A NMC 11 Applicant

CCI- MIT WPU School of Law 2nd National Moot Court Competition 2022
Team Code: A- NMC11
CCI- MIT WPU SCHOOL OF LAW 2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2022
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSLAND
UNDER
SECTION 53(T) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
- IN THE MATTER OF-
PLF CONSTRUCTIONS LTD.………………………………………………………...APPLICANT
VERSUS
SOLITAIRE OWNER’S ASSOSIATION……………………………………………….RESPONDENT
Clubbed With
DMK CONSTRUCTIONS………………………………………………………………APPLICANT
VERSUS
DMK OWNER’S ASSOSIATION………………………………………………….....RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Memorial for Applicant 1 | Page

ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON'BLE

SUPREME COURT........................................................................................................................1
[1.1] THERE IS AN EXISTENCE OF STATUTORY PROVISION IN THE COMPETITION ACT,

2002..................................................................................................................................1
[1.2] ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES WERE EXHAUSTED BY THE APPLICANT AS THE

APPLICANTS FIRST APPEALED IN THE NCLAT AND THEN TO THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER SECTION 53T.........................................................................................................2
[1.3] APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE..................................................2
ISSUE 2 - WHETHER PLF IS OCCUPYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE ABOVE

RELEVANT MARKET?.................................................................................................................3
2.1 THE RELEVANT MARKET IN THE INSTANT CASE IS RESIDENTIAL

BUILDINGS IN NEW TUMBAI....................................................................................3
2.1.1 Relevant product market.............................................................................................3
2.1.2 Relevant geographical market.....................................................................................4
2.2 PLF DID NOT ENJOY A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET..................5
2.2.1 There cannot be two dominating player in the market................................................5
2.2.2 PLF has close competitor(s) in the relevant market....................................................6
2.3 ARGUENDO, PLF HAS NOT ABUSED ITS DOMINANT POSITION....................8
2.3.1 PLF did not imposed any unfair condition..................................................................8
2.3.2 The conduct of PLF does not limit or restrict the provision of services.....................9
2.3.3 PLF was not involved in any practice that result in denial of market access.............9
ISSUE 3 - THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK IS NOT ANTI-COMPETITIVE

AS PER SECTION 3 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002.......................................................10
3.1 THERE IS NO EXISTENCE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK UNDER SECTION
2(B) OF THE COMPETITION ACT......................................................................................10

3.2.THE PARALLEL CONDUCT OF PLF AND DMK IS NOT INDICATIVE OF ANY

COLLUSION.....................................................................................................................11
3.2.1 There was mere Price Parallelism between the companies.......................................11
3.2.2 Absence of any strong Plus Factors..........................................................................12
3.3 NO APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION IN INDIA AS UNDER SECTION

19(3) OF THE COMPETITION ACT...................................................................................13
1.3.1 Negative Factors under section 19(3) of the Competition Act are not satisfied.......14
1.3.2 Positive Factors under section 19(3) of the Competition Act are satisfied...............15
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

S. NO. ABBREVIATIO EXPANSION

NS
1 & And
.
2 ¶ Paragraph
.
3 § Section
.
5 AIR All India Reporter
.
6 Art Article
.
7 CCI Competition Commission of Indusland
.
8. Co Company
9. COMPAT Competition Appellate Tribunal
10. Corp Corporation
11. DG Director General
12. EC European Commission
13. Edn Edition
14. Ibid Ibidem
15. Inc Incorporation
16. Ltd Limited
17. No Number
18. OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
19. r/w Read with
20. SC Supreme Court
21. Vol Volume
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES
S. NO. ACTS PAGES
1. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, 1993 (Indusland) 2,3,Passim
2. Indusland Contract Act, 1872, Act No. 9 of 1872 (Indusland) 8
INDIAN CASES
S. NO. CASES PAGES
1. Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 AIR 540. 1
A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1906.

2. 2
Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries,

3. 2
1979 Air 1889 (SC).
Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 818.
4. 2
Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 (Supp.) S.C.C.

5. 2
420.
6. In Re: Mr. Umar Javeed and Ors v Google LLC and anr Case No. 3
39/2018 (CCI).
7. Shri M Mittal v. M/s Paliwal Developers Ltd, Case No. 112/2015 3

(CCI) .
8. In Re: Fast Track Call Cab Pvt Ltd and anr v ANI Technologies Pvt 3
Ltd Case No. 6 & 74/2015 (CCI).
Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd v. Ministry of Railways, 2012 Case

9. 3
No. 64/2010 (CCI).
Atos Worldline v. Verifone India, 2015 Case No. 56/2012 (CCI).
10. 3

Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited (2011) Case

11. 4,5,
No.19/2010 (CCI).
Passim
Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd v. Competition Commission of India

12. 5
Civil Appeal No. 641/2017.
Mr. Pankaj Aggarwal & ors v. DLF Home Developers Limited Case
13. 5
no. 55/ 2012 (CCI).
In Re: Financial Software and System v. M/s ACI Worldwide
14. 5
Solution Private Limited &ors O.S.A.Nos.280 to 283 of 2011.
CCI v. State of Mizoram CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10820-10822 OF
15. 5
2014 (SC).
Royal Energy Ltd v. IOCL and ors. 2012 Comp LR 563 (CCI).
16. 6
In re: Meru Travel Solutions Pvt Ltd v. Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd
17. 6
& Ors, Case No. 81/2015 (CCI).
N. Sanjeev Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Hire Purchase Association, Case
18. 6
No. 49/2012 (CCI).
Consumer Online Foundation v Tata Sky Ltd & Ors. Case No. 2/
19. 6
2009 (CCI).
DLF Park Place Residents Welfare Association v. DLF Ltd.
20. 6
Haryana Urban Development Authority Department of Town and
Country Planning, 2011 Comp LR 490 (CCI).
M/s Royal Energy Ltd. v. M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Case no.
21. 6
1 of 28 (CCI).
M/s Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and M/s Hindustan
22. 6
Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 2012 Comp LR 563(CCI).
Jupiter Gaming Solutions Pvt Ltd v. Finance Secretary, Government
23. 8
of Goa, CompLR 2012 (CCI).
Matrimony.com v Google LLC and others Case No. 07 & 30/2012
24. 8
(CCI).9

