Emergency Response Plan (Supplement)

Marine Department
Emergency Response Plan (Supplement)

Credible Scenario worksheet
6/30/2020
Document Number: NA
Rev N: 2020 (2)
Level:
Controlled
Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

1
Table of Contents
The following credible scenarios as stipulated in the Marine Department EERP. They have all been
developed and evaluated by use of the Credible Scenario Analysis Worksheet of LPD SMG:
1.0 - ONSHORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS ............................................................... 3
1.1 Fire at Fueling Station ................................................................................ 3
1.2 Fire Onboard a Vessel under Repair ................................................................ 6
1.3 Electrical Fire ....................................................................................... 10
1.4 Fire in Storehouse ................................................................................... 13
1.5 Vessel Grounding in Pier Channel ................................................................. 16
1.6 Collision between Vessels in Pier Channel ...................................................... 19
1.7 Structural failure of Dry Dock (West Pier only) ................................................. 23
1.8 Explosion on vessel alongside, or in Dry Dock .................................................. 26
1.10 Flammable/toxic vapor release from adjacent Tanajib ....................................... 33
1.11 Confined Space Emergencies ...................................................................... 38
1.12 Man Overboard from Pier .......................................................................... 42
1.13 Hostile Acts .......................................................................................... 45
1.14 Onshore Oil Spill..................................................................................... 53
1.15 Severe Weather ..................................................................................... 63
1.16 Gas Escape from Terminal (W/P) ................................................................. 66
1.17 Shelter-in-Place ..................................................................................... 69
2.0 - OFFSHORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS ............................................................ 70
2.1 Main Engine or Steering Failure ................................................................... 70
2.2 Collision .............................................................................................. 72
2.3 Stranding or Grounding ............................................................................. 76
2.4 Man Overboard ...................................................................................... 79
2.5 Fire .................................................................................................... 82
2.6 Flooding .............................................................................................. 86
2.7 Search and Rescue .................................................................................. 89
2.8 Abandoning Ship ..................................................................................... 92
2.9 Medevac .............................................................................................. 95
2.10 Barge Tip Over While Alongside a Wellhead Platform ........................................ 104
2.11 Jack-up Barge Leg failure ......................................................................... 107
2.12 Offshore Crane Incident ........................................................................... 110
2.13 Dynamic Positioning System Failure ............................................................. 114
2.14 Confined Space Emergencies ..................................................................... 118
2.15 Offshore Oil Spill ................................................................................... 122
2.16 Search and Rescue ................................................................................. 127
2.17 Offshore Hostile Act ............................................................................... 143

2
2.18 Lightning Strike..................................................................................... 151
2.19 Anchor Fouling...................................................................................... 154

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1.0 - ONSHORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

1.1 Fire at Fueling Station
SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Quayside Fuelling Station Scenario No.: 1-ON

Type of Emergency:
_______ Flammable Vapor Release _______ Structural Collapse
X Fire _______ Toxic Vapor Release
_______ Search/Rescue X Explosion
_______ Hazardous Material _______ Confined Space
_______ Medical _______ Natural Disaster
_______ Equipment Failure _______ Security
_______ Other
A. Description of the Scenario:
(Provide a detailed description of units/equipment involved, as well as possible effects on
them, on personnel, on other units/equipment, outside the fence, etc.)
During routine bunkering of vessel ‘M/V Nonesuch’ at Tanajib/West Pier, a drip tray containing a
small amount of MGO is set alight. The immediate area becomes a potential explosion threat in
addition to the fire, due to fuel pipes to the main fuel holding tanks.
All vessel loading operations will cease, the quayside will be evacuated of all non-essential person-
nel, and the fire team will be called.
Vessels may have to let go and proceed from port and incoming traffic held back.
Local on scene firefighting attempts will be made by suitably qualified persons until professional
assistance arrives from outside the port.
B. Possible Causes:
(List all possible causes; this will help in identifying preventive measures.)
Sparks caused by electrical cables/connections or metal to metal contact when loading steel/me-
tallic products near the fuelling station.
Persons smoking in non-designated areas, and/or naked lights in the area.
Spontaneous combustion of discarded waste in the immediate area.
Spillage of flammable liquids onto a hot surface and/or flammable vapor ignites.
C. Expected Size, Areas Affected, and Duration:
(Provide estimates of the size, the areas affected, and duration of the emergency.)
Initially the containment barrier at deck level will limit the scope of the fire to a restricted area;
however, if the fire is not beaten down quickly, this may spread to the vessel and/or the pipe-
work and other items in the close vicinity. The duration of the fire remaining alight is dependent
on the speed of the fire teams to a) reach the scene, b) start fighting the fire, c) remove the fuel
source from the equation, extinguish the fire and clear away.
The whole quayside area will become a fire scene and thus the port operation will effectively
cease until the emergency is over and the fire is out completely.
D. Effect on Operations:
(List all possible effects on involved operations [including up & downstream] that may be affected.)
The effect of a quayside fire will affect all operations that take place in the port and on the quay.
Port Control will have to hold vessels off from entering port, potentially send vessels out of port

4
to reduce the risk of damage by explosion, and fire. Logistics will be affected in such that equip-
ment to the field will be delayed, and delays may affect operations throughout the company op-
eration as a whole.
E. Location-specific/Equipment-specific Notes:
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may in-
tensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access;
types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.].)
The location of the fuelling station is removed from the fuel tanks by a sufficient distance, how-
ever; the isolating valves between manifold and tank are manual, and thus requiring closure by
hand at the furthest point from the tank as possible, this may be close to the fuelling point, but
not so close to the tank as to become a risk.
Portable foam applicator units are available at each fuelling station and these should be regularly
checked/maintained to ensure optimum readiness in such an event.
No hazardous or flammable substances should be in close proximity to the fuelling stations.
F. Preventive Measures:
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineering
controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Comments Recommendations
Fuelling Stations to be kept clean, free of debris and as-
Constant care around all potential
sorted quayside equipment unless directly required for op-
fire risk areas to be maintained.
erational reasons.
Regular checks on fire-fighting equipment to be made by
SAPD to ensure constant readiness of fixed and portable
gear.
Removal of flammable and explosive stores from the vicin-
ity if the fuelling stations.
Notices to be posted on the quayside when a vessel is bun-
kering or taking on liquids of a flammable nature.
Regular checks for operation of closing valves and isolators
in the pipe line to the tank ashore.
Regular checks for electrical safety when reefer units are
running in the vicinity of fuelling stations.
Regular drills to establish a competent emergency on scene
fire-fighting team at the port, and dedicated people/offices
to carry out specific tasks related to the incident.
Communications system to be able to be utilized to sum-
mon and direct resources effectively for best effect.
G. Initial Response:
Required Actions: 1. Person discovering fire raises alarm to
(List all required initial response actions.) Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC)
2. MSC initiates 110 Emergency request-
ing fire and medical assistance
3. MSC initiates Emergency Alarm
4. Marine facility personnel proceed to
assembly areas and undertake head
count
5. Initiate fire monitor to blanket fire

5
6. Prepare fire hoses for boundary cool-

ing
7. Isolate supply to pump and fuelling
station
8. Ensure that no fuel is allowed to enter
adjacent sewage lift station
9. Consider moving any vessels alongside
that may be affected to contingency
berths, or even depart the port
10. Clear perimeter areas surrounding
area to allow access for emergency
services, evacuate all non-essential
personnel and control traffic
11. Emergency Services arrive on scene
and Fire Chief takes command
12. Fuelling station fire contained by fire
fighters
13. Fire Chief declares emergency over and
instructs personnel to stand down
H. Pre-Incident Plan Information:
(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes person-
nel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-incident plans.
Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and provide recom-
mendations for upgrades as required.)
Resource Required Resource Available

Qualified local fire-fighters. All resources available.
Qualified external agency firefighters.
Fire protection equipment inspected and available for use.
Recommendations: None
I. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on
items A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 Marine Divisions
 LPD
 Drilling and Work over
 FrPD
 JHAH
 SoNPD
J. Evaluation and Ranking:
(Assess risk [severity and probability of occurrence] and assign a ranking to prioritize scenarios.)
1. Fire at a fuelling station
Probability Consequences Ranking
(1=most likely; 5=least likely) (1=most severe; 5=least se- (Probability x Consequences)
vere)
4 2 8
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th, 2016

Approved by: Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21th, 2016

6
1.2 Fire Onboard a Vessel under Repair
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels Scenario No.: 2-ON
Type of Emergency:
___X___ Fire _______ Toxic Vapor Release
_______ Search/Rescue _______ Explosion
_______ Other
M/V Nonesuch is alongside at Tanajib/West Pier undergoing structural repairs to steelwork in the
cement room, adjacent and aft of the engine room by way of the oil purifiers. During the day,
cutting and welding has taken place with a fire watch being maintained. During the evening how-
ever; the fire watch is relaxed and an undetected hot spot in the steelwork behind lagging close to
the purifiers creates a fire that goes undetected until the alarm is sounded by auto detection sys-
tems onboard.
Vessels crew fight the fire with portable foam units and charged hoses, and the fire is extinguished
without further incident.
The Master alerts port control by radio and makes a ‘VHF’ broadcast to other vessels in port to
advise them of the situation, and provides fire-fighting teams from the vessel crew to fight the fire
and boundary cool the vessel side to reduce possible heat transfer to other vessels.
B. Possible Causes:
In this scenario, the fire has started due to an undetected hot spot in the steelwork causing lagging
to catch alight and subsequently start a fire adjacent the vessels fuel purifiers. The reason for the
fire is that the fire watch was not present for long enough after completion, and/or the watch was
not observant enough. Observation of this type of work has some experience required, and can be
dealt with by training and supervision with the addition of a toolbox talk at the JSA planning stage.
The fire started close to the fuel purifiers due to lagging with a residue amount of fuel oil soaked
into it, the smoke alarm head detected the fire before the heat detector and thus the fire had no
time to grow out of controllable proportions before ship staff arrived on scene to fight it. In this
case the fire was limited to a small area of the aft engine room on the starboard side, the fire was
extinguished using portable units and a charged hose.
The operation for the vessel in question will cease and the operation of vessels adjacent to it in
port. Logistics and drilling will be delayed in getting cargo to other vessels for the duration of the
emergency and subsequent delays will affect arrivals and departures from the port in question.

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types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc].)
The location of the fire will be known to the vessel crew, and port control once advised. This in-
formation will need to be passed to shore-side fire-fighters if/when they arrive on scene.
Access to the scene of the fire will be restricted by the smoke and vessel design, but speedy reac-
tion by the crew will negate the need for shore fire-fighters.
A full plan of the vessel will be available at the gangway for non-vessel crew teams to use in the
event of an emergency.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineer-
ing controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Fire watch personnel to be fully briefed on
what is required prior to, during and on com-
pletion of hot work.
A full record of PTW and JSA for the job to be

kept open until the job is completed correctly.
When hot work is taking place on a vessel, it is

to be stipulated that all 6 sides of the location
are checked thoroughly before the job is fin-
ished and PTW closed.
Training to be given to all crew/personnel who

may be involved at any stage in the job of fire
watchman.
Meal reliefs to be provided by the vessel man-

agement team onboard to allow full coverage
of the job.
1. Vessel raises the alarm to Marine Shift

Required Actions:
Coordinator (MSC).
(List all required initial response actions.)
2. At the same time the vessel initiates on
ship fire alarm and follows the require-
ments of checklist No. 5 detailed in the
Offshore Credible Scenarios
3. MSC to initiate 110 for fire and medical
assistance.
4. MSC initiates the emergency alarm.

8
5. Marine facility personnel proceed to as-

sembly areas and undertake head count
6. Initiate fire monitor if requested by ves-
sel
7. Prepare fire hoses for boundary cooling
8. Isolate supplies to adjacent fueling sta-
tions
9. MSC to nominate one suitable vessel to
stand-off and offer assistance
10. Consider moving any vessels alongside
that may be affected to contingency
berths, or even depart the port
11. Clear perimeter areas to allow access
for emergency services, evacuate all
non-essential personnel and control
traffic
12. Emergency Services arrive on scene and
Fire Chief takes command
13. Fire contained by fire fighters
14. Fire Chief declares emergency over and
instructs personnel to stand down
15. Information to be provided to FrPD:
16. The location and class of the fire
17. Number and details of missing person-
nel
18. Fire plans of the ship, deployment of
fire teams, international shore connec-
tion and stability details
19. Hazards – atmospheric, mechanical,
electrical and structural

Vessel to be on own power supply, i.e. harbor Yes, as per the ISM Code.
generator set.
Ships fire-fighting equipment to be readily avail-
able.
Recommendations:
All vessels FFA to be kept at immediate notice for use at all times, especially during repair/mainte-
nance days in port.
Fire Watch team to be rested and fully alert for the duty period.
All fire-fighting appliances to be in a state of readiness during port stay and maintenance days.


9
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
1 Fire Onboard A Vessel Under Repair
vere)
1 (3) (2) (6)
Approved by:Hasan Anbar(Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st, 2016

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1.3 Electrical Fire
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Sub-Station # 5 Scenario No.: 3-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Other
Smoke was observed coming from the air vent at Sub-Station # 5 at Tanajib Port. The alarm is raised
by a passing contractor informing a member of staff at the port. Tanajib Port Control initiates 110
and requests emergency and medical assistance and sounds the alarm.
All personnel evacuate the buildings adjacent the fire and muster at the allocated muster point
north of the Port Control Building, all power to the Port Control building is lost.
Attempts to contain the fire with portable units are thwarted by intense smoke and the area is
evacuated to a safe distance to await the arrival of the FrPD.
FrPD and an ambulance arrive and the fire is tackled and extinguished by them, using dry chemical
extinguishers in fireman’s suits and SCBA. Water hoses are made ready in-case of any hot embers
reaching the grassy area around the building.
B. Possible Causes:
Possible causes of an electrical fire at this location include, but are not limited to the following ….
Power Surge, Faulty Connection, Overheating Of Contactors, Loose Connection.
Due to the construction of the sub-station, the fire is limited to an elevated building of solid con-
struction. The building is located at the junction of 2 main roads and close to the Port Control Tower
in the Port. The duration of the emergency is dependent on the speed of response from local and
SAFD teams tackling the fire.
There are no other buildings within 35m of the fire, and there are no hazardous chemicals or other
issues in the immediate area.
The operation of Tanajib Port will be effected in that all power for the Port Control building comes
from Sub-Station 5. This may cause delays in loading/discharging vessels in port and arrival/depar-
ture of those waiting. Road traffic will be kept away and trucks with cargo and loads will be re-
directed outside the port perimeter. All roads to the SOF will be cleared of any traffic or obstruc-
tion.

11
types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.)
The location of the fire is limited to the sub-station building at the south end of the Port Control
Building. Portable extinguishers are available at the scene and other locations close by and these
will all be utilized to make a first aid attempt to put out the fire before the emergency services ar-
rive. No other buildings or hazardous substances within 35m.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures
[engineering controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Regular frequent checks on the connections
within the sub-station by qualified persons to
be established.
Removal of all debris and other non-essential
items from the building.
Additional DP wheeled extinguisher located
outside the building to be considered.
Fixed fire-fighting system inside the building to
be considered.
Required Actions: 1. Sound fire alarm

(List all required initial re- 2. Initiate 110 Emergency requesting fire and medical assis-
sponse actions.) tance
3. Inform all of fire location
4. Evacuates personnel to assembly area for head count and
at the same time report to Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC)
5. Isolate the electrical supply
6. If possible, contain and fight the fire with dry powder
and/or CO2 extinguisher
7. Shut all building doors, close ventilation fans and skylights
9. Marine facility personnel proceed to assembly areas and
undertake head count
11. Clear perimeter areas surrounding storehouse to allow ac-
cess for emergency services
12. Emergency Services arrive on scene and Fire Chief takes
command
13. Electrical fire contained by fire fighters
14. Fire Chief declares emergency over and instructs person-
nel to stand down

12

17. Number and details of missing personnel
18. Plan of the building
19. Hazards – atmospheric, mechanical, electrical and struc-
tural


Fully functioning fire protection equipment. Yes
Recommendations:
All vessels FFA to be kept at immediate notice for use at all times, especially during repair/mainte-
nance days in port.
Fire Watch team to be rested and fully alert for the duty period.
All fire-fighting appliances to be in a state of readiness during port stay and maintenance days.

 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD

1 Electrical fire

(1=most likely; 5=least likely) (1=most severe; 5=least severe) (Probability x Consequences)
1 (3) (4) (12)
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th , 2016

Approved by:Hasan Anbar(Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st , 2016

13
1.4 Fire in Storehouse
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Contractor Warehouse/Store Scenario No.: 4-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Flammable Vapor Release ___X __ Structural Collapse
___X___ Search/Rescue _______ Explosion
_______ Other
Fire broke out in a Contractor Warehouse, outside the perimeter fence of the Port confines. The
fire took hold in a section of the storehouse containing boxed stores, machinery and ships spares
and spread quickly through the building before the alarm could be raised by staff. The portable
extinguishers on scene were unable to extinguish the fire and SAFD were called and Tanajib Port
Control advised of the emergency.
The area was cleared of all non-essential personnel, vehicles and potentially combustible materials.
All contactor staff and employees were mustered at the designated muster point, but 1 person was
found to be missing.
The warehouse foreman supplied a list of MSDS to the fire team on arrival and it was noted that all
chemical were stored in separate annex to the warehouse.
Due to the intensity of the fire, just before the SAFD could arrive, the roof structure collapsed.
SAFD arrived on scene and immediately set about applying water from the bowser and an SAR team
was established to search for the missing man.
The fire was tackled by hoses and the fire beaten down allowing entry into the shell, and at the rear
in a separate section of the building, the missing man was found suffering breathing difficulties and
minor burns.
The casualty was transferred to a safe area by the SAR team and first aid was applied on scene
before he was taken by ambulance to the sick bay at Tanajib.
B. Possible Causes:
Possible causes of the storehouse fire include but are not limited to the following ….
Poor electrical connection, Spontaneous combustion of flammable materials, cigarette or naked
flame incorrectly supervised.

Due to the construction of the storehouse, the fire was contained within the footprint of the build-
ing until the roof collapsed, removing combustible materials from the sides of the building assisted
in limiting the external spread of the fire. The duration of the fire was dependent on the contents,
which fortunately did not include any hazardous chemical.

14
The operation of Tanajib Port will not be affected directly as the fire was outside the Aramco fence,
however, stores destined for vessels alongside will be delayed or made unable to be delivered, and
there could be a knock on effect. The contractor company will be affected in operations that may
otherwise cause delays in some pier operations.
The fire in the storehouse is away from any Aramco assets, however; the effect of possible stores
being delivered to vessels in the port may be affected. The lack of water hydrants in the area
means the fire can only fought with portable units until SAFD arrive on scene. Hazardous materi-
als will need to be identified by the storehouse owner and operator by means of a manifest and
layout plan available to the fire teams.
Regular checks on the fire safety of the building to be carried out
by appropriate inspectors.
Removal of all debris and other non-essential items from the
building.
Installation of fire water main in the area to be considered.
Fixed fire-fighting system inside the building to be considered.
Required Actions: 1. Storehouse personnel activate building fire alarm sys-
(List all required initial re- tem upon discovery of a fire in the storehouse area
sponse actions.) 2. Storehouse Supervisor initiates 110 Emergency re-
questing fire and medical assistance
3. All personnel in the storehouse area are informed of
the fire location
4. Storehouse supervisor evacuates storehouse personnel
to assembly area for head count and at the same time
reports to Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC)
5. If possible, contain and fight the fire
6. Shut all building doors, close ventilation fans and sky-
lights
8. Marine facility personnel proceed to assembly areas
and undertake head count
10. Clear perimeter areas surrounding storehouse to allow
access for emergency services
11. Emergency Services arrive on scene and Fire Chief takes
command
12. Storehouse fire contained by fire fighters
13. Fire Chief declares emergency over and instructs per-
sonnel to stand down

15

16. Number and details of missing personnel
17. Plan of the building
18. Hazards – atmospheric, mechanical, electrical and
structural
Recommendations:
Contactor staff to be fully trained in fire-fighting techniques and fire prevention.
Necessary FFA to be available to fight a big fire if needed, suggest installation of fire main or wa-
ter tower to enable this.
Contractors to develop a storage plan and identification of Hazardous materials for fire teams to
be appraised with before commencing fire-fighting/SAR on the premises.

 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD

1 Risk of heat transfer to flammable/high risk areas.
2 Disruption to safe vessel movement operations

(1=most severe; 5=least se-
(1=most likely; 5=least likely) (Probability x Consequences)
vere)
1 (3) (4) (12)
2 (4) (3) (12)

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1.5 Vessel Grounding in Pier Channel
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Vessel/Port Control. Scenario No.: 5-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Fire _______ Toxic Vapor Release
X Grounding
The tanker vessel Aurelia was entering Tanajib Port when she ran aground on the northern shoal
between marks T-1A and T3. The prevailing winds pushed the stern to the south while the bow
stayed on the sea-bed and she then made contact with the sea-bed at the stern, effectively closing
the entrance channel to Tanajib Port.
There was no cargo oil leak as the tanker is double hulled, however; a small quantity of hydraulic
oil escaped from the stern via the rudder stock.
Due to the low speed of the vessel on impact, the damage to the hull is limited to slight denting
forward, but the single screw has been damaged by contact with the sea-bed, and therefore the
vessel is unable to move under her own power and require external assistance to move.
B. Possible Causes:
Possible causes include, but are not limited to the following …..
Steering Gear breakdown, Engine breakdown, Loss of heading due to sheer/current, Navigational
human error.
With the LOA of the tanker at 100m, the whole channel is closed off both inwards and outbound,
this will have an adverse effect on all vessel traffic movements at the port, also the logistics traffic
to and from the field.
A knock on effect is the delay of stores and essential spares to the rigs which will ultimately effect
production if not corrected immediately.
The duration of the operation to clear the vessel from the channel will depend on weather, avail-
able AHTSS vessels, tides and associated resources.
The effects of a blocked channel will include but not be limited to the following ……….
Production, Logistics, Cargo, Stores, Crew Changes, Vessel Traffic movements ….

17
Specifically the channel at Tanajib will be closed to all traffic with the exception of very shallow
drafted vessels.
The crew of the tanker will need to take regular sounding both around the vessel and all ballast
tanks/voids and cofferdams to ensure the watertight integrity of the hull is not breached and vis-
ual inspection of hull where possible.
GOSRD will need to be standing by in the vicinity to establish a boom in the event of an unex-
pected spill.
Regular upkeep of vessels equipment and machinery to the
highest level.
OOW watch to be assisted by Master and watchman during

transit of high risk areas in the event of unexpected and sudden
condition changes.
Required Actions: 1. Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC) becomes aware of the
(List all required initial re- situation either from the vessel, or by visual observa-
sponse actions.) tion.
2. MSC initiates 110 emergency call and Marine Emergency
Response Plan.
3. Obtain SITREP from the vessel, including details of dam-
age, personnel injuries and any possible oil pollution
4. Ensure that vessels are following Offshore Credible Sce-
nario Emergency Checklist No. 3
5. Broadcast Mayday Relay/ Pan Pan as appropriate
6. Note exact position of grounding and height of tide
7. Provide information on local currents and tides, particu-
larly details of the rise and fall of the tide
8. Enlist the support of any tugs available
9. Consider Oil Spill Response measures as a precaution
10. Liaise with vessel regarding detailed damage assess-
ment
11. Establish a safe perimeter, evacuate all non-essential
12. Ensure safe and efficient access for emergency services
13. Before suggesting further action, consider all relevant
information such as:
a. State, height and range of tide
b. Nature of bottom
c. Weather and sea state

18
d. Depth of water all round vessel

e. Damage to ship, flooding, possible pollution,
personnel injuries
f. Stability condition of the ship
g. Use of high sea suction(s)

Recommendations:
1. A standby vessel or escort to assist the tanker on passage through the buoyed channel.
2. Nominated AHTSS vessels to be standing by to respond if required, both inside the port
and at the inner anchorage.
3. Vessel crew to be regularly drilled in the scenario of grounding.
4. Tanajib Port Control to establish shore based drills to simulate the scenario.

