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IMD-7-2000

15.10.2018

STOREFRIENDLY SELF STORAGE: FRANCHISING FOR GROWTH

Benoit Leleux, S. Schmidheiny Singapore, March 9, 2015. Jes Johansen had just hung up the phone.

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Professor of Entrepreneurship He could not believe it. The mysterious buyer who had been probing
and Finance, prepared this whether Jes would be willing to sell his company had revealed himself

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case, based on the original case to be none other than Singapore Post. It was looking for a way to quickly
assignment project by Christian become the dominant player in Singapore’s self-storage market and was
Bomb, Wilfried Tchouanga and proposing to pay serious money for Jes’s “StoreFriendly” franchise
Camelia Teodorescu (IMD network.
EMBA 2017), as a basis for
Jes founded StoreFriendly in 2011, adapting the business model

Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
class discussion rather than to
illustrate either effective or pioneered by his partner Kevin Chan in Hong Kong to local conditions
ineffective handling of a in Singapore. Jes’s self-storage model charged customers 50% more
business situation. than the competition per m2 of rental space, justified by its units being
located in more convenient areas of the city. The business model proved
a huge hit. After opening the first branch himself, Jes grew the business
quickly using a franchise model. By 2013 the network had grown to 12
branches, 2 of which were owned by Jes and the other 10 by franchisees.
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It was an intense and exhilarating experience. StoreFriendly was the


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first self-storage franchise on the Singapore market, and Jes’s


franchisees were usually well-to-do professionals, many of them
doctors, lawyers and corporate managers. They had money to invest but
usually little time to commit to or experience in the storage business.
Jes provided them with a “business in a box,” complete with assistance
in running their sites. Of course, their destinies were aligned: success
for them meant success for Jes.

Over the last four years, Jes had been busy launching the business,
running the franchise network and supporting the storage units – both
his and those of his franchisees. He had been so busy, in fact, that with
a focus on growth, Jes had not really had time to devise an exit strategy.
Out of the blue, one had just shown up in the form of Singapore Post,
with an appealing offer pricing the system at 15 times TTM earnings,1
three times more than Jes himself had valued the network. But there was
a catch: Since they wanted quick access to the market, they insisted on
buying the entire StoreFriendly network of 12 branches and were not
prepared to negotiate separate deals with the individual franchise
holders. It was very much an all or nothing offer. And it came in the
most explosive form: Singapore Post gave him a week to respond…

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1
TTM stands for Trailing Twelve Months, i.e. the reported earnings of the past 12 months.

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-2- IMD-7-2000

The Accidental Entrepreneur


Jes had never planned to become an entrepreneur. Some things just have a knack for
happening… A combination of personal choices and some chance events led him to the
situation in Singapore. He first got bitten by the entrepreneurship bug during a “gap year” in
1989. He was backpacking in Australia and about to run out of money when he saw an ad in a
local newspaper: buy paintings, frame them and sell them door-to-door at a profit. Together
with a few friends, he decided to give it a try. After some trial-and-error they discovered the

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right marketing strategy – targeting home owners of new builds. Older homes were already
choked full of decoration, but new ones often still needed new furniture and decor. It felt great

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to figure out an original business strategy – and to immediately reap the financial reward, albeit
modest.

After his travels, Jes briefly studied public relations and marketing but dropped out to join the
traineeship program at shipping conglomerate Maersk in 1990. It was not so much the desire
to work at Maersk that motivated him as the challenge of qualifying for what was considered

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one of Denmark’s most prestigious traineeship programs. It turned out to be a fun first job that
allowed him to spend most of the 1990s working abroad, in Poland, Guinea and, from 1996,
Singapore.

By 2000 he was ready for something new and quit his job to do an MBA at a prestigious
business school by Lake Geneva in Switzerland. After graduating, he joined Recall UK, a
storage and archive management company, as managing director. He fell out with group
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management and was fired in 2004, but he had gained valuable insight into the storage
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business. When a Swiss pharma company approached him to set up its distribution center in
Singapore, he did not hesitate long. Both he and his wife had enjoyed tremendously their time
in Singapore and were eager to return to the Far East.

The honeymoon with the Swiss company was short lived, however. Within a year he was on
the job market again in Singapore. In 2005, he became managing director for Asia of a self-
storage construction company. This is where he really learned the ins-and-outs of the self-
storage business, spending over six years observing up close how one of his clients in Hong
Kong, Kevin Chan, came up with and refined an innovative approach to self-storage. Jes also
came to realize that the model pioneered in Hong-Kong would suit perfectly the Singaporean
marketplace. It sounded like a no-brainer to him, but to his great surprise he was unable to
convince anyone to give it a try. Frustration is the mother of all inventions, so Jes concluded
that if no one else would do it, then he had to.