HT Me10dia Ltd v. Super Cassettes Ltd (2014), Case No. 40 of

25. 9
2011
Neeraj Malhotra v. Deustche Post Bank Home Financez Case No.
26. 10
5/2009 [CCI]
Bayer AG v. Commission, [2001] 4 CMLR 176
27. 10
Indian Sugar Mills Association (ISMA) v. Indian Jute Mills

28. 10,15
Association, [2014] CCI 90.
Jyoti Sawroop Arora v. The Competition Commission of India,
29. 10
(2016) DLT 396.
Tesco Stores Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, [2012] CAT 31 [68].
30. 11
FOREIGN CASES
S. NO. CASES PAGES
1. Continental Can Company Inc. v. Comm’n of the European 3

Communities, (1973) E.C.R. 215 (EU)
2. Aberdeen Journals Ltd v. Director General of Fair Trading, (No.1) 4

2003 CAT 11 (EU).
3. Case C-85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (EU) 5
4. Case C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. 5

Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 (EU).
5. United Brands Co & United Brands Continental BV v Commission of 6
European Communities 1978 ECR 207.
6. Case T-360/09, E ON Ruhrgas and E ON v. Comm’n, [2012] 8
ECLI:EU:T:2014:160 (EU).
ARTICLES & REPORTS

S. NO ARTICLES & REPORTS PAGE
1. OECD ‘ROUNDTABLE ON SAFE HARBOURS LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS IN 10

COMPETITION LAW BY INDIA’ 2017
BOOKS
S. No BOOKS Page
1. ABIR ROY & JAYANT KUMAR COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA (2ND EDN 3
EASTERN LAW HOUSE)
2. D.P. MITTAL, COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE: A 5
COMPREHENSIVE SECTION WISE COMMENTARY ON LAW
RELATING TO THE COMPETITION ACT (3D ED. TAXMANN 2011)
3. ARIJIIT PASAYAT KUMAR, SM DUGAR GUIDE TO 5

COMPETTITION LAW, 400-433 (LEXIS NEXIS 6 TH EDITION
2016).
4. F. LUNENBURG, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: WHAT CONSTITUTES A 8
CONTRACT?, VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1, 2011.
5. EDWARD GLAESER AND JOSEPH GYOURKO, THE ECONOMIC 9
IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING SUPPLY, JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES—VOLUME 32, NUMBER 1—WINTER 2018.
6. RAPHAEL HUI, THE DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: 9
GREATER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN HONG KONG: A COMPETIVE STUDY,
5 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 85 (2014-2015).
7. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON JR., & JOHN M. 13
VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST,
(6th ed. 2005)
8. ABIR ROY, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA: A PRACTICAL 13
GUIDE 104 (Kluwer Law International, 5th ed. 2016).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indusland has jurisdiction to hear the instant matter in the case
of PLF &DMK Builders v. Solitaire’s Owner Association (SOA) & DMK Owner’s Association
(DOA) under Section 53T of the Competition Act, 2002.
Section 53T reads as:
The Central Government or any State Government or the Commission or any statutory
authority or any local authority or any enterprise or any person aggrieved by any decision or
order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court within sixty days from
the date of communication of the decision of the order of the Appellate Tribunal o them:
Provided that the Supreme Court may, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed after the expiry
of the said period of thirty days.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. PLF is a company incorporate under the provisions of Indusland. It is one of the leading
players in the real-estate construction sector with a handful of other enterprises in the
arena. Its major area of activities include massive residential housing projects,
commercial/business parks, as well as infrastructural development.
2. New Tumbai is one of such metropolitan cities in Indusland, also known as commercial
capital of Indusland. Naturally, owing to sprawling business and employment
opportunities, New Tumbai witnessed immense international migration to it creating an
acute shortage of housing.
3. Bahisar is a revenue village located at the outskirts of New Tumbai. It is predominantly
an agriculture oriented land and has relatively small population as compared to New
Tumbai. PLF saw Bahisar as an emerging market to provide housing to the ever
increasing population in New Tumbai which was merely half an hour train journey from
Bahisar.
4. Consequently, PLF acquired a vast area of land in area of Bahisar closed to New Tumbai.
About 02-03 other major real estate enterprise also saw the opportunity and acquired a
vast area of land in Bahisar. DMK Builder was also one of the major builders who
acquired land in Bahisar.
5. PLF launched a housing complex ‘Solitaire’ which, as per initial plan consisted of 368
flats in total 5 multi-storied residential consisting 19 floors each to be construed in PLF
city, near New Tumbai. PLF, however, chose to build the housing complex on a very
small portion of land compared to vast areas acquired by it.
6. When the construction commenced, 5 buildings were constructed, however, each
building’s floor number increased from 19 to 29 leading to an increase in total number of
flats from 368 to 564. Additionally, the facilities ensured by the builders were
compressed due to shortage of area and the delivery of apartments were delayed to
owners by 2 years. Meanwhile, DMK builders constructed 25 floors while the sanctioned
plans was only till 17 floors. They also reduced their amenities similarly.

7. PLF and DMK entered into a verbal agreement that they will reduce the amenities as the
construction cost has increased. Solitaire Owner’s Association (SOA) and DMK owner’s
association (DOA) filed a complaint against the PLF construction Ltd. And DMK
builders respectively with Competition Commission of India (CCI) accusing them of
abuse of dominant position by their use of contracts with the apartment owners. In
addition to that, they alleged that PLF and DMK builders have entered into an Anti-
Competitive Agreement.
8. CCI has clubbed both the cases. It further analysed the information and held that it is a
prima facie case of abuse of dominance and Anti-Competitive Agreement and requested
Director General (DG) to conduct further investigation.
9. CCI on the basis of DG’s in- depth investigation held that the Competition Act is
applicable to this dispute. CCI further passed the order that PLF has abused its dominant
position in the real estate market through their unilateral powers to alter the provisions in
the buyer’s agreement without giving any rights to the buyers. It also held that agreement
between PLF and DMK builders is anti-competitive.
10. PLF appealed against this order before National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(NCLAT). NCLAT has upheld the order passed by CCI. NCLAT further imposed the
penalty of INR 6,300 million on PLF which was 7% turnover of PLF ad penalty of 50
million on DMK which was 0.3% of the total turnover of DMK builder.
11. Aggrieved by the decision of NCLAT, PLF Construction Ltd and DMK constructions has
approached the Honourable Supreme Court.