(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for com-
ments/input on items A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
1 Grounding in pier channel

vere)
1 (2) (2) (4)


19
1.6 Collision between Vessels in Pier Channel
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Facilities Scenario No.: 6-ON
Type of Emergency: _______ Flammable Vapor Release X Structural Collapse

X Equipment Failure _______ Security
_______ Other

This incident involves two marine department AHTSS vessels engaged in rig-supply. They are
termed ‘Vessel A’ and ‘Vessel B’.
‘Vessel A’ completes loading and is ready to proceed from station X, at a Marine Pier to a Rig.
‘Vessel B’ also completes loading and is ready to depart station Y and proceed to a Rig. At
2100hrs ‘Vessel B’ obtains permission from Port Control to start main engines in preparation for
departure. At the same time, ‘Vessel A’ obtains permission from Port Control to let go and depart
station X.
The Masters of ‘Vessel A’ and ‘Vessel B’ are unaware of each other’s movements. ‘Vessel B’ de-
parts the berth and is called by Port Control to return back to station Y to pick up a cargo item.
The vessel receives instruction that there is no need to moor but just to pick up the item and
then depart.
At 2125hrs ‘Vessel A’ lets go and is moving off station X. The Master is at the aft control console
and ‘kicks the engines ahead’ thus making ‘Vessel A’ move ahead. At the same time, ‘Vessel B’
picks up the cargo item and is moving off station Y.
The master on ‘Vessel A’ observes that he has no control at the forward control console and
therefore has no control of the vessel. ‘Vessel A’ is moving ahead at a speed of 3.2 knots. At
2130hrs the bow of ‘Vessel A’ makes heavy contact with the starboard quarter of ‘Vessel B’. Ex-
tensive damage is incurred to both vessels.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Failure of ‘Vessel A’ Master and Crew to comply with company procedures and standard
navigation procedures.
2. Poor communication between Port Control and departing vessels.
Vessel A
1. Extensive shell plating damage on bow including a hole 150cms x 60cms
2. Forepeak tank top-plate damaged.
3. Forecastle Deck Bulwark damaged.
4. Stiffeners in Forward Store and forward part of Forepeak tank damaged.
5. Bottom side plates on forward side of chain locker damaged.
Vessel B
1. Mooring Bollard on Starboard Quarter ripped off.
2. 6.7 meters of Starboard Quarter bulwark damaged.

20
3. Starboard Capstan displaced from housing base.

4. Starboard fresh water tank # 3 partly damaged
5. Starboard crash rail and support damaged for 3 meters in length.
6. Cable fittings of hydraulic flexible hoses to capstan, damaged.
7. Starboard quarter fire-main line damaged.
Port facility is not in operation for 2 hours, while the vessels make their way back to their re-
spective berths for full damage assessments. Rig supply is delayed by 12 hours while contin-
gency plans are made for re-supply. Both vessels are taken out of service for at least 2 weeks to
effect the necessary repairs. Marine Department are still able to maintain supply service to the
customer, but there is no back-up, should another vessel be taken out of service.
Main engines and steering gear are located in dedicated engine room spaces protected by fixed
fire-extinguishing systems and are protected by fire and watertight boundaries.
Crew training and competency All preventative measures are requirements
Emergency drills and training under the ISM Code.
Policies and procedures
Additional measures – Port Control Proce- 1. Departure and Arrival procedures
dures to be evaluated and assessed. 2. Multiple moves
3. Communication to Vessels
4. Information given to Vessels
5. Training and Certification of Port Con-
trol personnel.
6. Pre-designated positions for Port Con-
trol Coordinators.
Required Actions: By Vessels:
(List all required initial response actions.) 1. Stop engines.
2. Sound the general emergency alarm,
and carry out a crew muster to check
for missing or injured personnel.
3. Close watertight doors and automatic
fire doors.
4. Determine heading on collision, posi-
tion and depth of water.
5. Switch on deck lighting at night.
6. Switch VHF to Channel 16 and, if appro-
priate, to Channel 13.

21
7. Muster passengers, if carried, at emer-

gency stations.
8. Make ship’s position available to radio
room/GMDSS station, satellite terminal
and other automatic distress transmit-
ters and update as necessary.
9. Sound bilges and tanks after collision.
10. Check for fire/damage.
11. Take appropriate damage control
measures.
12. Offer assistance to other ship.
13. Inform Coastal State Authorities if ap-
propriate.
14. Preserve VDR or S-VDR records if not
automatically protected.
15. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and
MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and im-
minent danger and immediate assis-
tance is required, otherwise broadcast
an URGENCY message to ships in the vi-
cinity.
By Port Control:
1. Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC) be-
comes aware of the situation either
from the vessels, or by visual observa-
tion
2. MSC initiates 110 emergency call and
Marine Emergency Response Plan
3. Obtain SITREP from vessels, including
details of damage, personnel injuries
and any possible oil pollution
4. Ensure that vessels are following Off-
shore Credible Scenario Emergency
Checklist No. 2
5. Broadcast Mayday Relay if appropriate
6. Enlist the support of any tugs available
7. Consider Oil Spill Response measures as
a precaution
8. Liaise with vessels regarding detailed
damage assessments
9. Establish a safe perimeter, evacuate all
traffic
10. Ensure safe and efficient access for
emergency services
11. If fire occurs, initiate Onshore Credible
Scenario Emergency Checklist No. 2

22

1. Trained and competent vessel crew. 1. Yes, as per the ISM Code.
2. Trained and competent Port Control
Operators. 2. Training program in progress.
3. MIM 1187.001 COLLISION AND
DAMAGE BY OR TO MARINE 3. Yes.
EQUIPMENT OR CRAFT
Recommendations:
MIM to be revised and/or updated following any collision incidents.

 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
 Marine Contractors
1 Collision
vere)
1 (3) (2) (6)
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th ,2016

Approved by:Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st ,2016

23
1.7 Structural failure of Dry Dock (West Pier only)
Plant/Unit/Equipment: SAFD-2 Port Dock Arm Crane Scenario No.: 7-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Flammable Vapor Release X Structural Collapse
_______ Other
The incident happened when the crew technicians of SAFD-2 tested the load capacity of the dock
arm basket with 800kg of sand. During the operation they attempted utilizing the dock arm to
raise the basket. Suddenly the mechanical basket collapsed. One of the blaster painters working
on Ain Dar 3 injured his shoulder because of the debris of falling metal. The permit receiver saw
what happened and he immediately reported to the safety officer and SAFD-2 control. They as-
sisted the injured blaster painter to a safe place and put warning notices, barricades and cleared
out the site.
B. Possible Causes:
The load capacity of the dock arm was 400kg, but the crew technician was trying to do the load
test with 800kg of sand.
The SAFD-2 port side forward area was affected during the mechanical basket collapse.
Duration: 08:59 Incident occurs.
09:00 Incident reported by permit receiver to the safety officer. At the
same time the crew technicians also report the incident to the
SAFD-2 group supervisor.
09:01 The permit receiver and safety officer help the injured blaster
painter.
09:02 The safety officer reported to the SAFD-2 group supervisor.
09:03 The SAFD-2 group supervisor informed all the crew and called
110 for medical ambulance and response team
09:04 All the crew responded to put warning notices, barricades and
cleared out the site.
The SAFD-2 will be shut down for at least one day while the area is secured and the investigation
takes place. While this could affect the ETC date of the refit of the Ain Dar 3, this time could
probably be made up with overtime work from the Ship Repair Unit.
The port dock arm would be out of service for at least two weeks to effect repairs. Cost of repairs

24
is estimated to be $3000.00. The time for blasting and painting operation would be increased from
one week to two weeks as the JLG man-lifter could be utilized on the port side. This would almost
certainly affect the ETC of the refit by 7 – 14 days.
SAFD-2 port side forward dock arm crane.
Mechanical basket collapse due to human error of operating the machine.
Do not overload the weight capacity of the Always check and read the operation manual
machinery basket. before using the machinery.
Conduct a JSA and pre-job brief to highlight
all hazards with respect to the operation.
Required Actions: 1. SAFD-2 shift coordinator (SSC) raises
(List all required initial response actions.) the alarm, initiates 110 emergency call
and notifies Marine Shift Coordinator
(MSC)
2. All dry-dock non-essential personnel
proceed to assembly area and under-
take head count
3. MSC initiates Marine Emergency Re-
sponse Plan
4. SSC conducts a damage assessment
and reports findings to MSC
5. Consider using ballast water to correct
a substantial list
6. MSC to organize tugs to stand-off the
dock to offer assistance as necessary
7. Clear perimeter areas to allow access
for emergency services, evacuate all
traffic
8. Consider securing vessel in dry-dock (if
any) with ropes
If water ingress is discovered:
1. Close all doors
2. Sound bilges and tanks
3. Identify location of incoming water
4. Cut off all electrical power running
through the area
5. Shore up area to stem water flow

25
6. Check bilge pump for operation

7. Check auxiliary pumps for back-up op-
eration, as required

Medical Team Yes, SAFD-2 crew are trained in first aid and
have a first aid kit available. JHAH medical re-
sponders and ambulance can be on scene in
20 minutes.
Recommendations:
None

 Marine Maintenance Division.

 Marine QA&CU
 JHAH
 LPD

1 Structural failure of the Dry Dock (West Pier only)

vere)
1 (3) (4) (12)

Approved by:Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st , 2016

26
1.8 Explosion on vessel alongside, or in Dry Dock
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Scenario No.: 08-ON
Type of Emergency: _______ Flammable Vapor Release _______ Structural Collapse

_______ Search/Rescue ___X___ Explosion
_______ Other

Vessel X is alongside at Tanajib Pier station 24 undergoing repairs to steelwork in the engine room,
when there is a large explosion followed by a fireball via the engine room stores access hatch.
A contactor welder had inadvertently been welding a bracket to a bulkhead which formed part of
No 1 day tank, this tank had been drained to 50% capacity, thus allowing sufficient room for flam-
mable vapors to collect and subsequently ignite.
The engine room had been empty of other crew at the time of the incident, however; some crew
members had been working in the cement room aft of the ER bulkhead, the watertight door was
closed so as to prevent fumes from the welding job setting off smoke alarms in the cargo compart-
ment.
The blast from the day tank immediately killed the welder, the fireball exited the engine room via
the stores hatch being open, and several people on deck were caught in the flames, but thrown
clear of the hatch area. Crew working aft in the cement room escaped using the starboard escape
route and ran to the after end of the vessel to enable escape to the jetty. Burning debris will be
thrown in the air, this will cause further smaller secondary fires in other areas, and may injure
personnel ashore.
The bridge team immediately called 110 and port control on the VHF before all power was lost to
the vessel. The alarm was sounded onboard and a verbal instruction to evacuate the vessel given.
A headcount was carried out on the jetty and fire-fighting teams from the vessel started to fight
the fire from the jetty while waiting for assistance from SAFD.
B. Possible Causes:
Untrained contractor workers, incorrect notification by vessel crew, no JSA/PTW completed, poor
communication between concerned teams, misunderstanding of instructions,

The fire will be contained by the vessel design, however; vessels adjacent may experience heat
and smoke damage from the fire if allowed to go unchecked.
The fire will burn until fire teams extinguish the flames, this may depend on access or FSE con-
straints if using water/foam units.
The area adjacent the vessel and jetty will need to be clear of non-essential personnel and equip-
ment.

27
All operations will cease in the vicinity of the vessel, and adjacent vessels, pier operations will
cease to allow fire department access.
Port operations will cease until the incident commander declares emergency over, vessel move-
ments will be stopped until all clear.
The fire equipment at station 24 will be used immediately to make initial attempts to dowse the
flames and cool the deck. Other vessels in port with suitable Fi Fi equipment can be utilized to
direct water at the vessel on fire, and assist in boundary cooling from a safe distance.
This type of hot work needs very careful plan- JSA and PTW for the specific job should indi-
ning and a skilled crew with a good cate all inherent dangers with welding in that
knowledge of the vessel and specific area of part of the engine room and hazards to be
concern. physically identified with chalk or marker.
Gas freeing is essential when working with/on
or near fuel tanks, and marking out no go ar- Welding work not to be carried out in highly
eas to indicate tank edges and boundaries. explosive areas without first checking tank
Ships crews to be aware of not painting over levels and taking LEL readings to confirm limits
builders marks indication tank locations. are met.
Minimum crew numbers to be in the direct
area when this potentially hazardous wok is Fire-fighting equipment to be ready and avail-
being done. able with team standing by at a safe location
for immediate response.
Required Actions: 1. Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC) initiates 110 emergency call
and Marine Emergency Response Plan
(List all required initial
2. Marine shift coordinator will initiate the Emergency Alarm.
response actions.)
3. Marine facility personnel proceed to assembly areas away
from blast area and undertake head count
4. Evacuate all non-essential personnel from West Pier as soon
as possible
5. Assume worst case scenario, i.e. hostile act and initiate re-
sponse accordingly
6. Consider moving any vessels alongside that may be affected
to contingency berths, or even depart the port
7. Isolate supplies to adjacent fueling stations
8. Clear perimeter areas to allow access for emergency services,
evacuate all non-essential personnel and control traffic
9. Emergency services arrive on scene

28
10. Emergency contained by FrPD and Security Department

11. Emergency declared over and personnel instructed to stand
down
12. Information to be provided to FrPD and Security Department
a. The location, time and type of explosion if known
b. Number and details of missing personnel
c. Kind and quantity of the materials, gases, etc., that
were involved
d. Hazards – atmospheric, mechanical, electrical and
structural
Recommendations:
For a vessel explosion/fire alongside, consideration should be given to the debris fallout area,
the likelihood of smaller fires being spread to other vessels and quayside structures arising
from burning debris. Further consideration of secondary explosive incidents to be considered
from other tanks.
The vessels crew will need to evacuate the vessel as soon as is possible, but remain close
enough to assist in fighting the fire from the quayside and provide information to SAFPD.
The use of other vessels in port is dependent on the tidal state at the time, and the risk of fur-
ther damage and injuries.
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
 SAFPD
1 Explosion

vere)
1 (3) (1) (3)


29
9 Mechanical Failure of a Crane
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Scenario No.: 09-ON
Type of Emergency:
___X___ Equipment Failure _______ Security
_______ Other
One of the tracked cranes at Tanajib (Manitowoc 1400, 200T) was operating on the quay at station
11 loading a heavy item on sub-sea machinery onto the deck of a PSV. The PSV is high sided and
the tide was at the highest level, so the load was elevated to accommodate this and was approxi-
mately 5m above ground level of the quay, and 7m above the deck of the PSV.
At the point when the load was swung over the vessel deck, the boom of the crane was seen to
judder before collapsing, with the load and the crane boom landing heavily on the deck of the
vessel.
The impact of the load hitting the deck was sufficient to puncture the steel deck beneath the tim-
ber sheathing, and then the force of the boom landing across the vessel caused damage to both
crash rails and the bulk cargo manifolds in the walkways.
Fortunately the banks-man, deck crew and driver were unhurt in the incident, but the crane and
load have caused damage to the vessel.
On the jetty, all movements and operations are stopped until the crane and vessel are made safe,
the area is cleared to allow a 2nd crane to start lifting the first out of the way, emergency services
are on standby. On the vessel, damage control teams report buckling and puncture of the deck
heads in the engine room and cargo space aft, bulk cargo pipes and manifolds are buckled and
damaged above deck and the several sections of hydraulic and exhaust pipework in the engine
room have been ruptured. There is no immediate risk of fire or flood, however; the vessel stability
is a concern with the weight of an unevenly distributed load on the deck.
B. Possible Causes:
The load and lifting gear weight exceeds the SWL of the crane at the reach prescribed, the me-
chanical brake system on the crane failed, the turntable connection on the crane failed, operator
error, hydraulic system failure.
The immediate area of the crane will be restricted, the safe movement of traffic on the quay will
be delayed until a safe route is established, the movement of vessels in the port will be un-af-
fected, The time taken will depend on the availability of extra cranes to remove the damaged unit
and the result of the investigation by safety department.

30
All loading operations with this type of crane will cease until the reason behind the failure is es-
tablished. This in turn will have a knock on effect to drilling, logistics and producing.
The quayside and crane parking areas will need to be cleared, and the damaged crane will need
to be moved to a location that is clear of the quay, easily accessed by investigation teams and
secure enough to keep unwanted personnel away. The damaged crane parts will need to be
placed on the deck so as to allow investigators to have full access to all parts.
The vessel upon which the crane collapsed will have to remain in place until all investigations
onboard are complete.
Regular maintenance to be performed on
cranes by qualified personnel only, crane
sticker issued.
Heavy or special lifts to be risk assessed and a

PTW or critical lift plan produced.
Lifts of a critical nature are to be planned and

as such limited access to the work area for non-
essential personnel is required.
Crane operator to be well briefed on the

weights of the load and the limitations of the
crane.
Precise measurements of distances from the

crane to touchdown position to be available.
Required Actions: 1. If emergency response (e.g., fire, medi-
(List all required initial response actions.) cal) is needed, the equipment operator
shall
immediately call 110 or the appropriate
number if calling from a mobile or out-
side phone to report any crane or heavy
equipment incident
2. Notify the Marine Shift Coordinator
(MSC)
3. The operator shall then report the inci-
dent to his supervisor

31
4. If the equipment operator is physically

unable to report the incident (e.g., be-
cause he is injured), a co-worker shall im-
mediately call 110 and also report the in-
cident to the operator’s supervisor or
Company Representative
5. If the equipment operator is a Saudi Ar-
amco employee, his supervisor shall im-
mediately notify his division head
6. If the equipment operator is a contractor
employee, his supervisor shall immedi-
ately notify his Saudi Aramco Company
Representative. The Company Repre-
sentative shall immediately notify his di-
vision head
7. The division head shall notify the propo-
nent manager responsible for the area
where the incident occurred and the area
Loss Prevention division superintendent
within one hour of being informed of the
incident
8. Equipment involved shall only be moved
if it presents a hazard to personnel
and/or property and only with prior ap-
proval of the proponent manager. Action
shall be taken by the proponent to limit
hazardous conditions when they exist.
9. Clear perimeter areas to allow access for
emergency services, evacuate all non-es-
sential personnel and control traffic
Recommendations:
Limit the number of personnel required to a safe minimum.
Review the critical lift plan prior to making the lift.
Establish a robust communications system between driver, bank-man and vessel deck.
Check all weights of equipment used to confirm within the SWL for the crane at the extended
reach distance.
Close off the area of concern for the period before, during and after the lift is safely completed.
Prepare the vessel in respect of possible impact damage prior to lift.
Constant check on wind speed before and during lift.
Advise all port departments of the lift time and duration.
Limit vessel movements in the close vicinity of the recipient vessel during touch down period.

32

(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input
on items A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
1 Sudden increase in wind speed.
2 Vessel surge alongside due to wind/sea state.
3 Equipment failure – Lifting gear
4 Machinery failure – Crane
5 Operator error.

vere)
1 (4) (3) (12)
2 (4) (3) (12)
3 (3) (2) (6)
4 (3) (2) (6)
5 (3) (2) (6)


33
1.10 Flammable/toxic vapor release from adjacent Tanajib
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Manifa Drill Site 31 / TMOD Scenario No.: 10-ON
Type of Emergency:
X Flammable Vapor Release _______ Structural Collapse
_______ Fire X Toxic Vapor Release
_______ Other
An uncontrolled hydrocarbon release occurs at Manifa Drill Site 31. Winds are light from the E.
The emergency is reported by the rig drill site foreman through the Saudi Aramco Emergency Tel-
ephone Circuit (911). SOnPD management is notified of the emergency by the Tanajib Security
Control Center through the Management Alert System. The DCC Commander (SOnPD Manager or
his designate) makes the necessary assessment and reviews the wind direction and speed utilizing
the Corporate Emergency Responder Tool (CERT). The DCC commander instructs Tanajib Security
Control Center to activate Tanajib Plants Siren and advise the Government Affairs representative
to inform the Coast Guard Warden to notify all personnel at the station to muster at the identified
assembly point. The SONPD Emergency Evacuation Contingency Plan SON-040-320 is activated.
Tanajib Marine Terminal which is outside of the 30 ppm zone and within the 5 Km radius of the
drill site 31, is informed by the DCC Commander or his designated deputy by telephone or radio
regarding the nature of the emergency at the drill site and informs all their personnel to shelter in
place until further notice from the DCC Commander.
The backs substantially to the NNW and speed increases to 18 knots, putting Tanajib Marine Ter-
minal under threat. The DCC Commander gives the order to implement SON-040-320 and evacuate
Tanajib Marine Terminal by sea.
B. Possible Causes:
The uncontrolled hydrocarbon release occurs due to a blow out at Manifa Drill Site 31.

34

(List all possible effects on involved operations [including up & downstream] that may be af-
fected.)
This scenario will result in a full shutdown of Tanajib Marine Terminal which would have a huge
knock on effect on all end-users of Marine Department, including Drilling and Workover, Safaniyah

35
Offshore Producing and Project Management Team Offshore Projects Division.

The Tanajib Port Limits are from the East Tanajib Outer Beacon and from the North Beacon 22,
both through the approach channel and including the harbor area.
Twenty-three sheet pile bulk headed berths, numbered 2 to 24 inclusive are available. The height
of the quay wall is 12.50 feet above the LAT datum. The bulkhead is protected by energy absorb-
ing cylindrical rubber fender (mounted diagonally), which were designed to withstand, with no
damage, the impact of a 1000 ton vessel approaching at one foot per second.
Eighteen of the twenty-three berths are equipped with potable water, raw water and diesel
transfer connections and hoses to vessels of which eight are presently in service. In addition, fa-
cilities are provided for mud and cement storage and handling at berths 5 to 8 inclusive. Heavy
lift quay surfaces are at berths 2, 12, and 13.
High pressure directional fire monitors, hoses and hose connections are situated at Berths 2 to
24 inclusive. Potable and raw water metered connections and 2’ hoses are at berths 5 to 7 and
10 to 14 inclusive. Diesel metered connection and 2’ hoses are at berths 5 to 7 and 10 to 14. A
10’ flanged ship to shore connection is at berths 2 and 10.
The normal maximum loading is 50 tons at all berths except heavy lift berths. Maximum loading
of the 750 Tons Crane is permitted at Berths 12 and 13. Berths 2 and 3 surface are only suitable
for cranes equipped with tires. Designated Jack-up berths are 10, 11 and 12. For drilling rigs, the
above berths may be used, in addition to Berths 2 and 5. Shore to ship electrical connections are
available at berth Nos. 2 to 24 inclusive by water tight sockets supplying 480V (volts), 100A
(amps), 120V (volts) 30A (amps), and 208V (volts) 100A (amps).
Telephones are available at Berths 2 to 24 for local use only. Garbage skips are available upon
request. Pilot rope ladders are provided at Station Nos. 2, 9, 10, and 13 marked with a (P) sign
for emergencies.

