EMINENT DOMAIN IS THE SAME AS
EXPROPRIATION?
● NO. Rule 67 Sec 1 provides that
“The right of eminent domain shall
be exercised by the filing of a
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
verified complaint…” Said
complaint is a petition for
expropriation
● Power of eminent domain refers to
the inherent power to take private
property. While the power of
expropriation is the remedy that
must be resorted to by the State in
exercising the power of eminent
domain.
THE POWER OF EMINENT IS THE
HIGHEST AND MOST EXACT IDEA OF
PROPERTY REMAINING IN THE
GOVERNMENT. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
● Because under this power, all
properties are reserved to the
government. That whenever these
private properties will be needed
by the government at some future
time, the government may take
these properties for public use
upon payment of just
compensation.
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE EXERCISE
OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN?
CAN WE SAY THAT SEC 9, ART 3; SEC. 18,
ART 12, CONSTITUTION , ARE THE
BASES?
● NO. The power of eminent domain
does not need a constitutional
provision. Said provisions are
limitations on the exercise
● Sec. 9, Art 3 applies to all
properties in general; Sec 18, Art 12
on the other hand applies to public
utilities.
WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN?
● It originates from necessity.
IS QUESTION OF NECESSITY A
JUSTICIABLE QUESTION? A
CONTROVERSY THAT CAN BE
ADJUDICATED BY THE COURT OF
JUSTICE?
● It depends. If exercised by
Congress, it is a political question.
If exercised by a delegate under
specific delegation (the Congress
determines the property, purpose,
and its use), it is also a political
question. However, if it is
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exercised by a delegate under
general delegation it becomes a
justiciable question. (City of
Manila v. Chinese Community)
CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE
COMMUNITY
FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff
herein, prayed for the expropriation of a
portion private cemetery for the
conversion into an extension of Rizal
Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is
necessary that such public improvements
be made in the said portion of the private
cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.
Defendants herein answered that
the said expropriation was not necessary
because other routes were available. They
further claimed that the expropriation of
the cemetery would create irreparable
loss and injury to them and to all those
persons owing and interested in the
graves and monuments that would have
to be destroyed.
The lower court ruled that the said
public improvement was not necessary on
the particular-strip of land in question.
Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the
right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right
to inquire and determine the necessity of
the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may
inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.
HELD: When a municipal corporation
attempts to expropriate private property
and an objection is made thereto by the
owner, the courts have ample authority,
in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to
hear proof upon an -issue properly
presented, concerning the question
whether or not the purpose of the
appropriation is, in fact, for some public
use. The right of expropriation is not
inherent power in a municipal
corporation and before it can exercise the
right some law must exist conferring the
power upon it. A municipal corporation in
this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public
property. The land to be expropriated
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
must be private, and the purpose of the
expropriation must be public. If the court,
upon trial, finds that neither of said
condition exists, or that either one of
them fails, the right to expropriate does
not exist. If the property is taken in' the
ostensible behalf of a public improvement
which it can never by any possibility
serve, it is being taken for a use not
public, and the owner's constitutional
rights call for protection by the courts.
Upon the other hand, the
Legislature may directly determine the
necessity for appropriating private
property for a particular improvement for
public use, and it may select the exact
location of the improvement. In such a
case, it is well settled that the utility of
the proposed improvement, the existence
of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of
constructing it, the suitableness of the
location selected, and the consequent
necessity of taking the lands selected, are
all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts
have no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for those of
the representatives of the people.
But when the law does not
designate the property to be taken, nor
how much may be taken, then the
necessity of taking private property is a
question for the courts.
There is a wide distinction
between a legislative declaration that a
municipality is given authority to exercise
the right of eminent domain and a
decision by the municipality that there
exists a necessity for the exercise of that
right in a particular case.
Whether or not it was wise,
advisable, or necessary to confer upon a
municipality the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain, is a question
with which the courts are not concerned.
But whenever that right or authority is
exercised for the purpose of depriving
citizens of their property, the courts are
authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make
inquiries and to hear proof upon the
necessity in a particular case, and not the
general authority.
In the absence of some
constitutional or statutory provision to
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the contrary, the necessity and
expediency of exercising the right of
eminent domain are questions essentially
political and not judicial in their
character.
The taking of private property for
any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain.
That government can scarcely be
deemed free where the rights of property
are left solely dependent on the legislative
body without restraint. The fundamental
maxims of free government seem to
require that the rights of personal liberty
and private property should be held
sacred. At least no court of justice would
be warranted in assuming that the power
to violate and disregard them lurks in any
general grant of legislative authority or
ought to be implied from any general
expression of the people. The people
ought not to be presumed to part with
rights so vital to their security and
well-being without a very strong and
direct expression of such intention.
The exercise of the right of
eminent domain is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule
in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property
is held by individuals with greater
tenacity and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously,
than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, the plain
meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of
the necessity must precede, and not
follow, the taking of the property. The
general power to exercise the right of
eminent domain must not be confused
with the right to exercise it in a particular
case.
WHAT PROPERTY MAY BE
EXPROPRIATED?
● Private property only
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
CAN PUBLIC PROPERTIES BE
EXPROPRIATED?
● NO. If we allow this, it would result
in an absurd situation where the
owner of the property refuses to
voluntarily yield with his property
and an expropriation proceeding is
initiated and the government pays
just compensation which is to be
paid also to the government
● The statement under Sec. 1, Rule
67 only presupposes that there are
private interests attached to a
public property. For example a
land belonging to the PH is subject
of a lease agreement between RPh
and XYZ Corp. The term of the
lease agreement is 10 yrs. During
the 10-yr period, the government
needs its property for public use.
Definitely cannot just violate the
contract. However, it can
expropriate the contract. What is
expropriated is the private interest
attached to the property and not
the property itself.
● Property devoted to public use can
be further expropriated.
Power of expropriation is to be
exercised by the State as a last resort.
Whenever the government needs a
property for public use, the first thing
the government should do is to
negotiate with the owner. It is only
when the owner refuses to voluntarily
yield with his property that the
government shall initiate expropriation
proceedings.
ATTY GAB: According to Justice Cruz,
any private property, tangible or
intangible, real or personal, can be
expropriated. So anything that will
come into the dominion of man can be
expropriated except money and choses
of actions. So choses of action, it is
understandable, because they are not
yet properties, so there are just
expectancy so meaning they have not
yet ripened into a right. In case of
money, it will result in a situation where
the government will take money for
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money.
CAN WE SAY THAT U.S. DOLLARS ARE
MONEY? CAN THEY BE
EXPROPRIATED?
● YES. But note that possession of
U.S. dollar by a state is different
from possession of the local
currency. Because dollar reserve is
very necessary in measuring the
financial status of a state. So which
means that even if a state has a
high local currency reserve if it has
low dollar reserve then it the
financial status is very low. So
when it contracts loan it will be
subjected to restrictive interest. So
since dollars are money, they can
be expropriated because it will not
result to the absurd situation that
the government will take an apple
for an apple. So the government
will take an apple for a guava.
● The statement of Justice Cruz that
money cannot be the subject of
expropriation only applies to
money of legal tender. So a foreign
currency can be expropriated and
even Philippine peso which are
already out of circulation can be
expropriated but only for their
historical value not for their face
value.
CAN SERVICES BE EXPROPRIATED?