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME

COURT?
ISSUE 2- WHETHER PLF IS OCCUPYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT

MARKET?
ISSUE 3- WHETHER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK IS ANTI- COMPETITIVE AS
PER SECTION 3 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1- WHETHER PLF IS OCCUPYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET?
The Appeal is maintainable before the hon'ble Supreme Court because there is an existence of
statutory provision in the competition Act, 2002, and alternative remedies were exhausted by the
Applicant as the Applicants first appealed before the NCLAT and then to the Supreme Court
under section 53T. There is also no applicability of principle of natural justice.
ISSUE 2- WHETHER PLF IS ENJOYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET?
The Counsel most respectfully submits before this Hon’ble SC that PLF does not enjoy a
dominant position in the relevant market and has not violated provisions of §4 of the
Competition Act. The contentions are dealt in three folded manner. Firstly, the relevant market
identified by DG is incorrect and that it is “residential buildings in New Tumbai” in the instant
case. Secondly, PLF does not enjoy a dominant position as there exist close competitors in the
market including DMK in the same vicinity. Also, there cannot be two dominant player or
collective dominance in the same market. Lastly, Arguendo, PLF has not abused its dominant
position.
ISSUE 3- WHETHER THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK IS ANTI- COMPETITIVE AS
PER SECTION 3 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002?
The actions of the Real Estate Companies have not violated Section 3(3) of the Competition Act,
2002 because there is no existence of agreement between PLF and DMK under section 2(b) of
the competition act. The parallel conduct of PLF and DMK is not indicative of any collusion
because there was mere price parallelism between the companies and there is Absence of any
strong Plus Factors. The following Plus Factors are elaborated- No evidence of regular
communication and Oligopolistic Market Structure. No Appreciable adverse effect on
Competition in India as under section 19(3) of the Competition Act as negative factors under
section 19(3) of the Competition Act are not satisfied and positive factors under section 19(3) of
the Competition Act are satisfied.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON'BLE

SUPREME COURT.
It is humbly submitted that the Appeal is maintainable before the hon'ble Supreme Court
because [1.1] There is an existence of statutory provision in the competition Act, 2002 [1.2]
Alternative remedies were exhausted by the Applicant as the Applicants first appealed in the
NCLAT and then to the Supreme Court under section 53T. [1.3] Applicability of Principle of
Natural Justice.
[1.1] THERE IS AN EXISTENCE OF STATUTORY PROVISION IN THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble court that the appeal in question is
maintainable. The Competition Act of 2002 contains a statutory mechanism that allows an
aggrieved party to seek the Apex court's jurisdiction. The appellants approached the Supreme
Court using such a statutory provision, and thus there is no discretion to dismiss the appeal in the
presence of such a statutory provision.
Section 53T Appeal to Supreme Court states that :
"The Central Government or any State Government or the Commission or any statutory
authority or any local authority or any enterprise or any person aggrieved by any decision or
order of the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the Supreme Court…"
When a person is aggrieved by an Appellate tribunal decision or order, an appeal to the
Supreme Court is sufficient, according to this clause. It is also argued that because the act has a
specific legislative provision allowing for an appeal to the Supreme Court, PLF has sought the
court in accordance with that provision, Section 53-T, as a matter of right rather than process. 1It
is argued that the Appellants have not sought any other jurisdiction of the Hon'ble court because
the appeal provision is included in the Act itself. As a result, PLF has approached the court in
confidence about Section 53-T.
1 Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 AIR 540.

[1.2] ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES WERE EXHAUSTED BY THE APPLICANT AS THE APPLICANTS

FIRST APPEALED IN THE NCLAT AND THEN TO THE SUPREME COURT UNDER SECTION 53T.
Alternative remedy is a bar unless there was complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or
authority to take action impugned.2 However, the existence of a competent body to hear this
particular case questions the maintainability of the Appeal. It was held by the Hon’ble apex court
in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery 3 where there is an alternative statutory
remedy, court should not interfere unless the alternative remedy is too dilatory or cannot grant
quick relief. Thus, the respondents humbly submit that the present appeal is maintainable on the
ground that alternative remedy has been exhausted.
Here in this present case at the very first instance PLF and DMK appealed against the
order given by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) before the National Company
Tribunal (NCALT). The applicants have appealed before the Supreme Court order as NCLAT
has passed an order imposing unjustified penalty. As there are no other alternative remedies
available to the Applicants other than approaching the Supreme Court, the present appeal stands
maintainable.
[1.3] APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE
It is respectfully argued that the Appellate Tribunal shall be guided by the principles of
natural justice as indicated in Section 53 of the Competition Act. 4It is argued that it is a well-
known norm of legislative construction that a Tribunal or body should be regarded to be
equipped with such auxiliary or incidental powers as are essential to fulfil its tasks efficiently for
the purpose of justice and for resolving disputes between parties. 5 The omnipotence inherent in
this doctrine is that no one should be condemned unheard. The principles of natural justice are
not just mere principles but are formidable weapons which are used for protecting and securing
justice.6In the instant case, according to the NCLAT order, PLF was fined INR 6,300 million, or
7% of its turnover, and DMK was fined INR 50 million, or 0.3 percent of its total turnover. 7 The
2 A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1906.
3 Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries, 1979 Air 1889 (SC).
4 The Competition Act, No. 12 of 2003, India Code (1993), § 53O (1), [hereinafter The Competition Act]
5 Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 (Supp.) S.C.C. 420.
6 Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India AIR 1981 SC 818.
7 Moot proposition Para 17.
high penalty charged by NCLAT distinctly indicates unjustified deprivation of the Applicants.
Conclusively, the present appeal is maintainable in conformity with the principles of Natural
Justice.
ISSUE 2 - WHETHER PLF IS OCCUPYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE

ABOVE RELEVANT MARKET?
The Counsels most respectfully submits before this Hon’ble SC that the PLA does not
enjoy a dominant position in the relevant market and has not violated provisions of §4 of the
Competition Act. The contentions laid herein are three folded: [2.1] the relevant market in the
instant case is residential buildings in New Tumbai [2.2] PLF did not enjoy a dominant position
in the relevant market [2.3] Arguendo, PLF has not abused its dominant position.
2.1 THE RELEVANT MARKET IN THE INSTANT CASE IS RESIDENTIAL

BUILDINGS IN NEW TUMBAI.
The Counsel on behalf of Appellant contends that the determination of relevant market is
quintessential while analysing a case concerning to §4 of the Act.8 The delineation of the relevant
market is essential to ascertain dominance and analyse the alleged abusive conduct. 9 It helps in
identifying the competitive constraints faced by undertakings and provides information such as
market power and market share which help in assessing dominance. 10 While determining what
constitutes a relevant market, it is essential to give due regards to (2.1.1) relevant product market
(2.2.2) relevant geographical market
2.1.1 Relevant product market.
Relevant product market means a market comprising all those goods and services which
are regarded as interchangeable11 or substitutable12 by the consumer, by reason of characterstics
8 In Re: Mr. Umar Javeed and Ors v. Google LLC and anr Case No. 39/2018 (CCI).
9 Shri M Mittal v. M/s Paliwal Developers Ltd, Case No. 112/2015 (CCI), See also, In Re: Fast Track Call Cab Pvt
Ltd and anr v. ANI Technologies Pvt Ltd Case No. 6 & 74/2015 (CCI).
10 ABIR ROY & JAYANT KUMAR COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA (2ND EDN EASTERN LAW HOUSE) PAGE 160.
11 Case C-6/72, Continental Can Company Inc. v. Comm’n of the European Communities, (1973) E.C.R. 215 (EU)
[hereinafter Continental Can].
12 Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd v. Ministry of Railways, 2012 Case No. 64/2010 (CCI) [hereinafter Arshiya
Rail].

of the product or services,13 and their intended use.14 It is identified according to the particular
facts of the case at hand.15 Furthermore, for determining the relevant product market, due regards
must also be given to several factors such as end-use of the goods, consumer preferences, etc.16
Similarly, in the case at hand, the counsel submits that the relevant product market
considering the aforementioned criteria’s is “residential buildings”. The intended use of all the
residential buildings rests in rendering a living space to its consumers. Also, the consumer
preference would be based on their area of jobs, college or livelihood. The consumers
consequently can substitute their choice of residential building as per their convenience of
proximity with their workspace or livelihood in New Tumbai . The reason for the same being that
there are numerous residential buildings available in New Tumbai including the residential
buildings in outskirts of New Tumbai i.e. Bahisar.
2.1.2 Relevant geographical market.

The geographical limit of real estate is determined on the basis of its location. 17 As per §
2(s), “condition of competition for the services provided by competitors should be ‘distinctly
18
homogeneous from the conditions prevailing in the neighbouring areas.” Moreover, the other
factors such as local specific requirements, consumer preferences and transportation cost is also
to be considered for determining the relevant geographical market.19
It is contended that the relevant market is to be defined by reference to the facts in any
given case.20 In the case at hand, relevant geographical market is New Tumbai as the conditions
of competition are homogeneous for the residential buildings in it. The geographical market
identified by DG i.e. Bahisar is incorrect. 21 Bahisar is just a tale end of New Tumbai which
consist of population whose livelihood is based in the main New Tumbai as Bahisar is just an
13 Atos Worldline v. Verifone India, 2015 Case No. 56/2012 (CCI).

14 The Competition Act, supra note 4, §2(t); See also, Competition Commission of India v. Co-ordination
Committee of Artistes and Technicians of West Bengal Film and Television and Ors, (2017) 5 SCC 17.
15 Aberdeen Journals Ltd v. Director General of Fair Trading, (No.1) 2003 CAT 11 (EU).
16 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 19 (7).
17 Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited (2011) SCC OnLine CCI 89 (India).
18 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 2 (s).
20 Aberdeen Journals v The Office of Fair Trading [2003] CAT 11.
21 Clarification point 4.
agriculture oriented land.22 Just to accommodate the ever increasing population in New Tumbai
which has caused the acute shortage of housing 23, residential apartments were constructed in the
outskirts of new Tumbai which itself does not create a separate relevant market. Moreover,
narrowing down the relevant market would be unfair for the competition.24
2.2 PLF DID NOT ENJOY A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE RELEVANT MARKET.
Dominant position means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise which enables it

to operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market 25 or affect its
competitors or consumers in its favour.26 It ought to be assessed in light of all relevant
circumstances and the factors enlisted under §19(4) of the Act. 27 To this, the counsel hereby
submits that (2.2.1) there cannot be two dominating player in the market (2.2.2) PLF has close
competitor(s) in the relevant market.
2.2.1 There cannot be two dominating player in the market.

The counsel submits that the findings of DG that there was abuse of dominant position by
both the players (PLF and DMK) is incorrect. 28 As per the Competition Act Explanation (a) to §
4 (2), dominant position, therein means a position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise in the
relevant market to: (a) operate independently of competitive forces or (b) affect its competitors
or consumers or the relevant market in its favour. The term “an enterprise” is in reference to
single entity as per the statute.29 There is nothing in the definition of enterprise under § 2(h) 30 or
22 Moot proposition ¶ 3.
23 Moot proposition ¶2 & 4.
24 Belaire v. DLF, supra note 17.
25 Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd v. Competition Commission of India Civil Appeal No. 641/2017 ; See also, In Re:
Mr. Pankaj Aggarwal & ors v. DLF Home Developers Limited Case no. 55/ 2012 (CCI), In Re: Financial Software
and System v. M/s ACI Worldwide Solution Private Limited &ors O.S.A.Nos.280 to 283 of 2011, Case C-85/76,
Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461 (EU) [hereinafter Hoffman]; Case C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche
Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461 (EU).
27 D.P. MITTAL, COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE SECTION WISE
COMMENTARY ON LAW RELATING TO THE COMPETITION ACT (3d ed. Taxmann 2011); See also CCI v.
State of Mizoram CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10820-10822 OF 2014 (SC).
29 ARIJIIT PASAYAT KUMAR, SM DUGAR GUIDE TO COMPETTITION LAW, 400-433 (LEXIS NEXIS 6
TH EDITION 2016).
30 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 2 (h).
in the provisions of § 4 of the Act to suggest that two or more independent entities are capable of
holding a position of joint or collective dominance.
Moreover, courts in various occasions have identified that there cannot be more than one
dominant undertaking/ enterprise in the same market. Over several orders, adjudicating bodies
such as the CCI have categorically denied the applicability of joint dominance. 31 The only
reading of plurality that was allowed into § 4 is one where the dominant firms were legally or
structurally linked.32 In Royal Energy v. IOCL, BPCL and HPCL, in determining whether the
actions of three oil marketing companies amounted to an infringement of the Act, the CCI
explicitly held that the concept of collective dominance was not envisaged under the provisions
of § 4 of the Act.33 Therefore, it can safely be concluded that there cannot be two dominant
position in the market.
2.2.2 PLF has close competitor(s) in the relevant market.