36
Planned and preventative maintenance pro- None.

grams in place for Manifa Drill Site 31, includ-
ing safety devices should prevent a blow out
and uncontrolled hydrocarbon release.
Required Actions: 1. Upon hearing the Gas Alarm, all per-
sons in the area shall stop work
2. Proceed in an up-wind or cross-wind
direction to the nearest safe assembly
area
3. Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC) to li-
aise with SOnPD DCC Commander to
determine the hazard to Tanajib Ma-
rine Terminal
4. Marine Shift Coordinator (MSC) to li-
aise with Refinery Shift Coordinator to
determine the hazard to West Pier
5. If release is likely to affect Tanajib Ma-
rine Terminal, MSC to issue Mayday
Relay to all vessels alongside, in the
channel and at the nearby anchorages
6. MSC to coordinate suitable vessels to
evacuate Tanajib Marine Terminal
Personnel as quickly and as safely as
possible
7. MSC to liaise with Coast Guard Centre
8. If release is not affecting Tanajib Ma-
rine Terminal, all persons to shelter in
place as per SOnPD DCC Commander
9. If release is not affecting West Pier,
consideration to be given to evacuat-
ing all personnel by buses as an alter-
native if safe to do so

37
Marine Emergency Response Plan Yes
Tanajib Marine Emergency Response Plan Yes
SOnPD Emergency Management Manual SON-

040-010
Yes
SOnPD Emergency Management Manual SON-
040-010 Supplement 2
Yes
SOnPD Emergency Evacuation Contingency
Plan SON-040-320
Yes
Recommendations:
None

 SonPD
 TMOD
 FrPD
 JHAH
 LPD

1 Flammable/toxic vapor release from adjacent refinery

vere)
1 (4) (1) (4)


38
1.11 Confined Space Emergencies
Plant/Unit/Equipment: West Pier Scenario No.: 11-ON

X Search/Rescue _______ Explosion
_______ Hazardous Material X Confined Space
X Medical _______ Natural Disaster
_______ Other

Four contractor employees are working inside tank no. 2 center of Barge 146 which is berthed at
Station 10 at West Pier. The workers are cleaning the tank as part of the barge’s Planned
Maintenance System. Two of the workers start to feel unwell and immediately exit the tank via
the forward port manhole shouting to the other two workers who are further from the manhole
and nearer the center of the tank. The standby man immediately raises the alarm by calling his
supervisor by radio. The two remaining workers collapse just as they reach the bottom of the
ladder at the port forward manhole. The supervisor notifies the Shift Coordinator who dials 110
to initiate the emergency response.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Non-calibrated gas tester used to prove the gas free atmosphere inside the tank gives
incorrect readings and does not identify the presence of toxic gases.
2. Toxic gas pocket not located during the gas testing procedure.
3. Cleaning process caused toxic gases to be disturbed.
1. Barge 146 measures 210 x 60 x 13 feet. Tank number 2 center measures 40 x 20 x 12.5
feet and is located in between tanks 2 port and 2 starboard to the sides and 1 center
and 3 center fore and aft.
2. Two fatalities and two personnel with ICU level inhalation injuries.
3. The duration of the emergency is expected to last 1.5 hours.
fected.)
1. Barge maintenance will have to be suspended until the investigation is complete and
root causes are identified and dealt with.
2. This could affect diesel deliveries to Tanajib which may have lead-on consequences to
service provision in the offshore areas.
3. Bad publicity and loss of confidence in Saudi Aramco’s ability to conduct safe opera-
tions.

39
1. The barge tanks are by their nature confined spaces, with two restricted manholes for
access, located diagonally opposite it each at the tank extremities.
2. Gas testing equipment is either a Ventis MX4 or MX6 model.
1. Confined Space Entry work permit 1. Confined space entry plan pro-forma
and associated checklists. to be drawn up and then utilized with
frequent gas testing and adequate
2. Confined space entry risk assess-
ventilation.
ment.
2. PMS for equipment to be introduced.
3. Confined space entry plan.
3. Rescue equipment as proposed by
4. Confined space entry training.
QA&CU to be procured.
5. Planned maintenance system for all
4. Entry plan has to be developed by the
equipment used in confined space
Contractor/SAPO.
entry.
6. All equipment available and working.
1. Standby man to raise the alarm
Required Actions:
(List all required initial re- The atmosphere of any enclosed or confined space is poten-
sponse actions.) tially dangerous no one should enter to attempt a rescue with-
out taking suitable precautions. Failure to do so will put own
life at risk and almost certainly prevent the person he in-
tended to rescue being brought out of the space alive.
2. Do not allow any entry into space until necessary pre-

cautions have been taken
Primary assessment:
a. Secure standby man
b. Identify immediate hazards
c. Location, number and condition of victims
d. Secure entry permit, CHB and MSDS sheets
Secondary Assessment:
e. Type of space and access
f. Products in space
g. Hazards – atmospheric, mechanical, electrical
and structural
h. Plan of space
i. Lighting

40
j. Rescue team briefed

k. SCBA and BA board ready
l. Lifeline, harnesses, stretcher and hoist ready
3. Establish a safe perimeter, evacuate all non-essential

4. BA Team done gear and test communications
5. Back-up team prepare back-up equipment including
resuscitation and first aid equipment
6. BA Team enter with proper PPE, EEBD’s, torches, axes,
rescue harnesses, lifelines and recovery strops
7. Complete rescue of all casualties with least delay
whilst ensuring safety of rescuers
On completion:
a. Personnel accountability
b. Remove tools and equipment
c. Decontamination
d. Secure scene
e. Debriefing
(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes per-
sonnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-inci-
dent plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and
provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)

1. All necessary permits and 1. Yes, as per Saudi Aramco requirements.
checklists completed. 2. Yes
2. CSE plan in place. 3. Yes
3. Standby man trained. 4. No
4. Personnel trained. 5. No
5. Rescue personnel trained. 6. Ext - Yes. Int – Partially.
6. Rescue equipment available. 7. Dispatch 1 ambulance initially, with a medi-
7. Medical Response cal team of 2 paramedics and the required
resuscitation/ stabilization equipment, fol-
lowed by second ambulance as needed.
In coordination with the IC and under the
directive of Security and the Flag men, the
ambulance will be directed to the pre-as-
signed cold zone, where they will receive
the victims from the rescue team in coordi-
nation with the IC.
The medical team in the triage /stabilization
area will triage, stabilize and transfer the
8. FrPD Response victims back to RT/EMS as per medical
standards.
8. Dispatch one dedicated search and rescue
equipped appliance from Refinery. Person-
nel manning this appliance are specially

41
trained in advanced CSE rescue and extrica-
tion techniques.
Appliance will be directed to the staging
area in the pre-assigned cold zone.
Fire Chief will take over as IC after briefing
and will coordinate the rescue.
West Pier personnel have no capability to
carry out CSE rescue at the present time.
All responsibility for the rescue rests with
the FrPD. West Pier personnel will provide
all necessary support as required.
Recommendations: All personnel to receive CSE awareness training. Rescue team to be
identified and trained. Rescue equipment to be sourced.

(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/in-
put on items A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
1. MMSOD
2. FPD
3. LPD
4. Medical
5. ISO
6. QA&CU

(Assess risk [severity and probability of occurrence] and assign a ranking to prioritize scenar-
ios.)
1 Confined Space Emergency
vere)
(3) (1) (3)

Approved by: Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st, 2016

42
1.12 Man Overboard from Pier
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Vessel/Port Control. Scenario No.: 12-ON

___X____ Search/Rescue _______ Explosion
___X____ Medical _______ Natural Disaster
___X___ Other

A member of the pier staff at Tanajib Port has fallen over the quayside at station 23, and has
been knocked unconscious by striking the concrete side on the way down.
The event is observed by an AB on a vessel nearby who initiates the vessels MOB alarm, and
throws a lifebuoy into the water near the man.
The OOW informs Port Control via VHF and the Marine Shift Coordinator is advised. Medical
assistance is summoned and a crane on quay is made ready to lift the casualty from the water
close to station 22.
The tidal situation is low water 1 hour before flood, so the water level is very low and there is a
considerable height from quay to water.
The vessel from which the event was observed initiates the MOB procedure and the vessels
rescue boat which is outboard is prepared for launch.
The rescue boat is deployed and the man is recovered from the water by boat, first aid is applied
and the boat is driven close to the quayside at station 22.
The casualty is placed in a rigid stretcher (Spencer type) in the rescue boat, and lifted to the
jetty by the crane.
Medical crews arrive on scene and apply oxygen and first aid to the casualty on the jetty apron.
Once the casualty has rec’d immediate first aid he is taken to the Clinic by ambulance for further
observation and check up’s.
B. Possible Causes:
Lack of situational awareness by the IP, IP Struck by an object being lifted by crane, Slip Trip and
Fall, Quayside falling away.
The area of concern is limited to the immediate area of the jetty where the man is in the water,
the crane can be moved into place during recovery. Cargo and logistics may be delayed while
the crane is involved in recovery, but the duration will be short.
(List all possible effects on involved operations [including up & downstream] that may be
affected.)
Delays caused by the incident will be limited to a short period, vessel traffic movements need
not be delayed unless in the direct vicinity of the MOB and recovery operation.

43
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may
intensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted ac-
cess; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.)
The location and area of concern will be limited to the point of recovery; the quayside need
not be restricted except in the immediate area. Access will need to kept clear for medical
teams/ambulance and crane.
Regular checks on the condition of the apron
edge where linesmen operate, to ensure bro-
ken areas of quayside are repaired expedi-
tiously.
Personnel working on the quay should main-
tain a good all round awareness of work going
on in the immediate area.
Personnel working near the edge of the quay
should be extra aware of slips and trips haz-
ards, and take appropriate steps to avoid such
hazards.
PFD should be worn when working near the
edge or close to water.
Regular clearing of waste/debris from the
jetty to reduce trip hazards.
Required Actions: 1. Raise the alarm by shouting “Man

(List all required initial response actions.) Overboard” and informing the Marine
Shift Coordinator (MSC) to initiate 110
Call.
2. Throw a life ring from the nearest sta-
tion
3. Watch the man and offer encourage-
ment
4. Do not enter the water
5. Monitor the drift of the man and move
with him
6. Throw a second life ring if necessary
7. MSC notify all ships in harbor by send-
ing an Urgency message
8. MSC to nominate the nearest ship to
effect the rescue as appropriate
9. Determine most suitable method of re-
covery
10. Have medical support standing by

44
sonnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-incident
plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those
available, and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)
Recommendations:
Due to the nature of the incident and many ways in which a man can fall into the water, plan-
ning to avoid the incident is difficult. However; planning for methods of recovery can be a
useful tool.
Drills in recovery by crane, rescue boat and lifebuoy can be done at suitable times when there
is manpower and clear berth space available.
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD

1 Man overboard from pier

vere)
1 (3) (2) (4)

Approved by:Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st, 2016

45
1.13 Hostile Acts
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Everything Scenario No.: 13-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Equipment Failure X Security
_______ Other
A telephone call is received by Tanajib Port Control from an unidentified caller stating that several
explosive devices (IED’S) have been placed in strategic locations within the port confines.
The desk operator in Port Control uses the check sheets from section 13 of the ERP to take notes
while the caller is on the line. The caller provides the basic threat that devices are in place, no
indication of number, type, location or time of detonation is given.
The operator cannot discern any additional or background information from the caller before he
hangs up.
The operator calls 110 and initiates an emergency response and also advises the MSC.
SCC shall be established and contact made by that section to ISD, FPD, EMS, LPD-K9 and SAG and
Communications, SAA and PR.
The MSC will raise the alarm when advised by SCC and all staff will muster at the designated emer-
gency muster points for a head count and to wait for further instructions.
All non-essential personnel to be evacuated to a safe area, all vessels alongside to be moved out
to a safe anchorage to await further instructions.
After a period, the search teams arrive and carry out a thorough search of the facility, once this is
complete, the marine facility is re-opened.
B. Possible Causes:
Disaffected contractor or employee, terrorist group, civil unrest,

46

If a non-specific bomb threat is made for the Marine Terminal facility, it will encompass the entire
area inside the perimeter fence, and to a safe distance outside.

47
All operations will cease until the facility is searched by trained personnel and declared free of any
devices.
All vessels alongside will be shifted out to a safe anchorage.
As there is no specific location for the devices given, the search teams will have to prioritize the
search areas to minimize the potential impact of a blast should a device be detonated. The area
around the fuel tanks is likely to be the most disruptive if an explosion occurs, and as such should
be investigated thoroughly as an initial step. Port Control may need to
The search teams will require sniffer dogs (K9) and explosives detection equipment to enable the
search to be carried out properly.
Searchers will need to be in possession of safe radio/communication equipment in the event the
devices are radio controlled detonation.
Thorough and frequent checks on packages ar-

riving in and out of the marine facility by road
and vessel.
CCTV in high risk areas to monitor movements

of persons in question.
Regular drills carried out for evacuation and re-

sponse time.
Security threat level indicators displayed at

prominent locations in the facility.
Required Actions: 1. Remain calm, listen carefully, and con-
centrate on the exact wording of the
caller. Attract a nearby colleague’s at-
tention by using hand gestures, a hand-
written note, or other means to com-
municate the presence of an ongoing
threatening call and to call SCC (110) to

48
have the call traced if a caller identifica-

tion option is not available.
2. If the caller is actually on the line, do not
put the caller onto a speaker phone set-
ting unless that is the setting on the tel-
ephone when it was answered. Also, do
not change the mode of the phone
while the threat is being communi-
cated.
3. Deal with the caller in a confident man-
ner and get as much information as pos-
sible about the threat and motive. Use
the Bomb Threat Checklist.
4. Watch for signs that the caller is watch-
ing the building or is aware of your ac-
tions while receiving the threatening
call. Look also for signs that the caller
was aware of your activities immedi-
ately before you received the call.
5. Begin documenting significant infor-
mation and questions as quickly as
possible as indicated in the Bomb
Threat Checklist.
6. For verbal threats, be attentive and
write down the dialogue of the mes-
senger as carefully as possible. Take
extensive notes of everything that the
caller says and use the caller identifica-
tion option to identify the telephone
number being used if that feature is
available on your telephone.
7. Special attention should be given to
the location and timing of any threat as
well as to reasons why, the voice (male
or female), voice quality, accents and
speech impediments of the caller, race,
possible age, language used (well spo-
ken, foreign, irrational, etc.), and the
exact wording of the threat.
8. Pay particular attention to background
noises, such as motors running, music
playing, and any other noise, which
may give a clue as to the location of
the caller.
9. Do not attempt to transfer the call or
hang up the phone until information
concerning the caller is ascertained by
the person who received the threat or
until the call has been traced if caller
identification is not available on the
telephone where the call is received.

49
10. If the caller does not indicate the loca-

tion or the time of possible detonation,
ask him/her for this information.
11. Inform the caller that the building is
occupied and the detonation of a
bomb or release of a hazardous mate-
rial could result in death or serious in-
jury to many innocent people.
12. If the threat is received from a record-
ing device, do not erase the message
until directed. If the threat is received
on a computer or any other electronic
device (such as a Short Message Ser-
vice (SMS)), do not turn the equipment
off and leave the message on the de-
vice exactly as it was received.
13. Inform the nearest SCC immediately by
using 110 (if available), or landline tele-
phone service, or mobile cellular
phone. Answer any questions and fol-
low their instructions. If the employee
is at work, he/she shall also notify
his/her immediate supervisor.
14. When realizing that a co-worker is re-
ceiving an ongoing threatening call, a
person sitting near him/her shall notify
the SCC by use of another telephone
and then notify the immediate supervi-
sor.

50

51
plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and
GI 710.012 DEALING WITH COMMUNICATED YES

THREATS (BOMB AND OTHER THREATS) AND
SUSPECT ITEMS
MIM 1193.504 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
YES
Recommendations:
In this type of scenario there is no warning or information available from the attacker, there-
fore it is vital that evacuation of all non-essential personnel is done quickly and without caus-
ing alarm. Preventing a device from entering the marine facility is the first line of defense,
and so gate and perimeter security checks are vital and should be maintained.
An increase of security level should be implemented on receipt of any intelligence reports
from government agencies or security forces, and this level increase should be promulgated
to marine facility personnel before entering the facility.
Port control facilities should be moved to a vessel in the anchorage to allow radio and sat tel-
ephone communications with the SCC and all concerned department heads.

 Marine Department
 FrPD
 LPD
 Security Department
 Medical Department
 SonPD
 Saudi Arabian Government
 Saudi Aramco Affairs

52
1 Risk of a device/s detonating prior to or during evacuation.
2 Risk of device/s detonating near to strategic buildings/installations.
3 Disruption to safe vessel movement operations.
4 Disruption to production.

vere)
1 (3) (2) (6)
2 (3) (5) (15)
3 (3) (3) (9)
4 (5) (5) (25)


53
1.14 Onshore Oil Spill
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Tanajib Scenario No.: 14-ON
Type of Emergency: X Flammable Vapor Release _______ Structural Collapse

X Fire X Toxic Vapor Release
Search/Rescue X Explosion
______ Hazardous Material X Confined Space
X Hydrocarbon / Oil Spill

Hydrocarbon / Oil Spill from a leaking underground storage tank pipeline.
Aviation fuel is a highly flammable liquid hydrocarbon and therefore may present a very substan-
tial gas and fire risk!
Tanajib Airport is a small airport located in the oil complex of Tanajib in the Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia. The airport is 4 km away from the Arabian Gulf and occupies an area of 3 km².
The airport was built and being operated by the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), as
logistic support for the remote complex. Nowadays, it serves both Tanajib and the nearby Sa-
faniya.
The airport has one runway, 2,440 meters long and 30 meters wide, with lights and ILS support.
There are 6 parking/gates for medium-sized airplanes, many helipads can be found in the airport.
This scenario for this airport is based on a leak on an underground supply pipeline to an under-
ground holding tank North of the Tanajib Air Strip. The tank holds aviation fuel as storage and
also to re-fuel / service Air Craft and Helicopters.
GPS Coordinates:
27°52′04.1″N 48°46′08.8″E / 27.867806°N
Emergency Contact Telephone Numbers:
KFIA Fire Rescue Medical 877-4788
Ras Tanura Dispatch 673-4118
Tanajib Dispatch 378-2007
Dammam Terminal Clinic 877-4784

54
B. Possible Causes:
1. An underground leaking pipeline has the potential for discharging a large amount of hy-
drocarbon aviation fuel up to 2,000 barrels over a period of 7 days depending on the size
of the leak site, pinhole or leaking flange gasket.
2. A Toxic Gas release will occur during the leak from the pipeline / flange.
3. Inability to inspect the leak site due to the hydrocarbon gas build up in the trench.
4. A fire could result as part of the leak.
1. A leaking pipeline can result in a minimum area of 60 square meters being affected, but
this will vary due to the seepage through the trench wall contaminating the surrounding
area.
2. A fatality could result due to the Gas build up upon unauthorized entry into the trench or
a fire.
3. The duration of the emergency is expected to last for a minimum of 3 days.
4. It is expected that due to a leak of hydrocarbon fuel oil and the gas build up as a result
and the location and close proximity to the airport, the immediate surrounding area will
be impacted with hydrocarbons.
5. Static electricity can build up as a result of excessive hydrocarbon vapors in the air, which
can lead to an explosion and or fire or both.
1. Airport operations will have to be suspended until the investigation is complete and root
causes are identified and dealt with.
2. This could affect Saudi Aramco Tanajib and Safaniya staff in reaching their destinations.
3. Bad publicity and loss of confidence in Saudi Aramco’s ability to conduct safe operations.
1. Due to a leaking hydrocarbon pipeline and associated release of hydrocarbon gas, access
to the site will be very limited and the Airport may have to be shutdown.
2. Limited access may be allowed from upwind and the weather will have to be monitored
on an hourly 24/7 basis as determined by the Facility Manager / Proponent and Oil Spill
Incident Commander.
3. Gas testing equipment and fresh air equipment together with sufficient supplies of fresh
air equipment will have to be on hand to necessitate daily demand.
4. All site personnel attending to the incident will have to rely on gas monitors to avoid suf-
focating effects of the hydrocarbon gas.
Frequent area patrolling and surveillance in

55
order to detect any Hydrocarbon leakage
Required Actions: 1. Proponent witnesses / observes or smells

(List all required initial response actions.) the leak and calls his Supervisor by radio
or telephone to raise the alarm.
1. Duty Pollution Engineer Receives a 2. The Airport Duty Officer and Fire Depart-
report of a spill. ment will be immediately notified of sig-
2. Duty Pollution Engineer notify nificant fuel spills and activates Aviation
ROSC and ROSC notifies OSRT Notification Flow Chart Page 22 of the
members as applicable (Tier-1) (AD-SMS-04-014a)
3. Duty Pollution Engineer reports to 3. The Airport Duty Officer notifies the Ma-
Tanajib Air Port to ascertain more rine Shift Coordinator who dials 110 and
details of spill from the Tanajib notifies the Facility Superintendent.
Duty Dispatcher. 4. Marine Shift Coordinator receives the call
4. Coordinate access to the site with and notifies the Duty Pollution Engineer on
Tanajib Duty Dispatcher. +966556000735.
5. Check weather and wind direc- 5. Duty Engineer informs the IC.
tions prior to commencing re- 6. The Incident Commander notifies the Oil
sponse. Spill Response Director who in turn noti-
6. Order Trucks and load contain- fies Manager Marine Department and his
ment and recovery equipment superiors namely the Members of the Oil
onto trucks at Tanajib. Spill Response Management Committee.
7. Consider mobilizing oil spill re- 7. Duty Engineer based in Ras Tanurah noti-
sponse contractors, including an fies the Pollution Control Engineers at Ta-
excavation contactor. najib to physically investigate the cause of
the hydrocarbon leak / smell.
Additional Spill Response Actions: 8. Duty Pollution Control Engineer visits the
site / area to make an initial assessment
1. Prioritize environmentally sensi- and record the information.
tive areas for protection 9. Basis the Pollution Control Engineers as-
2. Contractor to obtain excavation sessment, he will communicate with the
permit. Pollution Control Forman to immediately
3. Gas monitoring to be placed, up- dispatch Oil Spill Equipment to the inci-
wind and downwind of the leak dent location.
location. 10. The Pollution Control Engineer recom-
4. Arrange facilities for reception of mends to the Incident Commander to raise
possible amount of recovered spill the Tiered Response Level to that of Tier-1
product, absorbent material and (less than 50 barrels).
dessert fill. 11. The Incident Commander notifies and mo-
bilizes the certain Oil Spill Response Team
Initial Response Priority Objectives: Members.
12. GOSRD Team Members will be informed
1. Obtain permit to enter the area before they report to the incident to re-
(including gas tests) and Propo- main outside the exclusion zone (to be de-
nent to set up Gas monitors (up termined by the Proponent) until it’s safe
wind and downwind). to enter the area.
2. Fresh Air (SCBA) “Entry to con-
fined space permit”.