● In the case of Republic vs PLDT the
SC allowed the expropriation of
the services of PLDT. It may be
considered as private property
therefore may be a subject of
expropriation upon payment of
just compensation.
REPUBLIC v. PLDT
FACTS: Prior to the supposed exercise of
the power of eminent domain, there was a
contract between the PLDT and the
Bureau of telecommunications for
interconnection. But upon the expiration
of the contract, PLDT is no longer willing
to renew it.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic can
compel PLDT to renew the contract.
HELD: YES. True that parties cannot be
coerced to enter into a contract where no
agreement is had between them as to the
principal terms and conditions of the
contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms
and conditions is of the essence of our
contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may
be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation or undue influence.
The Republic may, in the exercise
of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, require the telephone company
to permit interconnection of the
government telephone system and that of
the PLDT, as the needs of the government
service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court. Normally, of
course, the power of eminent domain
results. in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of to impose only a burden
upon the owner of condemned property,
without loss of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property may,
through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right of way. The use of the
PLDT's lines and services to allow
interservice connection between both
telephone systems is not much different.
In -either case private property is
subjected to a burden for public use and
benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of
the Constitution, the State may; in the
interest of national welfare transfer
utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no
reason why the State may not require a
public utility to render services in the
general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately,
the beneficiary of the interconnecting
service would be the users of both
telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
DOES THAT MEAN THAT ANY PRIVATE
SERVICE CAN BE EXPROPRIATED IN
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THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN?
● NO. The services that can be
expropriated shall only be limited
to the services involved in the case
- telecommunications. So which
means that the services that can
only be expropriated are public
utility services. So it may include
transportation, power, and other
public utility services but not
personal services. (Republic v.
PLDT)
DOES SIZE MATTER?
● [ATTY GAB: gentlemen, good
news. Size does not matter]
● NO. The propriety of exercising
the power of eminent domain
under Article XIII, section 4 of our
Constitution cannot be
determined on a purely
quantitative or area basis.
(Sumulong v. Guerrero)
SUMULONG v. GUERRERO
FACTS: The socialized housing project of
the government was challenged. One of
the basis of the challenge is that the
power of eminent domain can only be
exercised to expropriate large tracts of
land. According to the petitioner his
property is just a small property only,
barely one hectare, and there are
hundreds of hectares available.
HELD: The constitutionality of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain
does not depend on the size of the
property expropriated. The ruling of the
Supreme Court in Guido v. Rural Progress
Administration has already been
abandoned which provided that the
ultimate test in determining a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain
is the size of the property and the number
of beneficiaries.
The doctrine is any property, big
or small, which is needed for public use
can be expropriated in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
The State acting through the NHA
is vested with broad discretion to
designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
socialized housing purposes and how
much thereof may be expropriated.
Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith,
or gross abuse of discretion, which
petitioners herein failed to demonstrate,
the Court will give due weight to and
leave undisturbed the NHA's choice and
the size of the site for the project. The
property owner may not interpose
objections merely because in their
judgment some other property would
have been more suitable, or just as
suitable, for the purpose. The right to the
use, enjoyment and disposal of private
property is tempered by and has to yield
to the demands of the common good. The
Constitutional provisions on the subject
are clear: The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national
development. (Art. II, sec. 10). The
Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing
wealth and political power for the
common good. To this end, the State shall
regulate the acquisition, ownership, use
and disposition of property and its
increments.
DOES TAKING IN EMINENT DOMAIN
REQUIRE TRANSFER OF THE TITLE OF
THE PROPERTY TO THE
EXPROPRIATOR?
● No it is enough that the owner is
prevented from benefiting from
the property
DOES IT REQUIRE TRANSFER OF
POSSESSION?
● No as long as the owner is
deprived of the beneficial use of
the property.
IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS FAJARDO,
WAS THERE TAKING IN EMINENT
DOMAIN?
● Yes there was taking in the
concept of Eminent Domain
because the property taken was
wholesome and not noxious. The
accused remain to be the owner
and in possession of the property
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but he cannot devote it to any
reasonable purpose.
THE SC SAID THAT THE ACCUSED’S
POSITION IS WORSE THAN A PERSON
TOTALLY DEPRIVED OF HIS PROPERTY.
WHY?
● Because Fajardo still has the
burden of paying property taxes
yet he cannot use or benefit from
the property.
PEOPLE v. FAJARDO
FACTS: Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law)
are charged with violation of Ordinance 7
Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur which penalizes a person
who constructs a building without permit
from the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo
applied for a permit to build a building
beside the gasoline station near the town
plaza. His request was repeatedly denied
due to the reason that it “hinders the view
of travelers from the National Highway to
the public plaza”.
Appellants proceeded with the
construction of the building without a
permit, because they needed a place of
residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and
hitherto they had been living on leased
property.
Appellants were charged and
convicted by peace court of Baoo for
violating such ordinance.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid
exercise police power in its regulation of
property.
HELD: The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it
oversteps the bounds of police power, and
amounts to a taking of appellants
property without just compensation. We
do not overlook that the modern
tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the
comfort and happiness of residents. But
while property may be regulated in the
interest of the general welfare, and in its
pursuit, the State may prohibit structures
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait
vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State may
not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and
practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community. As the case
now stands, every structure that may be
erected on appellants' land, regardless of
its own beauty, stands condemned under
the ordinance in question, because it
would interfere with the view of the
public plaza from the highway. The
appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle
and unused for the obvious purpose for
which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result,
the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be
heard.
REPUBLIC v. VDA DE CASTELLVI
A number of circumstances must
be present in the “taking” of property for
purposes of eminent domain:
(1) the expropriator must enter a
private property;
(2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a
momentary period;
(3) the entry into the property should
be under warrant or color of legal
authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to a
public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
and
(5) the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
"Momentary” means “lasting but a
moment; of but a moment’s duration;
“lasting a very short time; transitory;
having a very brief life; operative or
recurring at every moment”. The word
“momentary” when applied to possession
or occupancy of (real) property should be
construed to - mean “a limited
period”—not indefinite or permanent.
It might really have been the
intention of the Republic to expropriate
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the lands at some future time, but
certainly mere notice—much less an
implied notice—of such intention on the
part of the Republic to expropriate the
lands in the future did not, and could not,
bind the landowner, nor bind the land
itself. The expropriation must be actually
commenced in court.
Under section 4 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is
to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. When the taking of
the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of
the date of the filing of the complaint.
In expropriation proceedings, the
owner of the land has the right to its
value for the use for which it would bring
the most in the market. The owner may
thus show every advantage that his
property possesses, present and
prospective, in order that the price it
could be sold for in the market may be
satisfactorily determined. The owner may
also show that the property is suitable for
division into village or town lots.
The amount fixed as the
provisional value of the lands that are
being expropriated does not necessarily
represent the true and correct value of
the land. The value is only “provisional” or
“tentative”, to serve as the basis for the
immediate occupancy of the property
being expropriated by the condemnor.
