Fake Degrees and Fraudulent Credentials in Higher Education

Ethics and Integrity in Educational Contexts 5
Sarah Elaine Eaton

Jamie J. Carmichael
Helen Pethrick Editors
Fake Degrees
and Fraudulent
Credentials in
Higher Education
Ethics and Integrity in Educational Contexts
Volume 5
Series Editor
Sarah Elaine Eaton , Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary,
Calgary, AB, Canada
Editorial Board Members

Tomáš Foltýnek , Department of Informatics, Mendel University, Brno,
Czech Republic
Irene Glendinning , Coventry University, Coventry, UK
Zeenath Reza Khan , University of Wollongong, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Rebecca Moore Howard, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA
Mark Israel, Australasian Human Research Ethics Consultancy Services,
Perth, Australia
Ceceilia Parnther, St. John’s University, Jamaica, NY, USA
Brenda Stoesz, The Center for Advancement of Teaching and Learning,
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada
The aim of this series is to provide an authoritative series of books on topics relating
to ethics and integrity in educational contexts. Its scope includes ethics and integrity,
defined in broad and inclusive terms, in educational contexts. It focuses on higher
education, but also welcomes contributions that address ethics and integrity in
primary and secondary education, non-formal educational contexts, professional
education, etc. We welcome books that address traditional academic integrity topics
such as plagiarism, exam cheating, and collusion.
In addition, we are particularly interested in topics that extend beyond questions
of student conduct, such as
• Quality assurance in education;
• Research ethics and integrity;
• Admissions fraud;
• Fake and fraudulent credentials;
• Publication ethics;
• Educational technology ethics (e.g., surveillance tech, machine learning, and
artificial intelligence, as they are used in education);
• Biomedical ethics in educational contexts;
• Ethics in varsity and school sports.
This series extends beyond traditional and narrow concepts of academic integrity
to broader interpretations of applied ethics in education, including corruption and
ethical questions relating to instruction, assessment, and educational leadership. It
also seeks to promote social justice, diversity, equity, and inclusion.
The series provides a forum to address emerging, urgent, and even provocative
topics related to ethics and integrity at all levels of education, from a variety of
disciplinary and geographical perspectives.
Sarah Elaine Eaton • Jamie J. Carmichael
Helen Pethrick
Editors
Fake Degrees and Fraudulent

Credentials in Higher
Education
Editors
Sarah Elaine Eaton Jamie J. Carmichael
Werklund School of Education Carleton University
University of Calgary Ottawa, ON, Canada
Calgary, AB, Canada
Helen Pethrick
University of Calgary
Calgary, AB, Canada
ISSN 2731-779X ISSN 2731-7803 (electronic)

Ethics and Integrity in Educational Contexts
ISBN 978-3-031-21795-1 ISBN 978-3-031-21796-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2023
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Preface
We did not start this work with a book in mind, but rather we began with curiosity
about fake and fraudulent academic credentials in higher education. We noted a lack
of scholarly research on this topic and wanted to know more. We (Jamie and Sarah)
developed a brief survey that they administered in Canada and realized that among
those who work in higher education, there were alarming gaps in knowledge. (You
can read more about our survey in chapter two of this book.)
After we (Jamie and Sarah) presented a webinar on the topic of fake degrees and
fraudulent credentials at the University of Calgary in 2020, we were humbled and
realized that we ourselves had a lot to learn. We began gathering all the literature we
could find on the topic and one name kept popping up, Allen Ezell. It quickly
became obvious that he was the leading expert in the world on this topic and we
knew we wanted to work with him. We also began to understand that fake and
fraudulent credentials included other topics, such as corruption and fraud in the
entire admissions process, including the administration of standardized admissions
tests and English language proficiency tests. We were also interested in the use of
technology and how it can be used to uphold integrity in the process of admissions
and academic record-keeping. We engaged in a lengthy literature review search and
found a limited number of articles and books on these topics, and we realized that
there was a need for an edited volume that brought together authors with different
but complementary expertise on topics related to fake and fraudulent degrees.
We developed a book proposal and put out a call for chapters. We also reached
out to Allen Ezell and asked if he would contribute a chapter, and we were delighted
when he agreed. As proposals for other chapters came in, the book began to
take shape.
Our third editor (Helen Pethrick) joined the project in the later stages of its devel-
opment, contributing editorial and academic writing expertise.
This book was developed and mostly written during the most difficult 2 years of
the COVID-19 pandemic, from early 2020 through to 2022. Everyone who contrib-
uted to the book was impacted by the pandemic either directly or indirectly. Although
we originally planned to have this book published a little earlier, we opted instead
v
vi Preface
to delay the publication of the work to provide contributors with the time they
needed to work on their chapters.
This book makes a unique contribution to the field of scholarship on academic
integrity and ethics, bringing insights from authors from working in Canada, the
USA, the UK, and Türkiye, several of whom have additional international experi-
ences that further broaden their perspectives. We are grateful to have learned from
and with each of the contributors to this one-of-a-kind book.
Calgary, AB, Canada Sarah Elaine Eaton
Ottawa, ON, Canada Jamie J. Carmichael
Calgary, AB, Canada Helen Pethrick

Acknowledgments
Sarah and Helen are grateful to the University of Calgary’s Taylor Institute for
Teaching and Learning, and specifically to the Educational Leader in Residence
(ELR) program that made this work possible. Thanks are due to Dr. Dru Marshall
for supporting the ELR program from a provost level, and we are especially grateful
to Dr. Leslie Reid, Vice Provost, Teaching and Learning; Dr. Natasha Kenny, Senior
Director of the Taylor Institute of Teaching and Learning; and Dr. Susan Barker,
Vice Provost of Student Experience, who all supported the Educational Leader in
Residence, Academic Integrity portfolio.
Jamie would like to thank Carleton University, where she has worked for 20
years, with 5 of those years as the Associate Registrar of Scheduling and Systems.
For the majority of this time, I (Jamie) have worked under the direction of Suzanne
Blanchard, Vice-President of Students and Enrolment, who has provided tremen-
dous guidance and a friendly ear over the years. Special thanks to Dr. Jerry
Tomberlin, Provost & Vice- President Academic, Dr. Catherine Khordoc, Deputy
Provost, as well as the Associate Deans (Dr. Howard Nemiroff, Dr. Jerome Talim,
Dr. Robert Langlois, Dr. Peter Thompson, Dr. Anne Bowker, Dr. David Mendeloff,
Dr. Paul Wilson, Dr. Julia Wallace, Dr. Sue Bertram, Dr. Kim Hellemans), who have
provided academic leadership.
I (Jamie) would like to thank my peers for their time in answering my questions
throughout the research process. In particular, the Admissions Office (Janice
O’Farrell, Jen Sugar, Sarah Ramisch, and Anshul Singh), Registrar’s Office (Dotty
Nwakanma and James Moretton), and the Information Security Office (Steve Fraser,
Eddie Vilarta, Todd Switzer, and Mahmoud Raslan).
I (Jamie) am also thankful for my academic department, Technology Innovation
and Management, which is a joint-program between Systems and Computer
Engineering, and the Sprott School of Business under the direction of Dr. Steven
Muegge. I planted my academic roots here as a graduate student under the supervi-
sion of Dr. Michael Weiss, Associate Professor in Systems and Computer
Engineering, who has introduced me to the world of text mining.
From Jamie, a special thank you to Dr. Lorraine Dyke, Vice-President of Finance
and Administration; Dr. Anthony White, Adjunct Research Professor; Dr. Luke
vii
viii Acknowledgments
Russell, PhD Electrical and Computer Engineering; and Dr. Sarah Elaine Eaton,
Associate Professor and Chair, University of Calgary, for their mentorship, support,
and encouragement. You have inspired me, been a force of positivity, and for that,
I am so very grateful.
Personal notes of thanks are also in order. I (Jamie) would like to thank my hus-
band, Edward Carmichael, and my children (Charlotte and Matthew) who are truly
my best chapters. I (Sarah) would like to thank my husband, Todd Maki, along with
all of my family who provide ongoing encouragement and support.
We all owe a debt of gratitude to Allen Ezell, FBI Special Agent (ret.). In addi-
tion to writing his outstanding chapter, Allen became a private tutor to us, providing
insights into the global industry of degree fraud that has continued to proliferate for
decades. We had many conversations with Allen throughout the preparation of this
book, each one more enlightening and instructive than the previous one.
Calgary, Canada Sarah Elaine Eaton
Ottawa, Canada Jamie J. Carmichael
Calgary, Canada Helen Pethrick

Contents
1 Fake Degrees and Credential Fraud, Contract Cheating,

and Paper Mills: Overview and Historical Perspectives�� 1
Sarah Elaine Eaton and Jamie J. Carmichael
2
Admissions Fraud in Canadian Higher Education�� 23
Jamie J. Carmichael and Sarah Elaine Eaton
3 Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Tour of Axact,
the “World’s Largest Diploma Mill”�� 49
Allen Ezell
4 Bridging to Tomorrow: A Historical and Technological Review
of Credential Exchange in Higher Education Within Canada�� 95
Joanne Duklas
5 Fair Play, Fraud, or Fixed? Athletic Credentials
in U.S. Higher Education�� 115
Kirsten Hextrum
6 Corruption in Admissions, Recruitment, Qualifications
and Credentials: From Research into Quality Assurance�� 133
Stella-Maris Orim and Irene Glendinning
7 Avoiding Favouritism in the Recruitment Practice
of Turkish Higher Education Institutions�� 153
Özgür Çelik and Salim Razı
8 None of the Above: Integrity Concerns of Standardized
English Proficiency Tests �� 169
Soroush Sabbaghan and Ismaeil Fazel
9 Examining the Problem of Fraudulent English Test Scores:
What Can Canadian Higher Education Institutions Learn?�� 187
Angela Clark
ix
x Contents
10
There is No Culture? A Framework for Addressing Admissions
Fraud�� 209
Brendan DeCoster
11 Security Risks, Fake Degrees, and Other Fraud:
A Topic Modelling Approach�� 227
12 Are You for Real? Lessons for the Academy About Professors
with Fake or Fraudulent Degrees �� 251
13
Fake Degrees and Fraudulent Credentials in Higher Education:
Conclusions and Future Directions�� 269
About the Editors
Sarah Elaine Eaton, PhD, is an associate professor at the Werklund School of

Education, University of Calgary, Canada. She has received research awards of
excellence for her scholarship on academic integrity from the Canadian Society for
the Study of Higher Education (CSSHE) (2020) and the European Network for
Academic Integrity (ENAI) (2022). Dr. Eaton has written and presented extensively
on academic integrity and ethics in higher education and is regularly invited as a
media guest to talk about academic misconduct. Dr. Eaton is the editor-in-chief of
the International Journal for Educational Integrity. Her books include Plagiarism
in Higher Education: Tackling Tough Topics in Academic Integrity, Academic
Integrity in Canada: An Enduring and Essential Challenge (Eaton & Christensen
Hughes, eds.), and Contract Cheating in Higher Education: Global Perspectives on
Theory, Practice, and Policy (Eaton, Curtis, Stoesz, Clare, Rundle, & Seeland, eds.)
and Ethics and Integrity in Teacher Education (Eaton & Khan, eds.).
Jamie J. Carmichael is the Associate Registrar of Scheduling and Systems at

Carleton University. She is responsible for the construction of the university timetable,
scheduling and administration of examinations, the operation of two examination cen-
ters for students with disabilities, a university-wide space management system, and
other core student administrative systems. Since 2009, she has received ten service
excellence nominations for her work that ranges from information technology projects
and team acknowledgment to innovation.
Carmichael’s research lies at the intersection of academic integrity and machine
learning, with graduate education in applied science in technology information
management (Engineering). She has presented or co-presented at national and inter-
national conferences and is often called upon by specialized groups in higher educa-
tion to present on her work.
Helen Pethrick, MA, is a researcher and educator in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Her
research areas include academic integrity in higher education, post-secondary stu-
dent mental health and well-being, and peer mentorship in educational settings.
xi
Chapter 1
Fake Degrees and Credential Fraud,
Contract Cheating, and Paper Mills:
Overview and Historical Perspectives
Abstract In this introductory chapter we provide an overview and historical per-

spectives of credential fraud, starting with definitions of key terms such as ‘fake
degree’, ‘fraudulent degree’, ‘degree mill’, and ‘diploma mill’, among others. This
chapter serves as a unifying thread for the volume as we discuss how fake degrees
and other forms of credential fraud impact the entire lifecycle of the educational and
professional spectrum. We show connections between the fake and fraudulent
degree industry, contract cheating, admissions fraud, and scholarly paper mills,
illustrating how the industries are linked, with mega-corporations selling both
goods, such as bogus parchments, and services, student impersonation services, as
well as fraudulent research and academic writing services. We synthesize what is
currently known about the size and scope of these industries to provide an updated
estimated valuation of the global academic fraud industry at $21 Billion USD. An
original contribution of this work is our model of the ecosystem of commercial
academic fraud that shows the relationship between fake degrees, contract cheating,
admissions fraud, and scholarly paper mills.
Keywords Fake degree · Credential · Degree · Fraud · Academic misconduct ·

Admissions fraud · Standardized test · Cheating · Contract cheating · Paper mills ·
Essay mills · Corruption · Higher education
S. E. Eaton (*)
University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
e-mail: seaton@ucalgary.ca
J. J. Carmichael
Carleton University, Ottawa, ON, Canada
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
S. E. Eaton et al. (eds.), Fake Degrees and Fraudulent Credentials in Higher
Education, Ethics and Integrity in Educational Contexts 5,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_1
2 S. E. Eaton and J. J. Carmichael
Introduction
In this chapter, we provide a foundation for the study of fake and fraudulent degrees,
including the definitions of key terms. The study of fraud has historically focused on
acts such as embezzlement and forgery, and definitions of these terms can vary in
different jurisdictions (Cressey, 1973). To our knowledge, even within the study of
forgery, little attention has been paid to the topic of fake and fraudulent credentials.
In this chapter we use the term fake degree industry as an umbrella term to refer to
the commercial industry selling all types of fake and fraudulent academic credential
documents. We use the term contract cheating to refer to the illegitimate outsourc-
ing of student academic work (see Clarke & Lancaster, 2006).
There has been little academic scholarship conducted on the topic of fake and
fraudulent credentials, at least relative to other areas of educational research. Some
exceptions include work by Angulo (2016), Attewell & Domina (2011), Brown
(2006), Johnson (2005, 2006), Qureshi (2017), and Van Tol (1990). We acknowl-
edge this may not be an exhaustive list of scholarship on fake degrees, but it is evi-
dent that research on the topic is limited. The mainstream media often shines a
spotlight on this problem highlighting notable stories in the news, whereas the topic
has been noticeably neglected by academic scholars (an irony which is not lost on
us). Diploma mills have been called “a festering score on the academic landscape”
(Arnstein, 1982, p. 550) and yet, even among academic integrity scholars, topics
such as plagiarism, exam cheating, and contract cheating have garnered more atten-
tion than fake and fraudulent degrees. We contend that the topic of fake degrees is
just as important, if not more so, than other forms of academic fraud. It has long
been documented that student academic misconduct is not always intentional (e.g.,
Eaton, 2021b; Elander et al., 2010; Adam, 2016; McGowan, 2005); however, buy-
ing or selling fake or fraudulent diplomas can hardly be called an accident, and
neither can contract cheating or engaging the services of a scholarly paper mill.
With respect to fake degrees specifically, Reid (1963) notes, “frauds perpetrated
by degree holders are not solely the responsibility of institutions. The holder is also
guilty” (p. 2). In other words, the culpability for buying and selling fake and fraudu-
lent academic documents applies to both the buyer and the seller. The case of
Operation Varsity Blues, the admissions scandal in the United States in which par-
ents worked with third parties to engage in admissions fraud to help secure their
children places in prestigious U.S. universities, presents an interesting example in
which both the buyers (i.e., parents) and the sellers (i.e., the third parties who pro-
vided the cheating services) were found guilty in court (see Hextrum, 2019; Jaschik,
2021, 2022; Thelin, 2019; United States Department of Justice: The United States
Attorney’s Office – District of Massachusetts, 2020). As we kept our finger on the
pulse of this story unfolding in the news, we noted that the universities involved
were not held accountable for their role in the scandal. It is beyond the scope of this
chapter to delve into the ways in which institutions, the higher education system,
and society at large enable the conditions that perpetuate this type of fraud, but a
discussion of this see Eaton et al. (2022).
1 Fake Degrees and Credential Fraud, Contract Cheating, and Paper Mills: Overview… 3
The issue of intentionality cannot be ignored. It is worth noting that there are
cases of individuals – hundreds of thousands (or possibly millions) of them in the
United States over the past few centuries – who are good and upstanding citizens
seeking an escape from poverty, who have been the victims of fraudulent schools
that knowingly swindle unsuspecting students out of their money selling empty
promises of a better life and useless diplomas. These individuals are not fraudsters,
but rather victims of fraud. This is particularly notable in cases of foreign students
and their families who are duped by unscrupulous educational agents who supply
faked or forged documents, as well as other cheating services, sometimes unbe-
knownst to the student or their family (e.g., Ansah et al., 2017).
Those who buy and sell fake degree online and those who operate pseudo-schools
are more interested in cash than credibility. Intentionality and deception are factors
that make the fake degree industry a scourge of society.
A Brief History of Fake and Fraudulent Credentials
It is not known exactly when or where the first fake or fraudulent degree was sold.
In the English-speaking world at least, the United States has been a hot bed for the
market due to its “emphasis on education, coupled with decentralization and a rea-
sonably free market” (Arnstein, 1982, p. 550). However, there is ample evidence to
show that bogus degrees are sold all over the world. Currently, it is thought that the
North American and Gulf Regions are particularly strong markets for the sale of
fake and fraudulent documents, including academic parchments (Ezell, 2019).
From our own country, Canada, we found newspaper accounts of fake degrees
dating back to 1923, with the headline, “More quack doctors stripped of titles”
(Globe and Mail, 1923). The story appears to have been republished from a news-
paper in Hartford, Connecticut, that shares information about a Grand Jury investi-
gation about a “fake diploma mill” that sold medical credentials in the United States.
Even in this example, we can see that much of what we know about the global fake
and fraudulent degree industry is from knowledge generated in the US. From our
perspective as Canadians, we have noted little acknowledgement that fake degrees
and contract cheating are problems in this country, despite having ample evidence
to suggest that these industries flourish in Canada, as much as in any other country
(see Carmichael & Eaton, 2023; Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC], 2017;
Eaton, 2022; The Globe and Mail, 1923; Seeland et al., 2020). Given that the eco-
system of academic fraud exists at a global level, it is naïve for anyone in any coun-
try to think that they are immune to the effects of the academic black market on its
educational system.
The earliest known case of a profit-hungry alleged “master” mason peddling
services to train an apprentice in exchange for free labour was in 1676 (Angulo,
2016). As one American scholar has noted, “profit seekers found a different niche in
colonial and revolutionary America” (Angulo, 2016, p. 2) – the generation of profit
through the provision of education. In the US, for-profit, proprietary colleges
without any legal authority to confer credentials have existed since the 1700s
(Angulo, 2016).
There are two notable points about these earliest of questionable schools. The
first is that these for-profit enterprises, whether they were individual “masters” of a
trade peddling their expertise to aspiring apprentices, or for-profit schools, the early
days of the fake degree industry appear to have started not as selling parchments
outright, but rather as a form of swindling individuals into buying or trading ser-
vices for low quality schooling where the primary purpose was not to educate indi-
viduals, but rather to make money. As historians of education tell us, the education
of children dates back millennia, even to the paleolithic age, when learning was a
matter of survival (Boyd & King, 1975). In the Western world, formal education can
be traced back to the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, and Greeks (Boyd & King,
1975). Even in the earliest of times, education was seen as a form of social good.
Whether it was designed to ensure survival or to pass on knowledge of customs,
religion, culture, and the world around us, the purpose of early education was
intended primarily as a benefit to the learners. The shifting of the primary purpose
of education being from one of social benefit to financial benefit did not happen
until much later.
The second point worth noting is that although the early education, including
universities, can be traced back to the ancient Greeks, the emergence of for-profit
education as a kind of predatory enterprise, appears to have emerged in the form of
adult education (see Honick, 1995). If little is known about the fake degree and for-
profit educational systems for adults, even less is known about the development of
for-profit education for children. That is not to say that predatory educational ser-
vices and swindling tutors have not existed for children. Even educational historians
have written about the existence of tutors, particularly for the children of wealthy
parents (Cubberley, 1920) and when schooling for children become more organized
during the industrial revolution, it also became monetized and although this has
been a topic of interest to educational historians (e.g., Cubberley, 1920), their treat-
ment of this topic has rarely included a discussion of outright fraudulent education.
As a result, much less is known about the development of fraudulent, questionable,
or fake diplomas in the primary and secondary schooling system. What we know
about the development of fake and fraudulent degrees seems to point to an industry
that has flourished in the tertiary education sector.
By the 1880s, the bogus credential industry in the United States was known even
Europe. There is a fascinating account in the United States “Report of the
Commissioner of Education for the Year 1880”, which discusses the proliferation of
the sale of degrees in “arts, sciences, and the learned professions” (United States
Bureau of Education, 1882, p. CLX).
If we fast forward more than a century, in 2009 the Council for Higher Education
Accreditation (CHEA), and United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), collaborated on a publication about fake degrees in which
they declared, “degree mills are and will continue to be a significant international
problem for students, employers, the public, legitimate providers of higher
education and accreditation/quality assurance and national governments” (CHEA &

UNESCO, 2009, p. 5). They were not wrong.
We do not “know very much about how holders profit from such degrees.
Evidence is available but sparse, for imposters do not readily confess” (Reid, 1963,
p. 3). This remains true today, as there is no systematic way to study how much
academic fraudsters have benefitted financially or socially from touting their fake
credentials. Experts have, however, been able to estimate the value of the global
industry. Although there was a time when the majority of suppliers were one-person
operations (Bear, 1986), much has changed since the mid-1990s when the Internet
became popularized. Since then, companies that sell fake degrees and other fraudu-
lent credential documents have proliferated into a massive and sophisticated global
industry, which was estimated to be worth at least $1 Billion USD as of 2014. By
2022 the fake degree industry was estimated to have over $7 Billion USD in global
sales (Ezell, 2022). In other words, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the
demand for fake credentials grew by seven-fold from 2014 to 2022, and the industry
continues to expand. One company alone, Axact, is estimated to have a sales goal of
$7 Million USD per month (Ezell, 2019). Historical estimates of the fake degree
industry point to a cumulative customer base of 4.7 billion customers worldwide,
with at least 700,000 individual customers in the USA alone (Ezell, 2022). We wish
to clarify that these are the estimated cumulative customers based on known history,
not current customers alive today; there are no available concrete statistics about the
number of active customers of the fake degree industry worldwide. Today the fake
degree industry operates mainly online and via telephone and the cost of a fake
diploma can range from $199 to $25,000 USD (Ezell, 2022).
Perhaps the most notorious company engaged in the sale of fake and fraudulent
academic credentials is Axact, based out of Pakistan (Ezell, 2019, 2022; Walsh,
2015; Qureshi, 2017; United States Department of Justice, 2016). International tele-
marketing of fake degrees has been prevalent since at least the 1980s (Bear, 1986)
and has been a lucrative way to engage in sales. According to FBI Agent (Ret.),
Allen Ezell, in 2013–2014, Axact received over 5000 telephone calls per day, with
a 40% buy rate. In other words, 4 in 10 customers who spoke over the phone with
representatives from this fake degree company ended up buying at least one fraudu-
lent document. In business generally, the average companies close 20% of the time,
and “best-in-class companies close 30% of sales qualified leads” (McDade, 2020,
n.p.). This means that the closing rate for this particular fake degree company
exceeds not only the average company, but even those considered the most success-
ful. This points to a well-trained, well-resourced, and unrelenting sales force. In
2016, the United States Attorney’s Office charged the executives of Axact with
“wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft in con-
nection with a worldwide “diploma mill” scheme that collected at least approxi-
mately $140 million from tens of thousands of consumers” (United States
Department of Justice, 2016). The business of selling fake and fraudulent academic
and professional documents is a massive global industry worth billions of dollars
that continues to proliferate.
A reasonable question to ask is whether it is illegal to buy or sell bogus academic

and professional credentials. The answer is not as simple as it one might think. One
of the world’s most knowledgeable experts on the topic of fake and fraudulent
degrees is FBI Special Agent (retired), Allen Ezell. He writes and speaks exten-
sively on the topic and has a particular focus on the mega-industry that operates out
of Pakistan. He points out:
Neither the United States nor Pakistan has federal criminal statutes outlawing the advertis-
ing, sale, issuance, possession, or use of diplomas issued by diploma mills or the issuance
of false accreditation documents by accreditation mills. The United States has federal crim-
inal statutes pertaining to wire fraud (interstate wire communications), mail fraud, and
computer fraud, and these have been used successfully to prosecute diploma and accredita-
tion mills. Pakistan does not currently have any cybercrime statutes. (Ezell, 2019, p. 41)
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the laws in multiple countries that
could potentially be used to curb the fake and fraudulent degree industry. Suffice to
say that lax laws relating to fake and fraudulent academic and professional creden-
tials have no doubt enabled companies worldwide not only to exist, but to prolifer-
ate into a mega global industry worth billions of dollars.
Defining Key Terms
In this section we define key terms relating to fake and fraudulent degrees and cre-
dentials. Here we take a straightforward and practical approach to definitions to
provide clarity and aid understanding. Our definitions are intended to be descriptive,
rather than prescriptive and in some cases, we have acknowledged debates among
experts about what the terms mean.
Accreditation
The definition of academic accreditation varies from one country to another, but in
general, “accreditation” and “recognition” are indicators of academic quality,
approved by a government body at a state, provincial, or national level. Accreditation
is considered desirable, especially when it is conferred by a legitimate and reputable
body (Arnstein, 1982).
One problem in the fake degree world is that companies that sell fake degrees
also set up their own fake accreditation bodies, making it difficult for the average
citizen to know which degrees are legitimately accredited. Fake accreditation bodies
have existed for decades, dating back to at least the 1970s (Arnstein, 1982).
In the United States, the Department of Education offers a free online service
called the Database of Accredited Postsecondary Institutions and Programs (DAPIP)
(https://ope.ed.gov/dapip/#/home) that allows anyone to check the accreditation
status of a post-secondary institution in that country (United States Department of

Education, 2022). Anyone can use this service, without charge, without creating an
account and without surrendering any personal information themselves. One simply
enters the name of the school into the search bar and can see the results generated
by the database. Not all countries offer such a service, and it is an excellent way for
employers or anyone else to quickly check the official accreditation status of a
higher education institution.
Contract Cheating
The term contract cheating was introduced by Clarke and Lancaster (2006); how-
ever, there are no universally accepted definitions of contact cheating (see Curtis
et al., 2022). Contract cheating generally refers to the outsourcing of academic work
to a third party. This can include, but is not limited to assignment completion, essay
writing, thesis writing, and exam impersonation (see, for example, Clarke and
Lancaster, 2006; Curtis et al., 2022; Rogerson, 2022; Crockett, 2022).
Draper and Newton (2017) assert that contract cheating occurs when “the third
party makes a contribution to the work of the student, such that there is reasonable
doubt as to whose work the assessment represents” (p. 1). This definition is particu-
larly relevant to this chapter, as it can easily be extrapolated to fake and fraudulent
degrees, as well as scholarly paper mills.
Credentialism
The increasing demand for academic credentials by employers, resulting in the need
for candidates to possess higher and higher credentials in order to secure employ-
ment, or those already employed to be eligible for promotion.
In the United States, as early as the 1980s, a master’s degree was required for
certain administrative jobs and teachers wishing to advance to the level of a school
superintendent needed a doctorate (Arnstein, 1982). Some employers enable the
escalation of credentialism because they encourage employees to obtain degrees to
elevate the perceived prestige of the organization, particularly to external profes-
sional or government bodies (Arnstein, 1982).
Degree/Diploma
Ezell and Bear (2005) offer simple and straightforward definitions of the terms
degree and diploma:
A degree is the title one earns from a legitimate school or buys from a fake one: Bachelor
of Arts, Master of Science, Master of Business Administration, Doctor of Philosophy, Juris
Doctor (law), Doctor of Medicine, and scores of other titles.
A diploma is the certificate – the piece of paper or parchment – that signifies that a
degree has been awarded.
Schools award degrees. And then they present the graduate with a diploma, which is, in
effect, an announcement, a proclamation of degree that has been awarded. (Ezell & Bear,
2005, p. 20, emphasis in original)
In the definition offered by Ezell and Bear, they recognize that degrees can be either
legitimate or fake. However, it is worth nothing that there is an assumption that
when we are defining the word “degree”, in terms of academic credentials, we are
talking about a valid degree (Contreras, 2020). Alan Contreras, an esteemed author-
ity on academic credentials, offers this definition:
A degree is a type of public credential, an academic credential. A public credential is dis-
tinguished from other kinds of awards and recognition that is used outside private life for a
specific purpose. Legitimate degrees are given for certain accomplishments in fields of
knowledge, within a structure that involves qualified teachers who evaluate student perfor-
mance against a set of generally accepted norms. (Contreras, 2020, p. 8, emphasis in
original)
Degree Mill/Diploma Mill
There are no universally accepted definitions of degree mill or diploma mill (CHEA
& UNESCO, 2009; Reid, 1963). As Ezell and Bear (2005) point out, “there is far
from unanimous agreement on just what a degree mill is” (p. 21). These terms are
often used interchangeably, though some experts have attempted to differentiate
between them.
Stewart and Spille (1988) offered this definition:
Diploma mills come in several varieties. In its simplest form, the diploma mill has few
academic pretensions. It simply sells a diploma or degree to a person upon payment of a fee
and does not require demonstration of the achievement of college-level learning. Such
diplomas may carry the name of the diploma mill itself, or they may be duplicates of diplo-
mas issued by legitimate colleges and universities… Bogus transcripts and letters of recom-
mendation may also be part of the wares offered by the diploma mill in its most pristine
form. (p. 11)
Contreras and Gollin (2009) proposed this distinction between the two terms: “A
degree mill provides a “real” degree from a fake college. A diploma mill provides a
fake degree from a real college.” (p. 37).
However, the following year, Gollin et al. (2010) published a paper in which they
defined a diploma mill as a “businesses that sell bogus degrees to customers in
search of easy credentials” (Gollin et al., 2010, p. 1), stating that a diploma mill is:
(1) an entity without legal authority from the jurisdiction in which it operates to issue aca-
demic degrees valid as credentials in that jurisdiction; and.
(2) which issues, sells, advertises, or otherwise provides or publicizes its degrees or degree
programs to individuals residing in states outside the state in which the entity operates,
or issues, sells, advertises, or otherwise provides or publicizes its degrees or degree
programs to individuals residing in countries outside the country in which the entity
operates; and.
(3) does not hold institutional accreditation from an accrediting body recognized by the
Department of Education or the Council for Higher Education Accreditation. (Gollin
et al., 2010, p. 11)
For us, there is little use in the academic exercise of trying to provide an absolute
definition or differentiation of these terms when others before us have struggled to
differentiate between them. In this book, we use both terms interchangeably.
It has been suggested that “honest but weak” legitimate schools ought not to be
called degree or diploma mills (Reid, 1963, p. 5). We recognize that in common
vernacular, especially when criticizing the increasingly commodified global sys-
tems of higher education people will often use one or both terms to refer to low-
quality-but-legitimately-accredited programs. However, for the purposes of this
book, we use the terms degree mill and diploma mill to refer to operations that
intentionally provide fake or fraudulent credentials to others. In our work, we are
concerned with fraudulent organizations that have no legitimate business.
Fake Degree
A fake degree is from a university that does not exist. Both the degree and the uni-
versity are fabrications.
Fraudulent Degree
A fraudulent degree is one that appears to be from a legitimate university (and

sometimes quite prestigious ones, such an Ivy League school in the United States),
but the person who holds the degree never actually completed their studies at
that school.
These are counterfeit documents of real degrees that are usually purchased from
an Internet-based supplier (Ezell & Bear, 2005). Suppliers procure copies of origi-
nal parchments in a variety of ways. Ezell and Bear (2005) outline seven main
methods counterfeiters use to obtain real degrees which they then manipulate to
make copies:
1. Requesting replacement parchments from legitimate schools in the names of the
actual degree-holder. Counterfeiters exploit the school’s policy to replace parch-
ments that have been lost, damaged, or destroyed. Schools enable this from of
fraud when they are not diligent about verifying the identity of who is requesting
the replacement parchment.
2. Web-based copies of diplomas. Again, Ezell and Bear (2005) speak to lax prac-
tices of some schools’ when it comes to advertising their document-framing
services and post examples of framed diplomas. We can add to this that it has
become common practice for brand new graduates to post pictures of themselves
online, posing in their cap and gown, holding their newly conferred degree. This
practice provides counterfeiters with an almost endless supply of photos of legit-
imate degrees that they can then manipulate and resell as they please. It might
also put the individual posting the degree at a higher risk of identity fraud.
3. Estate sales, yard sales, online marketplaces and auctions. Ezell and Bear (2005)
wrote that they found over 2300 actual diplomas for sale on eBay, “ranging from
an old Yale diploma with a $4,500 starting price on down to numerous counter-
feits in the $15 to $50 range” (p. 271–272).
4. Photos of diplomas hanging on people’s walls, taken with a digital camera.
5. Trade-ins. Ezell and Bear (2005) note that some companies will make deals with
customer to provide copies of their legitimate diploma from one school in order
to get a second diploma from a different school. For example, the buyer supplies
a copy of a bachelor’s diploma from Stanford, in order to buy a PhD parchment
from Harvard (Ezell & Bear, 2005).
6. Dishonest people who work at legitimate schools and print shops who provide
copies of parchments to counterfeiters. One of us (Eaton) once had the experi-
ence of walking into her private office on campus to find that one of her diplomas
on the wall was crooked and the parchment itself was askew from its matte.
There are a number of individuals who have keys to professors’ offices including
some administrative staff, custodial staff, and security staff, among others. It is
impossible to know what caused that incident, but it certainly caught her atten-
tion, given her research interests.
7. Stealing legitimate parchments from those who hold them. Ezell and Bear (2005)
talk about those who “simply stealing them from people’s walls” (p. 272), but
other forms of theft are also possible, such as stealing them from desks, book-
shelves, etc.
Ezell and Bear (2005) note that: “once the genie is out of the bottle, it cannot be put
back. If even one actual or replica Harvard diploma enters the marketplace, with the
easy exchange of JPEGs and PDF files on the Internet, no more are needed” (p. 272).
Fake University
A fake university is one that exists in name only and has no accreditation of any
kind. Such schools often exist only as an Internet URL, but some may also have PO
Box address to a post office box in an outdoor row of shops (commonly referred to
in North America as a “strip mall”, meaning that the shops are lined up in a straight
line, like a strip of ribbon) (Ezell & Bear, 2005). Among those whose professional
and scholarly work deals with fake and fraudulent degrees, it is common knowledge
that fake university outfits will choose names that are similar to real universities or
sound like they could be real. Ezell and Bear (2005) offer numerous examples in
their book and there are various other examples easily searched online. Some exam-
ples include “Paramount California University” and “Must University” (Ezell, 2019).
One of the best-known examples of a fake university is St. Regis University, an
entity that never actually existed (Brazao, 2008; Ezell & Bear, 2005; Gollin, 2022).
Run by Dixie and Steve Randock, based out of Spokane, Washington, USA, St.
Regis University allegedly sold its first degree in 1999 for $1400 USD to a customer
in Scotland (Gollin, 2022). The website for the fake university featured photos of
fake professors, using digital photo editor to create profiles for people who were not
professors and did not work at the organization (Gollin, 2022). Similarly, they used
digitally edited versions of real buildings and posted them on their website to make
it look like they had an actual campus, which of course, was anything but true.
There was eventually a federal investigation into the operation, which include the
participation of the U.S. Secret Service (Gollin, 2022). A raid of the Randock resi-
dential premises showed an excessive number of guns and a hand grenade in the
house (Gollin, 2022), along with servers, hard drives containing evidence of the
fake degree operation, along with “~11,000 images of child pornography, sorted by
age of the victim, in addition to the diploma mill sites” (Gollin, 2022, p. 29). Gollin
(2022) noted that “St. Regis sold 10,815 degrees to 9,612 customers in 131 coun-
tries. Gross receipts totaled ~$7.4 million (USD)” (p. 32).
Eventually, eight individuals were arrested and indicted. Counts included mail
and wire fraud, money laundering, bribery, along with receipt and possession of
child pornography. All eight individuals chose to plead guilty. Five went to prison
and three received probation (Gollin, 2022).
Gollin’s account of St. Regis University is riveting, like something out of a
movie, and yet the story is real. It is only one example of a case where the individu-
als involved were identified, arrested, and found guilty. There are an unidentified
number of similar operations in the world that are believed to fabricate thousands,
if not tens thousands of fake universities and sell significant numbers of parchments
from them. One need only look to the writings of experts such as Allen Ezell,
George Gollin, and Alan Contreras to begin to get a grasp of the magnitude of this
massive global industry (e.g., Contreras, 2020; Contreras & Gollin, 2009; Gollin,
2022; Gollin et al., 2010; Ezell, 2019, 2022; Ezell & Bear, 2005).
Paper Mill
The phrases term paper mill and essay mill are commonly used to refer to out-
sourced student work, whereas the term paper mill is used in scholarly and scientific
publishing to refer to “the process by which manufactured manuscripts are submit-
ted to a journal for a fee on behalf of researchers with the purpose of providing an
easy publication for them, or to offer authorship for sale” (Committee on Publication
Ethics [COPE] & International Association of Scientific Technical and Medical
Publishers [STM], 2022, p. 4).
Paper mills effectively extend academic outsourcing beyond student conduct into
the realm of scientific and scholarly fraud and misconduct. As we suggest later in
this paper, the organizations that supply manufactured papers or authorship for sale
are part of the larger global ecosystem of academic fraud.
Types of Fake and Fraudulent Products and Services
There are numerous types of fake and fraudulent credentials that are bought and
sold. In this section, we summarize some of the main types of fake and fraudulent
documents, as they have been identified by experts in the field (Ezell, 2019; Ezell &
Bear, 2005).
• Academic diplomas (i.e., parchments)
• Academic transcripts
• Reference letters (e.g., for admission applications)
• Accreditation documents
• Attestations of authenticity and origin of other documents. These are also known
as “apostille attestations.”
• Letterhead
• Correspondence (e.g., emails) from government offices such as the
U.S. Department of Education
• Prior Learning Assessment and Recognition (PLAR) services and attestations
• Fake student ID cards and ID numbers
This is an illustrative list, but not an exhaustive one. Basically, any type of document
that pertains to academic or professional credentials can be faked or forged.
Companies that are in the business of selling bogus documents procure authentic
paper (e.g., parchment), high quality printers, and authentic sealing machines that
can produce an emboss seal on a parchment. In the section that follows, we elabo-
rate on the services sold by these same companies, including contract cheating ser-
vices of various types.
he Connection Between the Fake Degree and Contract

T
Cheating Industries
In addition to the sale of documents, companies also offer services, including con-
tract cheating services. Although Ezell (2019) does not use the term contract cheat-
ing in his own writings, it is obvious to us as academic integrity scholars that he is
talking about the commercial outsourcing of academic and scholarly work to third
parties (Clarke & Lancaster, 2006; Newton, 2018). Allen Ezell (2019) has docu-
mented that companies that sell fake degrees also offer the following services:
Custom “research services”: This includes essay mills, paper mills, and
research papers. Ezell (2019) offers details of how this works, saying that compa-
nies purchase students identification numbers and log-in credentials of actual stu-
dents enrolled at hundreds of legitimate universities. Content is then stolen from the
libraries and resold online. Although Ezell speaks mainly about content being sold
from libraries, it is probable that student work can also be harvested from learning
management systems (LMSs) and resold online.
Proxy student services: Ezell (2019) details of how one company, Axact, has a
group of employees working specifically on student proxy (i.e., impersonation)
services:
students enrolled at legitimate U.S. institutions were invited to send all their academic
assignments to Axact throughout the school year. Axact would then conduct the necessary
research, prepare the assignments, and use “spoofing” technology to forward them to the
professor as if they were being sent directly by the student—all for a $40,000 fee. (Ezell,
2019, p. 43)
The links between the fake and fraudulent degree industry and the contract cheating
industry are undeniable; however, this relationship remains understudied. Further to
this, the links to scholarly paper mills, companies that churn out thousands of
research papers a month with the goal of having them published in academic jour-
nals, has become a major source of concern for the entire higher education sector,
including scientific and scholarly publishing (Committee on Publication Ethics
[COPE], & International Association of Scientific Technical and Medical Publishers
[STM], 2022).
Blacklists of Fake Schools: An Exercise in Futility
When we talk about our work in this area, we are often asked if there is an authorita-
tive “blacklist” of fake schools that university staff, employers, or members of the
public can check. The simple answer is no, and there is a reasonable explanation for
this. The names and websites of fake schools change so regularly and so quickly that
it is impossible to keep track of them all (see Ezell & Bear, 2005).
The first blacklist of degree mills that we know of was developed in the United
States and released in October 1959 by the U.S. Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, Arthur S. Fleming (Reid, 1963). Ezell and Bear (2005) share the names of
some fake universities in their book and one can find lists online of fake universities.
A new fake school can be created online in a matter of minutes, complete with pho-
tos of fake administrators and professors and buildings from anywhere in the world
(Ezell, 2019; Ezell & Bear, 2005). Make no mistake, it is utterly naïve to think there
could be a definitive list of all fake universities that exist now or have existed in
the past.
We note the obvious connection here to contract cheating websites (e.g., essay
mill websites) that change their names and URLs rapidly, with parent companies
owning the names of hundreds or thousands of URLs that they can swap out in a
matter of minutes, to set up a new online storefront quickly (Comas-Forgas et al.,

2020; Eaton & Dressler, 2019; Ellis et al., 2018; Newton & Lang, 2016; Seeland
et al., 2020). The fake degree industry is estimated to have hosted more than 10,000
websites since the early 1990s, with about 500–800 websites active at any given
time (Ezell, 2022). If a website is flagged for any reason, it can be taken down and
a new website with a different URL posted within minutes. In this way, the fake
degree industry operates in exactly the same way as the contract cheating websites
(e.g., term paper mills, homework help sites, thesis writing services), which regu-
larly change URLs to avoid being blocked by universities and colleges (Seeland
et al., 2020).
Blackmail, Extortion, and Links to Organized Crime
In his 2019 article on academic fraud and diploma mills, Allen Ezell provided
details about how companies that sell bogus academic documents “use extortion
and blackmail to extract more money from previous diploma buyers” (Ezell, 2019,
p. 40). In the fake degree industry, companies engage in aggressive upselling to
clients to get them to buy more and more documentation. Companies threaten to
expose customers if they do not pay the additional fees (Ezell, 2019, 2022). There
is at least one documented case of an individual handing over more than $1.4
Million USD to a fake degree company after being threatened (Ezell, 2022).
A year after Ezell published his article about extortion and blackmail by fake
degree companies in 2019, Jon Yorke and colleagues in Australia published an arti-
cle outlining how contract cheating companies extort students for more money. It
seems as though Yorke et al. (2020) may have been unaware of Ezell’s work pub-
lished just one year earlier, which would be reasonable given that the links between
the fake degree industry and contract cheating were not firmly established at that
time. Yorke et al. (2020) provided an overview of how contract cheating companies
threaten to report students to their schools for cheating if they do not pay additional
fees to the company, and then follow through on that threat. It is now widely
accepted among academic integrity scholars and higher education quality assurance
bodies that blackmail and extortion are common practices among some of the big
contract cheating companies (Draper et al., 2021; Lancaster, 2018; Quality and
Qualifications Ireland (QQI), 2019; Tertiary Education Quality and Standards
Agency (TEQSA), 2020). However, those who have studied and educated others
about contract cheating have been largely unaware about fake degree industry
engaging in blackmail and extortion; however, there is compelling evidence show-
ing a clear link between the fake degree industry and the contract cheating industry.
Law enforcement and other professionals who are experts in fraud have shown
that the fake degree industry is a form of organized crime (Ezell, 2019, 2022; Ezell
& Bear, 2005). Educators have only more recently proposed that there are parallels
between the contract cheating industry and organized crime (Grue et al., 2021). The
practices of blackmail and extortion are forms of revenue generation among large
commercial entities engaged in various forms of academic fraud including the sale
of bogus documents and the provision of contract cheating services. The global
academic fraud industry includes sophisticated organized crime operations that
include “rings” of smaller companies owned by massive global parent companies
that employ hundreds of thousands of people worldwide and generate billions of
dollars of profit every year. The existence of academic cheating cartels has been
documented to exist as far back as the 1970s (see Eaton, 2021a, b). In other words,
the academic fraud industry is well established, profitable, and global in scope.
Conclusions
We began this work as academic integrity scholars, with knowledge of cheating,

plagiarism, and contract cheating. As we delved into what is known about the fake
and fraudulent degree industry, it became obvious to us that there are clear links
between the companies that sell fake and fraudulent tangible products such as bogus
parchments, and those that sell academic fraud services, such as “research ser-
vices” and student proxy (i.e., impersonation) services. Bob Clarke and Thomas
Lancaster in the UK coined the term contract cheating in 2006 (Clarke & Lancaster,
2006) just one year after Ezell and Bear (2005) published their book, Degree Mills,
in the USA.
The study of contract cheating has been undertaken by academic scholars who
have uncovered how the industry operates, including the existence of mega “parent
companies” that operate hundreds of online storefronts, with sophisticated business
models and a worldwide network of suppliers (Baran & Jonason, 2022; Clare, 2022;
Clare & Rundle, 2022; Curtis & Tindall, 2022; Draper, 2022; Eaton & Dressler,
2019; Eaton et al., 2022; Ellis et al., 2018, 2022; Glendinning, 2022; Krásničan
et al., 2022; Lancaster, 2018, 2022; Parnther, 2022; Seeland et al., 2020, 2022;
Sutherland-Smith & Dawson, 2022; Thacker, 2022; Veeran-Colton et al., 2022).
One of the significant contributions of this chapter is to connect the dots between
companies that peddle fake and fraudulent academic and professional documents,
the contract cheating industry (including student proxy and impersonation services),
admissions fraud services, and the scholarly and scientific paper mill industry. We
refer to these interconnected industries as the ecosystem of commercial academic
fraud (see Fig. 1.1).
Of course, these are not separate industries, but rather a massive global industry
of academic fraud offering a multitude of products and services. A company could
specialize in one type of service, such as paper mills or the provision of fake docu-
ments, or it could offer a variety of products and services, that generate revenue
from multiple streams including, but not limited to the sale of fake or fraudulent
documents, contract cheating services, the harvesting and resale of content and
knowledge from university learning management systems and libraries, student
impersonation services, and the fabrication and writing of articles churned by scien-
tific and scholarly publishing mills. Some companies might specialize in certain
Fig. 1.1 The ecosystem of commercial academic fraud
types of products and services such as content harvesting and sales and contract
cheating, while avoiding sale of fake and fraudulent documents such as bogus
parchments. There is evidence that other companies offer a more “full-service”
model, with comprehensive lines of products and services (Ezell, 2022).
n Updated (and Still Incomplete) Valuation of the Academic

A
Fraud Industry
There is no way to precisely estimate the value of the global academic fraud indus-
try; however, we can connect the dots about what is currently known to offer some
informed insights. To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to determine a
comprehensive valuation of the combined industries of fake degrees, contract cheat-
ing, and scientific paper mills. In the Table 1.1 below, we provide a summary of
current estimates, which we acknowledge are likely low, due to limited publicly
available information about the industry. Nevertheless, the table below provides a
point of departure for a deeper understanding.
At the time of this writing (in December, 2022), we found no sources that pro-
vided an accurate estimate of the scholarly paper mill industry. It could be that some
of these services are subsumed under contract cheating companies or “full service”
academic fraud companies. This estimate is obviously incomplete and there may
well be some overlap between the industries; however, we contend that this estimate
is likely low, given the lack of publicly available information about these companies
Table 1.1 Estimated valuation of the combined global academic fraud industry
Estimated
valuation
Industry (US dollars) Sources
Contract cheating (e.g., homework help sites, $15 billion Eaton (2021a, 2022);
commercial file-sharing, thesis-writing Lancaster and Prakhar
services, essay mills) (2022)
Fake and fraudulent degree industry $7 billion Ezell (2022)
Scientific and scholarly paper mills Unknown No information available
as of 2022.
Total $21 billion
and their probable connections to money laundering and organized crime. We are
confident offering an updated (and we believe conservative) valuation of the global
academic fraud industry being somewhere in the range of $21 billion US dollars as
of 2022.
Limitations and Recommendations
There are limitations to any knowledge synthesis and our chapter is no exception.
We have drawn from scholarly and professional sources to provide an overview of
the academic fraud industry, synthesizing what is known about the fake degree
industry and the contract cheating industry. We recognize that deeper analysis is
necessary; nevertheless, we anticipate that this chapter can provide an informed
basis for more comprehensive research over time.
It became obvious to us during the writing of this chapter that academics and
professionals with expertise in contract cheating, publication ethics, fake degrees,
and educational quality assurance need to work together to develop a more accurate
and thorough understanding of the intersections and overlap between these different
aspects of the global academic fraud industry. We believe we have only scratched
the surface with this book chapter, illuminating the need for more research, educa-
tion, and advocacy.
From about 2019 onwards there has been an increase in the development of leg-
islation to prohibit the sale and/or advertisement of academic cheating services,
with countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, and England having passed
legislation, along with 17 US states that had legislation previously (Adlington &
Eaton, 2021; Draper, 2022). Legislation is not the only tool to take action against
academic fraud companies and it cannot be seen as the only solution; however, it is
an important piece of the puzzle. For those who have been involved in the develop-
ment and implementation of such legislation, we urge further discussion about the
provisions to include all forms of academic fraud, including the sale of fake and
fraudulent documents, and the provision of fake and fraudulent articles flooding the
scholarly and scientific publishing fields.
Technological solutions, such as blockchain, machine learning, and artificial

intelligence also play an important role, and one that is likely to become more
important in the future. More research, advocacy, and education are needed to
understand the impact and importance of these technologies.
The problem of academic fraud enabled by commercial enterprises that supply
services and products is not new, but it is growing. The threat to legitimate academic
credentials is real and increasing. We conclude with a call to action for everyone
who works in higher education, law enforcement, and industry, (1) to pay attention
to the global academic fraud industry and its impact on society; (2) to educate others
about the extent of the industry; (3) to engage in ongoing advocacy with all stake-
holders concerned with ethics and integrity in education; and (4) to support law
enforcement and legislative bodies so they can take clear and decisive action against
the individuals and organizations that perpetuate the global academic fraud industry.
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Sarah Elaine Eaton , PhD, is an associate professor at the Werklund School of Education,
University of Calgary, Canada. She has received research awards of excellence for her scholarship
on academic integrity from the Canadian Society for the Study of Higher Education (CSSHE)
(2020) and the European Network for Academic Integrity (ENAI) (2022). Dr. Eaton has written
and presented extensively on academic integrity and ethics in higher education and is regularly
invited as a media guest to talk about academic misconduct. Dr. Eaton is the editor-in-chief of the
International Journal for Educational Integrity. Her books include Plagiarism in Higher
Education: Tackling Tough Topics in Academic Integrity, Academic Integrity in Canada: An
Enduring and Essential Challenge (Eaton & Christensen Hughes, eds.), and Contract Cheating in
Higher Education: Global Perspectives on Theory, Practice, and Policy (Eaton, Curtis, Stoesz,
Clare, Rundle, & Seeland, eds.) and Ethics and Integrity in Teacher Education (Eaton & Khan, eds.).
Jamie J. Carmichael is the Associate Registrar of Scheduling and Systems at Carleton University.
She is responsible for the construction of the university timetable, scheduling and administration
of examinations, the operation of two examination centres for students with disabilities, a univer-
sity-wide space management system, and other core student administrative systems. Since 2009,
she has received ten service excellence nominations for her work that ranges from information
technology projects, team acknowledgment to innovation.
Carmichael’s research lies at the intersection of academic integrity and machine learning, with
graduate education in Applied Science in Technology Information Management (Engineering).
She has presented or co-presented at national and international conferences and is often called up
on by specialized groups in higher education to present on her work.
Chapter 2
Admissions Fraud in Canadian Higher
Education
Abstract The Operation Varsity Blues scandal brought the sheer ugliness of admis-
sion fraud to the surface. Although this behavior was not new, it shined a spotlight
on this issue globally. For that reason, one could hypothesize that after such a public
debacle, those in higher education would look internally and put the appropriate
checks and balances in place. This was not the case in Canada. The Canadian admis-
sions process has fundamental differences compared to the U.S., which may have
contributed to this lack of concern. First, there is no delineation in quality amongst
schools. The drive and pressure to get into the best school for fear of detrimental life
consequences are non-existent for Canadian high school students. Admission is
based on grades, with no standardized testing or emphasis and importance placed on
sport. For that reason, a sanctimonious response could be felt from Canada. In
this chapter we argue that Canada is vulnerable to admission and credential fraud.
This argument will be substantiated through three methodologies: (i) a survey that
spanned coast-to-coast within Canada, (ii) media review that targeted the response
to Operation Varsity Blues in Canadian newspapers, and (iii) a comparative analysis
with another survey on this topic to gauge how Canada is fairing compared to others
across the globe. This data triangulation resulted in an in-depth examination of
admissions fraud in Canada, with 14 recommendations for practitioners, research-
ers, and those involved in policy reform.
Keywords Canada · Corruption · Higher education · Admissions fraud ·

Credentials · Fake degrees · Operation varsity blues
J. J. Carmichael (*)
e-mail: JamieCarmichael@Cunet.Carleton.Ca
S. E. Eaton