56
3. Ensure system is isolated (Propo- 13. The Incident Commander directs Oil Spill
nent). Response Teams to preserve human life at
4. Locate the leak (if not already lo- all times.
cated). 14. The Facility Proponent (Aviation) Airport
5. Place absorbent boom under the Duty Officer will evacuate non-essential
leak location. (If safe & practice to personnel and gather them at the Emer-
do so). gency Assembly Area and follow the pro-
6. Aviation Department to pump out cedures per Tanajib Air Strip ERP. Assigned
the contents (hydrocarbons) from Marshalls wearing reflectorized vests to
the leaking tank. control the traffic flow and guide the
7. Vacuum Tanker to remove any ex- emergency responders to the location of
cess hydrocarbon fuel in the pit. the emergency.
8. Absorbent booms and pads could 15. The Facility Manager will assume the du-
be used to protect environmen- ties and responsibilities of the Incident
tally sensitive areas as circum- Commander until the risk of fire and Gas
stances permit. There might be a has been minimized or removed and
large amount of absorbent booms deemed safe to enter the area by the Oil
and pads consumed, however it is Spill Response Team.
felt that this is offset by the size 16. The Facility Manager or his delegated sub-
and importance of the sensitive ordinates will establish the Incident Com-
areas protected. mand Post (cold zone) and identify the
warm and hot zones. The Facility Manager
will instruct his staff to gas test with
breathing apparatus to measure the LEL,
H2S and O2 concentration surrounding all
the areas and in the trench.
17. The Facility Manager informs Security of
the staging area (cold zone) for Ambu-
lance, Fire Department & Oil Spill Team.
18. Do not allow any entry into space until
necessary precautions have been taken.
19. Primary assessment:
a. Note only trained personnel will
affect the rescue.
b. Check LEL, H2S and O2 concentra-
tion in all areas including the
trench. (Note: No CSE if, the
LEL is 50% or greater and H2S
above 100 PPM)
c. Secure standby man
d. Identify immediate hazards
e. Location, number and condition
of victims if any.
f. Secure entry permit, CHB and
MSDS sheets
20. Secondary Assessment:
a. Type of space and access
b. Products in space
c. Hazards – atmospheric, mechani-
cal, electrical and structural
d. Plan of space

57
e. Lighting
f. Rescue team briefed
g. SCBA board ready
h. Lifeline, harnesses, stretcher and
hoist ready
21. Rescue Team dons gear and tests commu-
nications.
22. Back-up team prepares back-up equip-
ment including resuscitation and first aid
equipment.
23. BA Team enter with proper PPE, EEBD’s,
torches, axes, rescue harnesses, lifelines
and recovery strops.
24. Complete rescue of all casualties with
least delay whilst ensuring safety of res-
cuers.
25. Rescue team moves the victims to Ambu-
lance for medical applications.
26. Facility Manager requests Security to se-
cure the incident scene.
27. Facility Manager announces to Regional
Security center the emergency is over.
28. The Facility Manager then hands over
command of the Incident to the Fire Chief.


1. All necessary permits and checklists 1. Yes, all permits will be completed as
completed. per SA requirements.
2. CSE (Confined Space Entry) plan in 2. Yes
place. 3. Yes
3. Standby man trained. 4. No
4. All responding Saudi Aramco Personnel 5. No
trained. 6. Externally - Yes. Internally – Par-
5. Rescue personnel trained. tially.
6. Rescue equipment available. 7. Dispatch 1 ambulance initially, with a
7. Medical Response. medical team of 2 paramedics and
8. FrPD Response the required resuscitation/ stabiliza-
Reference Documents : tion equipment, followed by second
1. Oil Spill Contingency Plan. ambulance as needed.
2. Oil Spill Credible Scenarios for this spe- In coordination with the Facility
cific area. Manager and under the directive of
3. GI.2.104, GI.2.400 & GI.2.401. Security and the Flag men, the ambu-
4. SA 5046-1,Leak and or Spill Report/In- lance will be directed to the pre-as-
land signed cold zone, where they will re-
5. Oil Spill Organization Chart. ceive the victims from the rescue

58
6. Excavation contractor ready & trained. team in coordination with the Facil-
7. Waste Management Contractor ready ity Manager.
& trained. The medical team in the triage /sta-
8. Suitable recovered oil spill reception fa- bilization area will triage, stabilize
cilities (waste management). and transfer the victims back to
9. Hazards relevant to spilled product RT/EMS as per medical standards.
(H2S, chemicals) 8. Dispatch one dedicated search and
10. Chemical Hazard Bulletin 414 – Arabian rescue equipped appliance from Ta-
Crude Oil najib. Personnel manning this appli-
11. Chemical Hazard Bulletin 404 – Diesel ance are specially trained in ad-
Fuel Oil vanced CSE rescue and extrication
12. Aviation Department Ramp Safety techniques.
Manual. Appliance will be directed to the
13. SOP 261 – AVIATION EMERGENCIES staging area in the pre-assigned cold
AND RESPONSES zone.
14. ASTM D1655 – 05 (Jet A and Jet A-1) Fire Chief will take over as Incident
SAUDI ARAMCO PRODUCT Commander after briefing and will
SPECIFICATION coordinate the rescue.
9. Fire (an oil spill response must not take Oil Spill Response personnel have no
place if the spill is ignited). capability to carry out CSE rescue at
Recommended Equipment: First Response the present time. All responsibility
Equipment for the rescue rests with the Fire Pro-
tection Department. Tanajib person-
 1 x truck or trailer containing nel will provide all necessary support
the following: as required.
1. 400 x Absorbent Pads. When the Incident is deemed safe,
2. 100.0’ x Absorbent Booms. The Fire Chief and Facility Manager
3. 1 x “Intrinsically safe” pneumatic will direct the Incident Commander
pump, 50.0’ suction and 50.0’ discharge of GOSRD to begin with Recovery of
hoses. (Must be clean / new and rated the Hydrocarbon / Oil basis this Sce-
for aviation fuel with a 10 micron fil- nario and the Oil Spill Contingency
ter). Plan and site specific plans in Section
4. 1 x Diesel compressor. “H” of this document.
5. 1 set of Earth cables.
6. 1 x 5000 liter Fast Tank.
7. 2 x 20.0’ x 20.0’ tarpaulin.
8. 2 x roles of plastic (2 meters x 1000 me-
ters).
9. 10 x orange warning traffic cones.
10. 1 x role of chevron (red and white)
warning tape. (Note, no loose or flying
objects will be allowed to be placed
onto the ramp in order to avoid in ges-
tation into the aircraft engines).
11. 4 x wheel barrows.
12. 4 x shovels.
13. 4 x brooms / brushes.
14. 1 x tool box rated for working in haz-
ardous environments (i.e. rubber ham-
mers) no sparks.

59
15. 2” to 12” pipe clamps including ¼” role
of rubber sheet.
16. 2 x Air movers with 100.0’ air hoses and
compressor, (Intrinsically safe).
17. 2 x 6 wheeler dump trucks (Contractor
supply).
Recovery Vehicles / Truck:
1. Vacuum Tanker (should be rated for
Aviation Gas) and cleaned.
2. Aviation Gas Tanker (to pump the re-
covered fuel from the tank back to the
tanker). (The recovered aviation fuel
will have to be sent for re-processing
and not re-used since this will be con-
taminated).
3. 2 x Dumpsters lined with plastic for
contaminated sand and dessert fill
(must not be cross contaminated with
regular waste).
Tier-1 Personnel required GOSRD: (Saudi Ar-
amco) in accordance with the ICS-Organization
Chart:
1. One Incident Commander.
2. One Operations Section Chief.
3. One Logistics Section Chief (Supplied by
Marine and Proponent).
4. One Site Safety Officer.
5. Fire Department.
6. Fire Department for SCBA / Fresh Air
Training.
Contractors:
1. Two Site Supervisors. (Contractors)
2. Eight trained oil spill responders (Con-
tractors)
3. Eight semi-trained labors (Contractors)
4. Six Site Safety Officer (Contractor)
Waste disposal Recovery:

The contractor will provide two 6 wheeler
dump truck to collect all the desert fill and con-
taminated earth will be collected from the site
and removed to the contractors waste disposal
site (SEW) after close consultation with Envi-
ronmental Protection Department.
Method of Deployment: Absorbent Materials:

After all permits have been approved for work
by the Proponent the Contractor will:
1. The Contractor will deploy absorbent

pad and or booms into the bottom of

60
the trench to absorb any excess Avia-
tion fuel.
2. Obtain access to open the top of the
tank manway cover.
3. Ensure the Fast Tanks are located on
firm ground and at a distance to allow
for the pumps to discharge the hydro-
carbon and place absorbent material in
and around the pumps and hoses to
prevent additional contamination.
4. Ensure the 10 micron filter is fitted
prior to pumping out the product from
the tank. Empty the contents of the
hoses into a container to avoid ground
contamination after pump out of the
product is completed.
Recommendations: All personnel to receive CSE awareness training. Rescue team to be identi-
fied and trained. Rescue equipment to be sourced.

1. Aviation Department.
2. QA&CU
3. Environmental Protection Department E.P.D.
4. GOSRD.

61
Underground pipeline to underground storage tanks North of Tanajib Air Strip
Probable worst case for a leaking underground Aviation fuel pipeline, North Tanajib Air Strip.

62
Tanajib Air Strip location map (GPS 27°52′04.1″N 48°46′08.8″E / 27.867806°N)


(3) (1) (3)


63
1.15 Severe Weather
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels Inside Marine Ports Scenario No.: 15-ON
Type of Emergency:
_________ Flammable Vapor Release _________ Structural Collapse

_________ Fire _________ Toxic Vapor Release
_________ Search/Rescue _________ Explosion
_________ Hazardous Material _________ Confined Space
_________ Medical _____X___ Natural Disaster
_________ Equipment Failure _________ Security
____X____ Other
Collision as resulted of Severe weather, thunderstorm and strong winds

During un expected severer weather, where the wind speed exceeded 60 KTS, where all vessels,
are moored alongside Tanajib/West Pier.
Three vessels have their mooring lines snapped resulting in multiple vessels collision in Tana-
jib/West Pier and one vessel drifting to the shore line.
B. Possible Causes:
Severe weather, thunderstorm and strong winds

(Provide estimates of the size, the areas affected, and duration of the emergency).
Due to the challenges of the weather condition during the emergency, the port will be closed and four
vessels are in emergency. All of them lost their securing ropes, which end up with three vessels in collision
satiation and one vessel drifting to the shore line.
Three vessels have made contact with each other and due to the banging to the pier station resulting in a
minor damage to its hull.
All three vessel, need to be repaired which will have an impact to support the operation once the weather
improved.

64
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may intensify the
situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types, quantities,
and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.]).
The location of the incident are in one of marine port and four vessels, which was moored along-
side the Pier, have lost their mooring lines, which resulted in a contact with each other’s and to
the pier jetty. The maneuverability condition has to be reported to the port control. Assessing
the damage and the required assistance need to be identified to the incident commander.
A full plan of the vessel has to be available, mustering all crew onboard and to made ready the
towing ropes & tools prior arrived assistance.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineering controls,
etc.] that might be put into effect.)
N/A Log the weather daily condition in daily bases.
Broadcasting the weather alerts to all vessels by port control, VTSO and unit head.
Port closure to be conceder in case of severer weather and thunderstorm.
Send all vessels to the nearest anchorage.
Vessels alongside to double up all mooring lines.
Set a weather watch during the severe weather.
 Sound the general Alarm.

 All personnel is to proceed to the mess room.
 Head count.
Required Actions:
 Number of missing or injured personnel.
 Inform the port control.
 Initiate the 911 emergency reporting the inci-
dent and the assistance required.
 Round the vessels for possible damages if pos-
sible.
 Prepare the vessel anchor incase its needed.
 Prepare the towing ropes for towing opera-
tion.
 Send the nearby tugs or vessels to support the
vessels if needed to provide an assistance.
 Assistance vessels arrived to the location.
 IC is manage the situation.
 IM is to declare that the emergency is under
control.
 IM is to declare that the emergency is over and
all personnel is to stand down.

65

plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and pro-
vide recommendations for upgrades as required.)
 Vessel Damage control tools and equip-  Vessel Damage control tools and
ment. equipment.
 Vessel emergency Radio communication  Vessel emergency Radio communica-
device. tion device.
 Towing operation equipment and tools.  Towing operation equipment and
 Vessels anchor. tools.
 Vessel emergency main and backup team.  Vessels anchor.
 Support vessels to provide assistance.  Vessel emergency main and backup
team.
 Support vessels to provide assistance.
Recommendations: N/A
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items A-H
and for identification of needed responses.)
 MD
 LPD
 FrPD
 JHAH
 Aviation
(1=most likely; 5=least likely) (1=most severe; 5=least severe) (Probability x Conse-
quences)
4 2 8
Reviewed by: AL Sabaan Abdulhadi (MSS) Date: 26-September-2019

Approved by: AL Sabaan Abdulhadi (MSS) Date: 26-September-2019

66
1.16 Gas Escape from Terminal (W/P)
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Gas Escape from Terminal at W/P Scenario No.: 16-ON
Type of Emergency:
____ X ___ Flammable Vapor Release _________ Structural Collapse

_________ Medical ________ Natural Disaster
_________ Equipment Failure _________ Security
_________ Other

On September 17, 2019 at 09:00 hours, the LEL Sensors which was installed at West Pier Facility are
activated and alarms sounded, allegedly due to an uncontrolled Hydrocarbon Gas Leak at adjacent
facility, i.e. RT Terminal Tank Farm.
 Marine Shift Coordinator informed Shift super.
 LEL Sensor is less than 10 PPM.
 Light Winds, ESE x 15 Knots.
 Good visibility.
 Hot and humid day.
 Temperature 42ºc.
 Marine ERP to be activated.
 Marine Shift Coordinator initiated Emergency Notifications via 911.
 ICP was set up at West Pier Port Control.
 An instruction has been received to perform a massive evacuation from W/P utilizing ma-
rine vessels to a safe location.
B. Possible Causes:
Uncontrolled Hydrocarbon Gas Leak at adjacent facility, i.e. RT Terminal Tank Farm

The entire west pier area.
 Marine operation at WP will be effected.

 Providing support to RT will be effected.

67
situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types, quantities,
and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.]).
Uncontrolled Hydrocarbon Gas Leak at adjacent facility, i.e. RT Terminal Tank Farm
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineering controls,
etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Maintenance Proper regular PPM to be maintained
Risk assessment must be conducted by Senior Engineer in daily basis.

 Initiate the 911 emergency reporting the inci-
dent and the assistance required.
Required Actions:
 All personnel is to proceed to sheltering area.
 Head count.
 Alert all vessels.
 Assign vessels to proceed to evacuate all per-
sonnel from W/P

 Emergency Response Plan  Yes

 Vessels required.  Yes
Recommendations:
Establishing good communication between Marine ECC and ICP on site.
Prepare to evacuate personnel from adjacent terminal facilities and adja-
cent coastguard facilities.
Identify the vessels by name and share the scenario with them

68
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items A-H
and for identification of needed responses.)
 MD
 LPD
 FrPD
 JHAH
 Aviation
quences)
4 2 8


69
1.17 Shelter-in-Place
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Everything Scenario No.: 15-ON
Type of Emergency:
_______ Equipment Failure X Security
_______ Other
Saudi Navy called 911 EC and reported detecting of hostile missiles and drones heading to Ras
Tanura.
Security Shift Supervisor requested 911 EC to announce the shelter-in-place on the emergency
channel. The siren is to be activated.
Marine department is to follow and implement the shelter-in-place till the security threat is over.
Both drones and missile were intercepted over the sea.
Saudi Navy called 911 EC for update.
Security Shift Supervisor requested 911 EC to announce that security threat is over.
B. Possible Causes:
Possible causes including but not limited to UAV/Drone/Missile attack, active shooting, terrorist
attack, forced entry, intrusion, and other security cases if situation dictates

70
2.0 - OFFSHORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

2.1 Main Engine or Steering Failure
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels Scenario No.: 1-OFF

_______ Other

Vessel suffers a main engine or steering failure while on passage. This will have an extremely ad-
verse effect on the manoeuvrability of the vessel which could then lead to grounding or collision.
Any of these two could result in total loss of the vessel and all crew. Other effects include large
heel angles and violent movements which could lead to serious personnel injuries and possibly fa-
talities. Equipment failure could also occur.
B. Possible Causes:
Poor maintenance, failure of critical parts, operator error, mechanical issues and electrical issues.
Only the propulsion and steering units are affected, assuming that no other events occur from this.
Duration could be anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours.
Operations could be affected if the vessel is involved in a collision or grounding, but generally iso-
lated steering and main engine failures would not have that much effect.
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may inten-
sify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types,
quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.].)
Main engines and steering gear are located in dedicated engine room spaces protected by fixed
fire-extinguishing systems and are protected by fire and watertight boundaries.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [en-
gineering controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Planned Maintenance Systems All preventative measures are requirements
Crew training and competency under the ISM Code and no further recommen-
Emergency drills and training dations are necessary.

71
Policies and procedures

Required Actions: 1. Inform master
2. Take action to manoeuvrer ship away from danger
(List all required initial re-
3. Prepare for anchoring if in shallow water
sponse actions.)
4. Exhibit “not under command” shapes/lights
5. Commence sound signalling
6. Broadcast URGENCY message to ships in the vicinity, if
appropriate
7. Modify AIS status message to communicate relevant in-
formation
8. Inform VTS or port authority if in controlled or similarly
monitored waters
In case of a STEERING FAILURE:
14. Inform engine room
15. Engage emergency steering
16. Prepare engines for maneuvering
17. Take way off the ship
(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes personnel
from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-incident plans. Iden-
tify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and provide recommenda-
tions for upgrades as required.)
Critical spare parts for repairing failures. Yes, as per the ISM Code.
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
1 Main Engine Failure
2 Steering Failure
vere)
1 (3) (5) (15)
2 (3) (5) (15)


72
2.2 Collision
Type of Emergency: _______ Flammable Vapor Release X Structural Collapse

_______ Other

This incident involves two marine department AHTSS vessels engaged in rig-supply. They are
termed ‘Vessel A’ and ‘Vessel B’.
‘Vessel A’ completes loading and is ready to proceed from station X, at a Marine Pier to a Rig.
‘Vessel B’ also completes loading and is ready to depart station Y and proceed to a Rig. At
2100hrs ‘Vessel B’ obtains permission from Port Control to start main engines in preparation
for departure. At the same time, ‘Vessel A’ obtains permission from Port Control to let go
and depart station X.
The Masters of ‘Vessel A’ and ‘Vessel B’ are unaware of each other’s movements. ‘Vessel B’
departs the berth and is called by Port Control to return back to station Y to pick up a cargo
item. The vessel receives instruction that there is no need to moor but just to pick up the
item and then depart.
At 2125hrs ‘Vessel A’ lets go and is moving off station X. The Master is at the aft control con-
sole and ‘kicks the engines ahead’ thus making ‘Vessel A’ move ahead. At the same time,
‘Vessel B’ picks up the cargo item and is moving off station Y.
The master on ‘Vessel A’ observes that he has no control at the forward control console and
therefore has no control of the vessel. ‘Vessel A’ is moving ahead at a speed of 3.2 knots. At
2130hrs the bow of ‘Vessel A’ makes heavy contact with the starboard quarter of ‘Vessel B’.
Extensive damage is incurred to both vessels.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Failure of ‘Vessel A’ Master and Crew to comply with company procedures and
standard navigation procedures.
2. Poor communication between Port Control and departing vessels.
Vessel A
1. Extensive shell plating damage on bow including a hole 150cms x 60cms
2. Forepeak tank top-plate damaged.
3. Forecastle Deck Bulwark damaged.
4. Stiffeners in Forward Store and forward part of Forepeak tank damaged.
5. Bottom side plates on forward side of chain locker damaged.
Vessel B
1. Mooring Bollard on Starboard Quarter ripped off.
2. 6.7 meters of Starboard Quarter bulwark damaged.

73
3. Starboard Capstan displaced from housing base.

4. Starboard fresh water tank # 3 partly damaged
5. Starboard crash rail and support damaged for 3 meters in length.
6. Cable fittings of hydraulic flexible hoses to capstan, damaged.
7. Starboard quarter fire-main line damaged.
affected.)
Port facility is not in operation for 2 hours, while the vessels make their way back to their re-
spective berths for full damage assessments. Rig supply is delayed by 12 hours while contin-
gency plans are made for re-supply. Both vessels are taken out of service for at least 2 weeks
to effect the necessary repairs. Marine Department is able to still able to maintain supply
service to the customer, but there is no back-up, should another vessel be taken out of ser-
vice.
intensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted
access; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area;
etc.].)
Main engines and steering gear are located in dedicated engine room spaces protected by
fixed fire-extinguishing systems and are protected by fire and watertight boundaries.
Crew training and competency All preventative measures are requirements under
Emergency drills and training the ISM Code.
Policies and procedures i. Departure and Arrival procedures
Additional measures – Port Control ii. Multiple moves
Procedures to be evaluated and as- iii. Communication to Vessels
sessed. iv. Information given to Vessels
v. Training and Certification of Port Control
personnel.
vi. Pre-designated positions for Port Control Co-
ordinators.

74
Required Actions: 1. Stop engines.
(List all required initial re- 2. Sound the general emergency alarm, and carry
sponse actions.) out a crew muster to check for missing or injured
personnel.
3. Close watertight doors and automatic fire doors.
4. Determine heading on collision, position and
depth of water.
6. Switch VHF to Channel 16 and, if appropriate, to
Channel 13.
7. Muster passengers, if carried, at emergency sta-
tions.
room/GMDSS station, satellite terminal and
other automatic distress transmitters and up-
date as necessary.
9. Sound bilges and tanks after collision.
10. Check for fire/damage.
11. Take appropriate damage control measures.
12. Offer assistance to other ship.
13. Inform Coastal State Authorities if appropriate.
14. Preserve VDR or S-VDR records if not automati-
cally protected.
15. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the
ship is in grave and imminent danger and imme-
diate assistance is required, otherwise broadcast
an URGENCY message to ships in the vicinity.
plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and provide
recommendations for upgrades as required.)

2. Trained and competent Port Control
Operators. 2. Training program in progress.
3. MIM 1187.001 COLLISION AND
DAMAGE BY OR TO MARINE 3. Yes.
EQUIPMENT OR CRAFT
Recommendations:
MIM to be revised updated following any collision incidents.

75
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD

1 Collision
vere)
1 (3) (2) (6)


76
2.3 Stranding or Grounding
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels and Barges Scenario No.: 3-OFF

X Stranding or Grounding

(Provide a detailed description of units/equipment involved, as well as possible effects on them,
on personnel, on other units/equipment, outside the fence, etc.)
This incident involves a marine department crew boat which is engaged in navigation light mainte-
nance. It is termed ‘Vessel A’. Other assisting vessels are ‘Vessel B’ and ‘Tug C’. Weather conditions
are light winds with slight seas.
At 1105hrs ‘Vessel A’ departs platform X bound for Beacon Y to conduct maintenance on navigation
lights. The Captain is on the bridge, with all equipment fully operational. Vessel is in hand-steering.
Vessel’s charted course is 184°, and helmsman is steering 190°. Captain is busy with a telephone con-
versation and is not monitoring the vessel’s position. At 1140hrs the vessel runs aground with a speed
of 11 knots. Position is 3 cables off the intended ground track.
Engines are stopped and the general alarm is sounded to muster the crew. Initial internal damage as-
sessment is done with no sign of water ingress found. Vessel grounded by the bow in 1.7m water depth
with no oil spill observed. Vessel reports the incident to the DPA at 1200hrs. Port Control establishes
contact with ‘Vessel A’ at 1503hrs. ‘Vessel B’ arrives at the scene at 1515hrs and remains steaming up
and down for safety standby role around 1.5Nm away from the position. Low water is at 1603hrs. ‘Tug
C’ mobilized and arrives at the scene at 1940hrs. It is decided to wait for the tide to rise before at-
tempts are made to pull ‘Vessel A’ from the shallow patch. ‘Tug C’ starts pulling ‘Vessel A’ from shallow
patch and ‘Vessel A’ refloated at 2115hrs.
Vessel has to proceed for emergency dry docking due to damage sustained.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Planning Less Than Adequate - No vessel passage plan.
2. Standard Navigational Procedures not followed.
3. No clear instruction given to Helmsman regarding which “Course” is to be steered.
4. 3. Poor Equipment - Magnetic Compass heading not compensated.
1. Port and starboard inner propellers are severely damaged.
2. Port and starboard outer propellers have slight dents on one propeller blade each.
3. Duration of the emergency is 10 hours.
fected.)
1. Vessel is taken to emergency dry-dock for a period of one month.