IN REPUBLIC v. CASTELVI THERE ARE
SEVERAL DATES WHICH ARE BEING
CONSIDERED AS THE DATE OF TAKING
JULY 1 1947 (WHEN THE LEASE OF THE
PROPERTY FOR A TERM OF ONE YEAR),
WE HAVE JUNE 30 1956 (HEIRS OF THE
OWNER REFUSED TO RENEW THE
CONTRACT), JUNE 26 1959 (THE
GOVERNMENT CASE FOR
EXPROPRIATION), AUGUST 10 1959 (THE
COURT ISSUED THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE
GOVERNMENT). WHEN WAS THERE
TAKING UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● On July 1, 1947, the second element
and fifth element were not
present. These elements are
present on June 26 of 1959 when
the government initiated the
expropriation proceedings.
HOW SHOULD DOUBTS BE RESOLVED
WHENEVER THERE ARE DOUBTS IN
EXPROPRIATION?
● It should be resolved against the
expropriator and in favor of the
property owner.
AMIGABLE v. CUENCA
As registered owner, she could
bring an action to recover possession of
the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the
attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient
nor feasible at this time because it is now
and has been used for road purposes, the
only relief available is for the government
to make due compensation which it could
and should have done years ago. To
determine the due compensation for the
land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking.
PPI v. COMELEC
To compel print media companies
to donate “Comelec space” of the
dimensions specified in Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 (not less than
one-half page), amounts to “taking” of
private personal property for public use
or purposes. The extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not
a case of a de minimis temporary
limitation or restraint upon the use of
private property. The monetary value of
the compulsory “donation,” measured by
the advertising rates ordinarily charged
by newspaper publishers whether in cities
or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a
lawful taking of private property for
public use need to be examined here: one
is the necessity for the taking; another is
the legal authority to effect the taking.
The element of necessity for the taking
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has not been shown by respondent
Comelec. It has not been suggested that
the members of PPI are unwilling to sell
print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed,
the unwillingness or reluctance of
Comelec to buy print space lies at the
heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not
been suggested, let alone demonstrated,
that Comelec has been granted the power
of eminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative
authority. A reasonable relationship
between that power and the enforcement
and administration of election laws by
Comelec must be shown; it is not casually
to be assumed.
There is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from
voluntarily giving free print space to
Comelec for the purposes contemplated
in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 of
Resolution No. 2772 does not, however,
provide a constitutional basis for
compelling publishers, against their will,
in the kind of factual context here
present, to provide free print space for
Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain.
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
a blunt and heavy instrument that
purports, without a showing of existence
of a national emergency or other
imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to
the individual business condition of
particular newspapers or magazines
located in differing parts of the country,
to take private property of newspaper or
magazine publishers. No attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and
palpable or urgent necessity for the
taking of print space confronted the
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable
and calibrated response to such necessity
available to the Comelec. Section 2 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the State.
IN THE CASE OF PPI VS COMELEC THE
SC SAID THAT THERE WAS TAKING. IN
THIS CASE ALL NEWSPAPER
PUBLISHERS ARE REQUIRED TO GIVE
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
THE COMELEC SPACE FREE OF
CHARGE. IN TELEBAP, AN ALMOST
IDENTICAL CASE, ALL TELEVISION AND
RADIO STATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO
GIVE COMELEC FREE SPACE WITHOUT
ANY CONSIDERATION. SC SAID IN PPI
THAT THE REGULATION OR ACT OF
THE COMELEC IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE THAT AMOUNTS TO TAKING
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.
WHILE IN TELEBAP THE SC SAID THAT
IT IS A VALID REGULATION. WHY IS
THERE A DIFFERENCE? WHY IS IT
THAT WHEN IT COMES TO
NEWSPAPER, THERE IS TAKING WHILE
WHEN IT COMES TO TELEVISION OR
RADIO STATIONS, THERE IS NO
TAKING?
● The difference lies on the fact that
insofar as newspaper is concerned,
the paper is a private property. So
it is owned by the publisher. So if
the COMELEC takes that private
property there must be a
corresponding just compensation.
But for broadcast television and
broadcast space, the time is only a
regulation of the use of the
frequencies and the airwaves. So
the frequencies and the airwaves
remain to be property of the State.
So since it is the property of the
state the use of that property only
constitutes regulation and does
not amount to taking.
DOES PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT
DOMAIN REQUIRE THAT THE
PROPERTY EXPROPRIATE THAT MUST
BE USED BY THE PUBLIC?
● This was the traditional application
of public use in eminent domain.
Any property expropriated in the
exercise of the power of eminent
domain must be available to use by
any individual without any
discrimination.
● However, in the case of Sumulong
v. Guerrero it abandoned the
traditional concept of public use
and instead applied the expanded
concept of public use in eminent
domain - any advantage, direct or
indirect, to the public is public use
in eminent domain. So as long as
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the taking of the property will
redound to the benefit of the
public, it is public use in eminent
domain.
IS PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN
THE SAME AS USE BY THE PUBLIC?
● In the case of Sumulong vs
Guerrero, the traditional concept
of public use in eminent domain
has already evolved. While
traditionally, public use means
those that are available to the
public like roads, public plaza, the
SC said the expanded concept of
public use provides that as long as
the purpose of the taking is public,
then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. So even indirect
advantage enjoyed by the public, is
considered now as for public use.
Also In the case of Manosca vs CA
the court said that in determining
whether the taking is for public
use, it is the primary objective that
should be considered and not the
incidental consequences.
IN THE CASE OF MANOSCA VS CA THE
PETITIONER IS PAINTING RELIGIOUS
COLOR TO THE ACQUISITION OF BIRTH
SITE OF FELIX MANALO, THE FOUNDER
OF IGLESIA NI CRISTO. THE PROPERTY
WAS SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
MARKER BECAUSE THEY RECOGNIZED
THE CONTRIBUTION OF FELIX
MANALO IN THE PH CULTURE. WILL
THE FACT THAT A CERTAIN RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION WILL BENEFIT MORE,
MAKE THE EXPROPRIATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
● No because the primary objective
of expropriation in this case is the
influence that Felix Manalo has
contributed to the shaping of Ph
culture.
MANOSCA v. CA
FACTS: Petitioners inherited a piece of
land which was later declared as national
landmark due to being ascertained by
National Historic Institute (NHI) as the
birthplace of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder
of Iglesia ni Cristo. On the opinion of
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
Secretary of Justice, he said that the place
must be subjected to the power of
eminent domain since places invested
with unusual historical interest is a public
use which such power may be authorized.
Thus, Republic, through the office of
Solicitor General instituted a complaint
for expropriation and filed an urgent
motion for the issuance for an order to
permit it to take immediate possession of
the property. The trial court issued an
order authorizing Republic to take over
the property once the required sum
would have been deposited with the
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro
Manila. The petitioners moved to dismiss
the complaint since such expropriation
would constituted an application of funds
directly or indirectly for the use, benefit,
or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which is
contrary to the provision of Section 29 (2)
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the “public use”
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant
in the attempted expropriation by the
Republic of a 492sqm parcel of land as
declared by the NHI as a national
landmark?
HELD: Eminent domain, also often
referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police
power and taxation, an inherent power of
sovereignty. It need not be clothed with
any constitutional gear to exist; instead,
provisions in our Constitution on the
subject are meant more to regulate,
rather than to grant, the exercise of the
power. Eminent domain is generally so
described as “the highest and most exact
idea of property remaining in the
government” that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method in
the nature of a forced purchase by the
State. It is a right to take or reassert
dominion over property within the state
for public use or to meet a public
exigency. It is said to be an essential part
of governance even in its most primitive
form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty. The only direct
constitutional qualification is that “private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.” This
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proscription is intended to provide a
safeguard against possible abuse and so
to protect as well the individual against
whose property the power is sought to be
enforced.