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_2
24 J. J. Carmichael and S. E. Eaton
Introduction
The research project, Degrees of Deceit: A study of counterfeit credentials, began in

summer 2020 as a result of a collaboration on a webinar (Carmichael & Eaton,
2020, 2021). At that time, we discovered that although the problem of admissions
fraud was frequently discussed in the media and white papers, there was a lack of
scholarly investigation. First, we wanted to administer a survey to obtain a pulse
point on this problem. We designed a survey that included 66 mixed-method ques-
tions with information we had learned from the webinar and questions asked by
attendees. Ethics approval was obtained accordingly. Two higher education list
serves were identified to act as a vehicle to recruit potential respondents who work
in a registrarial role, admissions services, or participate in academic hiring commit-
tees. Initially, our goal was to obtain a global response to our survey using these list
serves as springboards. However, with a release in fall 2020 (during COVID-19),
we received modest participation, and only within Canada (N = 100). We elaborate
on this in our Results section through a thematic analysis.
As mentioned, there is a lack of academic literature on this topic, and when pre-
paring this chapter, we returned to the literature to interpret our survey findings. A
variety of search terms were used in Google Scholar, with no content restrictions.
The term that yielded the best result was “operation varsity blues,” with 15 papers,
two white papers, and seven theses or dissertations. Of those gathered, 14 were
published in 2021. These papers are summarized in the Literature Review section.
This might not be surprising given the media attention awarded to this scandal;
therefore, considering this result, we also undertook a rapid media review to gauge
the Canadian response to admission fraud by using the Operation Varsity Blues
scandal as a case study. Media is often cutting-edge and can respond to issues faster
than academia. At the height of the media response, editorial articles in Canadian
newspapers between March and April 2019 were reviewed (N = 20). This allowed
us to probe whether a similar sentiment could be found in the media as existed in the
survey, which it did, with some differences. Findings were categorized and resulted
in five identified trends.
The second most successful literature search term was “corruption in higher edu-
cation,” which did not yield the same volume (N = 10), nor diversity, with one white
paper bringing the only exception to the compilation of academic papers. The date
range for these publications also varied with two current papers from 2019 and
2021; the rest were archived before 2016, with 2004 as the earliest date. Upon anal-
ysis of the findings, the white paper uncovered a comprehensive academic study by
Glendinning, Orim & King (2019) that included data on student admission and
recruitment, as well as credentials and qualifications (see p. 6). Moreover, the meth-
odology involved a global survey, which provided a mechanism for comparison
with our survey results, given we were not able to recruit participation from outside
of Canada. The inclusion of this data controls for this limitation. This study is intro-
duced in the Literature Review, and the similarities and differences are evaluated in
the Results section.
2 Admissions Fraud in Canadian Higher Education 25
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth examination of admissions

fraud in Canada through the distribution of a survey, media review, and comparative
analysis with an international survey on this topic. This chapter is organized as fol-
lows: Literature Review, Method, Results, Limitations, and Recommendations and
Conclusion.
Literature Review
The scandal coined “Operation Varsity Blues” involved Rick Singer, an education
counselor, securing admissions spots at elite U.S. schools through unethical means
for wealthy parents. These unethical means included admittance for sports without
notable performance, hiring impersonators for standardized tests to falsely obtain-
ing medical documentation for a learning disability to gain an advantage. The
impact went beyond indictments. Blanck (2021) speaks to how this perceived
advantage has labelled the disability community (Graham, 2019 as cited by Blanck,
2021) as “academic scammers when requests for exam or other accommodations
are made” (Blanck, 2021, p. 16).
Parents went to great lengths to secure admission. The literature revealed the
school one selects predicts future success, job opportunities, and overall social
standing in the U.S. (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021; Jayakumar & Page, 2021).
The learning and education gained were secondary to this purpose (Ashby-King &
Anderson, 2021). This commodification, Ashby-King & Anderson (2021) state, is a
“memorable message” (p. 2) that resides with the individual and has the power to
influence (Cooke-Jackson & Robinsky, 2018 as cited by Ashby-King & Anderson,
2021). To test the strength of such messages, they conducted interviews with 20
first-year students. The students were asked to share messages they had received
about education (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). Indeed, students reiterated the
need for education to get a job, be successful, and it was expected for the “real” or
“adult world” (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021, p. 9). Some participants mentioned
it as a way to “grow up” (p. 9) while a subset wanted an education to help others
(Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). These messages were reinforced through parents
claiming the importance of getting an education and peers who spoke to their expe-
riences (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). High school teachers went against the
neo-liberal ethos (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). They communicated that col-
lege was different and “harder” (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021, p. 12). Similar to
high school teachers, Ashby-King and Anderson (2021) recommend disrupting this
message by finding ways to create a “wedge” (p. 14) that goes against this mindset
within higher education and return to the goal of learning (Johnstone, 1990;
Johnstone & Mifsud, 1999 as cited in Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). This will be
challenging with the industry-lead trend of micro-credentials, whereby a student
will have a qualification of value immediately versus waiting for a 4-year degree
(Liu, 2021). It will be necessary for these two tracks to find balance and work in
parallel moving forward, mainly as higher education has changed significantly with
the pandemic (Liu, 2021).
Although this scandal was touted as the largest of its kind, Berghel (2020)
reminds us that this behavior is not new in the U.S. In the 1960s, affirmative action
came into effect and prohibited discrimination based on race, gender, or religion for
employment (Berghel, 2020). Berghel (2020) highlights that this was not “popular
in Congress,” (p. 74) particularly in the Southern states, as it challenged the social
order that was built on the heels of privilege. This privilege was at the heart of the
Varsity Blues scandal (Berghel, 2020). More specifically, it is reflected in admission
criteria, which can be divided into two groups (Berghel, 2020). Group one consists
of alumni, children of employees, minorities, and athletes in major sports (Berghel,
2020, p. 75). This is standard; however, group two consists of parents in a position
of power (e.g., celebrities, politicians, and the “elite”) and those playing minor
sports (Berghel, 2020, p. 75). The composition of whites far exceeds the minorities
in attendance at top universities (Berghel, 2020).
Privilege can be used for corruption. However, according to Glendinning et al.
(2019), defining corruption universally has been difficult. In their study, they focus
on the “intentional” actions by the individual or collective to distinguish this behav-
ior versus one done through happenstance (IIEP & CIQG, 2016, as cited by
Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 5). A category on corruption in admissions and recruit-
ment was included in their survey. These findings were based on five scenarios:
“exceeding enrolment limits set by governments and regulatory bodies, misleading
advertising for recruitment, bribery of admissions staff or recruitment agents, falsi-
fied transcripts and/or fake recommendation letters to cheating in admissions tests”
(Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 16). Results showed that misleading advertising was
the most concerning for 24 respondents, followed by falsified documents (n = 21),
cheating on tests (n = 18), exceeding enrolment (n = 12), and lastly, bribery (n = 8)
(Glendinning et al., 2019). A subsequent survey question asked about the frequency
of these five scenarios, and none of the participants ranked these as occurring “fre-
quently” (Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 18).
While the focus of the Operation Varsity Blues scandal was on Singer, his
actions, and the high-paying clients involved, little attention was given to the uni-
versity, admissions department, or process (Files et al., 2021). Although lack of
organization or process does not equate to corruption as defined above, it is a con-
tributing variable, which will be discussed below. Files et al. (2021) affirms that if
the prosecution charged the universities and held them accountable, as is the norm
in other industries, this would have instituted change. This is described in the com-
ment, “One could argue that we should hold institutions of higher education to
higher standards than banks. Instead, we allow them to behave at the level of fly-by-
night finance companies” (Files et al., 2021, p. 8). The lack of transparency in how
applicants are chosen, coupled with the desire for the product, and low demand,
provides an opportunity for corruption (Files et al., 2021). Chapman & Lindner
(2016) return to the literature and remind us “When people perceive the rules, pro-
cesses, and procedures of their workplace as unfair, they are more likely to compen-
sate by engaging in unethical behavior” (Tyler & Bader, 2003, as cited by Chapman
& Lindner, 2016, p. 255). In summary, focusing solely on the individual, punishing
their actions instead of the governance of the admissions process itself will not solve
the problem (Files et al., 2021).
Governance, transparency, and the importance of data can be found in the fol-
lowing examples. A healthy ranking for a U.S. institution greatly influences recruit-
ment and livelihood; therefore, emphasis is placed on admissions numbers (Files
et al., 2021). These admissions numbers were altered over longer periods for some
leading business schools (Files et al., 2021). This “fixing the numbers” demon-
strates the lengths an institution will go to compete and the lack of appropriate
controls in place (Files et al., 2021). The false information, once uncovered, was
directed to “rogue administrators,” (p. 24) absence of quality assurance and career
climbing (Files et al., 2021). This competition will likely continue. There is cur-
rently a decline in international students, and schools that are not deemed presti-
gious or “selective” will likely not fare as well (Liu, 2021, p. 3).
Transparency is one of the values used by accreditation bodies that oversee
higher education; however, the institutional practices are often “opaque,” according
to Files et al. (2021, p. 39–40). For instance, references are increasingly made to
holistic experiences (Liu, 2021). Such experiences might benefit the elite but not
others due to accessibility (Files et al., 2021; Jayakumar & Page, 2021). This
umbrella term, “holistic”, gives admissions officers a scapegoat to defend their
admission decisions but reveals a biased, unsystematic process (Files et al., 2021;
Jayakumar & Page, 2021). This reared its ugly head in the case of so-called athletes
during the Varsity Blues scandal. Students were admitted on athletic merit, held to
lower admissions standards, and in some cases, never having played the sport in
which they had gained special admission (Lens, 2021). Money exchanged hands,
and a blind eye was turned (Lens, 2021). Quality assurance bodies at times “swim
against the tide,” (p. 5) as stated by Glendinning et al. (2019). Still, despite the
obstacles, they provide a critical component to monitoring the practices in higher
education (Glendinning et al., 2019).
Accessibility or lack thereof extends beyond the determination of holistic experi-
ences and sport. Standardized testing can be a “predictor” of success, and awards a
student’s grade based on merit (Larson & Sibdari, 2020, p. 1582). Nevertheless,
wealthier families have access to better schools in their community, can afford
tutors to help them prepare, and the cost of the test is not burdensome, therefore
taken multiple times if required (Larson & Sibdari, 2020). Gender and culture were
also noted as a factor of inequity (Larson & Sibdari, 2020; Liu, 2021). For example,
females tend to guess less, which can have implications for multiple-choice ques-
tions particularly (Larson & Sibdari, 2020). Larson & Sibdari (2020) recommend
moving away from this type of testing that showcases memorization and provides
an average across all areas. In contrast, an ePortfolio allows an applicant to focus on
their strengths. These strengths also translate differently in regards to the formation
of an essay. Studies show that income plays a role in the type of essay topic chosen,
and topics from those with a higher income tend to be favored (Alvero et al. 2021,
as cited in Liu, 2021). Interestingly, over 1000 U.S. post-secondary institutions have
made standardized testing optional because of COVID-19 (Carnevale, 2020, as

cited by Liu, 2021).
Given this landscape, it is not surprising that mental health is a concern, with
increased levels of “stress, anxiety and self-harm” (p. 16) amongst high school stu-
dents being reported (Damour, 2019; Twenge et al., 2019, as cited in Villeneuve
et al., 2019). Challenge Success, a not-for-profit, develops intervention strategies by
working directly with school partners (Villeneuve et al., 2019). This work found
that the “definition of success” (p. 17) was a driver for stress (Villeneuve et al.,
2019). This is not surprising if we recall the “memorable messages” (p. 2) discussed
previously (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021). Villeneuve et al. (2019) state: “When
students believe that success depends on getting the grades and scores needed to get
into the best colleges, students tend to focus on how well they perform, rather than
how much they learn…” (p. 17). Listening and learning from students proved suc-
cessful in this case to enact change. Methods such as Shadow Days were instituted
whereby a school official spent the day with a student and recorded what they did
outside of school (Villeneuve et al. 2019, p. 18). One principal, who participated in
this exercise, was shocked to learn that a student had a 19-hour day (Villeneuve
et al., 2019). Another effective technique was asking ninth graders the question: “I
wish my teacher knew…” (Villeneuve et al., 2019, p. 19). The answers provided
spoke to the “…exhaustion, stress, pressure, need for downtime, the need to be
appreciated, and the recognition of how different school is for them compared to
their parents” (Villeneuve et al., 2019, p. 19).
In conclusion, tackling corruption in higher education is a “mammoth”
(Mohamedbhai, 2016, p. 14) undertaking. This is true given what has been pre-
sented in the literature. There is a dichotomy between the individual and the institu-
tion. Nevertheless, progress is being made. Measures need to be put in place at the
institution, nationally, and worldwide to institute change (Mohamedbhai, 2016;
Glendinning et al., 2019). Corruption devalues higher education, which has larger
societal ramifications (Glendinning et al., 2019). Initiatives are being undertaken
and work shared via the following: the Anti-Corruption Help Desk offered through
Transparency International (2022), Higher Education Corruption Monitor (Boston
College) (2022) to various web platforms (e.g., ETICO, 2022; Mohamedbhai, 2016).
Method
Our chapter answers three research questions. First, what does admissions fraud
look like in Canada? What is the Canadian response to admissions fraud? Lastly,
how does Canada compare to other countries in relation to admissions fraud? We
answered these questions using the following research methodologies: (i) qualita-
tive survey, (ii) media review, and (iii) a comparative survey analysis. The use of
three unique data points allowed us to substantiate findings, analyze theme replica-
tion, and identify gaps for future improvement. These data points captured informa-
tion during different timeframes. Our survey was distributed in fall 2020, the media
review examined articles from 2019, and the research study by Glendinning et al.
(2019) was conducted between 2017 and 2018.
Survey: Design, Demographics, and Distribution
The survey was designed in the Qualtrics platform. Inspiration for the survey came
from the webinar, as noted; however, principles were applied that guided its cre-
ation. The objective of the survey was decided foremost. In this case, we wanted to
frame the problem of admissions fraud and, in doing so, needed to collect data from
respondents with experience working directly with admissions files or credential
verification. Respondents included professionals working in admissions, registrarial
services, and those participating on academic hiring committees. Part of this fram-
ing involved understanding the processes and practices followed, the technology
used, and the propensity for change. The webinar highlighted the issue of training,
therefore a series of questions were developed around this point, including confi-
dence level in detecting fake documents and workload. The survey also asked ques-
tions about the frequency of cases at their institution and other security scenarios to
determine vulnerability. As a result, 66 mixed-method questions were generated, 12
of which were open-ended. Responses were not mandatory, recognizing that indi-
viduals’ experiences were different, and not all the questions would apply equally.
We obtained ethics approval for this study from the University of Calgary Conjoint
Faculties Research Ethics Board (CFREB) (File # REB19-1839) and circulated the
survey using two registrarial networks. After the survey closed, the data were
reviewed and clustered into themes.
Media Review
The height of the Varsity Blues storm hit on March 12, 2019 when Singer pled
guilty and exposed all those who used his services. Given this, the date range of
March 12, 2019 to April 30, 2019 was used as search criteria to find Canadian news
articles that discussed the response to this scandal. The database, Canadian
Newsstream, was utilized, and editorial pieces that referred to comparisons with
Canada were included. Articles that released general facts about the case or new
charges were excluded. The articles were cataloged and saved in a repository. The
goal of analyzing this data source was to capture the overall sentiment to the prob-
lem of admissions fraud by grouping trends. This scandal was relevant as it is cur-
rent, took place in North America, and some Canadians were directly implicated.
Comparative Survey Analysis
The framing of admissions fraud would not be complete without expanding beyond
geographic boundaries and identifying how Canada compares with other countries.
Glendinning et al.’s (2019) survey included international participation. Moreover,
North American respondents had a high response rate (46.38%) when measured
with other countries that participated. It examined corruption in higher education
through six categories: “the regulatory process, the teaching role, student admission
and recruitment, student assessment, credentials and qualification, and research and
publication” (Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 6). Follow-up interviews were also con-
ducted; however, they were excluded from our analysis. This study targeted those
working in quality assurance, which differed from our investigation, thereby allow-
ing intersections to materialize. The comparative analysis reviewed the findings
from all six categories and extracted similarities or differences with our survey.
The following Results section will go through each methodology, and answer the
corresponding research question. This chapter concludes with collective insights
that span all three data points to provide a detailed analysis of admissions fraud
in Canada.
Results
At the survey’s close in April 2021, we had received 100 respondents (N = 100),
mainly from Canada, with 9 out of the 13 provinces and territories represented. Two
respondents stated they were outside of Canada at the time of taking the survey
(Afghanistan and Antigua/Baruda, respectively); however, they resided in Canada.
Most of the respondents surveyed worked in the Registrar’s Office (28.6%), fol-
lowed by Admissions Services (27.3%); with 3.9% who were Deans or Chairs, 22%
in a managerial role, and lastly, 18.2% identified as “other”. Within this composi-
tion, most of the individuals were from universities (81.1%), with the remainder
being from colleges (17.6%), and a small population from trades and vocational
schools (1.3%). A significant portion of the Results section shows the survey find-
ings, which included the processes, practices, and technology used by respondents,
and a review of the emerging themes. The media review and comparative survey
analysis provided supporting evidence and complete this section.
Survey: Process, Practice, and Technology
To begin, we report on the admissions and registrarial processes and practices

employed by respondents. This foundation was necessary to understand the emerg-
ing themes due to their convergence. Seventy-six percent or 57 respondents stated
that they “work” in admissions. Almost all used a digital platform to receive admis-
sions applications (97%), and Ellucian Banner (2021), homegrown system informa-
tion systems (SIS), and Oracle PeopleSoft (2021) were examples of software used.
Most did not use an evaluation service to review the admission package (87.1%).
Among those that did, 60% mentioned that the use of such a service deviated for
undergraduate and graduate students. The open-ended responses revealed the use of
World Education Services (WES) and manual verification. Some, however, used the
same evaluation service for both groups of students, and several services were
recorded: AACRAO Edge (2021), Ecctis (2021), ICAS (2021), International
Credential Evaluation Service (ICES) (2021), Nuffic (2021), and WES (2021). In
most cases (77.8%), students incurred the service cost. Beyond admissions portals
and evaluation services, respondents were divided using a customer relationship
management (CRM) system, with 54.8% confirming usage. A different division
existed when it came to transcripts. Seventy-nine percent reported that they pro-
duced electronic and manual transcripts, with 19% using paper and 1.7% solely
electronic.
Survey: Emerging Themes in Admissions Fraud
After collecting general information about admissions and registrarial processes

and practices, the data were clustered into seven main themes: (1) confidence level,
(2) digitalization, (3) equity of admissions process, (4) frequency/causality, (5) pro-
pensity for change, (6) security, and (7) workload issues. We review the findings for
each theme below.
Theme 1: Confidence Level
One would predict that training to detect fraudulent documents and working in
admissions would correlate to one’s confidence level. Almost 68% indicated that
they received training on identifying fake transcripts; however, interestingly, when
asked whether they felt confident detecting fake documents, 54.7% said no. This
was noteworthy considering that training is provided for the majority; however, very
few used an evaluation service to verify their documents, and 76% of respondents
worked in admissions. This highlighted a significant training gap and vulnerability.
Moreover, the frequency of reported fake credentials may be higher as a result.
Theme 2: Digitalization
Digitalization was earmarked as the way forward in the next 10–15 years to address
credentials and efficiency. Ninety-seven percent used an admissions portal to receive
applications, and 34 respondents’ stated that they use a CRM system to manage
their recruitment pipeline. We had learned that transcripts have not been completely
digitalized; however, 91.7% agreed that a centralized platform to share admissions
data would be preferred. Eighty-nine percent believed this would minimize data
integrity issues. Blockchain technology is commonly used for credential verifica-
tion, and 69% were aware of this technology. Despite awareness, survey partici-
pants, when asked if they considered blockchain as a solution, 11.6% said yes
(51.2% maybe and 37.2% no). The importance of technology was captured, but the
way forward was unclear. The open-ended questions also disclosed the need for
standards that go hand-in-hand with digital solutions. One participant noted that
“advocacy for electronic standards globally that are accessible and affordable for all
institutions is key”. Likewise, the inclusion of various screening points and an audit-
ing process:
“Clearly outright forgery is a concern, and more secure ways to transmit data seem good in
theory. However, hackers, cheaters and sometimes unscrupulous or duped educators
(including test providers as we have seen with ghost writing of SATs, TOEFLS, and IELTS)
can also turn secure grades/results into unreliable data. This suggests screening applicants
from multiple perspectives, and also auditing the process retrospectively (especially when
we have admitted students who don’t do as well as hoped, or have been found to be cheat-
ing).” (Participant quotation)
Digitalization was an element of the solution, but quality assurance, policy, and
procedure need to be at the forefront when considering any tool or implementation
to avoid missing the mark. Not to mention the global reach and interconnectedness
of the problem. Working on a solution in isolation would not be effective.
Theme 3: Equity of Admissions Process
In Canada, admittance to a post-secondary institution is based on grades, and 75.8%

of respondents anticipated this would not change. Despite this, 68.2% communi-
cated a movement to incorporate experiential learning and other holistic experi-
ences alongside grades. Fifty-seven percent confirmed that first-generation students
have difficulty with the admissions process; nonetheless, this process was not
amended in any way (95.4%). Amendment of the admissions process may occur for
another purpose, however. Institutions that established trust might come out ahead,
according to one respondent:
I’m afraid that there may start to be more of a differentiation among ‘trusted’ schools/insti-
tutions that have sound academic integrity measures and where the students they send us
perform as expected, as opposed to schools where the opposite occurs…With new or
unknown schools, the default may be to deprioritize applicants. (Participant quotation)
This action is contemplated to maintain academic standards; however, it results in

bias, unfairness, and inequity. Data for this emerging theme were minimal. Still,
further research to ensure the inclusiveness and accessibility of the admissions pro-
cess in Canada is needed and is recommended in the conclusion of this chapter.
Theme 4: Frequency and Causality of Fake Credentials
Differentiation was also used when respondents shared their tell-a-tale signs of fake
credentials. These signs included where the transcript came from, font, paper qual-
ity, language, GPA, date or spelling errors, seal, envelope, logos, inaccurate names
of degrees or signing authorities, and transmission of the document itself. Over
88% of respondents reported having had cases of degree fraud at their institution.
For the number of known cases, 58.8% saw 1–20 cases; 19.6% reported 20–50, and
over 50 cases were seen for 21.6%. Most of these cases implicated undergraduate
students (61.1%), 5.6% graduate, and 33.3% involved both. Some respondents
claimed that students applying to STEM or business programs were more dominant
in these cases, whereas others noticed no pattern. Although the program was not as
distinguishable, 74.5% specified that these cases concerned those applying for a
4-year degree program. Two-year programs ranked second in terms of involvement
(21.3%).
Although the purpose of this survey was not to examine causality, we asked
respondents why they believed students engaged in this behavior. The responses
varied, including submitting a competitive application to get into a program, obtain-
ing permanent residency to international students working with an agent, and being
unaware that they were following an unethical process. This lack of awareness
could signal poor preparation. However, it may have also been done with purpose,
due to lack of educational opportunity in their own country, challenges in obtaining
the required admission documents, and lastly, to gain admittance (or advantage)
when they are not qualified.
As discussed, the frequency may be higher than reported due to confidence level
and the training gap. Causality would be difficult to pinpoint given the high stakes
for applicants and unwillingness to share about dishonest behavior.
Theme 5: Propensity for Change
Survey questions regarding change were presented: (i.e., is change needed, is it a

topic discussed with peers, and is credential fraud a concern at their institution).
Over 66.7% agreed that the admissions process needed to change and 83.7% dis-
closed that the subject of change was discussed with their colleagues. An open-
ended question was used to collect data the types of change that respondents thought
was necessary. Participants noted the need for additional resources. These resources
included software to automate the process; and more people to spend time on the
“increase in fraudulent documents” and the prior learning assessment and recogni-
tion (PLAR) for mature students Alternative, Adult and Continuing Education.
(2022). Moreover, a focus on quality assurance in the form of a process for receiv-
ing international documents, training in determining the authenticity of a document,
and samples from other countries were identified. In addition, if fraud was found,
have a reporting structure in place. According to one respondent:
While we have found falsified and more often misleading academic records, the problem
often comes to light ‘after’ a student has been admitted (sometimes when they are already
attending). We also have applicants complete Personal Profiles, yet have few tools to deter-
mine to what extent the writer has been coached (and if the applicant was really the
author). (Participant quotation)
Overall, the change denoted by respondents tied into what has been reported in
previous themes, from training, quality assurance, to a focus on multiple verifica-
tion points that included auditing and reporting. The final survey question for this
theme asked whether degree fraud and fake credentialing were a concern at their
institution, and incidentally, 60% had a negative detractor rating to this question.
While the propensity of change was high, there seemed a lack of a collective
response or action to address or recognize the problem, even though peers discussed
this issue.
Theme 6: Security
Similar to the collective concern about admission fraud, security seemed to be a

topic with little appetite. The exception to this rule were transcripts, investigating
whistleblowers, validating references, and participating in professional network
sharing. Eighty-four percent or 43 respondents had a negative detractor rating to the
probability of blackmail occurring for students who used fake credentials.
Institutions do not warn students about posting degree photos on social media,
which could be used to manufacture counterfeit credentials or conduct identity theft
(93.2% negative detractor rating). Sixty-two percent did not employ reports or data
to look for grade anomalies. For the 37.4% that did, some methods were discussed,
from “comparing the incoming admissions averages with progression averages and
those required to withdraw,” to scanning averages coming from schools.
Inconsistencies with language proficiency test scores, gaps in a students’ record,
and after admittance, review of course patterns that fall outside the average grade
distribution were noted. One respondent confirmed that they have grading commit-
tees that meet twice per term. When asked about the likelihood of a student hacking
in to change their grade, a negative detractor rating of 91% was recorded.
The responses were divided for the subsequent two scenarios: immigration veri-
fication and private or boarding schools. When it came to the immigration system
providing another layer of verification for fraudulent documents, 57.6% agreed with
this statement. This was explained in the following statement:
IRCC officers do not disclose to the institutions if a study permit has been refused on the
basis of fake credentials for admission (meaning not your institution’s credentials); how-
ever, IRCC will advise if they encountered such circumstances where they are seeking veri-
fication based on suspicion of fraud. (Participant quotation)
A similar dynamic was observed when we asked about admission issues with pri-
vate or boarding schools. Over 46% reported issues. Some respondents referred to
these schools as “private strip mall schools” or “fly by night schools” that exist to
make money and to provide credentials that are not based on academic merit. Some
of these private schools were known, and often the transcript was not clear with a
suspect grading rubric and curriculum. As we encountered, admissions officers will
determine whom they trust in the absence of government regulation if there is no
sanction on such schools. These concerns are discussed in the Recommendations
and Conclusion.
Finally, this last section outlines security practices instituted by the majority.
Eight-two percent of respondents investigated claims of fraudulent documents,
which involved students, employers, and others. These claims tend to be legitimate
(65.8%). In the same vein, when hiring, 63.4% verified credentials; however, when
asked how frequently education was authenticated for employers, a 62% negative
detractor was charted. Although we may have good internal practices regarding
checking references, how often is education corroborated, and the societal implica-
tions if this validation is not being performed addressed later in this chapter.
Most institutions had security measures to protect their transcript process
(89.3%). The transcript paper, seal, and watermark were listed when asked about the
security measures in detail. Some institutions controlled this even further with dedi-
cated printers, tracking access to who can request a transcript and how it is released.
Some institutions used a quality response identifier code to maintain authenticity
(47.8%). In line with previous findings, when asked whether an audit of the tran-
script process was frequently conducted, there was a 60% negative detractor rating.
Ninety-two percent of respondents participated in registrarial or admission net-
works, and 79.5% found these networks helpful in circumventing fraud.
To conclude, respondents were aware that implications of a fake degree or cre-
dentials would affect reputation, result in a possible media scandal, financial or liti-
gation repercussions (81.2%). Nevertheless, there was an absence in the use of data,
and reports to audit the work being done to avoid security vulnerabilities. In addi-
tion, an even more significant implication, outside the post-secondary admis-
sions environment, was the confirmation of education credentials when hiring.
Theme 7: Workload Issues
Ninety percent of respondents expressed that they had workload issues and that
79.4% indicated that additional resources would help process an admissions file.
This final theme, combined with the other vulnerabilities that have surfaced, put
Canadian institutions at considerable risk for admission fraud. These themes answer
the question of what admissions fraud looks like in Canada.
Media Review: Canadian Response to Varsity Blues
The objective of the media review was to substantiate the findings from our survey
in relation to sentiment towards the problem of admissions fraud. We found 20
articles from searching and filtering a news database when the Varsity Blues scandal
was in full swing. Some articles assumed a direct comparison with the landscape in
Canada, and five trends surfaced: (1) a ‘not in Canada mentality’, (2) socio-
economic inequalities in the admissions process, (3) remaining competitive in a
global market, (4) manufacturing a “fake” disability, and (5) the unregulated educa-
tion consulting industry. The trends highlighted an air of pompousness regarding
the likelihood of a scandal taking place in Canada; however, at the same time, it
revealed inequalities that influenced admission, a pressure to remain competitive
despite inadequate funding, and an unregulated agent industry coaching students on
how to secure admission. The data from these secondary sources generated a snap-
shot of the response to admissions fraud in Canada.
Trend 1: “Not in Canada” Mentality
Reasons, why the Operation Varsity Blues scandal would not happen in Canada were
noted throughout the articles and are examined and summarized below. Alongside
these reasons were statements that projected confidence that we “Canadians” are bet-
ter and unaffected. Examples of such statements: “there’s much less opportunity to
game the system in Canada” (Bresgne & Kane, 2019), “I really don’t think it could
happen on the same kind of level as in the States” (Brownstein, 2019), or “there’s so
much more room for something not kosher to go on in U.S. schools as there is in
Canada” (Brownstein, 2019). One article entitled, “… Two cheers, well, maybe one,
for the fraud-riddled U.S. higher ed” made light of having a laugh at the scandal
despite the implications for some Canadians in the indictments (Cosh, 2019).
Canada does not have the same Ivy League, tiered-education system found in the
United States, whereby the quality of education differed dependent on the school
was one such rationale. However, according to Cosh (2019), some Canadian private
schools could rival Ivy League status. If the school is classified as elite in the U.S.,
it would be more difficult to gain admission to, there would be fewer admissions
spots, but also greater reward by accelerating one’s standing to a higher economic
bracket upon graduation. In Canada, this delineation of quality does not exist, which
leaves more available spots, less aggressive competition, and far less significance
placed on “where you go” in securing future employment. Cosh (2019) questioned
whether Canadians are insusceptible from this elitism and stated that it is likely
known and used if one went to Harvard.
Admittance to a Canadian post-secondary institution is based on grades. There
are no qualifying entrance exams (e.g., SATs), or advantages granted due to sport.
Adjetey (2019) reported for The Globe and Mail that McGill University…“notes on
its website that it does not interview prospective students or consider extracurricular
activities, recommendation letters or legacy…”. McGill was, however, tangled in a
lawsuit about entrance being granted for those who did not have the marks, but were
connected (Park, 2019). As communicated by Adjetey (2019), these requirements
do exist in the U.S. system.
However, this might be changing in Canada. Cosh (2019) speculated whether
SATs or other qualifying tests, while imperfect and not fraud-proof, provided a
qualification that levels the playing field for those wanting social mobility. The
University of British Columbia adjusted its admissions process in 2012 to incorpo-
rate extracurricular activities to allow for more diversification amongst applicants
(Bresgne & Kane, 2019). This diversification, according to Truong-Cheung, a PhD
student who researched this change, had the opposite effect: “…while upper-class
youth have the time and resources for volunteering, travel, and extracurriculars,
working-class students often spend their extra time studying and working to support
their families” (Bresgne & Kane, 2019).
Despite the overall “not in Canada” mentality, inequalities in the Canadian
admissions process are detailed below. As Cosh (2019) astutely pointed out, “We
giggle playfully at the Americans, but avoid mirrors “.
Trend 2: Socio-Economic Inequalities in the Admissions Process
Statistics Canada reported an increase in students from lower-income families in

post-secondary institutions in 2014 (Bresgne & Kane, 2019). Despite this promising
statistic, Eloise Tan, from People for Education, revealed data from the Higher
Education Quality Council of Ontario that refuted this claim (Bresgne & Kane,
2019). The report found that first-generation students, where neither parent has a
degree, are 33% less likely to obtain this education qualification (Bresgne & Kane,
2019). Moreover, the report found the same trend for lower-income students
(Bresgne & Kane, 2019). Tan reinforced these findings in the comment: …“parents
are increasingly spending money on tutors to boost their children’s marks, but many
students cannot afford those supports. And as Ontario educators struggle for
resources, she said youth from higher-income families are more likely to attend
schools that have fundraising to offer extracurricular activities” (Bresgne &
Kane, 2019).
Trend 3: Remaining Competitive in a Global Market
Ivy League schools are heavily funded compared to the subsidies awarded to
Canadian post-secondary institutions. McLaughlin (2019) detailed that Harvard
received $36 billion USD, versus a large Canadian school (e.g., University of
Toronto), which would acquire $1-2 Billion, total. Another difference outlined is
that U.S. institutions do not pay taxes for this funding, including no property or
sales tax (McLaughlin, 2019). Therefore “… the American taxpayer, including
working and middle-class people and families, as well as small local businesses,
massively subsidize American private colleges” (McLaughlin, 2019). This is rele-
vant to Canadian institutions because we must compete with U.S. institutions in the
same global market for recruitment and research dollars, irrespective of the cost
disparities (McLaughlin, 2019). Tuition is another factor, with elite schools charg-
ing upwards of $70,000 USD (McLaughlin, 2019). In Canada, tuition costs $6000
to $8000 per year (McLaughlin, 2019). To mitigate this, Canadian institutions focus
on “…fundraising; they rely on inflated international student tuition and deregu-

lated professional programs” (McLaughlin, 2019). Regardless of the challenges and
measures taken, McLaughlin (2019) argued that keeping our education system pub-
lic goes a long way to an “egalitarian and democratic society”.
Trend 4: Manufacturing a ‘Fake’ Disability
As part of the Operation Varsity Blues scandal, Singer encouraged parents to get medi-
cal documentation for a learning disability that would result in their child receiving
extra time, memory aids, or other benefits for their standardized testing (Harrison,
2019). There is no evidence to date that this is taking place in Canada, but it is possible
that claims of disability could be used to gain an advantage (Harrison, 2019). In a
study in the US conducted by Harrison and peers, 144 university-aged students were
tested for a learning disability, and 15% overemphasized their condition (Harrison,
2019). This finding was high when compared to a survey conducted with Canadian
institutions who reported this number to be 10% (Harrison, 2019). Learning disabili-
ties, ADHD, and psychiatric disorders were the types of invisible disabilities where this
exaggeration might typically occur (Harrison, 2019). Remarkably, professionals who
diagnosed and tested for disability also had a bias (Harrison, 2019). In a survey of pro-
fessional clinicians who issued disability documentation at Canadian institutions, 55%
believed the objective was to provide support to the student (Harrison, 2019). Fourteen
percent affirmed that they would “lie” to secure these supports (Harrison, 2019).
Harrison (2019) calls for a review of how we evaluate students, including the emphasis
placed on timed assessments, which may result in students exploiting disability for
their benefit. “The disability con” has not yet been fully explored in academic integrity
research and there is debate among disability advocates about this topic (Dorfman,
2019). We recognize that there are many students with legitimate disabilities who
remain marginalized and continue to experience discrimination in a variety of ways.
The views expressed in the literature do not necessarily reflect our own views or values.
Trend 5: Unregulated Education Consulting Industry
The precise cost of the education consultation industry in Canada is unknown, but
Byran Ide from Key Education estimated it is worth “hundreds of millions of dol-
lars” (Peng, 2019). Consultants’ coach and mentor students hopeful of gaining
admission into top schools through tutoring and writing assistance, for example
(Peng, 2019). Writing help and plagiarism are identified as a blurred issue regarding
these services, and post-secondary institutions can ask applicants to acknowledge
that the content submitted is in fact theirs to circumvent this risk (Peng, 2019). Ide
himself refers to this industry as “a bit of the Wild West” in the absence of regula-
tion by the federal or the provincial governments (Peng, 2019). The only caveat is
that agents, under the Immigration and Refugee Act, prohibit any guidance being
given on immigration (Peng, 2019).
Comparative Survey Analysis: Glendinning et al. (2019)
Glendinning et al. (2019) conducted a detailed study on corruption in higher educa-

tion. One of the methodologies used was a survey instrument, providing a compara-
ble data set for our findings. The survey designs themselves were similar. They were
both mixed methods, included open-ended questions, and did not require mandatory
responses. E-mail list serves were used to recruit participants, and the response rates
were similar (N = 69 for the Glendinning et al. 2019 survey). Moreover, their study
recruited international participation, which was a limitation in our work. We sum-
marized the similarities and differences between the two surveys by systematically
reviewing the six main categories outlined in Glendinning et al. (2019): “the regula-
tory process, the teaching role, student admission and recruitment, student assess-
ment, credentials and qualification, and research and publication” (p. 6). Some of
these categories were not explicitly addressed in our survey. However, they surfaced
in the open-ended questions. The category of “teaching role” and “research publica-
tion” was excluded, as there were no data collected in these areas.
The surveys were intended for different audiences and had divergent objectives.
At first glance, this could be thought of as a limitation. However, in actuality, it
offered another lens through which to view this problem. The Glendinning et al.
(2019) research targeted those working in quality assurance and accreditation bod-
ies versus those processing admissions files at the ground level. Combining both
surveys created an opportunity to uncover further insights, find gaps, and provide a
marker on how Canada compares to other countries.
Category 1: Regulation of Corruption in Higher Education
In Glendinning et al.’s (2019) research, the regulation of corruption in higher educa-

tion spoke to bribery to achieve outcomes, conflicts of interest, unethical hiring
practices, and interference in decision-making (p. 11). Our survey did not refer
specifically to this regulation; nevertheless, we asked preliminary questions about
hiring and verifying of references or education. We found that institutions frequently
checked references but not education. Moreover, one respondent mentioned “hack-
ers, cheaters and sometimes unscrupulous or duped educators” concerning individ-
uals who could manipulate or construe data. Within these examples, 64% of
respondents in the Glendinning et al. (2019) study reported no concerns and low
frequency. Those from North America were in line with this trend. That being said,
in both surveys, the comments brought out some parallels surrounding corruption in
private higher education, their regulation, and those with suspect accreditation stan-
dards (Glendinning et al. 2019). As discussed previously, these institutions were
labeled as “strip mall schools” or “fly by high schools” in our findings. Concern was
also moderate in our survey, as 46% of respondents communicated issues with pri-
vate schools. International accreditation, particularly, and the transparency of their
processes were highlighted in Glendinning et al. (2019). This translated to our study
directly in that staff working on admissions files required training on how to exam-
ine the authenticity of international documents. Lastly, the need for transparency
with hiring, reports, policies, regulation, and an external body to audit issues were
solutions flagged in Glendinning et al. (2019). While the surveys had a different
stakeholder composition, they seemed to get to the same overall result. Process,
training, reporting, and auditing were themes that reoccurred in our survey as well.
Category 2: Admission and Recruitment
Glendinning et al. (2019) outlined five use cases surrounding student admission and
recruitment: over-recruiting beyond government quotas, false or misleading adver-
tising to attract students, bribery of admissions or recruitment professionals, fake
documents (e.g., transcripts and recommendation letters), and cheating on standard-
ized tests (p. 16). The use of advertising was the most problematic for respondents
within this category, which was a variable we did not consider (Glendinning et al.
2019). The other variables were of minor concern and were not frequent occur-
rences (Glendinning et al. 2019). For example, out of 21 respondents who answered
the question on fake documents, only 7 considered this serious or major (Glendinning
et al. 2019). Similarly, for cheating on tests, six found this behavior serious out of
18 total collected responses (Glendinning et al. 2019). This lack of concern was
apparent in our study, although we measured the response differently. Our
results revealed that 60% of respondents had a negative sentiment ranking when
asked whether admissions fraud was a concern at their institution. Cheating on tests
was not controlled for in our survey; however, it did appear in the open text boxes,
which is discussed in Category 3: Student Assessment.
Open-ended questions yielded the best result for comparison purposes.
International students who used fake credentials and/or agents were emphasized in
each study. These statements appeared in our data when respondents were queried
on why students engage in this behavior. A central admissions portal to receive
applications was indicated; however, two opposing arguments were presented.
Glendinning et al. (2019) explained, “One agency is responsible for administering a
centralized national application system, which, it says, put an end to corruption in
admissions” (p. 17). Our study also recognized the benefit. We found that 97% used
a central platform to receive documents, 91.7% agreed that a common repository
was preferred, and 89% believed this would minimize data integrity issues.
Nonetheless, we received additional feedback on needing to think about digital
standards globally and the inclusion of multiple checkpoints, not relying on one
gate to keep out fraud. Not to mention, these checkpoints need to be re-examined for
validity.
Category 3: Student Assessment
Student assessment was the highest response rate (41 out of 69) in the Glendinning
et al. (2019) investigation. Most ranked plagiarism and exam cheating as issues of
importance (Glendinning et al., 2019). Glendinning et al. (2019) introduced detailed
survey examples:
availability of leaked exam papers or exam-related material, contract cheating/use of essays
mills/ghostwriting of assignments, the proliferation of contract cheating companies, bribery
of invigilators/proctors and markers, impersonation of candidates in examinations, plagia-
rism and cheating in continuous assessments/assignments, cheating in formal examina-
tions, and inconsistencies and favouritism in grading. (p. 18)
These examples primarily outlined classroom activities; therefore, the comparison

is not as strong. However, our analysis documented ghostwriting or “coaching” of
submitted content, as well as language proficiency testing and impersonation.
Overall, Glendinning et al. (2019) learned that the majority were not concerned,
besides 26 respondents, of which some were from North America. One respondent
in their study specifically pinpointed grading, noting that, “Inconsistencies in grad-
ing are a major concern and a topic in the next accreditation cycle as institutions
need to introduce mechanisms to improve consistency of grading” (Glendinning
et al., 2019, p. 20). According to our survey, 62% do not check for grading anoma-
lies, and 91% expressed negativity when asked about the likelihood of a student
hacking in to change their grade.
Category 4: Credentials and Qualification
The final category, Credentials and Qualification, asked respondents about degree
mills, fake transcripts and degrees, false credentials for employment, and pressures
to award academic or honorary degrees (Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 21). Both stud-
ies intersected on the topic of fake transcripts and degrees, as well as employment.
Observations regarding checking references when hiring were noted under
Regulation of Corruption in Higher Education. Twenty-five out of 37 respondents,
in Glendinning et al. (2019), disclosed that they “never” or “rarely” (p. 23) encoun-
tered fraudulent credentials, degree mills, or misrepresentation in employment doc-
uments. Alternatively, our data showed that 80% had cases of degree fraud, with
58.8% reporting between 1 and 20 incidences. However, we also argued this might
be higher as 54.7% do not feel comfortable detecting fake degrees, despite training.
Training to detect suspicious documents was also highlighted in Glendinning
et al. (2019).
Limitations
This study is preliminary, and to our knowledge, it is the first scholarly examination
of admissions fraud within Canada. There are limitations, though we are hopeful
this research will provide a foundation for future work. The survey could be
improved upon by expanding demographics, including topics that surfaced in the
open-ended questions, the associated media review, and comparative analysis. As
discussed, this survey had participation from Canada only, and even within this
composition, 40.5% of respondents were from Ontario, with 78.7% residing in an
urban area. Future work might also consider ensuring representation from more
rural areas. Questions on admissions essays, language proficiency tests, and student
accommodation need to be asked. Moreover, investigation on other tools institu-
tions might be contemplating outside of the suggestion of blockchain. The lack of
established quality assurance processes was evident in the findings, but there might
be an opportunity to expand the questions in this area. For example, if fraudulent
credentials are discovered after the student is attending classes, what is the recourse?
Along the same line, the development of the survey around the themes of equity of
admission and hiring practices, as we realize that we have only scratched the sur-
face, and these topics could be surveys of their own.
Respondents quantified the number of known cases of fake degrees and creden-
tials at their institution. However, the question as to whether it was increasing was
not controlled for and should be added for following iterations. Furthermore, iden-
tifying the blockers impeding institutions in recognizing this as a problem and tak-
ing action is another area of significance to explore to assist in working towards a
solution. Networks are leveraged, but what are they sharing, and how is it helping
needs to be determined.
Regarding the additional evidence, the media review focused on a particular case
during a limited window of time. It was also a small sample. Subsequent work that
charts the problem of admissions fraud over time would be of tremendous value to
gauge how this problem has evolved. Conducting a survey after the COIVD-19 pan-
demic might also be fruitful, as many processes were disrupted during that time.
Similarly, the comparative analysis was narrow in scope with only one survey. With
time and more research, examining the data for replicated themes with different
stakeholders and modification will move the needle in the right direction.
Discussion
In the Literature Review, we learned about the Operation Varsity Blues scandal, but
more importantly, we pulled back the layers beyond the superficial aspects of this
media whirlwind. The commodification of higher education is engrained through
“memorable messages” (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021, p. 2). This need to get into
the “right” college, to get the “right” job fuelled the desperate attempts of wealthy
parents attempting to use their privilege to buy success for their children (Berghel,
2020). However, it does not need to be this extreme and can happen outside of the
U.S. borders, as demonstrated in our survey, media review, and comparative analysis.
One of the significant insights, with this data triangulation, was the lack of con-
cern, response, and action to this problem. One might predict that after this public
scandal, institutions worldwide would use this as an opportunity to review their
processes. This was not so within Canada. Our survey results were very similar in
nature to the Glendinning et al. (2019) research, which was collected before
Operation Varsity Blues.
We also saw in all three data points the issue of education agents (e.g., those who
provide assistance to international students). The survey noted that students might use
an agent utterly unaware of the unethical lengths taken, whereas others wholly under-
stood. By and large, the industry focused on helping international students gain admis-
sions to overseas schools is an unregulated; therefore, there are some creative
allowances with such services (Peng, 2019). Moreover, these creative allowances
could be ghostwriting and impersonation, which appeared in both surveys (Glendinning
et al., 2019). Additionally, these services are only available to those who can pay, a
factor that could lead to the perpetuation admission of students from wealthy families
and the exclusion of applicants from lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The road to higher education is not an equal or equitable one. This translates into
tutors that help prepare for standardized tests to knowing you can afford to take the
test more than once (Larson & Sibdari, 2020; Bresgne & Kane, 2019). First-
generation students are less likely to apply to post-secondary education, and if they
do, they may have difficulty with the process (Bresgne & Kane, 2019). Holistic
experiences were introduced to diversify the applicant pool, but the criteria are
unknown (Liu, 2021; Files et al., 2021; Jayakumar & Page, 2021; Bresgne & Kane,
2019). How many Canadian post-secondary institutions will make this switch from
admission based solely on grades is also unknown. Socio-economic inequality not-
withstanding, culture, gender, and accommodation for persons with disabilities can
also influence and cause divides (Larson & Sibdari, 2020; Liu, 2021; Harrison, 2019).
In the Operation Varsity Blues scandal, Singer suggested to the parents involved
in the scandal that they obtain medical documentation for a learning disability to
gain an advantage on standardized tests. This has been particularly harmful to the
disability community (Blanck, 2021), and may prevent those that legitimately
deserve academic accommodation from accessing services due to the stereotype
(Dorfman, 2019). Meanwhile, a Canadian study showed that 15% of students over-
exaggerated their condition, and some practitioners doing the testing had a bias
towards providing accommodations (Harrison, 2019).
Despite this, Ashby-King & Anderson (2021) encourage higher education to
continue to find “wedges” (p. 14) to break down this neoliberal mindset wherever
possible. “Wedges” are also necessary to reduce stress on high school students,
which the literature showed is on the rise (Ashby-King & Anderson, 2021;
Villeneuve et al., 2019). Although this trend did not appear in any of our data, we
believe capturing this perspective may be important moving forward.
Institutions open the door to corruption by alluding to exclusivity and creating a

brand that will only be offered to the few through unclear processes (Files et al.,
2021). Looking solely at the individual and not the institution’s responsibility would
be misguided (Files et al., 2021). Transparency and quality assurance throughout
the admissions process is critical (Glendinning et al., 2019). This expands outside
of admission requirements, but the procedures used to review an admission file,
what to do if a fake degree is found, to routinely auditing and adjusting as necessary.
Instituting this practice will move Canadian institutions towards solving the confi-
dence and training issues that surfaced during our survey and minimize vulnerabili-
ties. Likewise, leveraging technology to work with other efforts will increase
efficiency and reduce workload concerns but should not bring a false sense of hope
that “one” check will keep out fraud for good (Glendinning et al., 2019).
Alongside institutional measures, policy also needs to be created by the govern-
ment to address the issues of private boarding schools that, if left unregulated, will
force the hands of institutions to make biased and unsystematic admission decisions
(Glendinning et al., 2019). Schools that falsely provide accreditation need to be shut
down. Higher education can work with their professional networks to lobby for this
change and create a community of practice that will be needed as we move out of a
pandemic. Moreover, the work we do will be changing, with an unknown demo-
graphic and fierce competition as budgets are impacted, but working in silos will not
be effective; and will bring us back to where corruption lies (Liu, 2021; Files et al.,
2021; McLaughlin, 2019). Therefore, in the subsequent section, we offer recom-
mendations for institutions, researchers, and policy reform.
Recommendations and Conclusions
As a result of the survey, media review, and comparative analysis, 14 recommenda-

tions were formed that can be applied to higher education overall. Still, these rec-
ommendations are particularly relevant for Canada, with two of our data sources
narrowly focusing on this context.
ecommendations for Administrative and Professional Practices

R
in Canadian Higher Education
1. Be aware that your institution is at risk for admissions fraud. This risk is real and
no institution is immune.
2. Ensure your Admissions team is adequately staffed and has the required training
to do their job successfully. Contemplate a reputable third-party evaluation ser-
vice if there are limitations with obtaining enough resources.
3. Institute multiple verification points in your admissions workflow and audit
it regularly.
4. Leverage technology and data to complement existing quality assurance prac-

tices and increase efficiency.
5. Collaborate with the computing security team at your institution to look for ways
to minimize risk in the areas of admissions and registrarial services.
6. Review recruitment “pitches” and presentations for inclusive language that can
break down barriers.
7. Always check references and education when hiring.
8. Network and share information with your colleagues regionally, nationally, and
globally in higher education, as well as with industry experts on credential
verification.
Recommendations for Researchers
1. Develop and expand the survey instrument for admissions fraud due to the
knowledge learned in these preliminary studies. Consider standalone surveys on
hiring, student accommodation, and equity in admissions.
2. Conduct a study on Canadian high school students to determine how they feel
about the admissions process and their perspective on higher education (which
may have changed with the COVID-19 pandemic).
3. Create a network map that links all researchers who have done work in fake
degrees and credentials, as the work has been limited and sporadic. Such an
analysis will provide a timeline and possible gaps worthy of scholarly investiga-
tion. A timeline can also be developed for news media.
4. Explore and research pedagogical strategies to reduce bias and inequality in the
classroom.
Recommendations for Policy Reform
1. Regulate private boarding schools that do not follow standard accreditation

practices.
2. Provide guidelines around the operation of education consultation businesses
that are creating inequities in admission and concerns regarding academic
integrity.
This chapter provided an in-depth analysis of what admission fraud looks like in
Canada across three data points. We can conclude that Canada, based on our find-
ings, is presently vulnerable to fraud, and without the appropriate checks and bal-
ances in place, could find itself embroiled in a scandal that removes the smugness
of self-righteousness.
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Chapter 3
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Tour
of Axact, the “World’s Largest Diploma
Mill”
Allen Ezell
Abstract Welcome to the land of smoke, mirrors, and mirages! Just because you
think you see it on the Internet does not mean it is real; or just because it claims to
be a university with campus, buildings, faculty, courses, accreditation, students, and
alumni, does not mean it is real. Abraham Lincoln coined the phrase, “You can fool
some of the people some of the time, and all the people some of the time, but you
cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” Axact is a classic example of a criminal
enterprise. Even its own employees refer to it as the tower of frauds and house of
lies. A house of cards will always be a house of cards! Like a pig, you can dress it
up, even put lipstick on it, but it will always be a pig! All of this is true of Axact. I
use present tense because Axact is still in business today. Beware! Our tour of Axact
will include its formation, adolescence, exponential growth, and its behemoth sta-
tus reached by 2012. It is alive and almost well, operating at the time of writing
24/7, with 1200–1500 employees, and with the tacit approval of the Pakistan gov-
ernment and its intelligence agency. Using investigative tracing skills, I will show
you how to recognize a fake virtual school. Finally, I share my thoughts on tomor-
row and where I see diploma fraud, and how Axact, now known as Crest Tower, fits
into the picture.
Keywords Diploma mills · Degree fraud · Criminal enterprise · Fake

schools · Axact
Introduction
As dawn broke over Karachi, Pakistan on May 18, 2015, it was 84 degrees
Farenheit and cloudy. It was probably close to the same weather in Islamabad
(890 miles to the north), and Rawalpindi (702 miles to the northeast), where Axact
had offices. Pakistanis woke up to the astonishing news article on the front page of
A. Ezell (*)
Federal Bureau of Investigation (Retired), Washington, DC, USA

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_3
50 A. Ezell
the New York Times (NYT), above the fold, and posted on the Internet, titled Fake
diplomas, real cash: Pakistani company Axact reaps millions by Declan Walsh
(2015a). The level of fraud has been staggering. The unthinkable happened when
the NYT ran its front-page story. This was then followed by Tracking Axact’s
Websites (Palmer, 2015) on May 17, 2015 (names of 27 fake high schools, 84 fake
universities, 16 fake accrediting bodies, and eight landing pages and brokers set
forth); Big money, phony diplomas: Reporter’s notebook (Walsh, 2015b) on May
20, 2015, followed the same day with NYT editorial A rising tide of bogus degrees
(The Editorial Board, 2015). Remember, the Port of Karachi is one of South Asia’s
largest and busiest deep-water seaports.
There was shock and disbelief prevailing in the streets, and in the Pakistan capi-
tal of Islamabad. Crowds of stunned citizens and media trucks clogged the streets
where the Axact sixth floor office building was located. It seemed like everyone was
there, except federal law enforcement! They all found Walsh’s comments hard to
believe: that Axact had 370 fictional Internet high schools, colleges, and universi-
ties, supported by 550 fraudulent accreditation entities, and term paper mill and
research websites, all just to backstop these fake schools. In one day, the cards of the
Axact house of cards crumbled. But, not for long as you will see. There is ‘Pakistan
justice’! Before I go any further about Axact, I must set the stage and give you an
understanding of Pakistan so you can better appreciate the journey you are about to
undertake into the Muslim world and Axact. As you follow along, refer to the
Appendix, which shows relevant photographs.
Pakistan’s History, Laws, Prisons, and Justice
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Pakistan) is a country of 216.6 million inhabit-

ants as of 2019 with a 57% literacy rate and almost the size of two State of
Californias. Pakistan is located in South Asia, bordered by the Arabian Sea to the
south, Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the northwest, Tajikistan to the north, China
to its northeast, and India to its southeast, all the way to the Arabian Sea. An inter-
national border was established by the British on September 17, 1947, via the
Partition of India by the British Empire, and a line of control at which both Pakistan
and India administer a portion of the disputed territory, Kashmir. As you can imag-
ine given the above neighbors, occasional, or frequent skirmishes occur on the bor-
ders. The Pakistan-India border is described as “one of the most dangerous borders
in the world” (Walker, 2011) so frequently that India installed 150,000 flood lights
on 50,000 poles on their border, which is visible from space, and the picture is on
the Internet. Additionally, Iran constructed a concrete and steel wall, 3 feet thick and
10 feet high, and Pakistan continues to fence its side. Pakistan still suffers with
problems providing its inhabitants with stable electricity, clean water, stable econ-
omy, earthquake clean up, crime and access to a criminal justice system, with rebels
in their northern region, and terrorists, the Pakistan Taliban.
3 Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Tour of Axact, the “World’s Largest Diploma… 51
As you would expect given the name of their country, 96.4% of the population
are Muslim, with 1.8% being Hindi. In Islam, everything considered harmful,
whether to the body, mind, soul, or society, is prohibited (haram), while whatever is
beneficial, is permissible. Consuming pork, alcohol, or mind-altering drugs are pro-
hibited, as is fraud, theft, false oath, perjury, injustice in general, the acquisition of
property by illegal means, murder, terrorism, aggressive warfare, killing innocent
civilians during wartime, taking money, usury, arrogance, unjust government, pride
or magnificence, false testimony, lie, treason, and some of those forbidden acts.
Remember all of this when we discuss the true business, and the modus operandi of
Axact, and its employee prayer halls.
The judicial system of Pakistan can be described as dysfunctional. There are no
jury trials, only trials by a judge. Only confessions made in front of a Judicial
Magistrate are admissible. Law Enforcement Officers may use physical remand, to
hold for investigation. Courts use judicial remand, meaning probable cause found
by court, no bond allowed. An arrested person, such as Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh, CEO
and co-founder of Axact, can be held, then interviewed every day without counsel
present. Some Axact detainees were interviewed consistently for their entire 20 days
in custody. A person who cooperates with law enforcement as a witness, is referred
to as an approver. Sometimes, approvers disappear! Axact’s CEO, COO, EVP, and
Managers were held in custody for 15 months. The courts can issue non-bailable
warrants, and if you have reason to believe you are about to be arrested, you can
petition the court for approval of an anticipatory bail, thus avoiding an actual arrest.
Sharia Law is ever present in Pakistan. It is part of the Islamic tradition. Sharia
was declared the Supreme Law of Pakistan in the 1991 Enforcement of Sharia Act.
Section 4 stipulates that courts select an interpretation of law consistent with Islamic
jurisprudence and principals. In honor killings, Pakistan law permits the next of kin
and other relatives can “forgive” the killer or murderer, known as the Forgiven Law.
Women are treated like property or money. Over 1000 women a year are murdered
in Pakistan in the name of honor killings. Yet, Pakistan still allows child brides.
I am certain the name of Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden, also known
as Osama bin Laden, is known to all, as the both the founder of al-Qaeda, and the
mastermind behind terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
Besides mountain caves in Afghanistan, bin Laden and his family lived in a walled
compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, near the border of Afghanistan. It was in
Abbottabad where, on May 2, 2011, the Navy Seal Team Strike Force raided bin
Laden’s home, killing him at age 54. I personally believe that it would be very dif-
ficult for the Pakistan intelligence agencies, including their ISI (Inter-Services
Intelligence) not to know that bin Laden had a home in their country. The same
applies to Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian Organized Crime Figure, (on the FBI World’s
10 Most Wanted Fugitives list), and today has a $25 million USD reward on him. He
owns a home in Karachi, Pakistan, and members of his entourage have been seen at
both the Axact and BOL Network buildings in Karachi.
And it’s happening today! Examples like the Oscar-winning documentary A Girl
in the River (Obaid-Chinoy, 2015), the story of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Malala
Yousafzai (Yousafzai & Lamb, 2013), and ongoing honor killings (News Desk,
52 A. Ezell
2021) show what happens in Pakistan under Sharia Law and the Taliban presence.
Next-of-kin will “forgive” perpetrators of violence and often no arrests are made.
If one is convicted in Court and receives an active prison sentence, the exact
confinement is based on status: education, community standing, status in the busi-
ness world, and wealth. The higher up the ladder, the more perks available in
prison. At the top of the ladder is referred to as cushy surroundings where you can
actually have your own servant in prison, with outside meals allowed to be brought
to you in prison. Whereas, at the lower end (as was Shoaib Ahmed Sheik, CEO of
Axact, since the Court refused his request for cushy status), he had a cot in an
open hallway area with about 15–20 other men also living in this space. He had
no servants! There is also simple confinement, where you serve normal time, the
opposite being rigorous imprisonment, where the prisoner works at hard labor, or
penal servitude. As stated by a Pakistani official, quoted in a report by the Human
Rights Watch (2011):
“Even if the President or Chief Justice tells us to release you, we won’t. We can torture you,
or kill you, or keep you for ten years at our will. It is only the Army chief and the [intelli-
gence] chief that we obey.” (p. 1)
Pakistan and the United States of America
Since 2009, the United States Government has committed over $5 billion USD in
civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion USD in emergency humanitarian
response funds. The people of Pakistan and the United States share a fundamental
desire for stability, the hope for peace, and support regional and global economic
development. Since the start of the war in Afghanistan, the majority of the aid cones
from the United States via the Coalition Support Fund which is reimbursement to
Pakistan for counter-terrorism operations. Foreign aid to Pakistan from America
was $299 million USD in 2020.
The United States of America has given billions of dollars each year to the
Pakistan Government, in various foreign aids. They take our money willingly; at the
same time, they know Axact/Crest Tower is defrauding at least one half million
American citizens of millions of dollars each year. The Pakistan Government is an
enabler of Axact. With their knowledge and consent as an enabler, Axact/Crest
Tower is systematically fleecing and defrauding thousands of American citizens.
I doubt if this will change with the supposed end of the war against the Taliban. This
is just not right!
In lieu of a formal extradition treaty between Pakistan and the United States of
America, Pakistan adopted the bilateral agreement between United Kingdom and
the United States of America, ratified in 1932. Article 3 of that agreement lists vari-
ous crimes to which reciprocal extradition applies. This list includes “obtaining
money, valuable security, or goods, by false pretenses, receiving any money,
valuable security, or other properly, knowing the same to have been stolen, or
unlawfully obtained… Forgery, or uttering what is forged” (Bilateral Extradition
Treaties, 1931). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is actively inves-
tigating this matter, is aware of these clauses.
Axact: A Criminal Enterprise
Why do we have so many diploma mills? Follow the money. Consider their cost of
goods sold. They have no facility, no faculty, no health benefits, no retirement
accounts to fund, and no employee 401(k) to worry about. In fact, they have no
students ‘walking around’ – it’s all (almost) virtual. Their fake university is every-
where, yet it’s nowhere – it’s invisible!
For many years, I have believed and said that diploma mills do not operate in a
vacuum. They are professional operations that take planning, preparation, and orga-
nization to run smoothly. Like legitimate businesses, they have business models,
conduct market studies, have financial forecasts, perform cost analyses, set daily/
weekly/monthly sales goals, and offer sales incentives. They constantly survey their
competition, and actions by law enforcement and regulators, to determine the direc-
tion the wind is blowing.
Axact truly fits the FBI’s definition of a criminal enterprise (CE): “a group of
individuals with an identified hierarchy, or comparable structure, engaged in signifi-
cant criminal activity” (FBI, n.d.). Generally, we think of organized crime and “La
Cosa Nostra” when we discuss CE. Courts have held that a corporation can fit the
above definition, since they too can participate racketeering activity in violation of
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). Thus, Axact employ-
ees who participate in these numerous frauds can be held liable not only for their
own acts, but also for the acts of other corporate employees participating in the
same fraud.
I have investigated fake high schools, colleges, universities, and counterfeiters,
for the past 40 plus years, including Axact schools even before I knew Axact existed.
Based on my own investigations, and information, and that provided me by current
or former Axact employees, I earnestly believe Axact never had a legitimate export-
able product. Axact survived financially based on their sale of term papers, thesis,
dissertations, hosting pornography sites, manufacture and sale of diplomas and tran-
scripts in names of fake non-existent ‘American’ schools, coupled with related
backstopping including verifications, in addition to ancillary frauds involving sale
of high end used cars, travel agencies, computer application frauds, a publishing
company, logo design, website design, apps and games, along with “top rated repu-
tation management services and solutions” (Internet Reputation, n.d.). This website
promised: “Repairing, Protecting and Improving Your Internet Reputation” (Internet
Reputation, n.d.) and used an address in Greenwood Village, Colorado, the address
54 A. Ezell
being for the Belleview Station Building. All of the above was accomplished through
means of computer fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, counterfeiting, blackmail, extor-
tion, threats, intimidation, physical beatings, spoofing, phishing, and a language
school (Ali, 2015a, b).
Axact took the age-old game of manufacturing and selling fake degrees and com-
bined it with twenty-first century technology to maximize the width and breath of
its various type frauds via the Internet. The end result is today’s “World’s Largest
Diploma Mill” (Ezell, 2019; Szeto & Vallani, 2017a, b) as the press has called it,
which has staggering proportions. Axact, in its 24 years existence, has probably sold
over 9 million diplomas and transcripts worldwide on fake universities, touted
almost all as being ‘American schools’ using USA addresses. Everything in the
realm of educational credentials is available through Axact, from fake high school
diplomas and transcripts to Associate through Doctorate university diplomas sup-
ported by transcripts, with verification, topped off with Embassy Certifications and
U.S. Department of State Apostille certifications.
These diplomas are supported by hundreds of equally fake accrediting entities,
some in the Gulf Region, but the majority of which claim to be located in the United
States, and use names starting with American, U.S., United States, or close to the
names of legitimate entities, such as the Council of Higher Education Accreditation,
and the Department of Education. This is made more realistic with their use of pic-
tures of the American Flag and the United States Capitol, with logos and websites
dressed in red, white, and blue colors. Add pictures of students who appear to be
American, in conjunction with pictures of impressive looking university buildings
(all stolen from real schools), in conjunction with photographs and names of faculty,
this is enough to convince the student/buyer/victim that this is an American school!
As an additional backstop to support their illusion of legitimacy. Axact manufac-
tured and counterfeited United States Notarial Certificates, ostensibly from a public
notary located in Washington, District of Columbia, to accompany the counterfeit
United States Secretary of State (SOS) Apostille Certifications which it made. These
documents were printed at the Axact Print Shop. All of this was just to verify the
veracity of these fraudulent educational credentials. Additionally, Axact sells fake
research papers, term papers, dissertations, theses, custom research papers, back-
dating graduation dates, and inflating students’ GPA. Probably their most alarming
product is ‘Proxy Services’ where Axact offers services of their research and con-
tent writing departments to legitimate students in U.S. colleges and universities,
whereby Axact employees do all the students’ academic work (term papers, thesis,
research papers, dissertations, etc.), and send the final product directly to the teacher
electronically – all for a fee of $40,000 USD. This is also known as student imper-
sonation, covered under an egregious form of academic misconduct called contract
cheating.
Axact’s History and Finances
Axact was founded in 1997 by Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh and employed by six of his
relatives who hold positions in Axact (including his sister and her husband who
reside in Illinois) in a one room office, Sheikh has said. Viqas Atiq was listed as co-
founder. The Axact business, initially called Cyber Solutions, evolved into selling
term papers and other research work. If it was like their work of recent years, their
content and research departments steal the content from other sites and use stolen or
bought library codes to obtain the needed material from college and university
libraries. They then decided to sell high school diplomas and transcripts, which led
to the creation of Belford High School, a very successful Internet venture. They
soon realized there was a worldwide market for high school credentials. If there was
a market for high school documents, then why not establish their own companion
fake university, Belford University, and market this to their thousands of new high
school ‘graduates’. Quite logical! These fake schools where supported (back-
stopped) by their newly created fake accrediting entities, and other entities to give
the schools support and appear legitimate.
By 2000, Axact was then using the name Axact Cyber Solutions and indicated
the ‘Future is our Specialty.’ They conspired with other fraudsters who were already
operating their own diploma mills (high school and college) initially to sell their
products on a commission basis, such as University of Atlanta and Almeda
University. Axact quickly realized the lucrative nature and profit potential, so in
2002 they created their own entities, Belford High School, then Rochville High
School, leading to Belford University. In 2003, Rochville University was added to
the stable. I refer to these as Vintage 1 entities, because their web sites are very
thinly guised as being real schools, even with their fake accreditation entities.
However, when they openly reflect the number of documents you receive in your
graduation package, I believe the buyer knows exactly what they are buying: here is
my money, give me my diploma! I believe the dead giveaway is statements that
claim that the degree entails no books, no courses, and no classes. Some even offer
a sample diploma, which includes transcript, letter of recommendation, and letter of
verification! They probably would have used the name, ‘All American University’
however, it was taken by others on January 16, 2003. Axact has created several other
Vintage 1 schools over the years, some being Lorenz University (2008), Woodfield
University (2010) and Belltown University (2018).
Lawsuits
Axact officials have learned to be careful what and where they steal content and
who they sue! Axact officials have been caught several times stealing other compa-
nies research papers and selling them as their own. On May 22, 2008, Plaintiff,
Axact (Pvt.) Ltd., Karachi, Pakistan, listed as an Information Technology Company
56 A. Ezell
sued Student Network Resources, Inc. (SNR), Manalapan, NJ, an academic and
business-related research service alleging defamation, trade libel, copyright, false
advertising, and unfair competition. The suit was filed in United States District
Court, New Jersey (Axact (Pvt.) Ltd, v. Student Network Resources, Inc. et al., 2007).
Little did Axact know, that SNR had suspected Axact was stealing their products
and reselling as their own. SNR had previously placed an unusually titled paper on
its website, then ordered a similar paper from Axact. When Axact sued SNR, Axact
fell into the trap. SNR told the Court in finite detail exactly who and what Axact’s
businesses were, further, that Axact (through their Attorney) had lied to the Court.
On January 5, 2009, the Court entered a default judgement of $353,373 USD against
Axact, and $36,720 USD for attorneys’ fees.
On November 5, 2009, Elizabeth Lauber et al. initiated a civil lawsuit in United
States District Court, Southern Division, Michigan against Belford High School
et al. (Elizabeth Lauber, et al. vs. Belford High School, et al., 2017). The court
approved this being a class action suit (class of 30,000 victims), and later added
civil RICO (Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization) (Treble Damages) to the
suit. One Salem Kureshi from Karachi, Pakistan testified via video that he owned
Belford and operated this from his apartment in Karachi, and he was not associated
with Axact. All this was fraudulent, he in fact was a low level Axact employee (a
janitor) and was a straw for the real Axact officials. The Court was advised as to the
true nature of Axact, and that affidavits submitted by Shoaib Sheikh and Viqas Atiq
on Mary 9, 2016 from their respective jail cells in Pakistan, were false. On August
31, 2012, United States District Judge issued a Default Judgement against the
Plaintiff (Belford High School) in the amount of $22,783,500 USD.
I note that on January 11, 2016, officials of Coronado Pacific University (CPU)
were sued for racketeering (see the RICO statute) in San Diego Superior Court.
CPU was using address of 330 A Street, Suite 300, San Diego, CA 92101. Brett
Loebel, East 5th Avenue, Del Ray Beach, FL 33483. The President of CPU was
named in the lawsuit. Yani Zack, California resident was an official of both
CPU and AU.
Protect the Castle at All Costs!
Over the years, on numerous occasions, several former Axact employees have
posted various comments on Internet blogs and elsewhere, about the frauds actually
being perpetrated inside of Axact. Sheikh and Axact are similar to Donald J. Trump
and his businesses, or office held, in that each require the utmost loyalty from their
employees, consider the office group like a big family (and probably the same for
their paramours), and require all to sign Non-Disclosure Agreements when they
begin employment, or provide services. Of the two, Sheikh and Trump, one fraud-
ster operated Trump University which had no academic diplomas, nor transcripts,
and the other had thousands of fake universities, had over 2.2 million diplomas,
transcripts, and accreditation letterheads, etc., at his print shop, which were seized
by the FIA. Sheikh, like Trump, adheres to the motto of protect the name and the
castle (business entity) at all costs.
Therefore, when these former employees, or current employees, step out of line,
especially on the Internet where the written word lasts forever, and posts, or say
derogatory comments about the company or its leaders, both Sheikh and Trump use
the intimidation factor at will. They have, or purport to have, a cadre of lawyers
standing by to either, individually, or publicly, threaten the offender with a lawsuit.
Some lawsuits materialize, some lawsuits do not, but they have sent a message to
the individual, company, and society at large. There have been several such deroga-
tory articles about Axact, which included the blogger article by Unaiza (2008) who
published a simple inquisitive story, Unveiling operations of a local software house,
which resulted in her (the author) having a hefty lawsuit which the metro blogging
team in Los Angeles fully resisted and refused to delete the link, but Unaiza was
tormented locally in Karachi. Axact ultimately petitioned Google to have it removed
from its search results (Axact (Private) Limited, Karachi vs. Mr. Naseer Hashmi
et al., 2008). There have been similar instances of Sheikh using their attorneys like
hired guns against anyone who speaks ill of the company. More recently, in one
instance it only took the threat of a lawsuit by Axact for a large London publication
to remove an article, which only told the truth like it is inside Axact.
At Axact, when an employee is suspected of dishonesty (in such an organization
as Axact, which is dishonest itself), it is not unusual for several managers to appear
at the employee’s workstation (a cube in the call center), to grab him off his chair,
and to beat him publicly in front of his fellow employees, which serves as a warning
and deterrent to others. During this, they demand employee provide details about
their alleged fraudulent acts, demand to know if he has any assets at his home which
were bought with this ‘black money,’ request he sign a written confession, then
threaten to call the police. There are numerous instances where Axact officials
accompanied by the police have arrived at former employees’ homes and searched
the premises, and removed laptops, cell phones etc., in efforts to substantiate
alleged thefts.
Additionally, if you are a major producer of money for Axact and Sheikh, they
really do not want to let you leave the company, irrespective of the reason or circum-
stances. I know of at least one instance where an employee was beaten, tortured, and
forced to sign a confession for a theft he said had not done, just to stop the torture
(the use of a lighted cigarette). I firmly believe Sheikh had authorized these tactics,
but like Trump, would not get his hands dirty, thus has others do his dirty work for
him, thus he has deniability. Some employees may ever personally appear before
Sheikh to plead their case, he may even offer coffee and sweets to lull them, and
have them even sign a confession for a crime they did not commit, so this document
can then be used to offset the complaint supposedly filed at the police station by
Axact. The bottom line: do not cross Sheikh nor Axact, and all employees know this.
58 A. Ezell
Delusions of Grandeur
As Sheikh’s criminal enterprise grew, he needed more office space, so he opened