The Idea
Self-storage companies usually rented out simple rooms to customers looking for temporary
storage space. Average rent tenure in Singapore was six months and customers payed upfront.
In 2011, most self-storage facilities were large buildings, located in commercial and industrial
zones on the edge of the city. Their size was typically about 7,000 m2 of lettable space, divided
into an average of 1,200 rooms of about 6 m2. Incumbents charged an average monthly rent of
SGD 43/m2. Jes believed that customers were looking also for convenience and proximity and
that they were willing to pay a premium for this (refer to Exhibit 1 – competitor analysis). His
intuition was to develop smaller, adaptable self-storage spaces at an average size of only 3 m2.
Unlike most competitors, his branches would be open seven days a week and have air
conditioning and free Wi-Fi access. Most importantly, they would be centrally located, close
to public transportation and in areas where people lived and worked. That way, customers
-3- IMD-7-2000

would not need a car to visit their storage areas but could easily drop by on the way home from
work. He would charge SGD 65/m2/month, 50% more per m2 than the competition. He
expected Singaporeans would be willing to pay this price because they valued the greater
convenience. He also believed they would be tempted by the smaller monthly bill.2

To make good on his promise to deliver convenient access and proximity across town, it was
essential to quickly establish a dense branch network crisscrossing the city:

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I wanted to become the 7- Eleven3 of self-storage. You cannot be 7-Eleven with two branches.

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The smaller intended size of the facilities (offering on average 1,300 storage units of 3 m2
each, about half the size of those of competitors) made this easier to achieve, as smaller
buildings were plentiful and cheaper to acquire and recondition. This also meant he would be
able to break even with fewer customers. The original business plan aimed at opening 10
branches in the first three years, to quickly become the storage company with the largest
number of branches in the city.

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However, Jes estimated that opening those 10 branches would still cost about SGD 8.3 million
in total, and he did not have access to that kind of money. He considered for a moment raising
equity from outside investors, but he deeply disliked the idea of ceding control to strangers.
After all, this business was meant to be financially but also emotionally rewarding! Yes, this
was also about lifestyle, and being independent mattered a lot at this point in his career. He
approached a few banks, but none were willing to provide the necessary financing because he
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had never operated a self-storage business before. Short of options, he then decided to look at
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franchising as an alternative model to finance fast growth.

Franchising StoreFriendly Singapore


Franchising is an original business model that accounted for more than half of retailing in the
United States. The system is fairly simple: a franchisor comes up with an innovative, scalable,
business concept dubbed a Service Delivery System (SDS). This system, often proprietary, is
then executed locally by franchisees. The franchisee buys a “business in a box” that allows
him to greatly compress the necessary learning period to set up and run the business and benefit
from others’ learning curve. Another advantage, compared to a greenfield project, is that the
existence of successful franchisees offers a “proof of concept,” which helps considerably in
obtaining financing from banks at the store level.

For the franchisor, the system enables faster network growth with less capital. Franchisees not
only put up capital to set up their local branch but also pay an upfront franchise fee that the
franchisor can then invest in accelerating expansion, e.g. for marketing or processing the
acquisition of further franchisees. Both franchisor and franchisee thus benefit from scale
economies in areas such as bulk purchasing, marketing and brand building.

2
He would charge SGD 195 per month for an average 3 m2 storage, whereas established competitors
effectively charged SGD 258 per month for a 6 m2 room.
3
7-Eleven: American-Japanese international chain of convenience stores, known for extended hours
and convenient locations.
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A franchise contract defines the rights and obligations of each party. Typically, franchisors are
responsible for tasks best done on a large scale (e.g. negotiating purchase contracts; national
marketing and brand building; and developing the Service Delivery System and the
instructions for implementing it). Franchisees take care of what is best done locally (e.g. facing
the customer; hiring and training; and executing the Service Delivery System in accordance
with local conditions). Some tasks are shared, such as advertising and marketing, which can
be done at both the national and the branch levels (refer to Exhibit 2 for a breakdown of the
responsibilities of franchisors and franchisees in a typical franchise arrangement).