The court, in Guido, merely passed
upon the issue of the extent of the
President’s power under Commonwealth
Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire
private lands for subdivision into smaller
home lots or farms for resale to bona fide
tenants or occupants. It was in this
particular context of the statute that the
Court had made the pronouncement. The
guidelines in Guido were not meant to be
preclusive in nature and, most certainly,
the power of eminent domain should not
now be understood as being confined
only to the expropriation of vast tracts of
land and landed estates.
The term “public use,” not having
been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its
general concept of meeting a public need
or a public exigency. Black summarizes
the characterization given by various
courts to the term; thus: “Public Use.
Eminent domain. The constitutional and
statutory basis for taking property by
eminent domain. For condemnation
purposes, ‘public use’ is one which
confers some benefit or advantage to the
public; it is not confined to actual use by
public. It is measured in terms of right of
public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as
public has right of use, whether exercised
by one or many members of public, a
‘public advantage’ or ‘public benefit’
accrues sufficient to constitute a public
use.
The validity of the exercise of the
power of eminent domain for traditional
purposes is beyond question; it is not at
all to be said, however, that public use
should thereby be restricted to such
traditional uses. The idea that “public use”
is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by
the public” has long been discarded.
It has been explained as early as
Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that: “x x x A
historical research discloses the meaning
of the term ‘public use’ to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its
demands upon the individual increase and
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
each demand is a new use to which the
resources of the individual may be
devoted. x x x for ‘whatever is beneficially
employed for the community is a public
use.’ ”
Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat is the
so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s)
birthplace become so vital as to be a
public use appropriate for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain” when only
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves
little consideration, for what should be
significant is the principal objective of,
not the casual consequences that might
follow from, the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the marker is
essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to
the culture of the Philippines, rather than
to commemorate his founding and
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo.
The practical reality that greater
benefit may be derived by members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others
could well be true but such a peculiar
advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature.
Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of
property does not necessarily diminish
the essence and character of public use.
WHAT IS JUST COMPENSATION IN
EMINENT DOMAIN?
● Just compensation means the
value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained.
All the facts as to the condition of
the property and its surroundings,
its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.
IS JUST COMPENSATION THE FAIR
MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY?
● NO. Just Compensation is not only
the fair market value of the
property. It is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken at
the time of the taking taken from
the context of the losses suffered
by the property owner.
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● Aside from the fair market value
there are other factors that must
be considered by the expropriation
court in establishing just
compensation. So one of the
factors that must be considered by
the courts in determining just
compensation is the promptness
of payment
ACCORDING TO THE SC IN SUMULONG
VS GUERRERO, THE FACTORS IN
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION
INCLUDE?
1. Potential use of the property
2. Condition of the property
3. Improvements introduced in the
property
4. Assessed value of the property for
tax purposes
The determination of just compensation
is a judicial prerogative. It is set to be
established by the expropriation court
with the assistance of not more than
three commissioners
IF THE PROPERTY IS PARTIALLY
EXPROPRIATED, ASIDE FROM THESE
FACTORS, WHAT ARE OTHER FACTORS
WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED BY THE
COURT?
● Consequential benefits and
consequential damages.
WHAT ARE THE ACTIONS THAT MAY BE
DONE BY THE COURTS ON THE
REPORTS OF THE COMMISSIONER?
1. Accept in toto
2. Reject in toto
3. Partially accept, partialLY reject
4. Recommit to other commissioners
SUPPOSING THE COURT BELIEVES
THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE IS THE
BEST APPRAISER IN THE WORLD. HE
DOES NOT NEED THE ASSISTANCE OF
THE COMMISSIONER. MAY HE
DISPENSED WITH THE APPOINTMENT
OF THE COMMISSIONERS?
● No because under the rules of
court, reception of evidence for
the establishment of just
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compensation is delegated to the
commissioner.
WHO DETERMINES JUST
COMPENSATION?
● The courts
IN THE CASE OF SUMULONG v.
GUERRERO, THE PETITIONERS
ARGUED THAT IN EMINENT DOMAIN
CASES JUST COMPENSATION SHALL BE
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY FOR TAX PURPOSES.
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
ESTOPPEL BECAUSE ACCORDING TO
THE EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL IF A PARTY OBTAINS
BENEFIT FROM A STATEMENT, IT
CANNOT AT A LATER DATE DISOWN
THAT STATEMENT SO THE PROPERTY
OWNERS DERIVE BENEFIT FROM THE
LOW VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY
FOR TAX PURPOSES BECAUSE THEY
ONLY PAY LOW TAXES. ACCORDING TO
THE GOVERNMENT, PROPERTY
OWNERS ARE ALREADY ESTOPPED
FROM CHALLENGING THE ACCURACY
OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY FOR
TAX PURPOSES BECAUSE THEY HAVE
DERIVED BENEFITS FROM THAT
VALUATION.
● NO. The doctrine of estoppel
cannot be applied in expropriation
proceedings because it is only an
equitable principle. So it cannot be
applied when there is a specific
constitutional provision or a
specific law that provides for the
amount of just compensation. And
insofar as eminent domain is
concerned, the Constitution itself
provides for the compensation
which must be just. Just
compensation again is the full and
fair equivalent of the property at
the time of taking. The valuation of
the property for tax purposes is
not the actual value of the
property at the time of taking
because the valuation happened
several years ago and it is fixed on
generalities and not on the specific
condition of the property subject
of expropriation.
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SUPPOSING THE CONGRESS ENACT A
LAW PROVIDING THE MANNER OF
DETERMINING JUST COMPENSATION
IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES WHICH
COULD EITHER BE THE ZONE
VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY OR THE
ASSESSED VALUE FOR TAX PURPOSES
WHICHEVER IS LOWER. IS THAT A
CORRECT DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION? THIS IS THE ISSUE
IN THE CASE OF EPZA VS DULAY (ONLY
THAT THE DETERMINATION WAS
MADE BY THE PRESIDENT).
● No. in the case of EPZA v. Dulay,
P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
court's discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67
of the Rules of Court, is
unconstitutional and void. The
method of ascertaining just
compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives.
CAN THE LOCAL LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL DELEGATE TO POWER OF
EXPROPRIATION TO THE VICE MAYOR
OR APPOINT ANY OTHER LOCAL
OFFICER?
● No because when it comes to
exercise eminent domain by the
congress, the congress has a lot of
options, the congress can exercise
it, delegate it but when it comes to
LGU the exercise is restrictive. It
can only be done by the LGU
enacting an ordinance and
delegating such power to the
mayor and to nobody else and the
delegation must be specific.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE v. VM
REALTY CORP.
The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public
entities and public utilities. An LGU may
therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when
authorized by Congress and subject to the
latter’s control and restraints, imposed
“through the law conferring the power or
in other legislations.” In this case, Section
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19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
the power of eminent domain, also lays
down the parameters for its exercise.
—Thus, the following essential
requisites must concur before an LGU can
exercise the power of eminent domain: 1.
An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or
pursue expropriation proceedings over a
particular private property. 2. The power
of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit
of the poor and the landless. 3. There is
payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4.