offices in three other Pakistan cities, then enlarged his existing three-story Axact
House building in Karachi by building an additional three stories on top of his exist-
ing structure, all while all employees stayed at their desks selling all these fake
academic credentials. When you see a picture of the original Axact House head-
quarters, pay particular to the outer columns which support the new floors on the top
of the existing building, odd construction since this violated many local regulations.
But when you have political pull in the federal government, anything is possible.
Axact had quickly learned there was a fortune to be made in the $99 USD pro-
gram deposits, and $199–399 USD enrollment fees, then later charging higher
prices for courses, dissertation, and thesis research, then for publishing. When
Axact began their upselling program, they increased their revenues significantly.
These monies resulted from coercing existing ‘graduates’ to buy more diplomas
from more prestigious schools, embassy certifications, United States Department of
State attestations, memberships in professional organizations, and similar docu-
ments. Axact employees daily threatened their customers with physical harm, loss
of job, arrest, deportation, immigration issues for family members, and publicity
about their fake diplomas. The crowning blow of stupidity was to learn that Axact
routinely recorded these extortion and blackmail telephone calls. Several of these
recordings were made public after the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) raid on
Axact in 2015. In my career, I have never seen criminals so stupid to do this! It was
because of these calls where the victims are bordering on a heart attack, suicide,
bankruptcy, publicity, family embarrassment in a Muslim world that they gave up to
$1,200,000–1,400,000 USD to Axact. Single victims paying this much in US dol-
lars: unbelievable!
All during the above, Sheikh told many people his goal was to be the richest man
in the world, then he wanted to be the richest man in Pakistan. He emulated Bill
Gates of Microsoft, and Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook fame. This is probably why
Sheikh later created his GatesVille University, (http://www.gatesvilleuniversity.
com/), registered on September 22, 2016 by Gandi SAS, at an organization named
Domain Lance address 63-65 boulevard Massena, Paris, France 75,013. He still
dreams of being the next Bill Gates, and still has delusions of grandeur. At this point
I would tell you about the upbringing of Sheikh, but I do not know what is truthful,
and what is fake news. Axact is the mother of fake news. There are two articles
about his upbringing, The story of Axact CEO – Shoaib Sheikh (Ali, 2015a, b), pub-
lished at the time of the FIA raid and Delusions of grandeur (“Delusions”, 2018)
(probably the latter is truthful). Hyperbole, aggrandization, his reference to India as
Greater Pakistan, follow Sheikh. His background is also described in other articles,
Shoaib Ahmed Shaikh (Ellahi, 2018) and Untold story of Shoaib Shaikh, how he
became billionaire due to his computer hacking expertise, translated from Urdu
(“Untold Story”, 2015).
Axact is like all businesses (although criminal). They are constantly trying to
find new ways in which to sell their product, irrespective of its legality. Same for
Axact, and that is why they registered several websites under Gandi SAS in 2017
(e.g., http://www.payaftergraduation.com/). These were cash on demand (COD)
transactions. I have seen this about 20 years ago in similar sales pitch, with BOGO
(buy one, get one) with a different school. Gandi SAS is a French company provid-
ing domain name registration, web hosting, and related services, founded in 1999.
Today, they have more than 20,000 customers with 100,000 websites. I do not know
why Sheikh did not establish a fake school in Zuckerberg’s name, considering he
created a university in the name of his nemesis, NYT reporter Declan Walsh, in the
name, University of Declan Ford (https://www.uodeclanford.education/. This
school, which uses an address in Austin, Texas, was created on April 29, 2019, and
was also registered by Gandi SAS.
By 2012, Axact had about 2000 employees in Pakistan, and claimed to have
25,000 employees and representatives worldwide. I believe this figure is greatly
exaggerated. Whatever the true number is, these Axact representatives, probably
best called money mules whose job, upon orders from a superior, was to cause bank
accounts under various name to be opened in various countries: money laundering.
Next, they would move these black monies (derived from illegal criminal activity),
between accounts in different companies, ostensibly in legitimate business transac-
tions, with these monies eventually ending up being deposited in several Axact con-
trolled accounts in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), then transferred to Axact
controlled accounts in Pakistan. The FIA has stated Axact brings these ill-gotten
gains (black money) back to Pakistan disguised as proceeds of software exports.
In Axact’s heyday of 2013–2014, Axact’s call centers were receiving more than
5000 telephone calls daily, with about a 40% buy rate. The older Axact schools,
Vintage 1 I call them, charged $199 USD and $350 USD for enrollment fees. Web
pages indicate no exams, no studying, no tests; everyone is guaranteed to be
accepted. After the purchase, the upsell to additional products begins. The dollar
amounts may be small, but with large quantities of sales, even the small dollars add
up. Further, these Vintage 1 schools provide your salesmen (hucksters) with leads
for bigger fish. During this period, Axact reached the billion-dollar sales mark.
The money mules are paid a commission based on the amounts of money they
moved. Due to washing the money, keeping money in float, and moving it around
all the money is not in just one or two bank accounts at any one time. So, if federal
law enforcement learns of these accounts, they cannot seize all this dirty money at
one time from just one or two accounts. At the time of the FIA raid on Axact on May
19, 2015, Axact had about 35 bank accounts in 19 different countries, with balances
unknown, but believed to be many millions of dollars. Generally, Axact only allowed
a country’s biggest banks to get its accounts, which were all in United States Dollars.
As of the time of writing, Axact probably has about 1200–1500 employees at
Crest Tower in Karachi, and 300 at Islamabad office, working on a 24/7 basis. I am
sure their revenues are in the hundreds of millions. Axact and Sheikh are like a cha-
meleon, they change colors frequently to hide amongst the landscape. In 2016,
when the United Kingdom was embroiled in whether to leave the European Union,
60 A. Ezell
referred to as Brexit, Axact then opened a new school, Brexit University, which has
been deleted from web, reasons unknown, so date of registration unknown at this
time and the website now for sale, hosted server in The Netherlands. The Brexit
University logo had red, white, and blue color scheme. Two other sites on same
server believed to be Axact. In November 2020, Joseph Biden was elected as the
next President of the United States, Axact added what appears to be a clear sleeve
over the upper portion of the home page for several new fake school sites: BayState
University, California Imperial University (https://www.ciu.education/), California
Meadow University (https://www.cmuni.education/), and University of Woodland
California (https://www.wlcu.education/), and others. On this sleeve are the words,
“JOE BIDEN’S Scholarship Program. Apply Now, and get an instant scholarship!”
(California Imperial University, n.d.; see also the Appendix) However, I have not
seen even one of these schools which had details of this new scholarship on any of
their web pages, or in their school brochure. Very strange! It is all window dress-
ing – a mirage!
How Did Axact Continue to Operate for 24 Years?
Excellent question. Sometimes, it’s all based on who you know, and maybe what
you know, and if you know where the skeletons are buried. How was this fraud able
to operate for 18 years (now 24 years at time of writing) openly in plain sight,
although hiding under an information technology umbrella? They even had their
name on the front of their building for no one to miss. They even held and publi-
cized their annual gala, called Team Meet, each year, with a sit-down dinner for
hundreds and even thousands. Axact refers to this as “Pakistan’s Grandest Corporate
Event” (Axact, n.d.) then posted pictures taken at the annual Team Meet on the
Internet. He used this event to support all his verbosity. They may have used the
Academy Awards in Hollywood as their model. Besides Axact employees and fami-
lies in attendance, there were thousands of others including judiciary, government,
law enforcement, and military leaders present. Numerous photographers cover this
event, even using drones, and thereafter posting their pictures on the web. Axact
also posts pictures on its website (Axact, n.d.). Many believe Axact has remained in
this criminal business because of its deep ties with the Pakistan government, its
military, and ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence), or as many believe, Axact is using the
government and ISI to launder money worldwide, as does Axact.
What type of person is Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh, a Muslim, you wonder? What type
of person would defraud about 9,000,000 people, over 24 years, of billions and bil-
lions of dollars, all based on false statements and fictitious universities supported by
websites which were illusions, are hollow, and everything you see is fake? Sheikh,
age 50, his wife and chief enabler, Ayesha Sheikh, age late 40’s, have two grown
children, age 20’s. Although Sheikh claims he has a degree from the Institute of
Business Administration, Karachi, people that know him say he is not the all-
knowing man as stated on his website, or in the speeches he gives at annual Team
Meets (he just has imaginary writers). First, take a look at some of his pictures. He
always dresses in black, open collar, never a suit and tie.
To me, he is coarse, not a good orator even when speaking his native language
Urdu and does not speak English. But he loves the idea of playing visionary, yet so
naïve enough to stand in front of 5000 people at Team Meet (highly educated busi-
ness leaders, politicians, and military generals) and declare publicly that Axact gave
out more money, facilities, (benefits to employees), and perks than Google,
Microsoft, and Cisco, which he knew all was false. This almost sounds like a former
Washington, DC and New York City politician who was also selling certificates (not
academic diplomas) at Trump University. Sources in Karachi, Pakistan advise
Sheikh is not seen at Mosque, nor in the prayer hall he has for employees at Axact
(now Crest Tower). Although about 85% of Axact employees are Muslim, only
about 30% use the prayer hall at Axact/Crest.
Sources in a position to know and advise Sheikh say he is this same person at his
own board meetings, even using profanity to his own executives. Sheikh considers
his doings to be an act of God, whereas he believes that he is some kind of a chosen
soul sent to curb poverty and misery, and that’s the image he has tried selling through
SED Axact (Socio Economic Development). He ends many sentences with “God
Willing” (Inshallah), even though he is speaking of Axact criminal activities!
When Sheikh and Atiq founded Axact in 1997, he commented he wanted to be
the richest man in the world, later changing that to richest man in Pakistan, yet he
extolls his own virtues about wanting to help all the citizens of Pakistan through his
charitable works. I have never met him, but believe he appears to be the fellow who
is hired by the corner bookie to go collect past dues (debts). The only thing missing
is the little league slugger baseball bat! I do not believe he plays by the Marquis of
Queensberry rules, but most probably will not get his own hands dirty, just hires
others to do his dirty work! Sounds familiar. He may live in a million-dollar house,
surrounded by layers of security, and is driven in a 2018 Toyota Lexus Cygnus
model, grade 7 armor automobile, again with a heavy security detail. I am told he is
an outcast in social circles since the general public knows exactly the true nature of
Axact’s business. Further, he is now a former prisoner and a convicted felon!
However, his wife, Ayesha Sheikh, was recently appointed to the board of trustees
of the Karachi American School (Ali, 2021). Sheikh has only one goal: to make
money irrespective of how! Just follow the money and it will lead you to Sheikh.
Besides a second home on the land which had been donated by DHA (Defense
Housing Authority) (Pakistan Army) to Axact for GalAxact, he even purchased a
second country citizenship in St. Kitts and Nevis, a country in the Caribbean, for
himself, wife, children, and grandparents, for about $500,000 USD.
Axact executives consistently extoll the virtues of their company, how successful
they are, and how much money they were making. Even posting pictures on their
website of their inhouse sales promotions they have, including Project X1000 where
their goal was to increase sales by one thousand percent! Think about that for a
moment. One thousand percent! Axact even held a celebration for X1000 at their
“luxurious beach resort” and indicated “Axactians Experience Remarkable Growth
Not Once But TWICE A YEAR!” (Axact Officials, n.d.-a, b). A spectacular
62 A. Ezell
mid-year growth is a phenomenon familiar to most Axactians, simply because other

organizations do not have any legitimate exportable product they can point to. Axact
touts its amazing performance management system! Keep uppermost in your mind
what we are talking about here: Axact has no known exportable product! They are
saying, our employees (fake school call center hucksters selling diplomas and tran-
scripts on fictional nonexistent schools, then extorting and blackmailing the buyers)
will increase ‘sales’ of these products by 1000%! Can you envision the cadence of
the drumbeats for the oarsmen on the Axact Roman galleys, under the watchful eyes
of the guard standing nearby with a cat of nine tails whip in his hands? Just imagine
the sales incentives and pressures the salesmen were under at Axact to achieve this
very lofty goal. At Axact, if your monthly sales exceeded your base sales require-
ment, and you are due a bonus, you are only paid one half now, and the balance in
six months.
Let’s Take a Tour of Your ‘University’
On September 20, 2015, Stephen Colbert, the host of The Late Show aired a seg-
ment called Diplomas of Lies, a segment on Axact and the fake schools it was sell-
ing (Dumas & Katsir, 2015). He highlighted fake universities such as Granttown,
Barkley, Columbiana, Mount Lincoln, and Nixon University, exhibiting a State
Department Apostille Certification signed in the name of John Kerry, Secretary of
State. He even displayed a picture of Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh after his arrest in the
background. He then spoke of ‘Stephen Colbert’s totally legitimate Online PhD
Program for the fake schools he has created: Prancetown University, University of
Notre Dame, Mount Holly Smokes, Stanford & Son, Skidmark University, and
Johns Hotpants University, Dartface University, and Arizona State University. He
displayed a diploma from one of his fake schools. He indicated viewers can down-
load a PhD degree for free from one of his fake schools on his web site, comparing
the ease of getting an online degree to shopping for shoes. This resulted in an article
that appeared in The Wall Street Journal (Leeds, 2015).
What if you wanted to purchase a diploma or transcript too? Let’s take a tour of
your ‘university’. View Axact as an iceberg: you only see about 10% on the surface,
the remaining 90% is below water. View Axact’s thousands of web sites which they
aptly refer to as ‘landing pages’ as a giant spider web designed to entangle searchers
looking for online education. Or, view it as a carnivorous pitcher plant. They have
sweet nectar on its slippery rims, assuring you will slide down, cannot get out, and
will fall to the bottom where you will be dissolved in the liquid awaiting you there.
Axact’s victim students are attracted by means of fake job websites, advertising
various attractive open positions, and paying very good wages. When the potential
applicant calls the job placement office, they learn that a university degree is
required for the job. But wait, don’t worry, it just so happens the representative at
the job placement office knows where you can obtain a degree, qualify for the job,
and make great money. You are blinded by the great salary. Everything you
ever wanted.
You want to take several online courses and you have looked around on the
Internet for the right school. You settled on California Imperial University (CIU)
(https://www.ciu.education). You are about to click on their web site to see what
CIU looks like. If you had the ability to go through the telephone line to personally
meet the person who answers the telephone number indicated on the university web
site, would you do it? Do you really want to see what’s at the other end, and meet
the CIU official who will answer your call? He may even be at their Corporate
Administrative Office at 901 Main Street, Brawley, California as the web site indi-
cates. I doubt the phone is answered by the business actually at this address (Brawley
Auto Lube and Service). If not, where? Okay, let’s go look. Follow me through the
telephone line.
You will find a young male, probably age 20–30, black hair, brown skin, may be
clean shaven, or has a beard, but he is not holding a telephone up to his ear, because
he is wearing a telephone headset with microphone. He is sitting in an office ‘cube’
which is about 4 ft. wide, by 3 ft. deep, with a computer screen facing him, and a
keyboard on the surface of his work area. Above all of this is a storage area, covered
by two doors. Of course, there is a large telephone with several buttons sitting
upright on the left side of his work top, into which his headset is plugged. He is sit-
ting in a large room with at least 20 other similar fellow male employees. If he needs
a fellow employee who speaks Arabic, he can order one, referred to as ‘Arraba,’ and
they will be nearby. Sales teams generally are men, from 12 to 20 members, in the
age range of 20–40. Teams have names, such as Bashers, Eagles, Hawks, Legends,
Mavericks, Mercenaries, Mustangs, Olympians, Panthers, Wolves, and others.
Given the true nature of their real business, I wonder where are the Vultures?
Your school official is probably dressed in casual clothes, or he or his fellow
employees could be dressed in a white Muslim robe (a Kaftan) since you are in
Karachi, Pakistan, just 8432 miles from Brawley, California. Since you are in the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, a Muslim country, and devout Muslins should pray
five times a day, (the employer was Axact, now is Crest Tower DHA, or TCurve)
provides you with praying facilities, a prayer hall for you to use anytime. The Prayer
Hall is located just down the hall in this same building. This call center team is
located in the seven-floor building of the Crest Tower DHA (Defense Housing
Authority) (Pakistan Army) in Karachi, Pakistan containing 1500–2000 employees.
You are in downtown Karachi, in a building where all floors contain fraudulent
activities.
Your salesman is quite an actor – he has been trained to be, and he has perfected
his spiels with each role he plays. Besides being a ‘student counselor’ today, or
other university official, he has experience impersonating other officials, including
an FBI Agent, U.S. State Department official, Department of Education, White
House, many officials of legitimate college or universities, state or province offi-
cials, Embassy personnel, Ministry of Education, Federal Investigation Agency
(FIA), and can support these roles with any counterfeit document needed from the
Axact Print Shop. Spoofing and phishing are used daily in all these scenarios.
64 A. Ezell
The CIU ‘school official’ who answered your incoming telephone call is strictly
a salesman (a fraudster) selling diplomas, transcripts, and verification letters from
several, or from their entire inventory, of thousands of fake schools which his
employer has created, along with the accompanying websites. After the normal sale
has concluded, this is when later the upsell begins (i.e., extortion, blackmail, threats
of publicity and embarrassment to family, loss of job, expelled from school, arrest,
and deportation to name a few). Most of these fake schools are touted as being
American, with American sounding names, using red, white and blue colors, even
the United States Flag or a picture of the U.S. Capitol for good measure. Your sales-
man is well trained, having been told in his three-week employee orientation that
there are no laws in cyberspace: thus everything you do is legal, with no penalties.
He will tell you everything about your school façade, except telling you it is nonex-
istent! You are not a potential ‘student’ because there is no real schooling available
here – you represent nothing more than a potential ‘sale’ of documents. He must
make his quota of sales revenue in order to eat.
When you look around the room where your student counselor and his sales team
is located, or the entire floor on which you are located, several things appear to be
missing. The walls are bare! The walls are devoid of framed pictures of both high
schools and universities, especially those which they sell or represent, and from
which their ‘outstanding students’ graduated. No pictures of any of their thousands
of ‘honor students,’ along with no pictures of some of the top companies in the
world where their ‘graduates’ are supposedly employed are missing. Very unusual.
I realize all their schools are frauds, but I would have thought they would have
been proud of some of these fake schools, and the graphics which accompany them,
to the point they would blow up the picture of the fake school and use as wall hang-
ing. Not the case here – just bare walls! So much for a drumbeat of legitimacy. You
will see some of the finest graphics ever on these fake school websites—but when
you do, it is all just a mirage! All the pictures you see on Axact fake schools,
‘accreditors and support entities, were stolen from real schools, or rented under a
subterfuge, then stolen.
When you called, your student counselor will ask you many questions about your
background, prior education, work experience, military service, community involve-
ments, etc. prior education required to complete several screens. Most likely he will
then advise you that you qualify for their scholarship awarding you a large tuition
discount – up to 90%! He will ask your desired major, GPA, and graduation date on
your diploma. At most, he may ask for a copy of your CV, or a one paragraph email
summarizing all your background. Then he advises you qualify for this prestigious
diploma. Now, how are you going to pay for it?
You will also discuss various payment methods including credit card and several
payment plans (with 20% discount for single payment, and 10% for two payment
plan). In one to two weeks, your diploma and transcript will arrive at your doorstep.
Congratulations, but not worth the paper they are printed on at the Axact printing
facility!
Processing Trail of a ‘New’ University
To complete our tour, let’s follow the creation of your ‘university’ from beginning
until the end. Think of this like the slow-moving horizontal walkway at the airport.
We have 22 stops to make along our journey to create a new virtual fake university.
I will number the stops as we go along. See the Appendix for a flow chart as used by
FIA Sindh Director.
Initiation
1. A Business Unit Member 1 delivers the University name to a Brand Manager.

2. The Brand Manager verifies that the name has no legal or copyrights violation.
3. The domain name purchase and hosting request is raised by the Brand Manager/
User and the domain name is finalized.
4. A wire frame (skeleton of new university web site) and content is created.
5. The domain lance, owned by Axact receives the request.
6. In collaboration with Single Hop, hosting services are provided to domains
received from the domain lance.
7. The payment is done through Outreach Global – Noor Bank.
8. The domain Purchase occurs with Internet BS, Direct NIC, or Go Daddy.
Domain Purchase and Hosting
9. The degree and transcript related requirements are forwarded to graphics and
multimedia by the Brand Resource unit along with the names for signature
creation.
10. The final design is delivered to the User Interface department for development.
11. The final document templates and signatures are delivered in a CD/DVD to
Brand Resource on request, Brand Communication works on user interface
and design.
12. A CD/DVD with document templates is sent to the Administrative Process
Management (APM) Department at the Axact Print Shop for printing.
13. APM sends templates to vendor for university printing.
14. The developed website and degree documents’ images are delivered to software
for forms, CRM (Customer Relationship Management), email system, pay-
ments, electronic degree templates, and VOIP system integration.
15. The final website is reviewed by the Business Unit Member 1 and Brand
Manager. It is uploaded on the purchased domain with a landing page for
advertising.
66 A. Ezell
Advertising
16. An account is created directly or through a vendor on a particular advertising

platform for lead generation. Direct account payment is done directly in active
campaign.
17. Advertising campaign is created, and incoming leads are fed into the CRM
automatically. Payment done to vendor through bank wire or credit card.
18. Lead allocation through automated system (for both sales and advertising).
Sales
19. Sales agents contact customer through email and/or phone for sales closure.
20. Payment is done to the merchant account by the customer.
Upsell
21. The agent sells degree legalization services to customer.

22. The payment is done for degree legalization.
Note the use of the word ‘customer’ not student! ‘Legalization’ refers to their sales
of counterfeit Embassy, Ministry of Education, District of Columbia Notarial
Certification to accompany the United States Department of State Apostille
Certification. Axact extorted the buyers by telling them these legalizations were
now required by new regulations, or laws, in order to make their existing university
diplomas valid.
Some schools state they are known by the good works of their graduates. I won-
der if these count?
• Wally, a dog from Albany, NY. Owned by Peter Brancato, 2004 – AA degree,
childhood development from Almeda University
• Sonny, a dog in Australia – May 30, 2007 – MD degree from Ashwood University
• Maxwell Sniffingwell, English Bulldog, Clinton, Arkansas – 2009 – ‘therio-
genology/animal reproduction, $549, Belford University, received both diploma,
transcript and letter of recommendation, declined Honors because of the addi-
tional $75 cost.
• Chester Ludlow, a pug from Vermont – 2009, $499, MBA with 3.19 GPA and
Certificate of Distinction in Finance, Rochville University, two sets of tran-
scripts, and certificate of membership in the Student Council.
wo Separate Paths: An FBI Sting and the Arrest

T
of Umair Hamid
I recall the old saying in law enforcement – The first one on the bus gets the best
seat! Or, the first one to confess and cooperate with law enforcement officials, pros-
ecutors, etc., and help catch the bad guys gets the best deal. Remember this. Some
of the players have.
The following events are described in the three-part article, The curious case of
Umair Hamid: How an Axact VP was arrested in a sting operation in the US
(Husain, 2018) and two press releases (Department of Justice, 2014a, b).
On July 1, 2002, a company, Blue Pearl Services, Inc., of Del Ray Beach, Florida
was incorporated in State of Florida by Gerald Enowitch, Del Ray Beach, Florida.
Initial officers were listed as Brett Loebel, 4635 NW 3rd Court, #D, Del Ray Beach,
FL 33445, and Gerald Enowitch of the same address. This corporation was later
voluntarily dissolved on June 14, 2004, by Loebel, 7903 Via Grande, Boynton
Beach, FL 33437, and Enowitch of the same address. It appears from other docu-
ments that Loebel was President and Enowitch was Secretary.
On June 5, 2006, Umair Hamnid, Karachi, Pakistan began his employment at
Axact in Karachi as Offshore Communications Executive. He knew English, but
could not speak it, thus he did the emails in English. His regular monthly salary was
$2500–3500 USD. Over the years, Hamid rose to Vice President, International
Relations (i.e., procurement), since he is a premier sycophant. He was responsible
for purchasing new schools and developing ‘Strategic Partnerships’ and looking at
Axact’s competition. He accomplished this task by working with the Brand
Management Department in an effort to get an edge over their competition. Loebel
is a search and digital marketing specialist, with background in social media, online
marketing, and a search analyst including search engine optimization.
In about 1997, Loebel is believed to have formed Almeda University (AU) (i.e.,
Almeda College or Almeda International University) on the Caribbean Island of
Nevis and began selling diplomas and transcripts based wholly on applicants’ oral
statements regarding their prior education and work experience (life experience
degrees) for small amounts of money, leading to $499–1500 USD by 2002. Almeda
was a virtual school, only had an Internet website, and once, a back-room office in
Florida with a staff processing the students paperwork, grading papers, etc. AU
never had a college campus in the traditional sense. AU utilized convenience
addresses (private mailbox facilities in various states including Idaho and continued
using these addresses until state licensing authorities issued cease and desist orders).
Then AU began using an address in another state. AU was quite mobile. Authorities
in at least Connecticut, Florida, and Idaho issued the cease-and-desist orders, while
Texas, Oregon, New Jersey, North Dakota, and Washington said they were invalid.
On the AU website, it indicated that in some states the AU diploma was viewed as a
novelty. This was probably due to the non-recognized accreditation claimed by AU
and the manner in which it awarded its diplomas. At one point, AU established a
convenience address in Boise, Idaho.
68 A. Ezell
On November 5, 2006, an advertisement was posted on the Internet, ‘Almeda

University For Sale Business For Sale In Boise, Idaho’ (see the Appendix). This
notice indicates Almeda University has website with annual revenue of $3 million
USD, “Very High Profit Margin, asking $2.65 million, will hold note.” “Online
only, location does not matter, contact Richard for more information on University
this for sale.” Below it was indicated “Number of Employee – 6-9, current real
estate leased.” Then, “About the Sale, Reason for selling: Bad press in Florida from
cops that got caught with bogus Almeda U. degrees.” Wrong! It was the school
which was bogus, thus all diplomas and transcripts issued are fake. The cops were
‘graduates’ of this fake school.
Sometime before 2013, Umar Hamid developed a relationship with Loebel at
which point they were each using fake names with each other (which is common
under the circumstances). Loebel had a reputation of dealing with fake schools;
Axact’s and Loebel’s fake schools were competitors in the mid 2000s. But they
eventually learned to work together. Loebel’s fake schools were Trinity College,
Sioux Falls, South Dakota; Pace Christian University (PCU), and later Coronado
Pacific University. Axact then began renting its domains from Loebel.
In 2013, Hamid, on behalf of Axact, purchased Almeda University from Loebel
for $1000,000 USD per month. However, after Axact received the records of Almeda
University they saw that its brand name was tarnished from bad publicity, so Hamid
renegotiated the monthly rental price for Almeda. Now, Axact paid Loebel based on
the number of degrees sold (i.e., the number of students involved). Remember, the
core of Axact is to cheat everyone. Surprise: Axact did not give Loebel honest
monthly sales figures on which his payments were calculated. This is also common-
place in this industry.
In late May 2014, Hamid also purchased another fake school from Loebel,
Paramount California University (PCU), (www.pcu.edu) for $1000,000 USD per
month in a strategic partnership agreement, whereby Axact would run the school.
Axact would handle financing, Internet platform, and a telephone sales and support
call center for PCU. This PCU was one of Axact’s best sellers. The pcu.edu web
address has been used for four different fake schools because each school had the
same initials, and it had the coveted .edu extension.
On December 19, 2016, Hamid, age 30, also known as Shah Khan or the Shah,
was arrested by the FBI in Independence, Kentucky, based on a criminal complaint
for wire fraud in a sting operation when he came to visit relatives in Kentucky prior
to his meeting with Loebel at a lawyer’s office in Chicago. After his arrest, enroute
to the U.S. Magistrate’s office, he advised the following, as described by Husain
(2018). Sometime before the FIA raid on Axact’s offices in May 2015, Axact began
renting its domains for universities from Loebel. At time of his arrest, Hamid made
various admissions about his life at Axact. He was an Assistant Vice President of
International Relations for Axact. In his scheme, Hamid had collected over $140
million USD from tens of thousands of consumers. On January 1, 2017, Hamid was
indicted by a Federal Grand Jury, later entered a guilty plea, forfeited $5,303,020
USD, and on August 28, 2017, was sentenced to 21 months in federal prison. At the
completion of his prison sentence, he was deported.
See if you can guess who the unnamed defendant is in the April 16, 2014, press
release (Department of Justice, 2014b) describing James Enowitch’s criminal infor-
mation, involving the sale of fake diplomas and transcripts on Suffield University,
from 2003 to 2012, selling $5,000,000 USD worth of fake degrees throughout the
world and profiting more than $700,000 USD from this fraudulent scheme. Enowitch
and his alleged unnamed co-schemer operated at least seven different web sites
through which they sold diplomas on the following fake universities: Redding,
Suffield Glendale, Greenwood, and Bryson University. All ranges of degrees were
sold for $475–550 USD, with a 50% discount for multiple degrees. Customers
choose their own grades! Enowitch was sentenced on May 21, 2018, to 18 months’
probation on Count 1, fined $7000 USD and a $100 USD special assessment, and
he had previously forfeited $400,000 USD to the Government. The Court records
were then sealed.
rossing Paths: Suffield University and Manhattan

C
Bay University
In 2006–2007, I had purchased a diploma and transcript from Suffield University

for a client in Texas. My purpose was to prove the diploma being used by a Texas
school teacher was as fake as mine. I later gave my Suffield University documents
to the attorneys who had asked for my assistance, then traveled in 2007 to Fort
Worth, Texas and was deposed.
Manhattan Bay University is important, especially to me. On November 14,
2016, I received a cold call for Allen O. Benson from a student counselor at
Manhattan Bay University. He told me the university was located in Suite 7017 of
the Empire State Building (350 Fifth Avenue, Manhattan, NY 1018) and asked if
I was still interested in an MBA degree. I said, “yes.” I told him of my 50-year back-
ground in accounting, and military service, he said I qualified for their Presidential
Scholarship. He described my MBA degree package as one original diploma, two
sealed transcripts, a verification letter, and all this would cost me $1000 USD, which
we negotiated down to $800 USD because of my scholarship. He asked which credit
card I would use, I told him my credit line was about used up, but I had some cash
and could send a bank wire. If they really want my money, this forces them to tell
me the name of their bank, address, and account number and name on account. He
told me to send my wire transfer to Huntington Bank in Cincinnati, Ohio. I told him
I had been victimized previously, and I would like to see a copy of what I was buy-
ing. He then sent me copies of Manhattan Bay University diploma, transcript, and
some other documents. I immediately called the FBI office in NYC. The case agent
was delighted at my information (I did not ask why, I know better) and I sent him
copies of all documents I had, and a summary memorandum of my conversations
with my student Counselor.
70 A. Ezell
I later learned the FBI used my above information in the complaint they filed for
an arrest warrant against Umair Hamid, then after that, in their Federal Grand Jury
indictment. Turns out, Hamid had previously come to the United States and person-
ally opened this particular bank account at Huntington Bank! I was scheduled to be
a government witness at his SDNY trial, until he changed his plea to guilty.
Back to Axact in May 2015
Walsh (2015a) indicated in his May 18, 2015, cover story that Axact was a total
fraud of worldwide epic proportions since its inception in 1997! Karachi citizens,
and those throughout Pakistan, had held Axact in high esteem for the last 18 years,
especially based on its publicity of all their supposed company successes, and its
growth in the information technology age. Axact called itself the “World’s Leading
IT Company” (Axact, n.d.) and publicized all the good works it was doing for
Pakistani citizens and planned to do. The citizenry who bought into this big lie
revered its leader and co-founder, Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh, and its COO and co-
founder, Viqas Atiq, and were looking forward to the great things which they had
proclaimed. Both men repeated publicly their good works and projects. First it was
Project 2019 for a prosperous and a thriving Pakistan and “Axact will make sectors
of Food, Shelter, Healthcare, Judicial Assistance, and Education accessible to every
Pakistani by 2019” (Axact, n.d.) The population was then 216.6 million. This was
followed by Sheikh’s Plan 2036 whereby he would “make Pakistan the #1 Country
in the world by 2036.” (Axact, n.d.). Sheikh and Atiq then unveiled pictures of the
engineering icon for GalAxact, their new futuristic Axact office building containing
“3.5 million sq.ft. to accommodate 20,000 Axactians in one shift” (Axact, n.d.).
Additionally, he indicated he desired to increase the Axact workforce to 100,000.
Take a moment and do some simple calculations using 20,000 or 100,000 Axact
employees working 24/7 selling their fraudulent wares. Just how long would it take
for Axact to sell a degree to every single adult in the world? In 2020, it is estimated
there are 7.8 billion adults in the world.
Not surprisingly, Project 2019 never materialized, nor did any of the GalAxact
concepts. Look at Pakistan today, and you can see where they stand on Plan 2036.
Initially, Atiq cooperated with Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), then when he
felt he was about to be arrested, he fled the country, rumored now to be in Malaysia.
None of Sheikh’s above plans nor massive construction dreams materialized – all
were a conman’s dreams –all just more pie in the sky.
In the wake of the NYT article in May 2015, not only were Pakistani citizens
stunned, especially those in cities where Axact had offices, but also in the countries
of the Gulf Region where Axact had thousands of customers (victims) and news
stories had previously appeared in the press. For the first time in their existence,
Axact was now known for the fraud it truly was! Employees and relatives could no
longer be proud of where they were employed. In some circles, to now say, “I work
at Axact”, is no longer impressive, but akin to saying, “I work for the Mafia, we
threaten and extort money from people.”
Pakistanis and citizens worldwide later learned the information shared in the
NYT article was just the tip of the iceberg. Probably as a direct result of Walsh
(2015a) naming a former Axact employee, Yasir Jamshaid, as an approver in his
article, and his first-person statements about the true Axact which he experienced, is
probably the reason that at least a dozen or more of other former Axact employees
now came forward publicly to spill the beans to both print media and television.
Some of these approvers even brought supporting documents to support their sto-
ries. Hundreds of articles now appeared daily in the Pakistan press, throughout the
Gulf Region, and abroad. It seemed to be a daily barrage.
Walsh (2015a) also indicated former Axact employees advised that Axact was in
fact not the information technology company which it pretended to be. But it had
been selling spurious diplomas and transcripts on fake high schools, colleges, and
universities, to hundreds of thousands of individuals, both locally in Pakistan,
regionally in the Gulf Region, and throughout the world. Axact accomplished this
feat through its three (or, four at one point) Pakistan call centers, with hundreds of
degree salesmen who posed as school officials of the nonexistent schools on a 24/7
basis and sold these seemingly American schools convincingly in English with
no accent.
Pakistan citizens were not the only ones shocked and dismayed – so were mem-
bers of the Pakistan Parliament. For background, realize that in 2002, in order to
have more learned parliamentarians, new requirements were imposed on Members
of Parliament. They must now have at least a bachelor’s degree in order to run for
office. Supreme Court overturned this law in 2008. As you can imagine, since many
Members of Parliament had no degree, there was a mad dash to get fast degrees.
Any type would do – worthless, counterfeit, or diploma mill credentials – all of
which hit the press. At least 14 Pakistani MPs were disqualified, and I recall at least
one went to prison. Thus, the idea that Karachi, Pakistan was the home base for an
entity selling over 8 million diplomas worldwide, hit a very sore spot. One source is
titled, Fake Degree Holders and Defaulters should be in Jail, NOT in Parliament
(2013), along with Pakistani’s Parliament Full of Fake Degree Holders (duad-
pota, 2010).
Javed Akbar Khan, a Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA), having been
elected in 2013, then submitted a fake degree from a religious seminary (madressah)
to qualify in the 2008 election. He was arrested for this offense, then on November
30, 2016, was sentenced to two years in jail and a Pakistani Rupee 20,000 fine
(approximately $119.00 USD) and shifted (moved) to the Central Jail Dera.
Several Members of Parliament said if the allegations by the NYT were true, the
fraudsters deserved to be punished severely since they had embarrassed the good
name and reputation of the country of Pakistan. One Member of Parliament even
called these acts treason and demanded a trial. Pakistan Chief Justice called this a
“national shame” (PTI, 2018). Sheikh and several other Axact executives were
immediately placed on the Pakistan ‘Exit Control List’ (ECL), a no-fly list, so they
would not flee the country. The Interior Minister was charged with conducting a
72 A. Ezell
proper investigation, and on May 20, 2015, had Sheikh and several other Axact
executives placed on the Pakistan ECL so they would not flee the country. The
Interior Minister then ordered the Pakistan FIA to conduct such investigation. In
addition, Pakistan International Airlines, their flagship airlines, has examined the
credentials of over 1000 employees, terminating over 500 cabin and cockpit employ-
ees for fraudulent credentials. Axact did target the airline industry, and others, for
new business. Officials of Malir Development Authority determined about one half
of their work force, about 875 employees, used irregular credentials when hired.
Axact Is ‘Closed’
Axact offices were closed by the government, its offices sealed by the FIA for at
least 15 months. The premises were ‘accidently’ returned to Axact control when a
court order was supposedly misunderstood as Sheikh and 24 other Axact execu-
tives were released from prison. Sheikh then highly publicized the reopening of
Axact, and not surprisingly promised all returning employees, he would pay them
their 15 months back wages! He never repaid them their back wages, estimated to
be about $68,000,000 USD. All talk – just more window dressing! Think about
the dynamics of this offer for a moment. The government closed the business and
sealed the premises, almost all of top company management (except those who
fled the country) went to prison, supposedly sales stopped, and Sheikh is offering
to pay over $60,000,000 USD to returning employees. I wonder where the influx
of money would come from – maybe from ‘accumulated profits’ on their annual
financial statements? In addition, for the past 24 years Axact has withheld monies
from employees’ salaries for their provident fund, similar to a 401(k) plan.
However, sources say that many employees who leave the company have never
been able to get their Provident Fund balance given to them, unless they sue or
threaten bad publicity. Some estimates run as high as $68 million USD of unre-
turned deposits.
Sheikh was taken into custody by the FIA during the week of May 25, 2015, and
interviewed several times. On the evening of Wednesday, May 26, 2015, Sheikh led
the FIA officers, including the Additional Director General (ADG) Shahid Hayat
(Khan), Sindh District, and Judicial Magistrate Javed Iqbal Malik to the Axact Print
Shop. Magistrate Malik broke open the lock on the premises of Axact’s Administrative
Process Management Department First Floor, Bldg. Plot No. 124-C, Joint
Commercial, Khayaban-e-litehad, Phase -VII, DHA, Karachi (aka PIA Building) –
the Axact printing department.
The FIA then located various printing presses, seal making machines, both for
diplomas, letterheads, envelopes, and seals. FIA seized all the printed diplomas,
letterheads, and seals located on the property. A police officer advised these items
were stacked from floor to ceiling, and in several bookshelves. FIA later announced
the following week, the seized documents totaled 2.2 million. At about midnight,
the FIA ADG, Sindh District, invited the press into the printing facility to take
photographs of all that had been located, and he then held a press conference on the
doorsteps of the printing facility. I have copies of these photos. Sheikh was then
formally arrested on site along with other Axact officials, after the printing plant
raid. A First Information Report (FIR) that detailed the print shop raid summarizes
all that was seized and enumerates names of 44 universities and nine accrediting
entities. Sheikh was taken to court the following day, where more photos were taken.
Sheikh and Axact React
Always remember the old saying in law enforcement: the first one on the bus gets
the best seat! This means that the first one to cooperate with the law enforcement
officials, prosecutors, etc., confess, and help catch the other bad guys, gets the best
deal. Some of our players have mastered this strategy, just follow along. You guess
who got the best seat.
Sheikh immediately ordered all employees to come to the large auditorium at the
BOL building, which holds 500, but was about 800 then with standing room only.
He gave the same stories he had given in the past: this was all false information
drummed up by his business rivals, people envious of the success of Axact, and
impending opening of BOL Network, a media conglomerate consisting of platforms
desired by their audience including television, digital media, print media, cinemas,
movies, theater, and radio. BOL Network is a one stop shop for all avenues of com-
munication, with about 2000 employees throughout Pakistan. Chairman Sheikh
now has his own major propaganda arm for Axact and Crest. Beware of fake news.
Over the next several weeks, Sheikh would give false and misleading stories to the
press about their innocence, even issuing official statements that the NYT story
(Walsh, 2015a) was “baseless, substandard reporting” (Imtiaz & Walsh, 2015) as
part of a plot by rival news organizations to stop BOL Network which was sched-
uled to start operations shortly. Sheikh threatened several news organizations and
bloggers reporting on this issue with lawsuits. No such lawsuits ever materialized.
He also denied any association with the false educational websites, except selling
them software and admitted Axact did provide these clients’ schools with office
support and call center services to these websites.
At the same time, he was saying that Axact had done no wrong and the NYT story
was false, he had ordered Axact executives to destroy business records and for sales
area managers to either destroy documents, remove the data, damage the drives,
reformat things incorrectly, or to take computer files, hard drives, or servers to their
homes, which they did. Logs were even kept as to which officer took which com-
puter items. FIA, Cyber Crime Division, would later use these documents to visit
each official at their home, retrieve all the Axact computer items, and so indicate in
their FIR made to the Court.
In law enforcement, the element of surprise is paramount for the Agent and the
citizen. Do not give them too much time to think. You do not telegraph your moves
ahead of time, and you do not let the subject know you are coming, especially when
74 A. Ezell
hundreds of desk top computers, laptops, cell phones, servers, and millions of docu-
ments are involved amongst thousands of employees in at least three different
offices miles apart. The FIA executed its raids of all known Axact offices in Karachi,
Islamabad (the Pakistan capital city), and Rawalpindi with assistance from the
Pakistan Army and were photographed some carrying AK-47 rifles. The FIA seized
several truckloads of desktop computers, laptops, and business records and took
over 75 employees for questioning. Since the FIA raid was not immediately after
the NYT exposé (Walsh, 2015a), this gave them time to think. Therefore, Axact
employees were destroying or hiding everything in sight. The FIA took the logs the
employees had previously signed about taking equipment home and went to their
homes and retrieved all the equipment.
Circumstances of Karachi
Exactly what does ‘Circumstances of Karachi’ mean?

1. Scare off Judges (three), having 1 even leave the country
2. Bribe one Judge we know of (approximately $30,000 USD)
3. Kidnap the prosecutors (three) and threaten them and their families (probably
one more)
4. Kidnap (three times) a senior official at the FIA and take him to undisclosed
locate to be ‘re-educated’
5. If all else fails, throw a Russian grenade at the occupied home of the prosecutor
rumored to be getting back into the court case (once)
Zahid Jamil, age about 47, was a very competent, honorable Barrister in Karachi.
When the NYT exposed Axact for the fraud it is (Walsh, 2015a, b), Jamil volun-
teered his services (pro bono) to the FIA and agreed to be the Special Prosecutor of
the Axact case. This was his first experience as being the Special Prosecutor. He was
quite successful, established a near perfect record winning about nine different
defendants’ motions for bail requests – they all remained in custody. On January 11,
2016, he informed the court his team will be ready to file the final charge sheet and
commence trial by the end of the month, or at the latest by the middle of February.
This would be the big moment everyone has been waiting for. When the evidence
gets to see the light of day and the defendants get to see for the first time what the
prosecution has, and the trial could begin in earnest.
Suddenly, on January 18, 2016, Jamil announced that he had “disassociated him-
self from the case” (Husain, 2016). He gave no reason in his resignation letter to the
Court, other than circumstances have arisen, “that make it difficult to continue. My
professional conduct would be affected if he were to continue with the case.” He
ended his letter with comments “I take this step with disappointment”. He left the
case and never explained himself.
Later, just when the Pakistan federal government (FIA) was negotiating Barrister
Zahid Jamil’s re-engagement in the case, under the cover of darkness, two young
males driving a moped dove down his street, stopping at his house. The young male
passenger then got off the back of the moped and threw a Russian made grenade at
Jamil’s house. He then got back on the moped and they sped down the street. A
police officer said this was a serious attempt to do damage. No one has ever been
arrested for this. Jamil never rejoined the case. Three prosecutors after Jamil left the
case, distanced themselves from the case due to ‘circumstances of Karachi’ what-
ever that means. Jamil has directed the prosecution team from the shadows, but all
realized the FIA would compromise the case in his absence of his full control as a
lead prosecutor. Very recently Jamil was interviewed on Karachi television, still
hesitating to cross a line and say exactly why he quit the case, but did say after the
grenade incident, he left the country for a short period. Both the government and
Axact had delivered their message, Pakistan style! As expected, the Axact case did
not do well in the absence of Zahid Jamil. I note that even the Deputy Director of
the FIA, Cyber Crime Reposting Center, has been grabbed off the street, taken to
unknown place to be counseled about the case, on several occasions.
Ali Norman (also known as Norman Siddiki), age 35, was the head of Human
Resources at BOL Media and had been on loan to Axact. It is my understanding he
had decided to hold a press conference the next morning at which time he would tell
the world all about Axact and what was really happening there. He left the office to
go home to his wife and two young children, a boy and a girl, both age about three
to six. On July 15, 2015, as he drove home that evening in his company car, he was
assassinated by at least two assailants supposedly on a motorcycle, with them shoot-
ing several bullets into his car, hitting him in the head at least once, causing the car
to wreck. He was dead on arrival at the hospital. Police say this was the result of an
attempted robbery while others say it was a targeted killing incident. Oddly, various
members of the military attended his funeral, including very high-ranking officers,
which is very unusual. The Director Inspector General Feroze Shah, Karachi West,
even made comments about this shooting and advised a special team had been
established to investigate this shooting. But no persons have yet been arrested.
Photos of the car are available.
In late 2017 or early 2018, I gave the British Broadcasting Company (BBC),
London, England a list of about 3000 persons in the United Kingdom who pur-
chased fake diplomas from Axact. BBC began their investigation of this problem of
fake academic credentials being used in the United Kingdom, which resulted in
BBC Radio News, and their program ‘4’s File’ doing a story on January 18, 2018,
Investigation Reveals Thousands of UK Nationals Bought Degree from Diploma
Mill (Cox, 2018). BBC then enumerated the details they had obtained from numer-
ous interviews conducted with various ‘graduates’ now employed in various jobs
including the medical field, and government, throughout the United Kingdom. One
buyer had given these Axact schools she dealt a total of £500,000 (approximately
$689,882 USD) from 2013 to 2014.
This BBC program also surfaced the story of Pakistani Judge Pervarzul Qadie
Memon who had admitted accepting a bribe of Rs5 million ($30,000 USD) to acquit
all defendants in the Axact trial, which he did (Alvi, 2017). This BBC program must
have been broadcast in Pakistan because the Islamabad High Court immediately
76 A. Ezell
took notice of this information and held a hearing on the su motu case. On April 25,
2018, the Court heard the FIA plea against acquittal of Axact suspects which took
place on October 31, 2016 (Imran, 2018). At Axact, Sheikh also took note of the
BBC program, by closing the call centers for half a day, and meeting with all his
managers. Thereafter, they cut back some aspects of their fraudulent activity (imper-
sonating government and law enforcement officials), then resumed selling diplomas.
“The Axact scandal keeps giving” wrote Alvi (2018), when Judge Pervaizul
Qadir Memon, Additional District and Sessions Judge (ADSJ), admitted before the
Islamabad High Court that he had previously accepted a bribe in the Axact case.
Judge Memon was suspended on June 7, 2017, after a show cause notice had been
issued. These and other pertinent events regarding the Judge stem from his appear-
ance on October 30, 2016, before a Departmental Promotion Committee, at which
time he said that he had received a bribe of Pakistani Rupees five million (about
$30,000 USD) from Axact officials to acquit all 24 Axact defendants, which he did
on October 31, 2016, saying there was insufficient evidence. This may not have
been the only case which the Judge handled in this manner. As you can imagine, the
press had a field day. The Chief Justice of the IHC was embarrassed. The IHC then
issued a su moto notice on March 3, 2018, a ruling that overturned all prior Axact
court cases and starting the judicial process anew. No one, including the FIA, the
Courts, nor Axact, ever asked the sacked former Judge to return this money, sur-
render it to the government, or donate it to charity! He lost his position but kept the
bribe money!
After 2015: Still Selling Diplomas and Transcripts!
Because Axact was no longer responding to telephone calls from Canada to their
various fake schools, officials of Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC),
Toronto, Canada asked if I would front for them in contacting various Axact fake
schools to purchase diplomas (Szeto & Vellani, 2017a). I had previously given offi-
cials of CBC’s consumer fraud program, Marketplace, a list of over 2000 people in
Canada who had purchased fake diplomas from Axact. Marketplace started their
investigation and determined which specific fake diplomas they needed for their
story. Thus, from about July 1, 2017, to August 30, 2017, I became Peter Ma Lack,
the identity I had been given by CBC. This name is an anagram of the name
Marketplace. In the next sixty plus days, I called, and received, over 200 telephone
calls to various fake schools and emails, all stemming from the call centers at
Karachi, Pakistan.
On occasion, the university official was not present (in his cube) and someone
else would answer his phone, and give me an excuse for his absence – attending
board meeting, in a meeting with the dean, etc.
But I will never forget one call – the person who picked up the phone told me, his
chair was empty, which tells me everything! I was told which universities they
wanted, the level of degree needed, the desired major, date of graduation, and GPA
(grade point average). I now had my marching orders, my shopping list, and I was
off and running.
In this manner, with no academic work done on my part whatsoever, I purchased
a PhD degree in Psychology from Gatesville University (https://www.gatesvilleuni-
versity.com) in Stockton, California, backdated to January 12, 2001 with transcript
(GPA 3.92) for $1500 USD, in name of Peter Ma Lack. The website has beautiful
graphics. My degree package arrived via UPS Ground, an envelope bearing return
address of “Ship Swiftly, 1-201-366-6293, 3320 Central Park Blvd, Suite (no num-
ber shown), Fredericksburg, VA 22401”, as addressed to Dr. Peter Ma Lack, PhD at
my home address in Arden, NC. The graduation package of documents appeared to
have been straight off a cutting board with a cardboard backing. In my opinion, all
the documents I received were probably sent electronically from Karachi to Ship
Swiftly, where they were downloaded, printed, and machine cut, so it would look
like a small new book that had never been opened. Both of the diplomas I purchased
arrived in the same fashion from UPS Ground, bearing the same return address in
Virginia. I paid the $1500 USD for this diploma and transcript via three $500 USD
prepaid Visa cards purchased at Walmart as instructed. I believe you will locate cop-
ies of the above Gatesville University diploma and transcript if you search the name
Peter Ma Lack (Szeto & Vellani, 2017b).
Next, I needed a diploma from Almeda University, Boise, Idaho (http://www.
almedauniversity.org/). However, I was advised this school had already been closed.
Much negotiation began at various levels with my school officials, then they finally
agreed to sell me the diploma only, but without a transcript. I agreed. I purchased an
Almeda University PhD, in Biblical Counseling, dated January 12, 2011, in the
name of Peter Ma Lack. Initially they wanted $3200 USD for this diploma, but
finally accepted $1000 USD. I believe I paid for this via Western Union. A copy of
this diploma can be located today by searching Peter Ma Lack on Google Images.
My ‘degree package’ arrived in an envelope marked Ship Swiftly, Fredericksburg,
VA. as described above. During all the above my school representative confused the
type of degree I wanted, thus erroneously initially sent me an Almeda University
with PhD in Psychology, instead of Biblical Counseling. Therefore, I ordered and
paid for two diplomas, and received three. A copy of Peter Ma Lack’s additional
PhD diplomas are also available online (Szeto & Vellani, 2017b). In September
2017 I traveled to CBC Headquarters in Toronto, met the team at Market Place, and
was interviewed for their upcoming tv program broadcast throughout Canada, All of
us can be harmed: Investigations reveals hundreds of Canadians have phony
degrees (Szeto & Vellani, 2017a).
Sheikh learned of the above program aired by CBC in Canada, and the resulting
other stories which appeared thereafter, all with negative publicity about Axact and
their universities. He closed down all telephone lines for a while, then decided it
would be business as usual. The CBC program definitely did not have the same
effect as the later BBC program did on Axact (cite BBC).
On December 1, 2019, I wrote a detailed letter to the Pakistan Ambassador, Dr.
Khan, at the Pakistan Embassy, Washington, DC, relative to Axact explaining in
detail exactly precisely what was taking place. I even gave him stats on the number
78 A. Ezell
of fake degrees sold to his own countrymen in Pakistan, and around him in
Washington, DC, Virginia, and Maryland. I dealt with his personal Secretary, so I
know they may have initially thrown it away, but I then sent her a copy. She and I
spoke on the phone several times. When this letter became the subject of an article
in the Pakistan press (Gishkori, 2020), the Ambassador denied receiving it or having
any knowledge of Axact! And the coverup continues!
Publicly Blemished: New Name(s) for Axact
In late December of 2019, into early in January 2020, in view the name of Axact
was now known for what it truly represented, and was no longer honorable, Sheikh
wanted to change his image. Axact changed the name on its headquarters building
in Karachi from Axact, World’s largest IT Company, to Crest Tower DHA (Defense
Housing Authority) (Pakistan Army). The name on the outside of the building was
changed and the Crest emblem (similar to that of Chanel, an inverted C across
another C (https://www.cresttower.com/). However, the fraud games being perpe-
trated inside the building are the same as they were when Axact was located there,
the employees did not even have to leave their desks during this change – they just
received new building passes with a new company name on them. The new entities
are Crest Tower DHA, Axact (https://www.axact.com/news-and-events/), BOL
Network (https://www.bolmediagroup.com/), Dipdag (https://www.dipdag.com/),
Creativefu (https://creativefu.com/), Syscrowd (https://www.syscrowd.com/), and
TCurve (https://www.tcurve.com/archive). TCurve is responsible for all fake
schools being sold. The newest and hottest money-making scam is their graph-
ics scam!
For all practical purposes, it is all still Axact, just under the umbrella of several
new companies. The games (frauds) remain the same! Many of these new company
websites were registered all about the same time. The websites for these new build-
ing entities indicate they are software company; information technology; media
conglomerate, computer software/ design/communication solution; web and app
development & digital technology; and lastly CRM (Customer Relationship
Management) related applications. Or at least that is that umbrella they are hid-
ing under.
The building today bearing the name Crest Tower DHA was previously the head-
quarters for Axact and known as Axact House. In view of this, all the lavish employee
perks of Axact (he was trying to imitate Silicon Valley, CA) remain in the building
today: swimming pool, bedroom next to S’s office, various cafeterias and dining
rooms, games room, gym; salons, prayer hall, medical clinic, rooftop restaurant,
and more. If you look at the Crest Tower website they state: “We believe in Maximum
Productivity, Unlike the conventional workplaces in Pakistan, Crest Tower DHA
has been constructed on the idea of any externalities that act as a barrier on your
business way to stardom” (Crest Tower, n.d.). In other words, we want you to sit in
your cube to make more sales calls all the time. Snacks are even brought to you by
the floor steward, and you can order your cafeteria meal via your computer. All to
maximize production! The perfect balance between work & pleasure. Most employ-
ees in the Tower today previously worked at Axact, thus utilized all the Axact perks
before. During the changeover, most did not leave their desks, just received a new
company badge and door opener.
This has never seen before: any company or organization that had 900–2000
employees, and claimed 25,000 employees and representatives worldwide, has a
monthly cash payroll of about $1,500,000 USD for Axact/Crest Tower (1200–1500
employees), and $3,000,000 USD for BOL (2000 employees), all because no in-
country bank is willing to handle their payroll business, or because cash per se,
leaves no tracks. Think of the logistics of such large cash payrolls and the security
aspects. Sheikh has a nephew who previously handled the payroll, but it is a retired
Army Colonel, now employed by Axact, who takes the payroll to Islamabad. I am
sure all payroll officers are accompanied by many security guards. Employees
receive their cash payroll monthly from their Team Leader or Payroll Officer.
Overall, Adeel Qureshi, Chartered Accountant, CFO of BOL (parent company) is
responsible for all Axact/BOL/Crest Tower payrolls. I am still wondering what the
Army Colonel’s military specialty (job) was that qualified him to work at Axact in
retirement?
The Worst of the Worst: Extortion and Blackmail!
I have never seen a website anywhere like the Global Credential Evaluation and
Authentication Board (GCEAB). The site was registered on March 17, 2019, and
purports to provide “worldwide credential verification,” (GCEAB, n.d.) with a bit of
a twist. They have two main areas: GAD (Global Alert Database) and GBI (Global
Board of Investigation). GCEAB also purports to be a regional accreditor. Think
about this. It is both the NCIC (National Crime Information Center) and the FBI all
wrapped in one, offering accreditation on the side! So far, I only recall observing
Bayshore University, created on August 28, 2017, as its accreditor. GCEAB says it
“is an international body that verifies educational records, criminal records, employ-
ment records, traveling records, and credit records” (GCEAB, n.d.). For a moment,
please look at the flags they display, and all the countries it says they serve. Examine
their august partners, including the building at the center, and government bodies
with the bright United States of America flag. The web site says that it is “The Sole
International United National Organization for verification of Credentials”
(GCEAB, n.d.).
Please look at the content of the GBI closely. Through its own GVA (Global
Verification Agents) it examines records for discrepancies, and, if detected, places
the names of individuals (as appropriate) in the GAD. GCEAB claims to share the
GAD data with “embassies, missions, immigration bodies, global organizations,
government ministries, law enforcement agencies, education institutes, health insti-
tutions, and large private and public concerns, such as insurance, banking,
80 A. Ezell
technology, automotive, real estate, construction, and various others. The effect is
such that if an individual is undergoing any process such as admission, employment,
immigration, credit verification, travel, investigation, or health, then it is halted
immediately, and the relevant institution makes the appropriate decision. There are
cases in which criminal investigations were provided assistance and the subject
individual was brought to justice by going to jail” (GCEAB, n.d.). GCEAB rein-
forces all these penalties or horror stories by the colorful graphics they use all over
their web site. They even display several red ink stamps with wording, “Here’s what
happens to individuals upon entry in the GAD – Global Alert Database” (GCEAB,
2017). All of this is summarily depicted by the man in the jail cell, looking out the
bars, dressed in red and white checkered Arab Kafiya Kelliyeh Arabic Muslim Head
Scarf. This picture tells me clearly what audience they are trying to reach! This is
but more window dressing for their scare tactics and extortion and may give us a
good look into Shoaib Sheikh’s true soul. The scare tactics include which includes
being fired from a job, expelled from college, credit declined, adverse publicity, any
application refused, arrested, and deported. The Arab in the jail cell. If you do not
have your academic credentials validated by them, this is what can happen to you.
Scare tactics, like nothing we have ever seen before, which shows Sheikh’s true soul.
Axact Extortion Travel Teams
As if all the above ways to defraud people are not enough, then we have the mobile
Axact assault teams, generally 6–10 young, experienced employees who once or
twice a year will fly to New York City, then rent hotel rooms. They also rent a
room(s) at a separate hotel or apartment where they can keep all the tools of their
trade, they will need on this extortion trip. They have learned not to keep these items
in their real hotel room nor to carry them in their possession around with them when
they do not have to. The goals Axact management have given them can be as high
as $500,000–1,000,000 USD in one or two weeks. They branch out each day con-
tacting those Pakistani and Indian citizens in New York City and New Jersey, who
they know previously purchased diplomas and transcripts, and now the threats of
publicity, loss of job, arrest, deportation, etc. begin until they pay up. This basic
script continues until their goals have been reached. On a recent trip, their goal set
by Axact was $40,000,000 USD in one month for a ten-man team.
TCurve Amnesty Period for Employees
There are many definitions for the word amnesty, including in law, which is an act
of forgiveness for past offenses, or a forgetting or overlooking of any past offense,
or a provision of clemency offered to citizens who break the law, immunity from
prosecution. I am sure we have all encountered amnesty in our lives, from the local
library which has amnesty periods when clients can return overdue books with no
penalties or fees involved. Also, at the Department of Motor Vehicles where, in their
brief declared Traffic Amnesty Program, unpaid traffic tickets disposed of, and
under certain conditions, suspended drivers’ licenses can be absolved, and new
drives license issued and driving privileges begin anew. In law, amnesty is an act of
forgiveness for past offenses.
Karachi, Pakistan is replete with call centers, both legal and illegal. In its hiring
procedures, Axact would like to have applicants with prior experience working at
call centers, thus they know how the game is played. These experienced employees
have already learned that thefts from their employer via its telephone operators is
not unusual in this line of business. Normally, these thefts are accomplished by
diversion of income – telling the caller to make a deposit to an account not owned
by the employer or diverting credit card payments to an account not belonging to the
employer. Call center employees have also been known to steal sales records from
their employer, then sell this information (including name, address, telephone num-
ber, possibly even credit card information) to the highest bidder at competing com-
panies. These employers are well aware of the various ways to steal from them, and
in turn, they have installed surveillance cameras, and keyboard devices to monitor
keystrokes. But fraud still happens.
A source of known reliability furnished copies of internal documents and emails
referenced below. On June 25, 2020, the Business Manager of Axact’s Crest Tower
company TCurve, sent an email to all employees advising them of a four-day
amnesty period from June 26 ending July 1. (Note. The text of the email is quoted
exactly, including errors.)
“At TCurve, we strongly believe that adhering to commitment, displaying integrity, and
reaching company goals solely through honorable conduct are significant to our continuous
success. No company employee can, directly or indirectly, bring the data of customers from
their former companies to TCurve. Similarly, at TCurve, we advertise our brands to make
sure that we get fair share of leads from the market. And those leads/customers are actually
owned by the company which cannot be used for your own benefit in any ways.”
Thereafter, the Business Manager named two specific employees (users) by name,
position, and department, then said that the employees were found in violation of
the Data Theft Policy. Emails advised that both of the individuals had accepted this
violation with their written statements and were being dealt with strict disciplinary
actions. Employees were warned that any such incident in the future would be dealt
with swift legal action including, but not limited to an FIR, court proceedings, and
jail time. During the stated ‘amnesty period’, if anyone was involved in any such
activity, or aware of any such activity taking place, they were told they were required
to come forward. In the meantime, communications stated: “we are taking certain
preventive measures and carrying out an in-depth 360 degrees audit. Anyone found
to be involved in such activity, who has not come forward during this amnesty
period, will face strict legal action.”
A follow up email was sent with the results of the amnesty period in mid-July
2020. It stated that staff were strictly monitored by keyloggers in their computers
and CCTV within the Axact buildings. Seven employees were named in that email.
82 A. Ezell
There were several items listed in the email to correct the actions. It stated that fake
embassies were closed, staff were instructed to temporarily suspend named univer-
sities, and outlined steps to follow if law enforcement agencies became involved.
(Note. The text of the email is quoted exactly, including errors.)
“After people is view the webinar and they instructed to temporary suspend the university
which they have name in webinar also at the multiple fake Embassies are closed which are
running in every corner row of Sales also one Voip Nadeem vendor also asked them so that
I have checked your activity OF DID that you are using for fake embassies, If any law
enforcement agency call me and asking who is using then I will call your name to them they
remove DID at this time they are running with limited but CLI is still using that they call to
people that we are calling from embassies or Ministry of Foreign affairs.”
Finally, the email indicated that Sheikh had instructed employees to open new
Accreditation bodies and universities after some time. For background, I have long
known Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh and his enablers read what I write and watch my webi-
nars to determine what do I know, or do not know, and what is my source of informa-
tion, so they can take corrective actions (by closing the schools and accreditors we
know about). In several instances I have welcomed him and his enablers by name to
our webinar at the beginning! This is what is mentioned in the above paragraph.
Devaluing Degrees: Why Should We Be Concerned?
A proliferation of these fake documents will make any organization or employer

leery and suspicious of the next person who provides a resume or application from
this same, or similar, named school. Overall, they devalue all earned degrees. In the
case of Axact, and its thousands of fake ‘American’ school websites, his fake diplo-
mas and transcripts undermine the overall reputation and value of degrees earned in
the United States of America. Imagine how potential students in foreign countries
are confused.
1. Because they devalue hard earned degrees, especially the look-a-likes and
sound-a-likes.
2. They confuse the public, defraud the ‘students,’ especially when the fraudster
hides amongst legitimate ‘on-line education.
3. They deceive employers, customers, clients, and patients.
4. They pollute the professions with unqualified professionals. Especially when the
users are in leadership positions, where lives matter on their decisions.
5. They lower prestige abroad regarding legitimate colleges and universities in the
United States.
6. The counterfeit, or diploma mill issued diplomas and transcripts can be used as
supporting documents in various fraud schemes including identity fraud, and for
H1B Visas.
7. These fraudulent credentials have the potential to cause great harm, especially in
the aviation, engineering, law enforcement, transportation, and medial fields—
these instances can be horrendous.
In 2008, I purchased several counterfeit diplomas and transcripts from counterfeit-

ers in the names of well-known schools, such as University of Florida, St. Leo
College, Stetson Law School, Johns Hopkins University, and University of Oregon.
The American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions
Officers (AACRAO) in Washington, DC wanted me to write a book about this coun-
terfeiting situation, which I did (Ezell, 2008). At this same time, I was paying for my
younger daughter to attend the University of Florida, and here I was buying several
counterfeit degrees and transcripts from different suppliers in the same name and
design as hers. I did write the book and used her legitimate transcript as an illustra-
tion for comparison purposes, with my fake UF diploma on the opposite page. It
should not be this easy – this has to be outlawed!
How Do I Recognize a Fake School?
Or, how do I determine if a website is an Axact fake school? All Axact fake school
websites look professional and feature stock photographs, student models, great
looking campuses, impressive looking buildings, which may have even been lifted
from structures from your campus), and fantastic graphics. However, they also have
certain traits in common.
I have discussed tell-tale signs of an Axact school in this article, from common-
alities to red flag warning signs (Ezell & Bear, n.d.; Saidi-Kuehnert, 2020), to pro-
tect both yourself and your employer. Please take a few minutes and look at several
known Axact fake school websites, get familiar with their flow, layout, word usage,
and the verbosity of it all. The Axact Red Flag List contains false or erroneous state-
ments about various areas of falsity. Probably the most egregious, and most obvious
red flag is the claim of being open 24/7. No legitimate university is staffed 24/7 for
callers!
Domain name lookup is the most basic of the internet research tools for you to
use. That will be the foundation upon which you will build upon. You can also try
reverse IP lookup, internet archive, reverse image service; reverse information
search, and street and /or satellite view. Always start with searching the domain
name to determine the date this web site was registered, by whom, and the country
involved. Is the actual registrant data is hidden under a privacy umbrella, or do you
have an honest to goodness name of a real registrant? Today, Axact appears to be
using web hosting entities in Iceland, The Netherlands, Russia, and others.
Now look at the web site in question. Look at the number of faculty members,
number of current students, number of alumni, data regarding successful graduates.
Does this correlate with the date this site was registered? Are they open and invite
you to call 24/7? If yes, you may have your answer already. Does the site give you
an address for the school, if so, reverse it on the Internet and determine what is
really at that address? If a telephone number is shown, reverse this also. Sometimes,
you will find a New York City or Washington, DC, telephone number listed for the
legal office of a school or supposed accreditor, located three thousand miles away.
84 A. Ezell
Does this make sense to you? For accreditation you will probably find 1–20 accredi-
tors listed. Overkill? Certainly. Make sense to you? Search each of the listed accred-
itors and see what other schools they accredit. Reverse any address or telephone
number given. Do a general search on the Internet for both the schools and the listed
accreditors for overall general knowledge and posted complaints! Now, step back
and look at the totality of everything you have seen. Does this make any sense to
you? Is it just too good? Use your experience along with the Axact Red Flag List.
Notice the website flow. Note the web extension, the school’s name and address
if any, about us, why chose us, mission and vision, campus buildings, president’s
message, global presence, ‘accreditation’, tuition, scholarships, referral program,
and brochures if any. Are samples of diploma, transcript and verification letter
offered? Are the various schools listed? Look at the age of the school – are there just
too many degree programs offered and services? Look at some of the examples in
the Appendix.
Axact only says it does things on a grandiose scale, no matter what it is concern-
ing. With its fake school, always look for the schools ranking on the site. Hardly is
anything other than #1 or #2. Axact verbosity exists both in their graphics and the
written word – you will recognize it when you see it. There will be grandiose claims
about the university’s global ranking, faculty qualifications, graduate earnings,
credibility, accreditation, and size. If you encounter any of these statements, or simi-
lar, then welcome to the world of Axact!
Axact has created thousands of fake accreditation mills purported to be in the
Middle East, Gulf Region, and United States (many dressed up in red, white, and
blue colors, and displaying the American flag, or a picture of the Capitol), and else-
where to support and legitimize these fake schools. Many people especially people
new to the Internet and on-line learning, do not realize that fake accreditation mills
exist, that everything they see may not be real, or legitimate. I have observed some
of the finest graphics I have ever seen on some of these websites, which can also
serve as a red flag on the site during your evaluation. It’s just too good!
Examples of Fake Schools
Below are several Axact universities, some old, some medium age, and some new.
Closely examine each of these. Look for the unusual word combinations, misspell-
ings, anything that stands out to you as unusual, or odd– then search it. What do you
think? Some surprises await you but look carefully at all you are presented. Please
use the Axact Red Flag List derived from review of hundreds of Axact fake school
sites and as a check sheet during your reviews. Don’t forget to search all telephone
numbers to see if being used by other schools. See examples Gatesville University
(http://www.gatesvilleuniversity.com/), Sangonio University (https://www.
su.education/), Olford Mount University (https://www.omu.education/), Washington
Bridge University (https://www.wbu.education/), City University of New Orleans
(https://www.cuno.education/), Victorville Park University (https://www.vpu.
education/sample/documents/), and McAllen Fort University (https://www.mafu.