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The franchisee normally paid a one-off upfront franchise fee and then ongoing royalties,

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calculated as a percentage of sales. Furthermore, franchisees might have to buy products or
services from the franchisor (another source of income for the franchisor) and spend a percentage
of sales on local marketing activities. Conveniently, professionals often distinguished between
business format franchises, where the franchisor not only provided or defined the product or
service but also defined how it was to be delivered (e.g. a McDonald’s restaurant), and product
franchises, where the franchisor only provided the product (e.g. a car brand).

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Launching StoreFriendly Singapore
Jes first approached Kevin Chan, owner of self-storage company “StoreFriendly Hong Kong,”
informing him that he would like to implement the company’s concept in Singapore. Even
though they had never done business together before, they reached an agreement during their
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first meeting: For a stake in the new company, Kevin would provide the brand, the Service
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Delivery System, operational support to Jes as well as seed money. Jes would run the business
and invest capital as well as pay SGD 10,000 annually per site for call center support.
“StoreFriendly Singapore” was born.

To attract franchisees, Jes placed ads in local newspapers and promoted his concept to
franchise agencies. He generated some initial interest but not enough for candidates to commit
to the system. They wanted proof that the concept was commercially viable. Jes was left with
no other option than to launch and own the first store. On December 9, 2011, he opened his
first facility with great fanfare (refer to Exhibit 3 for the Grand Opening flyer and image). He
threw a lavish launch party and achieved extensive press coverage. The first branch proved a
genuine success. In less than two months he had signed up 80 customers, exceeding the
budgeted plan of one new customer per day. His assumptions seemed vindicated: Customers
were willing to pay more than the usual rate per m2 in exchange for greater convenience and
lower per-room cost. This accomplishment showcased what potential franchisees had been
waiting for, and before long they were queuing up to sign on.

StoreFriendly Operational Model and Terms


To start, Jes set up a service company, named StoreFriendly – Singapore (SF-S), to service the
franchisees (refer to Exhibit 4 for the Operational Model). Franchisees were charged
SGD 75,000 to join for five years, then a 15% royalty on sales once business was up and
running. He also marked up all fit-out works (primarily the storage rooms). For the franchisees,
the margin would be approximately 55% before royalty payments. Those fees were calibrated
to offer a good value proposition for both potential franchisees and the franchisor. To set the
right terms, he first considered what other franchises were charging. For example, McDonald’s
in Malaysia charged its franchisees a 5% royalty fee, a 5% advertising fee and a SGD 45,000
-5- IMD-7-2000

franchise fee.4 It was not possible to make a direct comparison with this model, however,
because in food services such as McDonald’s, franchisees had to continuously purchase
supplies from the franchisor. Jes would not benefit from that kind of additional recurrent
revenue stream. His franchisors signed up for a five-year contract, whereas the average
contract duration in other franchises was around nine years. Projections showed average per-
location after-tax profits of SGD 72,000 (refer to Exhibit 5 for SF-S operational contributions
and average franchisor operations costs).

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StoreFriendly’s smaller facility size and higher rent per m2 meant that, compared to competing
outlets, it was profitable with a smaller number of customers and cheaper to set up. Jes’s model

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required the acquisition of one customer a day for 300 days in a row to fill the facility, and it
would take on average four leads to convert one customer. To generate cheap working capital,
he incentivized customers to prepay six months of rental at sign-up, which created a healthy
cash flow for the business to cover operational expenses. As Jes explained:

Franchisees would break even after 60 months with a capital requirement of SGD 550,000, and

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stabilized annual cash flows of SGD 154,000 per year from year 2. Franchisees would be cash
flow positive from month 21.

(Refer to Exhibit 6 to see how StoreFriendly compares with the average franchise according
to key parameters.)
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The Dynamics of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship


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Franchisors monitored their franchisees to ensure conditions defined in the contract were being
met, in particular the all-important Service Delivery System and financial reports. This was
done by sending field support personnel to conduct audits (e.g. mystery shoppers), using
analytical IT tools, and collecting customer feedback. The financial reports were controlled by
sophisticated point-of-sales data collection systems and regular audits.

Contract theory usually ascertains that the interests between franchisor and franchisee are
better aligned than between a company and its managers. However, sources of tension have
also been highlighted:

 Franchisors have an inherent interest in boosting sales (increasing royalties), while


franchisees are naturally more focused on profits.

 Franchisors can be inclined to cut contractual costs by free-riding (i.e. spending less
than promised on local marketing and brand building) or shirking (i.e. cutting corners,
for example by using lower quality ingredients).

According to Steven Spinelli et al.,5 50% of all franchisors in the United States are in a lawsuit
at any given time.