A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief
executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution
of the municipal council. Thus, there was
no compliance with the first requisite that
the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur
vs. Court of Appeals to show that a
resolution may suffice to support the
exercise of eminent domain by an LGU.
This case, however, is not in point
because the applicable law at that time
was BP 337, the previous Local
Government Code, which had provided
that a mere resolution would enable an
LGU to exercise eminent domain. In
contrast, RA 7160, the present Local
Government Code which was already in
force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly
required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by
petitioner’s insistence that the terms
“resolution” and “ordinance” are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is
different from a resolution. An ordinance
is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An
ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently—a third reading is
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necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.
—Petitioner relies on Article 36,
Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an
LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is
clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of
RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over
said rule which merely seeks to
implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot
be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation. Besides,
what the discrepancy seems to indicate is
a mere oversight in the wording of the
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule
VI thereof, also requires that, in
exercising the power of eminent domain,
the chief executive of the LGU must act
pursuant to an ordinance.
As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, all the
requisites for the application of res
judicata are present in this case. There is
a previous final judgment on the merits in
a prior expropriation case involving
identical interests, subject matter and
cause of action, which has been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds
that the principle of res judicata, which
finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the
State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the
State, dictates that the right to exercise
the power be absolute and unfettered
even by a prior judgment or res judicata.
The scope of eminent domain is plenary
and, like police power, can “reach every
form of property which the State might
need for public use.” “All separate
interests of individuals in property are
held of the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals,
the eminent domain, the highest and
most exact idea of property, remains in
the government, or in the aggregate body
of the people in their sovereign capacity;
and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the
public interest requires it.” Thus, the State
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
or its authorized agent cannot be forever
barred from exercising said right by
reason alone of previous noncompliance
with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata
does not denigrate the right of the State
to exercise eminent domain, it does apply
to specific issues decided in a previous
case. For example, a final judgment
dismissing an expropriation suit on the
ground that there was no prior offer
precludes another suit raising the same
issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or
its agent from thereafter complying with
this requirement, as prescribed by law,
and subsequently exercising its power of
eminent domain over the same property.
By the same token, our ruling that
petitioner cannot exercise its delegated
power of eminent domain through a mere
resolution will not bar it from
reinstituting similar proceedings, once
the said legal requirement and, for that
matter, all others are properly complied
with. Parenthetically and by parity of
reasoning, the same is also true of the
principle of “law of the case.” In Republic
vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled that the
power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the
mere fact that a prior final judgment over
the property to be expropriated has
become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent
may still subsequently exercise its right to
expropriate the same property, once all
legal requirements are complied with. To
rule otherwise will not only improperly
diminish the power of eminent domain,
but also clearly defeat social justice
EPZA v. DULAY
FACTS: A certain parcel of land was
reserved by the President of the
Philippines for petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) for the
establishment of an export processing
zone. However, not all of the reserved
area was public land. The petitioner made
an offer to purchase the land registered in
the name of the private respondent, but
the parties failed to have an agreement on
the sale of the property. Thus, the
petitioner filed a complaint for
expropriation with a prayer for the
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issuance of a writ of possession against
private respondent on the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. The respondent judge
favored the petition and issued a writ of
possession authorizing the petitioner to
take into possession of the said property.
Having determined the just compensation
as only the issue to be resolved, the
respondent judge issued an order
regarding the appointment of certain
persons as commissioners who are tasked
to report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought
to be expropriated. Consequently,
commissioners were appointed and,
afterwards, recommended in their report
that the amount of P15.00 per square
meter as the fair and reasonable value of
just compensation for the properties.
Subsequently, petitioners objected to the
said order on the grounds that P.D. No.
1533 has superseded Section 5 to 8 of Rule
67 of the Rules of court on the
ascertainment of just compensation
through commissioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had
been repealed or deemed amended by
P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment
of commissioners to determine the just
compensation is concerned.
HELD: Just Compensation means the
equivalent for the value of the property at
the time of its taking. Anything beyond
that is more and anything short of that is
less, than just compensation. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained, which is the measure of
indemnity, not whatever gain would
accrue to the expropriating entity.
The method of ascertaining just
compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It
tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under the Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation
proceeding the court technically would
still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following
the applicable decrees, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
value of the property as declared either
by the owner or the assessor. As a
necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy
the due process clause in the taking of
private property is seemingly fulfilled
since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual
taking. However, the strict application of
the decrees during the proceedings would
be nothing short of a mere formality or
charade as the court has only to choose
between the valuation of the owner and
that of the assessor, and its choice is
always limited to the lower of the two.
The court cannot exercise its discretion
or independence in determining what is
just or fair. Even a grade school pupil
could substitute for the judge insofar as
the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned. "Another
consideration why the Court is
empowered to appoint commissioners to
assess the just compensation of these
properties under eminent domain
proceedings, is the well-entrenched
ruling that 'the owner of property
expropriated is entitled to recover from
expropriating authority the fair and full
value of the lot, as of the time when
possession thereof was actually taken by
the province, plus consequential
damages—including attorney's fees —from
which the consequential benefits, if any
should be deducted, with interest at the
legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to
the owner from and after the date of
actual taking.' In fine, the decree only
establishes a uniform basis for
determining just compensation which the
Court may consider as one of the factors
in arriving at 'just compensation/ as
envisage in the Constitution. In the words
of Justice Barredo, 'Respondent court's
invocation of General Order No. 3 of
September 21, 1972 is nothing short of an
unwarranted abdication of judicial
authority, which no judge duly imbued
with the implications of the paramount
principle of independence of the judiciary
should ever think of doing.' Indeed, where
this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby
limiting the determination of just
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compensation on the value declared by
the owner or administrator or as
determined by the Assessor, whichever is
lower, it may result in the deprivation of
the landowner's right of due process to
enable it to prove its claim to just
compensation, as mandated by the
Constitution. (Uy v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123).
The tax declaration under the Real
Property Tax Code is, undoubtedly, for
purposes of taxation." The determination
of "just compensation" in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function. The executive
department or the legislature may make
the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee
in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the
court's findings. Much less can the courts
be precluded from looking into the
"justness" of the decreed compensation.
IN ESTABLISHING JUST
COMPENSATION THE RULES OF COURT
REQUIRE THAT THE COURT MUST
APPOINT NOT MORE THAN THREE
COMMISSIONERS. CAN THE COURT
DISPENSE WITH THE APPOINTMENT
OF COMMISSIONERS?
● As a general rule, the courts
cannot dispense with the
appointment of commissioners
because it is mandatory except
when the expropriator and the
property owner have already
agreed on the value of the
property
WHO OWNS THE PROPERTY
EXPROPRIATED UPON THE FINALITY
OF THE ORDER OF EXPROPRIATION?
● It remains to be the private
property owner
WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE
PRIVATE OWNER WHENEVER THE
GOVERNMENT FAILED TO PAY JUST
COMPENSATION?
● In Republic v. Lim, if the
expropriator failed to pay just
compensation within five years
from the finality of the order of
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expropriation, the property owner
has a remedy to recover physical
possession of the property
expropriated. So which means that
the expropriator has only five
years within which to pay just
compensation.
REPUBLIC v. LIM
One of the basic principles
enshrined in our Constitution is that no
person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and
in expropriation cases, an essential
element of due process is that there must
be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our
Constitution mandates: “Private property
shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.” The Republic
disregarded the foregoing provision when
it failed and refused to pay respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The
length of time and the manner with which
it evaded payment demonstrate its
arbitrary high-handedness and
confiscatory attitude. The final judgment
in the expropriation proceedings (Civil
Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948.