education/) Hint-read the accreditation page (https://www.mafu.education/about-
us/accreditation/). There is nothing like a ‘proficient faculty.’
There is also the use of third-party websites to solicit sales, wherein the buyer
has no idea which school they will get in the return mail. Some of these are Ashwood
University, Belford University and Rochville University, Corllins University, and
Rochville University (see http://www.universaldegrees.com/).
Please understand, there is no master list of all Axact thousands of web sites over
the past 24 years, outside of Axact’s internal records. Only Axact knows the true
number of fake schools, accreditors, and enablers they have. I know of at least 62
web sites which I believe to have been registered by Axact in 2021(19), 2020 (24),
2019 (19), and 2018 (24). This includes both fake universities, accrediting entities,
and landing pages. These are just the ones I know of. I am certain there are hundreds
more. Look at some, if not all of these fake universities. Many of these websites
have been mentioned in this chapter, see also the photographs in the Appendix.
Increase your level of knowledge in this area. This is why tracing is so important to
increase your knowledge. Sometimes, you will be surprised!
Given Axact’s volume of fakes on the market, you will most likely encounter its
fake schools in your work life. Make copies of the Red Flag Lists and use accord-
ingly, to protect yourself and your company! The original 71 Axact List and the
general 92 Red Flag List are available online (Ezell & Bear, n.d.). Also posted there
is the investigative report and final charge sheet as filed in the Pakistan Courts by the
FIA. This document is a treasure trove of information on Axact’s fraud and its
schools, etc.
The Value of the Written Word
I cannot over emphasize the value of the written word as will be discussed below,
not only as reference material, but also for people worldwide who may be currently
employed in criminal organizations, want to get out, and are looking for a way out,
someone to contact. This has been the case with Axact articles, TV programs, webi-
nars, speeches, etc. Trust me!
This article is noteworthy here, Resume Ruse: The Use of False Academic
Credentials in Employment (Adams, 2017). Resume fraud, employment application
fraud, and embellishments in prior positions with education leading the pack. It is
all around us if we just look. Only a close review of the application, claimed educa-
tion, or review of any documents submitted will protect the employer, or educa-
tional institution. Normally, the slogan is ‘Caveat Emptor,’ or ‘buyer
beware’, however, when we have people using these fake credentials in the medical
field, even posing as physicians, even in our hospitals, its patient’s cave.
Congratulations to Mrs. Emily Smith CJE, Journalism and English teacher, and
advisor to the school newspaper, and to the ‘Pitt 6’ student reporters, Pittsburg High
School, Pittsburg, Kansas! In early 2017, the principal of Pittsburg High School,
86 A. Ezell
Pittsburgh, Kansas left the position to assume his new duties at another school. The
Board of Education began their search for a new principal. This was during the
COVID-19 period, several individuals applied, and the Board felt that applicant, Dr.
Amy Robertson, then living in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), was highly
qualified and the best candidate for the $93,000 USD salary job.
Superintendent Destry Brown, United School District 250 School Board, said
Robertson was the most qualified, was not interviewed in person (at best was inter-
viewed via the Internet), but they had reviewed her credentials, then at their March
6, 2017, board meeting, offered her this new position, with several conditions (take
several classes and obtain her Kansas administrator’s license). Dr. Robertson
accepted her new position.
Mrs. Emily Smith, CJE, is the Advisor for the school newspaper, The Booster
Redux which is circulated both inside the school and in the local community. Her six
student reporters are (all juniors except, Trina Paul): Gina Mathew, Kali Poenitske,
Maddie Baden, Trina Paul (Senior), Connor Bathazor and Patrick Sullivan, then
began preparations for a story to welcome the new inbound principal to their school.
They began examining these items the administration would allow them to see.
Robinson claimed several degrees including those from the University of Tulsa, two
from the University of Illinois – Urbana Champaign, and her Doctorate from
Corllins University, Stockton, CA. Brown had claimed Robertson’s credentials had
been evaluated by the Kansas State Bord of Education and verified.
When the students searched the Internet regarding her doctorate degree from
Corllins University, they located the article I had written in the Fall 2019, edition of
the College and University Journal for AACRAO (Ezell, 2009) titled Recent
Developments with Degree Mills: Accreditation Mills and Counterfeit Diploma and
Transcript Operations (see pp. 42–43 for a list of 50 newer diploma mills, which
includes #17, Corllins University). Mrs. Smith advised my article became the foun-
dation of their story. With this tidbit of information, they dug further into the valid-
ity of her credentials. Officials at the University of Tulsa advised they could not
confirm Robertson’s degree. Officials at the University of Illinois were able to ver-
ify one of Robertson’s two degrees, however, were unable to verify the second one
(Robertson was also unable to produce this diploma). Robertson also could not
furnish her diploma from University of Tulsa). Further, I do not believe UI-UC even
offers the major Robertson claims for the second supposed degree.
At the same time, the more the reporters dug into her credentials, the more ques-
tions they had. Brown still defended her, as he always had, telling the reporters not
to worry, everything was in order (basically, find something else to do), but he
granted their request to speak to her on Zoom; however, he decided he would be the
interviewer and would ask all the written questions from the student reporters ask-
ing the questions the reporters gave him. The interview went forward under these
rules. Based on her answers, when all the dust settled, the reporters still had more
questions and doubted her veracity. They reviewed all their facts with their Advisor,
and several outside professionals, to determine if they had sufficient evidence for
their story. The rest is history. Their story, “District Hires New Principal”, was front
page news in the school paper, The Booster Redux”, (informally known as, ‘The
Boos’) (The Booster Redux Staff, 2017). Soon, the story went viral. The phones at
the school were ringing off the hook – calls from news outlets all over the country,
even abroad, everybody wanting interviews. Brown continued to defend Robertson,
which prompted the student journalists to write a further editorial (Herbert, 2017).
A special board meeting was called (with closed session) for April 4, 2017, after
which Brown announced Robinson had resigned her new position. She may well
have been fired behind closed doors, who knows. Some parents even called for
Brown to resign.
The Pitt 6 received world-wide fame for their job well done. The Huffington Post
invited them on a trip to Washington, DC, a tour of Washington, then they were the
guests of the Huffington Post at the White House Correspondents’ Association
Annual Dinner on April 29, 2017. During this dinner, the Pitt 6 were acknowledged
from the podium, then they all stood with their advisor and received a round of
applause from the 2600 notables in attendance. They truly earned this recognition!
Trends in Axact’s New Fake Universities
As I conduct research for this chapter, I have observed several new trends in Axact
fake schools. I have encountered several fake universities which no longer show
pictures of a campus, majestic buildings, tall old trees, or students all about.
Most sites previously had a COVID-19 warning (to blend in with real schools),
and as of 2021 show statements about their COVID restrictions no longer in force.
For example, “Congratulations Ban Has Been Lifted” is written right above the “Joe
Biden’s Scholarship Program and Notice” (California Imperial University, n.d.).
In addition, I have also observed several examples (https://www.wbu.education/;
https://www.ouc.education/; https://www.ciu.education/; https://www.fbu.educa-
tion/), Washington Bridge University (WBU), Oxnard University of California aka
Oxnard University (OU), and California Imperial University (CIU), which each
reflect different addresses and telephone numbers for their university. WBU, a
Corporate administrative office, research extension center, and IT team and compli-
ance offices, 127 miles apart on farthest. WBU is 1869 and 3119 miles apart from
the student headquarters and deans’ office to its registrar’s administration office and
its IT department and student affairs office. With CIU, they have a corporate admin-
istrative office; research center and extension center, and IT and compliance depart-
ment and only 127 miles apart at farthest. I find this very strange, instead of these
schools blending in, they are standing out! At the same time that I located Florida
Beach University at Tampa, Fl and Brawley, CA inside Brawley Auto Lube &
Service (see section Let’s Take a Tour of Your ‘University’), I located OU at Abassis
Used Cars Dealership in San Diego, CA. Nothing like tracing!
88 A. Ezell
Personal Message to Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh
I have read some of your recent remarks regarding the prosecution of the Axact
case, and against you. Yes, it is personal. Exactly what does “circumstances of
Karachi” mean? Yes, you are a hardened criminal as the prosecutors stated, then you
(or your enablers) tried to re-educate them or offered counseling on the case. I won-
der if you even have any professional conduct yourself as you talk about others. As
you know all too well, Axact/BOL/ Crest Tower are in fact dirty (like black money),
they are not clean! How does what you have done for the last 24 years stack up
against the tenants of Islam in the Quran? Certainly not from what I have read. Like
you have said, let the music play. I say the same thing, by saying, may true justice
prevail. May you reap all you and your subordinates have sown for 24 years!
Game on!
Tomorrow and Axact
Society places a high value on academic credentials today. It takes these credentials
to get the interview, the job offer, and to retain a position once hired. Since these
academic documents are valued so highly, in the absence of tough state and national
laws, with rigorous enforcement, and sentences with teeth in them (imprisonment),
moving forward I predict it will be business as usual with diploma mills and accom-
panying accreditation mills flourishing. I know of no move afoot on Capitol Hill to
create a national law outlawing all forms of academic fraud. The more society and
the business world value these items, the more reason for some nefarious person to
fill this need. It is just the basic issue of supply and demand.
And then we have Axact/Crest Tower. Regrettably, I believe this criminal enter-
prise will continue to operate in Pakistan, selling their fraudulent academic creden-
tials worldwide as long as the Pakistan Government, including the Pakistan Army
and the ISI supports and enables them in their fraudulent activities. Even though
Axact’s activities are totally against the Quran, there has been no groundswell from
religious circles, nor the Government, to exterminate Axact and Shoaib Ahmed
Sheikh! Until the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and its leadership is so embarrassed
and will not tolerate the further denigration of the good name and honor of the coun-
try of Pakistan, and its religion, it will continue. Various Pakistani leaders speak of
how Pakistan’s honour is supreme, but apparently have no teeth nor enforcement
behind their words. Given all the above, I have to wonder what words will be on the
tombstone of Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh, perhaps: “here lies a man who defrauded over
eight million persons worldwide of millions of dollars through fraud, lies, deceit,
and extortion!”
Note. All Axact-related websites cited in-text and below have been archived on
the Wayback Machine (https://web.archive.org/), due to the shifting nature of their
online presence. At the time of writing, some websites listed in-text were no longer
available online, including on the Wayback Machine.
Appendix
Photographs accompanying the tour of Axact

90 A. Ezell
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investigators-raid-offices-of-axact-fake-diploma-company.html
Internet Reputation. (n.d.) Online reputation management solutions. Retrieved December 16, 2021,
from https://web.archive.org/web/20211216182902/https://www.internetreputation.com/
Leeds, S. (2015, September 22). Available now: ‘Stephen Colbert’s totally legitimate online Ph.D
program’. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-SEB-91111
News Desk. (2021, August 22). Couple shot dead in Karachi, The Correspondent PK. https://www.
thecorrespondent.pk/2021/08/22/honour-killing-couple-shot-dead-in-karachi/
Obaid-Chinoy, S. (Director). (2015). A girl in the river: The price of forgiveness. SOC Films; HBO
Documentary Films.
Palmer, G. (2015, May 17). Tracking Axact’s websites. New York Times.. https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/05/17/world/asia/tracking-axacts-websites.html.
PTI. (2018, January 19). Pakistan Supreme Court calls fake degrees scandal a
‘national shame’. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/pakistan/
pakistan-supreme-court-calls-fake-degrees-scandal-a-national-shame-5031488/
Saidi-Kuehnert, J. (2020, June 12). How to spot fake online programs: Highlights
of June 10, 2020 webinar. ACEI-Global. https://acei-global.blog/2020/06/12/
how-to-spot-fake-online-programs-highlights-of-june-10-2020-webinar/
Szeto, E., & Vellani, N. (2017a, September 10). All of us can be harmed': Investigation reveals
hundreds of Canadians have phoney degrees. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
diploma-mills-marketplace-fake-degrees-1.4279513
Szeto, E., & Vellani, N. (2017b, September 16). 1,000% unacceptable: Marketplace confronts
college professor about his fake degree. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/
marketplace-diploma-mills-degrees-professor-1.4291437
The Booster Redux Staff. (2017, June 14). District hires new principal. The Booster Redux. https://
www.boosterredux.com/news/2017/06/14/district-hires-new-principal/
The Editorial Board. (2015, May 20). A rising tide of bogus degrees. The New York Times. https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/20/opinion/a-rising-tide-of-bogus-degrees.html
Unaiza, K. (2008, January 1). Unveiling operations of a local software house. http://karachi.met-
blogs.com/2008/01/01/unveiling-operations-of-a-local-software-house/
Walker, P. (2011, June 24). The world’s most dangerous borders. Foreign Policy. https://foreign-
policy.com/2011/06/24/the-worlds-most-dangerous-borders/
Walsh, D. (2015a, May 18). Fake diplomas, real cash: Pakistani company Axact reaps millions.
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/world/asia/fake-diplomas-real-cash-
pakistani-company-axact-reaps-millions-columbiana-barkley.html
Walsh, D. (2015b, May 20). Big money, phony diplomas: Reporter’s notebook. New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/times-insider/2015/05/20/big-money-phony-diplomas-reporters-
notebook/
Yousafzai, M., & Lamb, C. (2013). I am Malala: The girl who stood up for education and was shot
by the Taliban. Little, Brown.
94 A. Ezell
Allen Ezell, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (Retired), has investigated
diploma mills and other aspects of academic crime for over 40 years. As an FBI Agent, he handled
and supervised the FBI’s investigations into diploma mills (Operation ‘Dipscam’) for 11 years
throughout the United States. Upon his retirement from the FBI after 31 years, he began a 19-year
career in banking on the fraud side, and did consulting work in academic fraud, thus continued
investigating diploma mills, accreditation mills, and counterfeit diploma and transcript operations.
He co-authored two books with Dr. John Bear, titled Degree Mills: The Billion-Dollar Industry
That Has Sold Over a Million Fake Diplomas, and authored two AACRAO books, Accreditation
Mills and Counterfeit Diplomas and Transcripts, in addition to writing dozens of articles. He has
testified as an expert witness on diploma mills, made numerous presentations, and testified before
a Congressional Subcommittee regarding diploma mills.
Allen Ezell has many back-dated high school and college diplomas, including a high school
diploma from Belford High School; an MBA from Suffield University; two bachelor’s diplomas
from Hill University, and three PhD diplomas from Almeda University and Gatesville University.
He has been offered hundreds of diplomas from various universities over the past 41 years, includ-
ing recently an MBA from Manhattan Bay University, with office in the Empire State Building,
NYC. All the above resulted in over two hundred telephone calls and emails with Axact personnel
and related individuals.
Chapter 4
Bridging to Tomorrow: A Historical
and Technological Review of Credential
Exchange in Higher Education Within
Canada
Joanne Duklas
Abstract Canadian higher education assessment practices for admission and trans-
fer are contextually situated in that they are informed and influenced by local gov-
ernment legislation and binding policy directives, quality assurance frameworks,
and institutional policies and procedures within colleges and universities. The
opportunity exists to embrace this diversity in all its complexity while providing
system level technical supports to aid quality assured assessment practices. This
opportunity is readily apparent in the area of document and credential delivery. The
dual goals of facilitating learner mobility and reducing document fraud are being
supported by existing and emerging technology which is in turn helping to evolve
quality assured credential recognition assessment and document handling practices.
The case for change is clear. The research in one study cited below indicates of 2.6
million background checks found, over 40% respectively exhibited evidence of lies
about work history and education achieved, and more than 20% presented false
credentials and licenses (Babcock, 2003). Another organization found more than
40% of CVs had education discrepancies, a 7% increase from the prior year
(Prospects HEDD, 2017).
Digitization and technology have improved electronic exchange practices in the
areas of document and data management and reduced occurrences of fraud thereby
encouraging greater trust in the verification and assessment process for admission
and transfer. This chapter explores the history and identifies how available and
emerging technology at the system level is resulting in new opportunities to collabo-
rate and address document fraud for colleges and universities using innovative
technology.
J. Duklas (*)
Duklas Cornerstone Consulting Inc, Georgetown, ON, Canada
e-mail: joanne@duklascornerstone.ca

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_4
96 J. Duklas
Keywords Credential assessment · Digitization · Canada · Higher education
Introduction
While advancements exist in Canada and beyond with sharing of official digitized
documents and data as an aid to mitigate fraud as illustrated by the emergence of the
national MyCreds™ | MesCertif™ document exchange network described later in
this report, a significant number of colleges and institutions still rely on credentials
handed in by students, provided in sealed envelopes that are ostensibly from col-
leges or universities, or sent as unsecure attachments by email. The COVID pan-
demic has helped to illustrate that relying on these methods no longer works for
staff and faculty who have had difficulties accessing campuses to fulfill official
document requests or receive documents from learners. This situation exists even
within regions with centralized application centres and transcript exchange hubs.
A specific objective of this research was to outline the history of electronic docu-
ment exchange in Canada supporting admission and transfer and to identify how
technology, when used effectively at the system level within higher education, is
providing a better model for trusted capture, exchange, and recognition of docu-
ments and prior studies.1 These approaches are helping to mitigate the prevalence of
document fraud.
Notable improvements have emerged in the last few decades since the early
1970s and more rapidly in the last two. Scalable, modern, and trusted supports for
large scale student data management have been developed that together and sepa-
rately enhance credential recognition practices both nationally and internationally
and mitigate fraud. Many of these solutions are offered at the provincial/state,
national, or trans-national level, highlighting the value of shared services and sys-
tem level supports for colleges and universities. These new methods provide greater
capacity for colleges and universities to receive and send digitized documents and
their underlying data at scale with trusted organizations (e.g., government, employ-
ers, other institutions) with permission of the learner. Many of these solutions seek
to address growing document fraud challenges, create efficiencies, support increas-
ingly rigorous privacy regulations, and address intensified pressures to advance
speed and quality of service to learners. Technology and digitization advancements
serve as important enablers, contributing to trusted recognition and exchange prac-
tices in the areas of academic document and data digitization and exchange.
This chapter includes five sections. Section one introduces the topic and section
two provides a history of national and international document digitization and
exchange organizations. Section three identifies typical adoption challenges fol-
lowed by Section four which provides examples of the way trust is ensured in
1
Although technology is referenced and described in this chapter as are specific exemplars, a tech-
nical analysis of different technology infrastructures such as blockchain is not the focus.
4 Bridging to Tomorrow: A Historical and Technological Review of Credential… 97
documents used for academic credential assessment. The final section summarizes
concluding thoughts and recommends potential future research.
Exemplars are highlighted briefly in Section two. When employed effectively at
the system level, technology options that integrate with local student information
systems are leading to significant advancements in trusted document sharing. These
shared service options are solidifying the essential role document issuing organiza-
tions and technology play in mitigating fraudulent practices and supporting learners.
Relevancy of Work
This work is original and significant from two key perspectives: (i) research on
Canada’s history with electronic document and data exchange to support higher
education is limited, and (ii) document fraud appears to be growing in the higher
education field, both within and beyond Canada, requiring more focused attention
on this area (Gondyke, 2021). One trade organization, ADP Screening and Selection
Services, analyzed 2.6 million background checks and found 44% lied about work
history and 41% about education achieved, and 23% presented false credentials and
licenses (Babcock, 2003). Another organization called the Risk Advisory Group
found that 44% of CVs had education discrepancies which represented a 7%
increase from the prior year (Prospects HEDD, 2017). Yet another UK study of
55,400 CVs found 15% had falsified education credentials (Creedence Background
Screening, 2019). The case for change is clear.
Research Approach
This chapter research is based on interviews with experts in the field, a review of
scholarly and trade literature and websites from organizations that provide docu-
ment issuing and data exchange support or who are active in the field of trusted
document exchange. The interviews (N = 5) were informed by a structured question
set with findings noted in the body of the report.2 National surveys, studies, and
white papers on this topic were previously authored or edited by this author. These
published materials serve as additional findings to support this research (Duklas,
2017, 2019a, b, 2020; Duklas & Schatzman, 2021).
2
The interview guide is available upon request from the author.
98 J. Duklas
Report Definitions
As the paper contains references to terms that might be foreign to the reader, the
most relevant ones are noted here to aid in the further review of this chapter.
Blockchain: “[A] shared, immutable ledger that facilitates the process of record-
ing transactions and tracking assets in a business network. An asset can be tangible
(a house, car, cash, land) or intangible (intellectual property, patents, copyrights,
branding)” (IBM, n.d.).
“[D]ata in a blockchain are recorded in a decentralised and distributed manner.
This means that they are recorded at the same time on all servers across an entire
network following an algorithmic process between the servers who jointly agree on
updating the database. This consensus process leads to the validation of data if cer-
tain formal requirements are met” (European Commission, 2021).
Digital Identity:
“[T]he foundation of the way that we express information about ourselves online
to facilitate data sharing and communication between different parties. Many differ-
ent technologies are used in the context of digital identity solutions, including an
emerging set of technologies known as decentralized identity.…Decentralized iden-
tity uses cryptography to allow individuals to create and control their own unique
identifiers. They can use these identifiers to obtain Verifiable Credentials from
trusted organizations and, subsequently, present elements of these credentials as
proof of claims about themselves. In this model, the individual takes ownership of
their own identity and need not cede control to centralized service providers or
companies” (MATTR Global, 2021).
Distributed Identifiers (DIDs):
“[A] new type of identifier that enables verifiable, decentralized digital identity.
A DID refers to any subject (e.g., a person, organization, thing, data model, abstract
entity, etc.) as determined by the controller of the DID. In contrast to typical, feder-
ated identifiers, DIDs have been designed so that they may be decoupled from cen-
tralized registries, identity providers, and certificate authorities. Specifically, while
other parties might be used to help enable the discovery of information related to a
DID, the design enables the controller of a DID to prove control over it without
requiring permission from any other party. DIDs are URIs that associate a DID
subject with a DID document allowing trustable interactions associated with that
subject” (W3C.org, 2021).
Interoperability:
“[T]he quick and easy transfer of data between systems via a common set of data
standards (definitions, codes, and technical specifications) (National Centre for
Education Statistics, 2010, as cited in Collins et al., 2007). Interoperability begins
with compatible software and hardware technology, but it does not end there.
Effective interoperability also requires significant changes in how organizations
work and, especially, in their attitudes toward information. Policymakers and data
system managers need to work together to ensure that the systems, procedures and
culture of an organization maximize opportunities for exchange and reuse of infor-

mation, internally or externally” (Collins et al., 2007, p. 2).
Portability: “[T]he ability to exchange student record and transcript information
electronically from system to system, across districts, and between P–12 and post-
secondary institutes – within a state and across states” (Collins et al., 2007, p. 2).
Recognition: “A formal acknowledgement by a competent authority of the value
of a foreign educational qualification with a view to access to educational and/or
employment activities” (Council of Europe, 1997a, p. 4).
Self-sovereign Identity (SSI):
“[A] term used to describe the digital movement that recognizes an individual
should own and control their identity without the intervening administrative author-
ities. SSI allows people to interact in the digital world with the same freedom and
capacity for trust as they do in the offline world” (Sovrin Foundation, 2018).
Verifiable Credentials:
“[C]an represent all of the same information that a physical credential represents.
The addition of technologies, such as digital signatures, makes verifiable credentials
more tamper-evident and more trustworthy than their physical counterparts….
Holders of verifiable credentials can generate verifiable presentations and then
share these verifiable presentations with verifiers to prove they possess verifiable
credentials with certain characteristics….Both verifiable credentials and verifiable
presentations can be transmitted rapidly, making them more convenient than their
physical counterparts when trying to establish trust at a distance” (W3C.org, 2019).
Context for Document Issuing
Overview
Previous Canadian research explored assessment practices for admission and trans-
fer and noted the importance of identifying if academic documents are official,
originate from an official source, and arrive via a trusted channel (Duklas, 2020,
p. 15). At the present time and despite technological and document digitization
advances, this early research found that regulatory bodies, colleges, universities,
and employers still rely on manual document submission methods for both sending
and receiving. Examples include requiring students submit documents in sealed
envelopes or send official documents as email attachments or by mail. These are
ineffective approaches in today’s world of technology given the ease with which
people can copy and reproduce camera ready transcripts, parchments, and other
documentation. They are also not sustainable in times of crisis.
The COVID-19 pandemic presented tremendous challenges for students and for
higher education staff who were unable to attend campuses to prepare, send, or
receive and assess paper transcripts, parchments, and other documents (Statistics
Canada, May 2020; ARUCC, 2020a, b). Even if an institution stores their academic
100 J. Duklas
data electronically, that does not mean they can access a human readable view easily
and share it through secure, electronic means with another party. This requires col-
leges and universities to adopt modern document and data exchange supports to
enhance recognition and assessment practices. Doing so will improve service deliv-
ery to learners and reduce instances of document fraud.
Canadian higher education assessment practices for admission and transfer are
situated within broader domestic and international contexts. Practices are shaped
and informed by diverse political scaffolding and privacy regulations across and
beyond 13 different provinces and territories and global conventions including the
Lisbon Recognition Convention (CICIC, 1990–2021a; Council of Europe, 1997b)
and the newly adopted Global Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications
(UNESCO, 2021). In recognition of this complexity, supporting technology solu-
tions need to align with quality assured standards for recognition and institutional
practices for credential assessment.
To improve document sharing and mitigate fraud, colleges and universities need
to consider the technology infrastructure used internally to capture and curate pro-
gression information, policies, and academic decisions of faculty, and to manage the
student records. These institutions have adopted different document and data
exchange standards, systems, and/or have different technical capacities and
resources available to affect change. A 2019 national study conducted by this author
highlighted the diversity that exists (Duklas, 2019a). Very solid principles govern-
ing technology opportunities like blockchain, one of the ways in which institutions
are exploring document sharing, have merit and value (MATTR Global, 2020), as
do the existing document issuing providers that use various technologies to improve
fraud free document sharing.
The challenge facing institutions is to bridge existing technical environments to
new technologies and partners. They must consider costs and available resources,
and the potential implications for their academic mission, policies, and practices.
The ability to deal with highly structured datasets like transcripts and ensuring con-
nectivity that embraces sharing of documents and underlying data at scale also
require careful consideration. Further, simply moving from one enterprise student
information system to another is not easy, takes significant time and resources, and
may not necessarily be the best viable option at a given point in time. These are
enterprise wide systems; any change presents large scale implications for their insti-
tutions. This pragmatic reality requires advancements in electronic trusted docu-
ment and data exchange that must consider bridging the current state to future
opportunities to advance rapid adoption. Colleges and universities could share aca-
demic data and documents between different technology stacks that operate using
varying standards or versions without causing massively disruptive system changes.
Successful implementation requires attention to interoperability and standards for
data exchange.
Several examples exist of domestic and international efforts to improve trusted
academic document exchange. This chapter highlights select ones to illustrate the
complexities and opportunities when seeking to improve official digitized docu-
ment exchange to enhance admission and transfer and reduce fraud.
International Context
The European Commission has conducted extensive research on ways to improve

document data sharing and exchange. The new Europass, a electronic passport by
which learners can present their comprehensive digital identity and educational out-
comes, represents a recent example (European Union, n.d.). The Commission and
the European Blockchain Partnership have created the European Blockchain
Services Infrastructure (EBSI) to advance standards and interoperability across
Europe which has relevance for the Europass and other providers that wish to con-
nect with European document issuing providers (European Commission, n.d.-b).
The European approach places the rights of the individual at the centre of any docu-
ment exchange infrastructure in accordance with privacy regulations and conven-
tions such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European
Commission, n.d.-a) and the Global Convention.
From 2018 to 2020, the European Union and other partners including the Council
of Ministers of Education, Canada through its coordinating body, the Canadian
Information Centre for International Credentials (CICIC), supported the DigiRec
project which directly examined “the relationship between digital student data and
the recognition of foreign credentials” (NUFFIC, n.d.). The subsequent white paper
outlines recommendations that “create a broader understanding in the networks
about the effects of digitization on their work; offer new policy perspectives, practi-
cal recommendations and guidelines; [and] support individual centres and the net-
works to develop policies” (NUFFIC, 2020). Sample recommendations include
ensuring official verification of document sources and distribution channels, advanc-
ing digitization practices, and considering alternate practices given that not all issu-
ers have yet adopted digitization (NUFFIC, 2020, pp. 43–45).
In my previous research, I curated a sampling of national level credential
exchange and document validation providers, which has expanded since publication
(Duklas, 2020, p. 14). Until recently, an online inventory of trusted document issu-
ing providers did not exist to guide policy developers and practitioners when assess-
ing documents during the admission and transfer process. Recently, the Groningen
Declaration Network (GDN) launched an award winning, one stop environment
called the GDN T.R.U.S.T. Hub (Groningen Declaration Network, 2021). It pro-
vides a comprehensive summary of the various document issuing organizations
available to support colleges, universities, governments, and employers with docu-
ment verification. Each organization in the GDN T.R.U.S.T. Hub has been vetted to
ensure they are recognized providers of academic credentials for colleges and uni-
versities and have agreed to uphold the principles of the Groningen Declaration
Network (Groningen Declaration Network, 2015). These include a commitment to
privacy and security, student centred practices, transparency and responsibility,
interoperability, openness, freedom to choose delivery options for student records
and data, integrity, diversity, respect of the law, auditability, good fellowship, and
access, particularly for institutions and students.
102 J. Duklas
Established in 1997, the American-based Postsecondary Electronic Standards

Council (PESC) is an international non-profit umbrella organization with member-
ship drawn from post-secondary institutions, government, standards bodies, and
other associations around the world (Postsecondary Electronic Standards Council,
1997). PESC “leads in the establishment and adoption of trusted, free and open data
standards across the education domain by serving as an open standards-development
and open standards-setting body producing PESC APPROVED STANDARDS”
(1997). This organization has significantly advanced open data standards to aid
electronic sharing of official student documents and data.
IMS Global represents another non-profit organization that is supporting interop-
erability and open standards (IMS Global Learning Consortium, 2001–2021a) by
“enhancing the standards to facilitate the exchange of information about learning
and education competencies and skills” (2001–2021b). It focuses on comprehensive
learner records, badging, and other related initiatives.
Several other standards and standard bodies across the world are influencing the
direction of electronic document sharing and exchange. The W3C Consortium is
pursuing standards to support academic credential exchange. This group is seeking
to standardize a globally recognized exchange format for Verifiable Credentials
(W3C.org, 2019), an effort that is directly relevant to advancing electronic docu-
ment sharing for Canadian colleges and universities.
The T3 Innovation Network is focusing on emerging technologies that support
creating better ways for learners to communicate what they know and can do for
future employers through a single comprehensive learner record (T3 Innovation
Network, n.d.). The IEEE Standards Organization is building consensus around nur-
turing and evolving new technologies with members who are actively pursuing
advancements for academic credential sharing (IEEE Standards Organization, 2021).
These various initiatives and more create for a confusing array of actors and pos-
sibilities for colleges and universities. However, it is important to remember that
one of the key components is to ensure a learner can obtain their official results from
their original institution and securely and efficiently send these results to a third
party (e.g., another school, government, an employer) with trust assured. As col-
leges and universities deal with high volumes of requests, receiving and sharing of
these results must be in a format to allow exchange at scale and with trust assured.
Further, the data must be in a format that aligns with standards that support interop-
erability. Lastly, to ensure rapid adoption, institutions need to align new opportuni-
ties to their existing technology, policy, and compliance and regulatory context.
Helping them bridge the realities of today to the opportunities of tomorrow repre-
sents a critical focus area to encourage more rapid change and adoption.
Canadian Context
Canadian colleges and universities actively collaborate to improve official academic

document exchange and assessment practices through the Association of Registrars
of the Universities and Colleges of Canada (ARUCC). Its work is guided by its
college and institutional members who are in turn subject to institutional policies
and government regulations. These practitioners and policy developers rely heavily
on external resources and tools to support their document management and assess-
ment practice. An example is the Pan-Canadian Quality Assurance Framework for
the Assessment of International Academic Credentials (QAF) created by the Council
of Ministers of Education, Canada (CICIC, 1990–2021b, 2016). It provides princi-
ples to guide assessment practice.
PESC serves an important place in the Canadian document exchange ecosystem.
A 2019 study included findings from a national survey of colleges and universities
that identified document sharing and exchange practices (Duklas, 2019a).
Approximately one third of Canadian institutions at the time of that research had
adopted PESC’s data exchange standards (called PESC XML) to support receiving
and sending of electronic student record data, a situation that has likely grown.
Adopting shared data exchange standards enables trusted, peer-to-peer (e.g., univer-
sity to university, college to transcript exchange hub, etc.) interoperability and por-
tability of the electronic data underlying official documents between organizations
and technology platforms. Several provincial transcript and application centres have
established this capacity through shared services infrastructure without compromis-
ing or adjusting the quality or customized content within the student record. This
means the data cannot be altered in transmission by the learners, ensuring a trusted
exchange occurs. To advance its work regionally, PESC is supported in Canada by
a user community called the Canadian Postsecondary Electronic Standards Council
User Group (CanPESC User Group) (Postsecondary Electronic Standards
Council, n.d.).
Canadian provinces have a long history of supporting data sharing for admission
applications and transcripts. At least 11 organizations transmit electronic learner
data to Canadian colleges and universities (two since the early 70s) across six of the
13 provinces and territories. As the longest standing example, the Ontario
Universities’ Application Centre (OUAC) represents a collaboration that began in
the early 70s as a centralized application service (Ontario Universities’ Application
Centre, 2021). In the late 90s, it evolved to collecting and distributing transcripts,
transmitting results from Quebec’s Collège d’enseignement général et profession-
nel (College of General and Vocational Education), and receiving British Columbia
high school results from the BC Ministry of Education. In 2004, it expanded to
include exchange of electronic transcripts with the Ontario college application ser-
vice (called OCAS) and BC post-secondary transcripts. According to the OUAC
website, 2.7 million transcripts between November 1996 and January 2021 were
processed electronically and 789,000 applications are processed annually (2021).
They were followed closely by Quebec’s Service régional d’admission du Montréal
métropolitain (SRAM) which was founded in 1973, a year after OUAC was formed
(SRAM, n.d.).
Other providers include ministries in select provinces that deliver electronic high
school results. Still others include the Alberta Post-Secondary Application System
which began in the mid-2000s (2020); the previously mentioned OCAS, the Ontario
college service provider (OCAS, 2021); the Council on Admission and Transfer for
104 J. Duklas
Nova Scotia Inc. (formerly named the Nova Scotia Council on Admission and
Transfer since 2016 and incorporated in 2021); EducationPlannerBC
(EducationPlannerBC, 2021); Bureau de coopération interuniversitaire (Bureau de
coopération interuniversitaire, 2021); Service régional d’admission au collégial de
Québec (SRACQ) (SRACQ, 2021); and a third Quebec CEGEP application centre.
Despite these supports, an extensive 2018/19 consultation, national survey, and
subsequent study funded by two provincial organizations and led by the national
registrars’ association (ARUCC) found significantly uneven capacities and docu-
ment sharing gaps within and across select provinces and territories (Duklas,
2019a). Examples included non-existent or limited intra- and inter-provincial docu-
ment exchange supports and connectivity between institutions and with regulatory
bodies, government, and employers. At that time, a single national document shar-
ing and exchange environment for higher education that crossed all use cases from
admissions through to and beyond graduation did not exist within any of the prov-
inces or territories. As a result, service was uneven for inbound, current, and out-
bound domestic and international students. This situation continues today although
to a lesser degree.
To address these gaps, ARUCC launched the ARUCC MyCreds™ | MesCertif™
National Network (MyCreds™) with the unanimous support of its higher education
community (Association of Registrars of the Universities and Colleges of Canada,
2020a, b).3 MyCreds™ enables trusted electronic exchange of digitized official aca-
demic credentials, including letters, co-curricular records, transcripts, parchments,
badges, and micro-credentials. Canadian MyCreds™ institutions create electronic
connections between the network and their student information systems to advance
rapid, automated access to academic documents for learners and other third parties.
Institutional data remains resident in Canada and within the partitioned cloud envi-
ronments stewarded fully by the colleges and universities. A snapshot of institu-
tional data is not centrally stored in local servers, unlike other system level
application and transcript data providers. When an institution updates an academic
record, the learner’s document is accessible within their wallet and instantaneously
updated. Further, immediate notification is sent to any recipients with whom the
learner has shared their data. MyCreds™ is fully compliant with Canadian and
European privacy regulations. The latter puts the learner at the centre of any docu-
ment sharing. While the learner cannot adjust the data in their document, they alone
determine who sees what document for how long by sharing access to it instanta-
neously from within their online wallet. In fall 2021 and as externally validated
evidence of its commitment to standards, interoperability, and mobility, MyCreds™
received international first place recognition from the American-based Postsecondary
Electronic Standards Council (PESC) (PESC, 2021).
3
Digitary, an international document issuing organization which supports colleges and universities
in other countries, provides the underlying engine that powers MyCreds™. The author has served
as the executive lead for this initiative with involvement since the project’s inception in 2014. Her
firm, Duklas Cornerstone Consulting Inc. provides executive leadership and operational support
for MyCreds™.
Canada’s MyCreds™ is an exemplar model for sourcing trusted higher education

documents and credentials through an innovative technology highway and learner
credential wallet. It supports recognized, trusted issuing organizations in Canada
and is part of an international global network with over 2 million learners. It pro-
vides institutions a trusted means to access official academic documents from indi-
vidual learners around the world and ensures fraud resilient incoming and outbound
post-secondary academic documents and peer-to-peer (i.e., institution to institution)
exchange. MyCreds™ supports postsecondary admissions, transfer, and subsequent
mobility of graduates into the workforce. The platform uses multiple data formats
(PDF, XML, JSON, and soon blockchain, Verifiable Credentials, and DIDs) and
presents documents and data in a variety of flexible formats. It is unique in Canada
and has been created by the Canadian higher education community with the support
of an international organization called Digitary which owns the underlying technol-
ogy to address fraud and modernize infrastructure in support of admission, transfer,
credential progression, and graduation document sharing needs. It supports the full
learner life cycle.
Internationally, other exemplars support electronic document exchange
(Groningen Declaration Network, 2021). Select examples include My eQuals in
Australia and New Zealand (My eQuals, 2017), the National Student Clearinghouse
(National Student Clearinghouse, 2021), Parchment (Parchment, 2021),4 the China
Credentials Verification Services called CHESICC (CHESICC, 2003–2021), the
South African Qualifications Authority verification services (South African
Qualifications Authority, n.d.), and the Diplome.gouv.fr in France (Ministère de
l’Éducation Nationale et de la Jeunesse, 2019). Other examples are available in the
GDN T.R.U.S.T. Hub (Groningen Declaration Network, 2021). Blockchain docu-
ment issuing providers at the nation state level remain in their infancy. OpenCerts in
Singapore is an early example that provides online verification of certificates using
the blockchain (OpenCerts: Government Digital Services, 2020). Italy is using
blockchain to support credential evaluation sharing with its Diplo Me service
(CIMEA Association, 2019).
doption Challenges of Digitized Documents and Trusted

A
Electronic Networks
Overview
Institutions remain challenged by degree and diploma mills and other forms of
fraud. Large scale document issuing providers are helping to solve these challenges.
Digitization of documents presents valuable considerations for credential evalua-
tion assessment practices at institutions and other organizations.
4
In 2021, Parchment purchased Digitary resulting in a further expansion of the national MyCreds™
network.
106 J. Duklas
Growth in Degree/Diploma Mills
Degree/diploma mills and document fraud seem to be growing although empirical

research is sparse (Council for Higher Education Administration and UNESCO,
2009; McLemee, 2014; Trines, 2017). Fraudulent actors engage in several activities
including making slight adjustments to names of institutions to represent them-
selves, selling fake diplomas, and using technology to advance their efforts
(American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers, 2021).
The situation routinely forces institutions to conduct thorough research to establish
a document’s chain of custody and other bone fides.
Employers also need to be diligent in their practices when verifying credentials.
A UK survey of 313 employers found 20% reported not checking or verifying cre-
dentials of new employees (Prospects HEDD, 2017, p. 7). Eighty-three percent
(83%) indicated their employees may have lied about their credentials (p. 7). The
study concluded with the following:
The fact that 25% of [small and medium-sized firms] are not taking any steps to safeguard
against degree fraud is alarming. Whether or not a degree is a requirement for a job is irrel-
evant – the point about checking the authenticity of a degree certificate is to verify that the
candidate is who they say they are and hasn’t exaggerated or invented their qualifications.
It’s fundamentally about establishing trust. (p. 9)
An obvious opportunity exists to facilitate peer-to-peer access to official digitized

documents enabled by technology to improve institutional and employer assess-
ment and verification practices.
Document Issuing Providers
Evidence exists that existing credential exchange solutions are solving document
fraud challenges. For example, the Australian My eQuals which is based on a differ-
ent technology stack than blockchain, reported zero document fraud issues since its
launch in 2014 (personal communications, J. Seqeth, September 2021). Institutions
use a variety of different technology stacks and document issuing providers, all of
which have received endorsements, sanctions, and support from their higher educa-
tion institutions and governments. These providers have created direct connectivity
between issuers, learners, and receivers; thereby ensuring portability, security, and
trust in the document exchange activity.
Established networks have currency with existing issuers and verifiers which
helps with adoption. My eQuals and OUAC described previously provide two
examples. My eQuals has 5 million student documents available through learner
wallets in a digitized format and has been adopted as the universities’ solution in
Australia and New Zealand for supporting electronic document exchange for learn-
ers (My eQuals, 2017). OUAC, as mentioned previously, serves millions of learners
annually with electronic document exchange.
Considering New Technology Options
Colleges and universities work with highly complex systems, policies, procedures,
and legislative and quality assurance environments; therefore, achieving broad
adoption of technology solutions, including innovations such as blockchain, takes
time. Potential solutions must both support learners with individual requests and
institutions with transmitting, receiving, curating, and managing documents and
data in high volumes to address admission and transfer assessment needs. Any solu-
tions for enhancing secure document digitization and exchange must take this con-
text into consideration for successfully scaled adoption. This requires building
bridges between technology environments by establishing greater connectivity.
Governments are important to this discussion within higher education as they can
help incentivize change.
More advanced options such as blockchain require further testing to ensure the
technology is addressing clearly identified problems in a frictionless way as a sup-
port to higher education actors (e.g., credential evaluators, students, governments,
employers). For example, organizations sometimes receive documents through
blockchain technology providers and yet still must conduct research to confirm if
the provider is legitimate and supported by the issuing organization or institution,
and that the document is sufficiently complete to allow robust assessment (personal
communications, M. Wenger, September 2021). Currently, documents provided
through the blockchain are difficult to receive, consume, and assess, making them
unwieldy and at times, marginally useful to the practice of postsecondary admission
and transfer assessment (September 2021). The work of IEEE, W3C, PESC and
others identified earlier represent collaborative examples where further exploration,
testing, and consultation are underway to advance innovations with a focus on spe-
cific academic use cases.
Establishing Trust in Digitized Academic Documents
Questions to Consider
The findings from the interviews and the prior research raised several areas of ques-
tioning regarding the source and chain of custody of academic documents and rec-
ognition of the learning represented (Duklas, 2019b). These three areas are relevant
to postsecondary admission and transfer assessment policies and practices.
Thematically, these separately and together influence determinations regarding the
official and trusted nature of a document (digitized or not).
1. Source. From where did the document originate? Did it come from the central
registrarial area or direct from a faculty member or program? Did it come from
the originating institution? Who signed it?
108 J. Duklas
2. Chain of Custody. What is the chain of custody for that document and the related
trust assurances? Through which channel or technology platform did it arrive? Is
the channel trusted and endorsed by the sending institution or sanctioned by
government?
3. Recognition. Is the issuing institution or program recognized? What resources
were used to validate that recognition?
Other considerations exist including content completeness, if the learner had access
or could customize the content, and so forth. These areas fall outside of the scope of
this research but remain equally important.
Degree Mill Challenges
Degree mills present challenges for establishing document chains of trust regardless
of technology used. Strategies to address these include creating resources and tools
to identify degree mills using quality assured and authoritative sources for deter-
mining recognition of the issuer and document delivery channel, informing the pub-
lic, pursuing legal avenues to combat fraud, and establishing multi-regional
collaborations and networks to mitigate the prevalence of fraudulent actors (Council
for Higher Education Administration and UNESCO, 2009, pp. 7–10). Related spe-
cifically to digitization, organizations need to advance “document verification tech-
nologies to make document checking simple and inexpensive for employers,
admissions officers, immigration officials, etc.” (Council for Higher Education
Administration and UNESCO, 2009, p. 7). The growing prevalence of trusted pro-
viders of electronic digitized documents provide illustrative examples of how to
achieve this objective.
Best Practice Advice
The DigiRec project group authored a comprehensive white paper that summarizes
where credential assessment providers should focus attention when considering
digitized documents and electronic exchange (NUFFIC, 2020). The paper provides
a helpful analysis of document digitization maturity levels across three dimensions:
application and documentation (inputs), case processing (throughput), and deci-
sions (output) (pp. 16–29).
It briefly highlights the advantages of blockchain technology, some of which
aren’t unique to blockchain. Examples include helping applicants to share elec-
tronic documents directly with a third party without a middle person and being hack
resistant and secure (p. 28). The disadvantages validate the findings in this report
and are noted below.
“Blockchain is a new technology and the alleged advantages mentioned above

fully depend on its implementation. Data transferal in a blockchain is considered
highly secure and alterations impossible. Yet, this also depends on who is part of the
blockchain network and how the network has been shaped. The source of the docu-
ments stored in the blockchain should be trusted and verified to avoid fraudulent
documents are included. Degree mills could operate a blockchain service that cranks
out immutable records that are nonetheless fake. Fraud can also occur when docu-
ments are uploaded by applicants in the blockchain. For that reason it is important
to consider which typology of blockchain is proposed (open, permissioned, pri-
vate): the most common and used option for administrative services and, in general,
the suggested blockchain for credential evaluation services is a permissioned block-
chain, where only certified institutions can upload data regarding qualifications”
(NUFFIC, 2020, p. 28).
The report’s recommendations for blockchain solutions include verifying the
chain of custody for the document back to the issuing organization, ensuring pri-
vacy by design is baked into the technology, and pursuing shared networks versus
stand alone institutional models (p. 29). The report also suggests specific ways to
create a digital orientation among credential evaluators (pp. 42–44).
Final Thoughts
The first objective for this research included a history of electronic document
exchange in Canadian higher education admission and transfer. Canada’s rich his-
tory began in the early 70s with the introduction of the Ontario Universities’
Application Centre in Ontario (OUAC), which was soon followed by the Quebec’s
Service régional d’admission du Montréal métropolitain (SRAM). OUAC collects
and transmits academic results, application data, and, for select students, additional
documents to support Ontario university admissions. SRAM provides similar sup-
ports for the Quebec CEGEP system.
At least 11 application and transcript exchange hubs exist today within five prov-
inces and a national network called MyCreds™ launched in 2020. Its purpose is to
provide digitized wallets for learners with personalized access to their official docu-
ments and the ability to share these to support Canadian college and university
admissions. It also supports exchange with employers and government by sharing
official academic credentials, transcripts, and letters. By working at the national
level, MyCreds™ is addressing extensive document and credential access gaps for
learners within and across the various provinces and territories. It also provides sup-
ports for inbound documents for domestic and international learners from other
parts of the world who now wish to come to Canada to study and work. By estab-
lishing trusted peer-to-peer access to official documents, MyCreds™ is helping to
mitigate document fraud.
110 J. Duklas
The second objective involved identifying how technology, when used effec-
tively at the system level within higher education, is providing trusted capture,
exchange, and recognition of documents. The paper provides examples of standards
bodies and electronic document issuing providers like MyCreds™ that provide
secure, privacy compliant methods at the national level. Each creates trusted chains
of custody for academic documents to support quality assured assessment practices.
The paper briefly explores blockchain, verifiable credentials and DIDs from a non-
technical perspective, a model that represents another way to support trusted
exchange of documents.
Ensuring trust and security are assured and supported at multiple levels remain
essential. Building solid bridges (technical infrastructure, standards, legislation,
policies, and procedures) between issuers and receivers of official documents
remains important for a trusted, quality assured ecosystem. Various technology
solutions are solving credential fraud and creating greater trust in the chain of cus-
tody and bone fides of official documents. Further exploring and testing of new
technologies and developing greater interoperability and connectivity to existing
technology remain the next stage challenges. At all times, bringing value to learn-
ers, colleges, universities, government, and employers remains essential.
Further research relevant to electronic document exchange is required and
includes exploring interoperability between technology solutions for specific docu-
ment types, developing shared commitment to data standards, and connecting exist-
ing and new technology environments. While helpful innovations exist, capacities
to consume digitized documents remain uneven. Continuing to research the daily
realities facing credential evaluators who receive documents from issuers that use
various forms of both old and new technology remains a gap to close. Ignoring this
focus will result in faulty implementation and poor adoption. Today needs to be
bridged to tomorrow as it is unlikely that the higher education community will fully
leave behind their existing systems, policies, and practices. Building such bridges
will help to reduce fraud, enhance trust, and enable more universal adoption of new
technologies to enhance sharing of official, digitized, academic documents.
Acknowledgements The author extends gratitude to the following experts for their support of
this project: Jay Segeth, program director, My eQuals; Meg Wenger, senior director of evaluation,
ECE; Herman de Leeuw, Former executive director, Groningen Declaration Network; Luke
McIntyre, chief product officer, MATTR Global; Simone Ravaioli, director, strategic partnerships,
Digitary.
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Chapter 5
Fair Play, Fraud, or Fixed? Athletic
Credentials in U.S. Higher Education
Kirsten Hextrum
Abstract This chapter considers how legal athletic admissions mirror the largest
college admission conspiracy in US history: Operation Varsity Blues (OVB).
Sharing findings from a year-long institutional ethnography (Smith, 2005) that
explored how youth become college athletes (Hextrum, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021a),
I offer three themes required for athletic admission: invest, market, and authenti-
cate. Materials analysed include: 1487 college athletes’ demographic data; 47 life-
history interviews with college athletes; and admission-related documents.
Quantitative data reveal how athletes invest to develop athletic talent, disputing col-
lege leaders’ claims that athletic admissions create diverse cohorts. The required
athletic investments create homogenous cohorts as White, middle-class youth are
overrepresented as college athletes. Next, qualitative data explores how athletes
navigated college access unveiling universities’ dissimilar and opaque athletic
admission portals. In this vacuum, those who market themselves are favoured.
Finally, I discuss how colleges authenticate athletes’ credentials. I found universi-
ties use inconsistent and arbitrary measures—sometimes admitting athletes with
little sport experience—questioning whether all specially admitted candidates will
athletically contribute. Cumulatively, findings indicate athletic admissions misalign
with the public’s interest because they are fixed to favour White, middle-class ath-
letes and remain vulnerable to fraud.
Keywords College sports · Special admission · Amateurism · Operation

varsity blues
K. Hextrum (*)
Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA
e-mail: Kirsten.Hextrum@oregonstate.edu