4
Source: iFranchiseSingapore website. http://ifranchisesingapore.com/mcdonalds-franchise-business-
opportunity.html (accessed 30 May 2018)
5
Spinelli, S., Rosenberg, R. and Birley, S. (2004). Franchising – Pathway to Wealth Creation. Prentice
Hall.
-6- IMD-7-2000

The relationship between the two parties is very much influenced by the perceived wealth
creation potential of the partnership, the value of the brand, the quality of formal and informal
communications as well as exit costs endured by unhappy franchisees when they leave the
system. Successful relationships establish a “tolerance zone,” an informal performance
standard that recognizes that no party will behave perfectly according to the contract at all
times. Franchisors, for their part, tend to care most deeply about operations (e.g. franchisor
field personnel visits, support and emergency troubleshooting) and marketing interactions (e.g.
value of marketing materials and sharing of marketing data).

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The Franchisees

Franchisees were mostly middle-class professionals with full-time careers and significant
savings and who were not convinced by the potential returns offered by financial markets. It
was fair to say that most had little or no experience in the business and hence depended heavily
on Jes for training and support. In its eight years of operation, the Hong Kong-based

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StoreFriendly Logistics Holding Limited had managed to open 79 branches in Hong Kong and
Macao, with more about 70,000 m2 of service area; 50% of the service areas were in self-
owned properties, with the rest occupied by 35 franchisees.6

Three months after opening his first branch, Jes had signed up four franchisees. Within three
years, he had 10 franchisees and was operating two facilities himself. He was initially
concerned about the potential conflict of interest of owning his own franchise (other
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franchisees would see him as competition). In practice though, franchisees preferred to see the
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franchisor own and operate some facilities as a show of commitment to the product. In the
average franchise system, 26% of the outlets were owned by the franchisor.

Selection and Franchisee Dynamics

Jes had a strong relationship with his franchisees. In the franchise model, the franchisor was
often perceived as the cornerstone of the system, at least in the beginning. Jes, for example,
was in charge of the all-important site selection, a key success factor in the strategy (refer to
Exhibit 7 for StoreFriendly locations). Jes was responsible for finding, negotiating and
preparing lease terms for 11 of the 12 facilities. With his previous experience of outfitting
storage facilities, he was best able to conduct these tasks for the franchisees, and he earned a
small markup on the services (refer to Exhibit 8 for an example of a StoreFriendly facility).
Jes was also deeply involved in setting up the operations and defining the specifications,
selecting vendors and negotiating terms for any equipment or products required to operate.

As a proven salesman, employee recruitment and staff training were also part of Jes’s tasks.
He also handled marketing and promised franchisees to generate enough leads for them to fill
up the rooms quickly. He taught them sales skills to sign up and retain clients. Anecdotally, he
would, for example, recommend to randomly put locks on doors to simulate occupancy during
customers’ visits, or to have someone continuously call the office to give the impression of
greater demand activity.

6
Data provided by Jes Johansen
-7- IMD-7-2000

Finally, Jes also negotiated with contractors and provided the IT system, including remote
access.

Franchisees received a ready-to-use asset, including all tools, operational manuals and the
demonstrated ability to capture customers. They contributed the required capital and executed
on Jes’s operational plan, as prescribed.

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Monitoring Franchisees

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Jes relied on an in-house accountant to audit the facilities every quarter. He also provided
temporary employees to franchisees if one of their staff was absent. This employee was
actually an accountant who understood the details of the operations and could incidentally
conduct a spot audit of the facilities.

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Communication with Franchisees and Resolution of Conflicts

The distribution of power in a franchise system is interesting. Whereas power lies clearly with
the franchisor at the beginning of the relationship, it can shift to franchisees later on, in
particular when franchisees own many units. To control this phenomenon, Jes tried to keep his
franchisees separate. There was, for example, no franchisees’ forum organized. As an extra
precautionary measure, Jes made sure he remained the largest operator in the system, forcing
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his hand in the opening of a franchisor-operated branch. Franchisees were contractually limited
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to a single outlet. As Jes explained:

Franchisees will always push to test the limits. But in the end we all wanted more customers and
no headaches.

Decision Time
Jes sat on his sofa, his mind racing. Singapore Post’s offer was enticing. But its insistence on
buying the whole network meant that Jes first had to convince his franchisees to sell their
branches back to him, before he could close the deal. What if some refused to sell and the deal
fell apart? Would he be left owning branches he could not afford? Would the whole network
unravel? It was clearly a risky endeavor and perhaps he should not rock the boat. On the other
hand, such an attractive offer might never come up again. And, with his in-depth knowledge
of all his franchisees’ operations, was he not ideally positioned to conclude the negotiations
successfully?
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References
-8-

StoreFriendly Singapore by Jes Johansen and dated 2011.