More than half of a century has passed,
yet, to this day, the landowner, now
respondent, has remained empty-handed.
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed
payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as
fair. This is more so when such delay is
accompanied by bureaucratic hassles.
Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest
were given a “run around” by the
Republic’s officials and agents. In 1950,
despite the benefits it derived from the
use of the two lots, the National Airports
Corporation denied knowledge of the
claim of respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest. Even President
Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the
Secretary of National Defense to expedite
the payment, failed in granting relief to
them. And, on September 6, 1961, while
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
expressed willingness to pay the
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appraised value of the lots, nothing
happened.
The Court of Appeals is correct in
saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to
the rules of fair play, as “just
compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also
the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered ‘just.’ ” In jurisdictions
similar to ours, where an entry to the
expropriated property precedes the
payment of compensation, it has been
held that if the compensation is not paid
in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.
Significantly, the abovementioned
provision of Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation
of power. This limiting function is in
keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights against the arbitrary exercise of
governmental powers to the detriment of
the individual’s rights. Given this function,
the provision should therefore be strictly
interpreted against the expropriator, the
government, and liberally in favor of the
property owner.
In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia
this Court ruled that the expropriation of
lands consists of two stages, to wit: “x x x
The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of
dismissal of the action, “of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint” x x x. The second phase of
the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the court of
“the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken.” This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. x x x. It is
only upon the completion of these two
stages that expropriation is said to have
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
been completed. In Republic v. Salem
Investment Corporation, we ruled that,
“the process is not completed until
payment of just compensation.” Thus,
here, the failure of the Republic to pay
respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest for a period of
57 years rendered the expropriation
process incomplete.
The Republic now argues that
under Valdehueza, respondent is not
entitled to recover possession of Lot 932
but only to demand payment of its fair
market value. Of course, we are aware of
the doctrine that “non-payment of just
compensation (in an expropriation
proceedings) does not entitle the private
landowners to recover possession of the
expropriated lots.” This is our ruling in the
recent cases of Republic of the Philippines
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and Reyes vs.
National Housing Authority. However, the
facts of the present case do not justify its
application. It bears stressing that the
Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice,the first was in the
expropriation proceedings and the
second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
years have passed since then. We cannot
but construe the Republic’s failure to pay
just compensation as a deliberate refusal
on its part. Under such circumstances,
recovery of possession is in order. In
several jurisdictions, the courts held that
recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is
wrongfully retained by one claiming to
act under the power of eminent domain
or where a rightful entry is made and the
party condemning refuses to pay the
compensation which has been assessed or
agreed upon; or fails or refuses to have
the compensation assessed and paid.
The Republic also contends that
where there have been constructions
being used by the military, as in this case,
public interest demands that the present
suit should not be sustained. It must be
emphasized that an individual cannot be
deprived of his property for the public
convenience. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we ruled:
“One of the basic principles of the
democratic system is that where the
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rights of the individual are concerned, the
end does not justify the means. It is not
enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will
not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most
urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking
a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right. The right covers the
person’s life, his liberty and his property
under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property,
the owner enjoys the added protection of
Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar
rule that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just
compensation.”
We thus rule that the special
circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle respondent to recover possession
of the expropriated lot from the Republic.
Unless this form of swift and effective
relief is granted to him, the grave injustice
committed against his
predecessors-in-interest, though no fault
or negligence on their part, will be
perpetuated. Let this case, therefore,
serve as a wake-up call to the Republic
that in the exercise of its power of
eminent domain, necessarily
derogation of private rights, it must
comply with the Constitutional
limitations. This Court, as the guardian of
the people’s right, will not stand still in
the face of the Republic’s oppressive and
confiscatory taking of private property, as
in this case.
CAN WE SAY THAT THE RULING OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE REPUBLIC v.
LIM HAS ALREADY OVERTURNED THE
PREVIOUS DOCTRINE THAT
NON-PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION DOES NOT
AUTHORIZE THE PROPERTY OWNER TO
RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
BECAUSE UNDER THE OLD RULE THE
ONLY REMEDY OF THE PROPERTY
OWNER IS TO DEMAND PAYMENT
WITH DAMAGES AND INTEREST. SO
CAN WE SAY NOW THAT REPUBLIC v.
LIM HAS ALREADY ABANDONED THAT
RULE AND SETS A NEW RULE, INSTEAD,
THAT WHENEVER THE GOVERNMENT
FAILED TO BE WITHIN FIVE YEARS THE
PROPERTY OWNER IS ENTITLED TO
RECOVER PHYSICAL POSSESSION?
● NO. Because the Republic v. Lim
doctrine is only an exemption to
the general rule. The general rule
remains that non-payment of just
compensation shall not entitle the
property owner to recover
physical possession. The Lim
doctrine shall only be
implemented when the reason for
the promulgation of that decision
is present.
In Republic v. Lim, the property was
expropriated for the construction of the
airport for the armed forces. So there
were several judgements issued by the
expropriation court which became final.
57 years after the finality of the first
order of expropriation, the government
still continues to refuse to pay just
compensation. So this impelled the
Supreme Court to say that, the
government should return, the
government has long delayed the
payment of just compensation and the
supreme court said that within five
in
years the expropriator shall pay.
Otherwise, return the property.
ATTY GAB: Supposing the government
expropriated the property of Juan De La
Cruz. The purpose of the expropriation
of the property is to build an
expressway. So supposing the property
of Juan de la Cruz is so big that it covers
the entire stretch of the expressway. So
supposing upon the finality of the order
of expropriation, the government
introduced the necessary improvement
to construct the expressway. And
supposing within a period of five years
the expressway is done but the
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government failed to pay just
compensation. Does that mean that the
government has to return the property
together with its accessories and the
highway? So if we will apply that ruling
of the Supreme Court in the Republic v.
Lim, this is the necessary consequence
the principal carries with it the
accessory.
In order to avoid this absurdity the
ruling in the Republic v. Lim should only
be implemented when within five years
the government failed to pay just
compensation and there is an express
or implied abandonment of the public
use of the property. because in the
Republic v. Lim, after 57 years there
were only 13 structures introduced in
the property. The property was
expropriated for the construction of an
airport but after 57 years there is no
airport. So which means that the
government has already abandoned the
public use. So this is the reason why the
Supreme Court ordered the return of
the property. But if the government has
fully utilized the property, the return of
the property can no longer be done.
The only remedy of the property owner
is to recover payment of just
compensation together with interest
and damages.
3. POWER OF TAXATION
WHAT IS TAXATION?
● Taxation is an enforced
proportional contributions from
persons and property, levied by
the state by virtue of its
sovereignty for the support of the
government and for all its public
needs
WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE
POWER OF TAXATION?
● Lifeblood doctrine
ASIDE FROM TAXES, THE
GOVERNMENT ALSO LEVIES MONEY IN
THE FORM OF FEES. WHAT IS THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FEES SUCH AS
LICENSE FEES TO TAXATION?
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● License fee is a police measure
while Taxes is a revenue measure.
The Amount collected for a license
fee is limited to the cost of permit
and reasonable police regulation
while amount of tax may be
unlimited so long as it is not
confiscatory.