For assessing the dominance, several factors enshrined under §19(4) has to be
considered.34Market share indicates the dominance of an enterprise 35 in a relevant market.36 The
counsel submits that there cannot be two dominant player in the market which has been
established above, nevertheless such findings by DG distinctly indicates that real estate
companies i.e. PLF and DMK were actually close competitors of each other. 37 The contention
could further be supported by their market share, PLF has market share of 55% whereas DMK
has market share of 42 %.38 Less difference between market share of two competitors cannot
indicate a dominant position enjoyed by any one of the two competitor. 39 Similarly, in instant
case, there does not exist much difference between the two and therefore, it clearly indicates that
31 Royal Energy Ltd v. IOCL and others, 2012 Comp LR 563 (CCI); N. Sanjeev Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Hire
Purchase Association Case No. 49/2012, (CCI); Consumer Online Foundation v Tata Sky Ltd & Ors., Case No. 2/
2009 (CCI).
32 DLF Park Place Residents Welfare Association v. DLF Ltd. Haryana Urban Development Authority Department
of Town and Country Planning, 2011 Comp LR 490 (CCI).
33 M/s Royal Energy Ltd. v. M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Case no. 1 of 28 (CCI), M/s Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. and M/s Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 2012 Comp LR 563(CCI).
34 The Competition Act, supra note 4, §19 (4) (a).
35 Supra note 12.
36 United Brands Co & United Brands Continental BV v Commission of European Communities 1978 ECR 207.
39 In Re: Meru Travel Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (Meru) v. Uber India Systems Pvt. Ltd. and ors., Case No. 96 of 2015
[CCI].

they were close competitors when the relevant product market i.e. residential building is
concerned.
It is further submitted that market share analysis is not suited for application to
dynamically competitive markets and that market shares by themselves may not be conclusive
evidence of dominance.40 Thus, along with market share, analysis of other factors mentioned in §
19(4) must be assessed too.41 To this affect, the counsel states that with reference to clauses (b) &
(c) of § 19(4)42, PLF’s total size and turnover relates to his other major area of activities as well
which includes Commercial/business parks, infrastructural development . 43It is not confined only
to the aforesaid markets under consideration as relevant market. However, DMK gives a close
competition to PLF in the same vicinity as it provides similar amenities to its consumer such as
clubhouse, sports arena, gymnasium etc. Moreover, there also exist 02-03 other major real estate
enterprises who has acquired vast area of land in Bahisar.
With reference to clause (f) of § 19(4), counsel submits that it cannot be said that any
consumer is in any way dependent on it when he/she desires to purchase a residential property.
Especially in a metropolitan city like New Tumbai, where alternative apartments are available
from different sources to the consumer, to choose from, it cannot be said that the consumer is
dependent on the enterprise. Even within PLF’s close proximity, DMK provided for a residential
building in Bahisar
Lastly, with reference to the factor mentioned in clause (h) of 19(4), it is stated that there
are other players also in the real estate construction sector 44 providing residential facility in
whole of New Tumbai including the outskirts of New Tumbai i.e. Bahisar. Such players also
create intense competition in the market and the existing developers have to meet this intense
competition.45 In such a situation, it cannot be said that there is an impediment for new entrants
by PLF.
40 Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Case No. 6 & 74 of 2015 (CCI).
41 Belaire v. DLF , supra note 17; See also Ibid.
42 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 19 (4) (b)& (c).
44 Ibid.
45 Belaire v. DLF, supra note 17, ¶ 5.29.
The counsel thereby concludes that that PLF did not enjoy a dominant position as there
existed close competitors in the relevant market.
2.3 ARGUENDO, PLF HAS NOT ABUSED ITS DOMINANT POSITION.
The CCI allows an enterprise to be in a dominant position, 46 but abuse of such a position
is prohibited.47 It is contended that PLF could infringe § 4 of the Act, only if enjoys a dominant
position in the relevant market, which it does not, as has been previously established, it is
averred that there arises no question to discriminatory condition or denial of any kind. Arguendo,
it is our submission that PLF has not abused its dominant position because [i] PLF did not
impose any unfair conditions [ii] conduct of PLF does not limit the provision of services [iii]
PLF was not involved in any practice that result in denial of market access
2.3.1 PLF did not imposed any unfair condition.

A plain reading of s 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act makes it clear that it requires the imposition of
an unfair or discriminatory “condition in purchase or sale of goods or service” to violate the
Act.48. Arguendo, It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble SC that PLF has not put any unfair
or discriminatory conditions in sale of goods of services as mentioned in s 4(2)(a) of CCI.
2.3.1.1Buyers had given consent for the changes made by builders.
It is contended that “a contract cannot be valid or legally binding unless ‘consent’ is

