Set 2

Testamentary Provisions
(Witnesses to Wills to Allowance and Disallowance of Wills)

1. Gonzales vs CA (G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979)

FACTS:

Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of
Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of
Isabel.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel, on the
following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and attested as required by
law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have testamentary capacity due
to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured through undue influence.

The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals Reversed the said
decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law
when there was absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.

ISSUE:

1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and still not be considered
credible as required by Art. 805?

2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will has good
standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?

HELD:

1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires something more than
just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under Articles
820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person to be an
instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his
credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held
and ruled that: “Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible witness,
so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify
as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether
to believe or not to believe his testimony.”
2.No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for
being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless
the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article
820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by
or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or
more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as
the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction
of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code.

2. Molo-Pekson vs Tanchuco (G.R. No. L-8774. November 26, 1956) ATUP

In the matter of the testate estate of the deceased JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO. EMILIANA MOLO-
PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, vs. ENRIQUE TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO
GOMEZ, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Mariano Molo died and by will bequeathed all his estate to his wife. Later, his widow, died leaving no forced
heirs but only collateral, — children and grandchildren of her sisters. She was supposed to have executed
about two years before her death, a document purporting to be her last will and testament, wherein she
bequeathed the bulk of her property to her two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar (appellees/petitioners). These
two foster daughters presented the document for probate in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

The other relatives, such as Enrique Tanchuco, only son of Juana’s deceased sister Modesta, and his two
children, Ester, and Gloria, both surnamed Tanchuco, and Faustino Gomez and Fortunata Gomez, the only
surviving grandchildren of another deceased sister, named Francisca, filed opposition to the probate of the will.

After hearing, the trial court, in a well considered decision declared the document Exhibit Ato be the last will
and testament of Juana Juan, and admitted the same for probate. Failing to obtain a reconsideration of this
decision, the Oppositors appealed.

Contention of Oppositors:

Under Section 618 of Act 190, the Old Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that a will should be
attested or subscribed by three or more credible witnesses, two of the attesting witnesses to the will in
question, namely, Miss Navarro and Miss Canicosa, who were employed as pharmacist and salesgirl,
respectively, in the drugstore of Pilar Perez-Nable, one of beneficiaries in the will, may not be considered
credible witnesses for the reason that as such employees, they would naturally testify in favor of their
employer.

Issue: Whether or not the employees of one of the beneficiaries of the will may testify.

Held: Yes. Section 620 of the same Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of
the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may be a witness to
the execution of a will.
This same provision is reproduced in our New Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer
and employee, or being a relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to
a will. The main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age, mental
capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to say, his testimony may
be entitled to credence.

There is a long line of authorities on this point, a few of which the Court may cite:
“A ‘credible witness’ is one who is not disqualified to testify by mental incapacity, crime, or other
cause. Historical Soc. of Dauphin County vs. Kelker, 74 A. 619, 226 Pa. 16, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1010.”
(Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 340).
“As construed by the common law, a ‘credible witness’ to a will means a ‘competent witness’.
Appeal of Clark, 95 A. 517, 114 Me. 105, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 837.” (Ibid. p. 341). “Expression ‘credible
witness’ in relation to attestation of wills means ‘competent witness’; that is, one competent under the
law to testify to fact of execution of will. Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 8283. Moos vs. First State Bank of
Uvalde, Tex. Civ. App. 60 S. W. 2d 888, 889.” (Ibid. p. 842)
“The term ‘credible’, used in the statute of wills requiring that a will shall be attested by two credible
witnesses, means competent; witnesses who, at the time of attesting the will, are legally competent to
testify, in a court of justice, to the facts attested by subscribing the will, the competency being
determined as of the date of the execution of the will and not of the time it is offered for probate. Smith
vs. Goodell, 101 N.E. 255, 256, 258 Ill. 145. (Ibid.)
“‘Credible witnesses’, as used in the statute relating to wills, means competent witnesses — that is,
such persons as are not legally disqualified from testifying in courts of justice, by reason of
mental incapacity, interest, or the commission of crimes, or other cause excluding them from testifying
generally, or rendering them incompetent in respect of the particular subject matter or in the particular
suit. Hill vs. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 152 N. E. 545, 546, 322 III. 42.” (Ibid. p. 343)
The Court itself held in the case of Vda. de Roxas vs. Roxas, that the law does not bar relatives, either of the
testator or of the heirs or legatees, from acting as attesting witnesses to a will.

3. Pascual vs De la Cruz (G.R. No. L-24819, May 30, 1969) BANGGAT

No. L-24819. May 30, 1969

TESTATE ESTATE OF CATALINA DE LA CRUZ, deceased, ANDRES PASCUAL, petitioner-

appellee, vs.

PEDRO DE LA CRUZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants

FACTS OF THE CASE:1. On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving
descendant or ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal.

2. On 14 January 1960, a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal by Andres Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the
decedent.

3. Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the
validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the
testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the
will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the
signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as
well as fraud are grounds to disallow a will.

RULING: No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de la
Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a matter of fact
it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also her sisters held him
with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also her sole heir to her
property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.

The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on this Court: that
to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates
the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.

The circumstances marshalled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue influence and
improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is on the assertion of
the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign anything unless I knew it,"
which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that proponent desired. On the contrary, the
evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed
the title in his name, but caused the name "Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to
mislead the deceased, even if true, demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to
overpower and destroy the free will of the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really
subjugated by him to the extent pictured by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to
the deception averred.

Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one of the
instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism of the
testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative or friend is,
likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those interested in her
succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant importunity and
recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire to keep the making of
a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament during her lifetime.

Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruzfell short of establishing
actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix considered proponent as
her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being made sole heir of her sister,
Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing abnormal in her instituting proponent also
as her own beneficiary.

The probate of the will was allowed.

NOTES. —The condition and physical appearance of a questioned document may help in determining
whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know,
saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, theref ore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor
one party to the prejudice of the other. This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of
the questioned document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting
nothing, and exaggerating nothing (Junquera vs. Borromeo, 19 SCRA 656).

4. Suntay vs Suntay (G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954) CAMACHO

Suntay vs. Suntay

G.R. No. L-3807 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

Facts: In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, China.
He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy.

He married twice, the first marriage was with Manuela Cruz with whom he had several children. While the
second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner Silvino
Suntay.

Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs of the first marriage. While the second wife, the
surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament
of the deceased which was claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in November
1929. The petition was denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof.

After the pacific war, Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and
testament in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January 1931 and probated in
the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for the probate of the will executed
in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will executed in Amoy China in November 1931.

Issue: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in the Philippines.

Held: The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must be proved. The law
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements
for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is
no proof on these points.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose
of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district
court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the will which
was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate cannot be said to
have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed
in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to
the probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and
recorded by a competent court of this country.

5. Singson vs Florentino (G.R. No. L-4603, October 25, 1952) CAMBE

5. G.R. No. L-4603, October 25, 1952

IN RE: PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED LEONA SINGSON.

MANUEL SINGSON, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,

VS.

EMILIA FLORENTINO, TRINIDAD FLORENTINO DE PAZ, AND JOSEFINA FLORENTINO VDA. DE

LIM, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.

FACTS:

Leona Singson died leaving a will. In said will the deceased instituted as heirs her brothers Evaristo,
Dionisio and Manuel, her nieces Rosario F. de Donato, Emilia Florentino and Trinidad Florentino de Paz,
her grandniece Consolacion Florentino, and some servants.

She named her brothers Evaristo and Manuel as executors of the will.

Manuel Singson filed a petition for the probate of said will.

Emilia Florentino, Trinidad Florentino de Paz and Josefina Florentino Vda. de Lim, daughters of a sister of
the deceased, opposed the petition alleging among other grounds that the signatures appearing in the
will are not the genuine signatures of the deceased, and that the will has not been executed in
accordance with the formalities of the law.

The trial court found that the will has been executed in accordance with law and admitted the same to
probate.

The oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the case was later certified to this court for the
reason that it involves purely questions of law.

The oppositors raised the following errors: (THREE ISSUES)

FIRST ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting the deposition of Fidel Reyes, an instrumental witness, which
was taken because he was then suffering from paralysis and was thus physically incapacitated to appear
and testify in court.

RULING ON THE FIRST ISSUE:

We opine that, while the taking of the deposition was not made in strict compliance with the rule
(section 11, Rule 77), the deficiency, if any, has been cured by the waiver evinced by counsel for
the oppositors which prevented the court from constituting itself in the residence of the witness.
Section 11, Rule 77 of the Rules, if the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses present in the
Philippines must be produced and examined, and if they are dead, absent or insane, this fact must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If a subscribing witness is present in the Philippines but outside
the province where the will has been filed, his deposition must be taken.

We believe, however, that the deposition may also be justified by interpreting section 11, Rule 77, in
connection with Rule 18, section 4 (c), of the Rules, relative to the taking of the deposition of a witness
in ordinary cases when he is unable to testify because of sickness. Interpreting and harmonizing
together these two provisions we may draw the conclusion that even if an instrumental witness is
within the seat of the court but is unable to appear because of sickness, as in this case, his
deposition may still be taken, for a different interpretation would be senseless and impractical and
would defeat the very purpose which said Rule 77 intends to serve.

SECOND ISSUE

WON the attestation clause, which allegedly failed to state the number of sheets or pages in which
the will is written, substantially complied with the law.

RULING ON THE SECOND ISSUE

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which
requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the
possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to
whom the property is intended to be bequeathed

(In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil, 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50
Phil., 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil., 481; Echavarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil., 611). The ratio decidendi
of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets
or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating
the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or
examination of the will itself.

But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or
pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a statement
that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule
of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has
been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.

One of such cases is De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104. Here one of the objections raised
was that, the attestation clause does not state that the will had been signed in the presence of the
witnesses although this fact appears in the last paragraph of the body of the will, and the Court, in
overruling the objection, said that "it may be conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn
and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection
with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent;
it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document".

Another case that may be cited is Mendoza vs. Pilapil (72 Phil., 546). In this case, the objection was that
the attestation clause does not state the number of pages upon which the will was written, and yet the
court held that the law has been substantially complied with inasmuch as in the body of the will and on the
same page wherein the attestation clause appears written it is expressly stated that that will contains
three pages each of which was numbered in letters and in figures.

The conclusion is inescapable that the will has been drafted in substantial compliance with the
law. This opinion is bolstered up when we examine the will itself which shows on its face that it is
really and actually composed of eight pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses.

THIRD ISSUE

WON the attestation clause state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses as required by law.

RULING ON THE THIRD ISSUE

A perusal of the above attestation clause would at first glance give the impression that the testatrix merely
signed or stamped her thumbmark on the will in the presence of the witnesses, without stating the place
where her signature or thumbmark had been affixed, which impression is caused by the fact that right
after the sentence firmo e imprimho su marca digital en presencia de todos nosotros, there appears a
semicolon; but if this semicolon is disregarded, we would at once see that the testatrix signed or affixed
her thumbmark not only at the bottom of the will but also on the left margin of each and every page
thereon, considering the concluding part of the sentence concerning the signing of the will. That
semicolon undoubtedly has been placed there by mistake or through inadvertence, as may be deduced
from the use of the word tambien made by the witnesses in the sentence immediately following, which
conveys the idea of oneness in action both on the part of the testatrix and the witnesses. Thus considered
and interpreted, the attestation clause complies substantially with the law.

"The appellants earnestly contend that the attestation clause fails to show that the witnesses
signed the will and each and every page thereof because it simply says (that we the witnesses also
signed in the presence of the testatrix and of each other).

"In answer to this contention it may be said that this portion of the attestation clause must be read in
connection with the portion preceding it, which states that the testatrix signed the will and on all the
margins thereof in the presence of the witnesses; especially, because the word also used therein
establishes a very close connection between said two portions of the attestation clause. This word also
should, therefore, be given in its full meaning which, in the instant case, is that the witnesses
signed the will in the same manner as the testatrix did. The language of the whole attestation clause,
taken together, clearly shows that the witnesses signed the will and on all the margins thereof in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other."

6. Caluya vs Domingo (G.R. No. 7647, March 27, 1914) DE GALA

G.R. No. L-7647 March 27, 1914

DOMINGO CALUYA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

LUCINA DOMINGO, respondent-appellee.

Facts/Issues:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte denying
the probate of a will.

The CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte denied the probate on the following grounds:

I. Although the testator had signed by mark, it nowhere appeared in the will who had written the
signature or that it had been written at his request.

II. The witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really have signed the attestation clause because, at
the time it was executed, he was attending a session of the municipal council of Piddig as a member
thereof.

III. As to the other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him
by the testator, and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court does not believe that any of the objections are well founded and the
judgment refusing its probate must, therefore, be reversed.