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_5
116 K. Hextrum
In March 2019, over 50 individuals were indicted in a college admission scheme

dubbed “Operation Varsity Blues” (OVB). Rick Singer started a consulting business
in the early 1990s helping high school kids boost their college resumes (Korte,
2019). In the past decade, he morphed his legal college advising into a two-pronged
conspirary, spanning US higher education, to guarantee admission for his wealthy
clients’ children (Smith, 2019). In prong one, Singer coordinated with testing cen-
tres and tutors to help his clients cheat on college entrance exams (Smith, 2019). In
prong two, Singer created fraudulent athletic profiles, posing his clients’ children as
potential college athletes. Singer then bribed coaches and athletic administrators to
admit the fake athletes onto real college teams. The main charges against Singer and
his co-conspirators were fraud and bribery (Rosen et al., 2019). As of publication,
42 of those indicted pled guilty and 13 pled not guilty. Singer admitted his athletic
scheme supported over 800 parents (Smith, 2019). OVB received renewed attention
in January 2021 when then-President Donald Trump pardoned one of the accused,
Robert Zangrillo, a hedge fund manager from Miami (DOJ, 2021).
Fraud and bribery charges utilize oppositional logic. Declaring something as
fake assumes its corollary, that which it proposed to be, is real. US federal law
defines fraud as someone who “knowingly and willingly…falsifies, conceals, or
covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact” (Legal Information
Institute, 2021a, para. 1). Singer committed fraud by falsifying the “material fact”
that his clients were athletes. This charge implies that potential college athletes are
a material fact or an observable and real category. Similarly, federal law defines
bribery as the “offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving of any item of value as a
means of influencing the actions of an individual holding a public or legal duty”
(Legal Information Institute, 2021b, para. 1). Indicting Singer on bribery assumes
that legal athletic recruitment evades monetary exchanges. The federal indictments
contrasted Singer’s scheme with legal athletic admissions charging Singer and his
clients with corrupting a fair system of college admission (Rosen et al., 2019;
Smith, 2019).
As OVB marked Singer’s actions as fraud and bribery, the prosecutors demar-
cated all other actions in athletic admissions as fair, transparent, and objective. In
this chapter, I argue against the FBI’s oppositional framing. I scrutinize legal ath-
letic admissions and discuss how universities, national organizations, and US law
empowered athletic departments to develop clandestine, flexible, and discrete prac-
tices for admitting college athletes. Sharing findings from a year-long institutional
ethnography (Smith, 2005) that explored how race, class, and gender shape one’s
path to college via athletics (Hextrum, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021a, b), I offer three
themes required for athletic admission—invest, market, and authenticate. These
themes counter the notion of fair play undergirding athletic admissions and instead
suggest that access to college sports is fixed to favour already-advantaged groups
and remains vulnerable to fraud.
5 Fair Play, Fraud, or Fixed? Athletic Credentials in U.S. Higher Education 117
Exceptional Admission for Athletes
Studies into athletic admission examine its history (Smith, 2011; Sperber, 2000;
Thelin, 2011); its relationship to the economy (Eckstein, 2017); and its impact on
exceptionally admitted athletes’ academic performance (Beamon, 2008; Harper
et al., 2013; Rubin & Moses, 2017). These scholars do not consider how universities
design and implement athletic admissions. This is a striking research gap as the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)—the major US college sport
organization—governs over 460,000 athletes. Little is known about how potential
college athletes apply for and receive special admission (see Hextrum, 2018, 2019
for literature review). Examining the origins and controversies of athletic admis-
sions demonstrates why Singer may have targeted this site for his scheme.
In 1852, US college sport began with a Harvard and Yale rowing regatta. In the
lead up to the race, debates ensued about who could compete. Could graduate stu-
dents or alumni race? Could the teams scout and enlist local talent? Could athletes
receive compensation? (Smith, 2011). Such questions arose from amateurism.
Amateurism accompanied rowing—both were imported to America from Oxford
and Cambridge—as US universities continually modelled themselves after their
British colonizers (Llewellyn & Gleaves, 2014). In the nineteenth century, the White
British ruling class invented the gentleman amateur—an idealized, wealthy man
who played sport for pleasure (not profit) and upheld sportsmanship and fair play—
to prevent White working-class men, immigrants, and women from athletic compe-
tition (Llewellyn & Gleaves, 2014).
The NCAA’s founding in 1906 codified the gentleman amateur into organiza-
tional rules (Carter, 2006). To safeguard amateurism, the NCAA prohibited athletic
recruitment, inducements (compensation for athletic talent), and unsportsmanlike
conduct and required athletes remain full-time students (Carter, 2006). These rules
ensured colleges create athletic rosters from already-enrolled students. US amateur-
ism arose alongside Jim Crow segregation (Martin, 2010). Southern schools banned
Black students from enrolment and from athletic participation. Northern schools
supported Jim Crow by restricting Black enrolment and benching Black athletes
when competing against Southern teams (Martin, 2010). Thus, amateurism effec-
tively prohibited anyone who was not elite, White, and male from entering sports
(Hextrum, 2021a).
Throughout the twentieth century, universities cultivated consumer markets
around men’s football and basketball (Smith, 2011; Thelin, 2011). The exploding
revenue for these teams pushed university leaders to modify amateurism by permit-
ting special admission and scholarships in exchange for athletic talent (Smith,
2011). Still, college sports remained largely White into the 1960s (Martin, 2010).
Student activism, coupled with several high-profile matches in which integrated
teams defeated all-White teams, slowly eroded segregation (Martin, 2010).
Universities realized that restricting their recruitment pools could hurt their chances
at winning. It was now in White universities’ interest to admit Black athletes to
enhance their athletic programs and national profiles (Donnor, 2005). Similarly,
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women’s activism pushed for changes in federal law to prohibit gender discrimina-
tion in educational access. The resulting Title-IX legislation required universities
that hosted men’s athletic programs to offer similar opportunities to women (Thelin,
2011). The expanding access for women and people of colour signalled that college
sports were meritocratic engines open to the best athlete, regardless of their class,
race, or gender (Shulman & Bowen, 2001). However, with the help of the US legal
system, colleges and the NCAA preserved the underlying impetus of amateurism—
sport access for the elite.
US courts and federal departments long deferred to universities to decide how to
define, measure, and evaluate academic potential in their admissions process
(Guinier, 2015). The rise of holistic review in the twentieth century, moved college
admissions officers—particularly at highly selective institutions—to create elabo-
rate applications and assessments favouring subjective criteria like character and
leadership (Karabel, 2005). In the 1970s, higher education institutions, including
the University of California system, used their discretionary power to increase the
number of women and racial minorities on their campuses (Guinier, 2015).
Alongside more admirable reasons like increasing diversity, Karabel’s (2005) inves-
tigation of elite institutions found universities also used subjective criteria and dis-
cretion to “favor key constituencies—some of them relatively weak in academic
merit—whom it wished to admit for institutional reasons” (p. 492) like donors’
children. The 1978 supreme court case Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke tested the limits of universities’ discretionary power in admission. The case
found that universities could not use quota-systems for race but can for student
characteristics. The court cited special admission for athletes as an acceptable form
of admission discretion.
Bakke was reaffirmed in a 1990s Department of Education investigation. The
probe examined whether Harvard’s admission practices, which granted preference
to alumni’s children and recruited athletes, harmed Asian American students.
Investigators found that special admission practices admitted mostly White students
with lower academic profiles, but when these groups were removed, Asian
Americans had similar admission rates to White students. Citing Bakke, the investi-
gation found that Harvard’s decision to admit students based upon characteristics
(not race) was legal even when the criteria created White students’ overrepresenta-
tion (Karabel, 2005).
Vast racial and economic inequities in youth sport access offer one explanation
for why special admissions may over-select White applicants. Youth sport access
flows through schools and communities that subsidize after-school athletic pro-
grams. Starting in the 1990s, privatized, play-to-play youth sports have increased—
especially in middle- and high-income areas—promising better training and
competition for aspiring college athletes (Eckstein, 2017). This patchwork of pri-
vate and public sponsored youth sports is riddled with hierarchies and unequal
opportunities (Hextrum, 2021a).
Low-income and youth of colour attend drastically underfunded schools com-
pared to their middle-class and White counterparts (Green & Gooden, 2016;
Rothstein, 2017). Low-income and youth of colour are therefore more likely to
attend schools with few or no athletic programs (Hattery, 2012; Sabo & Veliz,
2008). In contrast, White suburban children are more likely to live in communities
and attend schools with plentiful low-cost sport options (Sabo & Veliz, 2008). Sabo
and Veliz’s (2008) national study of youth sport found that White suburban children
played sports at higher rates than any other group—and they were the most likely
group to combine athletic opportunities, playing for school, recreational, and club
teams, granting them more time and chances to develop athletic talent.
In the forthcoming sections I explore how the student criteria “athlete” closely
aligns with “White” and “middle-class.” Granting preferential admission to athletes
allows universities to retain their elitist origin and limit broad-based access.
Diversity in college sports is contained to a limited number of schools and sports
programs. Revenue-generating men’s basketball and football have the highest racial
diversity, ranging from 50 to 60% Black-identifying athletes—but these teams com-
prise only 3.5% of college athletics (NCAA, 2019). The remaining 96.5% of ath-
letes play for non-revenue generating teams—and are majority White (between 80
and 85%, see Lapchick, 2020). Examining the athletic admission practices for non-
revenue generating athletes reveals why White, middle-class athletes are advan-
taged in recruitment and college access.
Methods
Findings arise from a larger institutional ethnography of one elite US university,

what I call “Coastal-U” (pseudonyms are used to protect confidentiality). My
research proposal underwent and received approval through the full review board of
human subject research at my institution. Institutional ethnographies centre peo-
ple’s lived experiences within institutions to analyse the social world (Smith, 2005).
Institutional ethnography begins with a central issue, policy, or practice. The
researcher then selects a people’s vantage point from which to build understanding
of their inquiry (Smith, 2005). My interests centred the institution of college sports
and the issue of athletic admissions, to explore how high school students become
elite athletes. To build this people’s vantage point, I collected college athletes’ life-
histories and institutional documents.
Life-history interviews reveal how social institutions shape the past, present, and
future possible lives of individuals (Lensmire, 2014). Life-histories allow inter-
viewees to drive the interview, construct their own meaning of events, and allow
researchers to centre people’s stories to understand cultural and social contexts
(Smith, 2012). This interview style explores how humans construct, reinforce, and/
or resist forces that constrain social outcomes (Ravitch & Carl, 2016).
I recruited participants from Coastal-U, a highly selective public university with
40,000 students. Coastal-U also hosts an elite athletic program, boasting nearly 100
team and 200 individual national championships. I centred two sports—rowing and
track & field (“track” for short)—to reflect potential demographic variety. Rowing
is one of the most restrictive sports, as rowers learn to row primarily through private,
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expensive clubs (Hextrum, 2021a). Track is widely accessible; it is the most com-
mon sport offered in US high schools to girls and second (to football) most common
for boys (NFHS, 2021). Combined, these sports represented 25% of Coastal-U’s
athlete population. I recruited volunteer participants through purposive sampling
and snowball recruitment methods. Twenty-eight participants identified as women
and 19 as men. Eleven identified as “people of colour” and 36 identified as “White”
(see Appendix 1 for participant demographics table).
To generate findings, I undertook the following processes sequentially. During
data collection, I documented my emerging insights through field notes (summaries
of my perception of each interview) and research memos (weekly records of themes
resonating across the interviews). I transcribed each interview verbatim, often
updating my field notes and memos with new insights. After I completed data col-
lection, I began open coding and read each interview identifying any possible theme,
repetition, or pattern (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). I combined this list with key terms
from my memos to devise a codebook. I then coded each interview within the quali-
tative software program Dedoose. I then interpreted the descriptive codes to identify
further patterns and discern higher order themes. Next, I challenged my themes by:
re-reading each narrative for conflicting or confirming statements of my claims;
checking my insights against the literature; and discussing findings with partici-
pants and members of the athletic community including former athletes and athletic
academic support personnel (Ravitch & Carl, 2016).
To contextualize participants’ reflections, I examined whether their accounts
were representative across cohorts. I created a database, Athlete’s Hometown Stats,
comprised of all Coastal-U track and crew rosters from 2005 to 2015 to identify
trends in background characteristics. Rosters offered each athlete’s hometown, high
school, sport, and gender. The database included 14871 athletes. I paired their high
school and hometown with US Census Bureau data to create measures for income.
I then used Coastal-U institutional reports to compare how community income dif-
fered among Coastal-U students, track athletes, and rowers. I used the database to
generate descriptive statistics and point to trends in who accesses college via athlet-
ics (see Hextrum, 2021a for elaborated methodology). To adhere to the constructiv-
ist traditions upon which I built this study, I incorporate my analysis into the findings
section presenting findings in conversation with, rather than disaggregated, from the
literature (see Mills et al., 2006).
Findings
Due to the length and scope of the study, my original analysis led to over 300
themes. Here, I share three major themes from the larger study: invest, market, and
authenticate.
1
International students are removed from the dataset as countries use different approaches in col-
lecting census data. This brought the total participant count to 1035.
Invest
As part of the larger study (Hextrum, 2020, 2021a), I analysed the NCAA’s 588
recruitment and admission regulations and found the rules differently governed ath-
letes based upon their class background. The rules restrict athletes’ behaviour, limit-
ing what they can and cannot receive from institutions. The NCAA bans colleges
from subsidizing opportunities to develop athletic talent (Hextrum, 2020). But there
are no regulations limiting the amount an athlete’s family can invest to develop their
child’s athletic talent. Said differently, the NCAA’s equal playing field ignores ineq-
uities in sport access and prohibits colleges from taking proactive measures to
redress imbalanced youth athletic opportunities.
The impact of NCAA regulations is visible in college athlete demographic
trends. Descriptive statistics generated from Athletes Hometown Stats revealed that
athletes came from wealthier communities than Coastal-U students. I compared the
median family income of an athlete’s community to their respective state definition
of “low-income.” Findings are listed in Table 5.1. Only 0.43% of athletes met this
criterion compared to 25.80% of students. Further, athletes were concentrated in the
middle or upper-middle income range, as 71.21% came from communities whose
income is higher than their state’s median income.
Important differences existed across rowing and track. Rowers came from
wealthier communities. But even track athletes, who are supposed to represent the
most accessible sport, were clustered in upper incomes. Less than 3% of track ath-
letes came from communities where incomes averaged less than $50,000 USD per
year. Instead, track athletes were most likely to be found in the communities ranging
from $80,000 to $124,999 USD.
The descriptive statistics suggest that athletes are more likely to live in higher-
income areas than their non-athlete peers. These trends indicate that sports are not
widely accessible across the US and that certain higher-income areas have greater
opportunities to develop athletic talent. As competition to attend top Ivy and private
institutions becomes fiercer, researchers document how elite public schools, like
Coastal-U, are less likely to serve lower-income students (Khan, 2012; Shamash,
2018). This trend is pushing lower-income, first generation college-going students
out of highly selective public universities; the same universities that were built to
provide mobility opportunities to White, working-class men (Weis et al., 2014).
Table 5.1 Family Median Income Comparison Across Coastal-U student Populations
Family Incomea USD Coastal-U studentsb % Crew % Track % Crew/track combinedc %
Less than 50,000 24 0.78 2.77 1.94
50,000 to 79,999 14 23.50 36.60 31.17
80,000 to 124,999 23 42.03 44.73 43.61
125,000 or more 38 33.68 15.90 23.27
a
US Census Bureau (2016) data, represented in 2014 USD
b
Includes entire student population
c
Refers to the combination of all rowers and track athletes
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Thus, if college athletes are more economically advantaged compared to their

college-going peers, than athletic recruitment must be more exclusive and elitist
than general admission.
Athlete narratives enliven how athletic recruitment retains elitist and exclusive
admission practices. Participants enumerated the monetary investments needed to
develop athletic talent including yearly purchases of new sports equipment, travel to
and from practice and competition, and medical care. Steve, a White man, joined
rowing after an Ivy League school recruited his friend. He discussed the costs asso-
ciated to his sport:
“I know that the money might be an issue for some people. And I think that row-
ing definitely attracts a certain ethnic demographic because there are a lot of White,
rich, people that have rowed and they’ve done quite well for themselves, and they
want their kids to row. It’s definitely a sport that requires a lot of money as well. The
boats are expensive, the gear’s expensive, racing’s expensive, everything’s expen-
sive. I feel like, it’s a lot harder to get involved with rowing [because of the costs].
So yeah, it’s definitely an expensive sport to be involved in.”
Sophia, a White woman, recalled the travel costs for rowing. Her first trip out of
the country was a rowing race in England. The costs included flights to Europe,
hotels, racing fees, and meals—close to $3000 USD. But her family willingly paid
these costs to invest in Sophia’s future.
Track required similar investments. LeVar, a Black man, competed in sprinting
and jumping events, each requiring their own equipment. He estimated buying three
new shoes per month to keep up with the sport. Taylor, a White woman, recalled
how her cross-country team was a “bunch of privileged White girls,” in part, because
of training requirements. She itemized the required investments in her sport: mem-
bership to a private gym for cross-training, new shoes each month, rides to-and-
from practice, and travel money for weekend races in far-off locations.
The largest investment was coaching. Thirty-six study participants played for
private sports clubs. The clubs represented in this study ranged from $1300 to $3900
USD per year. These teams required greater financial and time contributions from
families, including paying for travel costs, uniforms, club, and equipment. Track
athletes also recalled using private clubs and coaches. Private opportunities were
vital to field events (e.g., triple jump and pole vault) often unavailable in high
schools. Instead, athletes who paid for private coaching (ranging from $50to 100
USD/hour) could quickly excel in these events (Hextrum, 2020).
Developing athletic talent requires that sports are present in your community.
Athletes from White suburban communities were more likely to have abundant ath-
letic options and have the family resources to purchase supplemental athletic oppor-
tunities. No federal laws or NCAA and university-level policies ban such
investments. Therefore, the athletes who can pay to play sports are advantaged
through special athletic admissions.
Market
Investing in sports cannot guarantee preferential admission. US sports are pyrami-

dal and hierarchical as opportunities dwindle further up the competition level. Thus,
not every suburban youth playing sports can receive special admission. Special
admission practices purport that their winnowing mechanisms only elect the best
athletes. Yet successfully recruited athletes recalled how their talent did not drive
their recruitment. Instead, their marketing efforts set them apart in a crowded cohort.
London, a White/middle-eastern woman explained: “The whole recruiting process
was a whole lesson on how to sell yourself. And I know that sounds superficial. But
it’s so true. How can you market yourself [and explain] why [you] are better than the
person who’s trying to compete for your spot?”
London’s insights resonated across the study. Of the 47 participants, only 12
recalled colleges requiring an objective measure of ability like a time or score in
their sport. Instead, participants believed their marketing and outreach efforts
secured recruitment. The NCAA has 28 rules restricting the type and frequency of
recruiting materials universities can send to potential athletes. But the organization
has no regulations on what an athlete can send to a coach. Athletes learned through
their private clubs and coaches how to market themselves to increase their odds for
recruitment.
The most common marketing effort was to send an email of interest to college
coaches. Brandon, a White man, aspired to attend an elite public university.
“[Coastal-U] was exactly the kinda school—the highest [calibre] school I wanted to
be at…I wanted to leverage the running to get into the best school I could get into.”
Despite earning a national ranking in his track event, the Coastal-U coaches never
approached Brandon. “They didn’t send me anything.” Silence did not deter
Brandon. “I emailed the [Coastal-U] coach saying, ‘I wanted to go to a Big State
public institution, and somewhere far away, and somewhere with nice weather.’”
Brandon also sent his academic and athletic records. The coach replied and invited
him to visit the program, and later, granted Brandon exceptional admission to
Coastal-U.
As Brandon’s experience indicates, athletes proactively introduced themselves—
and their athletic potential—to college coaches. Some created detailed portfolios of
achievements including all their times, scores, meets and regattas attended; national
team experience; lists of prior teammates who were recruited to college; and media
coverage. Their athletic resumes were carefully crafted. Athletes learned how to
package themselves in ways that highlighted their strengths for a given program.
Amanda, a White woman, reached out to her former teammates, who were now col-
lege rowers, for advice. They taught her what college coaches valued in athletes.
She created a list of top schools and sent emails to the rowing coaches. “I knew that
[my] strong suits were my GPA, my height, and my years of rowing experience. I
knew that my [racing times weren’t] that big of a selling point. So I just chose to
focus on those three things. And, I just got positive responses from coaches. I really
milked that.”
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Athletes later learned from their college coaches why these outreach efforts mat-
ter. Morgan, a White woman from New England, started the recruitment process as
a passive participant. She recalled being “at home, by the phone, waiting for calls”
to come from college coaches inviting her to join their teams. She received a few
offers, but none from her top schools. On the advice of her club teammates and
coaches, she reached out to colleges. “I ended up calling [coaches]—I called [the
Coastal-U head coach] myself.” Morgan explained that Coastal-U was her top
school and discussed her admiration for the rowing program. After she hung up the
phone, Morgan second-guessed herself thinking: “Oh my God, what am I doing”—
she feared her eagerness might upend her chances. But her efforts worked. The
coach invited her to visit the school. On her trip, the coach said, “I like how upfront
you are” and mentioned her boldness in their previous phone conversation. On her
trip, Morgan was offered admission to Coastal-U. Morgan’s story reflects the irregu-
lar, subjective, and subtle criteria swirling within athletic recruitment. Morgan’s
demeanour, not her rowing times, made her stand-out.
By far the most effective marketing was not done by athletes themselves, but by
their high school coaches. The NCAA regulates the cost and frequency of interac-
tions between college coaches and potential athletes (NCAA, 2017). The NCAA
does not regulate interactions between college and high school coaches. Personal
connections between college and high school coaches allowed preferential access
for certain recruits. Nearly all athletes acknowledged their high school coach as an
important figure in their athletic development. Twenty-four athletes saw their coach
as the factor in gaining admission. Of those, nine had high school coaches who were
friends with or worked alongside Coastal-U coaches in previous jobs. No regula-
tions exist requiring athletes or schools to disclose such conflicts of interests. Rather,
youth athletes from these programs had an immediate advantage.
George, a White man, long-aspired to attend Coastal-U—his father’s alma mat-
ter. But George felt his high school academic performance was inadequate for
admission to an elite school. He was excited to learn that his high school coach’s
wife—an eight-time all American track athlete at Coastal-U—could get him into
Coastal-U another way: athletic recruitment. She used her reputation and connec-
tion with Coastal-U’s track coaches to recommend they admit George. Her recom-
mendation worked.
Tyrell, a White man, explained the extensive efforts high school coaches under-
took during recruitment. Tyrell’s high school coach competed in college track
alongside the Coastal-U coach. One day at practice Tyrell’s coach approached him
with an opportunity. Tyrell explained the interaction:
“[Coach said] ‘[Coastal-U] is hosting [a] meet this year. Would you be interested
in going? I know the sprint coach, I can contact him and set up a meeting.’ I was
like, ‘Yes, please do that…[Coastal-U] is an amazing school, that would be awe-
some if I could go there.’”
In addition to setting up an introduction, Tyrell’s coach drove him to the meet,
providing him with a face-to-face opportunity to speak with the coaches and see the
campus. Tyrell acknowledged that without his coach’s recommendation and intro-
duction, he would still be in college, but not at an elite university.
Singer and his clients engaged in criminal behaviour because they presented
“fake” athletic credentials. But the stories shared here illustrate the fungibility of
athletic skill. Athletes learned how to package, amplify, and enhance their skills to
attract college recruiters. Such stories indicate that athletic skills are not systemi-
cally and fairly measured and evaluated. Instead, colleges preference athletes with
marketing skills and existing relationships to university employees. The final sec-
tion explores the application process—or lack thereof—and how universities use
their discretionary authority over athletic admission to privilege White suburban
athletes.
Authenticate
Fourteen participants said they lacked the athletic skills to become college athletes.
Instead, they received preferential admission for their athletic potential. Colleges
have debated whether admissions should select an incoming class based upon past
merit, college readiness, or potential for future contributions (Shulman & Bowen,
2001). Measures and assessments of academic merit and college readiness are
deeply tied to a US education system steeped in race and class inequities (Khan,
2012; Weis et al., 2014). Colleges interested in reversing inequities have argued for
discretion in admissions to select students based upon potential contributions
(Guinier, 2015). Yet institutions have also used their discretionary powers to pre-
serve slots for the children of elite, such as legacy admission practices (Karabel,
2005). Scrutinizing the discretionary practices of athletic admission revealed the
preferentially admitted athletes—particularly those admitted based upon their
potential athletic contributions—did not reverse, but instead, accelerated race and
class inequities.
Athletic admissions are flexible and discrete. Universities say such strategies are
necessary to admit the most athletes—many of whom may finish their seasons at
times that are out-of-sync with general admission cycles (Smith, 2011). The NCAA
qualifier system requires all prospective college athletes meet minimum amateur
and academic standards (NCAA, 2017). An athlete is an amateur if they never
signed a contract with or received payment from a professional team, worked with
an agent, or received extra benefits from university representatives (NCAA, 2017).
The NCAA’s minimum academic standards are a 2.0 high school GPA in 13 core-
courses and a combined SAT score of 700 (Smith, 2011). Universities can develop
their own admission policies so long as the policy retains the academic and amateur
minimum set by the NCAA (NCAA, 2017). Many universities use a separate ath-
letic admission process with lower academic standards (Shulman & Bowen 2001).
Separate athletic admissions do not utilize publicly available applications and do
not have trained admission officers reviewing all the possible applicants (Smith,
2011). Instead, coaches and athletic administrators create the pool of applicants to
then be reviewed by admission officers (Shulman & Bowen, 2001). The admission
officers, in most cases, review whether a potential athlete meets academic
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minimums and do not scrutinize their athletic background. Instead, these officers
defer to coach’s judgements on athletic talent (Smith, 2019).
All study participants met NCAA qualifier definitions and had a high school
GPA of 2.0 or higher. Eleven recalled a Coastal-U coach explicitly saying they were
looking for top athletes, not strong students. Even more telling, only one student
recalled a Coastal-U coach inquiring about their academic interests. More com-
monly, coaches discussed their power to admit athletes. Nineteen participants said
Coastal-U coaches bragged that they had “sway” with admissions.
Iceman, a White man, admitted he lacked focus and discipline in high school and
his grades showed it. He learned from a family friend that rowing could make up for
academic deficits. He joined the team soon after. During recruitment, his decision
paid off as coaches from elite schools offered him admission—despite his sub-part
academics. Iceman recalled how:
“Everybody said, ‘We can offer you a spot. Fill out the application.’ They all had
the same little spiel: ‘You’re not going to be super easy to get in, but we have pull in
the admissions office and we can get you in.’”
In addition to having “pull” with admissions, college coaches completed por-
tions of athletes’ applications. Icemen—along with a dozen other study partici-
pants—said college coaches did parts of their college application. When asked
about his application to Coastal-U, LeVar recalled the differences between how
students and athletes apply. “I didn’t submit an application. You did the athlete
application. You did a couple paragraphs, the personal statement you made, and
then, sent in your transcript, and then the coaches did the rest.”
The power granted to coaches to define, evaluate, and shape athletic merit
unfolded in ways that reaffirmed rather than resisted existing educational inequities.
I found that low-income and athletes of colour had to overperform athletic skill—
achieve state or national-level ranking—to enter athletic recruitment (Hextrum,
2018). In contrast, White suburban athletes could underperform and still receive
multiple admission offers (Hextrum, 2018, 2019). Goose, for instance, a White
man, admitted he did not have the academic “chops” to get into a reputable univer-
sity without sports. Within a few weeks of starting at a prestigious boarding school,
Goose’s height and athleticism caught the eye of the school’s rowing coach. Simply
based on his affiliation to this boarding school’s rowing program, Goose received
recruitment invitations from the country’s top college rowing coaches. He had not
even rowed his first stroke when Coastal-U invited him on an official visit. When I
pressed him on how this was possible, Goose said the repute of his coach. “My
[boarding school] coach, his family is big into rowing. The [Ivy League] coaches
and [Coastal-U] coaches know him... So, he was the reason I got recruited. It wasn’t
any [rowing] score I was pulling, it was that.” Goose’s story shows the redundancy
of Singer’s illegal scheme. Had Lori Laughlin—American actress indicted in
Operation Varsity Blues—simply enrolled her daughters into the prestigious rowing
club rather than lying about her affiliation, USC may have recruited them. At the
very least, the rowing coach had the power and discretion to legally do so.
Study Limitations
This study had several limitations. First, the study’s vantage point is from the “suc-
cess stories” or those who received special admission. As stated at the outset, not all
athletes with financial means ascend to college. A richer explanation of special
admission practices may be found by scrutinizing those who were “weeded out” or
denied athletic recruitment. Second, Coastal-U is a top-ranking public university.
As evidenced in OVB, competition for scarce admission opportunities to elite uni-
versities may exaggerate social trends and behavior. Understanding if these findings
persist at lower-ranked universities is needed. Additionally, this study centered race
and class. Other forms of power like ableism are equally prevalent in athletics and
require study. Finally, US college sports imported amateurism from England.
Understanding whether and how the UK and other nations with elite college sports
recruit athletes could offer both research and policy insights for more equitable US
athletic admission practices.
Conclusion
OVB found college admissions counsellors, administrators, and coaches collaborat-

ing with wealthy parents to guarantee admission to elite universities. Parents admit-
ted on tape that their children lacked athletic merit. Applicants lied about their
athletic background and submitted fake awards, honours, and photoshopped-images.
The indictment states that specially admitted students were illegitimate athletes
(Smith, 2019). The case assumes athletic departments apply transparent and objec-
tive criteria to evaluate applicants.
This study into athletic recruitment suggests otherwise. Drawing upon descrip-
tive statistics and life-history interviews, I found that athletic admissions require
athletes invest to develop talent and market their best attributes. Athletes with
resources were immediately advantaged. These actions remain legal. The NCAA
prohibits colleges from subsidizing youth sports but allows families and communi-
ties unlimited spending opportunities. With athletic opportunities unevenly distrib-
uted across the US, White suburban athletes have the greatest youth sport access.
Athletes in these communities learned to market their strengths to increase their
recruitment odds. No equal playing field can exist so long as colleges require invest-
ments and reward marketing efforts.
The pre-college investments and marketing strategies succeeded, in part, because
colleges lack standardized athletic admission processes to assess athletic talent.
Instead, coaches retain discretion in defining and evaluating athletic talent and
rewarding an athlete with admission. OVB represents how fraud can abound within
these conditions. In some cases, like Georgetown, a coach could forward an email
request to an admission officer to admit a student. Further, OVB revealed that these
resumes are not vetted by current admission committees (Smith, 2019). Similarly,
128 K. Hextrum
the minimums and fact-checking in my study scrutinized academic, not athletic

criteria. The major difference between OVB and my study is Coastal-U athletes did
not lie about their athletic credentials. Coaches knew the athletes receiving prefer-
ential admission had mediocre skill or little athletic experience.
The discretionary power granted to US colleges permits athletes to be legally
admitted to universities with little merit. Universities created irregular admission
channels to admit athletes, a process later legitimized by the courts (Karabel, 2005;
Shulman & Bowen, 2001). The courts have allowed athletics to have separate and
unequal athletic processes even when these processes lead to almost exclusively
White and wealthy admission classes. Thus, the major recommendation of this
chapter is for further research, activism, and reform to consider how to eliminate the
exemptions for athletics and transform sport admissions into a publicly accountable,
transparent, and uniform method.
Eliminating the exceptional nature of athletic admissions will not solve the struc-
tural race and class inequities in US schools and sports. Access to youth sports will
remain widely unequal until substantial changes are made to American housing, tax,
educational, and employment policies (Hextrum, 2021a). But universities could
take swift action to change how their own practices favour White suburban athletes.
A necessary first step would be to incorporate athletic recruiting into the campus-
wide processes of recruitment and admission. Universities, not coaches, could drive
and monitor how to advertise opportunities to potential recruits, how recruits are
invited to campuses, and how recruits apply to their institutions. The current appa-
ratus of university recruitment, particularly the initiatives designed to target histori-
cally disenfranchised communities, could visit high schools, community
organizations, and teams to inform youth about the opportunity to attend their uni-
versity as an athlete. These efforts could spread broader awareness and knowledge
that becoming a college athlete is a possibility and how youth could start working
toward that future. Similarly, recruitment events that bring students to campus
should discuss and explain the athletic admission process. In other words, so long
as universities have a process for athletic admissions, this process should be adver-
tised, discussed, and made available at all public events, initiatives, and discussions
related to college admissions.
To aid in transparency, universities should work with athletic departments to
develop a uniform application for athletic admission. These applications can be
tailored to the needs of the team but should flow through a publicly available appli-
cation portal where anyone could apply to become an athlete. Universities already
specialize in evaluation and assessment across a range of disciplines. Assessing ath-
letic ability should receive the same scrutiny and transparency. Colleges could pair
coaches with existing researchers with knowledge on assessment and help coaches
develop rubrics for recruiting athletes. Athletic departments should then make the
assessments publicly available, and, like other forms of evaluation, constantly
revisit and rework the tool for effectiveness. Such changes alone will not fix the
inequities in athletic access. But they will allow for greater public scrutiny over the
elements of legal athletic admissions that closely resemble fraud and bribery.
Perhaps we will then have a better sense of whether and how universities are
defining the “material fact” of athletic talent and permitting individuals to use their
resources and social connections to influence the outcomes of preferential and
exclusive exceptional admission practices.
Appendix 1 Study Participant Background Characteristics
Participant Hometown median Proportion of white residents

name Sport Race incomea USD in hometown %
Amanda Crew White 100,000 77
Andrew Track White 69,000 6
Anthony Track Black 140,000 4
Boris Crew White N/A N/A
Brandon Track White 153,000 84
Brittany Track Black 75,000 31
Camilla Crew White 110,000 68
Captain Crew White 112,000 97
America
Casey Crew White 168,000 90
Chantae Track Black 61,000 67
Chelsea Crew White N/A N/A
CM Track White 110,000 51
Cooper Crew White 91,000 92
Duane Track Black 58,000 40
Ella Crew White N/A N/A
Erwin Crew White 132,000 65
George Track White 119,000 74
Goose Crew White 89,000 91
Iceman Crew White 38,000 49
Imani Track Black/Spanish/ 81,000 62
Japanese
Josephine Track Black 81,000 62
Joy Crew White 96,000 72
Kalie Crew White 100,000 78
Kayla Track Chicana/White 98,000 59
Laura Crew White 211,000 93
LeVar Track Black 69,000 40
Lisa Crew White N/A N/A
London Track White/ 136,000 8
Middle-Eastern
Malcolm Track Black 82,000 74
Merlin Track White 108,000 68
Monique Crew White 168,000 90
(continued)
130 K. Hextrum
Participant Hometown median Proportion of white residents

name Sport Race incomea USD in hometown %
Morgan Crew White 121,000 88
Noelle Crew White 70,000 90
Physicist Track White 136,000 84
Reggie Crew White N/A N/A
Sanya Track White 115,000 83
Savannah Crew White 92,000 80
Seamus Track White 87,000 50
Sophia Crew White 118,000 40
Stella Crew White 86,000 22
Steve Crew White N/A N/A
Taylor Track White 110,000 82
Terrance Track White 60,000 80
Tyrell Track White 92,000 80
Vera Track Black/German N/A N/A
Victoria Crew White N/A N/A
Will Crew White N/A N/A
Note. Data for hometown median income and racial demographics came from the US Census. No
adequate comparison exists for countries represented in this study. Therefore, no median income
or demographics are listed for international participants. Data rounded to the nearest 1000 for
income and whole percent for racial demographics
a
US Census Bureau (2016) data, represented in 2014 USD
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Chapter 6
Corruption in Admissions, Recruitment,
Qualifications and Credentials:
From Research into Quality Assurance
Stella-Maris Orim and Irene Glendinning
Abstract In our recent research we found evidence of corruption in education all

over the world. Integrity in education and research depends on reliability and trust.
All stakeholders involved in education, have a vested interest in maintaining quality
and standards and for identifying and helping to eradicate corrupt practices, but it is
difficult for individualsto “swim against the tide” of local norms and culture.
In this chapter we draw on research conducted in 2017–2018 for the Council of
Higher Education Accreditation’s International Quality Group (CIQG) into how
Accreditation and Quality Assurance Bodies (AQABs) respond to corruption. We
conducted a comprehensive literature review, an on-line questionnaire for AQABs
(69 valid responses) and 17 interviews.
We will focus on what we discovered about corruption in admissions, recruit-
ment, qualifications and credentials. Some of the data we refer to was not included
in the report, published by CIQG (Glendinning et al., 2019).
In most educational systems quality assurance (QA) is monitored by at least one
AQAB. The questions we asked were designed to explore what AQABs responsible
for academic quality and standards, do about corruption they find during activities.
Given the scale of corruption in the literature, media and press reports, surpris-
ingly few AQAB participants expressed concerns about corruption of any type, but
their modus operandi made it unlikely they would identify during institutional
audits. Many AQABs did not see pro-active investigations of suspicionsas part of
their responsibility.
The chapter closes with the question of who is responsible for reducing corrup-
tion in education and research.
S.-M. Orim (*) · I. Glendinning

Coventry University, Coventry, UK
e-mail: S.Orim@coventry.ac.uk; csx128@coventry.ac.uk

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_6
134 S.-M. Orim and I. Glendinning
Keywords Quality assurance · Higher education · Admissions and recruitment ·

Credentials and qualifications · Corruption · Fraud
Introduction
This chapter draws on reviewed sources, media reports and selected results from a
study conducted during 2017–2018 for the Council for Higher Education
Accreditation/CHEA International Quality Group (CIQG). The research was
designed to find out what roles are played by Accreditation and Quality Assurance
Bodies (AQABs) in fighting corruption in higher education and what they identify
as the main problems in their part of the world. Together with our colleague Dr.
Andrew King, we created an on-line survey instrument that was designed to collect
largely quantitative data responses from different parts of the world, using the
CIQG’s register of AQABs and networks on quality assurance. We followed the
questionnaire with semi-structured interviews to capture more in-depth information
from selected people involved in specific aspects of higher education, research or
academic publishing.
We based our survey on an earlier report, put together by Sir John Daniel (IIEP
& CIQG, 2016), consisting of contributions from an expert panel. This defined the
scope of the research, exploring AQAB responses about corruption in six areas: the
regulatory process, the teaching role, admission and recruitment of students, student
assessment, credentials and qualifications, research and academic publishing. We
later added a seventh category, corruption in institutional governance, that emerged
from the research findings. This chapter will mainly focus on just two of those seven
categories, admission and recruitment of students and credentials and
qualifications.
Throughout the study we conducted an extensive literature search to explore
types of corruption that apply to higher and other levels of education and to gain
some measure of understanding on how commonly fraud and corruption occur in
education and how this varies geographically. We collected many interesting and
sometimes shocking examples, both of corruption and responses to corruption, from
the literature, far more than we had space for in the final report. In addition, corrup-
tion in education has continued to happen and be reported since we finished our
research. Therefore, in addition to presenting relevant findings from the final report,
this chapter will also refer to more recent examples and some of the sources we
found that were not included in our report.
The Transparency International Glossary defines corruption as “the abuse of
entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International, n.d.). Corruption can
be seen as at one extreme of a continuum for classifying behavior, starting on one
side with integrity or exemplary practice, then routine/normal conduct, followed by
lack of knowledge, making genuine mistakes, carelessness, incompetence, malprac-
tice/misconduct/dishonesty, negligence and then varying degrees of corruption. For
this research we defined corruption as “intentional actions of individuals or groups
6 Corruption in Admissions, Recruitment, Qualifications and Credentials… 135
rather than misconduct through accident, incompetence or ignorance” (Glendinning

et al., 2019, p. 5). This definition of corruption in the context of education, helps to
define what was central to the research.
Literature Review
Unusually for academic research, we found relatively few academic journal papers
on corruption in education. The vast majority of the sources were social media
posts, newspaper articles, radio and television programmes; many of these were the
result of investigative journalism to expose fraud and corruption. On consideration
of the situation, this is not surprising, because investigative journalists are more
agile and may be able to respond rapidly to sources of interesting stories on corrup-
tion compared to academic researchers. Although there is a journalist code of con-
duct that must be followed, it is much easier for a committed journalist to secure
funding, design an investigation and gain permission to investigate suspicions of
corruption, than it would be for an academic researcher to design a similar experi-
ment, then apply for funding and finally secure ethical approval, for what would be
perceived as hazardous research. However, we did find publications by some
intrepid academic researchers in this field that provided very useful evidence about
corruption in different parts of the world, which we will include in this chapter.
Linking quality assurance and corruption was an uncommon theme in the litera-
ture, which confirms why this research was needed.
Literature Sources on Corruption in Admission and Recruitment
Nepotism, favouritism and bribery are common forms of corruption in admission to

higher education. This section will review diverse cases of fraud that span the globe,
from parents paying bribes to further their children’s education, leaked examination
questions, to homework help sites.
The first example, which is from Japan, concerns the Director General from the
Japanese Ministry of Education. He was found to have bribed officials at the Tokyo
Medical School, to secure admission for his son, allegedly in return for preferential
treatment for the University in research funding (Kakuchi, 2018).
A disturbing story from Russia indicates how challenging the corruption ortho-
doxy can have serious consequences. Pinchuk and Coalson (2018) reported on a
case of a concerned academic highlighting the availability of leaked exam questions
on-line prior to the Unified State Examination (EGE). This examination was intro-
duced in 2009 to assess eligibility for university admission, in order to reduce inci-
dences of exam fraud and ensure fairness. However, instead of gratitude, the
organization responsible for administering the examinations threatened the
whistle-blower with legal action (ibid). The system which was meant to foster social
mobility and encourage entry to government service, itself became the subject
of fraud.
Cases like this are not isolated to Russia. The Operation Varsity Blues scandal in
the USA was first reported in 2019 (Korn, 2019). A total of 33 parents were found
to have paid bribes to the agent Rick Singer and were then sentenced according to
what contribution they made to the fraud. These cases are indicative of the endemic
situation of corruption in US higher education. In October 2021, the BBC News
published an update to this admission scandal featuring “parents convicted in first
university admissions scandal trial” (BBC UK, 2021). This latest development arose
because, unlike the other parents who admitted their guilt, two wealthy fathers
chose to plead not guilty. They were convicted of paying bribes for their children to
be admitted to elite universities after the agent fabricated evidence that they were
successful athletes. One of the parents paid $300,000 USD while the other paid
$220,000 USD. Surprisingly, one of the parents is said to have also offered to pay a
$1.5 million USD bribe for his twin daughters’ admission to Stanford and Harvard
(BBC UK, 2021). Furthermore, Times Higher Education (THE, 2021) revealed that
on October 13, 2021, a former Wake Forest volleyball coach involved in the same
scandal, received a reprieve in return for repaying the alleged bribe just ahead of the
trial. Does this response serve as a deterrent to such conduct?
In an interesting footnote to this athletics admissions scandal, Enrique Guerra-
Pujol put together a case for legal action to be brought against homework help sites
like Chegg.com, which he claims to be a contract cheating company that should be
shut down (Guerra-Pujol, 2021). In addition to referring to the athletics bribery
case, he cites parallels with other upheld cases from USA of adult-aided bribery-
based cheating. One notable case involved Professor Edward Ennels, who set up a
tariff of charges (ranging from $150 to $500 USD), for his students at Baltimore
Community College to be awarded different grades, which resulted in a prison sen-
tence for the teacher of 10 years and $60,000 USD in costs (see Guerra-Pujol,
2021, p. 3).
There are similar cases to these in Africa and in other continents where they may
not be reported as widely or investigated effectively. Admission into Nigerian uni-
versities is a big problem, with the number of applicants that secure places every
year being less than half of those who apply for admission. Usually, in the federal
universities where a quota system is operational, access is based on merit with some
consideration of the applicant’s geographic catchment-area. The state universities
usually give preference to applicants from their states before other applicants, and
the private universities are at liberty to admit applicants, based on merit, provided
their requirements are met (see Orim, 2014, p. 88).
As a result of a shortage of university places compared to the demand, just like
the US cases described above, parents are willing to pay huge sums of money to
ensure their children get admission to study courses perceived as better than others
(such as Engineering, Medicine, and Law). Applicants are also willing to bribe or
pay any ‘price’ for admission into the prime federal universities as these are subsi-
dised with cheaper tuition fees than the state and public universities (Nigerianprice,
2021). This issue has been going on for decades, although there has not been much
publicity about it.
Times Higher Education reporter Anna McKie reported on an investigation of
sexual harassment of female students by lecturers at Makerere University in Uganda
(McKie, 2018). This took place over a 10-year period and the investigation led to a
pledge from the vice chancellor to take action. A similar example of harassment was
captured by the BBC Africa Eye in October 2019, which included 13 minutes of
recorded video featuring a senior lecturer from University of Lagos in Nigeria who
was offering applicants admission to the University in exchange for sex. The under-
cover female journalist posed as a 17-year old secondary school graduate (under the
legal age of consent in Lagos State), seeking admission into the University of Lagos
(UniLag, for short), but that did not serve as a deterrent to the senior lecturer (BBC
News Africa, 2019a). This lecturer had faced previous allegations of sexually
assaulting female students. A similar case at the University of Ghana, was included
in the same report (BBC News Africa, 2019a), featuring a journalist posing as a
final year undergraduate student seeking admission into a master’s course. These
cases show similarities to other examples in several African countries that applied
to different levels of study. Even though university policy forbids lecturers having
sexual relationships with students, where they can influence their education or
career, both the master’s and undergraduate applicants faced sexual harassment
from the lecturers (BBC News Africa, 2019a).
In December 2019 another covertly recorded video shows how professors from
two Ghanaian universities were abusing their power by demanding sexual favours
in return for admission for would-be applicants, who were again undercover report-
ers (BBC News Africa, 2019b). The two Ghanaian professors were suspended
(without pay), but were since reinstated, on condition that they underwent retraining
and monitoring (BBC News Africa, 2020). A different type of admission and recruit-
ment fraud in African Universities involves scammers pretending to be admission
officers helping applicants to secure places in polytechnics, universities, and other
higher education institutions (Kane, 2020).
We found evidence of universities making false or fraudulent claims in market-
ing their programmes (for example, about their facilities, reputation, affiliations,
and educational provision), typically to boost the recruitment of international fee-
paying students (Ellen, 2017; Coughlan, 2017; Silhan, 2021). This deception is
fuelled by applicants who are ‘vulnerable, under pressure and uncertain’ when
faced with forceful marketing tactics (Busby, 2019). Researcher John Bradley has
specialised in exposing this type of fraudulent activity by UK higher education pro-
viders (Bradley, 2013, 2018). He conducts his research by examining claims made
in prospectuses of UK universities.
Similar to the Russian EGE national examination and the Nigerian Joint
Admissions and Matriculations Board (JAMB), an entrance examination board for
tertiary-level institutions, the GaoKao was instituted across China in 1978 (Teniola,
2017). The Chinese national university entrance examinations were designed to
address corruption in admissions (Cyranoski, 2018), but far from solving corrup-
tion, the stakes are so high in China that cheating remains rife and can be very
contrived, such as identity theft (Liu, 2020), and cheating is often parent aided. This
has led to strange countermeasures, such as banning bras (Phillips, 2013) and more
conventional use of technology, including body scans, blocks on communication
signals and surveillance cameras in exam halls.
The ‘Vyapam scam’ provides an example of more sophisticated widespread
entrance examination corruption, this time in India (Mohamedbhai, 2020). The
Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board is an Indian government body
responsible for conducting entrance examinations for government jobs and higher
education institutions. There had been earlier reports of irregularities in Vyapam,
but until this report was produced, no one had imagined the scale of the admission
and recruitment scam, that was found to involve politicians, businessmen, senior
officials, and some 2500 impersonators in examinations (Mohamedbhai, 2020). It
was alleged that the digital data of the OMR (Optical Mark Recognition) sheets was
manipulated by officials of the Madhya Pradesh Professional Examination Board
(NDTV, 2021). According to CBI spokesperson Joshi, those accused were said
to have:
“adopted a unique engine-bogie system or method of cheating in MPPMT-2012 by engag-
ing intelligent students as solver candidates, allowing their answers to be copied by benefi-
ciaries or bogie candidates, and also manipulation of digital data and OMR answer sheets
of accused candidates by the said persons for passing these candidates in MPPMT-2012.”
(NDTV, 2021)
Unethical admission and recruitment collaboration between university staff and an

admission board is another variation. In India in 2015, again in the state of Madhya
Pradesh, authorities uncovered a group led by an assistant professor who was work-
ing with officials from the entrance examinations board. This group had unlawfully
influenced the admission of over 2000 students into medical school by selling
examination questions, enabling ‘grade improvements,’ and providing imperson-
ators to sit admissions exams for a fee (see Kirya, 2019, p. 43).
The international admission and recruitment market is another area where cor-
ruption thrives. Driven by factors in some countries such as unemployment, low
standards of living and dissatisfaction with the local education provision, the desire
to migrate to countries perceived as greener pastures can be achieved through a
student visa. Anglophone countries are particularly attractive to such applicants, but
China is also a popular destination – in decreasing order of number of inbound stu-
dents in 2019: USA, UK, China, Canada, Australia (Project Atlas, 2019). Although
applicants can apply and secure admission to international higher education institu-
tions by themselves, experiences in their home countries may convince them to rely
on the services of education agents. These agents play an important role in bridging
the gap between higher education institutions and international students and can
exert some influence on the process (Bista, 2017; Robinson-Pant & Magyar, 2018;
Tuxen & Robertson, 2018), and some bend the rules to secure admission and claim
their applicants’ consultancy fees. Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2020) argue that some
of these education agencies are problematic because of recourse to illegal and

unethical behaviour to achieve their lucrative goals. They also found that due to
applicants’ lack of knowledge, it is not uncommon for education agents simply to
mislead them about available university options and opportunities.
The great demand for education agents as a bridge between the international
students and HEIs boosts the education agent business as discussed by Xu and
Miller (2021). The current system in many countries has outgrown the regulatory
frameworks and monitoring systems designed to protect international applicants
from unethical or fraudulent conduct by either agents or education providers.
In 2014 there was an exposé of corrupt practices by education agents and higher
education institutions in Australia (McNeilage & Visentin, 2014), followed up later
by a report by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) (Besser & Cronau,
2015). In response to this and similar scandals, Australia and New Zealand govern-
ments have since enacted legislation, setting standards for HE providers’ use of
education agents, to protect international students’ rights and the sustainability of
their education markets and provision, both domestically and internationally
(Australian Government, 2018; NZQA, n.d.). Although both these codes of practice
set out increasingly rigorous standards for education providers, a comparative anal-
ysis of both set of regulations suggests some aspects of protection for international
students are still weak or missing, including lack of due diligence and weak contrac-
tual arrangements when appointing agents and training requirements for agents
(Nikula, 2020, p. 9–12), leaving the potential for irregularities in agents’ fees and
unethical conduct.
Xu and Miller (2021) explored students’ perceptions of, and experiences with,
education agents for Canada-bound international students. Their study had a total of
385 participants representing 59 countries. The findings revealed that approximately
half the students made their application with help from education agents and their
general perceptions and experiences with agents were less than satisfactory. In con-
trast, Bista (2019) found that the experiences of applicants from Nepal in using
education agents were comparatively positive. Most students who participated in
this study felt they could trust the agents, although other students reported they were
made to pay more than the required fees and were falsely threatened that failure to
pay would result in them being refused entry to their study country (see Bista,
2019, p. 18).
While we were writing this chapter, leading US liberal arts institution Amherst
College announced that it will stop giving preferential admission to children of
alumni (Nietzel, 2021), a long-standing practice common in prestigious USA uni-
versities. This is a positive development, but it remains to be seen whether other HE
providers, in US and elsewhere, will follow suit and also end practices such as
favouring admission for children of rich donors and public figures.
iterature Sources on Corruption in Qualifications

L
and Credentials
The use of fake degree certificates and diplomas to gain unfair advantage is not a
new form of corruption; it is easy to do, and, without awareness of this threat, it will
often go unnoticed. There are many motives for using fake credentials or exaggerat-
ing or inventing qualifications, to secure a job, gain promotion or to be admitted into
higher education. Some people are prepared to take the risk (Børresen et al., 2020).
One reason for faking qualifications arises when there is difficulty in securing
admission into higher education (Garwe, 2015; Orim, 2014). Another driving factor
is rigid rules on promotion: in Russia, for example, a higher education degree is
required for promotion to a senior management level, therefore there is a huge
demand for part-time study by mature students who find themselves unable to prog-
ress further in their career. According to one interviewee during our CIQG research:
“nowadays [fake degrees] is not a huge problem [in Russia], you as a student can go to
university pretend to work and faculty members will pretend to teach you and you will get
a real degree not a fake degree.”
In addition to corrupt professors inside respectable HE institutions, there are many

fake universities, often called degree mills, providing certificates and diplomas for
payment (AACRAO, 2005; Daniel, 2018). Degree mills often have names and web
sites that are very similar to genuine universities; some offer fake degrees cloned
from or very similar to certificates and transcripts issued by real universities (BBC
File on 4, 2018). Investigative journalism was again instrumental in exposing how
UK and EU students could gain access to an English student loan using fraudulent
qualifications (BBC Panorama, 2017). This shows that it is possible for anyone to
acquire an academic qualification, even a doctorate, without undertaking the neces-
sary study or research, given the right contacts or for payment. The BBC File on 4
report specifically focussed on the operations of Pakistan-based degree mill Axact
(BBC File on 4, 2018). For a more comprehensive discussion about Axact, see
chapter four in this volume (Ezell, 2023).
The demand for higher education credentials, high unemployment rate, reliance
on formal qualifications or certifications, and the desire for recognition and success,
fuels corrupt practices in the higher education sector (Orim, 2014; Garwe, 2015).
Garwe’s exploratory study in 2015 attempted to substantiate media reports regard-
ing the rise in Qualification, Award and Recognition Fraud in Higher Education in
Zimbabwe (Garwe, 2015). The results depicted an increase in credential fraud
involving both academic and professional awards and recognitions. Like contract
cheating, this is a global phenomenon and a very lucrative industry.
To counter the threat from credential fraud requires a global response, and that is
exactly what is happening. A global network of credential verification companies
called the Groningen Declaration Network (GDN) has been established to provide
a secure record of all genuine credentials and qualifications and an associated veri-
fication service. Some of the companies are private commercial ventures, but many
are funded or supported by national governments (Daniel, 2018). Individual compa-

nies can extend their verification capacity by reaching reciprocal agreements with
other members of GDN, to check both national awards and credentials awarded by
universities in other countries. What the GDN services cannot do, however, is to
detect unearned degrees awarded by a genuine university, based on insider
corruption.
Dissernet is a group of academics and journalists who are interested in exposing
and challenging corruption in Russian education, specifically focusing on fraud in
the award of PhDs (Rostovtsev, 2017). The group have digitised thousands of PhD
dissertations awarded by Russian universities and checked them for plagiarism. In
addition to finding over 6000 PhD dissertations that were 100% plagiarised, they
found evidence of systematic fraud by several groups of professors, each group
responsible for supervising as many as 50 PhD students. These groups of candidates
submitted similar, sometimes identical, non-original PhD theses (Abalkina
et al., 2020).
A fake university has also been used by those trying to prevent fraud. In 2019,
federal agents in USA set up a sting operation to catch international students who
were intent on overstaying their visa. The agents created and promoted a fake uni-
versity, the University of Farmington, which led to the arrest of 129 students, all
from India (BBC News, 2019).
Other countermeasures to address bogus universities, diploma mills and other
forms of fake credentials, involve awareness-raising for everyone affected and pro-
moting easy reporting methods so that these companies can be shut down and/or
face prosecution, on a national level. It is worth noting that “those affected” really
means everyone – who would want to have to rely on an unqualified airline pilot,
medical professional or civil engineer? Although cases of this nature are relatively
rare, the risk of significant danger to human life from cheating became very real
after an air disaster in May 2020 when 98 people died in Karachi (Hashim, 2020).
After this crash, attributed to human error, it emerged that some pilots were employ-
ing impersonators to complete their safety training and others had fake licenses
(ibid). According to the same source, Pakistan International Airlines initially sus-
pended 150 pilots, but an update from December 2020 confirms that 110 of the
suspended pilots had been reinstated: PIA “cancelled the licences of 15, … and 14
pilots had been declared unfit to fly” (India TV, 2020), with some cases still being
considered.
In 2017, Carecheck UK, a private company specialising in background checking
of candidates (Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checking), ran a survey with
1005 adult participants in which over 50% (512) admitted using resumés that were
not 100% true. They analysed the types of deceit and qualification fraud that the
respondents admitted to: 5% lied about having GCSEs, A-Levels or a degree and
3% lied about having a master’s degree, 27% exaggerated GCSEs (age 16 matricu-
lation qualifications) and 20% exaggerated A-levels (age 18 advanced qualifica-
tions). In a similar vein in the US, Swift (2018) of local10.com News reported that
Melissa Howard, running for public office in Florida’s 73rd House District claimed
she graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Miami University in Ohio, in a subject
that was not available at that university. Two things were disturbing about the pic-
ture of the certificate she posted online. Firstly, the university offers a Bachelor of
Science degree in business, not a Bachelor of Science degree in marketing. Secondly,
the photographed diploma also includes a signature of Robert Johnson, the then-
dean of the graduate school, not dean of the school of business (Swift, 2018). These
cases are not isolated to individuals, as seen from the research of Vasylyeva &
Ortrun, who found that three of the prevalent corruption schemes in Ukraine are
entrance examinations, grade attainment throughout university education, as well as
administrative corruption (Garwe, 2015; Vasylyeva & Ortrun, 2018). Similar activi-
ties were found in other countries, for example, in April 2019 four Lebanese univer-
sities were investigated for selling fake degrees, leading to imprisonment of over 40
people, including both civilians and military personnel (Rose, 2019).
It has become common knowledge that fake degrees are a growing problem as
the labour market becomes more competitive (Vasylyeva & Ortrun, 2018). Hall
(2021) revealed in the Guardian.com that over the last 5 years, 85 fake UK univer-
sity websites have been closed down as part of a government crackdown on degree
fraud. Some of these websites sold fake degree certificates which they claimed were
from genuine universities. Educational fraud is thought to be on the rise in the UK
as a result of the pandemic, with the number of active essay mills proliferating
(McKie, 2020). Of course, this type of problem is not confined to the UK, but can
also be seen in many other countries, for example in Lampung-Indonesia
(Purwatmiasih et al., 2021) and Spain (Faura-Martínez et al., 2021).
Findings from Our Research
The CIQG research included a questionnaire for which there were 69 valid
responses. Of these, 25 (39%) respondents represented organisations specialising in
education standards and quality, 19 (30%) subject-specific accreditation, 13 (20%)
professional programme accreditation, seven (11%) were concerned with approval
and authorization, three said their remit involved combinations of QA/accreditation/
licensing, one was concerned with programmatic accreditation and the remaining
respondent’s organisation was focused on academic ethics within institutions. A
total of 64 respondents were from AQABs and five represented AQAB networks
(see Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 8–9).
We will summarise the responses to questions about admission and recruitment
and credentials and qualifications. Because the questionnaire’s scope was very
broad, we made it possible for respondents to skip sections of the questionnaire that
were not applicable to their organisation, which partly accounts for the low number
of responses in the questions we have reviewed here. Figure 6.1 shows participants’
responses to the question “What is your organisation’s level of concern about the
following corrupt practices in admissions and recruitment?”
Only 39 of the 69 participants opted to answer questions about this topic. Of
these 39 relatively few respondents expressed any concerns about the five types of
Fig. 6.1 Level of Concern by AQABs About Corruption in Admissions and Recruitment. Note.
The chart shows number of responses. (Data sourced from Glendinning et al. (2019))
corruption listed. Misleading advertising was of concern to 24 (14 minor, seven

serious and three major); falsified transcripts and letters generated 21 concerns (14
minor, six serious and 1 major); cheating in admissions test was of concern to 18
respondents (12 minor and six serious); exceeding enrolment limits generated just
12 expressions of concern (5 minor, 6 serious and 1 major). The type of corruption
with least concern, with only 8 responses (5 minor, 3 serious) was about bribery of
admissions staff or agents – no participants saw this as a major problem.
Given the serious threats to quality and standards we identified through the lit-
erature, particularly cases of bribery, the low level of concerns expressed and the
low perception of applicability of all these types of corruption to the majority of
participants, is particularly surprising and worrying.
The section of the questionnaire about corruption in credentials and qualifica-
tions attracted 40 responses from the 69 participants. We asked participants: “What
Fig. 6.2 Level of Concern by AQABs about Corruption in Credentials and Qualifications. Note.
The chart shows number of responses. (Data sourced from Glendinning et al. (2019))
is your organisation’s level of concern about the following corrupt practices creden-
tials and qualifications”. The responses are summarised in Fig. 6.2.
Very few concerns were expressed about the award to public figures of academic
degrees (2 minor, 3 serious) or honorary degrees (four minor). The participants who
expressed these concerns represented “North, Central and South America, South-
East Asia” (Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 21) and two ABABs operating
internationally.
More concerns were expressed about the first three types of corruption listed,
covering most parts of the world. The use of degree and accreditation mills gener-
ated 23 expressions of concern (seven minor, 13 serious and three major); falsifica-
tion of credential documentation had 22 concerns (12 minor, nine serious and three
major); finally, there were 21 concerns about false claims and statements on CVs
and job applications (12 minor, eight serious and one major).
Summarising the responses to this question, despite the global nature of prob-
lems we identified from the literature about essay mills and fake qualifications and
degrees awards, and the consequent threats to the reputation of academia and safety
concerns in the workplace, at most one third of the 69 questionnaire respondents,
sometimes considerably less than this, expressed any concerns about different forms
of corruption in credentials and qualifications.
Discussion
Most higher education providers around the world are aware of corruption, fraud
and malpractice in student assessment. Many have already implemented strong
policies and procedures to counter these threats and others are developing measures.
However, we believe that much less attention has been given by institutions to the
types of integrity breaches that we have looked at in this chapter, fraud in admis-
sions and recruitment and in credentials and qualifications.
Based on the main sources we reviewed, including scholarly publications, media
reports and AQAB research findings, it can be seen that fraud and corruption in
these two essential operational areas is a very serious threat to higher education
institutions all over the world, that it really deserves more attention, at all levels
within organisations involved with regulation, quality and standards, governance
and delivery of higher education.
Admissions and recruitment fraud do not exist in isolation and have a ripple
effect on the operation of higher education institutions. When unqualified appli-
cants, including more privileged people in society as well as desperate applicants,
are given unwarranted opportunities for access to higher education, they take places
from those who could have been recruited and admitted on merit. This type of fraud
has an impact on society, the HE institution and the individuals who unjustly missed
out on educational opportunities.
When students admitted through corruption start studying and find it difficult to
cope, thinking of the high stakes (such as future job opportunities, family expecta-
tions), they start to seek ways to succeed, even if it means by-passing learning,
thereby exploring possibilities of academic dishonesty. This then inevitably results
in further academic fraud and corruption, which, if left unchecked, will have serious
impacts on quality and standards and potentially lead to negative publicity about the
institution, or lack of trust in the higher education sector more generally, as can be
seen in the media reports we included earlier.
Although a difficult thing to do, some educational institutions are making effort
to tackle the problem of fraud, wherever it happens in the institution and irrespective
of what form it takes. However, for a holistic solution, strong commitment and lead-
ership on academic integrity is required as well as buy-in from applicants, families
of applicants, educational institutions, governments, quality assurance bodies and
even civil society. There is an active role for everyone in ensuring that rigorous
policies are created by educational institutions, to counter corruption and fraud, and
then implemented in a transparent and consistent manner.
Based on the evidence presented here, it is abundantly clear that not enough is being
done to address corruption in higher education. Here we will address recommenda-
tions to both AQABs and the regulatory organisations that govern their operational
parameters.
The focus of our research was to explore how AQABs are addressing this prob-
lem. We made 11 recommendations to AQABs in our report, summarised briefly here:
1. Review terms of reference and standards in the light of this report
2. Make explicit the commitment to reducing corruption
3. Ensure scrupulousness about transparency, accountability and integrity in every
aspect of various activities
4. Remain vigilant, and be prepared to challenge HE providers about any corrupt
practices that may undermine quality and standards
5. Pro-actively monitor and respond to suspicions of misconduct and corruption
6. Arrange site visits at short notice to counter potential “gaming” of the process
of QA by HEIs
7. Provide support for developing educational and research quality and standards
8. Regularly engage with and draw upon expertise within the HE sector to explore
ways to discourage corruption
9. Network locally and internationally with other organizations concerned with
quality and standards
10. Take a leadership role in advocating legislation to counter threats from diploma
mills and accreditation mills as well as contract cheating companies
11. Undertake research and consult with members of the HE community, including
students, to inform and enhance policies and practices for addressing corrup-
tion and misconduct…” (Glendinning et al., 2019, p. 41).
CIQG followed up on our report with their own summary of the research, setting out
an Inventory of key questions, which was also addressed to AQABs (CIQG, 2019).
We also prepared several other recommendations to different stakeholders that
were not included in our report, the key points are summarised here.
National and local governments and ministries of education should review their
own terms of reference and those they provide to AQABs operating within their
higher education sector, in the light of our findings. Vigilance needs to be instilled
at all levels within the hierarchy defining the higher education sector, in every coun-
try, about evidence of corruption and malpractice. Where such evidence is found
there needs to be appropriate follow-up, and, if necessary, swift and decisive mea-
sures to address the problem.
Transparency should be encouraged at all levels of the quality assurance process.