given.49 ‘Consent’, essentially, occurs when two parties mutually agree to form a contract with
each other.”50 The counsels submits before this Hon’ble SC that the parties have given their
consent to enter into a contract and by giving assent to all the conditions that prevail in the
‘apartment buyers agreement’.51 It is held by CCI that “PLF was having unilateral power to alter
the provisions in the buyer’s agreement”52 which implies that there exists clauses in the
46Jupiter Gaming Solutions Pvt Ltd v. Finance Secretary, Government of Goa, CompLR 2012 (CCI) [hereinafter
Jupiter Gaming].
47 Case T-360/09, E ON Ruhrgas and E ON v. Comm’n, [2012] ECLI:EU:T:2014:160 (EU).
48 Matrimony.com v Google LLC and others Case No. 07 & 30/2012 (CCI).
49 Indusland Contract Act, 1872, § 10.
50 F. LUNENBURG, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS: WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONTRACT?, VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1,
2011.
51 Moot proposition, ¶ 8.
52 Moot proposition , ¶ 15.
agreement which gave such powers to the builders. It is contended that the same has been agreed
by the buyers and that they have given their due consent while they signed the builder-buyer
agreement.
2.3.2 The conduct of PLF does not limit or restrict the provision of services.
The service has been defined under Competition Law as “service of any description and it
includes the provision of services in connection with business of any industrial or commercial
matters such as real estate.”53 Limiting or restricting provision of services by an enterprise
amounts to abuse of dominant position.54
It is contended that PLF is not dominant in the relevant market and thus cannot be said to
be in contravention of s 4(2) (b) of the Act. Arguendo, PLF did not limit or restrict the provision
of services. With high demand, the price of the building increases. 55PLF increased the number of
flats from 368 to 564 to meet the rising demand in the market to accommodate the ever
increasing population.56 Additionally, the counsel submits that there is generally an escalation
clause in builder buyer agreement which allows them to increase the price of the building. But,
instead of imposing escalation clause to cover increased construction cost, PLF in ‘doctrine of
good faith’57 reduced the amenities for the time-being to meet with the market demand of
increased population in the market.
2.3.3 PLF was not involved in any practice that result in denial of market access.
It is contended that ‘denial of market access’ under s 4(2)(c) encompasses acts done by a
dominant undertaking resulting in market foreclosure for the competitors in the same market or
even upstream/downstream market by exclusionary or exploitative practices.The concept of
Whether a practice is Exploitative, Exclusionary or both, was observed in HT Media Ltd v Super
Cassettes Ltd.58
53 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 2(u).

54 Ibid, §19 (4) (b).
55 EDWARD GLAESER AND JOSEPH GYOURKO, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF HOUSING SUPPLY, JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES—VOLUME 32, NUMBER 1—WINTER 2018.
57 RAPHAEL HUI, THE DOCTRINE OF GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT: GREATER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN HONG KONG: A
COMPETIVE STUDY, 5 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 85 (2014-2015).
58 HT Media Ltd v. Super Cassettes Ltd (2014), Case No. 40 of 2011.
In light of the facts of the instant matter, PLF’s conduct could neither be said to be
exclusive nor exclusionary. It is averred that PLF neither imposed any unfair selling price which
would in turn affect its competitors nor did PLF indulged in any practice that led to denial of
market access. The fact that other real estate enterprises also acquired vast area of land in
Bahisar59 indicates there is no denial of market access by any player and there will be other
players who will be entering this market. Thus, it cannot be said that there is an impediment for
new entrants by PLF. In such a situation the condition prescribed in s 4(2)(c), cannot be
satisfied.
ISSUE 3 - THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK IS NOT ANTI-

COMPETITIVE AS PER SECTION 3 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002.
The Counsels for the Applicant humbly submits before the Honble Supreme Court of
Indusland that the actions of the Real Estate Companies have not violated Section 3(3) read with
Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002- firstly, There is no existence of agreement between
PLF and DMK under section 2(b) of the competition act [3.1]. Secondly, the Parallel conduct of
PLF and DMK is not indicative of any collusion [3.2] because there was mere Price Parallelism
between the companies [3.2.1] and there is Absence of any strong Plus Factors [3.2.2]. Thirdly,
No Appreciable adverse effect on Competition in India as under section 19(3) of the Competition
Act [3.3].
3.1 THERE IS NO EXISTENCE OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK UNDER SECTION 2(B)
OF THE COMPETITION ACT.
It is humbly contended before this hon'ble Court that for a case concerning to violation of
s 3(3) of the Competition Act, the existence of an agreement is of utmost importance 60 and the
existence of an anti-competitive agreement must be unequivocally established. 61 Further there
must be conclusive evidence of meeting of minds 62 and merely two or more persons doing
59 Moot preposition ¶ 5.
60 OECD ‘ROUNDTABLE ON SAFE HARBOURS LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW BY INDIA’ 2017 P.13.
61 Neeraj Malhotra v. Deustche Post Bank Home Financez Case No. 5/2009 [CCI].
62 In Re: Sugar Mills, [2011] Case No. 1 of 2010; Bayer AG v. Commission, [2001] 4 CMLR 176; Indian Sugar
Mills Association (ISMA) v. Indian Jute Mills Association, [2014] CCI 90.

similar acts, would not amount to the presence of an agreement. 63 An agreement should not be
adduced, assumed or arrived at through eliminative or wishful reasoning but must be concluded
through amassment of indisputable evidence.64 The establishing of joint mens rea of non-
competition is imperative and this should be substantiated with reasons and pertinent evidence. 65
Moreover, the question whether there exists a concerted action in a given case could only
be determined if the evidence upon which the decision was based was considered as a whole,
taking account of the specific characteristics of the market. 66 In the absence of any evidence to
prove an understanding amongst the parties, there can be no case of violation of s 3 of the Act.67
In the present case, the evidence for the verbal agreement entered between PLF and DMK
was not conclusively proved without any doubt.68
There is immense international migration which causes extreme shortage of housing 69 in

the market and a similar kind of conduct was taken by both of the companies in order to provide
housing to the migrants at the earliest. Nevertheless, there is no instance of communication for
the formation of an agreement which is anti-competitive in nature within the market of Bahisar.
Moreover, there is no such evidence of presence of an agreement which is unequivocally
established in the present matter.
3.2.THE PARALLEL CONDUCT OF PLF AND DMK IS NOT INDICATIVE OF ANY COLLUSION.
3.2.1 There was mere Price Parallelism between the companies