I. The evidence shows that the name of the testator was signed by another person at the testator’s
request and under his direction and in his presence and in the presence of the witnesses to the will.

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other. . . .
 In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan , it is nowhere required that, where the testator is unable to
write, the fact that his signature was written by some other person, at his request and express direction,
should appear in the body of the will itself.

The name of a person who is unable to write may be signed by another, by express direction, to
any instrument known to the law. There is no necessity whatever, as far as the validity of the instrument is
concerned, for the person who writes the name of the principal in the document to sign his pen name
also. As a matter of policy, it may be wise that he did so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as
would enable a person proving the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the principal.
Nevertheless, as a matter of essential validity of the document, it is unnecessary.

II. As to the second objection, it does not appear in the evidence of the opposition that the witness
Pandaraoan was attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig from something like 10 o'clock
until 12.30 o'clock of the day on which the will was executed and that the will was executed sometime
between 10 and 12 o'clock. The barrio of Piddig is only a short distance from the house in which the will
was executed and it would have taken but a short time to cover the distance. The witness Pandaraoan
himself testified directly and positively that, after having left the meeting of the municipal council, he went
to the house of the testator by appointment and there signed the will as stated in the attestation clause.
The other witnesses to the will as well as the notary public support this declaration.

All of the witnesses to the will unite in declaring that they were there present at the time the will
was executed and that they signed as witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal council began its session about 10 o'clock; that in order
to attend the execution of the will, as he had agreed with the notary public he would do, he was obliged to
leave the session before it terminated. He left the session, mounted a horse and arrived at the house of
the testator at about 12 o'clock, in time to take part in the execution of the ill as stated in the attestation
clause.

III. As to the third ground upon which the CFI based its decision; namely, that the will having
mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to Segundino Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not
rendering the will entirely invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality of its execution and especially the
testimony of said witness relating thereto.

Section 622 provides:

If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or

parent, or child, a beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal
estate, is given by such will, such devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns
such person, or the wife or husband, or parent or child of such person, or anyone
claiming under such person or such wife or husband, or parent or child, be void, unless
there are three other competent witnesses to such will, and such person so attesting shall
be admitted as a witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made or
given. But a mere charge on the real or personal estate of the testator, for the payment of
debts, shall not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.

As observed to the will, no interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis,
nor did it convey or transfer any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already consummated, a sale
already made. Even if, however, the will had conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it would not make
the whole will void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would have been void; the
remainder could have stood and would have stood as a valid testament.

7. Merza vs Porras (G.R. No. L-4888, May 25, 1953) DELUTE

8. ELIAB

G.R. No. L-12207 December 24, 1959

JUAN PALACIOS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

MARIA CATIMBANG PALACIOS, oppositor-appellee.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

FACTS

Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing himself of the provisions of the new
Civil Code, he filed a petition for its approval. In said will, he instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C.
Palacios and Andrea C. Palacios.

On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed a opposition to the probate of the will alleging that:

she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in said
will thus impairing here legitime.

The court on July 6, 1956 issued an order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for the hearing
of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after proper hearing concerning this incident, the
court issued another order declaring oppositor to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it
impairs her legitime,.

The appeal was immediately appealed to the SC by the petitioner.

ISSUE

Whether or not the opposition is proper.

RULING

It should be noted that petition instituted the present proceeding in order to secure the probate of his will availing
himself of the provisions of Article 838, paragraph 2, of the new Civil Code, which permit a testator to petition the
proper court during his lifetime for the allowance of his will, but to such petition on Maria Catimbang filed an
opposition alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she was completely ignored in
the will thus impairing her object to the probate of the will insofar as it due execution is concerned or on the ground
that it has not complied with the formalities prescribed by law; rather she objects to its intrinsic validity or to the
legality of the provisions of the will.

We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the
purpose of the opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who allegedly has
been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a separate action. This is especially so when
the testator, as in the present case, is still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will
leaving the effects thereof after his death.lawphi1.net

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of a testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter or
revoke the same before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary probate proceedings after the
testator's death would be in order" (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 53-54).The reason for this comment is that
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, new Civil
Code.).

It is clear that the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in annulling the portion of the will which
allegedly impairs the legitime of the oppositor on the ground that, as it has found, she is an extraneous
matter which should be treshed out in a separate action.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.

9. Macam vs Gatmaitan (G.R. No. L-42619, March 11, 1937) GALAGALA

10. Testate Estate of Maloto vs CA (G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988) GONZALES

10. TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO,
CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

FACTS:

Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-
Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto.

Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the case
was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate dividing it into
four equal parts among themselves. They presented the same and successfully gained court
approval.

Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” which
was purportedly to be the last will and testament of Adriana dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence
the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees.
The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under the instruction of the deceased
Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating among others that the said will was revoked.
Two witnesses were presented to prove that the will was burned by Adriana herself.

The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of
the will was sufficiently proven.

ISSUE:

WON the will was validly revoked?

HELD:

For a valid revocation to occur, the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will
not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an
intention to revoke (animus revocandi).

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not
constitute an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his
express direction and presence.

In this case, the document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established–that such was the will of Adriana Maloto. And that the burning was not
proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in
her presence. Both witnesses stated that they were the only one present at the place where
papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could not have constituted a valid
revocation of Adriana’s Will.

11. Casiano vs Maloto (G.R. No. L-32328, September 30, 1977) GUINTO

Note:

In this case, an intestate proceeding was filed. Subsequently, a petition for allowance of the last will and
annulment of the proceeding was filed in the same proceeding(intestate proceeding).

Ultimately, ingon sa court dapat separate ang action for probate of the will sa action for intestate
proceeding.

Facts:

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,
respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4,
1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding. In the course of said intestate
proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an
extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto whereby they adjudicated said estate unto
themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance approved the
extrajudicial partition.

A document purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of
Court. It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are
named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said with which are
bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also
allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo,
the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in the intestate proceeding a motion (1) for
reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament
of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also
filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto.

CFI – denied the motion on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court and was denied. The
SC said that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for
petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question.

Petitioners commenced an action to probate the alleged last will and testament of of Adriana Maloto.

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix, the instant petition for
probate is now barred by prior judgment or order (or res judicata, the estate of the late adriana maloto had
already passed out of existence and title thereto had already arrested in the distributees of their assigns,
petitioners aldina maloto casiano and constancio maloto are now estopped from seeking the remedy
tender this proceeding, they having ceased to be interested parties.
Probate Court – dismissed petition for probate. the alleged will sought to be Probated had been
destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. the petition for probate is now barred by the order in the intestate
estate proceeding.

Issue: W/N the probate court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate of the alleged will of
Adriana in the intestate proceeding.

Ruling: NO

It is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been
revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in the intestate estate proceeding stated that "Movants
should have filed a separate action for the probate of the will." And this court stated in its resolution of
May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition
is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to
the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

12. Gonzalez vs Carunggon (G.R. Nos. L-3272-73, November 29, 1951) JOSOL

G.R. Nos. L-3272-73 November 29, 1951

MANUEL GONZALES, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

MANOLITA GONZALES DE CARUNGCONG, petitioner-appellee;

ALEJANDRO GONZALES, JR., and JUAN GONZALES, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

On November 27, 1948, Manuel Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be referred to as testatrix) died at
the age of about seventy-eight years, leaving five children, namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Leopoldo
Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales. The estate left by her is estimated at
P150,000.

Manuel Gonzales filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will executed by the testatrix on November
16, 1942, devising to him the greater portion of the estate, without impairing the legitimes of the other
children.

Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the disallowance of the wills executed on November 16, 1942, and May 5,
1945, on the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by the testatrix in an instrument
executed by her on November 18, 1948, with the result that her estate should be distributed as if she died
intestate.
The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the will presented by Manolita G. Carungcong having been executed
in accordance with law the same is hereby declared as the true and last will and testament of the
deceased Manuela Ibarra Viuda de Gonzales, and said will is hereby admitted probate.

The appellants contend that the will does not contain any attestation clause; that, assuming the
concluding paragraph to be the attestation clause, it is not valid because it is the act of the testatrix and
not of the witnesses, and because it does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will.

On the other hand, appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee), contends
that the testatrix lacked the testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of
revocation, and their contention was sustained by the trial court.

For more than ten years prior to her death, the testatrix had suffered from hypertension. On November
14, 1948, she had aphasia and on November 15, 1948, she was taken to the hospital upon advice of the
family physician, Dr. Jose C. Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities Dr. Leveriza
stated that the testatrix was suffering from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. Particularly on
November 18, 1948, when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in
a comatose and unconscious state and could not talk or understand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the attestation clause is sufficient so as not to invalidate the will

2. Whether or not the testatrix has the testamentary capacity at the time of the revocation of the will

RULING:

1. YES. The attestation clause contained in the body of the will being thus valid, the statement in the
penultimate paragraph of the will as to the number of sheets or pages used, is sufficient attestation which
may be considered in conjunction with the last paragraph. It is significant that the law does not require the
attestation to be contained in a single clause. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable,
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially when the authenticity of the
will is not assailed, as in this case. (please see the full text for the portion of the attestation clause in
Filipino)

2. NO. The testatrix was of sound mind at the time of the revocation of the will.

The fact that the testimony of the attesting witnesses tends to imply that the testatrix was of sound mind
at the time the alleged instrument of revocation was executed, cannot prevail over the findings of the
attending physician, Dr. Leveriza, because even Dr. Ramon C. Talavera (an attesting witness) testified
that although he had not examined the testatrix, her case appeared serious; that he had a hunch that
"they were taking advantage of the last moment of the deceased and they were trying to make me an
instrument in the accomplishment of their aims," and that he had the idea that the testatrix was in doubtful
condition because he "could only judge from the people going there."

It is also argued that if the testatrix was in a comatose condition, Dr. Leveriza would not have ordered to
"let her sit on bed or on chair and let her turn on her side sometime." However, Dr. Leveriza has given the
reason for this prescription, namely, to avoid hypostatic pneumonia.

It is hard to rule that the testatrix had sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the
alleged instrument of revocation. In the first place, Constancio Padilla (brother of Jose Padilla) merely
asked the testatrix, first, if she was agreeable to the instrument of revocation prepared by Jose Padilla,
and secondly, if she was agreeable to the signing of said document by Constancio Padilla, to which two
questions the testatrix allegedly answered "Yes". It is not pretended that the testatrix said more about the
matter or gave any further instruction. The attesting witnesses were not introduced to the testatrix, and
their presence was not even mentioned to her. it is obviously doubtful whether the testatrix understood
the meaning and extent of the ceremony. Assuming that the testatrix answered in the affirmative the two
questions of Constancio Padilla, without more, we cannot fairly attribute to her manifestation of her desire
to proceed, right then and there, with the signing of the questioned instrument. In other words, contrary to
the recital of the attestation clause, the testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the
attesting witnesses.

13. Samson vs Naval (G.R. No. L-11823, February 11, 1918) JUEVES

14. De Molo vs Molo (G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951) JUNGCO

Molo vs. Molo

G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951

Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will contained a
revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate of the 1939
will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution.

As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time. Again the
oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They contended that
despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and thus effectively nullified the
1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent disallowed
1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent will,
containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it was not
executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the
said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator deliberately
destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will
executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument
intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the
old, and the new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
15. Roxas vs Roxas (G.R. No. L-2396, December 1, 1950) LAGARTO

Roxas vs. Roxas

(G.R. No. L-2396, December 11, 1950)

Facts:

Petitioner Natividad Roxas filed a petition for the probate of will of his deceased husband, Pablo Roxas.
Under the will, Pablo Roxas left all his property to his wife and his son, Reynaldo. The will is typewritten
and worded in Tagalog and attested by Jacinto Enriquez, Fortunato Gupit and Martin Rodrido.

Respondents filed an opposition on the ground that the will was not executed and attested as required by
law, that it was only intended as a mere request and was subsequently revoked by the deceased because
it was crumpled with an intention to destroy. Respondents alleged that the last will and testament was not
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator.

The Court of First Instance rendered a decision disallowing the probate of the will on the ground that body
of the will was typewritten and signed by the testator on a date or occasion different from and anterior to
the date or occasion when the attestation clause was typewritten and signed by the attesting witnesses,
with the result that the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses.

Petitioner appealed the decision of the CFI arguing that the testimony of the witnesses should be given
more weight. According to the witnesses, Between two and three in the afternoon Pablo Roxas showed
up and, approaching Gupit who was then reading a book, asked him to go to the sala with Roxas. The
latter got from his hip pocket a folded sheet of paper (the will here in question) and asked Gupit to read it.
In the meantime Roxas proceeded to the dining hall where a mahjong game was being played and called
Enriquez and Rodrigo who thereupon went to the sala and were asked to read the will previously handed
to Gupit. Roxas then made the request for the three to act as witnesses. Roxas, using his fountain pen,
signed it in the presence of Gupit, Enriquez and Rodrigo. Gupit then signed with his own pen and,
noticing that the ink in his signature was spreading, asked for a blotter. Roxas got a blotter from a nearby
writing desk and gave it to Gupit who accordingly applied it. Enriquez and Rodrigo, using the pen of Gupit,
took their turns in signing the will, the blotter being also applied. Thereafter, Roxas refolded the document
and inserted the same in his hip pocket.