77
2. Navigation light maintenance is hampered, which could possibly have serious consequences for
safe navigation, although in this case it does not.
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may intensify
the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types, quanti-
ties, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with light winds and slight seas. Responding vessels would have to be
sure of their positions when providing assistance in the area of shallow water where ‘Vessel A’ has
grounded.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engi-
neering controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Standard navigational practices as per Standard tracks and recommended routes to be
SOLAS, ISM Code, SMS and Saudi Aramco utilized where possible for vessels moving be-
MIM’s. tween offshore installations.
Required Actions: 1. Stop engines
(List all required initial 2. Sound general emergency alarm, and carry out a crew muster to check
response actions.) for missing or injured personnel
3. Close watertight doors and automatic fire doors
4. Consider use of anchor
5. Switch to high cooling water intakes
6. Maintain a VHF watch on Channel 16 and, if appropriate, on Channel
13
7. Exhibit lights/shapes and make any appropriate sound signals
8. Switch on deck lighting at night
9. Check hull for damage
10. Sound bilges and tanks
11. Visually inspect compartments, where possible
12. Sound around ship
13. Determine which way deep water lies
14. Determine the nature of the seabed
15. Obtain information on local currents and tides, particularly details of
the rise and fall of the tide
16. Consider reducing the draught of the ship
17. Consider taking on additional ballast to prevent unwanted move-
ment
18. Make ship’s position available to radio room/GMDSS station, satel-
lite terminal and other automatic distress transmitters and update as
necessary
19. Inform Coastal State Authorities if appropriate
20. Preserve VDR or S-VDR records if not automatically protected
21. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and
imminent danger and immediate assistance is required, otherwise
broadcast an URGENCY message to ships in the vicinity

78
(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which in-
cludes personnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute
pre- incident plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those
available, and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)
5. Passage plan with UKC calculations.
6. Full passage planning including all four
stages, namely appraisal, planning, execu-
tion and monitoring.
7. Bridge team management.
Recommendations: All deck officers to attend bridge resource management training.
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items
A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
Marine Contractors

1 Stranding or Grounding
(1=most likely; (1=most severe; 5=least severe) (Probability x Consequences)
5=least likely)
1 (2) (2) (4)


79
2.4 Man Overboard

X Man Overboard

This incident involves a marine department Offshore Construction vessel engaged in in soil
boring/sampling drilling operations. It is termed ‘Vessel A’
A Cone Penetration Test (CPT) operator on board ‘Vessel A’ sustains head, arm and body inju-
ries after falling from the drilling platform extending over the ships side on to the seabed
structure that was suspended just below the drilling platform then into the sea.
The headline supporting the outboard side of the drilling deck clamp snaps. The operator has
his weight forward, leaning on the deck clamp guiding the pipe through the deck clamp with
his foot. When the headline snaps the deck clamp falls into the sea and the operator loses his
balance and falls below to the seabed structure then into the sea. He is not wearing a life-
jacket, nor is he wearing fall protection.
The Man Over Board alarm is sounded and the rescue boat crew mustered. The rescue boat is
launched and the man is recovered. First aid is administered on board. Port control is contin-
uously engaged. The vessel proceeds to the port for disembarkation of the crew member to
hospital for further medical checks. The crew member is found to have a broken arm as well
as bruising on his head and torso.
B. Possible Causes:
1. The drilling deck clamp supporting headline wire parted unexpectedly.
2. Condition checks on the wire were not carried out after receiving certification.
3. No fall prevention equipment was being used.
4. Hazard identification and preventative measures were not being followed.
5. The seabed structure had been lowered further than normal below the working plat-
form to provide extra stability to the drill string. This meant there was an open gap
with a drop of approximately 1.5-1.8m to sea level.
1. Headline winch wire parted above the crimped termination.
2. Drilling deck clamp was lost over the side.
3. Duration of the emergency is six hours.
affected.)
Soil boring/sampling drilling operations are delayed by 10 hours.

80
cess; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with calm weather with light winds. Responders i.e. FRC crew
would have severe difficulty if the scenario was intensified by items such as night time condi-
tions, large swells, restricted visibility, high winds and associated sea conditions.
Work permit procedures, JSA, Quality of third party inspection and certification provid-
RA and fall protection plans to ers’ work to be verified when materials are returned to
be followed. the owner
PM of all lifting gear to be fol- Conduct visual checks for wear, damage and corrosion on
lowed. load bearing wires before use and at regular intervals.
Positive confirmation of checks to be recorded and any de-
fects identified to be addressed before use.
Wire ropes to be treated for protection from the environ-
ment.
Drill floor area requires lifejacket and fall protection for all
work.
Required Actions: 1. Release lifebuoy with light and smoke signal on
(List all required initial re- the side the crew member has fallen overboard.
sponse actions.) 2. Take immediate avoiding action so as not to run
over the man overboard.
3. Note ship’s position, wind speed and direction,
and time.
4. Activate GPS man overboard marker.
5. Initiate 110 Emergency Call Directly or via VHF to
Marine Port Control and relay MOB position.
6. Positive confirmation received from Port Control
that 110 Emergency Call has been initiated.
7. Sound three prolonged blasts of the ship’s whis-
tle and repeat as necessary.
8. Post a look-out with binoculars and instructions
to maintain a continuous watch on the man over-
board.
9. Engage hand steering, if helmsman available.
10. Commence a recovery maneuver.
11. Inform master, if not already on the bridge.
12. Inform engine room.
13. Hoist signal flag “O”.
14. Place engines on stand-by.
15. Muster rescue boat’s crew, master and coxswain,
and jointly assess launch/recovery risks.

81
16. Prepare rescue boat for possible launching.

17. Consider alternative means of MOB recovery if
launch/recovery of rescue boat considered to be
of excessive risk
18. Distribute portable VHF radios for communica-
tion
19. Rig pilot ladder/nets to assist in the recovery
room/GMDSS station
21. Broadcast URGENCY message to ships in the vi-
cinity
22. Preserve VDR or S-VDR records if not automati-
cally protected
23. Assume role of On Scene Coordinator
sonnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre incident

2. FRC available to launch within 5
minutes.
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
ios.)
1 Man Overboard
vere)
1 (3) (2) (6)
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU Date: August 20th, 2016


82
2.5 Fire

X Fire _______ Toxic Vapor Release
_______ Other

This incident involves a marine department AHTSS vessel engaged in rig-supply. It is termed
‘Vessel A’
At 08:15hrs ‘Vessel A’ is made fast to a drilling rig and commences discharge of deck cargo
and various bulk cargoes. At 22:40hrs, a trash skip is loaded on the main deck aft on the
starboard side. Five minutes later cargo operations at the rig are complete and at 23:15hrs
‘Vessel A’ has anchor aweigh and all clear and is proceeding to the port facility.
At 01:39hrs orange light reflections in the forward Bridge windows alert the Bridge Team to
a fire in a skip on the aft end of the Main Deck. The Bridge Team immediately activate the
General Alarm. The Captain appears on the Bridge in quick time and takes control of the ves-
sel and the incident. Meanwhile the crew are mustering. The Fire Team are instructed to rig
two fire hoses on the main deck, one from the port side and the other from the starboard
side. This is quickly achieved and the fire is extinguished at 01:43hrs. Inspection of the sur-
rounding area for fire and damage was then carried out, nothing of concern was found.
At 01:50hrs the Captain reports the fire to Port Control and then to his Company. The vessel
continued on passage to Tanajib with a continuous watch on the main deck maintained by
an Able Seaman.
At approximately 02:15hrs the AB on the Main Deck reports that smoke is coming from the
skip. The Captain instructs his crew to totally fill the skip with water to ensure the fire is
fully extinguished.
At 07:20hrs ‘Vessel A’ is all fast at the port facility.

83
B. Possible Causes:
1. The failure of the waste generator to segregate and correctly contain hazardous
waste for transportation as required by International Regulation and Saudi Aramco
requirements.
2. A smoldering heat source (from welding operations) which had found its way into
the skip and was fanned by the increased wind speed once the vessel commenced
on passage causing it to ignite.
3. A mixture of two or more chemicals reacting together.
4. Oily rags self-combusting. This is a known danger throughout the International Ma-
rine and other industries.
No injuries, pollution or damage were incurred due to this incident due to it being contained
in the skip. The consequences could however, have been catastrophic.
affected.)
Operations are not impacted by this incident.
etc.].)
The contents of the skip included, used oil, air and fuel filters (from what appeared to be a
CAT generator), rags, aerosols, various chemical drums (empty Caustic Soda drums etc.),
wood, cardboard and food waste.
The engine room is adjacent to this area and although not affected, it contains flammable
fuel oil.
Saudi Aramco Hazardous Waste Code, Drilling rigs to correctly segregate, catego-
D&WO / HSE 016 ‘Waste Handling Proce- rize, manifest and containerize waste mate-
dure’ and MARPOL Annex V. rials prior to backloading onto AHTSSs.
Spark arrestors fitted to the exhausts to
prevent sparks acting as an ignition source
for main deck cargo.
Required Actions: Action to be carried out:
(List all required initial response actions.) 1. Sound the fire alarm.
2. Call master if not already on bridge
and notify engine room.
3. Muster crew.
4. Establish communications.

84
5. Check for missing and injured crew

members.
6. On locating the fire, notify all on
board of that location.
7. If an engine room fire, prepare for
engine failure and maneuver ship
away from danger.
Assess fire and determine:
1. The class of fire.
2. Appropriate extinguishing agent.
3. Appropriate method of attack.
4. How to prevent the spread of the
fire.
5. The necessary personnel and fire-
fighting methods.
6. Close down ventilation fans, sky-
lights and all doors including fire
and watertight doors.
8. Make ship’s position available to
radio room/GMDSS station, satel-
lite terminal or other automatic
distress transmitters and update as
necessary.
9. Inform Coastal State Authorities if
appropriate.
10. Preserve VDR or S-VDR records if
not automatically protected.
11. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and
MESSAGE if the ship is in grave and
imminent danger and immediate
assistance is required, otherwise
broadcast an URGENCY message to
ships in the vicinity.
(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes
personnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-in-
cident plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and

2. Correct segregation, categorization, 2. Procedure is available.
manifestation and containerization
of waster materials prior to back-
loading onto AHTSSs.
Recommendations: Drilling rigs to enforce waste handling procedures.

85
 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
 Drilling and Workover

(Assess risk [severity and probability of occurrence] and assign a ranking to prioritize sce-
narios.)
1 Fire
vere)
1 (3) (1) (3)
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU Date: August 20th, 2016


86
2.6 Flooding

X Flooding

This incident involves a marine department tug which is engaged in berthing operations. It
is termed ‘Vessel A’. Weather conditions are NNW winds of Beaufort Force 5.
‘Vessel A’ has just completed a tanker move and is returning to her berth at the port facility.
During the final stages of berthing, an unexpected backing and increase of the wind to 50
knots, causes the tug to land heavily on slightly damaged SPM hose fender.
The result is a 50 x 40 com puncture of the tug’s hull just below the waterline. The vessel
starts to take on water rapidly when a rapidly increasing list to starboard. The Chief Engi-
neer reports the ingress of water to the Master who sounds the general emergency alarm.
Crew start to muster at their emergency muster stations
One of the watertight doors is not closed and the vessel suffers progressive flooding over
two compartments. The Chief Engineer is unable to close the watertight door due ingress of
water and the bilge pumps have little effect. The Master gives the order to abandon ship
and all crew take to the water. The tug then capsizes and sinks, coming to rest on the bot-
tom on her starboard side.
All crew manage to swim to the pier and none suffer any injuries.
A subsequent salvage review of the tug determines it to be a constructive total loss.
B. Possible Causes:
1. The unexpected backing and increase of the wind to 50 knots.

2. One of the watertight doors in the engine rooms was not closed.
3. The damaged SPM type fender.
1. Constructive total loss of a Marine Department tug.

affected.)
1. Cost of a new tug is estimated to be $15 000 000.

2. Procurement of a replacement vessel built to Arabian Gulf specifications will take
approximately 3 years.

87
3. Procurement of a replacement vessel under contract will take approximately 6

months.
4. Possible effect on downstream deliveries of crude, NGL and product if MD does not
meet the 11 vessels (7 tugs and 4 mooring boats) minimum requirement demanded
by the end-user, i.e. Terminal Department.
etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 5 NNW winds. Hazard-
ous materials on the tug are in limited quantities and do not pose any risk to divers inspect-
ing the capsized tug.
1. Watertight doors are re- 1. Watertight door indicator panel to be in-
quired to be closed during stalled on the bridge for the OOW to moni-
berthing and un-berthing tor watertight integrity.
operations. 2. Consider installing a wind sheer/strength in-
crease alarms on all wind sensors.
2. Vessels are fitted with 3. Verify integrity of all SPM hose fenders and
wind sensors. replace as necessary.
3. Pier fendering arrange-
ments.
Required Actions: 1. Sound the general emergency alarm.
(List all required initial re- 2. Close watertight doors, if fitted.
sponse actions.) 3. Sound bilges and tanks.
4. Identify location of incoming water.
5. Cut off all electrical power running through the
area.
6. Shore up area to stem water flow.
7. Check bilge pump for operation.
8. Check auxiliary pumps for back-up operation, as
required.
room/GMDSS station, satellite terminal and other
automatic distress transmitters and update as nec-
essary.
10. Inform Coastal State Authorities if appropriate.
11. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE if the
ship is in grave and imminent danger and immedi-
ate assistance is required, otherwise broadcast an
URGENCY message to ships in the vicinity.

88

2. PM for bilge pumps and compart-
ment isolation valves.
3. Damage Control Box.

 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
narios.)
2 Flooding
vere)
1 (4) (2) (8)


89
2.7 Search and Rescue
Type of Emergency:
X Abandonment

This incident involves a jack-up barge (A) and various SAR helicopters and attending ves-
sels.
At approximately 14:00 hours ‘Barge A’, while attempting to jack down, collapses and cap-
sizes in an oilfield. Of the twenty seven persons onboard, three people die. In addition,
eight people incur multiple injuries.
Of the 27 personnel on board, 24 escape and manage to get out of the water and position
themselves on the part of the barge that is above the water. The Captain instructs the sur-
vivors to remain on the structure until the rescue boats arrive.
The end-user Supervisor calls Aviation and requests a helicopter, using his personal mobile
phone. The barge capsizes too rapidly for a distress alert to be sent. He then calls 110 and
so does Aviation.
Port Control make a radio announcement over channels 11/16 and call for all vessels to
proceed to the incident location. ‘Vessel B’ arrives on scene at 14:10, is directed assume
the role of On-Scene Commander, launches her fast rescue craft (FRC) and rescues 10 peo-
ple (10/27). At 14:15 ‘Vessel C’ arrives and at 14:35 ‘Vessel D’ arrives on scene. Both ves-
sels launch their FRC’s. At 14:45 ‘Vessel C’ recovers 10 people (20/27). At 15:00 ‘Helicopter
E’ arrives on scene. At 15:10 ‘Vessel D’ recovers 3 people (23/27) and another person
(24/27) at 15:20 is recovered by ‘Vessel B’.
At 15:30 ‘Medevac Helicopter F’ arrives on scene. At 15:35 ‘Dive Vessel G’ arrives on scene
and commences diving operations. At 16:20 A vessel search pattern was established using
a parallel search to the NW (following tidal stream) at 00.5 mile leg spacing.
At 16:30 ‘Medevac Helicopter F’ transfers 3 injured crew (3/8) to shore facility. At 16:40
‘Helicopter E’ transfers 5 injured crew to shore clinic (8/8). At the same time ‘Dive Vessel
H’ and ‘Dive Vessel J’ arrive on scene and commence diving.
At 22:27 one body is recovered (1/3) by ‘Dive Vessel H’. At 23:10 one body is recovered
(2/3) by ‘Dive Vessel H’. At 08:30 the next day one body is recovered (3/3) by ‘Dive Vessel
H’. At 10:10 the Marine Incident Commander announces that the search and rescue is
complete.
B. Possible Causes:
1. ‘Barge A’ had the Jacking Console Manual Emergency Shutdown System disabled.
2. All personnel were not confirmed at their jacking muster stations prior to jacking.

90
3. Jacking Mode and Jacking Selector switches were placed in the wrong positions.
4. Engines #3 & #4 were inadvertently left on idle speed for 2nd jacking test.
5. Crew attempted a second test of jacking up leg #1 without first leveling the barge.
6. Life rafts failed to launch.
1. No environmental impact or fire resulted from this incident.

2. Three personnel fatalities.
3. The duration of the emergency is 19 hours 30 minutes.
affected.)
1. Shut down of well platform XX.
2. Oil production in the oilfield was not impacted.
3. The insured replacement value of ‘Barge A’ is $9.2MM.
4. Bad publicity and loss of confidence in Saudi Aramco’s ability to conduct safe op-
erations.
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that
may intensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [re-
stricted access; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the af-
fected area; etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 3 winds. These con-
ditions are suitable for abandoning ship and the subsequent search and rescue opera-
tions. Conditions which may intensify the situation and could hamper the response
would be night conditions, restricted visibility, high winds, rough seas and large swells.
Diving operations took place at night and this would have hampered the recovery of bod-
ies from the wreck.
1. Planned Maintenance System for 1. Deflector plates to be fitted to life
the barge jacking system. raft stowage cradles to ensure that
2. Jacking and evacuation proce- they deploy correctly in the event
dures as per the Safety Manage- of the barge capsizing.
ment System.
3. Emergency communication sys-
tems.
4. Adequate life-saving appliances
including readily deployable life
rafts.

91
Required Actions: 1. Carefully note all details of the received message
(List all required in- 2. Re-transmit distress message
itial response ac- 3. Maintain continuous listening watch on all distress fre-
tions.) quencies
4. Consult IAMSAR manual and ERP appendix 10.8
5. Establish communications with all other surface units
and SAR aircraft involved in the SAR operation
6. Plot position, courses and speeds of other assisting
units
7. Monitor X-band radar for locating survival craft tran-
sponder (SART) signal using 6 or 12 nautical mile range
scales
8. Post extra look-outs for sighting flares and other pyro-
technic signals
9. Carefully note all details of the received message
personnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-
incident plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available,
and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)
1. Trained and competent vessel crew. A. Yes, as per the ISM Code.
2. Fully functioning and equipped life-
boats and liferafts.
 Loss Prevention Department
 JHAH
 FrPD
 Aviation
 SofPD
 Offshore Security
narios.) Search and rescue
(1=most likely; 5=least (1=most severe; 5=least se- (Probability x Conse-
likely) vere) quences)
1 (3) (1) (3)


92
2.8 Abandoning Ship

X Abandonment

A marine barge is being lowered back to the water after completion work on rig XX. The
Master and Chief Engineer are on the bridge and the crew are at Muster Station. The Chief
Officer is on the deck with the crew, who are all wearing lifejackets and PPE.
The Master makes an announcement on the PA system that the barge is being lowered. The
Chief Officer confirms by radio that all crew are at the Muster Station. The Master and Chief
Engineer commence operation from the bridge control panel when there is a sudden emer-
gency with Leg No. 1, and a list to port develops. The Chief Engineer reports to the Master
that Leg No. 1 has gone into alarm and is not reacting correctly to the controls. The Chief
Engineer presses the emergency stop for all legs.
The Master announces the emergency of the PA and UHF radio to all crew and instructs
them to standby to board the lifeboat. The Chief Engineer reports a 2.5° list to port increas-
ing to 3°. The Master orders ‘abandon barge’ over the PA and UHF radio. The Chief Engi-
neer attempts to level the barge by operating Port Legs 3 and 4. The barge is successfully
leveled with 0° list.
The Chief Officer reports that all crew are now inside the lifeboat and are ready to lower.
The Chief Engineer reports that the barge is level again and the Master advises the Chief Of-
ficer and crew to standby for 5 minutes while the situation is further assessed.
The Master instructs the Chief Officer, Second Engineer and ETO to disembark the lifeboat
and carry out a visual inspection of the each leg at deck level to look for obvious irregulari-
ties. The Chief Officer report that Leg No. 1 hydraulic leg brake system is not aligned cor-
rectly. Then Master instructs the inspection team to re-board the lifeboat and requests as-
sistance from the barge supervisor.
All non-essential crew are transferred to a standby vessel and the Master and Chief Engineer
remain onboard until assistance arrives. The Master makes all reports and calls on VHF as
required to advise everyone in the vicinity of the problem. Port Control are contacted on
VHF Channel 11 and the barge supervisor is notified.
B. Possible Causes:
1. The cause for abandoning ship in this scenario is due to equipment failure affecting
the structural stability of the barge. However, a number of other scenarios may re-
quire abandonment including:
a. Collision.

93
b. Grounding and stranding.

c. Fire
d. Flooding
1. Launching the lifeboat and moving clear of the barge to a safe area should take be-
tween 5 and 15 minutes.
affected.)
1. The barge would not be able to operate which the incident is taking place.
2. The standby vessel not be able to operate which the incident is taking place.
3. This should not have an adverse effect on Marine Department operations, but may
effect the service offered to our customer.
The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 3 NNW winds. These
conditions are suitable for a abandoning ship. Conditions which may intensify the situation
and could hamper the response would be night conditions, restricted visibility, high winds,
rough seas and large swells.
1. Effective lifeboat and abandon ship 1. None.
drills conducted as per International
and SA requirements.
Required Actions: 1. Broadcast DISTRESS ALERT and MESSAGE on the au-
(List all required initial thority of the master
response actions.) 2. Instruct crew members to put on lifejackets and wear
adequate and warm clothing
3. Instruct crew members to put on immersion suits, if car-
ried, if water temperature is below 16° C
4. Order crew members to lifeboat stations
5. Prepare to launch lifeboats/liferafts
6. Ensure that lifeboat sea painters are attached to the
ship
7. Embark all crew in the lifeboats/liferafts and launch
8. Ensure lifeboats/liferafts remain in safe proximity to
the ship and in contact with each other

94

9. Fully functioning and equipped lifeboats 6. Yes, as per the ISM Code.
and liferafts.

 MTOD
 MMD
 TMOD
 GOSRD
 MODWR
 RTMOD
 SofPD
 Offshore Secutiry
1 Abandoning Ship
vere)
1 (3) (1) (3)


95
2.9 Medevac

_______ Flooding

This incident involves a marine department vessel which is in transit between port facilities.
It is termed ‘Vessel A’. Weather conditions are NNW winds of Beaufort Force 4.
‘Vessel A’ is underway between oilfields and 10 nautical miles from the nearest port facility.
The time is 12:00 and the crew are having lunch. While at lunch, the Chief Engineer starts to
complain about chest pain. He says that he has a sensation of squeezing in the center of his
chest. He starts sweating heavily and states that the pain is travelling from his chest to his
left arm. He starts to get very anxious and then collapses.
The Captain who is having lunch with him calls the bridge tells him to initiate a “Pan Pan”
and dial 110 to request an immediate helicopter evacuation. The Captain and Chief Officer
attempt to stabilize the Chief Engineer while the vessel crew prepare for a helicopter mede-
vac.
Port Control obtain the supplementary data as required in GI 1321.015 from the vessel and
relay the information to the appropriate Aviation Department Flight Dispatch office when
the Area EMS requests a MEDEVAC. The Area EMS ascertains the level of response and as-
signs the appropriate personnel. This information is passed to the Area Flight Dispatch of-
fice.
The Area Flight Dispatch Office sends an AW139 with hoisting personnel and a doctor and
nurse. The patient is prepared in a stretcher and the vessel makes contact with the helicop-
ter ensuring ship’s speed 5 – 10 knots, and a course to give wind 30°-40° on the port bow.
The medevac is successful, but unfortunately the Chief Engineer suffers a second severe
heart attack during the flight to the hospital which proves to be fatal.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Crew member had an undisclosed medical condition which was not revealed during
the TM 1-3 examination.
2. Crew member was suffering from intense stress and this brought the condition on.
1. This scenario deals with personnel injury and the duration is expected to last for 3
hours.