It is contended that mere price parallelism alone cannot indicate collusion since it is a
consequence of interdependence in the market.70 Also, mere similarity in prices or other features
due to unilateral decision making alone cannot be considered as a proof of an anti-competitive
agreement between the companies in the absence of substantially compelling reasons. 71
63 Jyoti Sawroop Arora v. The Competition Commission of India, (2016) DLT 396.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Tesco Stores Limited v. Office of Fair Trading, [2012] CAT 31 [68].
67 In Re: Alleged cartelization by steel producers (Case No. 9/2008) CCI.
70 In Re: Express Industry Council of India v. Jet Airways (India) Ltd. & Ors. (Case No. 30/2013) CCI [51].
71 Ibid.
Moreover, price parallelism on its own cannot be said to be indicative of any practice
being carried on in terms of section 3(3) of the Act. 72 Parallel pricing behavior in an oligopolistic
market producing homogenous goods will not in itself be sufficient to constitute a concerted
practice violative of Section 3 (3) of the Act. 73Such behavior and the evidence of proximity in
time74 are insufficient to imply the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy.75
Here PLF and DMK are the major players for providing housing in Bahisar with a market
share of 55% and 42% respectively with only 3% market share for the other companies. 76 Which
distinctly indicates that the market structure is oligopolistic with a high demand in the market for
residential units for the immigrants. PLF and DMK after considering this high demand tried to
increase the number of flats in their respective units with the intention to increase the supply in
order to fulfill the demand which was required in the market.
Moreover, both of the predominant companies have similar kinds of facilities provided to
the owners such as club, gymnasium, sports arena77 and almost around the same location, which
distinctly indicates that they have almost alike pricing for the housing. 78 Therefore it can be
concluded that since both of the companies are in the same oligopolistic market and producing
homogenous goods, the same approach can be taken in all probabilities in order to meet the
requirements of the market. Nevertheless, this cannot be regarded as a concerted practice which
is violative of Section 3 (3) of the Competition Act.
Therefore, it is submitted that mere ¶llel behavior in a concentrated market, with identical
products is inconsequential to any collusive agreement unless coupled with strong plus factors.
72 In Re: Domestic Air Lines, Misc. No. 15-1404 [2018] (CKK) (D.D.C.).
73 All India Tyre Dealers’ Federation v. Tyre Manufacturers, RTPE no. 20/ 2008 (CCI).
74 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
75 In Re: Domestic Air lines, supra note 13; Pevely Diary Co. v. U.S., CA-8 (1949); In Re: Chloride India Ltd.,
RTP Enquiry No. 46/1977.
3.2.2 Absence of any strong Plus Factors

Price Parallelism is not anti-competitive per se unless coupled with some plus factors 79
showing the existence of an agreement to determine sale prices. 80 Absence of such plus factors
will render the price Parallelism as perfectly legitimate market behavior. 81
3.2.2.1 No evidence of regular communication – While proving conspiracy among the

competitors, evidence of communication between the parties alleged of contravention is very
important.82 It must be proven that the exchange of information is being done with the purpose to
facilitate the conspirators to act upon the common scheme of illegal conduct. 83 However, in the
present matter there exists no conclusive evidence, neither circumstantial nor direct, to
substantiate any communication between PLF and DMK and therefore there exists no concerted
collusion.
3.2.2.2 Oligopolistic Market Structure- In an oligopolistic market structure a small

number of firms are present and none of which can keep the others from having significant
influence and the concentration ratio measures the market share of the largest firms. 84
Furthermore, an oligopolistic market deals with standardized goods with almost similar
cost,85 Consequently, it is perfectly legitimate for the companies to place their prices identically,
taking into account their price interdependencies,86 which is a special feature of such a market.
In the present case it is evident that real estate construction is an oligopolistic market
where there exists only a few market players and the market is extremely concentrated. Even if
there are similar prices nevertheless, it is not due to any conspiracy by the companies but caused
79 In Re: Alleged Cartelization by Steel Producers, [2014] CCI 3.

80 Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers’ Association, Case no. 29/ 2010 (CCI); All India Tyre
Dealers’ Federation v. Tyre Manufacturers, Case No. 20/ 2008 (CCI).
81 D.K. Shrivastava v. Daulat Ram Engg & Services P. Ltd. and Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine CCI 65; In Re Flat Glass,
386 F3d (2004), 360; Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. ¶mount Film Distribution Corporation, [1954] 346 US 537; Bell
Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, [2007] 550 US 544.
82 Film and Television Producers Guild of India v. Multiplex Association of India (MAI), Mumbai, 2013 SCC
OnLine CCI 89.
83 Ibid.
84 INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/oligopoly.asp (last visited April 24, 2022).
85 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, 509 U.S. 209 (1993); United States v. Natl.
Malleable & Steeling Co., DC Ohio 1957.
86 W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON JR., & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
AND ANTITRUST, (6th ed. 2005); ABIR ROY, COMPETITION LAW IN INDIA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 104
(Kluwer Law International, 5th ed. 2016).

due to the predominant structure of the market. Moreover, the market is concentrated, with the
exact same costs, and further identical products hence price parallelism is the only viable
economic option for the Real Estate Companies to independently adopt.
3.3 NO APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION IN INDIA AS UNDER SECTION 19(3)

OF THE COMPETITION ACT.
In order to establish a contravention under Section 3 of the Competition Act, it is