IMD-7-2000

March and August 2017. Part of the data is also extracted from the original business plan for
This case is based on a number of interviews with Jes Johansen conducted by the authors in

Purchased by Jochem Overweel for use on the Seminar Global Brand Strategy (FEM11179), at Erasmus University Rotterdam-FEW.
Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
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-9-

Exhibit 1

Source: Jes Johansen, StoreFriendly business plan, 2011


Competitor Analysis 2011
IMD-7-2000

Purchased by Jochem Overweel for use on the Seminar Global Brand Strategy (FEM11179), at Erasmus University Rotterdam-FEW.
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- 10 - IMD-7-2000

Exhibit 2
Transaction Analysis and Allocation of Tasks

Transaction Franchisor in typical Franchisee in typical StoreFriendly


franchise franchise
Site criteria definition Defines the key Applies the criteria to Jes selected nine out
elements of a location local market to identify of ten sites for his
that best serve the suitable sites franchisees

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target customer
Site acquisition Advises the franchisee Negotiates and Jes prepared generic

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and offers purchase or executes the purchase lease terms and
lease agreement or lease agreement negotiated on his
templates franchisees’ behalf
Building outfitting Provides guidelines on Applies guidelines to Jes managed interior
how to outfit the the local site design and outfitting

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building and design its himself, on his
interior franchisees behalf
Equipment / products Defines specifications, Establish purchase Jes defined
purchase Negotiates large timing and installation, specifications,
volume contracts for make payment selected vendors and
all outlets negotiated terms. The
franchisees paid.
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Employee Advises on Recruits local Jes helped most of his


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recruitment recruitment. Provides personnel. Adapts franchisees recruit


model employment model employment suitable staff.
contracts. contracts to local
conditions.
Employee training Establishes training Deliver ongoing Jes trained franchisee
programs and delivers training for initial staff staff himself
franchisee and and new/replacement
founding employees’ employees
training
Grand opening Designs a marketing Customize and execute Organized by Jes for
advertising template and advise on the template and the franchisee.
local customization develop local
promotions
Ongoing advertising Develops marketing Purchases local media Jes was in charge of
and advertising campaigns, all marketing and
materials. Purchases using/adapting material advertising activities,
national/regional provided by franchisor generating leads for
media campaigns. his franchisees.
Operating manual Develops business Adheres to the manual Jes provided the
model and documents operating manual and
in a manual for software, which were
franchisees to use based on those of
StoreFriendly HK

Source: Jes Johansen, StoreFriendly business plan, 2011


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Source: Company information


- 11 -

Exhibit 3
Grand Opening
IMD-7-2000

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Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
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Source: Company information


- 12 -

Source: Jes Johansen, StoreFriendly business plan, 2011

Exhibit 5
Exhibit 4

Franchisor Costs
Operational Model
IMD-7-2000

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Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
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- 13 - IMD-7-2000

Exhibit 6
Franchise Key Parameters – StoreFriendly vs. Average US Franchise

Parameter Average Franchise in US StoreFriendly Singapore


Percent outlets owned by 26% 17%
franchisor
Percent outlets owned by 74% 83%
franchisees

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Percent franchisees owning only 75% 90%
one outlet

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Franchise fee USD 29,000 USD 56,000
Royalty rate 5.6% 15%
Advertising fee 3.8% Included in royalty fee
Term of the contract 14 years 5 years
Total number of outlets 2,650 12

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Average investment of USD 155,000 USD 375,000
franchisees
Average after-tax profit of USD 55,000 USD 72,000
franchisees

Sources: Spinelli et al. (2004) for US data and interviews with Jes Johansen in 2017
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I

Exhibit 7
CoursePack code C-5963-60281-STU

StoreFriendly Locations, Singapore*

*12th site missing from image

Source: Company information


Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
CoursePack code C-5963-60281-STU

Source: Company information


- 14 -

Exhibit 8
StoreFriendly Facility
IMD-7-2000

Purchased by Jochem Overweel for use on the Seminar Global Brand Strategy (FEM11179), at Erasmus University Rotterdam-FEW.
Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
Usage permitted only within these parameters. This PDF may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or uploaded to any LLM (e.g. ChatGPT).
Educational material supplied by The Case Centre
Copyright encoded A76HM-JUJ9K-PJMN9I
CoursePack code C-5963-60281-STU