Issue:

Whether or not the will was attested by three credible witnesses?

Ruling:

YES.

This case is one in which the will is couched in a language known and spoken by the testator and the
signatures of the three attesting witnesses are admittedly genuine. Such being the situation, the question
that arises, far from requiring the intervention of experts, is one merely of credibility of witnesses. In our
opinion, the testimony of the three attesting witnesses — confirmatory of the due execution of the will —
deserves full credit, not only because of their qualifications (hereinbefore pointed out) but because their
reputation for probity has not been impeached. The fact that they may have some relationship with the
petitioner is not sufficient to warrant the belief that they did not tell the truth. The law, in the first place,
does not bar relatives either of the testator of the heirs or legatees from acting as witnesses. In the
second place, in the normal course of things and to be sure that the witnesses would not let the
beneficiaries down, the testator may be inclined to employ, as attesting witnesses, relatives of such
beneficiaries, if not wholly disinterested persons. In the third place, under the will, Reynaldo Roxas
(adulterous son of Pablo Roxas) is named a legatee on equal footing with the petitioner, and the attesting
witnesses are not related whatsoever with him. In the fourth place, whereas the three attesting witnesses
have no direct interest in the subject matter of the will, oppositor Maria Roxas, like the other oppositor
Pedro Roxas, is an intestate heir of Pablo Roxas and, therefore, naturally interested in having the probate
of said will disallowed.

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16. Trillana vs Crisostomo (G.R. No. L-3378, August 22, 1951) LOZANO

Damasa Crisostomo died and left two wills, one on October 19, 1946, and another on August 16,
1948. In both wills, the testatrix left all her properties as legacies to other persons. The CFI allowed
the October 19, 1946, and declared invalid the subsequent will.

Petitioner-appellants CONSORCIA P. CRISOSTOMO, ET.AL, who claim to be nephews and nieces

and therefore legal heirs of the deceased, applealed the lower court’s decision saying that the
October 19, 1949 will should be disallowed, and in so doing, they will they will inherit the estate left
by the testatrix. They contend that said will should be probated jointly or together with the will of
August 16, 1948, and the latter be allowed instead of the former.

Appellants argue that they are interested parties and therefore may appeal in the present case,
because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and in its that of August 16 is allowed, and
the legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go
to appellants.

ISSUE:
WON the appellants are parties-in-interest and have the right to appeal the CFI decision

HELD:

NO. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest in order
that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so that he will be materially and
directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or judgment: and not indirect or contingent
The interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent upon several uncertain and
future events: (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19, 1948 (2)The allowance of the will of
August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948.
Therefore, they are not real parties-in-interest, and have no right to appeal.

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17. Austria vs Reyes (G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970) MANGUB

AUSTRIA VS. HON. ANDRES REYES

G.R. No. L-23079

February 27, 1970

Doctrine: Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the CivilCode, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false;and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

FACTS:

Basilia Austria vda.de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last
will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of her estate designated for
respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the
nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstance should have left the whole estate of
Basilia open to intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.

It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia was deceived into believing that
she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter's
legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have instituted the respondents as heirs had
the fact of spurious adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the
terms, "sapilitangtagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitangmana" (legitime), the impelling
reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she
could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a false
cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring the petitioners’
nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her
will.

HELD:

NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second,
the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The
decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of
heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of
her estate, which largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively small devise of land
which the decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the
respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the
respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to
the bulk of the testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this
case. Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should be allowed to prevail.
Granted that a probate court has found, by final judgment, that the decedent possessed
testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence, it follows that giving full expression to her will must be in order.

ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost

18. Gago vs Mamuyac (G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927) MATURAN

CASE No. 18 - [No. 26317. January 29, 1927]

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased. FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner and appellant, vs. CORNELIO
MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA, FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents
and appellees.

JOHNSON, J.:

July 27, 1918 – Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament.
Jan. 2, 1922 – Miguel Mamuyac (with LW&T) died in Agoo, La Union. Francisco Gago (brother-in-law)
filed a petition at CFI La Union for probation of Mamuyac’s will.

Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac opposed to the petition
for the probation of said will.

Nov. 2, 1923 - petition for the probation of said will was denied.

GROUND: because the deceased Miguel Mamuyac, during his lifetime (16th day of April, 1919)
executed a new will and testament.

Feb. 21, 1925 – Francisco Gago instituted probate proceedings for the LW&T executed on Apr. 16, 1919.

Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac opposed to this on the
ff. grounds:

● that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament executed by the said Miguel
Mamuyac;
● the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac
● the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel Mamuyac.

CFI: denied probation of the Apr. 16, 1919 will.

GROUND: because the Apr. 16, 1919 will was cancelled and revoked in the year 1920. Mamuyac
executed another will in 1920.

ü Apr. 16, 1919 will is a mere carbon copy of its original which remained in the
possession of the deceased testator Miguel Mamuyac, who revoked it before his
death.

Witnesses

● Jose Fenoy, who typed the will of the testator on April 16, 1919
● Carlos Bejar, who saw on December 30, 1920, the original of Exhibit A (will of 1919) actually
cancelled by the testator Miguel Mamuyac, who assured Carlos Bejar that inasmuch as he had
sold him a house and the land where the house was built, he had to cancel it (the will of 1919),
executing thereby a new testament.

Corroborating witness: Narcisa Gago (sister of Miguel, lives in the same house as Miguel)

● admitted that the will executed Mamuyac in 1919 was found in the possession of father Miguel
Mamuyac.
● testified that the original of April 1919 will could not be found.

ISSUE: WON the Apr. 16, 1919 should be probated

RULING: NO. The will was cancelled and revoked in 1920, during Mamuyac’s lifetime.

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to. be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation of wills. The fact that. such
cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence
showing that after due search the original will cannot be found.

Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when
last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed.

The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other
person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation
or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed
by the testator with intent to revoke it.

In the case at bar…

CFI La Union is right to rule that the April 1919 will was revoked, since the original will of 1919 could not
be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that the same
had been cancelled.

To probate a will: proponent has burden of proof to clearly establish not only its execution but its
existence.

If execution of will was proved: the one who contests the will has burden of proof to show that it has
been revoked

In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there
is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of its cancellation perishes with the
testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution.

When proven by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed with
all the formalities and requirements of the law: duplicate may be admitted in evidence
● ü when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or
destroyed by the testator.

SC: the will presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920.

CFI ruling on not to probate will was affirmed.

19. Manalo vs Paredes (G.R. No. 24168, September 22, 1925) MIRANDA

VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS: On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Laguna an application for letters of administration of the estate left by her
deceased husband, who, according to the application, died intestate.
In the course of said administration and on May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, Daria
Mendieta and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, through their attorney Mr. Eusebio M.
Lopez, filed a motion praying for the probate of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein
most of his property was given as a legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the
legitimate wife of the deceased Francisco Villegas

On August 8, 1924, attorneys Messrs. Azada and Veluz, on behalf of the executor Melecio Fule, filed
a motion stating that the attesting witnesses had assured them that the supposed will had not been
executed by Francisco Villegas, and that the executor no longer took interest in the case.

Having received an order of the court to produce the supposed will, Justina Mendieta filed a motion
stating, that she knows not of any will executed by the deceased Francisco Villegas, except the one
above- mentioned signed on January 18, 1924…

Notwithstanding the motions, the court then ordered the publication of the application for probate.

On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta filed another application for probate and a motion for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors, which motion was granted. Laureana Hidalgo
entered her objection to the probate of the will. The court proceeded to the hearing of evidence.

However, on January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same supposed will of
the deceased Francisco Villegas.

In summary: the will, the probate of which is applied for in the petition dated January 7, 1925, is the
same one that was the subject of the application of May 5, 1924, and of September 5, 1924.

Hence this petition for mandamus commenced by petitioner, as guardian of minors Lazaro and Daria
Mendieta, addressed to CFI of Laguna ordering the publication of petition for probate of the will and
injunction to suspend proceedings in the registration case No. 954 until the termination of the
proceeding for the probate of the will of Francisco Villegas

ISSUE: WON writ of mandamus and/or injunction be issued to order publication of petition for
probate of a will and to suspend registration proceedings.

RULING: NO. The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem, and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication of the notice prescribed by section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered is binding against all of them.
Through the publication ordered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna of the application for the
probate, said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the supposed
will, including Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for probate, hearing all the
testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, all the parties became bound by said
judgment; and if any of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision,
they had the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot
now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a new
application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge to comply with
his ministerial duty. It is because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal,
or writ of error; especially when the parties interested have agreed to disregard the testamentary
provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them taking what pertained to him.

20. Solivio vs CA (G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990) MUANA

SOLIVIO VS. CA

G.R. NO. 83484/ FEBRUARY 12, 1990

MEDIALDEA, J.:

FACTS

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education.

Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister
of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased.

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters
of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her

However, Celedonia’s sister, Concordia, filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion
was denied by the court. But instead of appealing the denial of his motion, she filed a separate case
before the RTC of Iloilo, Brach 26 for for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages
against her sister. The RTC ruled in favor of Concordia.

Celedonia filed a motion for reconsideration over the decision of RTC Branch 26 and alleged that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation.. But the latter court denied the said motion.

Celedonia then filed an appeal before CA but the Court affirmed the decision of the RTC Branch 26.

Unsatisfied, Celedonia filed a petition for review before the SC and raised the following issues.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even
while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same
court;

2. Whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through
extrinsic fraud;

3. Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and

4. Whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in
the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably
with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already
been transferred to it.

RULING

1.YES. In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now
RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the
properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the
court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari.
However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for
the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed
for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of
the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.

2. NO. The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and
proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on
collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on
his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-
defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia
was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's
own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of
the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National
Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d
1144, 1149)

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any
"interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.

3. NO. We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to
reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's
side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the
line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who

inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.
 3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom
he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution
of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within

the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship
by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate

4. NO. Inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in
honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement
which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:

4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and
movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for
(sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance
in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80
Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v.
Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986,
146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even
testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly
indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but
he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her
share to the foundation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private
respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter.

21. Abut vs Abut (G.R. No. L-26743, May 31, 1972) RABANES

ABUT VS ABUT
G.R. NO. L-26743, MAY 31, 1972

FACTS: Gavina Abut, through counsel, seeks the admission of the amended petition in which she
substitutes for the original petitioner, Generoso Abut, who died after his original petition was filed,
published and the Court had taken jurisdiction thereof.

In the original petition the deceased Generoso Abut appears to have been named executor of the
will of the deceased Cipriano Abut; that he was in possession and custody of the latter's will; and
that he sought to be named executor of the will of the deceased Cipriano Abut.

In the amended petition, Gavina Abut alleges that the will was delivered to her by Generoso Abut
before his death and that it is now in her custody and possession, and she prays that she be
appointed administratrix of the estate of the deceased Cipriano Abut.

The lower court dismissed the original petition without prejudice to the filing of another petition
considering the amendments embodied in the amended petition, and the fact that publication of the
petition is a jurisdictional matter intended to inform whomsoever may be interested in said petition
and to afford him or her an opportunity to assert his or her rights,
Opposition to the petition was filed by the children of Cipriano Abut by his first marriage, namely,
Felipe Abut, Presentacion de Rodriguez and Absoluto Abut, now appellees here.

During the pendency of the case below but before the court a quo could even start the formal
hearing of the petition, which had been delayed by several postponements, Generoso Abut, the
original petitioner who initiated the probate proceeding, died on January 10, 1966. This eventuality
prompted Gavina Abut, a sister of Generoso Abut and an heir and devisee under the will of the
testator Cipriano Abut, to ask the court a quo to substitute her in lieu of Generoso Abut and to admit
an amended petition wherein she prayed that the probate of the will be allowed and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued in her favor. However, the court a quo dismissed the
petition originally brought by the deceased Generoso Abut, "without prejudice to the filing of another
petition pursuant to the requirements of the Rules of Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court correctly dismissed the petition simply because the original
petitioner who was the executor named in the will sought to be probated died before the petition
could be heard and/or terminated

HELD: NO. the Court finds the dismissal of the original petition for probate and the refusal of the
probate court to admit the amended petition without a new publication thereof to be untenable. The
jurisdiction of the court became vested upon the filing of the original petition and upon compliance
with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.