96
affected.)
1. The vessel would not be able to operate which the incident is taking place.
2. A replacement crew member would have to be provided for the vessel in line with
the Safe Manning Document.
3. This should not have an adverse effect on Marine Department operations.
etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 4 NNW winds. These
conditions are suitable for a helicopter medevac. Conditions which may intensify the situa-
tion and could hamper the response would be night conditions, restricted visibility, high
winds, rough seas and large swells.
1. Any personnel assigned ‘Ship- 1. None.
Crew’ work shall attend a medi-
cal examination and be passed fit
as per Medical TM 1-3. Physical
fitness examination TM1-3 shall
be carried out periodically every
2 years for all offshore employ-
ees.
Required Actions: Obtain patient details:
(List all required initial re- 1. Patient's name, ID number, age,
sponse actions.) gender, nationality and language.
2. Nature of illness or injury, including
apparent cause and related history.
3. Symptoms, including location of
any pain.
4. With accident cases, how the acci-
dent occurred.
5. Ability of patient to walk or be
moved.
6. Type, time, form, and amounts of
medication given.
7. Patient's respiration, pulse rate,
temperature and blood pressure.

97
Check ship’s position.

Call relevant Coastal Authority/Port Con-
trol and ensure that the 110 EMG CALL has
been initiated with the following infor-
mation:
1. Name of the vessel.
2. Latitude/longitude, or range and
bearing from a known reference
point.
3. Course and speed.
4. Whether a suitable clear area is
available for a helicopter hoist op-
eration or landing and location on
deck.
5. Direction and speed of the relative
wind and visibility in the area.
6. Whether the vessel has a medical
chest, and whether a physician or
other medically trained person is
aboard.
Prepare patient in stretcher (Verify with
helicopter pilot the stretcher preferred).
Establish contact with helicopter (VHF: 6,
10, 67 or 73 marine band, 123.1, or 121.5
MHz air band)
Ship’s speed 5 – 10 knots, course to give
wind 30°-40° on port bow or as directed by
pilot
MOB Team on standby
Preparations before the helicopter arrives:

1. Select and clear the hoist area,
preferably aft in the stern. This in-
cludes securing loose gear, awn-
ings, rigging and booms.
2. If the hoist is at night, illuminate
the hoist area as well as possible.
Do not shine any lights toward the
helicopter that may blind the pilot.
If there are obstructions in the vi-
cinity, put a light on them so the
pilot will be aware of their loca-
tions.
3. Point searchlights vertically to help
the helicopter locate the ship, and
extinguish them when the helicop-
ter is on scene.
4. Advise SAR mission coordinator of
location of hoist area before the
helicopter arrives so the pilot can

98
make his approach aft midship or

forward as necessary.
5. There will be a high noise level un-
der the helicopter, making voice
communications almost impossi-
ble. Arrange a set of hand signals
among the vessel crew who will
assist.
Hoist operations:
1. Be sure patient is tagged to indi-
cate what medications, if any,
were administered and when.
2. Have patient's medical record and
necessary papers in an envelope
or package ready to transfer with
them.
3. Move the patient to a position as
close to the hoist area as their con-
dition permits. Time is important.
4. It will be necessary to hoist the pa-
tient in a suitable rescue device,
which will be lowered by the heli-
copter. Be prepared to do this as
quickly as possible. Be sure the pa-
tient is strapped in, face up, with a
life jacket if their condition per-
mits.
5. Change course so the ship rides as
easily as possible with the wind on
the bow, preferably the port bow.
Reduce speed if necessary to ease
ship's movement, but maintain
steerageway. Once the hoist be-
gins, maintain course and speed.
6. If you do not have radio contact
with the helicopter when you are
in all respects ready for the hoist
signal the helicopter in with a
“thumbs up" by hand, or at night
by flashlight.
7. Allow the rescue device to touch
the deck before handling it to
avoid static discharge. If the heli-
copter drops a trail line, guide the
rescue device to the deck with the
trail line. Do not tie the trail line or
hoist cable to the vessel.
8. If necessary to take rescue device
away from hoist point, unhook the

99
hoist cable and keep free for heli-

copter to haul in. Do not attempt
to move rescue device without un-
hooking it. Do not secure the cable
to the vessel.
9. Place patient in rescue device, sit-
ting with hands clear of sides or
strapped in face up
10. Signal hoist operator when ready
for hoist. Patient signals by nod-
ding head if he is able. Deck per-
sonnel give "thumbs up" to hoist
operator. Steady the rescue device
to prevent turning or swinging.
11. If a trail line is attached to the res-
cue device use it to steady the res-
cue device during the hoist. Keep
feet clear of the line.
12. The helicopter may elect to lower
a rescuer to the vessel to evaluate
the patient and assist in the hoist
evolution. Assist the rescuer and
follow his instructions.

100

2. Medical chest onboard. 2. Yes, as per the ISM Code.
3. GI 1321.015 – Request for Air Medi- 3. Yes, as per Saudi Aramco General
cal Evacuation. Instructions.
4. Helicopter with rescue capability. 4. Yes – provided by Aviation Depart-
Aviation operate two helicopters, ment.
and use both for MEDEVAC opera-
tions:
A109E – They must be able to land
this aircraft to be able to perform
the MEDEVAC. They would normally
use the A109E (3000 kg) on a jack-up
rig or other facility that does not
meet the landing criteria for landing
the AW139. The A109E is a day only
aircraft.
AW139 – May be used for landing on
facilities that accept the landing size
and weight (17m/up to 6800 kg, de-
pending on ambient conditions) , or
for hoisting from those that do not
meet landing criteria.

101
Agusta 109E Information
Aircraft Type A109E

Arrival - Aramco 12 Nov 2005
Engine Model Pratt & Whitney PT 206C
Passenger 6
Basic Wt 2162kg
Max Take Off weight 3000kg
Max Landing Weight 3000kg
Max fuel 490kg
Endurance 2.0 hrs
Range 200nm
Crew 1p / 6 pax

102
Agusta 139 Information
Aircraft Type AW139

Date of Manufacture May 2008
Arrival - Aramco July 2008
Engine Model PT6C-67C
Crew / Pax 2/12
Max Take Off Weight 6800 KG
Max Landing Weight 6800 KG
Max fuel 2767lb
Endurance 5 hours
Range 1061 km

 All Marine Divisions


103
 John Hopkins Aramco Healthcare
 Aviation Department
ios.)
1 Medevac
vere)
1 (2) (3) (6)


104
2.10 Barge Tip Over While Alongside a Wellhead Platform
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Arabiyah-2Scenario No.: 10-OFF

Equipment Failure _______ Security
X Other: Punch Through

While the barge is conducting initial preload, leg no.1 punched through and barge tilted
(tipped over) towards the platform.
Assuming that the barge has touched the platform there will be a damage sustained to the
platform and the barge structure and personnel on deck might fall to the sea and /or sustain
injuries or death from falling or striking fixed objects on deck.
If No. 3 leg was the one that is punched through another possible effect might of barge fall
to the sea and sank if big load was attained on other legs and broke them which will result
in loss of asset (Barge) and personnel.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Sea bed nature (Broken cap rocks), old holes, and incorrect sea bed survey.
2. Incorrect preload procedure
3. Extreme bad weather.
1- The Platform boat structure damaged at the point of touch
2- The barge legs might be bent or broken, holes to barge hull or barge might sink.
The platform will be locked until it is repaired and the barge is cleared out, the duration de-
pends on the time taken to recover or remove the barge from the location.
affected.)
1. The platform will be shut down and will lose its production,
2. The barge will be taken out of service until repaired (lost hours of utilization)
3. Oil Pollution might occur
4. Loss of personnel (lost man hours)
etc.].)
1- Barge fire safety plan( to get access to all fire & safety equipment locations and

105
spaces on the barge)

2- Field services to get info. on Platform, oil and any work permit or access
3- Tanajib Disaster Control for all over coordination.
4- Tanajib aviation for locations, nearest landing area, medevac and casualties
5- Tanajib Port Control for locations, crew nature oil spill and support vessels and sup
coordination with item no. 3.
1- Before commence jacking, check In case of punch through, continue lower-
your jacking plan deeply with special regard ing the punched through leg and raise the
to the present updated SBS and previous other leg to level the barge and abort loca-
jacking history remarks on this platform and tion immediately.
check all notes noted. Call Rig Move and barge Offices.
2- Check the No Go list, and if punch Diving boat should be on standby nearby
through was experienced on this location the barge upon leg position to check the
then abort jacking or get advice from RMO legs position prior to preload and jack up.
and barge office.
Required Actions: 1. Transmit Mayday signal.

(List all required initial response actions.) 2. Contact Port Control on VHF and re-
lay present situation. Clearly indi-
cate to Port Control if barge has
compromised the wellhead plat-
form, in order that the relevant User
Department can be notified immedi-
ately for shutdown reasons.
3. Close watertight doors and auto-
matic fire doors
4. “Abandon ship” announcement by
the master.
5. Conduct head count and ensure that
all personnel are accounted for.
6. Ensure that the EPIRB has been acti-
vated.
7. Ensure that SARTs have been acti-
vated.
8. Secure portable hand-held GMDSS
radios.
9. Deploy life rafts.
10. Evacuate the barge either by pilot
ladder or by jumping to the sea (if
safe to do so).

106
11. Cut the painter line, go to a safe dis-

tance from the barge, stream the
sea anchor, post lookouts, close and
maintain the liferaft.

incident plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as
those available, and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)

1- The master should check and study the All resources available.
SBS of this location and make sure it is in date.
2- The master should check the present and
upcoming weather forecast for the period of the
operation and don’t attempt the operation until
he is satisfied.
3- The master should consult the previous
jacking history on this location.
4- The master should do a jacking plan in ad-
vance to departure from the present location that
contains all the info. extracted from above.
5- If in any doubt, the Master should consult
the Rig Move and barge offices for advice.
Recommendations: No further recommendations.
Marine Quality Assurance
Barge Rig Move office, Barge operation office, Field service and Diving unit

narios.)

vere)
(3) (1) (3)


107
2.11 Jack-up Barge Leg failure
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Arabiyah-7 Scenario No.: 11-OFF
Type of Emergency:
_______ Other

While jacking the barge down, a big sound from the starboard side leg was heard and after
few seconds the leg speed increased suddenly causing the barge to list to starboard side.
Chief Engineer tried to stop lifting of the starboard leg from the joystick, but unfortunately,
it didn’t stop. The starboard leg continued lifting up with high speed and the barge list
reached 2.5 degrees. Chief Engineer then tried to stop the Jacking operation by pressing
the jacking Emergency Stop, but it also didn’t work. Chief Engineer directly disengaged the
jacking clutches (PTO’s) form the clutch engaging/disengaging levers in the wheel house
jacking console. Jacking operation was then stopped, and the barge list reached about 3.0
degrees.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Legs gearboxes brakes failed to disengage due to sudden failure in priority valves.
2. Two gearboxes pinion shafts sheared off (broken), due to brakes not disengaging,
causing the leg speed to increase.
3. The Directional Control Valve for starboard leg was stuck on the jacking down (leg
up) position because of defective solenoid valve.

Possible capsize of the barge due to the high list on the starboard side.
Improperly secured equipment such as W/L unit, tools, W/L lubricators, oil drums, gang-
way slide to starboard side, fortunately, causing no personnel injuries.
affected.)
1. Delay of operation for few days to repair the directional control valve, jacking emer-
gency stop and replace the damaged gearboxes.
2. Some oil pollution from the oil drums on the main deck due to impact on the drums
during barge listing.

108
etc.].)
1. Barge fire safety plan
2. Charts
3. Field Service
4. Abu Ali pier port control
5. RT aviation
MIM # 1198.001 None
MIM # 1199.001
Required Actions: 1. Suspend jacking operation and at-

(List all required initial response actions.) tempt to level the barge. If barge
continues to incline due to leg fail-
ure, follow the actions below.
2. Transmit Mayday signal.
3. Contact Port Control on VHF and re-
lay present situation.
4. Close watertight doors and auto-
matic fire doors
5. “Abandon ship” announcement by
the master.
6. Conduct head count and ensure that
all personnel are accounted for.
7. Ensure that the EPIRB has been acti-
vated.
8. Ensure that SARTs have been acti-
vated.
9. Secure portable hand-held GMDSS
radios.
10. Deploy life rafts.
11. Evacuate the barge either by pilot
ladder or by jumping to the sea (if
safe to do so).
12. Cut the painter line, go to a safe dis-
tance from the barge, stream the
sea anchor, post lookouts, close and
maintain the liferaft.

109

MIM # 1199.001 Yes

Marine Quality Assurance

Rig Move Office
Marine Engineering
Barge masters and Chief Engineers
narios.)

vere)
(3) (1) (3)
Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th ,2016

Approved by:Hasan Anbar (Element 8 Champion) Date: August 21st ,2016

110
2.12 Offshore Crane Incident
Plant/Unit/Equipment: ARB-2 Scenario No.: 12-OFF
Type of Emergency:
X Hazardous Material _______ Confined Space
Equipment Failure _______ Security
Other:

The Marine Crane is required to lift a Full Garbage Skip (Lugger Bucket) containing scrap
metal, weighing approximately 4 tonnes, from the barge to the garbage collection boat which
is tied up to a boat landing on a 6 well platform in Safaniyah Oilfield. The transfer requires
that the lift traverses the barge deck and across the wellheads on the platform before being
placed on the main-deck of the vessel. Sea and wind conditions are within limits for the opera-
tion, and all personnel are suitably qualified, (including riggers and crane driver). A general
work permit has been issued for work on the platform but no specific permit has been issued
for crane operations. The “below the hook” rigging, including slings (4 legs), shackle and hooks
are certified and have been inspected prior to use, the garbage skip has been visually in-
spected for defects but does not have an SWL (Safe Working Load) rating stamped anywhere
on the unit.
During the transfer and whilst the skip is over the wellheads of the platform, one of the two
tag lines catches on the “Christmas tree” and the load is temporarily subjected to dynamic
loading. A failure occurs to one of the four skip securing lugs. The skip tilts, now being held by
three of the four legs. Additional weight is transferred to the remaining three lugs, and a sec-
ond lug shears off. The full skip tilts and the contents are spilled over the platform and the
two remaining slings slip off the lugs resulting in the MT skip falling to the platform.
Crane is immediately returned to the barge.
One man working on the platform is slightly injured by falling debris and a section of the BOP
is also damaged, resulting in a “blow off” of H2S gas which ignites. A small fire flame emits
from the blow-off. The empty skip falls clear of obstructions and rests on the platform deck.
Quick acting personnel on the platform close BOP valves to stop the gas escape which extin-
guishes the flame.
General Alarm is activated and Barge contingency plans are initiated for medical injury and
fire response. Injured man is recovered and treated for minor injuries by medical staff. All
work is stopped and all personnel proceed from the platform to the barge. Garbage boat is
contacted and asked to move clear of platform, but to standby in case FIFI required.
Boundary “spraying” is utilized over the platform to reduce chance of any re-ignition.
Marine and Producing management are advised of situation as required by relevant MIM’s
and GI’s
After 1 hour the order for cease boundary cooling is given. Photographs are taken and the
scene is preserved until management authorize clean up.

111
B. Possible Causes:
Main cause is that the SWL (Safe Working Load) of the Lugger bucket has not been established
and in this case the load being transferred has been too high. Secondary cause could be un-
seen metal fatigue on the lugs (through continued use) which has additionally contributed to
failure under load. Additional cause attributed to the tag line being too long, too bulky, or was
not tended properly throughout the operation.
In this scenario, only the wellhead is affected. Total duration of the emergency is 2 hours.
affected.)
1. Delay to Operations during Investigation
2. Delay to operations due to manpower reduction (Injured person)
3. Delay to operations during repair of BOP
4. Possible disruption to oil supply if platform was still in production.
Aft Crane in use. Restricted access to platform via Gangway only. Emergency situation dura-
tion expected to be 1-2hrs but would be more if the fire had got out of control, or gas leak had
been intense, or more serious damage had resulted in oil pollution, all of which would be ele-
vated to a disaster response scenario. Classed as a level 1 incident for the purposes of this sce-
nario
Presently in place - GI 7.024-Offshore crane Suggested Engineering Control- All Lugger
operations. Planned maintenance on cranes, buckets to be officially tested and certified
lifting equipment safety training and certifi- with SWL rating, together with an annual
cation of crew covered by MIM’s 1191.003, MPI test of lug connections to ensure no
1191.501, 1192.001, 1193.501, 1193.504, hairline cracks or damage.
1193.504, 1199.001, 1201.007 and the Ma-
rine Department SMS Manual.
Required Actions: 1. Isolate source of gas leak.

(List all required initial response actions.) 2. Sound the Fire Alarm and announce
“FIRE ON PLATFORM”. Fire pump will
be started by engine room staff. All
crew will proceed to emergency sta-
tions as per Muster List requirements.

112
3. Consult Fire Contingency Plan and fol-

low steps required - Initial step - start
off-ship fire pump and have off-ship
monitors ready for use. Prepare deck
fire hoses and have them ready for
use, either as direct fire response or
as boundary protection
4. Conduct a head count and establish
communications with deck teams via
hand held VHF. Ensure that all person-
nel are accounted for. Consult Medi-
cal Contingency Plan and get stretcher
team at standby. Recover injured per-
sonnel from platform if safe to do so.
If further medical assistance required,
contact EMS Services in Tanajib 378
3286 or Ras Tanura 678-4882
5. Contact the Trash Boat and request
him to standby away from platform
with FIFI equipment ready for use.
Consider asking for more vessel assis-
tance (Depends of severity of situa-
tion)
6. If weather conditions are favorable,
Prepare Barge for Jack-down as pre-
cautionary measure. Otherwise pre-
pare Lifeboats for possible evacua-
tion. Consider requesting emergency
evacuation of non-essential personnel
via helicopter if situation and condi-
tions allow.
7. Contact Port Control on VHF and relay
present situation. Contact Safaniyah
Producing. Ensure listening watch on
“Producing Emergency VHF Tetris
channel” and VHF channel 11.
8. Consider issuing a general “Urgency”
broadcast to vessels in vicinity
9. Establish Boundary cooling to plat-
form after fire extinguished
10. When situation is under control, re
contact Port Control and Marine Su-
pervisor / Foreman with update

1. Toolbox meeting. All resources available.

113
2. Daily and weekly crane inspection
checklist.
3. Lift-plan (If required)
4. Crane Operations Generic Risk Assess-
ment.
5. Crane Operations Generic JSA.
6. Applicable MIMs, GI’s and SMS man-
ual extracts re crane operations
Recommendations: No further recommendations.

Marine Department, SOFMD Maintenance Division, Offshore Producing Department, Loss Pre-
vention Department.

ios.)
(1=most likely; 5=least (1=most severe; 5=least se- (Probability x Consequences)
likely) vere)
(2) (5) (10)


114
2.13 Dynamic Positioning System Failure
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Karan-8 Scenario No.: 13-OFF
Type of Emergency:
_______ Other

A failure of DPS while it is in control of ship movement. The ship was deploying ROV-survey
equipment- in close proximity of ZG4. Ship started to move unexpectedly towards accom-
modation platform.
Possible effects:
- Sever injuries / death
- Sever Damage to GOSP.
- Sever Damage to Ship and people on.
- Stoppage of operation in the GOSP /oil field.
- Oil Pollution.
- Fire/explosion.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Lose of DPS main Components:

2. DGPS, Gyro Compass, Anemometer, stern thrusters, bow thrusters, engine failure,
DPS controller, DP screens, UPS.
3. System not operated properly.
- Damage to Ship
- Damage to Offshore installations (Oil Wells, GOSPs, etc.)
- Loss of Survey Equipment
- Serious consequences
affected.)
1. Survey Operations and Under-water Inspection stop.

2. Oil installation offshore trip or damage.
3. Vessel outage for repair

115
4. Loss in production
may intensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [re-
stricted access; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected
area; etc.].)
Critical spares inventory to be maintained either on board or for immediate dispatch from
materials handling to the vessel.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [en-
gineering controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
Proper Training and Operations. To Train K8 Engineers to maintain DPs
DP Pre-Operation Checklist To have periodic check on the system by
System maintenance and spare parts. manufacturer
FMEA performed and regularly reviewed
and updated to reflect anticipated levels of
vessel performance with failed compo-
nents.
Required Actions: 1. If any survey equipment in the wa-

(List all required initial response actions.) ter, Inform survey Party Chief on the
bridge.
2. Press “Desk On” button on the de-
sired control console.
3. Press “DP OFF” button.
4. Press “Control Here” button on bow
thrusters console.
5. Ensure control received at console,
by manually thrusting, turning shut-
tles and bow thrusters.
6. If ROV in water, maneuver the ship
away from danger and ROV to fol-
low.
7. If other survey equipment in water,
manoeuver the ship away from dan-
ger and Survey equipment to follow.
8. Be aware of other ships or struc-
tures in the vicinity.
9. Navigate to a safe area 3 miles away
from any structure.
10. If all clear and safe, call captain and
CE and investigate issue.

116
11. Make an assessment of the current,

tidal and weather conditions to en-
sure the continued safety and integ-
rity of the vessel.
12. Where applicable complete an inci-
dent report form reporting the Near
Miss or details of the incident in ac-
cordance with the MIMs.

(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team,
which includes personnel from applicable response and support organizations to de-
velop and execute pre- incident plans. Identify all human and material resources re-
quired, as well as those available, and provide recommendations for up-
grades as required.)

DP System failure should constitute part of Yes.
the vessel desk top scenarios and emer-
gency drill schedule. No.
The plan should be specific in identifying
specific action to be taken with respect to
failure of specific components and should be No.
referenced in conjunction with the FMEA.
Contact number should be available for key
contacts such as: No.
• DP System Manufacturer
• DP system critical spares list and lo-
cation of parts.
• Competent personnel familiar with
the electro technical and mechanical opera-
tions of the systems.
Recommendations: FMEA to be sourced and technical personnel to be type specific
trained.
1. TMOD
2. UIR
3. MMSOD
4. QA&CU

117
narios.)

vere)
(4) (2) (8)
DPS failure should be rated across a full scope of operations capable of being undertaken by
the vessel.
The probability rating should be closely linked to past performance and incidents experi-
enced through loss of the system particular to the vessel or class of vessel. Reference should
be made to DP equipment failure reports which are printed and promulgated by IMCA in re-
spect of failure of DP systems.
It would be of value for the company to consider involvement and reporting of DP incidents
to IMCA to benefit from the wide range of guidance that is available in respect of this sub-
ject.


118
2.14 Confined Space Emergencies
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Marine Vessels and Barges Scenario No.: 14-OFF

_______ Hazardous Material X Confined Space
_______ Other

A crewman is fatally injured after falling in a confined space onboard a barge. A ballast tank
is open for steel repairs; permits to work are in place for these repairs. The incident occurs
during the initial entry into the tank for inspection purposes. A standby-man is present, and
two persons enter the tank and began to climb down the ladder. The inspection is per-
formed and the two persons begin to climb the 4m ladder out of the tank.
The second person climbing up has a gas detector in front of him on a band around his neck.
The gas detector gets stuck between him and the ladder when he is nearly at the top. He
tries to free himself but loses his grip and falls 3m to the bottom of the tank, and suffered
serious internal injuries.
He is evacuated from the ballast tank and subsequently medevac’d by helicopter but dies on
the way to hospital.
B. Possible Causes:
1. The position of the gas meter being carried by the casualty whilst climbing the lad-
der. He was carrying the gas meter on his abdomen during his ascent of a vertical
ladder;
2. Carrying the gas meter on the abdomen during descent and ascent of a vertical lad-
der was not recognized as a risk or hazard;
3. Absence of fall protection.
1. Ballast tank number 2 center measures 40 x 20 x 13 feet and is located in between

tanks 2 port and 2 starboard to the sides.
2. One serious injury leading to a fatality.
3. The duration of the emergency is expected to last 2 hours.
affected.)