- 15 - IMD-7-2000

Appendix 1
StoreFriendly: Financial Performance per Branch

Present status of StoreFriendly Branches as of 31.oct.14


Branch Opening No of Occupancy Rooms Rental area Nett Lettable Avg unit Aircon % Site rent per Other ops Total ops Ops profit at Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly Ops profit at Operating
month rooms % rented sq ft (GFA) Area sq ft size sq ft of units month $ cost per cost take over revenue royalty/ops Revenue at Royalty/ops 95% (as margin (as
(NLA) month now profit now 95% profit at 95% owner) owner)
(as franchisor)

Bukit Batok déc.11 313 99% 310 12 700 8 001 26 100% $ 16 510 $ 4 500 $ 21 010 $ 30 990 $ 52 000 $ 30 990 $ 52 000 $ 30 990 30 990 60%
Serangoon Nth sept.12 188 95% 179 8 460 5 499 29 100% $ 15 841 $ 3 400 $ 19 241 $ 13 677 $ 32 918 $ 3 950 $ 32 918 $ 3 950 13 677 42%
Geylang oct.12 245 94% 230 11 550 7 623 31 100% $ 16 066 $ 4 000 $ 20 066 $ 22 547 $ 42 613 $ 4 977 $ 45 333 $ 5 296 25 267 56%
Bukit Merah Central déc.12 200 85% 170 10 800 7 560 38 100% $ 16 756 $ 4 000 $ 20 756 $ 12 266 $ 33 023 $ 4 293 $ 36 908 $ 4 798 16 151 44%
MacPherson mars.13 180 83% 149 8 050 5 635 31 100% $ 11 628 $ 3 500 $ 15 128 $ 11 082 $ 26 211 $ 2 359 $ 30 000 $ 4 500 14 872 50%
Woodlands mai.13 144 88% 127 7 680 4 608 32 100% $ 12 326 $ 3 500 $ 15 826 $ 8 167 $ 23 993 $ 3 599 $ 25 902 $ 3 885 10 076 39%
Pasir Panjang juin.13 295 70% 207 15 600 10 608 36 100% $ 24 704 $ 4 000 $ 28 704 $ 14 746 $ 43 450 $ 6 518 $ 66 491 $ 9 974 37 787 57%
Ang Mo Kio nov.13 160 65% 104 8 000 5 600 35 100% $ 12 800 $ 3 500 $ 16 300 $ 7 496 $ 23 796 $ 3 569 $ 34 779 $ 5 217 18 479 53%
Chai Chee févr.14 140 50% 70 8 050 5 635 40 100% $ 13 351 $ 3 500 $ 16 851 $ 1 347 $ 18 198 $ 2 730 $ 34 576 $ 5 186 17 725 51%
Tai Seng févr.14 138 36% 60 11 000 7 700 56 100% $ 15 000 $ 3 500 $ 18 500 $ (1 178) $ 17 322 $ 2 598 $ 45 712 $ 6 857 27 212 60%
Serangoon sept.14 224 13% 30 19 100 13 370 60 65% $ 24 830 $ 4 500 $ 29 330 $ (4 330) $ 25 000 $ (4 330) $ 66 850 $ 37 520 37 520 56%
Bukit Batok ph 2 nov.14 208 0% 0 17 100 10 220 49 100% $ 21 828 $ 3 000 $ 24 828 $ (4 828) $ 20 000 $ (4 828) $ 56 410 $ 31 582 31 582 56%
Total/Average 2 435 67% 1 635 138 090 92 059 38 94% $ 201 642 $ 44 900 $ 246 542 $ 111 982 $ 358 524 $ 56 425 $ 527 878 $ 149 755 281 337 53%
Total annual $ 1 343 785 $ 4 302 284 $ 677 099 $ 6 334 538 $ 1 797 056 $ 3 376 038
Overhead cost at stable state (little mkt/staff costs) $ (700 000) $ (250 000) $ (250 000)
Annual EBIT $ 643 785 $ 1 547 056 $ 3 126 038

Source: Company information

Purchased by Jochem Overweel for use on the Seminar Global Brand Strategy (FEM11179), at Erasmus University Rotterdam-FEW.
Taught by Prof. Dr. Martijn De Jong, from 5-Mar-2024 to 30-Apr-2024. Order ref F504111.
Usage permitted only within these parameters. This PDF may not be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or uploaded to any LLM (e.g. ChatGPT).

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