While the power of eminent domain
shall be strictly construed against the
government, the exercise of power
taxation shall be liberally construed in
favour of the government and against
taxpayer because any exemption of the
exercise of the power of taxation shall
be in derogation of the exercise of this
inherent power.
PURPOSE?
● In the exercise of power of
taxation the purpose must be
public.
● Note the difference between
power of eminent domain and
power of taxation. In eminent
domain it is intended for public
use but in power of taxation it
must be for public purpose
PASCUAL v. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS
FACTS: Petitioner, the governor of the
Province of Rizal, filed an action for
declaratory relief with injunction on the
ground that RA 920, Act appropriating
funds for public works, providing P85,000
for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement of
Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing
but projected and planned subdivision
roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio
Subdivision is owned by the respondent,
Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of
the Philippines. Respondent offered to
donate the said feeder roads to the
municipality of Pasig and the offer was
accepted by the council, subject to a
condition that the donor would submit
plan of the roads and an agreement to
change the names of two of the street.
However, the donation was not executed,
which prompted Zuleta to write a letter
to the district engineer calling attention
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the approval of RA 920. The district
engineer, on the other hand, did not
endorse the letter that inasmuch the
feeder roads in question were private
property at the time of passage and
approval of RA 920, the appropriation for
the construction was illegal and
therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner,
prayed for RA 920 be declared null and
void and the alleged deed of donation be
declared unconstitutional. Lower court
dismissed the case and dissolved the writ
of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the deed of
donation and the appropriation of funds
stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional.
HELD: It is a general rule that the
legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenues for anything
but a public purpose. * * * It is the
essential character of the direct object of
the expenditure which must determine its
validity as justifying a tax and not the
magnitude of the interests to be affected
nor the degree to which the general
advantage of the community, and thus the
public welfare, may be ultimately
benefited by their promotion. Incidental
advantage to the public or to the state,
which results from the promotion of
private interests, and the prosperity of
private enterprises or business, does not
justify their aid by the use of public
money.
Generally, under the express or
implied provisions of the constitution,
public funds may be used only for a public
purpose. The right of the legislature to
appropriate public funds is correlative
with its right to tax, and, under
constitutional provisions against taxation
except for public purposes and
prohibiting the collection of a tax for one
purpose and the devotion thereof to
another purpose, no appropriation of
state funds can be made for other than a
public purpose.
The test of the constitutionality of
a statute requiring the use of public funds
is whether the statute is designed to
promote the public interests, as opposed
to the furtherance of the advantage of
individuals, although such advantage to
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
individuals might incidentally serve the
public.
Where the land on which
projected feeder roads are to be
constructed belongs to a private person,
an appropriation made by Congress for
that purpose is null and void, and a
donation to the Government, made over
five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of the Act for the purpose of
giving a "semblance of legality" to the
appropriation, does not cure the basic
defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not
precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBIT
DOUBLE TAXATION?
● Constitution does not expressly
prohibit double taxation because
the power to tax twice is as ample
as the power to tax once
● Double taxation is valid as long as
it does not violate the principles of
taxation
WHAT IS DOUBLE TAXATION?
● It is the imposition of the same or
identical tax twice by the same
taxing authority within the same
taxing jurisdiction for the same
purpose and for the same object.
PUNSALAN v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
MANILA
There is double taxation where
one tax is imposed by the state and the
other is imposed by the city, it being
widely recognized that there is nothing
inherently obnoxious in the requirement
that license fees or taxes be enacted with
respect to the same occupation, calling or
activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof.
PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION?
1. The rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
2. The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions
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as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the
framework of the national
development program of the
Government.
3. Charitable institutions, churches
and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques,
non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from
taxation.
4. No law granting any tax exemption
shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress. (Sec. 28,
Art. 6, Constitution)
WHAT DOES UNIFORMITY AND EQUITY
MEANS?
● Uniformity or Equality means that
all taxable articles and property of
the same kind shall be taxed on the
same rate. Equity of taxation
means that the tax imposed shall
be in proportion to the ability to
pay or the value of the property.
SISON v. ANCHETA
The power to tax moreover, to
borrow from Justice Malcolm, “is an
attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest
of all the powers of government.” It is, of
course, to be admitted that for all its
plenitude, the power to tax is not
unconfined. There are restrictions. The
Constitution sets forth such limits.
Adversely affecting as it does property
rights, both the due process and equal
protection clauses may properly be
invoked, as petitioner does, to invalidate
in appropriate cases a revenue measure. If
it were otherwise, there would be truth to
the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall
that “the power to tax involves the power
to destroy.” In a separate opinion in
Graves v. New York, Justice Frankfurter,
after referring to it as an “unfortunate
remark,” characterized it as “a flourish of
rhetoric [attributable to] the intellectual
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
fashion of the times [allowing] a free use
of absolutes.” This is merely to emphasize
that it is not and there cannot be such a
constitutional mandate. Justice
Frankfurter could rightfully conclude:
“The web of unreality spun from
Marshall’s famous dictum was brushed
away by one stroke of Mr. Justice
Holmes’s pen: ‘The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this Court sits.’ ”
So it is in the Philippines.
Petitioner likewise invoked the
kindred concept of uniformity. According
to the Constitution: “The rule of taxation
shall be uniform and equitable.” This
requirement is met according to Justice
Laurel in Philippine Trust Company v.
Yatco, decided in 1940, when the tax
“operates with the same force and effect
in every place where the subject may be
found.” He likewise added: “The rule of
uniformity does not call for perfect
uniformity or perfect equality, because
this is hardly attainable.” The problem of
classification did not present itself in that
case. It did not arise until nine years later,
when the Supreme Court held: “Equality
and uniformity in taxation means that
all taxable articles or kinds of property
of the same class shall be taxed at the
same rate. The taxing power has the
authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation, *
* *. As clarified by Justice Tuason, where
“the differentiation” complained of
“conforms to the practical dictates of
justice and equity” it “is not
discriminatory within the meaning of this
clause and is therefore uniform.” There is
quite a similarity then to the standard of
equal protection for all that is required is
that the tax “applies equally to all persons,
firms and corporations placed in similar
situation.”
DOES THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBIT
REGRESSIVE SYSTEM OF TAXATION?
● NO. In the case of Tolentino v. Sec.
of Finance, the Supreme Court
said that the Congress is only
mandated to evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
● It is ideal that the taxation should
be progressive but the
Constitution does not prohibit the
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Congress from enacting tax laws
which are regressive in character
WHAT IS THE BASIS OF REGRESSIVE
SYSTEM OF TAXATION?
● It encourage productivity among
individuals. If a taxpayer wants to
pay less, earn more. We cannot
adopt this kind of system of
taxation
CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL SAID THAT
THE POWER TO TAX INCLUDES THE
POWER TO DESTROY. WHILE JUSTICE
HOLMES SAID IT DOES NOT INCLUDE
POWER TO DESTROY AS LONG AS THIS
COURT SITS. CAN WE RECONCILE THE
SEEMINGLY CONFLICTING
STATEMENTS OF THESE TWO JURISTS?
● YES. They are not mutually
exclusive. The statement of Justice
Marshall that the power to tax
includes the power to destroy shall
be taken from the context that
power of taxation is used as an
instrument of police power or as
an implement of police power. So
under this principle the state can
exercise power taxation to
discourage undesirable activities.