119
1. Barge maintenance will have to be suspended until the investigation is complete

and root causes are identified and dealt with.
2. This would not affect the operation adversely.
3. Bad publicity and loss of confidence in Saudi Aramco’s ability to conduct safe opera-
tions.
etc.].)
1. The barge tanks are by their nature confined spaces, with two restricted manholes
for access, located diagonally opposite it each at the tank extremities.
2. Gas testing equipment is either a Ventis MX4 or MX6 model.
1. Confined Space Entry work permit 1. Confined space entry plan pro-
and associated checklists. forma to be drawn up and then uti-
2. Confined space entry risk assess- lized.
ment. 2. Fall protection plan to be utilized.
3. Confined space entry plan. 3. Rescue equipment as proposed by
4. Confined space entry training. QAVI to be procured.
5. Planned maintenance system for 4. Entry plan has to be developed by
all equipment used in confined the Contractor/SAPO.
space entry.
6. All equipment available and work-
ing.
7. Fall protection plan.
Required Actions: A. Standby man to raise the alarm
(List all required initial response actions.) B. The atmosphere of any enclosed or
confined space is potentially danger-
ous no one should enter to attempt a
rescue without taking suitable pre-
cautions. Failure to do so will put own
life at risk and almost certainly pre-
vent the person he intended to rescue
being brought out of the space alive.
C. Do not allow any entry into space un-
til necessary precautions have been
taken
D. Primary assessment:
a. Secure standby man
b. Identify immediate hazards

120
c. Location, number and condi-

tion of victims
d. Secure entry permit, CHB and
MSDS sheets
E. Secondary Assessment:
a. Type of space and access
b. Products in space
c. Hazards – atmospheric, me-
chanical, electrical and struc-
tural
d. Plan of space
e. Lighting
f. Rescue team briefed
g. SCBA and BA board ready
h. Lifeline, harnesses, stretcher
and hoist ready
F. Establish a safe perimeter and evacu-
ate all non-essential personnel.
G. BA Team done gear and test commu-
nications
H. Back-up team prepare back-up equip-
ment including resuscitation and first
aid equipment
I. BA Team enter with proper PPE,
EEBD’s, torches, axes, rescue har-
nesses, lifelines and recovery strops
J. Complete rescue of casualty with
least delay whilst ensuring safety of
rescuers
K. On completion:
a. Personnel accountability
b. Remove tools and equipment
c. Decontamination
d. Secure scene
e. Debriefing

1. All necessary permits and checklists 1. Yes, as per Saudi Aramco require-
completed. ments.
2. CSE plan in place. 2. Yes
3. Fall protection plan in place 3. Yes
4. Standby man trained. 4. Yes
5. Personnel trained. 5. No
6. Rescue personnel trained. 6. No
7. Rescue equipment available. 7. Ext - Yes. Internally – Partially.
8. Aviation Response

121
8. Dispatch 1 helicopter to the scene
to retrieve the casualty.
Recommendations: All personnel to receive CSE awareness training. Rescue team to be
identified and trained. Rescue equipment to be sourced.

1. MMSOD
2. FPD
3. LPD
4. Medical
5. ISO
6. QAVI
7. Aviation

narios.)

vere)
(3) (1) (3)


122
2.15 Offshore Oil Spill
Type of Emergency:

Medical _______ Natural Disaster
_______ Flooding

(Provide a detailed description of units/equipment involved, as well as possible effects on them,
on personnel, on other units/equipment, outside the fence, etc.)
This incident involves a marine department tanker which is in transit between port facilities. It is
termed ‘Vessel A’. Weather conditions are NNW winds of Beaufort Force 4.
During a self-bunkering operation a spillage occurs on the main deck from the bunkering hose connec-
tion.
B. Possible Causes:
1. Damaged gasket.
2. Improper connection.
3. Bunker receiving valve closed.
1. Leakage on the main deck starboard side approximately 50 liters of Gas Oil.
2. The duration is expected to last for 1 hour.
fected.)
1. The vessel would not be able to operate which the incident is taking place.
2. This should not have an adverse effect on Marine Department operations.
the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types, quanti-
ties, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.].)
1. Oil spill equipment in the fore store and hose handling crane area, Oil Spill drums and welding
pumps on the main deck, aft part.
2. Fire hoses and foam monitors on the main deck.

123
3. The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 4 NNW winds. These con-
ditions would not cause an adverse effect on the situation. Conditions which may intensify the
situation and could hamper the response would be night conditions, restricted visibility, high
winds, rough seas and large swells.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineering
controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
1. Check materials before hose connection, 4. None.

2. Make regular pressure test of the bunkering
hose.
3. Check the bunkering system including valves
status for readiness for operation.
4. Prepare bunkering plan.
5. Assign responsible deck and engine officers.
6. Maximum rates to be agreed. Regular checks
of the rate. Ensure low rate on commence-
ment of bunkering.
7. Ensure of sufficient space in the bunker tank.
Required Actions: OOW
1. Stop all cargo and bunkering opera-
tions, and close manifold valves
2. Sound the emergency alarm, and ini-
tiate emergency response procedures
3. Inform terminal/ loading master/
bunkering personnel about the inci-
dent
4. Record of incident commenced.
Master

124
1. Stop all cargo and bunkering opera-

tions, and close manifold valves
2. Sound the emergency alarm, and ini-
tiate emergency response procedures
including SOPEP
3. Inform terminal/ loading master/
bunkering personnel about the inci-
dent
4. Record of incident commenced
5. Master assumes control of vessel af-
ter briefing from OOW
6. Pollution prevention team mustered.

7. Make notifications in accordance
with national and international regu-
lations.
8. Is there a risk of fire?
9. Smoking on board banned.
10. Consider whether to stop air intake
into accommodation and non-essen-
tial air intake to engine-room.
11. If spill in water, consider shutting
down ER sea water intakes.
12. Consider mitigating activities such as
decontamination of personnel who
have been exposed.
13. Reduce the tank level by dropping
cargo or bunkers into an empty or
slack tank.
14. Is external assistance required?
15. Will vessels stability be compromised
by spill and or transfer?
Emergency Party:
1. Nature and source of spill confirmed.
2. Quantity of spill confirmed.
3. Spill stopped.
4. Spill contained onboard.
5. Commence cleanup operation.
6. Drain affected area of oil.
7. Prepare portable pumps if it is possible.
8. Arrangement made for the collection of oil.
9. Arrangements made for the disposal of resi-
dues.
10. Sample of spilled oil taken.
Engine Room Party:
1. Engine room party mustered.

2. Report given to Chief Engineer about inci-
dent.

125
3. Instructions issued to ER party.

4. If leakage in ER, stop machinery in vicinity of
leakage.
Pre-Incident Plan Information: Resource Availa-

(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which ble
includes personnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop
and execute pre-incident plans. Identify all human and material resources re-
quired, as well as those available, and provide recommendations for upgrades as
required.)
Resource Required
Trained and competent vessel crew.
SOPEP onboard and officers familiar with its content and equipment.
OIL SPILL EQUIPMENT INVENTORY
# Item Req. Quantity
1 Sorbent Boom 3m x 10 cm 8 pkt 8 pkt
2 Sorbent Pads 48cm x 43cm, 200 pads per 1pc 2 pcs 2 pcs
3 Sorbent Pads 97cm x 86cm 50 pads 50 pads
4 Sorbent Rolls 44m x 48cm 2 rolls 2 rolls
5 Seacare OSD 250 ltrs 250 ltrs
6 Jet Spray 10lit 2 pcs 2 pcs
7 Rubber Boots 12 pairs 12 pairs
8 Oil Chemical Resistant Gloves 12 pairs 12 pairs
9 Disposable Overall Suits 24 pcs 24 pcs
10 Hand Cleaner, 5ltrs 1 pc 1 pc
11 Deck Box C/W Roll Waste Bags, 10 bags 1 pc 1 pc
12 Plastic Bucket 15lit 12 pcs 12 pcs
13 Non-Spark Plastic Shovel 6 pcs 6 pcs
14 Non-Spark Plastic Hand Scope 6 pcs 6 pcs
15 Non-Spark Plastic Squeegee 6 pcs 6 pcs
16 Non-Spark Plastic Broom 12 pcs 12 pcs
17 Protective Vented Googles 12 pcs 12 pcs
18 Safety Hats 6 pcs 6 pcs
19 Wilden Pumps M-8 2 pcs 2 pcs
20 Suction Hose with Fittings 10mtrs 2 pcs 2 pcs

126
21 Discharging Hose with Fittings 25mtrs 2 pcs 2 pcs

22 Air-Hose with Fittings 30mtrs 2 pcs 2 pcs
Additional items
23 Plastic Bags 100 pcs
24 Rubber Bucket 4 pcs
25 Deck Broom 4 pcs
26 Hand Broom 0 pcs
27 Containment Drum 200ltrs 4 drums
28 Mop 30 pcs
29 Rags 350 kgs
30 Saw Dust 7 bags
31 Scupper Plugs (Spare) 4 pcs
28 con-
32 Ace Heavy Duty Cleaner 25ltrs tainer
33 Teepol Liquid Soap 80 ltrs
Yes, as per the
ISM Code.
H. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

 All Marine Divisions

 John Hopkins Aramco Healthcare
 Aviation Department
I. Evaluation and Ranking:

1 (3) (1) (2)


127
2.16 Search and Rescue
Plant/Unit/Equipment: OFSSV and attending vessels Scenario No.: 16
Type of Emergency: X Flammable Vapor Release X Structural Collapse

X Search/Rescue X Explosion
X Abandonment
This incident involves Gas Drilling Rigs (A), (B) and (C), various SAR helicopters, various attending vessels and the
OFSSV (D).
(A) is involved in drilling HSBH-56, which is an offshore gas development well. The well is being drilled from
HSBH 56/59 platform, targeting the flank of the high pressure Khuff gas reservoir in the Hasbah Gas Field. The
platform is in close proximity to HSBH 22 platform (1.47 km away), HSBH 21 platform (1.84 km away) and HSBH
23 platform (1.84 km away). The Khuff gas contains about 5 mole % H2S. The well is located approximately 50
km north of Karan field and 50 km northwest of Arabiyah field.
For any drilling in the vicinity of other internal and external organizations, the respective areas of responsibility
are as follows:
 Drilling is responsible for all personnel on the drill site and all D&WO personnel locate within 30 ppm RER
(Rupture Exposure Radius) of the well.
 The Wellsite and appropriate D&WO Superintendent will be responsible for their personnel working
within 5 km of the well.
 Area Production Department and PMT will be responsible for all personnel associated with their respective
activities outside the drill site and within 5 km of the well.
At approximately 14:00 (A) suffers a catastrophic failure. An uncontrollable flow of high pressure gas ignites
causing a huge explosion. This results in total engulfment. Within 60 minutes, (A) collapses and capsizes. Of the
115 persons onboard, 85 die due to the explosion and subsequent fires, H2S exposure and drowning. Of the 30
survivors, 15 escape in a lifeboat. 15 are in the water and 5 of these are seriously injured.
Marine have 3 dedicated AHTSS vessels in the field at any one time. Fast crew boats and a significant number of
other assets can be made available at very short notice for response to a major incident.
During day light, Aviation normally operate approximately 6 or 7 helicopters from Tanajib and 3 or 4 from Ras
Tanura. Therefore you could get as many as 10 helicopters for support in approximately 2 hours from notifica-
tion during the day.

128
General Location of the incident

Using a combination of vessels and helicopters, Rigs (B) and (C) are safely evacuated to (D). Following close coor-
dination with attending SAR assets, the 30 survivors are also safely evacuated to (D). The seriously injured are
stabilized by the onboard medic on (D) and then transferred to Tanajib Clinic for further treatment. FiFi
equipped Marine Vessels are utilized to tackle the fire and bring it under control.
The general preferred hierarchy of full facility down manning and evacuation of a Gas Rig is:
1. Helicopter via helideck
2. Support vessel via personnel transfer
3. Lifeboat
4. Escape to sea (escape ladders)
A temporary first aid station/triage area would be set up on board the OFSSV with a team of medics transferred
from shore side to the OFSSV. This is used to treat non-life threating injuries.
OFSSV with 4 vessels alongside

129
B. Possible Causes:
1. Blow out on rig

2. Blow out on nearby well
3. Blow out on main distribution platform (TP-01)
4. Terrorist attack
5. Rig need to evacuate due to fire, H2S, LEL etc.
4. Constructive total loss of one drilling rig.

5. Hasbah Gas Field would be affected.
6. 85 personnel fatalities.
7. The duration of the emergency is at least 36 hours.
affected.)
3. Shut down of Gas Operations in the Hasbah Gas Field

4. Saudi Aramco gas producing capability would suffer losses.
5. The insured replacement value of (A) is $200 MM to $650 MM.
6. Bad publicity and loss of confidence in Saudi Aramco’s ability to conduct safe operations.
7. Cost of the combined air-and-sea SAR operation would be substantial.
may intensify the situation and information that may need to be known by responders
[restricted access; types, quantities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the af-
fected area; etc.].)
The scenario is during the day with calm weather and Beaufort Force 3 winds. These conditions are suitable for
abandoning ship and the subsequent search and rescue operations. Conditions which may intensify the situation
and could hamper the response would be night conditions, restricted visibility, high winds, rough seas and large
swells.
Vessels and aircraft would have to approach from upwind and would be at risk of further explosions, flames, H 2S,
SIMOPS, collision etc.
Marine Department AHTSS Vessels have the following capabilities and equipment:
1. Fire Fighting Equipment
Vessels are classed as per contract either FFV-1, FFV-2 or FFV-3 and provided with the equipment required as per
the class notation. This includes all the ancillary equipment such as searchlights, additional hydrants, fire hoses &
nozzles, fireman outfits & SCBA sets.
2. Plans & Procedures

A comprehensive Rescue Operations Plan / Manual prescribed by the Contractor and approved by Saudi Aramco
(SA). Plan is posted in the bridge and drills incorporating various rescue scenarios are conducted at intervals not
exceeding three (3) months.
Crew are capable of demonstrating competence in utilization of safety / rescue equipment and understanding of

130
Rescue Operations Plan requirements.
3. First Aid / Survivor Facilities

3.1 Survivor Reception / Recovery Area:
Survivor reception and recovery areas with adequate seating and protection from the elements is provided. The
recovery area is capable of accommodating a minimum of twelve (12) persons. This area may be the crew / pas-
senger lounge. A cabin with two (2) berths is available for use by survivors, this may be the hospital. A shower,
wash basin & toilet is also available.
3.2 Survivor Treatment Room (Hospital):
This is easily accessible with a stretcher from the main deck. It has a bed, separate shower, toilet and hand basin
facilities. The hospital has an instrument table, secure medical cabinet with medicines & equipment, emergency
lighting and a patient alarm audible on the bridge. Phone communications to the bridge is also fitted.
3.3 Eye Wash & Shower Station:
An emergency eye wash station and rinsing shower is provided on the deck adjacent to the rescue zone to enable
survivors to be rinsed & cleaned of contaminants prior to entering the survivor reception / recovery area.
3.4 Medic / Safety Officer
An appointed officer trained in basic medical treatment and vessel safety and rescue operations.
4. Rescue Equipment
4.1 Fast Rescue Craft (FRC):
A Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) system for survivor rescue or medevac purpose only is provided. It is serviced and certi-
fied annually by an authorized service agent. It meets the following criteria;
 A single point launching davit located clear of thrusters/ propellers and fendering. In compliance with
SOLAS Regulation No 48.
 The launch system is such that the FRC can be cleared away in less than two (2) minutes.
 Inboard diesel powered waterjet propulsion.
 An approved quick release system.
 Nine (9) person capacity including three (3) man crew.
 Equipped as per IMO resolution A 656.
 An additional 2KG DP fire extinguisher is provided.
 Crew Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Inflatable Lifejacket, Hard Hat Eye Goggles, Leather Gloves &
High Visibility vest,
 A fitted waterproof VHF radio complete with external speaker and headset for the coxswain.
 Fifteen (15) inflatable marine lifejackets. Fully certified and serviced annually.
FRC crew are fully trained and certificated. The Chief Officer holds a coxswain certificate and at least one (1) engi-
neer is certified crew.
4.2 Rescue Zones:
Rescue Zones are established on both sides of the vessel clear of thrusters and overboard discharges. They comply
with the following:
 Distinctly marked by black & yellow diagonal lines and the words RESCUE ZONE
 Adequately illuminated on both deck and over-side to the waterline with no shadow areas.
 Bulwarks are provided with access of either opening or removable type of adequate length to accommo-
date the scramble nets and deck crew assistance for survivor access.
 Two (2) scramble nets are available to be fitted at each zone. Each net is capable of reaching from the
main deck level to 1m below the waterline with the vessel at lightest operational draft.
 Fendering does not impede the rescue zone area or deployment of the nets.
 Provided with an adequate number of securing points for nets, safety lines and rescue craft.
 A portable over-side ladder with suitable securing system providing footholds clear of vessels side and
reach a depth of 1m below the waterline when vessel at lightest operational draft.
 Clear access is provided to the survivor holding areas and treatment room.

131
 An additional eight (8) lifebuoys complete with 30m buoyant lines are available in addition to those re-
quired by flag state / SOLAS. These are stowed in a protected store on board.
4.3 Life-rafts:
Life-raft capacity on board is capable of accommodating forty (40) persons per side. Total eighty (80).
4.4 Portable VHF Radios:
Three (3) hand held multi-channel VHF radios compete with spare batteries and chargers. These are in additional
to the units provided for general on board use.
5. Helicopter Winching Equipment:

The following is available for helicopter winching operations:
 A Winching Area clearly marked with a circled W on the aft end of the main deck, free from obstruction
when the main deck is not loaded.
 Fixed Aviation USB radio accessible to aft control console complete with frequencies 121.5, 138.2, 138.225
& 138.25 Mhz.
 Three (3) x High Visibility Vests
 Wind sock complete with illumination and with suitable means of erecting on wheelhouse top and clearly
visible from the aft areas of the vessel.
 Two (2) pairs of heavy duty insulated rubber gloves
 One (1) long earth bonding pole complete with suitable of length of earthing wire connected to a clamp.
 One (1) pair of heavy duty wire cutters with a minimum of 1m long arms.
 One (1) Shell type rescue stretcher complete with certified four (4) point lifting harness.
 One (1) pair of Day / Night aircraft directing batons.
 Two (2) portable transistorized battery powered / rechargeable loud hailers.
6. Additional Fire / Safety Equipment

The following additional equipment is provided:
 Four (4) Fall Protection Safety Harnesses.
 Two (2) Fireman Outfits in addition to and with same equipment as required by the SOLAS & FFV 1 re-
quirements.
 A clean air compressor for recharging the SCBA set air bottles. Must be serviced and clean air certified an-
nually.
 Two (2) portable multi-gas detection meters capable of detecting H2S, Hydrocarbons and Oxygen.
The Offshore Floating Storage and Supply Vessel (OFSSV) is assigned to the AHTSS Unit with Gas Rigs Critical Oper-
ations being the end user. The OFSSV produces and supplies products and services to the gas rigs in the Karan,
Hasbah and Arabiyah Gas Fields. Products produced and supplied include Water Based Mud (WBM) and Fresh Wa-
ter. Products received from vessels include Barite, Bentonite, Cement and packaged chemicals involved in the
manufacturing process of WBM.
It is currently anchored in Hasbah Anchorage, within sight of the Hasbah Gas Field.
The OFSSV has the following capabilities and equipment:

Length Overall: 190.00m
Breadth: 28.00m
Depth: 16.80m
Max Draft: 11.50m
Deadweight: 32,174T
Deck Area: 1,360m2 (wooden deck)

132
Deck Capacity: 2,500MT

Accommodation: 110
Cranes: 4 (2x60, 1x25 and 1x5)
Helideck: CAP 437 Compliant. Suitable for Sikorsky S92. Day Only.
Lifeboat/Rescue Boats: 2x28 men
Lifeboats: 2x32men
Liferafts: 6x25 men and 1x6 men
Medical: One Doctor’s office with Medic on-board, medical supplies locker
with two first aid kits, one hospital room with two beds, one
resuscitation set, two stretchers, one sterilizer and toilet, shower and
sink.
Aviation have 6 A109 helicopters and 14 AW139 helicopters. The small A109 can carry one medivac stretcher day
only. The AW139 can be configured to carry either one stretcher or a 4 person stretcher during the day or night.
For moving normal passengers the AW139 would be used. It can carry 12 passengers.
In this situation, Aviation could launch within 30 minutes of notification one helicopter from Tanajib and one from
RT configured for medivac. With both configured for 4 inured you could get 8 injured people off the helideck
fairly fast. 30 minutes to reconfigure aircraft. Approximately 45 minutes flight to Arabiyah/Hasbah. This equates
to being on station in around 1 hour 15 minutes from notification.
Depending upon circumstances other aircraft could be made available especially during daylight when full crews
are on duty. In such an incident the entire resources of the Aviation Department would be made available.
During day light, Aviation normally operate approximately 6 or 7 helicopters from Tanajib and 3 or 4 from Ras Ta-
nura. Therefore you could get as many as 10 helicopters for support in approximately 2 hours from notification
during the day.
At night Aviation have one 1 aircraft at Tanajib and 1 at Ras Tanura. That is assuming they shut down normal op-
erations and shift to disaster recovery/relief mode.
The Rawabi Integrity helideck is limited to DAY ONLY. The January 2016 helideck 2016 showed the helideck did
not have flood lights so night flights are prohibited. That is a significant limitation.
An offshore Gas Rig has the following Capabilities and equipment:
Helideck: CAP 437 Compliant. Suitable for AW139. Day and night.
Lifeboats: 3x60 men
Rescue Boat: 1
Liferafts: 6x25 men (davit launched) and 4x25 men (throw-over)

133
Typical AHTSS Layout

134
OFSSV Layout

135
AW109 Layout
AW139 Layout

136

137

138
Typical Gas Rig Evacuation Layout
 Evacuate personnel to standby boat and from  D&WO to arrange a Major Evacuation Drill to
there to safe location e.g. HUB, Tanajib, or test all resources, response, procedures and
Nearby platform (needs to be able to handle identify any gaps.
all personnel in HASBHA field in worse cause  An action plan to be developed to close any
scenario +/- 100 per rig) identified gaps including training of person-
 Evacuation from safe location by helicopter nel, resource suitability, resource capability,
 Sufficient boats if required to fight fires resource readiness and suitability of proce-
dures.