AQABs should be resourced and empowered to:
• provide support and guidance for HEIs under their remit, prioritizing ways to
address types of corruption and malpractice they encounter that cause harm to
quality and standards.
• explore evidence about corruption within institutions, either pro-actively or aris-
ing from any reliable source, and take specifically defined regulatory actions
when corrupt activities are identified.
• Provide feedback to the appropriate government body on any issues concerning
corruption or undermining integrity that may have consequences beyond
their remit.
There is a need to reflect on any rules or procedures within every higher education
sector that incentivise corrupt practices, either of institutions or individuals.
Examples of potentially flawed incentives include allowing or encouraging aca-
demically unqualified individuals to preferentially enroll into higher education
study by virtue of some alternative status, such as to secure an industry management
position (Russia) or being an army veteran (Kosovo). Although well-intentioned,
such incentives can lead to lack of engagement and declining standards.
Governments and other bodies with oversight for AQABs should consider pro-
viding legal protection for AQABs, particularly when they are challenging corrupt
practices.
A conversation should be started about how to reduce corruption and misconduct
in parts of the world where practices such as cheating in admissions and credentials
is seen as culturally acceptable. The dialogue should aim to influence the conduct of
public figures and academics, but also target students and their families.
Education and training in topics such as integrity, ethics, academic writing,
copyright and intellectual property rights should be provided for everyone con-
cerned with, and responsible for, quality and standards in education, ideally starting
at primary level education and include academics and current students.
Novel and innovative technological solutions and other approaches for helping to
address corruption and malpractice in higher education should be prioritised for
procurement, or funding provided for local development.
The responsibilities do not just rest with governments, ministries and AQABs.
Everyone involved in, or connected with higher education and academic research
has a part to play in fighting corruption that undermines quality, standards and
integrity.
Our advice to everyone is: firstly, don’t be discouraged if your efforts do not
immediately impact on the problem you are trying to address; secondly, networking
with other like-minded individuals and groups will help to give you new ideas,
strength and more capacity to continue the fight.
It is always good to end on a positive note. In this chapter, by focusing on the
negative evidence we are hoping to challenge any complacency and denial and raise
awareness about what additional things need to be done to reduce these types of
corruption, which affect higher education across the world. However, we do not
suggest that nothing is being done about the forms of corruption we have discussed
in this chapter.
In the course of our research, we encountered many examples of very coura-
geous individuals and groups of people who are challenging and standing up to
corruption, including anti-corruption groups in different countries, including
Dissernet, and organizations such as Transparency International, IIEP/UNESCO,
CIQG and Retraction Watch and the QA bodies who are taking action, most notably
TEQSA, QAA and QQI. We congratulate all the efforts being made to fight corrup-
tion in higher education and hope this chapter will help to inspire others to fol-
low suit.
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Dr. Stella-Maris Orim is an Assistant Professor in Coventry University, UK. She has worked for
over 2 years in Nigerian higher education (HE) and over 12 years in the UK HE. In the last
10 years, Stella has contributed to different HE quality and standards roles and made considerable
contributions to several funded research projects into corruption in HE (IPPHEAE, PAICKT,
SEEPPAI), HE Governance (CHEA/CIQG) and is currently contributing to the Partnership on
University Plagiarism Prevention (PUPP) funded by Europe and Canada. She has authored book
chapters on Quality Assurance and Academic Integrity. She is also researching into corruption in
HE provisions in Africa (Nigeria and Ghana) and contributes to Transnational (Ghana, Malaysia,
Oman) Standards and Quality offerings. She has contributed greatly to the development of the
Coventry University Group strategy on Academic Integrity.
Dr. Irene Glendinning is the academic integrity lead for Coventry University Group, based in the
Office of Teaching and Learning. During the last 12 years she has led and participated in several
successful research projects, mainly focused on policies for academic integrity, funded by the
European Commission, Council of Europe and Council for Higher Education Accreditation. She is
currently leading a working group for the European Network for Academic Integrity (ENAI) on
ethical publishing and dissemination (EPAD). Her research interests remain in academic and
research integrity, quality assurance, pedagogy, student experience and addressing corruption in
higher education. She serves on several editorial boards and advisory groups focused on academic
and research integrity and continues to conduct research, currently with funding from Canada
and Europe.
Chapter 7
Avoiding Favouritism in the Recruitment
Practice of Turkish Higher Education
Institutions
Özgür Çelik and Salim Razı
Abstract Favouritism is regarded as a widespread phenomenon in the recruitment

process and poses a significant threat to competency-based recruitment, resulting in
serious problems in research productivity, the quality of education, and the climate
of higher education institutions. The aforementioned problems are among the fun-
damental problems of Turkish higher education, and one of the sources of these
problems is favouritism. This study aimed to depict the presence of favouritism in
the recruitment practices of Turkish higher education institutions. To do this, we
first portrayed the Turkish higher education system and current recruitment prac-
tices. Then, we analysed 66 favouritism news stories regarding universities found in
the Turkish media online to explore in what ways favouritism occurs. The analysis
showed that overly detailed conditions are used as the primary method in recruiting
the favoured person in Turkish higher education, with “Specifying the research top-
ics of the favoured person” in the recruitment announcement is the most common
particular condition used for favouritism purposes. Also, interviews and written
exams are other commonly used methods, especially in the recruitment of lecturers
and research assistants. In the end, we proposed suggestions to help mitigate favou-
ritism cases in Turkish higher education.
Keywords Favouritism · Turkish higher education · Recruitment · Academic

misconduct · Anti-favouritism policies · Academic integrity
Ö. Çelik (*)
Balıkesir University, Balıkesir, Türkiye
S. Razı
Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Canakkale, Türkiye

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_7
154 Ö. Çelik and S. Razı
Introduction
Favouritism, simply defined as giving an unfair advantage to individuals (Tauginienė

et al., 2018), is a significant threat to competence-based or merit-based recruitment.
Favouritism is a serious misconduct that inevitably leads to corruption, first when or
where it occurs, and then ultimately in society. As an umbrella term, favouritism has
many different forms, such as nepotism, cronyism, patronage or clientelism (Özler
& Büyükarslan, 2011). Nepotism is recruiting underqualified relatives (nepots) by
virtue of their relationship with the employer (Wong & Kleiner, 1994); while in
cronyism, old friends or associates are preferred over other candidates without con-
sidering their qualifications (Begley et al., 2010). On the other hand, patronage and
clientelism refer to hierarchical ties based on a dyadic and asymmetrical relation-
ship between persons of unequal power (Sayarı, 2014). Among these forms of
favouritism, nepotism and cronyism are the most likely types to occur in academic
settings.
Favouritism is a widespread phenomenon in the recruitment process (Ponzo &
Scoppa, 2011), and a growing number of studies show that employers tend to recruit
their family members (nepotism) or persons with whom they are socially connected
(cronyism). This tendency poses a significant threat to the organisational culture of
higher education (HE) institutions because expertise and competence should be the
essential criteria in higher education recruitment. Safina (2015) lists some of these
threats to HE as personnel demotivation, loss of beliefs and abilities, permanent fear
and negative thinking, self-despair of qualified co-workers, bad management of
workforce, lack of competition, and irresponsible behaviours.
The implications of these threats might become visible in the short-, medium-,
and long-term, relating to the consequences of favouritism in higher education. For
example, favouritism may cause a negative impact on satisfaction, motivation,
work, commitment and trust among employees (Büte, 2011; Zulfiqar et al., 2019).
Also, loss of trust in administrators (Turhan, 2014) and an increase in mobbing
cases (Demirel & Seçkin, 2014) are potential consequences of favouritism. However,
the situation deteriorates in the medium-term when the institution is confronted
with negative feedback about its reputation, a decrease in organisational perfor-
mance and sustainable development, management problems (Vveinhardt & Sroka,
2020) and loss of trust (Turhan, 2014). When it comes to the long-term effects,
favouritism will facilitate corruption (Safina, 2015) and society’s level of tolerance
towards unfair behaviours increases (Vveinhardt & Sroka, 2020). As a result, soci-
ety may lose its trust in universities. It can be seen, therefore, that the negative
consequences of favouritism are far-reaching, as short-term consequences echoing
in the department but having long-term effects in the institution and society.
Although favouritism is a global problem, it is widely encountered in underde-
veloped or developing countries (Kim, 2007). As a developing country, Turkish
higher education has been suffering from favouritism for a long time along with
other problems (Çoban, 2014). From 2010 to 2020, media coverage highlighted
several blatant cases, triggering a reaction to favouritism. However, research on
7 Avoiding Favouritism in the Recruitment Practice of Turkish Higher Education… 155
favouritism in Turkey is quite limited. One reason for this is that, unlike other types
of corruption, favouritism is implicit, indirect, and hard to prove (Loewe et al.,
2008). Currently, there is no dissertation dealing with favouritism in higher educa-
tion in the Turkish National Thesis Center Database, and to the best of our knowl-
edge, there are only two studies on favouritism in Turkish higher education. Those
two studies focus on perceptions of favouritism among faculty members (Aydoğan,
2012) and administrative staff (Çelik & Erdem, 2012) in universities.
Governance of Turkish Higher Education
Higher education in Turkey underwent three reform movements, namely, in 1933,

1946 and 1981 (Arslan, 2005). From the Ottoman Empire era to the early years of
the Turkish Republic, higher education institutions were mainly military schools,
and higher education evolved around military purposes (Kılıç, 1999). Starting with
the 1933 reforms, Turkey adopted the European higher education model. In the
1946 reforms, universities gained scientific and administrative autonomy. With the
1981 reform, the Council of Higher Education (CoHE) was established, and univer-
sities were affiliated to CoHE. As stated on their website: “CoHE is responsible for
the strategic planning, coordination, supervision and monitoring of higher educa-
tion as well as establishing and maintaining quality assurance mechanisms in
Turkey” (The Council of Higher Education, 2019). CoHE is directed by a Board
consisting of 21 members. Each Board member is appointed for 4 years. Fourteen
members of the Board are appointed by the President of the Republic of Turkey,
whereas seven others are elected by the Inter-University Board (IUB) as the other
governing body in Turkish higher education. The Inter-University Board is a supra-
university academic body responsible for ensuring academic coordination among
universities, taking measures to meet the need of universities’ faculty members, and
preparing draft laws, by-laws and regulations within the scope of higher education
planning (UAK, 2021). IUB is also responsible for assigning associate professor-
ship titles to candidates who are eligible considering their publications and other
studies (Higher Education Act, 1981). In Turkish academia, the associate professor-
ship title is given by the IUB. However, recruitment to associate professor positions
is made by each higher education institution individually, under the supervision
of CoHE.
Turkish higher education institutions are governed by their university Senate.
The Senate consists of the chancellor, vice-chancellors, deans, directors of graduate
schools, directors of post-secondary vocational schools and a faculty member rep-
resentative from each faculty. University chancellors are appointed by the President
of the Republic of Turkey for 4 years. Universities are comprised of six main aca-
demic units: faculties, graduate schools, four-year schools, conservatories, post-
secondary vocational schools and research and application centres. Faculties award
BA and BSc degrees, whereas graduate schools award MA, MSc and PhD degrees.
Four-year schools provide instruction for a particular profession. Conservatories are
Table 7.1 Statistical DETAILS about Turkish Higher education

N Public Foundation Total
HE institutions 129 78 207
Faculty Graduate 4-year Vocational Res. & app. Total
school school school Center
Academic units 1969 592 383 1029 4057 8030
HE Assoc.
students degree BA MA PhD Total
M F M F M F M F M
1,476,843 1,526,121 2,419,316 2,119,610 158,113 138,888 46,943 54,299 7,940,133
Teaching staff Prof. Assoc. Prof Asst. Prof. Instructor Research assistant Total
30,562 17,778 41,508 38,289 51,548 179,685
Note. Open and distance education are excluded
where students are trained to specialise in specific fine arts. Post-secondary voca-
tional schools award associate degrees and students are trained for specific profes-
sions for 2 years. Lastly, research and application centres are responsible for
carrying out research in particular areas.
Currently, Turkey has almost eight million students in over 200 higher education
institutions. Table 7.1 presents some statistical details about Turkish higher educa-
tion (HE Information Management System, 2020).
Roles and Responsibilities in Turkish Academia
In the Turkish Higher Education Act (1981), academic staff are identified in three
categories; faculty members with PhD, teaching staff, and research assistants.
Faculty members with PhD category can hold one of three positions: full professors,
associate professors, and assistant professors. According to article 22, the responsi-
bilities of faculty members with PhD are:
• “To carry out education, instruction and applied studies at the associate, under-
graduate, and graduate levels in higher education institutions and to manage
project preparation and seminars in accordance with the purposes and principles
of this Law,
• To carry out scientific research and publish that research in their higher educa-
tion institutions,
• To accept students on certain days according to the schedule determined by the
head of the relevant unit; helping them in necessary matters, and guiding and
counselling them in line with the purpose and main principles of this Law,
• To fulfil the duties assigned by the authorised bodies,
• To perform other duties assigned by this Law” (Higher Education Act, 1981,
p. 5361).
Teaching staff, the so-called instructors or lecturers, are assigned either full-time or
part-time to teach courses that require specialist knowledge and expertise in univer-
sities and their affiliated units. Candidates who apply for a position with the teach-
ing staff are required to have at least a master’s degree. Instructors and lecturers are
eligible to teach students for associate and undergraduate degrees.
Research assistants are academic staff who assist in research, examinations, and
experiments in higher education institutions and perform other duties assigned by
authorised bodies. Eligible research assistant candidates are required to be under the
age of 35. Research assistants cannot teach in departments since they are pursuing
their postgraduate degrees. After completing their PhD degrees, they can teach up to
12 h daily.
In Turkish academia, titles and positions are different concepts that are issued by
different bodies. For instance, an academic may have the title of associate professor
without being employed as an associate professor in a university. Associate profes-
sor candidates must first obtain the title from the IUB, then apply to a university for
an associate professor position. The title is a prerequisite for the position.
Recruitment in Turkish Higher Education
Recruitment in Turkish Higher Education is strictly framed by two regulations.

Teaching staff and research assistants are recruited according to the regulation enti-
tled “The regulation regarding the central and entrance exams to be applied in the
recruitment of the teaching staff”, whereas the recruitment of faculty members is
based on “The regulation on promotion and recruitment of faculty members”.
The Recruitment of Teaching Staff and Research Assistants
Teaching staff and research assistant candidates are required to obtain eligible
scores from two central exams in order to apply for the recruitment. First, they are
required to take the Academic Personnel and Graduate Education Entrance Exam
(ALES), which is administered twice a year, consisting of multiple-choice ques-
tions measuring verbal and quantitative reasoning (OSYM, 2021). Second, they
take the Foreign Language Proficiency Exam (YDS). Both ALES and YDS are
administered by the Turkish Student Selection and Placement Center. The applica-
tion requirements are presented in Table 7.2.
According to the aforementioned recruitment regulations, all candidates must
get a score of at least 70 from ALES in order to apply for a position. The YDS exam
is compulsory only for academic staff who will teach a foreign language, and the
minimum score is 80. For the teaching staff to be appointed to teach a foreign lan-
guage course, only an oral exam is administered to measure the candidates’ profes-
sional articulation and knowledge skills. However, if the Senate decides so, a written
Table 7.2 Application requirements for teaching staff and research assistants
ALES YDS Interview Written Exam Age MA Degree
Teaching staff M O O M N/A M
Foreign language teaching staff M M M O N/A M
Research assistants M O O M 35 O
M mandatory, O optional
Table 7.3 Percentage values of exams and interviews for candidates’ evaluation
Interview or
ALES GPA YDS Written Exam
Foreign language teaching staff 30% 10% 30% 30%
Teaching staff and research assistants at 4-year schools 30% 30% 10% 30%
Teaching staff and research assistants at 4-year schools 35% 30% N/A 35%
and at post secondary vocational schools
exam is also administered to those who score at least 60 in the oral exam. Only a
written exam is held for other teaching staff and research assistants to measure the
candidates’ level of knowledge relating to their field. The written exam is manda-
tory for teaching staff and research assistants. It should be noted that research assis-
tants must be under the age of 35 to apply for a position, and holding a postgraduate
degree is not mandatory. On the other hand, teaching staff, including foreign lan-
guage teaching staff, should have at least an MA degree.
The candidates are evaluated by a hiring committee. The committee consists of
three members and one substitute member to be proposed by the deans or directors
of the related academic units. The minimum percentages required in exams are pre-
sented in Table 7.3.
Candidates with at least 65 points are considered successful, and the candidate(s)
with the highest score are recruited for the position (The Council of Higher
Education, 2018). Within this evaluation framework, an interview or written exam
score can be used as the primary instrument to recruit the favourited person. ALES
and YDS exam scores come from a national database, and validation of these scores
can easily be made electronically. GPA score is retrieved from university databases
and can be tracked electronically. Therefore, it is almost impossible to manipulate
these scores. However, interviews or written exams are scored by the exam jury.
There seems to be a great potential for favouritism to occur through the manipula-
tion of these scores at this step.
The Recruitment of Assistant Professors
Universities that recruit assistant professors announce the vacant positions both on
their university webpages and in the Official Gazette which is the only official jour-
nal of Turkey informing the public about new legislations and announcements
including official job posts. In this announcement, the conditions are specified, and
the applicants are given a period of not less than 15 days to apply. Candidates sub-
mit their CVs, research projects, and publications to the relevant dean’s office or
directorate. In order to examine the applications of the candidates, a committee is
formed by the relevant dean or director. Three full professors or associate profes-
sors, one of whom is an external member employed by another university, are
assigned in relation to the candidate’s discipline. The dean or director sends the
candidates’ portfolios, including scientific publications and research studies, to the
committee members and invites them to submit their written reports about each
candidate within a month. After receiving the written reports, the dean or the direc-
tor informs the Board of Directors and asks their opinions about each candidate. If
there is more than one candidate, the members of the Board indicate their prefer-
ences, justifying them accordingly. The dean or the director then reports their deci-
sion to the chancellor. The chancellor decides whether to make the appointment or
not. Assistant professors are appointed by the chancellor for at least 1 or at most 4
years, considering the advice of the Board of Directors. This recruitment procedure
is quite open to favouritism since recruitment is solely based on the chancellor’s
decision. The preferences of the Board of Directors are advisory only. The chancel-
lor may decide to recruit a candidate whose qualifications are lower than the other
candidates. In the Recruitment Regulation, no quantitative criterion is set for a can-
didate to be regarded as successful. The recruitment decision is given to the
chancellor.
The Recruitment of Associate Professors
The prerequisite of being appointed to the position of associate professor is obtain-

ing an associate professor title from the Inter-University Board. As in the recruit-
ment of faculty members, the application conditions are announced on the university
webpage and the Official Gazette. Candidates submit their portfolio, including a
CV, scientific projects and publications, to the Rectorate. Universities may adminis-
ter an oral interview exam for the recruitment. However, in the case of receiving the
associate professorship title after an oral interview examination session with the
Inter-University Board, the university is not allowed to hold an additional oral inter-
view examination. The chancellor sends the candidates’ portfolios to three profes-
sors, one of whom is from another university, and requests their written reports.
Based on the advice of the professors, the chancellor makes a decision about the
appointment after taking the justified opinion of the University Administrative Board.
The Recruitment of Full Professors
The Regulation on Promotion and Recruitment of Faculty Members pre-requires

three conditions to apply for a full professor position, which are; to have worked in
the related field for at least 5 years after receiving the associate professor title, to
have produced original work in the related discipline at the international level, and
to have carried out practical studies in the case of being employed in a department
of applied science. The university announces vacant full professor positions with
the conditions required to apply, and candidates submit their portfolios to the
Rectorate. In order to determine the academic qualifications of the candidates, a
committee consisting of five full professors working in the same discipline is formed
by the University Administrative Board. Three of the committee members are exter-
nal reviewers who are selected from other universities. Committee members submit
a detailed written report about each candidate to the Rectorate. The appointment is
made by the chancellor upon the decision of the University Administrative Board,
taking into account the advice from the five committee members.
Favouritism in Turkish Higher Education
Although favouritism has long been a problem in the Turkish Education System
(Aydogan, 2009), in recent years, it has started to gain more media coverage, and the
reaction against favouritism in higher education has become more visible. However,
the research on favouritism in Turkish academia is quite limited. Therefore, in order
to present a clear snapshot of favouritism cases in Turkey, we analysed 66 favourit-
ism news stories regarding universities found in the Turkish media online. We used
Google News, in which the majority of Turkish online news outlets are indexed, to
search for favouritism news stories. We conducted the search using specific key-
words in the Turkish language. Some English equivalents of the keywords are:
“favouritism”, “nepotism”, “tenure scandal”, “special condition”, “recruitment
scandal”. We turned on the “Hide Duplicates” function to avoid collecting the same
news stories. We excluded the favouritism cases which were not related to universi-
ties. The oldest news story we could find dates back to 2016. We could not find any
relevant news stories before 2016, and we stopped searching. We took the screen-
shot of each news story we found and tagged the type of favouritism (if mentioned),
the university’s name, the university’s location, and the reason why the recruitment
was regarded as a favouritism case.
Of the news stories we analysed, some of the cases explicitly relate to nepotism
(n = 13), patronage (n = 3) and cronyism (n = 2). However, in other cases, the type
of favouritism is not mentioned. In the news stories, 61% of the incidences are
reported to take place in different universities (n = 40). Almost half of the favourit-
ism cases (n = 31) took place in universities located in the central and eastern regions
of Turkey.
As emphasised in the news stories, the most commonly used method for recruit-
ing the desired candidate is to determine particular conditions in a way that would
describe only that candidate. We analysed news stories and identified eight such
conditions that were used for favouritism. These specially-chosen conditions are
presented in Table 7.4.
In 47 cases (71%), favoured candidates are recruited based on unique conditions.
Among the particular conditions identified, “specifying the research topics of the
favoured person” is the most common way used (53%). A deeper analysis of this
condition showed that the publication’s title or thesis title of the favoured person is
specified as the research topic. Thus, a very particular research topic is specified so
that other candidates cannot apply to the position. Other commonly-used favourit-
ism methods in the conditions are graduation (13%) and post-graduation (11%)
department requirements. In this method, the department of the favoured person is
specified as the department from which the candidate must have graduated.
Recruiting candidates based on their graduation department is a common hiring
practice. However, in the news stories examined, it was seen that the department of
the favoured person, which is specified in the particular conditions, is not related to
the position. In some cases, higher education institutions specify a particular train-
ing (6%) or a certificate (6%) as a particular condition. However, this training or
certificate, which the favoured person has already taken, is mainly local, with none
or very little academic value. Also, years of experience (6%) are used for favourit-
ism purposes. The exact years of experience of the favoured person, or minimum
years of experience, are specified in the conditions to eliminate as many candidates
as possible. In one case, the course name which the favoured person is teaching is
specified as the particular condition. Additionally, how long the course has been
offered, and at which level, is specified in the announcement (e.g., to have taught
Business English at the undergraduate level for three semesters). Lastly, in one case,
a university required candidates to obtain a score from a particular exam (local and
non-standardised), which is not a mandatory exam, and the minimum score for
application was determined as the score of the favoured person.
Table 7.4 Conditions used for favouritism purposes

Particular condition n
Specifying the research topics of the favoured person 25
Specifying the graduation requirement as the department of the favoured person 6
Specifying the postgraduate degree requirement as the department of the favoured person 5
Specifying a particular training that the favoured person has taken before 3
Specifying a particular certificate that the favoured person has taken before 3
Specifying the years of experience as the experience of the favoured person 3
Specifying the courses that the favoured person is teaching or taught 1
Specifying getting the desired score from a particular exam (other than mandatory exams) 1
that the favoured person has gotten before
Total 47
It can be argued that particular conditions are used as the primary method in
recruiting the favoured person in Turkish higher education. However, recent years
have witnessed a growing backlash against favouritism, especially the use of overly
detailed conditions for favouritism purposes. Also, as stated by CoHE, numerous
academics have sent formal letters of complaint to CoHE, requesting the inspection
of recruitment cases (CoHE Declarations, 2021). In the declaration note, CoHE
stated that, “In the formal letters of complaint sent to the Council of Higher
Education for investigation; there are allegations that universities set particular
conditions for the positions announced for the recruitment of academic staff, but the
particular conditions were specifically determined to indicate a particular candi-
date, thus preventing the application of other candidates, and that certain people
were recruited by means of these particular conditions. In the investigations made,
it was determined that the particular conditions included in the recruitment
announcement of some universities define a certain candidate in a way to prevent
academic competition. Great similarities were found between the publications of
the appointed persons and the particular condition determined, and even for some
appointments, the master’s or doctoral thesis titles of the appointed persons were
determined as a particular condition. In some announcements, it was observed that
restrictive and anti-competitive conditions were determined in such a way that
could not be explained by the differences between scientific quality and science
disciplines.” Following this investigation, CoHE added the following article to the
Regulation on Promotion and Recruitment of Faculty Members; “In the application
announcement, the name of a part or all of the postgraduate thesis written by the
candidate, and particular conditions that define only a certain candidate, cannot be
included in the announcement”. In order to see the impact of CoHE’s declaration
about particular conditions, we analysed the retracted recruitment announcements
of higher education institutions from the governmental announcement website (ilan.
gov.tr). Figure 7.1 shows the percentage of retracted recruitment announcements.
As these figures suggest, the reaction against favouritism in Turkish higher edu-
cation in recent years led to the retraction of some favouritism announcements. Data
show that the number of retracted announcements was 10 in 2017, 22 in 2018, 69 in
2019, 72 in 2020, and 48 in 2021. After CoHE’s declaration about particular condi-
tions on the ninth of March, 2021, 39 announcements were retracted (by October,
2021). All of the retracted announcements included one of the particular conditions
mentioned above. CoHE’s declaration was successful in reducing the favouritism
cases to some extent. However, in general, there are still particular conditions being
included in the announcements that clearly define a particular person.
The other favouritism methods articulated in news stories are biased interviews
or written exams, which are commonly used in the recruitment of teaching staff and
research assistants. Interviews or written exams are the only methods to recruit the
favoured person in the recruitment of teaching staff and research assistants because
other requirements (central exam scores and GPA) cannot be manipulated.
Therefore, interviews and written exams can pose a significant threat to competency-
based recruitment (Özkanan, 2021). Since the interviews are not recorded, it is
impossible to prove unfair practices in the interview sessions. Similarly, written
Fig. 7.1 Percentage of retracted recruitment announcements
exam questions may be supplied to the favoured person beforehand, or fairness is

intentionally avoided during scoring. Another problem with the conduct of these
exams is that they are not supervised or monitored by external parties. The exam
committee consists of the faculty members that the chancellor or the dean chooses.
Although CoHE attempted to prevent favouritism in recruitment practices with a
declaration and regulation update, this endeavour has not received the desired out-
come yet. Particular conditions are still being used as the primary method to recruit
the favoured person, even after the CoHE’s declaration. Moreover, no action has
been taken so far against biased interviews and written exams accusations. Therefore,
there is still an urgent need for a new model to prevent favouritism in recruitment
practices.
Conclusion
Favouritism-based recruitment may lead to serious problems in research productiv-

ity, the quality of education and the climate of higher education institutions.
Therefore, the prevention of favouritism should be one of the main concerns of
governing bodies in academia. However, the prevention of favouritism has been a
rather neglected topic in Turkey. Although there have been certain attempts to estab-
lish a fairer recruitment process by the CoHE, the precautions taken are not yet at
the desired level, and favouritism is still a widespread phenomenon in Turkish
academia.
The period from 2010 to the early 2020s has resulted in growing unrest among
scholars towards favouritism in Turkish universities, and after the Turkish media
started to highlight these cases, the reaction to favouritism became more visible.
With the involvement of the media, public reaction against favouritism began to
emerge, and scholars started to send official complaints to the CoHE. As the number
of complaints mounted, the CoHE published a declaration expressing their concern
about the cases of favouritism taking place at universities. In response, the CoHE
updated the recruitment regulations by adding an article restricting favouritism.
However, the CoHE’s attempt did not produce the desired outcome and favouritism
continued its existence in the recruitment practice. Obviously, the current regula-
tions, academic culture, and institutional practices fall short in preventing favourit-
ism in Turkish academia. Therefore, we propose the following suggestions to
mitigate examples of favouritism in higher education recruitment.
First, a national policy directing institutional policies should be developed. As
policies define the actions to be taken and procedures followed, the desired institu-
tional culture is cultivated through policies (Von Solms & Von Solms, 2004). From
this standpoint, favouritism can be best reduced by developing and implementing
sound national and institutional policies. Such policies constitute a crucial initial
step in establishing an anti-favouritism culture. Several higher education institu-
tions make their anti-favouritism policies publicly available via their web pages
(Imperial College London, n.d.; Loyola University, n.d.; The George Washington
University, 2019; The University of Chicago, 2021; The University of Queensland,
2014; University of Alberta, 2010; University of Cambridge, n.d.; University of
Minnesota, 1999; University of Rochester, 2015). In these policies, universities
highlight their stance against favouritism, acceptable and unacceptable practices,
and give guidelines, as well as expounding legal issues. Moreover, these policies
depict institutions’ accountability and transparency towards favouritism. To the best
of our knowledge, none of the Turkish universities has an anti-favouritism policy
yet. Therefore, the CoHE is expected to develop a national anti-favouritism policy
and encourage Turkish universities to initiate and implement their own related
policies.
Second, particular conditions in recruitment announcements should be moni-
tored critically. Identifying such conditions for the announced position may be nec-
essary for more tailored recruitments. However, particular conditions may also be
used in a way to clearly describe the favoured person, thus preventing applications
from other eligible candidates. Currently, this seems to be the most common favou-
ritism method used in the recruitment practices of Turkish higher education institu-
tions. Although the CoHE attempted to prevent this with a regulation update, using
particular conditions as a favouritism method is still a widespread practice. As a
solution, the members of the recruitment approval committee can be trained to be
more critical about particular conditions. The recruitment announcements of HE
institutions are first sent to the CoHE for approval, and only after the committee
approves the request do institutions post their recruitment announcements.
Therefore, a more critical investigation during the approval process may help detect
and prevent potential favouritism cases.
Third, interviews and written exams should be supervised by external parties. In
the recruitment of teaching staff and research assistants, interviews or written exams
are the only way to recruit the favoured person as the scores of centralised exams
cannot be manipulated. The examining board for the interview or written exams
currently consists of faculty members chosen by the dean or director. This consti-
tutes a risk and is relatively open to favouritism since the dean or director may
choose the exam board members from their close circle. An external reviewer from
a different university or a member of the CoHE’s relevant bodies could be appointed
to audit the interview or written exam process to ensure transparency and fairness.
The reviewer appointment should be made by CoHE considering the conflict of
interest between the examiners and examinee. Also, interview sessions should be
recorded and provided to relevant auditing bodies per request. Content validity of
the interviews should be ensured. Reviewers should be familiarised with the evalu-
ation rubric developed by the administrators considering institutional policies and
expectations.
Finally, academics should raise their voices against favouritism in its entirety.
Favouritism in Turkish higher education has a long history; however, only in recent
years have scholars started to rebel against unfair recruitment practices, either
through social media or by legal means. CIMER, which is the legal whistleblowing
service of the Turkish government, played an important role in raising awareness
about favouritism at the administrative level. This growing reaction, which was sup-
ported by the internet media, resulted in the anti-favouritism declaration of the
CoHE. A collective reaction against favouritism may well help raise awareness and
avoid potential occurrences of favouritism.
Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincere thanks to Sarah Elaine Eaton and
Jamie J. Carmichael, the editors of this edited collection, in addition to Graham Lee and Barış Uslu
for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Chapter 8
None of the Above: Integrity Concerns
of Standardized English Proficiency Tests
Soroush Sabbaghan and Ismaeil Fazel
Abstract High-stakes standardized English proficiency tests are generally used to

measure the language proficiency of candidates who wish to study, work in, or
immigrate to environments where English is the dominant language. The purpose of
this chapter is to shed light on the complexities and the apparent disconnect between
equity, integrity, fairness, and justice in standardized language proficiency tests and
the integrity issues that can arise as a result. Some of the pre-Covid-19 and post-
Covid-19 disconnects are outlined and potential solutions are offered by drawing
from literature, our first-hand experiences and observations as test examiners and
designers, as well as our experiences as academics in Canadian academic institu-
tions. We hope that by unveiling issues rooted in socio-cultural and socio-economic
injustices, our potential solutions will encourage stakeholders to work in tandem
towards a more equitable and inclusive language assessment.
Keywords Standardized English proficiency tests · Integrity · Equity ·

Social justice
Introduction
Large-scale standardized language tests are often used to classify and select indi-
viduals for various purposes such as immigration and university admission. These
high-stakes tests serve as “door-openers and gatekeepers” (Bachman & Purpura,
2008, p. 456) to include individuals in, or to exclude individuals from, a pathway
S. Sabbaghan (*)
Werklund School of Education, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB, Canada
e-mail: ssabbagh@ucalgary.ca
I. Fazel
Vantage One Academic English Program, University of British Columbia,
Vancouver, BC, Canada

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_8
170 S. Sabbaghan and I. Fazel
potentially leading to educational resources and opportunities, and as such can have
crucial and consequential effects on people’s lives. Due to their high impact, one
might believe that these tests uphold the highest standard of integrity. However,
high-stakes language testing can be unethically coercive. Institutions demand test-
takers prove a certain proficiency by a third party who controls all aspects of the
test, including judgment and thus the future of the test-taker (see McNamara, 2012;
Shohamy, 2001). Test-takers may take comfort in the belief that these tests are fair
in the sense that they can accurately measure the test-takers’ language proficiency
and in the sense that no one will be given an advantage (McNamara & Ryan, 2011).
However, in this chapter, we offer evidence where in some instances these tests do
not apply methods to ensure objectivity and do not grant equal opportunity for all
(e.g., Haladyna & Downing, 2004; Hoang & Hamid, 2017). The literature further
reveals the gap between testing in theory (as reflected in test scores), and test takers’
actual proficiency and their real-world language performance (Hamid et al., 2019).
Therefore, they cannot be characterized as fair. Since fairness is a precondition for
justice (Nussbaum, 2002; Sen, 2009), we cannot label these tests as just. We outline
research offering evidence where some tests do advantage a certain group while
other tests are not construct-relevant to the context of the test-taker and finally tests
that are not free from bias in form and practice.
As we outline the contents of this chapter, we draw from Shomay’s (2001)
interpretation of power of tests and how they are used to discuss issues of equity,
fairness, and justice in high-stakes commercial language proficiency tests. We
bring to fore the oft-neglected discord between equity and integrity in high-stakes
standardized language proficiency tests, such as the International English
Language Testing System (IELTS), Test of English as a Forign Languaage
(TOEFL), Canadian Academic English Language (CAEL) by making references
to the relevant literature in language testing as well as our own first-hand observa-
tions and experiences as language examiners. We argue that the “potential and real
injustice of tests” (McNamara & Ryan, 2011, p. 165) can regrettably incentivise
desperate attempts to circumvent test security at any cost. We explore unethical
behaviour exerted by both test-takers and test-developers. When it comes to dis-
cussions around test fraud, the blame is often squarely placed at the feet of test
takers. We feel it is important to also discuss underlying root causes and circum-
stances that could potentially predispose test takers to resort to fraudulent behav-
iour. Our contention is that, to discourage and deter test fraud, there needs to be a
concerted effort by higher education institutions and language testing agencies to
address issues of inequity and injustice in language assessment. To that end, we
outline challenges to equity and offer some best practices for equitable language
assessment. The chapter will conclude with a call for critical consideration of
commercialized high-stakes language tests before and after the COVID-19 pan-
demic and recommendations for adopting an equitable and inclusive approach to
language assessment.
8 None of the Above: Integrity Concerns of Standardized English Proficiency Tests 171
Unethical Behaviour
Organizations that develop transnational language proficiency tests such as the

British Council and Educational Testing Service (ETS) seek to standardize their
tests (e.g., IELTS, TOEFL) and testing procedures. They have developed strict pro-
tocols and test administration procedures to ensure test fairness; no matter where in
the world test-takers sit the test, they will receive the same test input under compa-
rable conditions. However, it seems almost paradoxical that a one-size-fits-all
approach would amount to testing fairness. At their core, standardized procedures
imposed by testing centers ignore the fact that test-takers come from different socio-
economic and sociocultural backgrounds with different interests, motivations and
experiences of learning and using English. Both test-takers and test-developers are
responsible to uphold integrity and refrain from engaging in unethical behaviours.
As Mulkey and Fremer (2005) explain, there might be various reasons why a
task-taker might cheat. Some students are under immense pressure from various
stakeholders such as parents and schools to demonstrate excellence. This might
especially apply to those students who are overachievers. As a result, these test-
takers might engage in unethical practices to succeed on the test. Other test takers
might cheat due to the financial burden these tests impose (Alsagoafi, 2018; Pearson,
2019). They might feel that cheating is a form of saving money or feel that cheating
is the only way to ensure some degree of financial security. Others might cheat
because they believe they can get away with it and others might indulge doing it
because they live in a context where others have gotten away with cheating. Finally,
Shohamy (2001) argues that there are some test-takers (who she dubbed as the dom-
inated) who simply refuse to partake into a social contract between themselves and
the test (which she labels as the dominator). Test-takers cheat because they feel they
have no choice due to the hegemony of language testing agencies and cheating is a
means to regain some sense of control.
Unethical Test-Takers
It is important to note that a test is only fair if the result of the test is based on the
“real” abilities of the test-taker. Any behavior that gives an examinee an unfair
advantage over other examinees, or any action on the part of an examinee or test
administrator that decreases the accuracy of the intended inferences arising from the
examinee’s test score or performance is considered as cheating (Cizek, 1999), and
will impact both the validity and reliability of test scores. Those who engage in
unethical behaviour use creative practices to give themselves an advantage. As test-
takers are inclined to put trust in the validity of standardized language proficiency
tests, it’s important to shine a light on cheaters in various settings. Mulkey and
Fremer (2005) offer a very interesting classification of cheater types. Adapting their
classification, we will focus on the types that are more prevalent in standardized
language testing.
• The Impersonator, also known as proxy test taker, is the person who takes the test
on behalf of someone else. For example, Carson (2014) from the Courier Mail
reported In 2009 a Perth man was jailed for taking $32,000 AUD from Indian
students who acted as an Impersonator on the IELTS.
• The Smuggler is someone who brings into the test setting materials or devices
intended to provide an advantage over honest examinees. As Examiners we have
certainly seen people trying to bring cheat sheets into an exam on some occasions.
• The Storyteller is the individual who memorizes test items only to “retell” them
later to others. Social media platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp contain
private “groups” or “rooms” where can get access to the latest ILETS questions
(often for a small fee). The group often describe themselves of a platform to
share IELTS “experiences.”
• The Chain Gang is a group that memorizes and sells items. For example, in an
article in the Guardian, Shepherd (2008) mentions the TOFEL “hoo-kee” phe-
nomenon in South Korea which involves test-takers running to upload their ver-
sion of test they just took (while other contribute). It is unclear who the audience
of the uploaded material is or what motivates test-taker to commit such an act.
• The Robin Hood category refers to test takers who are not involved, but whose
teachers or other authorities are involved in changing student responses with or
without the students’ knowledge. It is unfortunate but test integrity can be com-
promised by people administering the exams.
Unethical Test-Makers
There is an underlying assumption that with standardized testing, test-takers have

equal opportunities to develop skills and knowledge and that they will be assessed
in an equitable and fair manner (McNamara & Ryan, 2011). This assumption might
stem from claims made by testing organizations. For example, the IELTS website
claims that “Thousands of the world’s most reputable universities and colleges will
accept your IELTS results as proof of your English language proficiency” (IELTS,
2021a). It also states that the test is fairer (than other language proficiency tests)
because it “gives you a quiet room for an individual speaking test with no distrac-
tions or interruptions” (IELTS, 2021b). With such bold claims, it is understandable
that some test-takers might assume that the test is equitable and fair. But there are
studies that question both the fairness and equity of these standardized proficiency
tests. For example, Hu and Trenkic (2019) show that test-preparation courses bloat
test-taker’s test scores, which is not indicative of their academic language profi-
ciency. In another study, Hamid et al. (2019) highlighted that test-takers view lan-
guage proficiency tests as not offering an accurate measure of their proficiency.
These findings raise concerning questions about the reliability of scores, validity,
and fairness of these tests.
Mass language testing is immensely complex. There are logistics, resources, and
security challenges that these organizations have overcome. However, there are still
looming challenges which impact test fairness, validity, or equity. For example, the
results from language proficiency tests such as the IELTS are now used in contexts
for which the test was never designed (Pearson, 2019). The scores are used for
immigration even though there is limited research in the predictive validity of these
scores for such a use. Some employers use these tests to assess prospective employ-
ees’ ability to function in a workplace, even though these tests are designed to mea-
sure one’s language proficiency not what an employee is expected to do in different
occupations (Choi, 2008; McLeod, 2021). And yet, testing organizations have taken
no accountability beyond the technical assessment of proficiency. They continue to
capitalize on individuals’ need to prove proficiency credentials and expand their
commercial interests and global expansions, which by any standards is unethical
behaviour.
Challenges to Equity in High-Stakes Language Testing
Before proceeding to discuss the best practices in equitable and inclusive language
assessment, a brief discussion of the main sources of inequity in language tests
seems warranted. Research in language testing has revealed some of the potential
flaws and shortcomings in language tests which can give rise to or exacerbate ineq-
uities inherent in high-stakes language tests. Inequities in language tests can, at least
in part, stem from potential biases in test design of commercialized language profi-
ciency tests. A test is said to be biased if “test-taking groups of similar ability are not
treated in the same manner” (Kunnan, 2017, p. 167). A fair language test, in essence,
is expected to solely assess test-takers’ English proficiency levels, irrespective of
any other irrelevant attributes that may differentiate language test takers. Test bias
can arise if items or tasks in a language test are advantageous, or otherwise disad-
vantage, certain groups of test-takers vis-à-vis others, based on “construct-irrelevant”
factors such as culture, gender, or first language (Deygers, 2019, p. 549). Some
examples of test biases include cultural bias, linguistic bias, and gender bias, among
others, which will be briefly explained here.
One of the main sources of inequity in language tests is considered to be cultural
bias (Freimuth, 2016; Khan, 2006). A test is essentially said to be culturally biased
when it makes assumptions about what is considered “common knowledge” shared
by all test takers and includes topics which are familiar to people in a certain (often
Western culture), and not so much familiar to those from non-Western cultures and
backgrounds, which can potentially disadvantage a certain group of test-takers. For
example, words like “miles”, “feet” (as a distance measure), the “Richter scale”,
“Fahrenheit”, or asking a test candidate to talk about their “pets” would be more
familiar to some and less familiar to some other test takers. More broadly, this bias
refers to including topics and contents in a language test that are considered taboo
or too sensitive in certain cultures, and which can affect test takers. Research on
large-scale standardized language tests like IELTS (e.g., Freimuth, 2013, 2016;
Khan, 2006) has reported that using culturally laden topics in tests can disadvantage
some candidates from a non-Western culture.
Closely related to the notion of cultural bias is the concept of “topical knowl-
edge”, which has been defined as “the interaction between one’s prior knowledge
and the content of a specific passage” (Alexander et al., 1991, p. 334). Language
tests commonly use tasks, particularly in their speaking and writing components, to
elicit and assess language performance of test takers. Research (e.g., He & Shi,
2008, 2012) has indicated that commercial language proficiency tests may include
tasks and items that require a certain level of knowledge and familiarity with a cul-
tural, political or topical content, which can serve to (dis)advantage test-takers from
a particular cultural background. As argued by Bachman and Palmer (1996), “all
instances of language use involve topical knowledge” (p. 112), but the most crucial
questions to ask are: “To what extent does the task presuppose the appropriate area
or level of topical knowledge, and to what extent can we expect the test takers to
have this area or level of topical knowledge?” (p. 152). Khan (2006) asserts that
topics that might not be suitable for Bangladeshis are pets or animals. This is due
the fact that Bangladeshis hardly keep pets and there is different level of sensitivity
towards animals than there is in the West. However, the topic of animal is prevalent
on the IELTS speaking because it is assumed that most candidates are familiar with
the topic because most people either have (or have had a pet) or keep them for agri-
cultural purposes. It is not easy, if possible, to make a fair and accurate evaluation
of test-takers’ language ability on a task that requires certain content or topical
knowledge that they do not possess. This bias is often reflective of the assumption
that all test takers have had more or less similar life experiences and thus share a
similar level of familiarity with the contents on the test (Laing & Kamhi, 2003).
Another source of bias and inequity in language tests is linguistic bias (Chen &
Henning, 1985), which refers to a disparity between the language (including dialect,
vocabulary, etc.) used on the test and the language or dialect familiar to test takers.
For instance, Spanish speakers would be more familiar with words like Approximate
(aproximado), Animated (animado), Maintain (mantener), Obstruct (obstructed).
So, test takers coming from languages such as Arabic or Persian would be less
familiar with such words, compared to Spanish speakers. Gender bias (Ross &
Okabe, 2006) is another type of bias which can potentially disadvantage test takers.
For example, including topics which tend to be associated with and are more famil-
iar to a particular gender, like truck driving (transportation). Yet another source of
potential bias is the very structure and format of these standardized language tests,
which are in fact speed tests, not power/competence tests. It is thus incumbent upon
test developers to ensure that tests are free from any potential biases that may poten-
tially discriminate against a certain group of test takers (Holland & Wainer, 2012;
Kunnan, 2017).
Apart from the above-mentioned issues with test design, inequity and bias can
also arise from inconsistencies and variations in how language assessment is
conducted and graded by examiners, who quite naturally can be prone to misjudg-
ments or unfairly favoring a certain group of candidates. For instance, research has
indicated that examiners might tend to grade local and non-local test takers differ-
ently, rather than across the board (Hamp-Lyons & Zhang, 2001). Gender of the
examiner and examinee (in test interviews) might also have an effect on how an
examiner grades a test candidate (O’Loughlin, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2000, 2002). The
discordance/concordance of the examiner/examinee in terms of their cultural back-
grounds is also likely to play a role in treating and grading candidates potentially
(Khan, 2006). It goes without saying that all test takers are entitled to equal treat-
ment during a test, regardless of their physical or demographic differences, (Deygers,
2019; Nussbaum, 2002).
Equally importantly, inconsistencies within and across language examiners
(inter-rater and intra-reliability) can also contribute to inequity in such tests. Intra-
rater reliability refers to “the tendency of a rater to give the same score to the same
script on different occasions” whereas “inter-rater reliability refers to the tendency
of different raters to give the same scores to the same scripts” (Weigle, 2002, p. 135).
Rater reliability can be potentially influenced by variations among raters in terms of
training, experience, rater intuition and differential interpretation of a rating scale,
among others (Davis, 2016; Fulcher et al., 2011; Isaacs & Thomson, 2013; Lumley,
2002), which calls into question the scoring validity of such language tests (Deygers,
2019; Deygers & Van Gorp, 2015; Harsch & Martin, 2013).
Best Practices for Equitable Language Assessment
Achieving equity and inclusivity in language assessment demands a multi-pronged

approach that must involve multiple stakeholders in language assessment including
test developers, examiners, and academic institutions. Test developers, as a key
stakeholder in language assessment, have a prominent role to play in addressing the
main sources of inequity in language tests.
As noted in the preceding section, language tests are notoriously prone to certain
implicit or explicit biases and design issues (e.g., cultural bias, linguistic bias, and
gender bias), which can undermine the test fairness and disadvantage certain groups
of test takers. We believe it is imperative that testing companies take concrete mea-
sures aimed at minimizing if not eliminating test design flaws and shortcomings,
which are known to be a major source of inequity. Such measures, among other
things, should include screening test items and further diversification of examiners.
After being designed, test items need to be closely and scrupulously checked for any
potential bias or flaw that might give rise to inequity and injustice in testing; all
these checks and balances are required prior to rolling out a test. Clearly, developing
a solid language test is time and resource intensive.
The unexpected emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has further compounded
the complexities involved in equitable and inclusive language assessment. In
response to the exigencies introduced by the pandemic, language testing
organizations have increasingly tried to roll out online and ‘home-edition’ tests. The
question remains though as to whether and how thoroughly these tests are screened
and piloted before being rolled out. There is a “due process” of sorts in test develop-
ment, which cannot and should not be bypassed. Circumventing the “due process”
of language test development is consequential and has far-reaching repercussions
and implications.
Testing organizations also need to diversify their examiners and pools of test
developers (i.e., item writers), such that they represent different and diverse cul-
tures, rather than all or mostly coming from Western culture. It is also a prime and
critical responsibility to ensure the consistency of ratings across different adminis-
trations and examiners. Test organizations often provide initial training to make sure
examiners are sufficiently consistent in their ratings, which appears to improve rat-
ing accuracy. Nonetheless, while training, existing research indicates that “raters,
even when they are experienced and trained in the appropriate use of the scoring
rubric, differ widely in their rating behavior” (Eckes, 2009, p. 161). Examiners are
individuals, each with their own unique set of experiences and backgrounds that
shape their subjective perspectives, which can directly or indirectly influence their
grading (Eckes, 2008, 2009; McNamara, 1996; Wolfe, 2004). Apart from providing
proper training, testing organizations also need to implement strict oversight and
rigorous monitoring to ensure that their examiners grade consistently enough.
Moreover, given the inevitable subjectivity involved in rating, it would be good
practice to have two examiners rate the same sample as it can be helpful, though
doing so would incur more costs for testing organization. Furthermore, in keeping
with the ethos of social justice and equity, it would be more democratic, when via-
ble, to give test takers a choice as to the gender of the examiner that they feel more
comfortable with.
In addition to the paramount role played by testing organizations, examiners can
also help contribute to the fairness and equity of language assessment. They need to
develop a critical cognizance of their own potential, implicit or tacit biases. It is also
important for examiners to develop more familiarity with the local culture and con-
text of where they operate. Examiners also need to stringently adhere to the standard
protocols in grading. It is not uncommon for examiners, particularly those with
more experience, to rely on their intuition rather than the standard rubric and proto-
col to grade.
Universities, as a key stakeholder group, also bear part of the responsibility in
addressing issues of inequity in language tests. Academic institutions and universi-
ties need to revisit, rethink and where necessary revise their admission policies
regarding language proficiency thresholds and measures. An important question to
pose and address for academic institutions is whether the admission policies are
ethically and socially just. Academic institutions also need to walk the talk; if they
claim to follow an inclusive and equitable ethos, then they need to find ways not to
exclude but rather to include and accommodate more inclusive admission practices.
Perhaps the bigger question to ask is “how can we judge the language ability of
students coming from various cultural backgrounds according to one single stan-
dard (developed based on Western norms and conventions)?” Moreover, it is
immensely important to bear in mind that the native speaker model of language
competence and standards also needs to be revisited. International students simply
need to be “competent users of English,” not native-like. Furthermore, and crucially,
admission committees should know that a language test is simply a measure, a snap-
shot, so to speak, of a test taker’s language competence not the full picture. As noted
earlier, language assessment, as with any other evaluation, is inherently prone to
potential error and variability, stemming from a manifold of factors including biased
test items, examiner subjectivity and inconsistencies in test administration, among
others. One possibility is avoiding sole reliance on these language tests and employ-
ing multiple measures of language proficiency, for instance, high school grades in
English in the case of “international students” as an example. It is worth noting that
some universities have made it mandatory for students not meeting their cut-off
scores in language tests to take post-admission EAP courses, but research has indi-
cated they are often unfortunately not nearly as effective as expected (Tweedie &
Chu, 2019).
ritical Review of Current Challenges

C
to Language Assessment
While the field of language assessment has mainly been dedicated to psychometric
traits measurement (i.e., measuring traits that cannot be directly or physically mea-
sured) centred around forms-focused knowledge of language, in the last two decades
we have witnessed pockets of research with a shift in focus. The psych-social aspect
(McNamara, 2010; Messick, 1981, 1998) as well as the political functions of lan-
guage testing (Shohamy, 2007, 2008, 2013) have been reviewed. In light of this
research, it is now clear that the quality of language tests is not merely dependent on
their ability to measure psychometric accuracy but their rooted values and social-
economical impacts.
There have been some studies which have investigated the social and political
dimensions of high-stakes tests such as the IELTS (Alsagoafi, 2018; Hamid et al.,
2019; Noori & Mirhosseini, 2021; Pearson, 2019). Compared to the body of litera-
ture on the psychometric aspects of major standardized tests, studies that have
focused on the social-political dimensions are extremely limited. Nevertheless,
these studies outline critiques and challenges associated with these high-stakes lan-
guage tests. However, most of these studies were conducted before the global pan-
demic. The COVID-19 pandemic has affected nearly all the language test-takers
around the world. This is especially true for test-takers of standardized tests who are
using these tests to demonstrate their English language proficiency as a requirement
for university admissions or immigration. In this section we will outline two differ-
ent sets of challenges: those which exist from before the pandemic and those which
emerged as a result of the pandemic and offer potential solutions for both.
Challenges of Language Testing Pre-COVID-19
Financial Burden
Standardized language proficiency tests create a significant financial burden on test-

takers and their families (Alsagoafi, 2018; Pearson, 2019). Test organizations
impose high test fees that vary significantly based on the country in which the hold
is being held. Table 8.1 shows the high-test fees for the IELTS and how they vary
significantly from one country to another.
The fees for IELTS (British Council, 2021) in China and the UAE are higher,
most likely because test-takers from these countries are willing to pay a higher
amount. Given that IELTS (2021b) boasts that approximately three million tests are
taken across 140 countries, it is very likely that their dynamic pricing model is
meant to generate maximum profit. We should note that other fees associated with
sitting these tests such as transportation and accomodation (some tests are only
offered in limited cities in each country) were not considered in Table 8.1. As
Alsogoafi (2018) discovered, the test fees and costs associated with them create a
significant financial burden for test-takers and their families. The financial burden
increases exponentially when test-takers fail to achieve the minimum requirements
needed for the purpose of taking the test. As a result, they would have to work
harder and perhaps participate in (more) preparation courses while not knowing
how much training is needed to achieve the desired test score.
Possible solutions to reducing the financial burden on test-takers is to offer a
discount for those test-takers who are not taking the test for the first time. Another
solution might be to make the tests modular (Alsogoafi, 2018). Under this model,
students would only sit the parts of the test that they have scored low within a pre-
determined time span (e.g., 6 months). This way, students would focus all their
attention on the area they need to improve instead of studying for the whole test
again (Pearson, 2019). Yet, another solution would be for institutions to allow for a
test-taker’s score aggregation with a pre-determined time span. This way, test-takers
will not be financially pushed if they are increasing their language proficiency. We
Table 8.1 Relative cost of IELTS in various countries

Test fee Canadian equivalent
Country Local currency CAD
Azerbaijan 360 AZN 271
Canada 319 CAD 319
China 2020 RMB 398
Ghana 1227 GHS 369
India 14,700 INR 254
Korea 268,000 KRW 290
Turkey 1400 TRY 207
UAE 1130 AED 393
Note. Fees for paper-based tests (British Council, 2021)
could also offer open access language proficiency courses. This would not only
reduce the financial burden on test-takers and their families, but also ensure that
test-takers with limited economic means can at the very least prepare for these tests.
Feedback Issues
As former IELTS examiners, we sometimes came across a paper that was well-
written, but because the content was not a response to the essay prompt, we had to
penalize the test-taker, which significantly impacted their score. Since there is no
feedback mechanism, the test-taker would never know why they scored so low.
Most standardized language proficiency tests only offer an overall score and a
break-down of scores in individual papers. The feedback does not indicate what
might have gone wrong in a specific subtest. Therefore, the test-taker would not
have the necessary information needed to improve their performance. Obviously, a
more robust feedback mechanism would benefit the test-taker. Standardized lan-
guage proficiency tests are highly structured and information regarding areas which
test-takers need to improve will lead to more targeted development, which may
decrease time constraints and the financial burden on test-takers.
Interpretation of Results
According to the IELTS handbook, academic institutions “should also consider a

candidate’s IELTS results in the context of a number of factors, including age and
motivation, educational and cultural background, first language and language learn-
ing history” (IELTS, 2007, p. 7). We have served as members of various selection
committees but have never witnessed members interpret a candidate’s IELTS results
as it is mentioned in the handbook. To the best of our knowledge, language profi-
ciency scores are used in a much cruder fashion as pass-fail indicators. As a result
of this policy, our institutions, as well as many others across Canada, risk losing
international students with very high GPAs who are just shy of the English profi-
ciency cutoff mark for those who have obtained the minimum requirement but have
modest GPAs. We agree with Chalhoub-Deville and Turner (2000) that it is the
responsibility of the receiving institutions to “consider how language ability, indi-
vidual factors and academic requirements fit together to ensure more dependable
admission decisions” (p. 538). Education regarding the interpretations of language
proficiency standardized test is needed. For example, Sawyer and Singh (2011)
reported that academic institutions perceived an IELTS 6.5 band score where the
test-taker scored 6.5 on each individual paper as superior to all other combinations
in which obtaining IELTS 6.5 is possible. Such misconceptions regarding test scores
not only disadvantage some test-takers but also impact the validity of the results.
Although many test organizations warn against using score tests in a pass/fail
capacity, the opposite has been our experience as academics. As a result, is it the
test-taker who will be impacted. When test-takers “fail” a test, they must retake the
whole test or give up their ambitions. Most institutions in Canada require a mini-
mum band score of 6.0 on the IELTS or an equivalent for undergraduate admission.
Combining scores from previous exams even if taken within days of each other is
not possible. The way test organizations average scores on individual papers or sec-
tions of the test are often peculiar. For example, on the IELTS, if a test-taker achieves
band 6.0 in three subtests, but a 5.5 on another, they will not be awarded the band
score of 6.0 and so they will be forced to retake the test. For many test-takers, this
rule is incredibly frustrating. A potential solution to this problem is for institutions
(not test organizations) to accept individual section results across multiple test
attempts within a specific time frame.
Challenges Imposed at the Onset and after Covid-19
Covid-19 disrupted how language testing organizations administer tests. Prior to

Covid-19 all standardized language proficiency tests had an in-person component.
The emergence of the pandemic created a vacuum and forced test providers and
users to consider alternatives to “traditional” approaches to language proficiency
testing (see Isbell & Kremmel, 2020 for a list of possible language proficiency
tests). Many testing services quickly pivoted to online, at-home administration.
However, this shift poses serious technological, reliability, and validity issues for
stakeholders.
Although most at-home proficiency tests require hardware that is generally avail-
able in most developed countries, their software is often specific and requires a
stable internet connection with a generous amount of bandwidth due to video-based
proctoring, audio/video prompts, and voice recording requirements. This also
means that test-takers would need audiovisual equipment, which is often integrated
into hardware, so no further expense is necessary. However, there are limitations
with these tests. For example, the TOEFL iBT Special Home Edition will only
execute on Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox, but allows over-ear headphones,
while Duolingo explicitly prohibits the use of over-ear headphones. Most testing
services have made much effort to make sitting the test convenient. However, the
technological requirements alone will put many test-takers at a disadvantage, as
they may not have access to suitable hardware or a stable internet connection.
For in-home tests to be accepted by institutions, there must be assurances for the
validity of the test scores. Unethical behavior can negatively impact the reliability
of test results. For example, academic misconduct such as using notes or other
resources will give an unfair advantage to the test-taker. Other misconduct, such as
having someone else sit the exam, is also a serious threat to validity of test results.
To counter the effects of misconduct, some tests rely on video, screen, or room (to
ensure there are no sticky notes attached to the monitor) proctoring. However,
giving a testing agency the right to monitor one’s screen or the environment in
which the test is being taken may violate freedom of information and privacy pro-
tection laws in different jurisdictions and is cause for ethical concerns. A possible
solution to this problem is to have test-takers sit several tests during a specific
period. If several samples of the test-taker’s proficiency are acquired, the probability
of misconduct decreases and as the scores are aggregated, the error in measurement
could decrease leading to higher reliability of scores.
Validity is not a black and white construct. But most scholars will agree that
for a test to be valid, there needs to be an evidence-based research-informed
argument that a test which is developed for a certain purpose can measure the
construct for which it was designed. Unfortunately, on many in-home language
proficiency tests there are problematic mismatches. For example, regarding test
validity, Wagner (2020) highlighted the fact that Duolingo English Test (DET)
does not assess test-takers’ ability to create and develop discourse. This short-
coming is highly problematic in an academic setting where students are expected
to comprehend and produce texts at various lengths. The study also showed that
the DET also does not assess interactional competence, which is an essential
component of communicative competence. There is also a serious lack of real-
world tasks connected to academic contexts (Wagner, 2020). While authenticity
is not a requirement of language proficiency tests, authentic language tasks
would make unethical behavior more challenging and positively impact test-
taker motivation and performance (Ockey & Wagner, 2018). Another issue with
test validity of in-home language proficiency tests stems from the remarkable
speed at which they were developed. For example, the TOFEL iBT Home Edition
is identical to the content and scoring of the TOFEL IBT test which was admin-
istered in the test center pre-Covid-19. This change of mode from the test center
to home was made in a matter of months (in 7 months to be exact). During this
gap, there is no way to determine the validity of the results of the in-home ver-
sion. Yet, the TOFEL iBT in-home edition was launched in November 2020 any-
way. According to ETS (2020), preliminary data show that the TOEFL iBT Home
Edition and the TOEFL iBT administered in test centers have comparable reli-
ability and standard error of measurement. The report, however, does not indicate
which specific subgroups, countries, first languages, and reason for taking the
test were included. Alarmingly, the result of this test is accepted by many aca-
demic institutions. Similarly, the IELTS Indicator (see https://www.ieltsindica-
tor.com/), which is the in-home edition of the IELTS, was developed in the course
in just 6 weeks (Clark et al., 2021). It is commendable that the decision was made
to provide test-takers with a provisional score and recommend that the full IELTS
be taken at a later stage. The move highlights the fact that test developers were
aware of validity issues that may arise by changing the mode of a standard-
ized test.
Conclusion
This chapter reveals the complexities and the apparent disconnect between equity,
integrity, fairness, and justice in standardized language proficiency tests and the
integrity issues that can arise as a result. We have shown that when it comes to test
fraud, both test-takers and test-makers should be held responsible. We believe that
unethical behavior of test-takers stems from power imbalances and psychometrical
and socio-economical injustices deeply rooted in test structure and procedures.
We’ve outlined some of the disconnects drawn from existing literature as well as our
first-hand experiences and observations as test examiners and designers. We have
also offered potential solutions to the issues we highlight, which involve institutions
(not test-makers) re-evaluating the way they interpret the results of these tests. Our
hope is that we have been able to shed some light on why standardized language
proficiency testing practices require intense security. Integrity cannot be achieved
by solely conveying the rules of testing procedures to the test-taker. We end by call-
ing for a critical revisiting and rethinking of underlying issues and factors which
precipitate academic dishonesty in language tests. All stakeholders, including test-
makers and institutions that accept and interpret test results, must be involved and
work in harmony towards more equitable and inclusive language assessment.
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Soroush Sabbaghan is an Associate Professor (Teaching) at the Werklund School of Education.