quintessential to establish that the alleged anti-competitive agreement had an AAEC in
Indusland.87 The presumption of AAEC generates once the existence of a price fixing agreement
is established; however, such a presumption is rebuttable. 88 In addition, the principle of ‘shall
presume’, used in s 3(3) of the Competition Act, is a mere presumption and not evidence in itself
and is merely indicative of the fact that, on whom, would the burden of proof fall. 89It has been
also explained through various judicial pronouncements where the courts have observed that it
only makes a prima facie case for the party in whose favor it exists’.90
Here in the present case there is no appreciable adverse effect on competition because the
positive factors are satisfied whereas the negative factore under section 19(3) are not satisfied.
Further elaborating,
1.3.1 Negative Factors under section 19(3) of the Competition Act are not satisfied.
In the present matter there exists an oligopolistic market one of the features and further
causes for creation of an oligopolistic market is natural entry on barriers. However, such barriers
are inherent barriers i.e. created by market forces or demands. For example, substantially high
costs of entry, excessive legal procedure for entry, requirement of licenses or qualifications, etc.
Bahisar is an emerging economy91 for providing housing to the increasing population in New
Tumbai and it is located at the outskirts of New Tumbai and within a distance of only half an
hour train journey from New Tumbai.92 Therefore, there exist substantially high costs of entry
and technical complexities in operation leading to creation of entry barriers. However, such
87 The Competition Act, supra note 4, § 3(1)(2002).
88 India Sugar Mills Association v. Indian Jute Mills Association, 2014 CompLR 225 (CCI).
89 Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P., AIR 1986 SC 1099.
90 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
barriers are in no manner created by the Real estate enterprises and are naturally created by the
market.
The Real Estate Companies have merely behaved in a rational economic manner thereby
altering their policies and tried to provide more housing as there was a high demand in the
market owing to spontaneous coordination with each other. They have not concerted so as to
eliminate competition but have undertaken practices, necessitated purely by economic pressures.
1.3.2 Positive Factors under section 19(3) of the Competition Act are satisfied.
The absence of the positive factors alone cannot determine AAEC; it must be coupled
with negative effects.93 In the present case, not only are there no negative effects, but even if the
alleged agreement is present, it is causing positive effects on competition. In the present case
PLF and DMK by means of reducing the amenities have increased the number of flats which was
required in the market. The real estate construction companies have actually taken measures to
increase benefits over time for the flat owners as they increased the production within a
stipulated time which was necessary and also improved production and distribution of goods and
provision of service. Some amenities were reduced by both of the companies with the intention
to increase the production so that a large number of people can get benefit through it. Therefore
PLF and DMK did improve production and took oughtmost care for the benefits of the flat
owners.
Thus, the presumption of causation of AAEC is incorrect in the instant matter. The
Counsels would also like to emphasize that, the presumption of AAEC under s 3(3) of the Act
follows only once an agreement falls under clauses (a) to (d) of s 3(3) of the Act. 94 Having said
that, it is contended that none of the clauses as mentioned under s 3(3) of the Act are attracted in
the instant matter. Conclusively, it is submitted that the Real Estate Companies do not
contravene the provisions of s 3(3) of the Competition Act.
93 Automobiles Dealers Association, Hathras, U.P. v. Global Automobiles Limited and Pooja Expo Pvt. Ltd., 2012
CompLR 827 (CCI).
94 Indian Sugar Mills Association v. Indian Jute Mills Association 2014 CompLR 225 (CCI).
PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments on merits, evidences supplied and
authorities relied on, it is humbly prayed that:
I. The Appeal is maintainable before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

II. PLF does not occupy a dominant position in the relevant market.
III. Agreement between PLF and DMK is not Anti-Competitive as per section 3 of The
Competition Act, 2002.
And pass any such order which this Hon’ble SC may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice
and good conscience.
All of which is most humbly submitted.
(Counsels for the Appellant)
Memorial for Applicant

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CCI- MIT WPU School of Law 2nd National Moot Court Competition 2022

Team Code: A- NMC11

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSLAND

SECTION 53(T) OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002

- IN THE MATTER OF-

PLF CONSTRUCTIONS LTD.………………………………………………………...APPLICANT

SOLITAIRE OWNER’S ASSOSIATION……………………………………………….RESPONDENT

DMK OWNER’S ASSOSIATION………………………………………………….....RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS

Memorial for Applicant 1 | Page

ISSUE 1- WHETHER THE APPEAL IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON'BLE

[1.1] THERE IS AN EXISTENCE OF STATUTORY PROVISION IN THE COMPETITION ACT,

[1.2] ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES WERE EXHAUSTED BY THE APPLICANT AS THE

[1.3] APPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE..................................................2

ISSUE 2 - WHETHER PLF IS OCCUPYING A DOMINANT POSITION IN THE ABOVE

2.1 THE RELEVANT MARKET IN THE INSTANT CASE IS RESIDENTIAL

2.1.1 Relevant product market.............................................................................................3

2.1.2 Relevant geographical market.....................................................................................4

2.2.1 There cannot be two dominating player in the market................................................5

2.2.2 PLF has close competitor(s) in the relevant market....................................................6

2.3 ARGUENDO, PLF HAS NOT ABUSED ITS DOMINANT POSITION....................8

2.3.1 PLF did not imposed any unfair condition..................................................................8

ISSUE 3 - THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLF AND DMK IS NOT ANTI-COMPETITIVE

Memorial for Applicant 2 | Page

3.2.THE PARALLEL CONDUCT OF PLF AND DMK IS NOT INDICATIVE OF ANY

3.2.1 There was mere Price Parallelism between the companies.......................................11

3.2.2 Absence of any strong Plus Factors..........................................................................12

3.3 NO APPRECIABLE ADVERSE EFFECT ON COMPETITION IN INDIA AS UNDER SECTION

Memorial for Applicant 3 | Page

S. NO. ABBREVIATIO EXPANSION

9. COMPAT Competition Appellate Tribunal

10. Corp Corporation

11. DG Director General

12. EC European Commission

13. Edn Edition

14. Ibid Ibidem

15. Inc Incorporation

16. Ltd Limited

18. OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

20. SC Supreme Court

21. Vol Volume

Memorial for Applicant 4 | Page

S. NO. ACTS PAGES

1. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, 1993 (Indusland) 2,3,Passim

2. Indusland Contract Act, 1872, Act No. 9 of 1872 (Indusland) 8

1. Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 AIR 540. 1

A.V. Venkateshwaran v. R.S.Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1906.

Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery Industries,

Grindlays Bank Ltd., v. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 (Supp.) S.C.C.

7. Shri M Mittal v. M/s Paliwal Developers Ltd, Case No. 112/2015 3

Arshiya Rail Infrastructure Ltd v. Ministry of Railways, 2012 Case

Memorial for Applicant 5 | Page

Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited (2011) Case

Uber India Systems Pvt Ltd v. Competition Commission of India

Memorial for Applicant 6 | Page

HT Me10dia Ltd v. Super Cassettes Ltd (2014), Case No. 40 of

Indian Sugar Mills Association (ISMA) v. Indian Jute Mills

S. NO. CASES PAGES

1. Continental Can Company Inc. v. Comm’n of the European 3

2. Aberdeen Journals Ltd v. Director General of Fair Trading, (No.1) 4

4. Case C-322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. 5

ARTICLES & REPORTS

Memorial for Applicant 7 | Page