139
Required Actions: 1. Carefully note all details of the received
(List all required initial response actions.) message
2. Stop all operations
3. If necessary bring ALL crew to Emergency
Stations
4. Re-transmit distress message
5. Maintain continuous listening watch on all
distress frequencies
6. Establish communications with all other
surface units and SAR aircraft involved in
the SAR operation
7. Plot position, courses and speeds of other
assisting units
8. Monitor X-Band radar for locating survival
craft transponder (SART) signal using 6 or
12 nautical mile range scales.
9. Post extra look-outs for sighting flares and
other pyrotechnic signals
10. The vessel should be prepared to receive
survivors, with berthing food and shelter
11. The Hospital and medical facilities should
be made ready to provide first aid and
other treatments as applicable.
12. Maintain a 24-hour listening radio watch
on channels 11 and 16 and be prepared to
respond to any distress calls. The marine
working channels are 6, 13, 21, 67 and 80.
13. Provide full assistance to all medical per-
sonnel who may be stationed on board the
vessel/Barge.
14. All Medevac operations to follow the pro-
cedure as stipulated in G.I. 1321.015 Re-
quest for Air Medical Evacuation
15. In cases where an IC has been assigned, all
search patterns will be conducted as per
IC’s instructions.
16. In case where only one vessel has been as-
signed to conduct a search pattern then
Masters should refer to the ERP (MIM
1193.504)
17. Vessels involved in SAR must be prepared
to work alongside other departments such
as Aviation, SAG Coast Guard, Royal Navy
or other 3rd party assets.
18. The Chief Engineer to be briefed and the
machinery prepared for possible maneu-
vering

140
19. Vessel to be prepared for Helicopter Opera-

tions as per International Chamber of Ship-
ping (ICS) ‘’Guide to Helicopter/Ship Opera-
tions
20. Survivors being transferred are to be
tended to and names recorded. The names
of each person should be communicated
once confirmed.
On Rig Actions
1. Detection of the emergency situation will
occur and be reported to the PIC as de-
scribed in the other relevant emergency re-
sponse procedures
2. Muster at the Control Room / Radio Room
/ Bridge and assess the emergency situa-
tion. Determine if there are any other haz-
ardous conditions at the scene before com-
manding the emergency response person-
nel to the scene of the emergency
3. Assess and select the appropriate method
of facility evacuation by giving considera-
tion to the hazardous conditions associated
with the emergency, the environmental
conditions and the available time. The gen-
eral preferred hierarchy of full facility down
manning and evacuation is:
5. Helicopter via helideck
6. Support vessel via personnel trans-
fer
7. Lifeboat
8. Escape to sea (escape ladders and
liferafts)
4. Determine and select the appropriate mus-
ter location for non-essential personnel.
Activate the general alarm and muster per-
sonnel. Mustering locations will be deter-
mined by giving consideration to the likely
means of evacuation to be used. In the case
that evacuation will be performed via heli-
copter or support vessel the forward life-
boat station should be used for the muster
location
5. Provide emergency response instructions
to all personnel over the PA / GA system
6. Consult with the Client Offshore Repre-
sentative on the desired condition in which
the well is to be left, if applicable and if
time permitting. Command the Well Secur-
ing Team to take the agreed actions to se-
cure the well

141
7. Command the Radio Operator / Bridge

Watchkeeper to begin broadcasting
MAYDAY abandonment emergency com-
munication
8. Notify the onshore ERT of the decision to
abandon and to commence the necessary
onshore emergency response support ac-
tions
9. Command all emergency response person-
nel to prepare for evacuation as described
in the Rig Operations Manual
10. Activate the Abandonment Alarm and
make an abandonment announcement
over the PA / GA system
11. Commence facility abandonment actions as
described in the Rig Operations Manual

personnel from applicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre- inci-
dent plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those available, and pro-

10. Trained and competent vessel and air crew. 1. Yes
11. Vessels capable of performing sea SAR. 2. Yes
12. Aircraft capable of performing sea SAR 3. No
13. Fully functioning and equipped lifeboats and 4. Yes
liferafts on the rigs. 5. Yes
14. (HSBH-56/RBK-56) Emergency Response Plan 6. Yes
15. G.I. 6.001 Notification Requirements for Inci- 7. Yes
dents (Including Fires) 8. Yes
16. GI 0082.001 Emergency Response Operations 9. Yes
Roles & Responsibilities In Offshore Oilfields 10. Yes
17. GI 1321.015 Request for Air Medical Evacua- 11. Yes
tion. 12. No
18. GI 1851.001 Offshore Emergency Response - 13. Yes
Roles and Responsibilities 14. Yes
19. MIM 1193.504 Marine Department Emergency 15. Yes
Response Plan 16. Yes
20. MIM 1193.507 Safety Drills on Board Marine
Vessels
21. OFSSV Helideck can support 24 hour opera-
tions.
22. IMO Guidelines for the Development of Plans
and Procedures for the Recovery of Persons
from the Water (MSC.1/Circ.1447)
23. ICS Guide to Helicopter/Ship Operations 4th
Edition

142
24. International Aeronautical and Maritime
Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual
25. SMG 08-001-2008 Emergency Preparedness
Guide (Safety Management Guide)
Recommendations:
1. D&WO to conduct a full evacuation drill of an offshore gas rig to ensure the effectiveness of their pro-
cedures. MD can then measure their response capabilities.
2. AD to study the feasibility of acquiring the capability of carrying out full marine search and rescue op-
erations.
3. RVOS to conduct a feasibility study to fit the Hub out for night time helicopter operations.
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for
comments/input on items A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 Drilling & Workover
 Pipelines
 Loss Prevention Department
 JHAH
 FrPD
 Aviation
 SofPD

(Assess risk [severity and probability of occurrence] and assign a ranking to prioritize
scenarios.)

(3) (1) (3)
Reviewed by: Daniel Wood and Larry Kilbane (QA&CU) Date: Nov 14th, 2016
Approved by:Hasan Anbar (SMS Element 8 Champion) Date: Nov 15th, 2016

143
2.17 Offshore Hostile Act
Offshore Hostile Act No: 17-OFF
Type of Emergency:
Flammable Vapor Release Structural Collapse
X Fire Toxic Vapor Release
Search/Rescue X Explosion
Hazardous Material Confined Space
Medical Natural Disaster
Equipment Failure X Security
Other

(Provide a detailed description of units/equipment involved as well as possible effects on them, on personnel, on
other units/equipment)
At 18:00hrs 1 high speed RIB is seen approaching the starboard side of the (Offshore Hub). The Captain was in-
formed and shortly before his arrival on the bridge a loud bang was heard and the vessel (HUB) shook violently. A
large plume of smoke and flames was seen to rise form forward of the accommodation block. The Captain takes
charge of the situation
Location of HUB with distance to Iranian Border.
18:01hrs The general alarm is sounded and ALL crew and operations personnel muster. (Of the 90 on board only
84 mustered)
18;03hrs The Hub Master advises Port Control and initiates the ERP
The explosion and fire occurred in the bulk room.
18:07hrs The Captain requests the assistance of other vessel’s in the general location which are stationed off and
have FiFi capabilities. Other vessels are also requested to attend. A Pan Pan message is transmitted.

144
18:08hrs: On deck the crew immediately set about their duties as per the muster list in order to contain and extin-
guish the fire. BA Teams are readied, hoses are ran out, fire pumps are started, boundary cooling commences,
There is a large fire in the mud mixing deck. It has been determined that this is also the location of 6 of the miss-
ing personnel.
18:09hrs A list to starboard is becoming readily apparent.
18:10 As the firefighting commences, it is decided to evacuate non-essential crew from the HUB. This will be done
by utilizing assets with high passenger capacity and other floating assets which are on station in the Hasbah Field.
Evacuation by helicopter is to be avoided due to the reduced visibility caused from the fire.
The evacuation will be from the port side of the integrity as the fire has disabled the starboard side LSA.
18:12 Saudi Coast guard vessel is in attendance.
18:15 A second smaller explosion is heard from the location of the fire. There is a risk of further fire and explosion
as there is a large quantity of combustible material.
18:20 The fire teams report that the heat is intensifying and they are unable to gain access to the location. They
pull back to allow further cooling by the off vessel FiFi.
18;21 Ballast is pumped into the forward port tanks to stabilize the situation
18:25 Industrial Security requests the complete evacuation of the hub as they have received reports of a second
vessel acting suspiciously in the area.
18:33 Saudi Navy and Coast Guard open fire on a second rib acting suspiciously. It retreats in an easterly direction.
18:54 All crew abandon the HUB however 6 crew are still missing
23:50: The HUB sinks with the loss of 6 lives.
B. Possible Causes:
The possible causes for this attack can be summarized as follows:
(List all possible causes, this will help in identifying preventive measures)
 A terrorist organization.
 An unprovoked attack by a hostile nation
 An attack by rogue elements operating independently.
(Provide estimates of the size, the areas affected and duration of the emergency)
 The entire structure of the HUB will be affected.
 The duration is expected to last several hours with inevitable total loss.
 Because of the nature of the attack, there is an additional risk of a further follow up attack on assisting
vessels.
(List all possible effects on involved operations (including up & downstream) that may be affected).
 All operations on the vessel will be suspended.
 All vessels with FiFi and MOB Rescue Facilities shall be made available
 The Hasbah Field is close by (approx. 4 miles to the NE) operations in this area may have to be scaled back
and non-essential crew put on standby for evacuation.
(Identify specific locations and equipment involved and provide information on items that may intensify the situation
and information that may need to be known by responders (restricted access, types, quantities and locations of haz-
ardous materials stored in the affected area)
The starboard side of the vessel took the force of the impact and subsequent explosion. In this area the dry bulk
tanks are located. At this time 7 persons would be present. The hull was breached allowing water to ingress.
In this area of the vessel there are numerous types of combustible material including:
 Diesel
 Hydraulic Oil

145
 Lube Oil
 Compressed Air Cylinders
 Large compressed dry bulk tanks.
 Rubber hoses
 Packaging form material
 The RIB was small enough and fast enough  Regular drills to be carried out jointly with Se-
that is was not detected by the RADAR equip- curity and Coast Guard for security incidents
ment on board. such as this with particular focus on vessels or
 There was a lack of awareness or importance small craft acting suspiciously.
placed on watch keeping duties.  Increase the frequency of fire drills.
 Poor transfer of communications in terms of  Increase the frequency of search and rescue
imminent security threats and intelligence drills on board such vessels which are station-
gathering. ary.
 Failure to understand the current security  Joint firefighting drills with support vessels.
threat level as perceived and assessed by ISO  The review and logging of security infor-
(Industrial Security Operations). mation received.
 The installation of an early warning detection
system such as REWS (Radar Early Warning
System).
 The mustering of all crew on the Offshore
Hub
 The activation of the SSAS (Ship Security Alert
System)
 The putting into action of the ERP and the
communication protocol.
 The evacuation of all non -essential person-
nel.
 The request for assistance from nearby ves-
sels with off ship FiFi capabilities.

146
 The assistance from Saudi Coast Guard and

the Royal Saudi Navy
 Preparation of firefighting teams as per the
muster list.

(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes personnel)

MIM 1193.504 Emergency Response Plan Yes
GI: 6.025 Control of Remote Area Travel and Search / Yes
Rescue Procedures. Yes
GI: 82.001 Emergency Response Operations Roles Yes
&Responsibilities in Offshore Oilfields
Contractor companies ISM and drill matrix
Recommendations:
This type of attack is the preferred choice of terrorist organizations. Its use of remote control fast craft are
very hard to detect. Therefore its very important that multi organization drills are conducted twice yearly so
as to be prepared for this threat.

(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items A-H and for
identification of needed responses)
 Security Department
 Medical Department
 Saudi Aramco Affairs
 Saudi Arabian Government

scenarios.)

3 1 3
Reviewed by:Lawrence Kilbane QA/CU Date:23rd Aug 2017

Approved by: Date:

147
Arc Flash
Plant/Unit/Equipment: Vessel Engine Room Scenario No: 15
Type of Emergency: Arc Flash

Flammable Vapor Release Structural Collapse
X Fire Toxic Vapor Release
Search/Rescue Explosion
Hazardous Material Confined Space
Medical Natural Disaster
Equipment Failure Security
X Other
(Provide a detailed description of units/equipment involved as well as possible effects on them, on personnel, on other
units/equipment)
Two new large air compressors were being installed onto a vessel to add additional air capacity. The power of each
was 100kw. The supply was to be taken from the port and starboard main switchboards respectively using two of
the four spare breakers already fitted. The main supply boards are 440v 3ph 60Hz. The breakers are manufactured
to IEC/EN 60947-2, Category B which is the standard to which industrial circuit breakers are manufactured.
The power cables had been run in from the switchboard to the location in the engineroom when the vessel had
been in drydock. The supply breakers had been labeled and locked off.
The plan was to run in power for the short period the main switchboards were dead and later complete installa-
tion when time allowed.
A few days later when the vessel was back in the water with power reinstated alongside the layby berth the com-
pletion of compressor installation was commenced.
When moving the free end of the cables into the starter box for the port compressor the cable core touched the
steel box where they were about to be pulled into. When this happened a loud bang along with a large flash oc-
curred.
The worker who was moving the cable jumped back and fell against machinery behind him. Some minor burns
were noted on his face and hands where the flash had arced off the steel junction box.
Typical ship 440V switchboard.

B. Possible Causes:

148
(List all possible causes, this will help in identifying preventive measures)
The cable that was supposed to be dead was in fact live and connected to a 100A isolator that was in the
‘On’ position.
The cables that were run in whilst the switchboard were wrongly connected.
Investigation showed that the cables were connected to the wrong isolators. The cable to the port com-
pressor was connected to the stbd isolator and the stbd compressor was connected to the port isolator.
The first compressor to be connected was the stbd one and when completed the breaker was closed in
anticipation of a complete test. Verification was not done at that point as the port compressor was still to
be done.
Effectively the closing of the stbd isolator had made the unconnected cable to the port compressor live
direct with 440V 3ph power.

(Provide estimates of the size, the areas affected and duration of the emergency)
The compressor junction box suffered a small amount of burn damage to the outer casing. The cable end
was melted and the port switchboard supply breaker tripped causing partial blackout of the vessel.
The duration from accident to return of power was approximately 30 minutes.
The worker was slightly burned on the backs of his hands and lower part of his face. He had been wearing
safety glasses and consequently no permanent damage to his sight occurred. In the short term his eyes
were flash blinded resulting in soreness which would improve with rest and recuperation.
(List all possible effects on involved operations (including up & downstream) that may be affected).
Due to the accident a number of issues had to be resolved.
 All cables that had been run in needed to be line re-checked for correct installation and termina-
tion before reinstatement.
 Permit to work system and LOTO use to be investigated and use checked. Further training to be
given before work restarted to ensure that system is used properly to protect personnel and
equipment.
The two main areas above would delay the commencement of work by 24 hours and subsequent delay in
vessel availability.
situation and information that may need to be known by responders (restricted access, types, quantities and
locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area)
The location of the incident is the upper flat above the main engines. The junction boxes are located on
the after bulkhead in way of the walkway.
Access to the engineroom is via the main entrance, the tween deck entrance and the aft entrance. There
are two escape routes also.
The equipment involved is as follows;

 Port main switchboard
 Starboard main switchboard.
 Port switchboard breaker/trip

149
 Port 100A isolator

 Stbd 100A isolator
 Port compressor junction box
 Stbd compressor junction box.
In the area no chemicals or oils stored.
The space around is congested with additional engineroom auxiliary machinery which may restrict easy
access for stretchers if required.
New power cables All cables to be ring tested and then verified by on
board staff. The ETO (STCW III/6) would be best
placed to carry out this work.
All cables to be double checked for live or dead status
Permit to work before being manipulated even if it appears the isola-
tor is in the ‘Off’ position.
The permit to work system must be re-evaluated to
ensure that it is used as a means to ensure safety of
people and equipment not to be a tick box exercise.
Training to be given.
The correct Arc Flash PPE is to be used when working
on equipment where there is potential for energy re-
lease. The required standard is 40 cal/cm2.
The initial response was to find and check that the worker involved was injured or not. When the engineers ar-
rived they assessed the condition of the cables that were suspected of being live.
First aid called and the master contacted dockyard control to ask for emergency services to be sent.

(Information in this section shall be provided by the pre-incident plan team, which includes personnel from ap-
plicable response and support organizations to develop and execute pre-incident plans. Identify all human and mate-
rial resources required, as well as those available, and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)

150

QA/CU to make assessment of situation and to help Yes
Loss Prevention.
Recommendations:
Improve the use of the Permit to Work and to ensure that personnel understand the LOTO policy and how to
use it to guarantee safety of workers.
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items A-H and for
identification of needed responses)
QA/CU
Loss Prevention
Marine Technical Department
Port Engineering.

scenarios.)

3 1 3
Reviewed by: Lawrence Kilbane and Mark Chisholm Date: 27th Aug 2017
Approved by: Date:

151
2.18 Lightning Strike
Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels Scenario No.: 18
Type of Emergency:
_________ Flammable Vapor Release _________ Structural Collapse

_________ Medical _____X___ Natural Disaster
____X____ Equipment Failure _________ Security
____X____ Other
Vessel power generation, vessel management system and communication damage as result of lighting
strike.

During routine trip of a fast crew boat, which was carrying 50 passenger from Tanajib/West
Pier, to the work location on offshore fields/offshore infrastructures.
A severe weather is affecting the offshore area, which is resulting a lightning strike on the fast
crew boat. The Lightning made significant damage on the power generation and distribution
system, which result that the vessel has experienced a blackout and drifting to shore line.
Moreover all electronic appliances experienced significant damages including communication
equipment (portable and fixed radio)
B. Possible Causes:
Lightning strike during severe weather.

Initially the fast crew boat lost its capability to manoeuvre and the two way communication (shore to
offshore) due to the Lightning strike. The vessel power generators and vessel management distribu-
tion system is not in operation mode resulting to lose the manoeuvrability control.
The effect of the lighting strike on the fast crew boat, has an impact on the operations within the Ar-
amco fields and operation offshore infrastructures such as GOSPS, SI and terminal control. As the
crew boat isn’t able to continue its trip with 50 passenger on board. Moreover the vessels nearby will
respond to assist during the emergency for supporting and evacuation proposes.

152
the situation and information that may need to be known by responders [restricted access; types, quan-
tities, and locations of hazardous materials stored in the affected area; etc.]).
The location of the effected equipment will be on board the fast crew boat on the power
distribution control and the internal communication and other location, equipment which
will be known to the vessel officers. This information will need to be passed to shore-side
“nearest port control.
A full plan of the vessel will be available including mustering all crew on board and to
made ready the towing ropes & tools prior arrived assistance.
(Identify existing preventive measures in place and determine additional measures [engineering con-
trols, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
N/A Log the weather daily condition in the pre-departure check list.
Broadcasting the weather alerts to all vessels by port control, VTSO and unit
head.
Port closure to be conceder in case of severer weather and thunderstorm.

 All personnel is to proceed to the mess room.
 Head count.
Required Actions:
(List all required initial response
 Number of missing or injured personnel.
actions.)  Switch on the emergency radio.
 Inform the nearest port control.
 Initiate the 911 emergency reporting the incident
and the assistance required.
 Round the vessels for fire search.
 Prepare the vessel anchor incase its needed.
 Prepare the towing ropes for towing operation.
 Send the nearby vessels in the area to provide an
assistance.
 Assistance vessels arrived to the location.
 IC is to start the medical evacuating.
 Fast rescue boat is safely towed to the nearest port
control.
 IM is to declare that the emergency is under con-
trol.
 IM is to declare that the emergency is over and all
personnel is to stand down.

153
incident plans. Identify all human and material resources required, as well as those availa-
ble, and provide recommendations for upgrades as required.)
 Vessel Damage control tools and  Vessel Damage control tools and
equipment. equipment.
 Vessel firefighting equipment.  Vessel firefighting equipment.
 Vessel emergency Radio communica-  Vessel emergency Radio communi-
tion device. cation device.
 Towing operation equipment and  Towing operation equipment and
tools. tools.
 Vessels anchor.  Vessels anchor.
 Vessel emergency main and backup  Vessel emergency main and backup
team. team.
 Support vessels to provide assistance.  Support vessels to provide assis-
tance.
Recommendations: N/A
(Add all organizations that should review the Scenario Analysis Worksheet for comments/input on items
A-H and for identification of needed responses.)
 MD
 LPD
 FrPD
 JHAH
 Aviation
quences)
4 2 8

154
2.19 Anchor Fouling
Type of Emergency:
_______Flammable Vapor Release _______ Structural Collapse
_______ Fire _______Toxic Vapor Release
___X___ Equipment Failure _______ Security
___X____ Other
K. Description of the Scenario:

 During an emergency on-board one of the utilities boat, where she has a total blackout
due to the main engines failure, the vessel master instruct to drop vessel anchor close to
the field border to stop her from drifting toward the nearest platform.
 The vessel officers have sort the issues out with all engines and the vessel back on opera-
tion.
 The vessel master instruct the vessel boatswain to heave up anchor.
 While the vessel anchor Up-Down notice, the boatswain notice a power cable between
the anchor fluke and the anchor shank.

155
L. Possible Causes:
 The vessel drop its anchor close to the field border.
 The power cable should be inside the field boundary.
 The master should call the Rig-Move master to get permission.
M. Expected Size, Areas Affected, and Duration:

 Damage to Subsea Composite Cable (SCC) from MRJN GOSP-3 to HSBH TP-2 (KM.50)
N. Effect on Operations:
 Total shutdown due to loss of power and communications to TP.
O. Location-specific/Equipment-specific Notes:
Location Marjan Oil Field, Hassbah Gas Field, Marine Vessel, power cable.
Damage to the power cable between Marjan Oil Field, Hassbah Gas Field.
Total shutdown to TP-2 at Hassbah Field.
P. Preventive Measures:
[Engineering controls, etc.] that might be put into effect.)
 The vessel an emergency is to call the nearest port con-
trol.
 Port control is to assign escort vessel to support.
 Port control to inform marine Shift Superintendent.
 Port control to inform marine Rig move office.
 The power cable should be inside the field boundary.
 Support vessels are to escort the vessel in emergency
to safe location as instructed by Marine shift superin-
tendent.
Q. Initial Response:
Required Actions:
 The vessel an emergency is to call the nearest port con-
trol.
 Port control is to assign escort vessel to support.
 Port control to inform marine Shift Superintendent.
 Post IC.
 Activate marine ERP.
 Port control to inform marine Rig move office.
 Support vessels required to standby for further instruc-
tion.
 Establish communication with proponent ECC.
 POD is to be notified.

156
 Emergency Response Plan  Yes

 Vessels required.  Yes
 Diving.  Yes
 Maintenance  Yes
Recommendations:
 Establishing good communication between Marine ECC and ICP
on site.
 Identify the vessels by name and share the scenario with them.
 Share the scenario with the field proponent.
 Share the scenario with POD
R. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

 SOfPD.
 NAGDP
 RTPD
 ManfaPD
 Industrial security.
 LPD
 FrPD
 TMOD, RTMOD, MMD
 POD
 IT
 JHAH
S. Evaluation and Ranking:


vere)
1 (4) (1) (4)
Reviewed by: AL Sabaan Abdulhadi Date: January 09th, 2020

Approved by: QA&CU, RTLPD Date: January 09th, 2020

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Marine Department

Emergency Response Plan (Supplement)

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

1.0 - ONSHORE CREDIBLE SCENARIOS

SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Plant/Unit/Equipment: Quayside Fuelling Station Scenario No.: 1-ON

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

6. Prepare fire hoses for boundary cool-

Resource Required Resource Available

Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th, 2016

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Plant/Unit/Equipment: All Vessels Scenario No.: 2-ON

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

A full record of PTW and JSA for the job to be

When hot work is taking place on a vessel, it is

Training to be given to all crew/personnel who

Meal reliefs to be provided by the vessel man-

1. Vessel raises the alarm to Marine Shift

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

5. Marine facility personnel proceed to as-

Resource Required Resource Available

I. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Plant/Unit/Equipment: Sub-Station # 5 Scenario No.: 3-ON

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Required Actions: 1. Sound fire alarm

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

16. The location and class of the fire

H. Pre-Incident Plan Information:

Resource Required Resource Available

I. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

J. Evaluation and Ranking:

Probability Consequences Ranking

Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th , 2016

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Plant/Unit/Equipment: Contractor Warehouse/Store Scenario No.: 4-ON

C. Expected Size, Areas Affected, and Duration:

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

14. Information to be provided to FrPD:

Resource Required Resource Available

I. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

J. Evaluation and Ranking:

Probability Consequences Ranking

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

SCENARIO ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Plant/Unit/Equipment: Vessel/Port Control. Scenario No.: 5-ON

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

OOW watch to be assisted by Master and watchman during

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

d. Depth of water all round vessel

H. Pre-Incident Plan Information:

Resource Required Resource Available

I. Key Affected, Response, and Support Organizations Review:

Probability Consequences Ranking

Reviewed by: Paul Scott (QA&CU) Date: August 20th , 2016

Saudi Aramco: Company General Use

Type of Emergency: _ Flammable Vapor Release _ Structural Collapse