The demise of the original petitioner during the pendency of the proceeding does not divest the court
of such jurisdiction and does not preclude the continuation of the case on the theory that the
amended petition filed by herein petitioner, who admittedly was a person having an interest in the
estate, seeking to substitute her in place of the original petitioner, but with a similar prayer for the
allowance of the same will, required a new publication in order to invest the court with jurisdiction.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of
the petition, the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of
the estate of the deceased. The fact that the amended petition named additional heirs not included
in the original petition did not require that notice of the amended petition be published anew. All that
Section 4 of Rule 76 provides is that those heirs be notified of the hearing for the probate of the will,
either by mail or personally.

Jurisdiction of the court once acquired continues until the termination of the case, and remains
unaffected by subsequent events. The court below erred in holding that it was divested of jurisdiction
just because the original petitioner died before the petition could be formally heard. Parties who
could have come in and opposed the original petition, as herein appellees did, could still come in
and oppose the amended petition, having already been notified of the pendency of the proceeding
by the publication of the notice thereof.

The admission of the amended petition, of course, does not mean that Gavina Abut's prayer that she
be appointed administratrix with the will annexed is necessarily meritorious. It simply recognizes that
since the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the res, such jurisdiction continues until the
termination of the case.
The first question that the lower court should hear and decide is the probate of the will; and the
question of whether or not Gavina Abut should be appointed administratrix must be decided on the
basis of the facts to be presented and after the will is proved and allowed, as provided in Section 6
of Rule 78.

22. Nuguid vs Nuguid (G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966) SANDALO

FACTS:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and
Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, one of whom is Remedios, the petitioner of
the case at hand.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the CFI of Rizal a holographic will allegedly
executed by Rosario Nuguid some 11 years before her death. She prayed that the said will be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, opposed the probate of the will and argued that by the
institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, they — who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.

The CFI of Rizal ruled in favor of Felix and Paz, and held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid." Remedios
subsequently elevated the case to the Supreme Court after her motion for reconsideration was
denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the will executed by Rosario is a complete nullity

RULING:

YES, the Supreme Court held that the will executed by Rosario is a complete nullity.

Note: While the SC does not usually rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein, it granted an exception to this case. The SC
stressed that besides the fact that nothing will be gained if the case were to be remanded for
probate of the will, there is also the probability that the case will come up once again before them on
the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus
added anxiety.

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall
annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.

It may now appear trite but nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before
us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6

The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree
upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or
of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40
A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to

abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And,
the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they
were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition.

The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No
specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity
is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will.
Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary
disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded
and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive
meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annulment notwithstanding, "the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit
consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854
suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would
give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be,
in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and
separate from the nullified institution of heir.

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as
universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRETERITION AND DISINHERITANCE

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs
nor are expressly disinherited."

Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their
names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which
the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution
of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions
in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the
person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived.

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the
Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before
us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the
same. The entire will is null.

23. Guevara vs Guevara (G.R. No. L-5405, January 31, 1956) SANTIAGO

[G.R. No. L-5405. January 31, 1956.]

ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, Petitioner, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO,

Respondents.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS: Victorino L. Guevara executed a will, distributing assorted movables and a residential lot among
his children, Rosario and Ernesto, and his stepchildren, Vivencio, Eduvigis, Dionista, Candida, and Pio.
To his second wife Augustia, the testator bequeathed, in addition to various movables, a portion of 25
hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618, plus another five (5)
hectares in settlement of her widow’s usufruct. The balance of the 259 odd hectares he distributed as
follows: 100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testator’s lifetime and for payment of his debts and
family expenses; 108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara, including therein 43.2342
hectares by way of mejora; 21.6171 hectares to ‘mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara.’ Ernesto
Guevara was appointed executor without bond.
Victorino then executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto, conveying to the latter the southern half of the
said 259-hectare and expressly recognized Ernesto as owner of the northern half.

Prior to this sale, Victorino and Ernesto had jointly applied for registration of the big parcel, but in view of
the sale from the former to the latter, the decree was issued in the name of Ernesto exclusively and for
the whole tract, a certificate of title was issued in his sole name.

Fifteen days prior to the issuance of said title, Victorino died, but his will was not filed for probate. About
four years later, Rosario, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased Victorino, and on the
assumption that he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto to recover 423,492 square meters of
the tract as the portion that should correspond to her by way of legitime.

CA decided in Rosario Guevara’s favor; but upon certiorari, the SC modified the judgment reversed and
set aside CA’s judgment, and ordered the parties to present the will to the proper court for probate in
accordance with law, among other things.

Claiming to act pursuant to the foregoing decision, Rosario commenced special proceedings CFI -
Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino.

Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. He filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the
grounds that (a) the petition itself alleged that the will was revoked; (b) that ‘whatever right to probate the
parties may have has already prescribed’; and (c) that the purpose of the probate was solely to have
Petitioner Rosario declared an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, which was, at first, denied
but granted upon motion of reconsideration. Hence, the petition was dismissed on the ground that
Rosario’s petition did not ask for the probate in toto of the will, contrary to the order of the Supreme Court;
that her right to petition for the probate of the testament of Victorino L. Guevara had prescribed; and
that her action for judicial declaration of acknowledgment had likewise prescribed.

CA: reversed and ordered the court a quo to reinstate the petition, and to hear and decide whether the will
of Victorino Guevara, deceased, should be allowed to probate.

In his appeal therefrom, Petitioner Ernesto raises the question, among others, Is the petition for probate
of the alleged will of the deceased Victorino barred by the statute of limitations?

ISSUE: WON the petition for probate of the will of Victorino is barred by the statute of limitations
(considering that the testator died on September 27, 1933, and that the petition for probate of said will
was filed twelve (12) years later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945)

RULING: NO. (SC adopted the ruling of CA)

The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court,
reiterating those of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), point out that the presentation of a
decedent’s will to the competent court has always been deemed by our law as more of a duty than a right,
and the neglect of such obligation carries with it the corresponding penalty and it is inconsistent with that
policy that the court should refuse to admit wills to probate, without inquiry into their validity. The authority
given to testators to dispose freely of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded, unless
adequate measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased would be
carried out. Because the decedent may no longer act to have his testamentary dispositions duly
executed, the state authority must take over the opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free
testamentary disposition does not remain a delusion and a dream. This was expressly recognized by the
Supreme Court in its previous decision, G. R. No. 48840 (Exhibit E) when it said:

We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and
the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that
will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the
presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent
legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their
inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.’ (Italics supplied)

In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below failed to notice that
its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition and violative of the owner’s right to
control his property within the legal limits. The appealed order in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim
of custodians and heirs interested in their suppression.

The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the existence of the right of any living person,
but to determine whether or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the pertinent statutes
which are the essential prerequisites to personal direction of the mode of devolution of his property on
death. There is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to attempt to validate the
wishes of the departed, and he may and frequently does receive no personal benefit from the
performance of the act.

One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is the duty of the court to effectuate, in
so far as may be compatible with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased person To
that end, the court is, in effect, an additional party to every litigation affecting the disposal of the assets of
the deceased. A determination, therefore, that the mere non-action of a person upon whom no legal duty
rested in this regard, could have the effect of subverting the wishes of one who was no longer able to
protect his own unquestionable rights, would strike at the very foundation of all conceptions of justice as
administered in probate courts.

From whatever angle the case is viewed, a hearing on the allowance of the will is unavoidable. The
persistent, albeit obnoxious, attempts of Rosario Guevara to sidetrack the will are not remedied by
dismissing the petition for probate of will, and allowing Ernesto to retain a greater interest than that
intended by the testator.

24. Maravilla vs Maravilla (G.R. No. L-23225, February 27, 1971) TURNO

[ GR No. L-23225, Feb 27, 1971 ]

IN MATTER OF PETITION TO PROBATE OF WILL OF DIGNA MARAVILLA v. PEDRO MARAVILLA +

DECISION147 Phil. 632

Facts:
Digna Maravilla died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August 1958, leaving an extensive estate.
Prior to her death, she was a resident of Saravia, same province. Herminio Maravilla petitioned for the
probate of his wife, Digna Maravillas’s will. The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A", which is typewritten
in the Spanish language, purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October, 1944; it
consists of five (5) pages, including the page on which the attestation clause was completed. The
purported signatures of the testatrix appear at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left
margin of all the other pages.

At the bottom thereof appear the purported signatures of Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino Mansueto and
Mariano Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. Their signatures appear also on the left margin of all the five (5)
pages. The paging of the will is by handwritten words, such as "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc.,
written at the top of each page. On the lower half of the third page, before the name "CONCEPCION P.
MARAVILLA", is the typewritten word "hermana", which was crossed out, and over it was handwritten the
word "cuñada", bearing, at the left thereof, the initials "D. M."

After the legacies in favor of herein appellant Adelina Sajo, a niece of Digna Maravilla, the latter's sister-
in-law, Concepcion P. Maravilla de Kohlhaas, and Concepcion's daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, the will
named appellant Herminio Maravilla as universal heir and executor. In case of the heir's death, or if he
should not become heir for any reason, he is to be substituted by the legatee Adelina Sajo in one-half of
the properties bequeathed, the other half to pass collectively to legatees Concepcion P. Maravilla and the
daughter of the latter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas. All previous wills are declared revoked.

At the time of the probate proceedings, only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3) attesting
witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2) others (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having
died previously. Col. Mansueto identified his own signature and those of Dr. Timoteo Hernaez and of
Digna Maravilla, and asserted that the latter did sign in the presence of all three witnesses and attorney
Villanueva; that Hernaez signed in his presence and in the presence of the other witnesses and of Digna
Maravilla; and that present at the signing were "Dr. Timoteo Hernaez, Mr. Mariano Buenaflor, attorney
Manuel Villanueva, and both Herminio Maravilla and Mrs. Digna Maravilla" (the testatrix) and identified his
signature and those of Digna and Hernaez although, subsequently, the witness admitted that he could not
remember very well whether Mr. Maravilla was there at the time he signed the will. The witness explained
that he could not remember some details because fourteen years had elapsed, and when he signed as a
witness, he did not give it any importance, and because at the time he (Col. Mansueto) was very worried
because of rumours that the Japanese Kempeitai would arrest officers of the USAFFE who did not want
to collaborate.

Herminio Maravilla's testified that Digna Maravilla told him of her desire to "renew" her will because of the
critical period in Manila before the liberation; he invited Buenaflor, Hernaez and Mansueto to attest to the
will; sent his messenger, Mariano Buenaflor, to ask attorney Manuel Villanueva to come to his house in
order to prepare the will; at his wife's request, he gave the list of properties to Villanueva; he knew that
the will was executed in the dining room while he remained in the sala: and Villanueva, Mansueto,
Hernaez and Buenaflor were in his house in the morning of 7 October 1944 and sat with his wife around
the table in the dining room, with Villanueva at one end, Cigna beside him and the witnesses facing each
other; and after the signing they had lunch, at his invitation, and when they were eating, petitioner
Maravilla saw the three (3) copies of the will on the dining table. However, he did not see them sign.

Attorney Manuel Villanueva reiterated the above evidence of Herminio Maravilla, asserting that he had
been summoned through Mariano Buenaflor to the house of the Maravillas at 222 Mabini, Ermita, Manila,
and there met Digna who requested him to draft a new will, revoking her old one, to include as additional
beneficiaries Adelina Sajo, Concepcion Maravilla, and the latter's youngest daughter, dose Mary
Kohlhaas, who lived with her (Digna) and whom she considered as her real children, having cared for
them since childhood. Digna gave Villanueva instructions concerning the will, and handed him her old will
and a handwritten list of the certificates of title of her properties, which list she asked and obtained from
her husband. On 7 October 1944, the date of the execution of the will, he brought one original and 2
copies with him, and handed them to Digna; she read the document and while doing so the witnesses
Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor came. Villanueva talked with them and satisfied himself that they were
competent, whereupon all proceeded to the dining room table. Digna and the witnesses signed in the
presence of one another and of attorney Villanueva. Digna appeared to the witness very healthy and
spoke in Spanish intelligently. The signing ended around 12:30 p.m., and after it all ate lunch.

The petition for probate was opposed by the appellees Pedro Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed
"Maravilla", who are allegedly the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla, The opposition
alleged the following grounds:

"a) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix and the instrumental witnesses did not sign
the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence of each other;

"b) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged testatrix, affixed her signature to her alleged will
under undue and improper pressure and influence and/or duress brought to bear upon her by the
petitioner, for his own personal benefit and advantage and that of his nieces, Adelina Sajo and Rose
Marie M. Kohlhaas and his half-sister Conchita Maravilla Kohlhaas;

"c) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, at the time she affixed her signature to her alleged will was not of
sound and disposing mind;

"d) That the alleged will, now being offered for probate had already been revoked by the deceased,
Digna Maravilla."