He holds a PhD in English Language Teaching and another in Curriculum and Learning with a
focus on Mathematics Education. His current focus is on addressing the pedagogical challenges in
the post-pandemic context of higher education.
Ismaeil Fazel has a PhD in Language and Literacy Education (TESL) and a sub-specialization in
Measurement, Evaluation, and Research Methodology from the University of British Columbia,
and is currently teaching at UBC-Ritsumeikan and UBC Vantage College, as an instructor. He has
been actively engaged in the field of English for Academic and Professional Purposes for over 15
years now, serving in a variety of leading roles such as practitioner, teacher trainer, curriculum
developer, and researcher. His publications have appeared in journals including the Journal of
English for Academic Purposes, English for Specific Purposes, System, the Journal of English for
Research Publication Purposes, and TESL Canada Journal.
Chapter 9
Examining the Problem of Fraudulent
English Test Scores: What Can Canadian
Higher Education Institutions Learn?
Angela Clark
Abstract Canada is a very attractive destination for hopeful students and hosts the
third-highest number of international students in the world (CBIE, 2020). For those
who are non-native English speakers (NNES), gaining admission to an institution
where English is the language of instruction involves taking a test to gain proof of
English language proficiency. Because of their life-changing impact, these high-
stakes tests operate as gatekeepers, and the pursuit of sufficient scores can lead to
fraud. The main argument of this chapter is that relying on a single language profi-
ciency test score to determine an individual’s readiness is problematic, and also
problematic is the lack of related academic research and data to help guide admis-
sions decision-making. Media reports have alerted the public to suspected or con-
firmed test fraud, and this chapter includes examples from three countries: the
United Kingdom (UK), United States (US) and Canada. The cases demonstrate how
fraud can be instigated through cultural differences, family pressure, and a desire to
gain citizenship, and they also show a diversity of responses towards the students
involved. Media reports and a lack of data serve to promote distrust of the language
testing process and the test scores that institutions receive. This chapter examines
different factors affecting test score use and presents institutional stakeholders with
ways to become better informed about these tests and their impact and approaches
to help international NNES students succeed within their new academic disci-
plines and new academic cultures.
Keywords Test fraud · Admissions fraud · English test scandals · High-stakes

English tests · Gatekeeping tests
A. Clark (*)
York University, Toronto, ON, Canada

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_9
188 A. Clark
Introduction
Each year, millions of individuals worldwide take an English proficiency test in the
hopes of gaining admission to an educational institution where English is the pri-
mary language of instruction (Eckes & Althaus, 2020). Canada is an attractive des-
tination for hopeful students and boasts the third highest number of international
students in the world (CBIE, 2020). International students make up 23.7% of the
total student population in Canadian higher education with more than half of these
students hailing from two countries, India and China (Global Affairs Canada, 2019;
Project Atlas, 2020). Students choose Canada for a variety of reasons, including the
country’s reputation as safe, tolerant, and non-discriminatory and for the quality of
education on offer (CBIE, 2019). Another consideration for those choosing to study
in Canada is that it can open a pathway to permanent residency. For those who
return home after earning a credential, their enhanced English language skills and
intercultural experience may lead to better paid and more prestigious work opportu-
nities in their country of origin (Gui et al., 2016). For hopeful students who are
non-native English speakers (NNES), gaining admission to an institution where
English is the language of instruction involves taking a test to demonstrate language
proficiency. Because of their life-changing impact, such tests are considered to be
high-stakes, operating as both door-openers and gatekeepers (Bachman & Purpura,
2008). But when the stakes are high, the motivation for cheating should not be
underestimated, and in particular gaining admission is the impetus for different
types of educational fraud (Lahib, 2016; Schmidgall & Powers, 2017).
This chapter argues that relying on a single language proficiency test score to
determine an individual’s readiness for post-secondary studies in English is prob-
lematic as gaining a sufficient score has spawned numerous illicit or questionable
practices and furthermore, this test score is not reflective of a student’s ability to
succeed linguistically or academically in their particular discipline. Although
addressing test fraud appropriately in Canada requires the involvement of stake-
holders at the federal and provincial levels, the focus is on higher education institu-
tions. A further argument is that when it comes to test scores, institutional
stakeholders often do not have the data to appropriately guide admissions decision-
making. The chapter is organized into the following sections: an overview of English
test scores, test security and the types of cheating and fraud that can occur; exam-
ples of real-life scandals that have been suspected or confirmed in three countries;
how English test scores are being used within institutions and their impact; and
some future considerations for institutional stakeholders to help them reconsider
test score parameters and implement better supports for the international students
admitted to their institutions.
9 Examining the Problem of Fraudulent English Test Scores: What Can Canadian… 189
English Proficiency Tests, Test Security Measures, and Fraud
Most colleges and universities in Canada accept scores from a variety of different
English language proficiency tests. Among the most popular are the International
English Language Testing System (IELTS) provided through the British Council,
IDP Education, and Cambridge Assessment English, and the Test of English as a
Foreign Language internet-based test (TOEFL iBT, referred to as TOEFL in this
chapter) provided by the Educational Testing Service (ETS). The TOEFL and the
IELTS differ in some respects, but each are divided into four sections, separately
measuring the test taker’s reading, listening, speaking, and writing capabilities.
These language skills are separately assessed, with each skill assigned a sub-skill
score, which are then compiled into an overall score. This section provides a descrip-
tion of the types of security measures employed by high-stakes English test provid-
ers and the types of fraud, cheating and other questionable practices that can occur.
Test Security Measures
As expected of high-stakes tests, both the TOEFL and the IELTS undergo a rigorous
development process to ensure their validity and reliability (Ockey & Gokturk,
2019). Although scandals involving high-stakes English proficiency tests have
occurred and have heightened the sense that fraud is pervasive and ever-growing,
testing providers have put into place various precautions to prevent cheating and
fraud from occurring for in-person and online testing. These measures can include
requiring test takers to present valid forms of identification, and to further ensure
identity, increasingly biometric identifiers are required, such as fingerprints, voice
samples, facial recognition, palm-vein scans, or retinal scans (Murray & Hicks,
2016; Newbold, 2017; Schmidgall & Powers, 2017). To deter cheating for in-person
testing, proctors may be present, video or audio monitoring equipment can be
employed, and as well, electronic detection scanning devices, such as hand-held
metal detectors or wands, may be used to detect unauthorized devices (Newbold,
2017; Schmidgall & Powers, 2017). After tests have been submitted, some testing
centres employ additional screening measures prior to releasing scores to detect any
suspicious patterns (Schmidgall & Powers, 2017). High-stakes language tests, such
as the TOEFL and the IELTS implement most of these types of security measures,
among others. They also impose strict procedures and perform regular audits of test-
ing sites to prevent cheating and fraudulent activity at test centres worldwide (ETS,
2021b; IELTS, n.d.-a).
190 A. Clark
The Move to Remote Testing
The threat of COVID-19 prompted test centres to close in March 2020 and test pro-
viders to develop adapted versions of their tests for at-home use. The corresponding
TOEFL iBT Home Edition and the IELTS Indicator include the same content and
scoring as the in-person versions (Clark et al., 2021; Papageorgiou & Manna, 2021).
To help maintain test security, the TOEFL iBT Home Edition employs a third-party
remote proctoring service (ETS, 2021a). In contrast, when the IELTS Indicator first
became available, it did not have a fully functioning remote proctoring system in
place, and as a result of security concerns, it was decided that IELTS would provide
an indicative score only (Clark et al., 2021; IELTS, n.d.-b). In adapting to remote
testing for high-stakes language tests, security remains a key priority. However, for
tests using remote proctoring, a new set of problems have emerged, including
accounts of proctoring software wrongly flagging suspicious behavior (e.g., Purpura
et al., 2021), and privacy concerns for test takers (e.g., Isbell & Kremmel, 2020;
Papageorgiou & Manna, 2021).
Types of Cheating and Fraud
The types of cheating that have plagued English language proficiency tests are var-
ied in nature. These can include hiring a third-party proxy to take the test on the
test-taker’s behalf; providing or receiving unauthorized help during the exam;
accessing unauthorized materials while the test is taking place; and distributing fake
scores to institutions (Eckstein, 2003; Guhr & Furtado, 2013; Isbell & Kremmel,
2020; McQuarrie, 2019; Schmidgall & Powers, 2017). Third parties that aid test
fraud can include proctors at test centres, who have usually received little training
and can lack the motivation to effectively monitor the testing environment to detect
cheating (Foster, 2013). Another third party who can facilitate cheating and fraud
are overseas education agents. These agents can be either individuals, companies, or
organizations that provide different types of paid services to clients including assist-
ing with the application and visa process and connecting hopeful students to prepa-
ration courses (Hagedorn & Hu, 2014). Although it is acknowledged that some
agents are reliable and scrupulous, not all behave ethically, and have been known to
produce fraudulent English test scores for their clients (Hagedorn & Hu, 2014;
Hagedorn & Zhang, 2012). However, little is known about their scope of involve-
ment due to a lack of related academic literature (Guhr & Furtado, 2013; Heuser
et al., 2016).
Test Preparation Practices
Yu and Green (2021) note, “where there is an admissions test, test preparation will
also be found” (p. 3). To meet the demand of the millions of hopeful students who
wish to study overseas, the test preparation industry has flourished into a massive
enterprise, particularly in some Asian countries (Yu & Green, 2021). Cheng et al.
(2020) describe how in China, the test preparation industry has been assisting
approximately one-tenth of the country’s massive population, which in 2015
resulted in a total annual revenue of more than $200 billion USD. Although not
typically considered to involve fraud, there is debate about whether preparing stu-
dents for these high-stakes tests should include “teaching to the test” practices
which can include explicit test-taking strategies, answer selection tricks, and
restricting the curriculum so that students only practice content from previous tests
(Hall, 2018; Trenkic & Hu, 2021). One side of the debate argues that helping test
takers become familiar with test formats and focusing lessons on what they can
reasonably expect on the day of the test has been shown to reduce test anxiety, lead-
ing to better performance (Suryaningsih, 2014; Winke & Lim, 2014). Yet the other
side of the debate counters that these benefits may come at the expense of true lan-
guage acquisition as scores are improved without corresponding mastery (Hall,
2018; Hamp-Lyons, 1998). Additionally, the test preparation industry can perpetu-
ate inequity by providing advantages only to those who are able to pay for these
services. Those who cannot do not gain these advantages.
Different views on the matter can be culturally bound, for instance, in China it is
generally accepted that test takers should spend a great deal of time preparing for
tests and preparation should involve decoding test patterns (Cheng et al., 2020).
However, Cheng et al. (2020) also describe how test preparation companies can
facilitate fraudulent activity, for instance, these companies have been known to send
teachers to complete the test on behalf of their clients. Another concerning practice
involves distributing test information which occurs when test takers memorize test
items which they later share or sell. This can still occur with a large test bank and
furthermore, test preparation centres may even facilitate this type of cheating
through making leaked test items available to clients (Schmidgall & Powers, 2017;
Trenkic & Hu, 2021). Fraudulent test scores can result from behaviours that range
from blatantly dishonest to ones that are less obvious and more disputed, and most
fraud is typically facilitated by third parties. The next section includes media reports
about English test fraud that has occurred in recent times.
192 A. Clark
eports of Fraudulent Practices: Case Studies from the Media

R
and Lessons Learned
Fraud in higher education is not a new phenomenon and different stakeholders

including government agencies, quality assurance bodies, test providers, and aca-
demic institutions have long instituted various efforts to combat it (Guhr & Furtado,
2013). Little is known about English test fraud as test providers are reluctant to
release any data they collect on fraudulent practices, there is a lack of academic
research on the topic, and most educational institutions tend not to share their own
data on fraudulent test scores for fear of reputational repercussions (Guhr & Furtado,
2013; Lahib, 2016). As such, media reports serve to inform society about the occur-
rences of language test fraud in the absence of other data. This section includes
examples from the media that involve suspected or confirmed English test fraud in
three countries: the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and in Canada.
These examples show different reasons for why fraud occurred or was suspected
and also show different responses. The section concludes with an examination of
what can be learned from these examples.
TOIEC Test Scandal in the United Kingdom
A well-publicized scandal occurred in the UK when in 2014, The British Home

Office claimed that thousands of international students who had taken the then-
approved Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) to renew their
student visas were guilty of cheating on this assessment and therefore, had gained
fraudulent test scores. The Home Office was alerted to the alleged cheating through
the covert filming of two test centres for a 2014 documentary, Panorama, which
revealed different types of fraud occurring at each. At one centre, proxies were seen
arriving to take the place of test-takers, and at the other, a proctor provided test-
takers with answers to multiple-choice test questions (APPG, 2019). Seeking evi-
dence, the Home Office received assistance from ETS, who reviewed all the TOEIC
test results for tests that had been taken across UK test centres between 2011 and
2014. Employing the use of voice analysis software to review audio recordings from
the tests, ETS identified that out of 58,361 test takers, 58% had invalid results, 39%
had questionable results, and only 3% were found not to have cheated (APPG, 2019;
NAO, 2019). Based on this evidence, the Home Office instigated the forced removal
of 2,468 individuals from the UK. Another 7,206 left the country voluntarily after
receiving a warning that if they stayed, they would face detention (Gentleman,
2019a; NAO, 2019).
To date, the accuracy of the data that the Home Office acted upon has been seri-
ously questioned (e.g. APPG, 2019). This scandal occurred at a time when the UK’s
Home Office decided to crack down on illegal immigration and introduced policies
geared towards creating a hostile environment to significantly reduce net migration
numbers (Gentleman, 2019a). In gaining evidence, it has been noted that when ETS
employed the use of voice analysis, it was the first time they had done so (NAO,
2019), leading to results that were hotly contested. Many of the students implicated
have maintained their innocence and initiated appeals (NAO, 2019). The effects of
the scandal have been shown to be brutal and long-lasting for these students and
many find it difficult to move forward with their lives, even those who won their
appeals. For instance, many of the students who left the UK found that because they
had been identified as cheaters, they have been unable to obtain visas for other coun-
tries, enroll in new academic programs, or secure employment (APPG, 2019).
Those who stayed in the UK and tried to dispute the allegations have faced high
legal fees which have left them destitute, yet they have been restricted from work-
ing, studying, securing rental housing, or accessing health care (Migrant Voice,
2021). Furthermore, media reports detail how the accusations have led to profound
strains on their family relations and lasting impacts on their mental health (e.g.,
Gentleman, 2019b; Migrant Voice, 2021).
Test Fraud Cases in the United States
In 2015 it was reported that 15 Chinese nationals, most of whom had been living in
the United States, had been implicated in a scheme where they paid imposters to sit
different types of tests on their behalf, including the TOEFL test. Occurring largely
in the Pittsburgh area throughout 2011–2015, some candidates paid nearly $6,000
USD for this service, and based on the scores, had been admitted to universities
across the country (Bidgood, 2015). One of the defendants was in their fourth year
of studies at Northeastern University, just a few credits short of graduation by the
time the fraud was revealed (Krantz, 2015). To gain access to the test, the imperson-
ators used fake passports, and subsequent criminal charges included conspiracy,
counterfeiting foreign passports, wire fraud and mail fraud (Bidgood, 2015). Most
of the defendants pleaded guilty and were deported from the US (Welitzkin, 2017).
This is not the only case of its kind; there have been reports of similar fraudulent
activities in the US involving hopeful international students from China (e.g., Meija,
2019; Raymond, 2017). For instance, an article in The Atlantic discusses the net-
works of criminal activity that exist in China and use such fraudulent means to gain
the scores required for admission to universities in the US. Hopeful students or their
education agents connect with a broker, who in turn, creates convincing fake pass-
ports and locates impersonators, who are known as “gunmen” (Tyre, 2016, para. 8).
The passports typically display the candidate’s personal information with a substi-
tuted photograph of the gunman, but more sophisticated brokers take photographs
of their client and the impersonator and create a fusion (Tyre, 2016). The fee is
calculated by taking into account the type of test, location, the travel costs for the
impersonator, and the score the candidate hopes to achieve (Tyre, 2016). The article
reveals the great amount of pressure that is placed on hopeful students to study at a
renowned institution in the US with one of the interviewees reporting that “there is
194 A. Clark
a cultural disconnect—many Chinese families don’t realize how seriously Americans

take these kind of infractions” (Tyre, 2016, para. 9). China’s traditional emphasis on
education, bolstered by factors such as the country’s one child policy, a large
middle-class population, and a strong desire for US degrees from elite institutions
has led to increased competition and more reliance on education agents, who as
previously mentioned, are not always scrupulous (Hagedorn & Hu, 2014). Heuser
et al. (2016) point out that it is widely accepted that in China “fraud in education is
widespread and non-apologetic” (p. 358) and furthermore, the authors point out that
cultural factors and a steadfast loyalty to networks makes it difficult to confront
fraudulent practices that occur, which allows the cycle to continue.
One Canadian College’s Concerns
Concerns about English test fraud have occurred in Canada as well, although unlike
in the UK and the US, there have not been any well-publicized scandals to date.
However, in 2018, the media detailed English test fraud that had been suspected at
Niagara College in Ontario. Faculty members at this college raised concerns about
the language proficiency of current first-year international students, even though
they had met the English proficiency standard for admission. As a result, 400 stu-
dents were required to take an in-house English test to determine their language
proficiency (Civinini, 2018; Keung, 2018). The resulting test scores revealed that
for 200 of these students, their English language skills were not at the required level,
and as a result, the college offered to transfer them from their academic programs
into an English language program, yet most refused and opted to remain (Keung,
2018; LaFleche, 2019). Of these students, most (80%) were from India and had
taken the IELTS at centres run by IDP Education in India, with the majority having
been tested at one centre in particular (Civinini, 2018). As a result, 428 individuals
in India who had taken the test at the same IDP centre and had received offers of
admission to Niagara College for January 2019 were required by the college to
retake an English proficiency test with the college covering the test fee (Civinini,
2018). IDP Education has maintained that the IELTS is a valid measurement tool of
English proficiency and test centres offering the IELTS are vigorously monitored
(Keung, 2018).
The related media reports also publicized the plight of international students
from India who came to Canada seeking a better life often at great expense.
Attending college in Canada has become a dream for many hopeful Indian students,
often representing a way to escape crushing poverty through gaining permanent
residency (LaFleche, 2019). To finance this dream, students and their families have
often hired private education agents to assist with the process, and to help meet the
high costs of tuition, housing, travel and admission testing, they been willing to take
on a great amount of debt, selling property and possessions (LaFleche, 2019).
Although fraud has not been confirmed in this incident, it led to an evaluation of the
English language requirements for each program at the college and has led other
colleges to retest their own international students (LaFleche, 2019). Subsequently,

The Globe and Mail reported that Immigration, Citizenship and Refugees Canada
paid for an advertising campaign in 2019 in India to raise awareness about unscru-
pulous immigrations agents and recruiters (Bascaramurty et al., 2021).
Test Fraud Scandals: What Can Institutions Learn?
As illustrated by the case studies, English test fraud appears to be largely facilitated
by unscrupulous test centre employees and corrupt overseas agents who secure
proxies and fake identification in order to make money. The cases also demonstrate
how fraud can be prompted by particular factors, including cultural differences,
family pressure, and by a desire to gain citizenship and an escape from poverty.
They also show diverse responses in how the students involved were treated. The
international students implicated in the TOEIC scandal were effectively silenced:
the evidence against them was not transparent, they were given little recourse, and
many had their lives upended and suffered longstanding negative effects. Media
reporting on the scandals that occurred in the US do not provide many details about
the students, nor about how the fraud was detected, although it was reported that for
one student, the fraud was discovered when the student was in their fourth year and
about to graduate. The student was subsequently deported. In the Niagara College
case, fraudulent activity was not confirmed, but students were given the choice to
transfer to a language program, and incoming students were permitted to retake
language assessment tests, with fees covered by the college. Undoubtedly, deciding
how to handle such cases is a difficult and complex process with many variables to
consider. However, in making the decision to open the floodgates to international
students, governments and institutions have an ethical responsibility to the students
they accept. For institutions who depend on high international student enrollments
as a vital source of revenue, the appeal of full-fee tuition payments may dispropor-
tionately affect admissions decisions. The next section investigates how test scores
are used by institutions and the impact of these scores.
The Use and Impact of English Test Scores
If it is believed that English language requirements for admission should indicate a

“readiness to participate fully in all instructional activities on the first day of class
without the need for English language support or accommodation” (Ginther & Yan,
2018, p. 273). When students do not demonstrate this readiness, it could lead to the
assumption that they have engaged in fraud. Consequently, this can foster a deep
distrust of the language testing process and the test scores that institutions receive.
Instead, if international students are experiencing difficulties post-admission,
it could signal that gatekeeping language assessment scores are being misused
196 A. Clark
(Murray, 2018). This section examines how test scores are used by institutions
through reviewing the predictive validity of English proficiency tests, the language
assessment literacy of test users, the cut scores implemented by institutions for
English language tests, and the impact of test scores on students.
Predictive Validity of English Proficiency Tests
High-stakes English tests aim to replicate authentic academic performance, and

given their controlled and standardized nature, the resulting test scores are com-
monly considered to be predictors of future linguistic and academic success (Brooks
& Swain, 2014). Often referred to as predictive validity, various studies have been
conducted that examine either IELTS or TOEFL as a predictor of academic success
(e.g., Cho & Bridgeman, 2012; Cotton & Conrow, 1998; Feast, 2002; Ginther &
Yan, 2018; Kerstjens & Nery, 2000; Wait & Gressel, 2009). However, these studies
have led to differing results and therefore, no conclusions can confidently be drawn.
Cho and Bridgeman (2012) point out that this is because studies that focus on pre-
dictive validity are difficult to carry out and interpret. Many of these studies rely on
a student’s subsequent GPA as a measure of academic success, but there are several
factors that can affect a student’s GPA, for instance: students’ attitudes, habits, moti-
vation, learning strategies, discipline knowledge, frequency of English used in
everyday life, and the extent of their academic and non-academic acculturation
(Cho & Bridgeman, 2012; Eckes & Althaus, 2020; Ginther & Yan, 2018; Neumann
et al., 2019). Additionally, Murray (2018) argues that because English language
proficiency tests focus on English for General Academic Purposes, students are not
adequately prepared for the types of discipline-specific language requirements in
their fields of study. Yet, institutions depend on language test scores to determine
applicants with appropriate English language skills, and the varying results of pre-
dictive validity studies make it difficult for institutional stakeholders to understand
and apply ethical admissions processes.
Language Assessment Literacy for Test Users
When using test scores to admit students, it is assumed that institutional decision
makers (i.e. test users) possess language assessment literacy, which is defined as
possessing “knowledge, skills, and understanding of assessment principles and
practice” (Taylor, 2009, p. 24). Yet studies have found that those involved in the
admissions process largely do not possess strong language assessment literacy (e.g.,
Coleman et al., 2003; Ginther & Elder, 2014; O’Loughlin, 2011). Test providers for
English proficiency tests usually offer detailed information about their tests, which
includes information about what is being measured, the design of the test, tasks,
scoring, and how to use scores to make decisions (Eckes & Althaus, 2020).
Ultimately, the lack of knowledge persists. Not being well informed may lead to
making incorrect decisions about applicants, which can include admitting those
with fraudulent scores. One particular challenge test score users may face is navi-
gating the variations between different types of English language proficiency tests.
Most colleges and universities in Canada accept scores from a variety of language
tests which means prospective students who are NNES are able to choose from a
wide selection. Although the IELTS and the TOEFL tests are the most common,
other tests that are considered acceptable to Canadian institutions include: the
Canadian Academic English Language (CAEL) test; the Cambridge English
Assessment test; the Duolingo English Test; and the Pearson Test of English
Academic (PTE), among others (El-Assal, 2020). Although some test providers
supply parameters on how scores from different tests align, this information is often
not sufficient given that English proficiency tests differ widely in terms of structure,
tasks and scoring (Eckes & Althaus, 2020). Another challenge test users can encoun-
ter occurs when there are suspicions about a test score. The test provider conducts
an investigation, which can be lengthy, and once complete, institutions are merely
informed whether the test score is acceptable or if has been canceled. If cancelled,
an explanation is often not provided, serving to further limit data to institutions
(Lahib, 2016). Although test providers share some pertinent data with test users
within institutions, these users do not have access to all the data they require, which
limits their language assessment literacy and affects decision-making.
Setting Cut Scores
A cut score is a number from the test score scale that institutions choose to differen-
tiate those hopeful students who meet or exceed the minimum English proficiency
level from those who do not (Eckes & Althaus, 2020). Language cut scores vary by
institution and within particular institutions, cut scores can vary by program. Both
IELTS and TOEFL providers offer guidance to institutions on setting appropriate
cut scores. For instance, IELTS recommends a higher band score for academic pro-
grams that are deemed to be more linguistically demanding than those that are con-
sidered less demanding (IELTS, n.d.-c). Yet, it is unclear how these categories are
defined (MacDonald, 2019). Institutions are not bound by test providers’ guidelines
and have the flexibility to set their own scores and increasingly, institutions face
pressure to set cut scores low in the ongoing competition for international students
who pay higher fees (Hyatt, 2013; MacDonald, 2019). Some disregard test provid-
ers’ guidelines and instead refer to the scores set by other institutions (Johnson &
Tweedie, 2021). In the case of Canadian universities, MacDonald (2019) found that
most require an IELTS band score of 6.5 overall, which is not aligned with IELTS
guidelines, and does not appear to be high enough for academic success. Also,
MacDonald (2019) notes that there is not a systematic difference in cut scores
between different undergraduate programs contrary to the advice IELTS provides
regarding linguistically demanding versus linguistically less demanding programs.
198 A. Clark
Selecting the appropriate minimum English cut score is largely dependent on human
judgment and it is crucial to get the balance right (Eckes & Althaus, 2020). Cut
scores that have been set too high can pressure hopeful students into engaging in
unethical behaviour and scores that are too low can lead to accepting students who
will later struggle, which underscores the need for institutions to become better
informed about the cut scores they set.
Language Test Scores: Effect on Students
Achieving a test score that allows admission to an institution where English is the
language of instruction leads students to believe that they have the necessary skills
in English to succeed. Yet, students who have scored successfully on high-stakes
tests such as the TOEFL or IELTS have been shown to face difficulties post-
admission, experiencing challenges in all domains of academic life post-admission
(Rajendram et al., 2019). When they realize that their English test score is not an
adequate reflection of their preparedness, “it is not uncommon for students to swing
from inaccurate confidence that they can speak English to an equally inaccurate
conclusion that they cannot” (Carroll, 2005, p. 38). For example, Liu (2012) details
her personal experience arriving in Canada to study at a university. Gaining both
sufficient IELTS and the TOEFL test scores, she still experienced great difficulty
understanding in class and felt frustrated with her lack of ability to communicate.
As a result, she explains that she suffered from symptoms of culture shock, includ-
ing a loss of confidence and identity, homesickness, and a reluctance to interact with
other students. As such, it is important for institutional stakeholders to have “a good
understanding of what their language measures actually mean in practice for their
students” (Rajendram et al., 2019, p. 86).
Future Considerations: Moving Beyond English Test Scores
Murray (2015b) argues that using scores from high-stakes English proficiency tests
is not ideal, but at the same time, “they do serve a purpose; one that cannot easily be
better served by alternative instruments” (p. 108). This section examines methods
institutions can use to supplement these tests, including: reconsidering admissions
criteria, embedding appropriate academic support into the curriculum, and offering
services to assist with acculturation to help international NNES students better
acclimatize to their new academic culture and succeed in their academic disciplines.
As well, it offers suggestions to help institutional stakeholders become more
informed about language tests and test scores.
Reconsidering Admission Criteria
Although better language assessment literacy is needed, how to achieve this remains
unclear. One suggestion is that test users begin to incorporate cut scores on subskills
(listening, speaking, reading, and writing) into their decision-making, instead of
only considering the total score. This can provide more information about potential
students’ linguistic and academic readiness (Ginther & Yan, 2018). Relatedly,
Murray (2015b) suggests that to develop a better sense of what test scores mean,
institutions can implement opportunities where different stakeholders can regularly
make connections between test scores and students’ use of English. For example,
students’ language test scores or sub-skill scores can be listed on attendance regis-
ters or on assignment submissions so that through interacting with these students,
stakeholders can learn to connect students’ academic performance to their test
scores, which would lead to a better understanding of test scores in practice. Another
possible response is to adopt a “multi-judgment system” to gain a fuller understand-
ing of students’ strengths and needs prior to admission (Rees, 1999, p. 434). Many
institutions in North America already require students to submit academic letters of
recommendation and a statement of purpose, but to help further gain an understand-
ing of language proficiency and readiness, ETS (2011) recommends that test users
consider using other criteria, such as scores from other admissions exams, teacher
recommendations, or interviews with applicants. As well, applicants could be
required to complete an additional discipline-related written proficiency assess-
ment, submit a self-assessment, present language proficiency portfolios, or provide
their own argued case for admission (Banerjee, 2003; Hamp-Lyons & Condon,
2000; Rees, 1999). To help lessen the influence of education agents, Hagedorn and
Zhang (2012) recommend that institutions strive to make the application process
more straightforward for prospective students in China by providing application
information and support in their native language, which would help applicants’
families better comprehend the process. Since family aspirations are a main driver
of students studying abroad, making this information more accessible can poten-
tially decrease the reliance on agents. In these ways, expanding admission criteria,
applying the use of test scores in practice, and making the admission process more
accessible could help reduce the frequency of fraudulent practices.
urricular Considerations: Instituting a Post-Entry Language

C
Assessment (PELA)
Some institutions have dealt with concerns about test fraud by re-testing students
using their own post-entry language assessments (PELA), which are commonly
used in Australia and New Zealand (Read & von Randow, 2013). For instance,
Curtin University, who sustained their own scandal involving falsified IELTS test
scores during 2009 and 2010 (Guhr & Furtado, 2013), now mandate that all new
200 A. Clark
international students take their PELA (Atkinson et al., 2016). PELAs aim to iden-
tify those newly-admitted students with significant academic language needs so that
they can be directed to appropriate institutional supports (Eckes & Althaus, 2020;
Read & von Randow, 2013). They can be used as a screening tool to place students
in an institution’s English as a Second Language course, or they can be used as
diagnostic assessments to help students understand their own strengths and weak-
nesses and empower them to take control of their own learning and access services
offered by their institutions (Dunworth, 2009; Eckes & Althaus, 2020; Lahib, 2016).
However, PELAs are not without criticism, for instance: instituting this test may
give the impression that an institution accepts students with weak English language
skills; it does not trust the scores received through high-stakes language assess-
ments; the test may pose an additional obstacle for students who may opt to con-
tinue their education elsewhere; and it may cause test fatigue for students (Dunworth,
2009; Murray, 2015a). In any case, using PELAs help reveal a changing mindset
where language proficiency is not just an admissions concern, but instead, it needs
attention throughout all stages of a student’s higher education journey
(MacDonald, 2019).
Connecting PELAs to Academic Literacies
Murray and Hicks (2016) note that excessive test preparation among hopeful stu-
dents can lead to sufficient entry scores without the acquisition of the types of lan-
guage skills needed for success in their programs. These students will often struggle
because they have not become socialized in the language that is specific to their
disciplines. Yet including such discipline-based language instruction remains rare
(Murray, 2018). For such instruction, Murray (2015b) stresses the importance of
moving away from teaching students generic English language skills, such as the
type they prepared for and encountered on their high-stakes English language test.
Instead, it is recommended that language development is aligned more directly to
faculties and integrated more fully into the curriculum with proper supports
(Dunworth, 2010). For example, Fox et al. (2016) discuss a PELA that was used
with engineering students at a Canadian university. The test was embedded in a first-
year course, and consisted of a hybrid of diagnosing both generic academic lan-
guage skills and discipline-specific threshold competencies for the program.
Embedding the test in a course allowed for the creation of a dedicated tutoring
space, comprised of tutors who were upper-year engineering students for discipline-
specific support, as well as an Applied Linguistics graduate student who assisted
students with academic reading and writing. Before embedding the PELA into this
course, at-risk students largely did not reach out for academic support, but with the
embedded approach, more students sought academic assistance. This is an example
of how PELAs can result in early, discipline-specific intervention for NNES stu-
dents who may struggle within their programs.
Offering Acculturation Support
International students who experienced their formative education in a different cul-

ture are at a high risk of experiencing difficulties when transitioning to a new culture
where they are expected to understand and assume “similar attitudes, values, and
beliefs to teaching and learning as other students at their destination institution”
(Atkinson et al., 2016, p. 205). As in the case of Liu (2012), these students may
experience difficulties with communication, leading to culture shock. Atkinson
et al. (2016) recommend that institutions offer a cultural transition course for inter-
national students as well as appropriate cultural training for instructors. Although
most institutions offer different types of supports typically geared to international
students, participants in Rajendram et al.’s (2019) study noted that these supports
were not widely promoted at their institution, and therefore not accessed. In particu-
lar, one participant reported that accessing these supports required too much effort
and found that instead, a great source of support were peers (Rajendram et al.,
2019). International students who have more social support adapt more easily, how-
ever, simply having international students in the same learning environment as
domestic students does not lead to social connectedness or intercultural learning
(Scott et al., 2015). Instead, programs that intentionally pair international and
domestic students have shown to help international students academically, socially,
and have also encouraged them to use institutional support services more often (Abe
et al., 1998; Shigaki & Smith, 1997).
ecoming Better Informed Through Partnerships

B
and Further Research
Media reports about test fraud abound, but it is difficult to know the real scope of
the problem as there is a notable lack of academic literature on the topic, and fur-
thermore, those stakeholders who hold data on fraud are unlikely to release it. As a
result, educational leaders can lack language assessment literacy and remain unin-
formed about the scope and nature of the problem of test fraud, which has implica-
tions for developing related policies, detecting fraud, and dealing with questionable
test scores. This lack of knowledge can also perpetuate assumptions about interna-
tional students. When it comes to interpreting and using the test scores received, the
responsibility ultimately rests with the test user (O’Loughlin, 2011), yet more sup-
port from the test providers seems to be required. Test providers share test standards
and guidelines, yet there still remains confusion about setting appropriate cut scores,
recognizing equivalency between scores from different tests, and accessing the
results of investigations involving suspected fraud. To that end, Eckes and Althaus
(2020) recommend that test providers make available easy-to-use material that
clearly outlines basic knowledge, skills, and principles to lead to better informed
decision making, for example, scores can be provided with accompanying
202 A. Clark
certificates that include descriptions (Hyatt, 2013). Ginther and Elder (2014) also
recommend that institutions, acting on the guidance of test developers, construct an
appropriate response to possible questions, concerns and misinterpretations of
scores. Moreover, Sinclair et al. (2019) call on both test providers and institutions to
gain a better understanding of the potential vulnerability that international students
face as a consequence of high-stakes English tests. International students them-
selves can be a rich resource to better understand how these tests impact them,
which can then help to inform institutional policies, practices and training for
admission decision-makers (Sinclair et al., 2019). Future academic research that
focuses on tests as predictors of academic success can incorporate more qualitative
approaches rather than relying on GPA. For instance, methodologies can include
interviewing international students to better understand their challenges and needs
(e.g., Rajendram et al., 2019). Finally, Lahib (2016) notes that it would be greatly
beneficial to institutions to have access to test providers’ proprietary data about
fraud. Although this data is not readily made available, any future studies that insti-
tutions carry out would benefit test providers, and more importantly, would foster
trust between the two stakeholders that currently does not exist.
Conclusion
Although test developers make these high-stakes gatekeeping assessments as valid

and reliable as possible and test centres instill a variety of security measures, these
tests provide institutions with limited information about the individuals who apply
to their institutions. As such, “we still need to be troubled by how much confidence
to place in using results like these in making fateful decisions about people”
(Spolsky, 1997, p. 246). To that end, less reliance on a single test score can be
accomplished through incorporating additional evidence of language proficiency;
creating opportunitites to learn more about test scores in practice; establishing a
PELA; and embedding supports both in and outside of the curriculum. Given that
Canada’s appeal as an attractive destination for hopeful international students keeps
growing, now more than ever it is important to ensure that making admission deci-
sions for these students is conducted in a more informed and ethical manner.
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Angela Clark has worked as an academic integrity practitioner since 2016, currently holding the
position of Academic Integrity Officer at York University in Toronto, Ontario. From 2017-2019,
she served on the executive committee of the Academic Integrity Council of Ontario (AICO).
Previously, Angela taught courses in English as a Second Language (ESL) and first-year
Communications courses at institutions across the Greater Toronto Area where she became inter-
ested in learning how to effectively promote academic integrity within the learning environment.
She holds a Bachelor of Education degree in Adult Education from Brock University, a master’s
degree in Applied Linguistics from York University and is now working towards her PhD in Higher
Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto where
her research is focused on Canadian institutions’ approaches to academic integrity.
Chapter 10
There is No Culture? A Framework
for Addressing Admissions Fraud
Brendan DeCoster
Abstract This chapter questions individual responsibility for admissions fraud,

examining how excessive focus on the individual in policy and popular representa-
tions of fraud ignores the responsibility that institutions and overall culture play in
defining fraud and creating the conditions that can lead to greater and lesser amounts
of fraud. Drawing on a theoretical framework from Ajzen’s planned behavior,
Becker’s labelling theory, and Campbell’s law, the chapter establishes how a multi-
level approach allows for a more nuanced analysis of admissions fraud, particularly
when considering how powers and positionalities can interact to create conditions
that promote or inhibit fraud. The chapter proposes a five-level framework for ana-
lyzing admissions fraud, noting how individuals, small groups and firms, larger
firms, institutions, and political entities all play roles in establishing definitions of
fraud, investigating fraud, prosecuting fraud, committing fraud, abetting fraud, and
countering fraud. The chapter then uses this framework to analyze a case of admis-
sions fraud, examining how each level uses power and how the culture of fraud is
constructed. The analysis is followed by implications and considerations regarding
how policy might be adapted or further studied to allow for a culture of integrity
rather than fraud.
Keywords Fraud · Integrity · Culture · Individual · Framework
Introduction
Recent admissions fraud stories, particularly the Varsity Blues case (Korn & Levitz,
2020), share a common pattern: students, parents of students, or college prep agen-
cies cheat on tests, falsify records, or pay others to write applications. This fraud
B. DeCoster (*)
University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
e-mail: decoster@umd.edu

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_10
210 B. DeCoster
must be detected and punished to avoid future instances (Seltzer, 2019). To address
admissions fraud, we must improve defenses against those who would seek to
defraud the admissions system (Korn & Levitz, 2020; Seltzer, 2019).
This is exemplified by recent headlines: A Chinese cheating ring at UCLA
reveals an industry devoted to helping international students scam grades (Beam,
2019); U.S. charges 15 Chinese nationals in college exam fraud scheme (Edwards,
2015); Cheating ring to get foreign students US visas ends in 5 arrests, Calif. pros-
ecutors say (Gilmour, 2019); and 5 arrested in scheme that hired people to take
english proficiency exam on behalf of Chinese nationals seeking student visas
(USDOJ, 2019). These titles show a particular commonality: individuals and cheat-
ing rings choose to commit fraud to gain admission, and they must be punished.
This perspective makes many assumptions. First, fraud is an individual action.
As many codes of conduct in the North American sphere of higher education state,
integrity is an individual responsibility (McGrail & McGrail, 2015; Pavela, 1997).
This implies that the student is solely responsible to understand and adhere to a code
of conduct, prior even to being admitted to an institution (Pavela, 1997). However,
this statement belies the idea that an individual is responsible for fraud, as the indi-
vidual must follow rules they have never seen before (Gullifer & Tyson, 2010;
Strangfeld, 2019). Holding the individual responsible assumes each person is aware
of the standards of not only each institution applied to, but also each department
applied to (Pavela, 1997).
Furthermore, if an institution has established admission standards, it has taken
responsibility for defining fraud. For example, a university which pays international
recruitment agents to assist students in applying to college acknowledges that an
agent’s job hinges on presenting applicants in the best possible way, often offering
help on the admission application (NACAC, 2020). An institution which does not
use recruitment agents, however, shows that individual student work is expected.
Thus, a student receiving substantial application help could be either normal or
fraudulent depending on institutional context.
Next is the assumption that institutions must establish standards, and detect and
punish violations of standards. Standards may not be developed at the institutional
level, as with visa requirements (ICE, 2021), such that admissions requirements
may be a combination of regulations at the institutional, departmental, state or pro-
vincial, and possibly federal levels (Kaplin & Lee, 2007). There are also funding
incentives towards certain admission standards, or quotas for certain majors, estab-
lished at a countrywide or federal level (Jaschik, 2005, 2013).
There is also no consideration of why institutional standards exist, something
important as test scores are dropped for admissions, particularly since they do not
accurately predict success in higher education nearly as well as high school GPA
(NACAC, 2020; Selingo, 2020; Soares, 2012). By requiring an SAT or ACT score
for admission, an institution establishes a standard; however, by not having a clear
reason for it, institutions should expect the standard will be questioned (Becker,
1963; Campbell, 1979), something stated by the National Association of College
Admissions Counselors (NACAC, 2020).
10 There is No Culture? A Framework for Addressing Admissions Fraud 211
There is also the question of responsibility for detection and punishment of fraud.
While reasonably thought an institutional task, many standards are not verified by
institutions, with work outsourced to firms for language proficiency, college readi-
ness, and credential verification (Read, 2015; Selingo, 2020; Soares, 2012). Regarding
the SAT or ACT, an institution cannot reasonably be responsible for detecting fraud
on a test which it neither administered nor developed, but having the firm administer-
ing and developing the test responsible for detection and punishment of fraud is also
problematic, particularly considering that a firm cannot assess penalties against stu-
dents, as this is the domain of civil and federal authorities (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).
It is thus harder to take at face value the headlines above. These stories ignore
systematic issues, discounting institutional responsibility in creating conditions that
can bring about admissions fraud. To provide a better perspective on admissions
fraud, a comprehensive perspective is required, one examining the culture of admis-
sions fraud. The remainder of this chapter seeks to provide a framework for this
perspective, noting multiple contributing levels to admissions fraud before provid-
ing an examples of admissions fraud through the framework, along with implica-
tions for policy.
A Culture of Admissions Fraud: A Multi-Level Framework
All other things being equal, an individual aware of the rules for college admissions
can make a reasoned choice to commit fraud (Ajzen, 2020). However, rational deci-
sion making is subject to the constraint of social forces. Campbell’s Law (1979) has
considerable influence over individual actions when one indicator has an outsized
influence on admissions. The SAT example above illustrates this here, but it is not
sufficient to describe how this guides individual choices. For this, Ajzen’s (2020)
theory of planned behavior is useful. Ajzen’s theory posits that any individual deci-
sion to engage in an action is guided by three main factors: normative beliefs, con-
trol beliefs about ability to carry out an action, and intention to carry out an action.
Normative beliefs are divided into perceptions of existing social norms regarding
what is right and wrong, and subjective individual social norms, guided by per-
ceived social norms. Control beliefs are divided into perceptions of what factors
exist that might help or hinder completion of an action, and perceived behavioral
control, or the individual’s beliefs regarding whether they can perform an action.
The last factor, intention, is divided into expression of intent in the form of declara-
tions, and performative intent, which is actual engagement in action.
Ajzen (2020) notes his model is incomplete as it analyzes individual behavior
through two conditions, and states that measuring actual individual situational con-
trol is extremely difficult, which is why his model infers it from individual percep-
tion of control. For this, I turn to Becker’s (1963) labelling theory, which provides a
framework for examining the rules that guide actions. Becker’s theory notes that
rules governing behavior are inherently social and subject to change over time, par-
ticularly through the work of moral entrepreneurs. Moral entrepreneurs are groups
212 B. DeCoster
or individuals who either push for the establishment or change of a rule on behavior
(rule creators), or those who seek to enforce rules (rule enforcers). Becker notes that
those most able to act as rule creators and rule enforcers are typically at higher lev-
els of social power, and that those most frequently punished for rule-breaking
behaviors are at lower levels of social power, mentioning that some groups are less
likely to be viewed as rule breakers and can thus engage in rule breaking without
being detected or punished.
Taken together, Campbell (1979), Ajzen (2020), and Becker (1963) offer several
important ideas. The first is that firms and institutions, as rule creators and enforc-
ers, bear responsibility for defining and punishing fraud. Second is that they bear
responsibility for bringing about fraud through their choices of what is evaluated in
an application to an institution. Third, some groups or individuals may be more or
less powerful in the creation or enforcement of rules, while some groups or indi-
viduals may be seen as more likely to be subject to given rules. Finally, as Ajzen
notes, there is always an individual component in deciding whether or not to engage
in a particular behavior.
A framework can thus provide a more complete picture about admissions fraud.
This framework has to address several issues: what entities are involved and identi-
fied in admissions fraud? What power and influence do these entities have over
admissions fraud, and how do these powers relate to and influence one another?
Such questions are addressed by multiple theorists, notably by Bronfenbrenner
(1979) in his ecological systems theory. Bronfenbrenner’s model posits different
levels of relationships of power and influence, but it is extremely expansive and is
intended to capture an entire ecosystem and history of events. Instead, Bertram
Gallant (2008) offers a four-level model more tailored to academic integrity and
fraud which moves from the individual to the institutional level, something elabo-
rated on and expanded by Eaton (2021) in her application of the 4 M framework
including multiple actors and constituencies under its micro, meso, macro, and
mega levels. However, owing to the nature of admissions fraud, these frameworks
can be difficult to operationalize, particularly because many actors do not fit into a
four-level system. In Table 10.1, I offer an adapted framework to better understand
Table 10.1 Framework for examining admissions fraud

Level Type Example
Micro Individual actors Students, professors, administrators,
coaches, advisors, counselors
Metaxy Geographically bounded groups of actors; Cheating rings, private academies
contracted with the meso and macro levels (hakwons, buxibans, jukus, college
admission advisory firms)
Meso Geographically diverse and dispersed Credential evaluation or testing firms
groups of actors; contractors with the meso
and macro level
Macro Institutions of education Colleges, universities, high schools
Acro Governments Local, regional, state/provincial,
countrywide
the scope of admissions fraud. In the sections that follow, I provide further explana-
tion about each level.
Micro
This level focuses on individual actors, like students, professors, staff members,
administrators, coaches, counselors, and others (Gallant, 2008; Eaton, 2021). This
is the level most frequently addressed in academic integrity and fraud policies, but
only at the student level (McGrail & McGrail, 2015). Furthermore, US federal visa
regulations punish students for admissions fraud, not institutions or firms (Kaplin &
Lee, 2007).
However, admissions fraud takes other forms at the individual level. Professors
and advisors do not decide admissions, but they do decide who they recommend for
admission, (Korn & Levitz, 2020; Selingo, 2020). Professors can also be involved
in scholarship determinations (Selingo, 2020). In addition to professors and advi-
sors, there is clear individual influence of coaches, as in the “side door” admissions
process in Varsity Blues (Korn & Levitz, 2020).
Metaxy
This level, from the Greek word for “between” or “middle”, refers to firms, compa-
nies, and groups that are geographically bounded and involve smaller numbers of
individuals working together on admissions concerns. These entities focus on assist-
ing individuals in gaining admission to institutions at the macro level by providing
specialized services, such as test preparation, private tutoring, and admissions
advising, as well as illicit services such as test cheating and creation of fraudulent
letters of recommendation, admissions essays, and transcripts (NACAC, 2020).
Entities here mostly interact with micro and meso levels, and can be affiliated
directly with meso-level entities. For example, several cheating rings have focused
on one set of schools in small geographic areas (Bergman, 2012; Qing et al., 2016),
providing cheating services on entrance exams; in contrast, branch offices of the
ACT’s GAC program have come under fire for cheating practices and fraudulent
transcripts (Stecklow et al., 2016). Some entities here interact with macro level
institutions, particularly recruiting agencies (NACAC, 2020). These are small and
largely focused on one city or region, yet still contracted to work with macro institu-
tions (universities) to recruit students (NACAC, 2020; Qing et al., 2016).
Metaxy entities typically do not have direct influence over admission decisions.
However, their influence can be large in their ability to manipulate admissions sys-
tems, particularly regarding testing, proof of desired extracurricular activities,
admissions essays, and letters of recommendation, leading them to be blamed for
fraud (Korn & Levitz, 2020; NACAC, 2020; Qing et al., 2016).
214 B. DeCoster
Meso
This level contains entities less geographically bounded and more numerous in ser-
vices than at the metaxy level. While a metaxy entity might focus on test prepara-
tion, a meso institution might offer comprehensive services, including provision of
coursework for college credit, test preparation, extracurricular and volunteer oppor-
tunities, and writing coaching (Stecklow et al., 2016). Entities here are tied to insti-
tutions at the macro level and may act as part of them, as in university department
level scholarship committees (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).
Additionally, this level contains “bridging programs” or tracks for conditional
admission (ICEF, 2016a; Ross, 2018). These programs allow admission if a course
of language study is completed successfully (ICEF, 2016a, b; Stecklow et al., 2016).
Often, outside firms contract with an institution to provide a service too prohibitive
for the institution to provide, such as recruiting students abroad and providing
English language training (NACAC, 2020).
Such outside firms also provide other services to macro institutions. These
include firms such as ETS, which administers both TOEFL and GRE exams for
prospective graduate students (Read, 2015), and the Common Application, a plat-
form to manage applications to multiple institutions (Ehrenberg & Liu, 2009).
These firms recruit a quota of international students and provide a steady stream of
revenue, something illegal under US law for domestic students (Kaplin & Lee,
2007; NACAC, 2020). They have thus been the subject of intense scrutiny by the
National Association for College Admissions Counseling (NACAC) (2020). These
agencies provide multiple services to students they recruit, including language
training, test preparation, admissions counseling, application completion, and pre-
paratory trainings on living abroad (Bergman, 2012; Pratt, 2014; Qing et al., 2016).
This level also includes companies assisting students in applying to institutions,
also known as college prep companies (NACAC, 2020). These companies provide
assistance in areas previously mentioned ones do, particularly application prepara-
tion and test preparation (Qing et al., 2016). However, these companies also offer
assistance on course planning and extracurricular planning during high school in
order to present a “well-rounded” and focused transcript for desired institutions and
majors (Korn & Levitz, 2020; Selingo, 2020). The main difference between agen-
cies mentioned previously and college prep companies is that college prep compa-
nies typically focus on domestic students in their second or third years of high
school (Selingo, 2020).
Macro
This level includes institutions that students are trying to gain admission to. They
are the entities that confer degrees to students. They often set rules for admission
and contract with groups at the meso level to provide services (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).
Many meso entities exist inside these institutions, but ultimately, the institution
establishes rules for admission. Thus, while committees make recommendations,
there will ultimately be an interaction among committees and administrators such
that final decisions are those of the institution (Kaplin & Lee, 2007; Korn & Levitz,
2020; Selingo, 2020). For example, a committee may have decision-making author-
ity for admission to limited enrollment programs, but decisions of these committees
might be contravened by institutional admissions offices (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).
This means establishing standards for admission, such as GPA, evidence of prior
learning, number and types of letters of recommendation, minimum scores on
admissions tests, extracurricular activities, proof of desired language proficiency,
and any other qualifications the institution deems important (NACAC 2020).
Beyond this, institutions also must decide how each of these is adjudicated, though
as Selingo (2020) has noted, this process is complex. This may involve contracting
with firms at the meso level to determine academic aptitude, or with WES to deter-
mine whether a transcript is evidence of prior learning (Selingo, 2020). Most impor-
tantly, it involves the “shaping” process, whereby an incoming class is crafted based
on the desired demographic makeup of the institution (NACAC, 2020; Selingo, 2020).
Acro
This level includes governing bodies at the local, state or provincial, and federal or
countrywide levels. For example, in order to study at a university or college in the
US, an international student must meet the requirements of a given institution, but
also the requirements for a visa (ICE, 2021; Kaplin & Lee, 2007). These occur at the
federal level in the US and apply to all institutions of higher education (Kaplin &
Lee, 2007; Jaschik, 2005; Selingo, 2020). States and provinces can exercise influ-
ence on admissions through economic or manpower planning, as in the case of
Florida’s move to establish quotas of given majors at its state universities based on
economic need in the state (Jaschik, 2005). Beyond this, multiple levels of govern-
ment are able to influence admissions through scholarships, such as Obama’s pro-
posal to tie Pell Grant provision to university rankings (Jaschik, 2013). Finally,
there is the case of federal entities creating fraudulent universities with the intention
of entrapping students for visa fraud (Narea, 2019).
Example Case: The ACT GAC Cheating Scandal
Summary
Two of the most popular standardized tests used for admissions to US universities
are the SAT and ACT (Dudley et al., 2016; Selingo, 2020; Soares, 2012). These tests
claim to predict student success, though this has been cast into doubt (Soares, 2012).
216 B. DeCoster
Among these, the SAT is the most popular; however, the ACT has been gaining
ground (Dudley et al., 2016; Selingo, 2020). Part of the reason for this is the Global
Assessment Certificate (GAC) program offered by ACT (ACT, 2020), which allows
students to gain academic skills and earn college-level credit in furthering their
education at a university in multiple countries, including the US, Canada, England,
and Australia (ACT, 2021a). The idea in this program is that students at approved
education centers around the world are taught a standardized curriculum, prepared
for the ACT, and then sent off to partner universities around the world (ACT, 2021a,
b). In this curriculum, students can take courses accepted for transfer credit for
many general university requirements for one year or more of study based on agree-
ments with partner universities (ACT, 2021a, b; ICEF, 2013). As noted by Dudley
et al. (2016), this made the ACT an attractive alternative to the SAT, which had been
suffering from a security breach in 2013. The GAC program was seen as a viable
pathway to a higher education in the US for students who might not otherwise have
a path to such an education (Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School, 2019b). As a
result of this, GAC program centers saw an increase in enrollment, and a greater
usage in applications to universities in the US (Stecklow et al., 2016).
In 2016, an investigation by Reuters staff found that GAC centers in China and
South Korea were providing students answers to the ACT (Stecklow et al., 2016).
GAC centers must be approved by the ACT, meaning each GAC center operates
under the auspices of the ACT itself (ACT, 2021a). This meant that a center provid-
ing test answers before the test was an indictment of the testing center and the ACT
itself (Stecklow et al., 2016). The report provided testimony from students and
teachers at several GAC centers that cheating was common, test answers were freely
distributed, and students and teachers helped each other cheat the ACT in hopes of
admission to universities in desired countries and greater prestige for the GAC cen-
ters (Stecklow et al., 2016; Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School, 2019a).
The information showed that GAC centers were sometimes for-profit test prep
agencies, and that they were sometimes linked to schools, whether high schools or
universities, to grant them legitimacy (Stecklow et al., 2016). This is explicitly for-
bidden under the ACT’s standards for operating a GAC center (Stecklow & Harney,
2016). In both China and South Korea, Dudley et al. (2016) found that test prep
centers were able to present themselves as legitimate separate educational institu-
tions in order to gain ACT accreditation (Stecklow et al., 2016). In Korea, one GAC
center was found to have been established in a for-profit test-preparation center
because the operator of the center was able to use a separate university-based testing
center as the center of record to obtain ACT certification (ICEF, 2013; Stecklow &
Harney, 2016). The report also mentioned that security concerns surrounding the
Korean center were communicated to ACT authorities, but that these concerns had
been dismissed (Stecklow & Harney, 2016; Stecklow et al., 2016) Moreover, the
report showed that the ACT was aware of this, and that they did not take any action.
In the aftermath, ACT executives stated that they had the highest standards for
GAC subunits, and that all efforts were made to ensure the security of the test and
the integrity of GAC programs (Stecklow & Harney, 2016). The main statement
regarding GAC centers in Asia mentioned that security and vetting of GAC centers
was the responsibility of the Hong Kong branch (Stecklow et al., 2016), and that the
central ACT office was unaware of irregularities. The ACT tried to indicate any
breaches of integrity were due to individual actions (Stecklow & Harney, 2016;
Stecklow et al., 2016). The ACT eventually created a special fee of $51 USD
addressed on non-US based test takers to allow for more funds to investigate fraud
on the test (Stecklow & Harney, 2016). Stecklow et al. (2016) contacted multiple
US based universities with GAC contracts to determine whether they were aware of
what had happened and if they planned to take any action about it, but none of the
institutions reported being aware of what had happened, and none expressed any
clear actions to be taken.
nalysis Using the Framework: What Are

A
the Entities Involved?
Micro
Students, teachers, and administrators were involved in either engaging the services
of the GAC centers or providing information about how centers were providing
fraudulent services. Multiple students reported they had either used services offered
to cheat or had seen other students do so. Multiple students and former teachers and
administrators at GAC centers also spoke to the media about observing others cheat-
ing, and how they had felt it was inappropriate to allow such practices to continue.
Metaxy
Owing to the nature of this incident, it is hard to create clear boundaries between
metaxy, meso, and macro entities. This is because metaxy entities are connected
directly to both meso and macro entities here, such that a metaxy entity like a GAC
center is housed inside a legitimate macro entity like a high school, such as in the
case of Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School (2019a). Moreover, a GAC unit can
provide services to a macro entity, such as in the case of ACT services and training
provided to the University of Macau (Stecklow et al., 2016). Metaxy entities here
have a relationship with the meso level at the very least, and can also have relation-
ships with macro and possibly acro level authorities as well.
For example, Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School was founded by three indi-
viduals who served in either macro or acro levels of administration in Henan prov-
ince in China (Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School, 2019c). The GAC center there
is operated by the former minister for international education in Henan, one of the
aforementioned founders of the school. Per ACT rules, all GAC centers must be
certified by the ACT itself in order to provide both the GAC curriculum and ACT
218 B. DeCoster
test (ACT, 2020). Thus, there is a linkage here between one unit of a high school
(metaxy) with the ACT organization (meso), as well as within the high school itself
(macro) and possible linkage to province-wide rule makers (acro).
Likewise, STEPEDU was identified in Korea (Stecklow et al., 2016), wherein an
GAC center operator had been associated with Hanyang University, but had been
forced to end his association with the university owing to new laws in 2012 banning
GAC operation at universities (GoHackers, 2011; ICEF, 2013; Stecklow et al.,
2016). This led him to move the GAC center to a private test-prep unit called
STEPEDU, and then publicly note that this was the only private institution running
a GAC center in the world. This is a violation of the ACT’s certification standards
(ACT, 2020), something which the ACT was already aware of as several individuals
provided information that the GAC center was operating as a test-prep center for the
ACT, leading to an internal ACT investigation (Stecklow et al., 2016). Here, a
metaxy entity moves from being a part of a macro entity (university) to being a divi-
sion of another metaxy entity, maintaining its certification through lax oversight at
the meso level (ACT).
Interestingly, there is one other metaxy entity identified within the ACT, which is
the ACT test security division. Stecklow et al. (2016) note that the ACT test security
office reported that it was concerned with the security of both the test and the reli-
ability of GAC centers throughout Asia, and that it had also been examining the
SPECEDU center in Korea mentioned above.
Meso
While several branches and departments of the ACT were involved here, ultimately,
all decisions about taking action came from the central offices of ACT in Iowa
(Stecklow et al., 2016), especially surrounding investigations and certifications.
Notably here, there were multiple metaxy entities directly related to the meso entity
here, particularly through the franchise arrangement that ACT created for GAC cen-
ters (ACT, 2020). However, as each of these entities operated essentially as indepen-
dent contractors, there was little direct influence of the ACT organization over them.
Macro
There are many linkages between the metaxy, macro, and acro levels here, though
less so with the meso level owing to lax ACT oversight (Qing et al., 2016; Stecklow
et al., 2016). With this said, there are two clear categories of macro entities here:
housing institutions and transfer institutions. Housing institutions contain a GAC
center as part of the organization, while transfer institutions have established an
agreement with a GAC center to accept students. Housing institutions included both
high schools and universities which contained and managed GAC centers (ICEF,
2013; Stecklow et al., 2016). These entities were often required as part of the regula-
tions established at the meso level, despite having little connection to their linked
metaxy entities (ICEF, 2013). This is clear for both Zhengzhou and SPECEDU
instances detailed above, though each case varies. Zhengzhou was and is a macro-
level institution in Henan province, with ongoing certification as a school and con-
tinued status as a GAC center (Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School, 2019a, b, c),
while the SPECEDU center in Seoul was a metaxy-level center that was used to
transfer the metaxy-level GAC unit from macro-level Hanyang University
(GoHackers, 2011; ICEF, 2013). As such, while macro-level entities can be speci-
fied in the case of housing institutions, they are largely only important as they relate
to metaxy-level entities.
The picture is clearer for transfer institutions, which have established a linkage
with GAC centers such that completion of GAC coursework, along with a sufficient
score on the ACT, will allow students to matriculate and be placed at advanced
standing in their coursework (ACT, 2021a, b). As such, the metaxy entity is not part
of the transfer institution, but rather a separate entity that has an agreement with the
macro-level transfer institution. This was the reasoning that led to the ban on GAC
centers at universities in Korea, as a linkage between a metaxy entity and a foreign
macro entity violated the Higher Education Law (ICEF, 2013). ACT lists multiple
macro entities as transfer institutions on its homepage (ACT, 2021a, b), including
Iowa State University and the University of Michigan-Flint.
Acro
In the case of Zhengzhou, individuals with links and previous work experience at
the provincial acro level founded the school itself, leading to the possibility that
there was undue influence in licensing requirements or other access money issues
(Ang, 2020). However, several acro entities are clearly identified in this case, par-
ticularly the Henan Department of Education (Stecklow et al., 2016) and the
Ministry of Education in Korea (ICEF, 2013). These entities are identified based on
their influence over the licensing and legality of the metaxy/meso/macro relations in
this case. Thus, the entities identified here are all related to the macro-level housing
institutions rather than the transfer institutions.
Beyond this, though not specifically identified, the US Department of State, ICE,
and USCIS are also present, since the issues detailed in conversations with Iowa
State University and the University of Michigan-Flint are grounds for communica-
tion with acro-level authorities regarding visa fraud. However, there are multiple
other entities identified through the ACT website (2021), as they have all signed
contracts with ACT regarding student admission through completion of the GAC at
a given center (ACT, 2021a, b).
220 B. DeCoster
hat Power Does Each Entity Have Over Admissions Fraud,