● For example the imposition of sin
taxes on cigarettes and spirits.
This may be imposed even at a
restrictive rate to the extent of
destroying the industry because
then we can apply the statement of
Justice Marshall that the power to
tax includes the power to destroy.
But when the power taxation is
used for the purpose of revenue
raising the statement of Justice
Holmes shall be the applicable
principle the taxation should be
uniform and equitable and it is not
arbitrary and not amount to
confiscation
HOW DO WE CONSTRUE TAX LAWS?
● The interpretation of tax laws is
that it must be strictly construed
against the taxpayer liberally in
favor of the government
● In favor of taxation and against
exemption
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
● The Constitution also imposes
stricter requirements for the
validity of laws granting tax
exemption. Under the fourth
paragraph of Sec. 28, Art. 6, no law
granting any tax exemption shall
be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
IS THIS A STRICTER REQUIREMENT?
CAN WE NOT SAY THAT ALL BILLS
REQUIRE THE MAJORITY OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS?
● NO. There is a difference between
all the members of Congress and
of the Congress
● Bills granting tax exemption must
be approved by the absolute
majority - ½ plus 1 of the total
membership while all other bills
may be granted by ½ plus 1 of
those present constituting the
quorum.
ATTY GAB: So supposing in the Senate
we have only 23 senators in order for a
bill granting tax exemption to be validly
passed by this composition, the
required vote under the Constitution is
½ plus 1 of 24, even if there are only 23.
However for the passage of other bills
which are not for exemption, it can be
lower than that. So supposing in a
session there are only, say for example,
13 senators present. So in order to pass
a bill that does not grant tax exemption
only ½ plus 1 of that 13 is required.
ASIDE FROM THE CONGRESS, DOES
THE CONSTITUTION ALSO GRANT TAX
EXEMPTION?
● YES. Charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto,
mosques, non-profit cemeteries,
and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from
taxation (Sec. 28, Art. 6,
Constitution)
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WE HAVE LEARNED IN STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION THAT WHEN SEVERAL
ITEMS ARE SEPARATED BY COMMAS
AND ONE OF THE PHRASES IN THIS
PROVISION IS A QUALIFIER, THE
INTERPRETATION IS THAT THE
QUALIFIER SHALL ONLY APPLY TO THE
ITEM IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING IT. SO
THE QUALIFIER IS THE PHRASE
“ACTUALLY DIRECTLY AND
EXCLUSIVELY USED” AND THE PHRASE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THIS
QUALIFIER IS THE PHRASE “ALL
LANDS, BUILDINGS AND
IMPROVEMENTS”. SO CAN WE SAY
THAT THE QUALIFIER ONLY APPLIES
TO LANDS, BUILDINGS AND
IMPROVEMENTS BUT NOT TO THE
OTHER ITEMS ENUMERATED UNDER
PARAGRAPH 3?
● NO. The qualifier ‘actually directly
and exclusively used’ shall apply to
all of the items without regard to
tools of statutory construction.
Determine the intent and the spirit
of the Constitution rather than the
form
DOES PAR. 3, SEC 28, ART. 6 COVER ALL
FORMS OF TAXES?
● NO. Constitutional exemption for
religious purpose refers only to
property taxes (Lladoc v. CIR)
LLADOC v. CIR
Section 22(3), Art. VI of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts
from taxation cemeteries, churches and
parsonages or convents, appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for
religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on
such properties enumerated, as property
taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise
taxes.
A gift tax is not a property tax, but
an excise tax imposed on the transfer of
property by way of gift inter vivos, the
imposition of which on property used
exclusively for religious purposes, does
not constitute an impairment of the
Constitution.
A.Y. 2019-2020 YOU DO NOTE(s)
ABRA VALLEY v. AQUINO
As early as 1916, in YMCA of Manila
vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 33 Phil.
217 [1916], this Court ruled that while it
may be true that the YMCA keeps a
lodging and a boarding house and
maintains a restaurant for its members,
still these do not constitute business in
the ordinary acceptance of the word, but
an institution used exclusively for
religious, charitable and educational
purposes, and as such, it is entitled to be
exempted from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva
Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos
Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this Court
included in the exemption a vegetable
garden in an adjacent lot and another lot
formerly used as a cemetery. It was
clarified that the term “used exclusively”
considers incidental use also. Thus, the
exemption from payment of land tax in
favor of the convent includes, not only the
land actually occupied by the building but
also the adjacent garden devoted to the
incidental use of the parish priest. The lot
which is not used for commercial
purposes but serves solely as a sort of
lodging place, also qualifies for exemption
because this constitutes incidental use in
religious functions.
The phrase “exclusively used for
educational purposes” was further
clarified by this Court in the cases of
Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of
Assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961]
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA
991 [1965], thus““Moreover, the exemption
in favor of property used exclusively for
charitable or educational purposes is ‘not
limited to property actually indispensable’
therefor (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p.
1430), but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of said purposes,
such as in the case of hospitals, ‘a school
for training nurses, a nurses’ home,
property use to provide housing facilities
for interns, resident doctors,
superintendents, and other members of
the hospital staff, and recreational
facilities for student nurses, interns, and
residents’ (84 CJS 6621), such as ‘athletic
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fields’ including ‘a firm used for the charitable or educational purpose,

inmates of the institution.’ ” it is not exempt from taxation.
It must be stressed however, that Besides, real property tax is a tax
while this Court allows a more liberal and on the property not a tax on the
non-restrictive interpretation of the owner
phrase “exclusively used for educational
purposes” as provided for in Article VI, NON-STOCK NON-PROFIT
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION ENJOYS
Philippine Constitution, reasonable GREATER EXEMPTION THAN STOCK
emphasis has always been made that PROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION?
exemption extends to facilities which are ● YES. Because a non-stock
incidental to and reasonably necessary for non-profit educational institutions
the accomplishment of the main enjoy exemption from all taxes and
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of duties, not only real property tax
the school building or lot for commercial but even income tax, as long as the
purposes is neither contemplated by law, property is being actually, directly
nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use and exclusively used for
of the second floor of the main building in educational purpose
the case at bar for residential purposes of
the Director and his family, may find IS CHARITABLE INSTITUTION
justification under the concept of PROPERTY?
incidental use, which is complimentary to No it is not a property. This goes to show
the main or primary the imperfection of the constitution.
pur-pose—educational, the lease of the When it should have been property of the
first floor thereof to the Northern institution not the institution itself.
Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered
incidental to the purposes of education.
—Under the 1935 Constitution, the MIDTERM EXAM:
trial court correctly arrived at the Constitution of the Philippines to Power
conclusion that the school building as of Eminent Domain
well as the lot where it is built, should be
taxed, not because the second floor of the
same is being used by the Director and his
family for residential purposes, but
because the first floor thereof is being
used for commercial purposes. However,
since only a portion is used for purposes
of commerce, it is only fair that half of the
assessed tax be returned to the school
involved.

IS OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY

RELEVANT IN DETERMINING
EXEMPTION?
● NO. The ownership of the property
is irrelevant in determining
exemption. What vests exemption
is not the ownership but the use of
the property even if it is owned by
a religious, charitable or
educational institution. Thus, if it
is not actually directly or
exclusively used, this can be
extended to incidental religious,

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