They introduced one Eufrocina Berja who qualified Digna Maravilla as insane because she saw Digna
Maravilla acting strangely one morning in 1921 (23 years before the will was execu ted). In Berja's own
words -"Would you not call a person insane who is waving a bunch of flowers and singing along a road,
especially taking into consideration their reputation in the Community?"According to this witness) Digna
saw her in 1946, but would not answer her questions and "was in a deep thought (sic) and her tongue
was coming out of her mouth". Another witness Eleazar Lopez, asserted having visited his aunt, Digna
Mara-villa (whom he had not seen since he was four years old), two days after the first bombing of Manila
by the American planes in September, 1944. Lopez claimed to have seen Digna on that occasion
laughing and crying and then staring blankly at the ceiling, without recognizing the witness; and that he
visited her again toward mid-October of the same year and she had worsened. [

The trial court denied the probate of the will ruling that the will was not executed in accordance with
Section 618 of Act 190; that Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla sign the will in question,
basing such conclusion upon the fact that while Mansueto positively identified his own signature ("I
identify this as my signature") but not that of the testatrix, his five answers to the questions of counsel, in
reference thereto, being "this must be the signature of Mrs. Digna Maravilla".

The instituted heir, Herminio Maravilla, and the legatee, Adelina Sajo, perfected their appeal. The Court of
Appeals certified the same to this Supreme Court.
Herminio Maravilla died on 16 July 1966, after the case was submitted for decision. The Supreme Court
allowed, the motion for intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary Kohlhaas.

Issues:

1) Whether or not it can be considered that the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses sign the
alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence of each other

2) Whether or not Digna Maravilla, can be considered, at the time she affixed her signature to her alleged
will to be of not of sound and disposing mind

Held

1) Yes. A will may be allowed even if some witnesses do not remember having attested it, if
other evidence satisfactorily show due execution (V. Act 190, Section 632), and that failure of
witness to identify his signature does not bar probate.

It was but natural that witness Mansueto should be positive about his own signature, since he was familiar
with it. He had to be less positive about Digna Maravilla's signature since he could not be closely
acquainted with the same: for aught the record shows, the signing of the will was the only occasion he
saw her sign; he had no opportunity to study her signature before or after the execution of Exhibit "A".
Furthermore, he witnessed Digna's signing not less than fourteen years previously. To demand that in
identifying Digna's signature Mansueto should display a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him
in recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by
the witness is the best evidence that he was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of
truthfulness rather than the reverse. In the absence of an assurance that no one else was present,
Mansueto's statement on cross-examination that "I remember and (I) signed the will in the presence of all
the witnesses and in the presence of attorney Villanueva" does not really contradict Mansueto's testimony
in chief that "I have read the entire document before I signed it in the presence of the other witnesses,
Digna Maravilla and Attorney Villanueva".

That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to one
another around one table when the will was signed is clearly established by the uncontradicted testimony
of both attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that detail proves beyond doubt that each one of
the parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the others. It should be remembered, in this
connection, that the test is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will but whether he
was in a position to see if he chose to do so.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney,
who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is
entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason
is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of the instrument,
is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents
in his memory.'"

2) Yes. The evidence of Eufrocina Berja who qualified Digna Maravilla as insane would certainly not
justify a finding that Digna Maravilla was not competent to execute the testament in 1944. By Berja's
standards, any one could be held insane. The case for the oppositors did not improve by the evidence of
their witness Eleazar Lopez. Coming from a nephew who expected to succeed if the will in question were
denied probate, and who sought to become administrator of the estate, even offering to resign from his
position in the government if appointed, this testimony of Lopez was evidently colored by his monetary
interest, thus leading to its correct discrediting by the trial court. His recollection after 15 years of the
alleged symptoms of his aunt is very suspicious, as it does not even appear that Lopez at the time
bothered to inquire from other persons what caused his aunt's alleged abnormal condition. Moreover, the
court's duty to reconcile conflicts of evidence should lead it to hold that the symptoms described by Lopez
were due to a temporary disturbance of the nerves caused by the unsettling effect of a bombardment not
previously experienced, compatible with the due execution of the will on 7 October 1944.

As between the testimony of Lopez and that of attorney Villanueva, who repeatedly visited and talked to
the testatrix around the time her will was executed, the latter's view that Digna Maravilla was competent
to make the will when it was signed should be accepted. The law itself declares that – "To be of sound
mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties or that
his mind be wholly unbroken unimpaired or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause." (Civil
Code, Article 799; Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).

The preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the testament, Exhibit "A", was duly executed by a
qualified testatrix and competent witnesses, in conformity with the statutory requirements. The decree of
the court below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said
testament is hereby ordered probated.

25. Lopez vs Gonzaga (G.R. No. L-18788, January 31, 1964)

FACTS:

This case involves Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer who died intestate on April 11, 1935 without any
issue and leaving real and personal properties worth Php 400,000. She was survived by the plaintiffs,
who are her nearest kin-her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces. During the lifetime of the deceased,
she expressed that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga, the principal defendant was engaged in
coconut oil experimentation, he could use the products and rentals of her properties for his experiments.
The scientific venture by the defendant was discontinued when he became totally blind in October 1955.
Due to this, plaintiff Lopez asks for a partition of the estate and cancellation of titles of lands fraudulently
transferred in the name of defendant.

Defendant file Motion to Dismiss for res judicata and non inclusion parties which was denied. Defendant
filed their answer, stating that there was no intestacy and that a will of Soledad who instituted Luis as sole
heir, and that such will was allowed and probated (this is in view of world war II, defendant claimed that
there was a will but destroyed due to the said war). After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment and
both parties appealed.

ISSUE

Whether or not appellee had burden to produce the copy of the original will which was destroyed during
WWII?

HELD
The Argument is misleading. There is proof that copies of the will existed other than the one burned while
in appellee’s possession. The appelle is not contending whether the will was executed properly but if the
will was probated which was established conclusively.

The contention of appellant that Gonzaga has no need to ask the court for an order of adjudication is
erroneous. The order of adjudication is the judicial recognition that in appointing Luis as her only her, the
testatrix did not contravene the law and that the heir was in no way disqualified. Just as a final order
admitting a will to probate concludes all contending the statutory formal requirements have not been
observed. Instead of contradicting the testamentary institution of heir, the order of adjudication confirms it
in this case. The of Order of Feb 8, 1936 speaks of approval of the project of partition while the petition of
Jan 29, 1936 referred to an oder of adjudication to a single heir. Such difference in the terminology was
an inadvertent mistake.

The failure of the defendant, Luis Gonzaga, to file with the Register of Deeds a certified copy of his
letters of administration and the will, as provided in Section 90 of Act 496, and to record the attested
copies of the will and of the allowance thereof by the court under Section 624 of Act 190, does not
negate the validity of the judgment or decree of probate nor the rights of the devisee under the will.
The judicial orders sufficed as notice to interested parties and was substantial compliance with the
required recording of the will itself.

As a witness, the defendant's counsel, Atty. Amelia del Rosario, testified that the aforequoted
records of the probate court of Iloilo were discovered by her among the records of the cadastral
court in Negros Occidental. Due to the destruction of the court and property record of Iloilo as a
result of the last war, no will or probate order was produced and neither were attested copies with
the ROD that result to an assurance that Soledad died leaving a will instituting Luis as her sole
testamentary heir.

In the course of the years prior to the institution of this case in 1958, appellee held the properties
and dealt with them as sole owner, leasing, encumbering, and selling some them. The SC believed
the statement of Atty Hortillas that deceased made appelle the sole heir to her properties.
Considering the fact that Atty. Hortillas was married to Monserrat Gonzaga, a sister of Soledad, who
would have been one of the heir intestate had it not been for the testament in favor of appellee.

This is coupled with the possession as owner exercised dominical acts over the properties of
Gonzaga for 22 years that constitute conclusive proof of the truth.

26. Maninang vs CA (G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982) ATUP

27. Ralla vs Untalan (G.R. Nos. L-63253-54, April 27, 1989) BANGGAT

PABLO RALLA, petitioner, -versus- HON. ROMULO P. UNTALAN, HON. DOMINGO

CORONEL REYES, AND LEONIE RALLA, PETER RALLA AND MARINELLA RALLA,
respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-63253-54,

SECOND DIVISION, April 27, 1989, SARMIENTO, J.

Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the court,
but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried out, and
the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from subsequently
attacking its validity or any part of it.

Likewise: Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation
that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners’
knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the
property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to
the tenor of the partition.

They cannot attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case.

FACTS: On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own
will in CFI of Albay docketed as SP No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son,
Pablo leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro. In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the
partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; docketed Civil Case No. 2023.

In the course of the hearing of the probate case (Special Proceedings No. 564), Pablo Ralla
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer
interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo Ralla, for its probate would
no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. This motion was denied, and the denial
was denied by the Court of Appeals.

(The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood
to gain if the testate proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be
compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo Ralla 149 parcels
of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the
exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro Ralla, DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF
CIVIL LAW 174 who was being deprived of his successional rights over the said properties.)

The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by this Court (in G.R. No. L-
26253). On a hearing, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the
subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and
Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo Ralla who should share equally upon the division of
the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to compromise in the partition case. On December 18,
1967, they entered into a project of partition whereby sixty-three parcels of land,
apparently forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, were amicably
divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved on December
19,1967 by Judge Ezekiel Grageda.

Eleven years later, or on February 28, 1978, Joaquin Chancoco, brother-in-law of the
petitioner (Pablo) filed a petition for the probate of the same will of Rosendo Ralla on the
ground that the decedent owed him P5,000.00. Pablo Ralla then filed a manifestation stating
that he had no objections to the probate; thereafter, he filed a "Motion to Intervene as
Petitioner for the Probate of the Will." This motion was heard ex parte and granted despite
the written opposition of the heirs of Pedro Ralla. Likewise, the petition for probate was
granted; Teodorico Almine, son-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed special
administrator, over and above the objection of the heirs of Pedro Ralla.

However, in taking possession of the properties belonging to the estate of Rosendo Ralla,
Teodorico Almine also took possession of the sixty-three parcels of land covered by the
project of partition mentioned earlier.

Consequently, the heirs of Pedro Ralla (the private respondents herein) moved to exclude
from the estate of Rosendo Ralla the aforesaid parcels of land. About two years later, or on
June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration
Of The Court The Exclusion Of 67 (sic) Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In
Civil Case No. 2023.” In his Order, the Jude reconsidered his earlier Order and excluded the
sixty-three (63) parcels from the proceedings. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for
recommendation but the same was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the
petition for the probate of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULLITY.

RULING: Where a partition had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of
the court, but distribution of the estate in pursuance of such partition had fully been carried
out, and the heirs had received the property assigned to them, they are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity or any part of it. Likewise: Where a piece of land has
been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected
through improper means or without the petitioners’ knowledge, the partition barred any
further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition.

They cannot attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case. Based on
the foregoing pronouncements, the Order of August 3, 1979 setting aside the project of
Partition was clearly erroneous. Realizing this and the fact that it was not yet too late for
him to correct his mistake, respondent Judge Untalan issued the questioned Order of July
16, 1981.
In fine, the partition in Civil Case No. 2023 is valid and binding upon the petitioner and
Pedro Ralla, as well as upon their heirs, especially as this was accompanied by delivery of
possession to them of their respective shares in the inheritance from their mother, the late
Paz Escarella.

They are duty bound to respect the division agreed upon by them and embodied in the
document of partition. Thus, the petitioner could no longer question the exclusion of the
lands subject of the partition from the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Rosendo Ralla.

28. Maloles II vs Phillips (G.R. No. 129505, January 31, 2000) CAMACHO

Maloles II vs. Philips

GR 129505, Jan. 31, 2000

Mendoza, J.

FACTS: Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will.
Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; and that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the
named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.

Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was placed on the witness stand and was directly
examined by the Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give this Court a basis to
determine the state of mind of the petitioner when he executed the subject will.

After the examination, the Court was convinced that petitioner is of sound and disposing mind and was
not acting on duress, menace and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his Last Will and
Testament on his own free and voluntary will and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other
person in signing it.

The RTC allowed the will. Petitioner sought to intervene and to set aside the appointment of private
respondent as special administrator. Judge Abad Santos granted petitioner’s motion for intervention.
Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision setting aside the trial court’s
order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene. Petitioner contends
that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the
order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

HELD: NO. After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean
that he cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be
allowable on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the
ordinary probate proceeding after the testator’s death would be in order.

Even if petitioner was the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an "heir" of the
testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no compulsory or forced
heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.

Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s - (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4)
Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred
to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may have been preterited in the
testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his
will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.

Petition Denied.

29. Teotico vs Del Val (G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965) CAMBE

29. G. R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965

VICENTE B. TEOFICO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT,

VS.

ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

FACTS:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will
written in Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She
affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page
of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged before
Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use
of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the
beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could
freely dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teofico,
married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct
of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her
grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina
Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise
disposed of in the will.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same
testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds:

(1) said will was not executed as required by law;

(2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and

(3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal
personality to intervene. The probate court allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera, and the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging the additional ground that the
will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took
care of the testatrix during her last illness.

The probate court rendered its decision admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition
made in favor of Dr. Rene Teofico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.

Separate Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the parties but were denied.
ISSUES

(1) WON oppositor Ana del Val Chan has the right to intervene in this proceeding?;

(2) WON the will in question has been duly admitted to probate?; and

(3) WON the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the
legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teofico?

RULING:

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it
either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:

"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an 'interested person. 'An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanua ). The Interest' required in order that a person may be a
party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs
Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)."

Under the terms of the will, Oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.

In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the Oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix?

The law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited
by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil
Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother;
In Grey vs. Fabie: Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be called relatives and
they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law docs not recognize it.

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera
because under our law the relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
the adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child
except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the
adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of
the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter
to avoid scandal." (

It thus appears that the Oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only because it was not
properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the
testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In
this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was In perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for
she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the
attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the
other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to
the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself
who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will
later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the
execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the
will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed the document, and that all the
witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the
testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to
destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso vs.
Deza, 42 Phil., 696).

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among which the following may be
cited:

"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provision of the will cannot be entertained in Probate
proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G., p. 220)

"From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it
does not follow that such provisions lack of efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law
recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental
doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals." (Montefiano
vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement by the court a quo declaring invalid the
legacy made Dr. Rene Teofico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in
excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to
intervene in this proceeding..

30. Cortes vs CA (G.R. No. 117417, September 21, 2000) DE GALA

G.R. No. 117417 September 21, 2000

MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.

Facts:

Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent, Milagros R. Cortes, petitioner, and
Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively.
 During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a house and lot with an address at 173
Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila (subject property). Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T.
Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will, which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with
Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix,
she filed a motion before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of
the property, be ordered to vacate the property and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof.
This is the motion, which the respondent court granted, in the assailed order of October 18, 1993.

In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside being that the issue of
ownership or claim over a real property is beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a probate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the subject property of the case.

Ruling:

Yes. The long-standing rule is that probate courts or those in charge of proceedings whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties. Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession
of, personal or real property, made by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or
made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court.”

In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to
vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be
considered an "outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such,
he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate. By way of exception to the above-
mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property." Here, the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.

In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since
the former's theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter. In the same way, when the controversy
is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the
same is properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent, which is to be distributed among
the heirs. The case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is

dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either."

Consequently, this case should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of
Teodoro.
31. Cayetano vs Leonidad (G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984) DELUTE

32. Aranas vs Mercado (G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014) ELIAB

G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,

vs.

TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO,

MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

DECISION

Principle: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Petitioner: daughter by the decedent’s first marriage; the oppositor

Respondents: the widow, and their 5 children

Decedent: Emigdio Mercado

FACTS

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard
V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio S. Mercado owned shares in Mervir Realty Corp. and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corp. He assigned his
real properties in exchange for stocks in Mervir Realty and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
Teresita was appointed as administrator. Teresita indicated in her inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had
“left no real properties but only personal properties.”

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion
through the order of January 8, 1993.

The parties agreed to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should be
included in or excluded from the inventory. Thereafter, the RTC ruled that Teresita should have included in the
Badian Property in the inventory.

Ruling of the RTC

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.
Decision of the CA

CA reversed RTC decision. Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve
the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir
Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC
promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?

RULING

NO! The SC favored the petitioner.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid
the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in
making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration
of the estate."23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or
excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion."25
As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty.

GENERAL RULE: The jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

EXCEPTIONS which are justified by expediency and convenience:

1. the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final
determination of ownership in a separate action;

2. if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or
the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership;

3. its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate,
such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best
to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong
to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As
long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted
and erroneous.

33. Gallanosa vs Arcangel (G.R. No. L-29300, June 21, 1978) GALAGALA

34. Noel vs CA (G.R. No. 59550, January 11, 1995) GONZALES

34. G.R. No. 59550 January 11, 1995

EDILBERTO NOEL (now PINITO W. MERCADO) as ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATE OF GREGORIO NANAMAN and HILARIA TABUCLIN, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE C. DELESTE, respondents.

G.R. No. 60636 January 11, 1995

PINITO W. MERCADO, as SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
GREGORIO NANAMAN and HILARIA TABUCLIN, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE C. DELESTE, respondents.

FACTS:

Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin (Nanaman spouses) were a childless, legally-married
couple. Gregorio, however, had a child named Virgilio Nanaman by another woman.

During their marriage, Gregorio and Hilaria acquired certain property including a 34.7-hectare
land in Tambo, Iligan City on which they planted sugarcane, corn and bananas. They also lived
there with Virgilio and fifteen tenants.

On October 1945, Gregorio died. Hilaria then administered the property with the help of Virgilio
to the exclusion of Juan Nanaman, the brother of Gregorio, and Esperanza and Caridad
Nanaman, Gregorio's daughters by still another woman.

Virgilio declared the property in his name for taxation purposes. Then, Hilaria and Virgilio,
mortgaged the said property to Jose Deleste (private respondent). Later on, Hilaria and Virgilio
executed a deed of sale over the same tract of land also in favor of private respondent.

On May 1954, Hilaria died. On, 1954, Esperanza and Caridad Nanaman filed intestate estate
proceedings concerning the estate of their father, Gregorio. Included in the list of property of the
estate was the 34.7-hectare land. Inasmuch as only Esperanza, Caridad and Virgilio Nanaman
were named as heirs of Gregorio in the petition, Juan Nanaman, Gregorio's brother, opposed it.

On November 1954, the petition was amended to include the estate of Hilaria with Alejo
Tabuclin, Hilaria's brother, and Julio Tabuclin, a son of Hilaria's deceased brother, Jose, as
additional petitioners.

Having been appointed special administrator of the estate of the Nanaman couple, Juan
Nanaman included the 34.7-hectare land in the list of the assets of the estate.

On June 1956, when Edilberto Noel took over as regular administrator of the estate, he was not
able to take possession of the land in question because it was in the possession of private
respondent and some heirs of Hilaria.

The court thereafter ordered Noel, as regular administrator, to file an action to recover the land
from private respondent.

The trial court rendered a decision, holding that the action for annulment of the deed of sale had
prescribed that Gregorio's heirs had slept on their rights by allowing Hilaria to exercise rights of
ownership over Gregorio's share of the conjugal property after his death in 1945.

Noel appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ruled that the transaction between
Hilaria and Virgilio on one hand and private respondent on the other, was indeed a sale. It found
that no fraud, mistake or misrepresentation attended in the execution of the deed of sale and
that no proof was shown that the contract was merely a mortgage.

The appellate court, however, agreed with Noel that Hilaria could not validly sell the 37.7-
hectare land because it was conjugal property, and Hilaria could sell only her one-half share
thereof.

Private respondent filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision praying for the total
affirmance of the decision of the trial court. Noel also filed a motion for reconsideration praying
for the return of ownership and possession of the entire tract of land to the estate of the 34.7-
hectare land.

ISSUE:

WON Hilaria and Virgilio could dispose of the entire property sold to private respondent
and assuming that they did not have full ownership thereof?

HELD: No.
Gregorio died in 1945 long before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines on August
30, 1950. Under Article 2263 of the said Code, "rights to the inheritance of a person who died,
with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of
1889, by other previous laws, and by the rules of Court."

Thus, succession to the estate of Gregorio was governed primarily by the provisions of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Under Article 953 thereof, a spouse like Hilaria, who is survived by
brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent, as is obtaining in this case,
was entitled to receive in usufruct the part of the inheritance pertaining to said heirs.

Hilaria, however, had full ownership, not merely usufruct, over the undivided half of the
estate (Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 493). It is only this undivided half-interest that
she could validly alienate.

On the other hand, Virgilio was not an heir of Gregorio under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
Although he was treated as a child by the Nanaman spouses, illegitimate children who were not
natural were disqualified to inherit under the said Code (Cid v. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434
[1968]).

Article 998 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which gave an illegitimate child certain hereditary
rights, could not benefit Virgilio because the right of ownership of the collateral heirs of Gregorio
had become vested upon his death (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2253; Uson v. Del
Rosario, 92 Phil. 530 [1953]). Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over
which he did not own.

Therefore, Virgilio had no right at all to transfer ownership over which he did not own.
In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is selling. The
principal obligation of a seller is "to transfer the ownership of" the property sold (Civil Code of
the Philippines, Art. 1458).

This law stems from the principle that nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to him
(Azcona v. Reyes, 59 Phil. 446 [1934]; Coronel v. Ona, 33 Phil. 456[1916). NEMO DAT QUAD
NON HABET. While it cannot be said that fraud attended the sale to private respondent, clearly
there was a mistake on the part of Hilaria and Virgilio in selling an undivided interest in the
property which belonged to the collateral heirs of Gregorio.

35. Heirs of the Late J. Fran vs Salas (G.R. No. L-53546, June 25, 1992) GUINTO

36. Dael vs Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-68873, March 31, 1989) JOSOL
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68873 March 31, 1989

LUCILDA DAEL, EVERGISTO DAEL, DOMINGO DAEL, JR., CONRADO DAEL, FEDERICO DURANA,
JR., FREDISVINDA DURANA, FLEURDELIZADA DURANA, FABIAN DURANA and FE PATRICIO
DURANA, petitioners,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CARMENCITA CABUTIHAN, NONILON CABUTIHAN, ROMULO

CABUTIHAN, LERMO CABUTIHAN, and BIENVENIDO CABUTIHAN, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:

Cesario Cabutihan was married twice. First, with Bienvenida Durana in February, 1942 and, finally, with
Victorina Durana, sister of his first wife, on April 6, 1958. The first marriage produced the following
legitimate children: Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido all surnamed Cabutihan and
who are the intervenors in this case although Carmencita Cabutihan instituted the case as petitioner.
While the second marriage did not produce any issue.

The dispute herein centers on the intestate estate of Victorina who died on August 1, 1977 in Manila.
Cesario who died earlier on June 9, 1972. Bienvenida, on the other hand died on May 2, 1957.

The heirs of Victorina are the children of her two sisters and a brother namely: Bienvenida Durana,
Soledad Durana and Federico Durana Sr.; the latter is the father of the oppositors, Federico, Jr.,
Flordelizada (sic), Fredizvinda, Fabian and Fe Patricio, all surnamed Durana; while Soledad Durana is the
mother of the other oppsitors, Evaristo, Domingo Jr., Lucilda and Conrado, all surnamed Dael; the other
heirs of Vitorina Durana are the petitioner herself and the intervenors who are all the children of
Bienvenida Durana.

After the demise of Cesario, Victorina and the private respondents entered into a extra-judicial settlement
of his estate on December 30, 1973. Part of the properties adjudicated to Victorina include the copra
business abovementioned, as well as some of the vehicles used in the transportation business.
Subsequently, however, the vehicles were transferred to the private respondents by virtue of a "deed of
sale" dated July 24, 1978.

Petitioners’ Contention:

Petitioners submit that both the respondent and lower courts erred in concluding that the copra business,
as well as the properties listed in the inventories as acquired during the second marriage, are assets of
the conjugal partnership of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. They argued that to so
hold would, in effect, maintain the theory that the marital community of proprietary interest continued to
exist even after the Cesario-Bienvenida conjugal partnership had been dissolved by the death of
Bienvenida.

Private Respondents’ Contention:

It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are entitled to 2/3 portion of the estate of Victorina considering
that their predecessors-in-interest are the brother and sister of Victorina; while the remaining 1/3 portion
should devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who represent their mother Bienvenida and the other
sister of Durana.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs of Victorina from her other two (2) siblings are entitled to 2/3’s of her estate
included in the inventory of properties submitted to the probate court

RULING:

NO.

The marriage of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the corresponding legal
consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income of the separate properties of the spouses
would be conjugal, including those acquired through their industry. Hence, the fruits and income of
Cesario's share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his conjugal share in the property of the first
conjugal partnership would form part of the conjugal partnership properties of the second marriage. The
fruits and income derived or acquired through these last-mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal
in nature.

It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of the first
marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately, We cannot determine from the records the
amount of such properties at the time of Bienvenida's demise. There is a dearth of proof on this matter.
What appears evident, however, is that, considering the continuity in the operation of the two businesses
during the marital coverture between Cesario and Victorina which spanned a period of fourteen (14)
years, and the fact that after Cesario's death Victorina still actively engaged in the same business until
her own death five (5) years later, the properties enumerated in the aforesaid inventories submitted to the
probate court could not all have been properties of the first marriage.

Inevitably, the problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two conjugal partnerships.
On this score, guidance should be sought from the provisions of the Civil Code to the effect that whenever
the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by the same person should be
carried out at the same time and there is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal property
belonging to each of the partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be
divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property
belonging to the respective spouses.

The first marriage existed for approximately fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957), while the second marriage
lasted for about fourteen (14) years (1958 to 1972). Applying the aforestated rule, the first conjugal
partnership will be prorated a share of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties included in the
inventory submitted on August 30, 1978, while the second conjugal partnership will get fourteen twenty-
ninths (14/29) thereof. Not to be included, however, are the real properties listed in the supplementary
inventory filed on January 16, 1979, because they definitely belong to the estate of Cesario as the latter's
inheritance from his parents, Bartolome Cabutihan and Natividad Daelo.
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his
conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five children as
the heirs of Bienvenida.

37. Vera vs Navarro (G.R. No. L-27745, October 18, 1977) JUEVES

38. Cuenco vs CA (G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973) JUNGCO

Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors'
Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2)
minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, and by his
children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes
Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes
and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales.

On 5 March 1964, respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of

Administration, alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in
Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death;
and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same
date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964,
directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering
the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City and Province of Cebu. Respondents filed in the Quezon City court an
Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, opposing probate of the will and assailing the
jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition for probate and
for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said
respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue.

The Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason
the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."

Issues:

1. Whether or not the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with the
testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the
testator's express wish in his testament

2. Whether or not the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings

Ruling:

1. Yes. The appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish. Under Rule 73, "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other 194 courts." Conversely, such court, may upon
learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with
his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may
decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance,
and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the
decedent's alleged last will.

2. No. the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be
deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the
probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all
other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least
equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it
and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule
73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City
court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court
did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's
testamentary disposition.

39. Fernandez vs Tantoco (G.R. No. 25489, September 8, 1926) LAGARTO

Fernandez vs. Tantoco

(G.R. No. 25489, September 8, 1926)

Facts:

While being a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital, Manila, Basilia Tantoco executed an instrument
purporting to be her will. A few days later, she died. Application for probate was made by father Vicente
Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. Opposition to probate was made by three brothers and a nephew of
the deceased. During the submission of proof with respect to the execution of the will, Petitioner
introduced three witnesses: Vicente Platon, Fidel Macapugay and Placido Suarez.

Vicente Platon, an attorney of Malolos and one of the witnesses, testified that he has been doing legal
services to the testatrix. In fact, she executed a will in the year 1910 leaving her properties to the parish.
During her last days, she exoressed a desire to make further changes in the will. Vicente Platon redrafted
the will and carried it to the hospital for execution. During the execution of the will, it was attested and
subscribed by Platon, Macapugay (a doctor) and Suarez

The trial judge refused to allow the will for probate on the ground that the statements of the witnessed are
inconsistent.

Issue:

Whether or not the will was executed in the presence of three witnesses?
Ruling:

YES.

The testimony of the attorney, Sr. Platon, is in every effect respect worthy of credit, and he gives a
detailed account of the incidents connected with the execution, which could in our opinion have been only
by a person who had his attention fixed upon the occurrences connected therewith. He shows that the
testatrix understood the contents of the instrument and that its provisions were found to be in conformity
with her wishes. At the time of the execution of the instrument she was sitting up in her bed and was able
to affix her signature in a clear and legible hand at the close of the will and upon each of its pages, as the
law requires.

Macapugay testified somewhat vaguely and evasively; and although he admitted having been the testatrix
sign and the fact that all the signatures of himself are genuine, he exhibited a weak memory with respect
to other things that occurred. In particular he suggests that he left the room before Sr. Platon had finished
signing all of the sheets, and he does not remember seeing Placido Suarez in the room at all.

The other subscribing witness, Placido Suarez, pretended that Macapugay was not present when Suarez
signed; and, while admitting his own signature, he claims not to be able to recognize the other signatures
appearing on the sheets. We have no hesitancy in saying that the testimony of this witness shows a
manifest and deliberate departure from the truth.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who
has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to
greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act, supposing of course
that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of
the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of the proper execution of the instrument, is more likely
to become fixed on details; and he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his
memory.

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40. Pecson vs Coronel (G.R. No. L-20374, October 11, 1923) LOZANO

FACTS
November 28, 1922, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga probated as the last will and testament
of Dolores Coronel. The said will revoked all former wills and directed that her nephew-in-law,
Lorenzo Pecson, husband of her niece Angela Coronel, receive all her properties and appointed him
executor of said will, with grandson Victor Pecson as substitute should Lorenzo be unable to
discharge such duties.

Lorenzo petitioned for the probate of the will. Oppositors are Agustin Coronel, et. al., on the ground
that the will does not contain the will of the testatrix and the attestation clause is not in accordance
with law. They contend that it is unusual that she would completely exclude her blood relatives from
her vast estate, that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her
estate in said manner, the truth being that the same be distributed among her blood relatives; and
second, that if such will not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence.
However, testimony by Atty. Francisco (Dolores’ revealed that Dolores Coronel revealed to him her
suspicion against some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery of which she had
been a victim.
The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by
the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. The Civil Code thus says:
Any person who was no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in
favor of any person qualified to acquire it.
ISSUE:
WON such preterition is improper and amounts to Dolores’ lack of testamentary capacity, or was due
to extraneouos illegal influence.
HELD:
NO. The Court finds nothing strange in the preterition made by Dolores Coronel of her blood
relatives, nor in the designation of Lorenzo Pecson as her sole beneficiary. Furthermore, although
the institution of the beneficiary here would not seem the most usual and customary, still this would
not be null per se.
In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over
his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or
legal claim upon his bounty. If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will,
and the disposition of his property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not
rendered invalid by the fact that it is unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust. Nothing can prevent
the testator from making a will as eccentric, as injudicious, or as unjust as caprice, frivolity, or
revenge can dictate. However, as has already been shown, the unreasonable or unjustice of
a will may be considered on the question of testamentary capacity. (40 Cyc., 1079.)

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41. Ortega vs Valmonte (G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005) MANGUB
 LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 157451, THIRD DIVISION, December 16, 2005, PANGANIBAN, J.

TOPIC:GROUND FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS

FACTS:

Placido Valmonte toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached
retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, he lived in the house and
lot located at Makati, which he owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte. Two years after
his arrival from US and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little
more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984.

Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. He gave all his
properties to his wife Josefina.

Leticia Valmonte, Placido’s sister opposed the will on the ground among others that the will was
procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner and or/her
agents and/or assistants: and that the signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trickery, and he
did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.
Petitioner alleged that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the
notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of will.

Petioner further contends that it was “highly dubios for a woman at the prime of her young life (to )
almost immediately plunge into a marriage with a man who (was) thrice her age, and who happened
to be (a) Fil-American pensionado”, thus cating doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the
probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly “defies human reason, logic and common experience”
for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and
testament.

The RTC denied to probate the will of Placido. On appeal, CA reversed and admitted the will to
probate. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended thet the instrument should be his last will and
testament?

RULING:
No. The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must
be satisfied for the probate of a will. 10 Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when
a will may be disallowed, as follows:

"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or
of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his signature thereto."

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud in its
execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time.

The Supreme Court ruled that “Fraud is a trick secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which
the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to
the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make certain will which, but for
the fraud, he would not have made.

The Court stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud
at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only
upon showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately, in this case, other than the self-serving
allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had
instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded
petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken “the cudgels of taking care of the
testators in his twilight years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED
42. Vaño vs Vda. de Garces (G.R. No. L-6303, June 30, 1954) MATURAN

CASE No. 42 - [No. L-6303. June 30, 1954]

In the matter of the last will and testament of JOSE VAÑO, deceased. TEODORO VAÑO, petitioner and
appellant, vs. PAZ VAÑO VDA. DE GARCES, ET AL., oppositors and appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS:

Dec. 11, 1949 - Jose Vaño executed a Last Will and Testament in Cebu City.

Content of LW&T of JOSE VAÑO:

● ü Testator is single.
● ü He was of sound mind while executing LW&T\
● ü Language used in the LW&T (English) was known to him
● ü Teodoro Ceblero Vaño is my son.
● ü I bequeath to aforesaid Teodoro Ceblero Vaño all my properties
● ü Will is a one-pager doc
● ü Three (3) attesting witnesses certified that will was signed in their presence (Pedro C. Ceniza; O.
Rama, M. D; Atty. Nazario R. Paquiao)

Jan. 28, 1950 – 78 y/o Jose Vaño died in Cebu City. He left properties valued at P95,913.05.

Feb. 11, 1950 - Teodoro Ceblero Vaño (alleged son of Jose Vaño) filed for probate proceedings at CFI Cebu,
concerning Jose’s LW&T. He also asked to be appointed administrator of Jose’s estate and that pending his
appointment as regular administrator, he be designated special administrator.

Mar. 24, 1950 - Jose Vaño’s siblings opposed to the probate proceedings. PRAYER: don’t probate the will!

1. 1. Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces (Jose’s sister)

2. 2. Heirs of Jesus Vaño(Jose’s brother – predeceased)

GROUNDS:

■ ü The siblings were entitled to participate in the Estate of Jose in case of intestacy
■ ü The will Teodoro sought to be probated was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of Teodoro Ceblero (not an acknowledged natural
child of the deceased Jose Vaño)
■ ü By Dec. 11, 1949, Jose Vaño was mentally incapable to make a will
■ ü Jose’s signature was procured by fraud and trick on the part of Teodoro Ceblero and the
said deceased Jose Vaño never intended that the said document should be his will at the
time of fixing his signature
■ ü The language used in the will is not Jose’s usual & proper language.
●
■ ü Jose Vaño never recognized Teodoro Ceblero as his acknowledged natural child
(Teodoro is a mere protégé, and not an adopted or acknowledged natural child;
●
 ■ ü Jose, during his lifetime, told his sister and nephews that he will not execute a will
because he wants to leave all his estate in favor of his brother and sister, and nephews;
●
■ ü Dolores Garces de Falcon (Jose’s niece) is the nearest next-of-kin) should be the estate
Administatrix and is willing to serve as such.

FOR THE PETITIONER:

Aug. 29, 1950 - Ireneo Vaño (nephew of testator Jose, only son of Jesus Vaño), prayed that he be removed as one
of the oppositors since he respects the will of his uncle and he was named as one of the oppositors without his
knowledge and consent. This was granted by the Court.

When asked to testify, he declared that:

● ü he was the only son of Jesus (younger brother of Jose the testator)
● ü he knew the oppositors of the probate but they are not siblings since he is an only child
● ü petitioner Teodoro is his cousin, testified as to their blood relationship
● ü Ireneo never authorized anyone to include him as oppositor to probate
● ü He did not oppose to probate.

Ceniza, et. al. (three attesting witnesses, also testified as to the validity of the will, that the will has complied with
the formalities prescribed by law, that the will was signed in their presence and that the testator was of sound mind
when he signed the will. Atty. Paquiao, one of the attesting witnesses, said that he personally prepared the will,
pursuant to testator’s wishes.

Dr. Paul Rodriguez Versoza, another handwriting expert

● ü Testified that signatures to the will are genuine

● ü any difference noted between them were due to the age, weakness, and illness of the testator, especially
the fact that he was suffering from rheumatism.

FOR THE OPPOSITION:

Ciriaca Ale (former servant at Teodoro’s house), Dolores Garces de Falcon (Jose’s niece, daughter of Paz) &
Carmen Vallore

● ü Testified that from Nov. 1949, Jose was very sick and was in serious condition, bedridden
● ü Could not maintain conversation with anyone
● ü Jose is not in the right condition to execute a will.

Edgar Bond (NBI - Questioned Documents and Ballistics Division chief); handwriting expert

● ü Testified that the signatures of Jose in the LW&T are forgeries

● ü Petitioners opposed to this since petitioners already admitted that the signatures in the will were
genuine & merely claimed that the will was not the testator's voluntary act because said signature was
obtained thru trickery and that undue pressure and influence were brought to bear upon him.

CFI CEBU: the supposed signatures of Jose Vaño on the LW&T are not genuine but imitated and held that the LW&T
sought to be probated was not the last will and testament of Jose Vaño.

ISSUE: WON CFI Cebu was correct in denying probate of the LW&T of JOSE VAÑO
what evidence an opponent to a probate of a will may be permitted to present at the hearing—whether or not
he is limited to presenting evidence to sustain the particular objection or ground on which he bases his
opposition to the probate.

RULING:

One of the grounds of their opposition was that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud and trick,
thereby leading one to believe, including the court and the petitioner that said signature was genuine but was not
valid. At the hearing, said oppositors completely changed their stand and claimed that the signature was
actually forged. As we have already said, that conduct and attitude, changeable and uncertain, does not
strengthen their position.

THE LW&T SIGNATURE OF JOSE WAS VALID.

While it is true that both Bond and Verzosa are handwriting experts, but the factor of the infirmity, age, and state
of health of the testator had not been given due consideration by the witness of the opponents and by the court.
When he executed the last will and testament, he was suffering from apparently advanced pulmonary tuberculosis as
well as rheumatism which according to Dr. Osmundo Rama who had been treating him until the day he died, affected
his joints. He was also bedridden during that time, which makes it natural that his signatures on Exhibit "A" should
lack the firmness, rhythm, lack of effort and continuity of motion that they had before he became quite ill and infirm.

Upon examination of the LW&T, while the signatures on the original are already infirm, rough and jagged,
suggesting a hand infirm and trembling, those on the duplicate are still more so, showing the effects of the
concentration of attention, exertion and effort of the testator in reading and signing the original.

OPPOSITORS WERE NOT SURE OF THEIR STAND, CHANGED GROUNDS OF ASSAILING THE WILL DURING
THE PROCEEDINGS.

In their written opposition the opponents did not question but on the contrary, assumed if not conceded the
genuineness of the signatures of the testator. Then at the hearing, they changed their attitude and for the first time
put in issue the genuineness of said signatures.

The opponents and their lawyers had almost one and a half months within which to examine and scrutinize the
signatures on Exhibit "A" on the LW&T, after which examination they did not doubt their genuineness.

OPPONENTS INCLUDED Ireneo Vaño among oppositors, but Ireneo would later testify that Teodoro was
indeed the testator’s son.

Again, the opponents included Ireneo Vaño, a son of Jesus Vaño, brother of the testator, among the oppositors.
This same Irineo later filed a motion in court repudiating the action taken by the opponents, saying that he was
included among the oppositors without his knowledge or consent; that far from opposing the probate of the will of his
uncle, he believed that said will was a true expression of the wish and desire of the testator. Not only this, but he
testified for the petitioner and said that the petitioner Teodoro Vaño was the son of the testator and had been treated
by him as such since childhood.

THE UNCERTAINTIES ON THE ATTESTING WITNESSES’ STATEMENTS STRENGTHEN THE VERACITY OF

THEIR CLAIMS.
The learned trial court lays emphasis on the uncertainty of the three subscribing witnesses as to who filled out the
blank spaces on the will now occupied by the words "11th" and "December", while they are sure that the name Jose
Vaño on the space at the beginning of the first 'paragraph was written by the testator himself.

Said uncertainty on the part of the said three subscribing witnesses instead of affecting their veracity, in our
opinion, strengthens it, because it refers to a minor detail and shows that they had not been rehearsed but
on the contrary, testified to what they remembered.

There is every reason to believe that the fact that the space for the name Jose Vaño on the LW&T was left in blank to
be filled out later by the testator himself argues against the theory of forgery, because if there had been forgery, by
leaving the blank space for the name of the testator to be filled out later, including the space for the date and the
month, the forgers would be laying themselves open and unnecessarily creating an additional opportunity for the
opponents and for the court to detect the forgery.

TEODORO WAS INDEED THE NATURAL SON OF JOSE.

There is no need for Teodoro to forge Jose’s signature because there is every reason to believe that said testator
would leave all his property to petitioner Teodoro Vaño. The evidence shows that Teodoro was a natural son of the
testator.

● ü Teodoro was raised and sent to school by Jose since childhood

● ü Jose lived with Teodoro even after the latter married and had his own family
● ü Jose executed an SPA with extensive powers in 1945, stating that Teodoro is his son and is his atty-in-
fact to lease some of his Cebu-based properties
● ü While Teodoro was in Bohol, Jose wrote him a letter asking Teodoro to send P5,000 to him, addressing
him as his "dear son" and with the complimentary clause "your loving Dad", signing the same
● ü At least in Cebu and Bohol petitioner Teodoro Vaño was known by everyone to be the son of Jose Vaño
because the latter had treated and accepted, even recognized him as such, and shortly before his death,
entrusted him with the complete management of his business.
● ü Opposition witness Carmen Vallore, Jose’s cousin-in-law, referred to Milagros Vaño as wife of Teodoro,
daughter-in-law of Jose

Under all these circumstances, is it any wonder that Jose Vaño should voluntarily by means of a will, leave
all his properties to his only son, though natural?

Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces JUST CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY HER WEALTHY BROTHER DID NOT LEAVE
ANYTHING TO HER. THAT’S WHY SHE FILED OPPOSITION TO PROBATE.

It is not improbable that one of the reasons prompting the filing of the opposition to the petition ex or probate was
that Paz Vaño Vda. de Garces, sister of the testator, could not understand why her brother, a wealthy man should
leave all his wealth to a mere natural son (Teodoro) and leave nothing to her; but it was not altogether strange
because it seems that the relations between Paz and the testator, were rather strained and in 1949, according
to the evidence, Paz had brought a civil action against Jose Vaño and Irineo Vaño, the nephew of Jose Vaño who ref
used to oppose the probate of the will. And during the last and prolonged illness of the testator, Paz, living in the
same city of Cebu, did not even once visit her ailing and bed-ridden brother.

the subscribing witnesses were under oath & are reputable persons.

● ü The three witnesses were under oath when they testified that Jose voluntary signed LW&T
● ü All three were not related to Jose & have no interest at results of probate
● ü Pedro Ceniza is a responsible businessman,
● ü Dr. Osmundo Rama, is a practising physician and
 ● ü Atty. Nazario Pacquio, is a member of the bar and at the time he prepared Exhibit "A", he was Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Cebu.
ü There is no reason to believe that Atty. Pacquio who, at the time was not only a member of the bar
but was an assistant provincial fiscal, should commit forgery by drafting LW&T and take part in
forging the signature of the testator and later falsely testify in court on the due execution of said
will and subject himself not only to criminal prosecution and dismissal from his post as assistant
provincial fiscal, but also to disbarment proceedings.

● ü Their disinterested testimony cannot be taken lightly.

● ü Because there is doubt as to the handwriting experts’ conflicting statements, the positive and clear
testimony of the three subscribing witnesses should prevail.

DISCUSSIONS:

In some jurisdictions in the United States the rule is that the issue in contested wills is made up by the pleadings
or framed ex rom the same, and no evidence can be introduced except in support of allegations contained in
such pleadings.

For instance, if the only opposition to the probate of a will is lack of mental capacity of the testator, then the
oppositor in presenting evidence will be confined to that point.

In other jurisdictions, however, it is said that the issue is fixed by the statute and is practically the old common
law issue "devisavit vel non," is the instrument presented for probate the last will and testament of the
testator?; that said issue may not be varied by the pleadings and that every ground of attack on the validity of the will
may be employed.

As the law in our jurisdiction on the probate of wills now stands, we are inclined to adopt the second view,
namely, that the law itself fixes or determines the issue.

Under section 12, Rule 77, of the Rules of Court, before the probate court can allow the will it must be satisfied upon
proof taken and filed that the will was duly executed, and that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound
and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence, or ex raud.

Also, under section 9 of the same rule, a will may be disallowed (a) if not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) if the testator was mentally incapable of making a will; (c) if it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear,
or threats; (d) if it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and (e)
if the signature of the testator was procured by fraud and trick. The oppositors in the present case therefore were not
precluded ex rom attacking the will on the ground of forgery despite the fact that their opposition was confined to
grounds (b), (c) and (d) of section 12, Rule 77 as stated above.

Section 10 of the same rule 77 provides that "anyone appearing to contest the will must file a writing stating his
grounds for opposing its allowance; and serve a copy thereof on the petitioner and other residents of the province
interested in the estate."

PURPOSE: to apprise the person or persons seeking the probate of will, as well as any other person interested in the
estate, of the reasons in opposing probate so that they may prepare the necessary evidence to counteract and
disprove said ground of opposition, this, in addition to apprising the court itself of the issue involved in the
proceedings so that it may intelligently direct the presentation of evidence during the hearing.

An oppositor objecting to the probate of the will on one or two specific grounds may, during the hearing add to
the grounds and submit evidence in support of the same, but when this happen as it did in the present case,
one is more or less justified in inferring that the oppositors were not sure of their ground; that they were in
doubt as to the basis of their opposition, a fact which naturally and not inconsiderably weakens their stand.

43. Ozaeta vs Cuartero (GR No. L-5597, May 31, 1956) MIRANDA

ROMAN OZAETA, petitioner and appellee, ROSA GONZALES, ET AL., co-petitioners and appellees,
vs. MARIA CUARTERO, ET AL., oppositors and appellees. SEBASTIAN C. PALANCA, MARCIANA
PALANCA and ANGEL C. PALANCA, oppositors and appellants.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila allowing the probate of the will
purportedly executed by Carlos Palanca and appointing the petitioner-appellee Roman Ozaeta
executor. The entire burden of appellants' contention is that the will could not have been executed
by Palacan on May 19, 1945, and in the manner described by petitioner's witnesses, and that,
supposing it to have been so executed, still it should not be allowed because it was allegedly
procured thru fraud and improper pressure and influence and did not comply with the requisites of
the law. Appellants' case is built mainly on surmises unsupported by the evidence. As to the
question of whether or not the will was obtained thru undue influence and improper pressure, it is
not enough that there was an opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it might
have been exercised. There must be substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. (21 A.L.R.
821).
Judgment appealed from affirmed, with costs against the appellants. Reyes, A., J., ponente.

44. Coso vs Fernandez (G.R. No. L-16763, December 22, 1921) MUANA

G.R. No. L-16763 December 22, 1921

PASCUAL COSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.

FERMINA FERNANDEZ DEZA, ET AL., objectors-appellees.

FACTS:

Federico Gimenez Zoboli a married man and resident of the Philippine Islands, became acquainted
with Rosario Lopez in Spain in 1898 and that he had illicit returns with her for many years thereafter. After
his return to the Philippines she followed him, arriving in Manila in February, 1918, and remained in close
communication with him until his death in February, 1919.

The testator left a will wherein it gave the tercio de libre disposicion to an illegitimate son had by the
testator with said Rosario Lopez, and also provides for the payment to her of nineteen hundred Spanish
duros by way the reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in taking care of the testator in Barcelona
during the years 1909 to 1916, when he is alleged to have suffered from a severe illness.

When probated, Court of First Instance of Manila set aside the will on the ground of undue
influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of a testator by one Rosario Lopez.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE INFLUENCE THAT ROSARIO LOPEZ WAS OF SUCH A
CHARACTER AS TO VITIATE THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR.

RULING:

NO. MERE AFFECTION, EVEN IF ILLEGITIMATE, IS NOT UNDUE INFLUENCE AND

DOES NOT INVALIDATE A WILL. NO IMPOSITION OR FRAUD HAS BEEN SHOWN IN
THE PRESENT CASE. THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DISALLOWING THE
WILL OF FEDERICO GIMENEZ ZOBOLI IS HEREBY REVERSED AND IT IS ORDERED
THAT THE WILL BE ADMITTED TO PROBATE.

The English and American rule in regard to undue influence is thus stated in 40 Cyc., 1144-
1149.

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a

will; to have that effect the influence must be "undue." The rule as to what constitutes
"undue influence" has been variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a
kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his
free agency and make his express the will of another, rather than his own. 1awphil.net

. . . such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to
the execution of the will in question, either at time of the execution of the will, or so
near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of
particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which
the testator would not otherwise have made. . . .

. . . and while the same amount of influence may become "undue" when exercised
by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that
some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a
will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence, in the
sense above expressed, existed at the time of its execution and we do not think that this
burden has been carried in the present case. While it is shown that the testator entertained
strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered
and subjugated his mind as to "destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own." He was an intelligent man, a lawyer by profession,
appears to have known his own mind, and may well have been actuated only by a
legitimate sense of duty in making provisions for the welfare of his illegitimate son
and by a proper feeling of gratitude in repaying Rosario Lopez for the sacrifices she
had made for him.

Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a
will. No imposition or fraud has been shown in the present case.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as `undue,' if no

imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an
unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed
to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.

45. Cuyugan vs Baron (G.R. No. L-45804, February 7, 1940) RABANES

Probate of the late Silvestra Baron.

VIVENCIO CUYUGAN v. FAUSTINA BARON and GUILLERMO BARON
GR No. L-45804 February 7, 1940

FACTS: That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the said
testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting
under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her
estate by will. The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina
Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will,
Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her
signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained by imposition and undue influence of the said
Vivencio Cuyugan and fraudulent confabulation between him and the attorney who prepared the
document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with law to be admitted for probate.

RULING: An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities
required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passes
to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed
testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and
voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law. The finding
that the will was executed under undue influence or by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary
capacity.
The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation
of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as
weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has
been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of
execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of
revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that
he had not executed the will in question.