W
and How Do These Powers Relate to One Another?
Micro
Individuals could either engage in or choose to expose fraud here. Micro entities
here have multiple incentives to follow the lead of those at levels above them in
perceived power (Ajzen, 2020), particularly since metaxy, meso, macro, and possi-
bly acro entities are actively or passively encouraging fraud. ACT prep schools, the
ACT itself, and actors at the acro level in Henan province were aligned in ensuring
that Zhengzhou Cornerstone maintain its presence and dominance in international
college admissions (Stecklow et al., 2016; Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School,
2019a, b, c). As such, there was pressure to go along with actions such as providing
test answers in advance (Stecklow & Harney, 2016), something which teachers and
students note in Stecklow et al. (2016) investigation. In several cases, teachers sim-
ply gave test answer booklets to students and advised them to use them to improve
their scores.
However, individuals also could expose fraud, which happened in this case
among both students and teachers. Both students and teachers complained to GAC
centers, the ACT, and the media about practices that they felt were morally wrong,
particularly the provision of advanced test answers and the proctoring of tests at
test-prep institutions (Stecklow et al., 2016).
Metaxy
There are four ways here in which power over fraud is exercised. The first is choos-
ing to engage in fraud, as with GAC centers that operated in violation of ACT’s
facility separation standard, or tacitly, as with institutions ignoring reports of cheat-
ing or reuse of materials. The second is by influencing the actions of students
through messaging, particularly through guarantees of admission to top US univer-
sities and perfect test scores (ICEF, 2013; Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School,
2019a, 2019b), and through claims of legitimacy by affiliation and licensing by
meso, macro, and acro entities, particularly partner schools, the ACT, and provincial
or central governments (ICEF, 2013; Qing et al., 2016; Stecklow et al., 2016). The
third is through connection with meso, macro, and acro entities, particularly estab-
lishing and managing relationships with individuals who can provide favorable con-
ditions for continued business operations (Qing et al., 2016). For example,
STEPEDU operated an ACT test site in a test-prep institution, but characterized this
as a boon to students in advertising and promotion of its GAC program, increased
test scores, and expertise in placing students in partner universities abroad.
STEPEDU was able to operate within Hanyang University to gain legitimacy, but
when this arrangement was made illegal, STEPEDU was able to use its other
existing relationship with the ACT to simply maintain its status as a GAC center,
even having allegations against it being dismissed (Stecklow et al., 2016).
The fourth way that power is used regarding fraud here is to monitor and inves-
tigate it. While the ACT overall has the power to make decisions regarding cancel-
lation of tests, forfeiture of licensing and partnerships, and changes to the structure
of the GAC program, its Test Security Division is tasked with monitoring and inves-
tigating possible fraud. In this case, the Test Security Division was made aware of
possible fraud at multiple GAC centers, including Zhengzhou and
SPECEDU. According to the documents obtained by Stecklow et al. (2016), the
Test Security Division did recommend further investigation and action by the ACT
in both cases.
Meso
As an organization, the ACT had the ability to monitor and sanction test fraud and
GAC center practices, such as the removal of partnership with STEPEDU and its
elimination as an ACT test center. The ACT also created standards for test security
and licensing requirements for operating a GAC center; it also has the power to
shirk this authority, either through not taking action on allegations of fraud, not
regularly vetting GAC partner institutions, or not sanctioning in a way that affects
entities responsible for fraud. Thus, while allegations and evidence of fraud were
presented to the ACT by its own Test Security Division, the ACT took no action
until the Reuters investigation came out. Furthermore, when the Reuters investiga-
tions came out, ACT decided to assess a fee from test takers in Asia rather than from
GAC centers or macro-level partners.
The ACT also exercises power in trying establishing the GAC program as a
desirable alternative to programs like AP or IB in allowing for admission and
advanced academic standing for students (Qing et al., 2016; Selingo, 2020). Similar
to metaxy entities, ACT seeks to establish relationships with partner macro entities
in the form of GAC bridging programs into universities throughout the world
(ACT, 2021b).
Macro
Macro entities here can establish a metaxy entity as part of their overall organiza-
tion, as with Hanyang University or Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School; likewise,
they can choose to remove the metaxy unit from their organization. They can also
choose to partner with the metaxy organization for provision of specific services,
such as when the University of Macau uses one specific GAC center for all provi-
sion of ACT testing and test prep (Qing et al., 2016). Beyond this, macro entities can
choose to partner with a meso entity, the ACT, for provision of either testing
222 B. DeCoster
services in the form of the ACT test or bridging services in the form of GAC part-
nerships for admission.
Acro
Provincial and central government authorities exercise power here through rule-
making, licensing, and monitoring for educational entities at the macro, meso, and
metaxy levels. As seen with SPECEDU, Korea implemented a countrywide rule that
bridging institutions would no longer be allowed to partner with universities, while
in contrast, the Henan Department of Education licensed and continues to license
Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School despite allegations of fraud. Acro-level
authorities could choose to issue sanctions against the macro, meso, and metaxy
entities identified here (ICEF, 2013; Melcher, 2010; Reuters, 2021); however, in
these cases, it appears that they have chosen not to do so.
Conclusions and Limitations
The framework and case presented above are useful in showing how admissions
fraud involves an entire culture of individuals and entities, and how characterizing
fraud as simply one individual’s choice misses the many levels of power that a
choice is subject to. When an entity that depends on an appearance of reliability for
its profit must self-monitor for fraud, it is hardly surprising the entity would ignore
fraud unless forced to confront it (Qing et al., 2016).
Likewise, the framework is useful in showing how micro level sanctions do not
address the conditions that lead to individual decisions. It also shows how a focus
on the micro level can actually serve to reinforce fraudulent behavior at higher lev-
els, as there is no accountability at these levels. It is easy to charge individuals for
cheating, and it is easy to portray individuals as solely responsible for their actions.
By doing so, entities at higher levels can divest themselves of any responsibility and
power they may have over fraud.
Finally, the framework is useful in showing how individuals can move among
different levels, and how this can lead to social pressures that can influence percep-
tions of whether fraud should be overlooked, embraced, or rejected. When a former
head of an acro-level institution takes a position in a meso or macro-level institu-
tion, it is possible for the relationships this individual has had at the higher levels to
play a role in how fraud is treated at their new level. Likewise, when the head of a
metaxy or meso-level entity is able to establish a relationship with an individual at
the acro level, it becomes possible to lobby for lax oversight or enforcement of rules
regarding fraud (Qing et al., 2016).
One key limitation of this framework is that it allows for analysis, but remedy of
fraud. As noted, authorities in charge of detecting and sanctioning fraud either chose
to sanction individuals and not larger entities, chose to dismiss clear allegations and
proof of fraud, or chose to divest their authority to another entity at a lower level
which had an incentive to not detect or sanction fraud. As such, the problems are
clear, yet the manner in which to address them is not.
There are two methods that have been used to address this that the framework
does not directly address, and these are lawsuits and media exposure. The first of the
two can be seen in the cases of entrapment (Narea, 2019), and in class-action law-
suits against the UC system for continuing to use the ACT and SAT as admissions
requirements (Asimov, 2021; Nawordny, 2019), as well as a recent suit against the
ACT for falsely flagging a score as being suspicious (Jaschik, 2019). In each case,
individuals at the micro level targeted by entities at higher levels have attempted to
use the legal system to address their concerns, being successful in at least two cases:
removal of the SAT and ACT from UC system admissions standards and removal of
the arbitration requirement for the ACT for suspicious test scores.
The second of these is the effectiveness of media exposure, which is an area that
is not sufficiently studied in regards to academic fraud. As an example of this, the
ACT case described involved multiple GAC centers which were not in compliance
with ACT standards, and while this had been noted and documented prior to the
Reuters investigation, no action had taken place. Once the Reuters investigation was
made public and notable, at least one GAC center, the STEPEDU private ACT test
center, was decertified by the ACT. As such, meaningful change has taken place as
a result of this manner of engagement.
As the framework does not address either of these manners of engagement, a
more expansive and inclusive framework is needed to address both the nature of and
remedy of admissions fraud. However, it may also be possible to include remedies
in the framework as another form of power. This initial examination of admissions
fraud does not allow for such a nuanced framework, but clearly, attention is required
to this theme.
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pto=nui&_x_tr_sch=http
Brendan DeCoster is an instructor, academic advisor, and Ph.D. candidate in International

Education Policy at the University of Maryland, College Park. His research focuses on internation-
alization of tertiary education, particularly related to issues of academic integrity, language policy,
sustainable development, credentialism, and high-stakes testing. His dissertation examines the per-
spective of Chinese and Korean students at mid-Atlantic universities on academic integrity and
academic integrity violations. Prior to beginning his doctoral work, Brendan was an ESL/EFL
teacher and teacher trainer, working for both the University of Oregon, USA, and the Gyeonggi-Do
Office of Education, South Korea. He is a guest lecturer at George Washington University, where
he teaches a course on education and development in East Asia.
Chapter 11
Security Risks, Fake Degrees, and Other
Fraud: A Topic Modelling Approach
Abstract Topic modeling is an unsupervised machine learning technique com-

monly used in computer science as a research method. Machine learning utilizes
data to make decisions and draw inferences through an algorithm. Topic modeling
has yet to be used widely in education and, to our knowledge, not within the scope
of security. This technique provided the main focus of this study. We investigate this
gap using the problem of fake degrees and credentials, which also has limited schol-
arly review outside of technical solutions. The purchase and use of counterfeit
degrees devalue the objective of higher education. If such a case is made public, an
institution could be under fire and incur considerable financial loss due to reputa-
tional damage, legal fees, etc. Websites selling degrees are easily found with a quick
search, and looking beneath the layers was essential to understanding this business.
Data from 30 websites selling fake degrees were manually scraped, observations
noted, and a topic model was built to identify risks within the dataset. Co-occurrences
of keywords were visualized to provide a greater understanding of the data. As a
result of our findings and further questions, web tools were applied to the IP
addresses of the websites (e.g., geolocation and dynamic versus static connection)
to provide supplemental data. We demonstrated that topic modeling can identify
security risks by providing an environmental scan of the threat. This scan allowed
us to isolate 23 risks. This analysis is beneficial for security professionals and senior
leaders in higher education to ensure the solutions employed address the threat.
Furthermore, this study also delivers value to researchers using text mining and
those examining academic integrity or security. At the conclusion of this paper, 20
recommendations are outlined.
S. E. Eaton

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_11
Keywords Academic integrity · Academic misconduct · Credentials · Fake

degrees · Fraud · Higher education · Internet protocols · Security · Topic modeling
· Web mining
Introduction
We are an increasingly connected society. With increased connection comes a need

for security and privacy as an important architectural component in the design of
our systems (Baset & Denning, 2019). Threats in the digital age are challenging to
track as they continue to change and are multi-faceted with far-reaching implica-
tions. Learning as much as possible about the threat allows one to be proactive, not
reactive (Samtani et al., 2017). For this reason, topic modeling can provide an over-
view of a given problem using various data points, from academic literature and
industry papers to information on the web. To synthesize all of this information for
a human would be challenging and time-consuming. However, with machine learn-
ing, it can be organized succinctly to allow the user to interpret, explore, and find
trends. Our primary exploration was conducted on the mined data from 30 websites
that sell fake degrees and provided a summary of these business operations.
This summary included a list of topics with associated keywords, revealing
insights into the data collected. Topic modeling in this study utilized a latent
Dirichlet allocation algorithm, which assigned each data element to a topic (Blei,
Ng, & Jordan, 2003; Blei, 2012 as cited in Bailetti & Tanev, 2020). This assignment
relies on probabilistic distributions (Buenaño-Fernandez et al., 2020, p. 35322),
whereby each topic represents a collection of words that might appear more fre-
quently in relation to each other (Bailetti & Tanev, 2020). The degree of this rela-
tionship is represented with a numerical weight that can be used to determine
significance (Bailetti & Tanev, 2020). Weiss (2021) explains this with the keywords
“goal, ball, audience and money” (p. 1) that might appear within a topic and point
to the theme of sports. However, carefully interpreting the literature or data source
is necessary to uncover a deeper meaning (Weiss, 2021). Examining co-occurrences
(e.g., words that replicate) can assist with this objective (Weiss, 2021) and, in this
case, led us to investigate the internet addresses of the websites more closely, which
provided a secondary data point. In review, this technique in education is novel,
with most text-mining papers in this domain focusing on surveys, feedback, tools,
and a means to analyze literature (Carmichael & Weiss, 2023). This novelty was
also evident in the problem being explored.
Fake degrees and fraudulent credentials are discussed in the media and working
papers but seldom in academia despite their early appearance. In preparation for a
webinar in summer 2020 (in the early days of our research), we found a journal
article dating back to 1883. The notion of diploma mills or “the sheepskin shop”
(Thompson, 1883, p. 256) was highlighted as tainting education. Diploma mills
versus degree mills is a delineation that is made, which is not entirely intuitive.
Diploma mills churn out suspect credentials from an accredited or “real” institution,
11 Security Risks, Fake Degrees, and Other Fraud: A Topic Modelling Approach 229
whereas degree mills produce fake documents from fake schools (Contreras &
Gollin, 2009 , p. 37). Although this is not a new phenomenon, a web page or fake
school can be easily created with the use of printer technology, and supporting
details found on the Internet (Jimu, 2018). The examples in this paper refer to
diploma mills.
We show that topic modeling can identify security risks within higher education
through the problem of fake degrees and credentials. We identified nine topics,
which summarized the business behind these enterprises, and in doing so, found 23
risks. Once we know the risks, we could determine recommendations for further
consideration.
This paper is organized by detailing the literature on topic modeling, security,
fraud, and fake degrees within the literature review. Next, we outline the steps fol-
lowed to create the topic model in methods, and in the subsequent section, we pres-
ent the results of the steps followed. We will record the limitations of our study and
how the literature compares with our findings in the discussion. Lastly, we will
provide recommendations and our conclusion, which can be used for future work
for researchers and practitioners.
Literature Review
The literature review summarizes the various use cases of topic modeling in secu-
rity, emphasizing fraud detection. This section will conclude with literature on the
problem examined in this paper, fake degrees, and credentials.
Text mining is an investigative tool that can be used to learn more about a given
threat. Akyazi et al. (2021) examined cybercrime forums where given services were
promoted and customers located. This activity is labeled as Cybercrime-as-a-
Service (CaaS), and in their study, they measured the supply and demand of the
different types of existing services through classification (Akyazi et al., 2021).
While this research did not directly use topic modeling, it examined text to gauge
how these services evolved (Akyazi et al., 2021). Interestingly, most of the activity
took place behind logins and chats, making the transactions hard to measure (Akyazi
et al., 2021). Moreover, the authors also provided a comprehensive review of other
studies that used a similar method on such forums. Samtani, Chinn & Chen (2015)
used topic modeling on documents and tutorials on hacker forums. This content
could include specific instructions on creating malware (Samtani et al., 2015). The
results were fruitful and displayed the types of attacks; of particular interest was the
information related to banking (Samtani et al., 2015). This thread led the research-
ers to dig further, use a classifier, and reveal further insights into this threat (Samtani
et al., 2015). Samtani et al. (2015) state that these tools, and the framework outlined
in their paper, provide a practical guide for those working in the security industry.
Forums for such behaviors continue to be researched with the aid of topic modeling
(Bahamazava & Nanda, 2022; Benjamin, Valacich & Chen, 2019), and some used
the knowledge learned to develop blacklists. Swe and Nyein Myo (2018)
implemented the keywords generated from a topic model as the basis for a blacklist
to detect fake Twitter accounts.
The use of topic modeling can be expanded beyond the web. System monitoring
for potential risks is a task that is often done manually for those working in security
due to the complexity of automated monitoring (Adilova et al., 2019). With system
monitoring, there are data logs to review. Because malicious threats can look “nor-
mal,” false alarms can result if an automated solution is employed (Sommer &
Paxson, 2010, as cited in Adilova et al., 2019). This manual process is resource and
labor-intensive, and machine learning continues to be explored in this domain
(Adilova et al., 2019). In the research conducted by Adilova et al. (2019), they uti-
lized topic modeling on the behavioral patterns from the log data, which in turn was
visualized for the security professionals to interpret, and cluster into meaningful
categories. The results of this exercise were used to train an anomaly detection soft-
ware, nevertheless taking advantage of both the expertise of the security resource
and the speed of an algorithm (Adilova et al., 2019). The use of topic modeling to
build better software and systems was also seen in Attigeri et al. (2018). In this case,
documentation from fraud cases in the banking sector was ingested into the model
so that the types of fraud could be categorized to develop a better detection system
(Attigeri et al., 2018). Attigeri et al. (2018) noted a gap between the business and
technical solutions put in place; therefore, using this classification to rectify this
problem. Likewise, the same approach has been applied to email scams and telecom
fraud with cell phones, with topic modeling providing a mechanism to extract pat-
terns (Genc et al., 2021; Li et al., 2017; Pandit et al., 2018).
The intersection of security, topic modeling, and higher education was limited
within our search. However, Dadkhah et al. (2021) used this method to learn about
predatory journals through the social media channel Reddit and developed a dash-
board (https://drdadkhah.shinyapps.io/pedcheck/) that professors and supervisors
can use. There are many characteristics of predatory journals (Cobey et al., 2018),
but the standout traits are a deviation from publication standards and quality
(Dadkhah et al., 2021). There can also be an element of deception (Oermann et al.,
2020, Dadkhah et al. 2021). Similar, was the study conducted by Lagopoulos et al.
(2017). They used topic modeling and server logs to uncover suspect academic
publishing online via web bots. Lagopoulos et al. (2017) argue that web bots go
through a website “incoherently”, (p. 1), whereas humans will engage with the
information quite differently. For example, humans might randomly stop on certain
pages or search for something particular (Lagopoulos et al., 2017). Therefore, deter-
mining a viable detection approach requires analyzing the semantics through topic
modeling (Lagopoulos et al., 2017). This research also considered the format of the
web pages, geolocation, and if any web services were used (Lagopoulos et al., 2017).
There are some connections between predatory journals, publication fraud, and
fake degrees. When searching the literature on the topic of fake degrees, it was
scarce and somewhat dated, except for blockchain. Blockchain is a technology that
allows a digital transaction to take place securely (i.e., from sharing to storing data)
using cryptographic hashing (Alam et al., 2021). Hashing is a way to encrypt the
information to ensure it gets to the intended receipt safely without modification
(Alam et al., 2021). This technology has been used in banking and is now being seen
in education in various capacities (Alam et al., 2021). It can be applied to any data
element, from course content or for the delivery of assignments and examinations
(Alam et al., 2021). Blockchain is primarily seen in student records and for docu-
ments needed during the admissions process (Mishra et al., 2021 as cited in Alam
et al., 2021). After completion, the credentials can also be shared with employers
(Alam et al., 2021). There were many examples in the literature of models to follow
when implementing blockchain in higher education (Dongre et al., 2020; Khan
et al., 2021), and even some added machine learning (Shah et al., 2021). For exam-
ple, blockchain would be used to hold and transmit the records for students securely,
and machine learning would be utilized to predict the jobs needed in the future
based on the data (Shah et al., 2021).
There are limitations of blockchain within education, however. For instance,
aligning the different learning pedagogies and assignment types, not to mention, the
inflexibility of the technology if something needs to be amended (Alam et al., 2021).
Shaik (2021) argues that blockchain is in its “infancy” (p.2) within higher education
and that cryptography and QR codes could be considered for this problem, which
provides a cost-effective, alternative solution. Cryptography uses an algorithm to
encrypt the data and can also employ hashing, as noted above (Shaik, 2021). Two
keys, one public and the other private, allow one to access their data (Shaik, 2021).
The public key is a QR code on an institution’s website alongside a scanning appli-
cation that can be downloaded (Shaik, 2021). Conversely, the private key is embed-
ded on the credential itself, via a QR code, and when the user uses the scanning
application on the document, it decrypts the information by matching up both the
public and private keys (Shaik, 2021).
While the focus was on the technical solution, some examined the threat head-
on. Kaur and Randhawa (2020) reviewed the activities on the Dark Web, which is a
hidden layer of the Internet that cannot be accessed through a browser. It is a plat-
form for many illegal activities, including fraud (Kaur & Randhawa, 2020). Fraud
that involves selling cards or personal data is shared, for example, usernames and
passwords (Kaur & Randhawa, 2020). In their investigation, Kaur and Randhawa
(2020) noted that “people hired hackers to break into University systems and change
grades (p. 2156)”. Furthermore, this activity was confirmed by cyber intelligence:
“According to Israeli intelligence firm Six gill, criminals were discovered selling
fake degrees, certifications and passports” (Kaur & Randhawa, 2020, p. 2156).
A few papers cut across the use of technology and looked at the sociological
rationale for engaging in this behavior, as well as the documented prevalence of the
cases. Attewell and Domina (2011) found that 6% of undergraduate degrees were
misconstrued, 35% of graduate degrees, and 73% of vocational degrees in the
U.S. (p. 68). In most cases, the students who chose this path went to the school in
question and were close to completing their graduation requirements (Attewell &
Domina, 2011). More general courses in high school, lower income, and those who
belong to a minority group were also more likely to end up in this situation (Attewell
& Domina, 2011). This becomes more meaningful when the following observation
is contemplated: Giani et al. (2020) report that undergraduates routinely do not
complete their studies as some education still increases their ranking in the labor
market and goes above those who do not pursue higher education.
Some different findings took place outside of North America. A man in Romania,
Mateo Politi, impersonated a plastic surgeon, performed surgeries, and only had an
eighth-grade education (Drăgan, 2020). It took a year for this scam to come to the
surface; fake documents were used, in addition, identify theft of a doctor that shared
the same name as him (Drăgan, 2020). Similarly, Garwe (2015) found significant
fraud in Zimbabwe upon collecting data from 15 universities and the quality assur-
ance body (Zimbabwe Council for Higher Education), resulting in an urgent call to
action to address the problem. Quality assurance bodies have an essential role to
play, and their response to corruption and fraud was also recorded in the interna-
tional research conducted by Glendinning, Orim and King (2019). Perhaps this
study’s most unsettling result was the lack of concern in many of the measured
categories (Glendinning et al., 2019).
Despite the appearance of dated literature, it was scanned and summarized if
applicable. Some themes uncovered would benefit from being re-examined. For
instance, Adams (2016) examined the perception of high school principles when
hiring teachers who obtained credentials from the traditional in-person training pro-
grams versus those wholly or partially online. This research’s result was that certi-
fications obtained through in-person were preferred (Adams, 2016). The media
contributed to the negative response regarding online. This was due in part to media
reports about suspect advertising (Carnevale, 2002 as cited in Adams, 2016), mar-
keting (Government Account Office, 2010, as cited in Adams, 2016), and fake
degrees (Bartlett & Smallwood, 2004, as cited in Adams, 2016).
The literature review discussed how topic modeling has been used in security, as
well as the various themes found in fake degrees and credentials. We will now tran-
sition to the methods used in our research.
Methods
In this paper, we examined two research questions (RQ):

RQ1: Can topic modeling be used to identify security risks in higher education?
RQ2: What are the risks with the proliferation of fake degrees and credentials on
websites?
We describe our methods in the following section which involve two data points:
topic model (primary focus), and IP address (secondary focus). The first step was
determining what problem and data within higher education would be used for the
topic model to answer question one. We learned in summer 2020 that the existence
of literature on fake degrees was scarce and far between. Consequently, this gap
provided an opportunity for further study; however, creating a topic model with
academic literature alone would not be fruitful. There is a substantive presence in
the media; of course, the websites provided another abundant source. We decided to
focus on the websites, as this was the central piece to assess if we were putting the
appropriate solutions in place from a security perspective. Moreover, it could also
allow for future comparisons with academic literature and the media.
After we determined the problem and the data source, we needed to think about
how to collect the data and the quantity that would be captured. The purpose was to
understand the business and identify risk; therefore, we opted for a smaller data sam-
ple to do an in-depth analysis. Thirty websites were chosen by searching “buy fake
degree” on Google. The goal was to follow the breadcrumbs throughout the site to
learn as much as possible. This was not a discriminating process in that the first 30
websites that appeared were tracked and documented in a database. At the time of col-
lection, we gathered 50 sites in case there were website errors that prevented scraping.
We used the open-source tool, Simplescraper (https://simplescraper.io/), and ran
some experiments on automatic versus manual text scraping. We created some rules
to initiate and test a web crawler but found that the data returned was not uniform
and would require many rules to be effective. Even after such implementation, it
would likely require substantial data clean-up. We, therefore, elected to scrape the
text from each layer of the site manually. However, we found some ways to acceler-
ate this process by aggregating the web layers into one extraction file through the
application. Even with only 30 websites, we quickly learned of the intricacies and
connectedness of these sites. For example, some sites would have over 100 pages of
degree samples, with six samples per page on average. There was also a significant
amount of duplication. We instituted some parsing rules and only included 10
degree, seal/emblem, transcript, or blog samples per website. We did not want these
samples to create bias in the model. The number of layers, scraping issues, year, and
other observations were recorded in the tracking database.
The textual data collected forms a single file called a corpus, which was fed into
the data mining software to create a topic model. This file required some cleaning.
There can be odd characters, particularly from the web, duplication, and in our case,
personal identifiers from social media, which were removed. As a rule of thumb,
testing the file structure early with the data mining software can save issues, mainly
as large datasets are often used in creating such models, and finding problems at this
stage can be challenging. There were many data mining tools to choose from; how-
ever, we opted for a custom tool, Topic Model Explorer (https://github.com/michael-
weiss/topic-model-explorer). It provided functionality to run multiple topic models
simultaneously and visually examine re-occurring words (similar to a cognitive
map). These re-occurring words also highlighted the topic’s stability, replicability,
and theme subtleties (Bailetti & Tanev, 2020; Weiss, 2021).
The first step in the topic model process was pre-processing (which takes place
in the software). This involved removing grammar, capitalization, and words that do
not contribute positively to the model. These words were often joining words that
did not add substance to the study area. To start, one would typically run a baseline
test to see what the output reveals. After this exercise, runs are initiated by adjusting
the number of topics marginally and adding stop words until the model is meaning-
ful and keywords are replicated across the topics. It is important to note that not all
keywords replicate. The objective is to pinpoint the replications and use them to
Fig. 11.1 Summary of topic runs (run 0–3)
label a topic. Afterward the top keywords within the topics can be compared and
examined for stability (see the word “seal” in Figs. 11.1 and 11.2). Keyword repeti-
tions or co-occurrences were isolated using a ratio. This ratio was designated with a
color in the application (see Fig. 11.3). The largest to smallest ratios were examined
(Weiss, 2021).
The findings led to curiosity about the geographic locations of these services,
and we decided to examine the web addresses in more detail, which provided addi-
tional information about these services. Internet protocols are a string of numbers
that can identify one’s position in the network. This position typically includes your
digital location (i.e., geolocation) and the type of connection in the network based
on the hierarchical structure of internet protocols outlined by the Internet Engineering
Task Force Request for Comment (RFC) 720 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfc7020.html). The type of connection is either static or dynamic. Static means that
the IP address does not change, versus dynamic, which does. This designation is
noteworthy as businesses often employ static connections due to server hosting and
needing improved performance for their users. They might have a data centre ser-
vice, for example. Services used and the name of the Internet service provider (ISP)
can also sometimes be determined with this identification.
We employed two website tools to locate IP addresses of the collected websites
to determine their country of origin (Open Admin Tools https://ip.openadmintools.
com/en/, WhatIsMyIPAddress.com). This process involved pasting the URL for the
fake degree website within a search field, documenting the IP address, and record-
ing the geographic location in a database. Two website tools were chosen to com-
pare and verify results. All of these details were managed in the Excel database.
Moreover, this experiment was replicated a few months later to reveal whether the
Fig. 11.2 Summary of topic runs (run 4–8)
IP address was static or dynamic. The frequency of how often a dynamic connection
was changed would vary between Internet providers. We recognize that using such
tools is imperfect, as an IP address can be masked in several ways to disclose its
location.
Results
The results section details observations while scraping, pre-processing the data, the
list of generated topics in their raw state, keyword co-occurrences, IP address exper-
imentation, and a summary of identified risks were compiled from the findings.
Observations: Data Scraping
A database encompassed all the elements of this study. There were no major scrap-
ing issues (i.e., website blockers) within the 30 selected websites. One site had a
blocker for the sample degree pages but was fine for the other textual pages. We
have elected not to disclose the names of these sites; therefore, not giving these
Fig. 11.3 Summary of co-occurrences
services further promotion, but we will discuss these observations as generaliza-

tions as our goal was to understand the business model for risk. These details also
provided additional context for interpreting the list of topics.
The scraped data ranged from sample degrees, how to order products, policies on
return, privacy, and security. One site featured a blog post about how to create your
fake degree at home. The value proposition for these services included claims of
novelty gag gifts, home décor, and securing employment. However, some offered a
student library or union card, a school email address with a lifetime guarantee, to
adding “your name” to the graduation database within 24 hours. There was also a
link to academia. A thesis could be purchased for a price, written by a Ph.D.,
stamped by university officials, and delivered within 45–50 days. Over and above,
accessories were available and consisted of a folder, hood, or cap. These products
could be paid for through Western Union, MoneyGram, and Bitcoin.
The earliest year on record for these websites in our data was 1998; some provid-
ers own more than one site. We saw two instances of this within our small dataset.
This is noteworthy, given that the dot.com boom is widely recognized to have
occurred in the same historical period. In other words, the massification of the sale
of online degrees and credentials can be correlated to the increase in e-commerce
worldwide. The associated social media sites were often suspended or terminated.
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter were the most common, but Pinterest was also
featured. Interestingly sometimes the accounts would follow schools or individuals
in a position of power. For example, one site followed the Department of Education
in Ireland and the Education Minister of Delphi. This was not the only way these
sites were promoted. Blogs or news articles that randomly embedded the services’
name in the content were typical in the sample. Along the same line, in one exam-
ple, they took faculty names off the Queens University website (located in Ontario,
Canada) and added them to their website. One would presume this was done to add
legitimacy to their service and possibly confuse or dupe buyers.
The justification for the purchase of these products was varied. Wait times to get
into university, admissions rates, and that COVID-19 had delayed graduation were
noted. In one case, the company promoted fake Canadian degrees to international
students, as Canada was stated to be more culturally and racially tolerant than other
countries. One website even ranked the best services in this market.
Beyond the featured products and suspect marketing, extensions of this business
model were sold that could change a person’s identity. This included certification,
government documents (e.g., driver’s license, birth certificate, passport), and even
the option to remove a criminal record. This darker tone was also reflected in
instances where the page was linked to SPAM or a buyer’s name was highlighted
because they did not pay.
In at least three cases, web pages contained Asian writing; for one, they stated
that they resided in Shenzhen, China. These are global businesses, will discuss more
on this theme later in this section.
Pre-processing the Data
As suggested within the research methodology, we tested the file structure early on
with our data mining tool, Topic Model Explorer, to avoid more significant issues.
There were Unicode problems, but we rectified them swiftly with some formatting
changes, and when it came time to download the completed file, it was successful.
The final file included 28,230 web layers.
We started with the introduction of stop words, and to get a foundation and save
time, we downloaded a starting list from GitHub (https://gist.github.com/seble-
ier/554280). This list had 127 words (primarily prepositions). The Topic Model
Explorer also embedded a preliminary list of English stop words. A baseline run
was actioned without stop words; we indicated ten topics and reviewed. Subsequently,
we included the stop words and ten topics to compare the outputs. These iterations
continued, multiple runs took place, and with five megabytes of data, it took some
time to generate. Once the miscellaneous stop words were excluded, decisions
about domain-specific words needed to be made. This exercise is an art or a fine
balance because the removal of the wrong words could impact the topic model. At
the conclusion, nine topics materialized that provided a high-level summary of the
problem, and 975 stop words were used.
List of Topics
The words in a topic model tell a story and bring insights to the surface. This topic
model was unique because instead of running one topic model, we ran four simul-
taneously to analyze keywords that replicated across models. These replications are
called co-occurrences. First, we reviewed the models sequentially (one through
four) in their raw state and interpreted the keywords based on the information
gleaned from scraping. In this state, each topic model has the same number of top-
ics, but the topics appear in a random order (see “seal” in Figs. 11.1 and 11.2). For
some cases, we needed to return to the documents of collected text, search for the
keyword, and follow up with a quick Internet search. During our analysis, we con-
sidered what keywords were expected versus what was surprising. Our findings
found nine overall topics, labeled as topics 0 to 8. The generated model results can
be found in Figures One and Two.
In topic model one, topic zero, we began by identifying the product (“high school
diploma”) and the steps to proceed with the purchase (“find,” “option,” “choose,”
“contact,” “email,” and “review proof”). In topic one, the same model, the testimo-
nies or promises of the service were mentioned: “best paper,” “quality,” “custom
printed,” and “professional”. The word “security” was also listed and may refer to
the buyer’s data and confidentiality. One website that was examined, it gave the
option to log in with a Facebook account. By doing so, the terms of the agreement
disclosed that the content would be accessed, including profile and friend details.
Topic two denoted the words “fake job”. Moreover “buy,” which was also uncov-
ered within this topic, could be paired with “fake” and other words like “diploma,”
“university degree,” “college certificate, “or “transcript”. These pairings explained
how specifically one might “fake a job”. Coincidentally, the string “fake online
university” was present, which is different from buying a bogus degree, as the digi-
tal storefront for this service would look and feel like a real school. Fields of study
are noted in topic three with “science,” “management,” “engineering,” and “technol-
ogy”. The inclusion of the word “tuition” could refer to a financial hurdle, whereas
the words “blue” and “Hong Kong” were more complex to interpret besides the
indication of a geographic area. Upon returning to the textual data, we found that
blue foil was a requestable feature, and Hong Kong was linked to several schools
(e.g., Chinese University of Hong Kong). Conversely, with a Google search, “blue”
and “Hong Kong” revealed a political divide in the city that referenced support for
protestors or the police (Beech, 2020). This support was demonstrated by
businesses displaying either yellow for those in favor of the protest movement or
blue, those behind the police (Beech, 2020). These keywords could have material-
ized through blog stories, often pulling from current news, but the collected text did
not show this effect.
Topic four followed suit, with both “medical” and “law” fields stated. Both fields
are accredited professions with an ethical code of conduct. Some sites restricted
selling degrees from these accredited disciplines, while others did not. “Novelty,”
“copy,” or “real” were reasons one would purchase in topic five, and “design” was
featured in topic six. In this topic, “canada” was also recorded, and this paper will
explore location more closely in the IP Address Experimentation section. The topic
model concluded with topics 7 and 8, where extended services were reinforced
through the words “graduation,” “grade,” and “gpa”. “Art” for your wall is another
reason to purchase, and multiple locations were again documented (“chinese,”
“malaysia,” “western,” “michigan”).
Topic model two replicated many of the concepts found in model one. For exam-
ple, in topic zero, the attributes of the product are introduced (“seal,” “paper,” to
“hologram.”) These words were comparable to topic six in topic model one. This
similarity continued with “job,” “education,” and “tuition” in topic one. Fields of
study, extended services (“graduation list” or “state card,”) geographic positioning,
and reasons to purchase are found throughout the topics. “State” was linked with
“card,” but “law” was another possibility in topic five. IELTS is displayed in topic
six and stands for International English Language Testing Systems, which is
required for admittance to post-secondary institutions for non-native English learn-
ers or those wishing to find employment outside their country of origin. The absence
of a particular score can impede an individual’s chance to leave their country, study
or work abroad, and further their economic standing. “Honor” is also recorded in
this topic, referring to honor roll, or degree to a service characteristic.
Both topic models three and four duplicated these findings, with a few excep-
tions. Topic model three, topic three spoke to a “policy guarantee” and “student” or
“campus card” as other examples of extended service complements. The word
“marquette” appeared in topic model four, topic three, and based on reviewing the
text; it referred to Marquette University. Similarly, Marquette University is located
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, based on a web search. “Wisconsin” is another keyword
in this specific topic. Lastly, the words “friends” and “family” are indicated in topic
model four. This might be comparable to contract cheating, where friends and fam-
ily facilitate this type of cheating (Lancaster & Clarke, 2016; Harper et al., 2018).
These relationships might be leveraged to some capacity in the case of degree fraud,
but “impressing friends and family” was repeated in the data.
When reviewing what was expected and surprising while interpreting the results,
the keywords that focused on the main product, attributes, and promises was pre-
dicted. However, what was novel were the various product extensions (Grade Point
Average, grade, and students’ identification), the notions of policy and security, and
what these meant precisely, plus the involvement of family and friends. The idea of
a “fake online school” pretending to have the necessary curriculum and standards in
place but, in actuality, provides a vehicle for attaining credentials without students
doing the work. Moreover, many countries and cities were pinpointed. This left
questions about whether this was a result of their frequency within the data (e.g.,
degree samples) or had some other meaning that could be extracted. The keywords
that replicate, defined as co-occurrences, will be examined in the next section.
Keyword Co-occurrences
The dominant product focus continued as we transitioned to co-occurrences.

Statistical weighting was discussed in the Introduction, and each topic was assigned
a numerical value based on its frequency within the corpus (Bailetti & Tanev, 2020).
Keyword co-occurrences were coded with a colour that represented a specific ratio
(see Fig. 11.3). For example, keywords marked as yellow appeared across all four
models, and the ratio was greater or equal to two. Green had the same ratio as yel-
low; however, the keyword did not translate to all models, and lastly, blue was also
present in “some” models but had a ratio of less than two. The words coded as yel-
low were also found primarily in the topics with the highest statistical significance
(e.g., “high school diploma”) and focused on the product. Conversely, green was a
mixture of different themes and much easier to visually see the patterns and digest
than looking at numerical values alone (which were not in the high or low range).
This particular ratio included reasons to purchase (“novelty, “art”), the product
(“transcript,”) to the materials used in the process (“paper” “gold.”) Nevertheless, it
extended into the business end of things with the keywords “online,” “service,” and
“customer”. The word “chinese” was also coded green, and with review of the
scraped text for this topic, this could refer to a university or a blog post. Blue had
the smallest ratio, and contained some keywords associated with actions, service
extensions, and a country. Analysis of the replicated words reinforced the stability
of the overall topics in the model (Bailetti & Tanev, 2020; Weiss, 2021).
IP Address Experimentation
Verification of IP addresses was not part of the initial research design and therefore
presents additional information. Still, when interpreting the keywords and co-
occurrences, we speculated on whether there were further insights that could be
extracted surrounding geographic location, other than the existence of sample
degrees from different institutions and countries. This speculation led us to check
the IP addresses to decipher the country of origin and whether they had a static con-
nection, as is typically seen for businesses. As iterated in the methods section, we
started by going to the website, Open Admin tools, and pasting the website URL
into the search field. Twenty-three of the 30 websites were in the United States, with
13 in California, primarily San Francisco (10). The specific city or state could not
be identified for five of those in the United States. The other countries represented
were Canada (2), China (1), Netherlands (1), Turkey (1), and two timed out and
were not able to be traced.
The second part of this process was to verify the findings using a different tool
(WhatIsMyIPAddress.com). This verification found similar results but detected a
few differences. Twenty-three sites resided in the States, with 15 in San Francisco,
and the same two sites did not generate any results. Five were located in the States
in an unknown city with the first search tool. In this investigation, these were now
labeled as San Francisco. The countries outside the United States were now:
Brussels (1), Canada (3), and Singapore (1). There were five instances where the IP
address changed countries. For example, Mountain View, California changed to
Singapore, or Turkey switched to Los Angles. One example did not involve the
United States, whereby the Netherlands moved to Fergus, Ontario, Canada. If these
services were using the cloud, they might have servers in various global locations,
for example.
The final part of this experimentation was to re-test a few months after the origi-
nal check, as both verifications took place on the same day. We posted the URL for
the website again to see if the IP address had changed (dynamic versus static). This
was true for 13 of the 30 sites using Open Admin Tools (43% were dynamic).
Twenty-one sites originated in the United States; the other countries varied slightly:
China (1), Canada (3), France (1), Netherlands (1), and Turkey (2). There were two
sites previously untraceable, but with this new test, one site was now linking to
Markham, Ontario, Canada. Interestingly 18 sites mimicked the exact location
found in the original findings, and in three instances, the IP address was dynamic.
San Francisco decreased in frequency, with only five occurrences. There were more
United States unknowns than was seen previously (8), which were associated with
San Francisco in the prior check.
In addition to these observations, we also considered the scenario of a web server
farm whereby the IP address would change, but stay within a given range. For
example, 138.119 would remain the same, but the last few digits would change. If
the first few digits changed (i.e., 138.119), this might be more suspicious. Of the 13
sites that changed IP addresses, 12 had employed this tactic, which could indicate
deception. Only one IP address changed the last six digits, which might be less
concerning.
Lastly, we returned to WhatIsMyIPAddress.com to compare and finalize our
findings (see Fig. 11.4 for a summary of geolocations in North America produced
by Mapline https://mapline.com/). Twenty-three IP addresses were in the United
States, 11 from San Francisco. Only three other countries were noted this time:
Canada (4), Singapore (1), Poland (1), and one site remained unidentifiable. Twenty-
one locations were replicated from the first pass. While additional criteria were not
in this paper’s scope, during this analysis, we observed if there was a service pro-
vider recorded. In quite a few instances, it was Cloudfare Inc. Rogers
Communications, Shopify, Tencent Cloud Computing, Hawk Host Inc., and Fastly
were a few that were listed. Data centre was another equally standard service. The
blacklist was checked, and many sites had “dnsbl.spfbl.net” flagged, which indi-
cates some distrustful activity.
Fig. 11.4 Summary of geolocations in North America
Summary of Identified Risks
The identified risks were uncovered throughout the study, from the early observa-
tions while scraping text and the topic model to the investigation of IP addresses.
These risks are outlined below in Table 11.1, and the associated topics are also
cross-referenced. Some risks, for example, number 1, has elements of all the topics
(0–8), whereas risks 6 and 7 regarding social media would only impact topic 1, 4
(“security”), and topic 2 (“online”). This exercise was able to match all of the risks
to the topic model, therefore demonstrating that this technique can highlight risks
for a given area.
Limitations
This was a preliminary study, and there are limitations, which we hope can be
expanded upon in further research. We constructed a targeted topic model that was
narrow in scope without consideration of different actors. For example, the topic
model does not analyze solutions to circumvent fake degrees. However, the findings
can be used for awareness and as a “check” to ensure the right solutions are in place.
Likewise, the sample size was modest, with 30 websites that sell fake degrees, and
the inclusion of more data, even other sources besides the web, would be of value.
Beyond content, there is room for error with the manual scraping of the text; how-
ever, we believe the risk of omitting data would have been greater with automatic
extraction. This should be tested and additional experiments conducted.
Investigation of IP addresses using digital tools is an imperfect exercise, as dis-
cussed, and should not be used as the primary identifier. The website owner can
easily disguise their location using something as simple as a virtual personal
Table 11.1 Summary of identified risks

Number Risk
1 Purchase fake degrees online easily from different institutions, and various programs,
from around the world with a simple click. Topics 0–8
2 Order identification affiliated with a university (e.g., student or library card). Topics
3, 4
3 Obtain a university email address without having ever attended. Topics 0, 1, 4
4 Infiltration of university records and systems to include names on graduation lists,
alter grades, or grade point average. Topics 1, 4, 6, 7, 8
5 Academic writing is completed and paid for by a third-party service. Topics 0, 1,
6 Use of social media data if the buyer logins using one of these applications. Topics 1,
2, 4
7 Services follow higher education institutions and individuals on social platforms.
Topics 1, 2, 4
8 Suspect marketing with real institutions and faculty names is used to add legitimacy
and confuse buyers. Topics 1, 2, 3, 7
9 Involvement with identity fraud in selling government documents (e.g., birth
certificate or driver’s license), certification, and removing a criminal record. Topics 3,4
10 Fear and doubt about admissions processes are planted to rationalize purchases and
behavior. Likewise, play on insecurities about how to impress friends and family.
Topics 4, 8
11 Promotion of use to secure employment, and if hired, might not have the skills
required to do the job. Topics 2. 3, 4,
12 Link to SPAM on some of the web pages for these services. Topics 1, 4
13 Potential for blackmail if the user does not pay. Topic 4, 8
14 Fake online schools that disguise themselves as real schools and award credentials.
Might unwillingly dupe a well-intentioned student. Topics 0,2
15 Potential to secure credentials for accredited disciplines (i.e., medical, law,
engineering), which results in significant threats to society. Topics 3, 4, 8
16 These businesses devalue higher education, the process of learning, and working hard
to receive a degree or certification. Topics 0,2
17 Data centres and servers might be set-up in certain countries or states to avoid laws.
Topics 1, 4
18 Services might use the objective of “art” or “novelty” to circumvent laws and not
intentionally mention that it can be used for unethical purposes. Topics 3, 7
19 International students might enter another country for school or work based on a fake
language proficiency test. Topics 0, 2, 8
20 Internet protocols can be masked and geographic locations hidden using
VPN. Analysis of the IP scheme should uncover whether a VPN service was used.
Topics 1, 2, 4
21 Cloud computing can allow these services to bounce around the world dynamically,
providing services to their users. Topics 1, 2, 4
22 Data revealed the potential for a higher demand of users within North America. Topics
3, 5, 6, 8
23 As printers and technology evolve, easier to replicate a fake degree at home. Topics
1, 6
network (i.e., VPN). Expertise in analyzing IP address schemes should allow one to
determine if a VPN service was used. That being said, site owners residing in coun-
tries that have poor cyber legislation and enforcement will likely not resort to this
extra step. We tried to control for some limitations by using two web tools and
performing tests at differing intervals. This analysis was not the primary focus of the
study; however, it added another layer to investigate. Lastly, we are not security
experts and welcome further exploration by researchers and practitioners in this
field. In this novel study, we have attempted to bridge text mining and security in
higher education, but recognize we have much to learn.
Discussion
Diploma and degree mills are not a new problem, but technology continues to
evolve. “Online,” “service,” and “customer” were coded as green and re-occurring
words. These keywords point to businesses that are built on digital platforms, and
the information gathered speaks to its power both in purchasing the product and in
the promotion of fake credentials. Cybercrime, hacker, or dark net forums were
highlighted in the Literature Review, and the aim of these studies was to learn more
about the threat to develop responses. (Akyazi et al., 2021; Bahamazava & Nanda,
2022; Benjamin et al., 2019; Samtani et al., 2015; Swe & Nyein Myo, 2018). There
are many possible drivers behind the criminals who run these businesses, from
financial, political, and ego to espionage. Topic modeling proved to be an effective
tool for environmental scanning of the given risks.
Akyazi et al. (2021) wanted to measure the supply and demand within cyber-
crime forums. Although, it was discovered that most transactions take place pri-
vately and cannot be measured. This is true for sites that sell fake degrees and
credentials as well. However, service owners want their users to have a good user
experience; therefore, it could be argued that they may host their servers or data
centres where the business or demand is strongest. Our data showed that the U.S. was
dominant in the geolocation of the 30 websites examined, particularly San Francisco.
According to the industry magazine, DataCentre, the U.S. is a leading player in the
data centre market, with Dallas, Los Angles, and the Bay area rounding the top sites
(Berry, 2021). All of these cities were reflected in the data.
Sometimes topic modeling, in the literature, was combined with other techniques,
for example, a classifier in Samtani et al. (2015). Lagopoulos et al. (2017) also looked
at IP addresses in conjunction with the website’s format and services. Future work on
this problem could examine formatting and services more systematically to create a
detailed profile. For example, if the service provider changed, and whether this might
have been related to cost or regulatory issues. We noted that most of the service pro-
viders involved cloud computing and that many sites were “on” a blacklist.
We did not investigate the legal aspects of having a technical infrastructure in
certain countries or states and what benefits this might bring concerning the law.
Likewise, purchasing a degree for art on your wall or as a funny gift might be a way
to circumvent laws. There was also not much discussion around creating your own
fake degree, but this theme surfaced in one website. As printers and other technolo-
gies improve, this will likely be easier for a novice with some simple instructions
(Jimu, 2018).
There is potential to look at academic fraud as a network to ensure all compo-
nents are considered in relation to each other. We saw this in the data as a customer
could buy much more than a fake degree. Drăgan (2020) detailed how Mr. Politi
used fake documents and assumed another doctor’s identity. In North America, we
are moving towards digital identification (i.e., driver’s licence or health card); how-
ever, while this might disrupt aspects of this business model, the adversarial response
needs to be taken into account. Dadkhah et al. (2021) and Lagopoulos et al. (2017)
looked at predatory journals and academic papers influenced by web bots. Part of
this network will include the Dark Net. Hackers can be employed to break into a
system to change a grade (Kaur & Randhawa, 2020). We found this “grade” option
as a requestable service within our findings, as well as different types of personal
identification that can be purchased. The linkage between the surface web and Dark
Net was an interesting observation given that the websites selling fake degrees are
accessible and open; however, there may be hidden connections perhaps more so
after technical solutions are put in place. Mapping all possible connections may
uncover gaps or new insights and predict what may lie ahead.
Attigeri et al. (2018) noticed a gap between the business and the technical solu-
tions using topic modeling. Most of the literature on fake degrees and credentials
focuses on the solution of blockchain. However, Shaik (2021) provided an alterna-
tive using cryptography and QR codes. In order to have an effective response, more
studies are needed on the problem itself and possible technical or product pairings
that might account for some of the limitations. For example, QR codes could be
used on student campus or library cards. Likewise, a comparison between the finan-
cial sector, where blockchain is heavily used, with higher education in data integ-
rity, to examine the intersections more closely might be useful.
The literature review identified some older articles, and there may be value in
returning to these themes. For example, in Adams (2016), high school principals
favored in-person teaching training versus online credentials; however, how has this
changed since the pandemic? Is online still viewed in the same way, and is the
media still an influencing factor when it comes to legitimacy? There is the possibil-
ity that these perceptions may affect opportunities for some individuals who need to
fulfill their degree online as they are professionals, working, and might be disadvan-
taged as a result. Conversely, is the dropout rate changing because of increased
online learning (Giani et al., 2020)?
We have demonstrated that topic modeling can be used to provide an environmental

scan of the problem of fake degrees and credentials. Moreover, this view was
expanded upon using other tools to interpret, explore and visualize. The risks of
fake degrees and fraudulent credentials are extensive, with 23 risks identified from
a small-scale study. With increased research, this list will likely grow. We used these
risks to put forth our recommendations below.
ecommendations for Security Professionals

R
in Higher Education
1. In parallel with other methods, utilize topic modeling to aid investigation and
environmental scans on a given concern or problem. This inclusion may increase
confidence levels when abnormal patterns are found and contribute to more auto-
mated responses versus those that require human intervention.
2. Scan fake degree sites with a web crawler to look for content from your
institution.
3. Block these websites from being used (i.e., create a blacklist) and accessed on
campus to foster a culture of academic integrity.
4. Create a database of such sites and routinely audit their IP addresses via scripts
to ascertain where the demand is located. Be cautious of those located close to
an institution, as other services might be present.
5. Share malicious IP addresses, and other indicators of compromise (IoC) on com-
mercial threat feeds. In Canada, post-secondary institutions commonly subscribe
to a threat feed service (The Canadian Shared Security Operations Centre -
CanSSOC https://canssoc.ca/).
6. Evaluate the highlighted threats in this study: student email address, campus
card, or other forms of personal identification to the vulnerabilities of systems
(i.e., graduation database).
Recommendations for Senior Leaders in Higher Education
1. Awareness of the prevalence of such services and the significance of quality

assurance in the admissions process, auditing, and a business continuity plan
should fraudulent credentials be discovered.
2. Monitor the results of those who are admitted with language proficiency tests,
given the high stakes, and those who are close to graduation but struggling.
3. Student campaigns around privacy and one’s digital footprint to safeguard
against wrongful use of information and the potential for blackmail should one
become engaged in such services.
4. Collaborate with other institutions nationally and globally to create a public
forum for such threats (similar to the commercial threat feed noted earlier). Work
with quality assurance bodies on safely sharing documents, as well as creating
awareness regarding to the importance of checking education credentials to cir-
cumvent these services. Students are recruited globally, and institutions are at
various points in circumventing this threat.
5. Incorporate the inclusion of statements against fraud in your institution’s aca-

demic integrity policy.
6. Consider including QR codes for personal identification used on campus, and
verify crypto algorithms used for any issues. In Canada, the government pro-
vides guidance through the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (https://cyber.
gc.ca/en/guidance/guidance-s ecurely-c onfiguring-n etwork-p rotocolsitsp
40062).
7. Work closely with security professionals on topics typically defined as academic
(e.g., academic integrity) for additional perspectives on this problem.
Recommendations for Researchers
1. Replicate the methodology on a larger data sample of fake degrees and creden-
tials, experiment with different text-mining tools, increase the number of topics,
and consider further usage within education.
2. Examination of other data points, for example, academic literature and news
articles, with this study’s results.
3. Consider other techniques to visualize and interpret topic modeling data (i.e.,
network), particularly web data, which is less uniform.
4. Incorporate and test other security tools that bridge with text mining, with greater
attention focused on cloud computing and data centres in relation to IP addresses.
5. Trace the state laws, particularly in California, where the geolocation data was
highest, to determine if there is any significance to having the servers or data
centres in certain areas, mainly if the service owner is outside the given country.
6. Exploration of the Dark Net for higher education fraud, however, must be done
with extreme caution and requires expertise.
7. Further study on the problem of fake degrees and credentials, from the perspec-
tive of different disciplines, intersections, and comparisons, as most current lit-
erature focuses on the blockchain solution.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Dr. Michael Weiss and Steve Fraser for their
expertise.
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Sarah Elaine Eaton, PhD, is an associate professor at the Werklund School of Education,
Chapter 12
Are You for Real? Lessons
for the Academy About Professors
with Fake or Fraudulent Degrees
Abstract In this chapter we demonstrate what can happen when professor and edu-
cational leaders have fake or fraudulent degrees or other qualifications. We present
four key issues: (a) the threat to institutional reputation; (b) the threat to the creden-
tials awarded by the institutions; (c) the impact on students; and (d) material costs
to the organization. Then, we propose seven recommendations to prevent or address
academic qualification fraud: (a) verify applicant credentials; (b) develop or update
internal risk assessment plans; (c) conduct an internal qualifications audit; (d)
develop or update institutional codes of conduct; (e) develop an internal process to
investigate allegations of credential fraud; (f) develop and follow internal quality
assurance processes for courses, programs, and curricula; and (g) Develop or update
crisis communications plans to include credential fakery or fraud. We conclude by
emphasizing that moral outrage will not solve the problem of academic credential
fraud. Clear policies and procedures must be in place to prevent, investigate, and
address qualifications fraud in educational contexts.
Keywords Fake degrees · Fraud · Credential fraud · Higher education · Professors
Introduction
As we pointed out earlier in this book, there are no absolute definitions in the area
of fake degree research, perhaps because there has been relatively little scholarship
conducted on the topic. There are no universally accepted definitions of “degree
mill” or “diploma mill” (Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) &
S. E. Eaton (*)
J. J. Carmichael

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_12
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),

2009). Scholars have proposed that a “degree mill” sells degrees or diplomas from
a fake college, whereas a “diploma mill” awards fake or ill-earned credentials from
a real college (see Contreras & Gollin, 2009). We elaborate on definitional nuances
elsewhere in this book (see Eaton & Carmichael, 2023) and in this chapter we
examine a specific sector in which degree fraud is especially problematic: higher
education. Scholars have noted that the proliferation of fake and fraudulent degrees
is due, in part, to credentialism (Arnstein, 1982; Johnson, 2006). One example of
credentialism is when employers demand or prefer candidates with degrees when
such credentials are not actually required to do the job. This can lead to a situation
in which an individual buys a fake degree in order to meet employer demands,
resulting in an absurd reality in which “the employer pretends to need a degree; the
employee pretends to have one” (Johnson, 2006, p. 269).
There is arguably no other sector where individuals need academic credentials in
order to do their job more than in higher education. Not only are academic qualifica-
tions a pre-requisite for attaining academic employment, but there is also a tendency
for job applicants with degrees from more prestigious universities to be favoured
over those with degrees from less prestigious institutions (see, Burris, 2004; Nevin,
2019). Although this phenomenon may be particularly prevalent in the United
States, other countries such as Canada have followed suit, in what Nevin (2019)
calls “Americanized” (p. 412) higher education. In other words, it not only matters
that professors have degrees, but it matters which institutions granted those creden-
tials. Professors with degrees from universities perceived to have high levels of
prestige are then deemed to bring prestige to the institutions that later hire those
individuals. When the sector that awards academic credentials then employs indi-
viduals with fake or fraudulent credentials, it poses a threat not only to individual
employees or employers, but also to the reputation of the institution and the entire
post-secondary system. In this chapter we ask the question: What happens when
professors have fake or fraudulent credentials?
There are ample stories about individuals working in questionable institutions,
such as unaccredited private colleges (Angulo, 2016). It is easy to find stories in the
news about the pseudo-academy, an industry that dupes students into believing they
are attending a legitimate college when the programs are not recognized by any
accrediting body. Angulo (2016) writes about the diploma mill industry that has
flourished in the United States for more than a hundred years. The US is not alone
however, and evidence of pseudo-schools can be found across the world including,
but not limited to, Canada (General, 2017; Newmarket Today, 2020; Ranger, 2020),
the UK (BBC News, 2008), and South Africa (Gatticchi, 2019). Although worthy of
study, the pseudo-academy is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, we limit
ourselves to professors with fake or fraudulent credentials working in accredited
universities; that is to say, universities recognized by multiple governing bodies
such as governments and quality assurance bodies.
12 Are You for Real? Lessons for the Academy About Professors with Fake… 253
The Accidental and Anecdotal Impetus for this Chapter
The impetus for this chapter came while this book was under development. In 2021,
one of us (Eaton) was invited to take part in an academic selection committee (i.e.,
hiring committee for a professorial position) for a tenure-track role. Because the
topic of fake and fraudulent credentials was top of mind, Eaton asked the human
resources manager assigned to the file what steps were taken at the institution to
verify the credentials of applicants. The answer: none. This led to an internal discus-
sion in that particular hiring committee about the importance of verifying academic
credentials, especially for tenure track roles, which are scarce in today’s academic
job market (Kezar et al., 2019).
Following that experience, both of us (Eaton & Carmichael) began informally
comparing notes about hiring practices at our respective institutions, located thou-
sands of kilometres away from each other in Canada. We found that the practices
were similar at both universities, leading us to suspect that perhaps this was the case
more broadly. Although we have since found out that some post-secondary institu-
tions in Canada claim to have a process to verify the credentials of applicants (see
Szeto & Vellani, 2017a), this practice does not seem to be consistent or common
knowledge. Credential verification systems exist in a number of countries (see
Brown, 2006), including our own (see Duklas, 2023), but to our knowledge creden-
tial verification is more common in the academic admissions process than it is in the
academic hiring process.
We have noted an underlying systemic assumption that credential fraud would
not occur among the professoriate because if credentials have been verified when
individuals applied to academic programs as students that their documents would
have been verified at that stage. We contend that this assumption is erroneous and
naïve for a few reasons. The first is that not all universities engage in a rigorous
credential verification process as part of the admissions process. It is possible for an
individual to apply, be admitted to, and convocate from a graduate program with
faulty credentials from prior learning. As we learned from our empirical survey
research, individuals do not always buy degrees outright, but sometimes buy degrees
after failing to graduate from their desired programmes (see Carmichael & Eaton,
2023). As a result, individuals might have some academic background in an area
without having fully earned a bachelor’s degree. If a fraudulent undergraduate
degree is not identified at the time someone applies for graduate school, it is possi-
ble for an individual to be admitted to, and subsequently complete, a graduate
degree without having legitimately earned a bachelor’s degree.
Second, with the rise of transnational education (see Brown, 2006) verifying
credentials from other countries can be problematic, particularly in places where
educational systems have been adversely impacted by war or natural disasters.
Applicants can argue that they have no way of providing official transcripts to a
graduate program because they are not available. Although this may be true in some
cases, it can also be a way for individuals to engage in fraudulent behaviour regard-
ing their credentials when applying to graduate school or applying for academic jobs.
Finally, it is possible to purchase fake degrees that appear to be from reputable

and accredited institutions (Brown, 2006; Ezell & Bear, 2005). In this way, fraud-
sters can bypass the entire higher education system itself, so the assumption that
preventing credential fraud at the time of admission is sufficient to prevent individu-
als from attaining employment as academics or administrators in higher education
is flawed and this argument ought to be rejected.
Neither of us is a human resource professional and an in-depth study of academic
hiring practices is outside of our scope of expertise. Instead, we present this chapter
as a discussion of some of the key issues, offering ideas and recommendations for
further dialogue, research, and changes to institutional human resources practices.
It is our hope that future readers will be surprised to learn that there was a time when
credential checks of applicants to academic positions were not conducted, or at least
such checks were uncommon, because the practice of verifying credentials will
have become a normal aspect of the hiring process.
Overview of the Chapter
We have organized this chapter into three main sections. First, we provide some
background into credential fraud in the professions broadly, followed by a discus-
sion of credential fraud and malpractice in higher education. In the second section
we discuss key issues of importance regarding qualifications fraud in higher educa-
tion, noting threats to the institution and to student experience. In the final section,
we present recommendations for institutions to prevent credential fraud before it
happens, and to investigate and address it if it is discovered. We conclude with a call
to action, not only for further dialogue, but also for clear and decisive action to
ensure that academic integrity includes unwavering expectations for credential
validity within higher education itself.
Background
In this section we provide the reader with a broad overview of fake and fraudulent
credentials in the professions, and specifically in academia. We also provide clarifi-
cation about the differences between credential fraud and other types of misconduct
or malpractice in higher education.
Credential Fraud in the Professions
There are any number of reasons an individual might engage in credential fraud, but
a common one is a desire for a better job (Angulo, 2016; Eaton, 2021a; Ezell &
Bear, 2005). In some professions, such as law, engineering, medicine, nursing, and
public-school teaching, individuals are required to be members in good standing of

a professional body that certifies its members. Key aspects of a professional career
that differentiates it from other kinds of jobs include systematic self-governance
that includes expectations for ethical conduct within the profession (Bruhn et al.,
2002; Reader, 1966). Behavioural norms within a profession are established by
those who work within it and reflect a collective understanding of expectations
members ought to follow (Braxton & Bayer, 1999).
In an ideal world, membership in a professional association should help to pre-
vent individuals without proper qualifications from getting jobs in that field.
However, professional associations are not a failsafe, and the results can be devas-
tating to human life. For example, after the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island
nuclear station that caused radioactive gas to be released into the atmosphere, it was
discovered that some engineers working at the plant had fake degrees (Ezell & Bear,
2005). In another instance, a man who posed as an obstetrician-gynecologist in
Maryland, USA, presented fraudulent credentials to get a medical license. When the
fraud was discovered, class action lawsuits were brought against him representing
more than 200 patients and he was later charged (Bui, 2018; McKinney, 2019).
These are just a couple of examples from among thousands of cases to illustrate the
point that when an individual claims to have credentials they have not earned, it may
not only be a case of document fraud, but there can be a direct impact on the lives
of others. Despite international calls for degree fraud to be made illegal (see CHEA
& UNESCO, 2009), there seems to be little evidence to show that such recommen-
dations have been heeded on a consistent basis.
Credential Fraud in the Academy
News reports from around the world provide examples of professors found to have
fake or fraudulent degrees. In Nigeria in 2019, the Executive Secretary of the
National Universities Commission announced that more than 100 individuals work-
ing as professors across the country were found to have fake degrees after an initia-
tive requiring professors to upload copies of their credentials to an online portal
(Abutu, 2019; Ekpu, 2019). In Canada, a news investigation found that a professor
who had taught at the University of Toronto was found to have fake degrees
(Adlakha, 2017, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), 2017). In the United
States, a professor in California who had been named as the state’s poet laureate
claimed to have a degree, but had not earned one (Lee, 2005).
It is worth noting that in many countries, the professional and scholarly associa-
tions for higher education serve no regulatory or governing function (see Bruhn
et al., 2002; Eaton, 2021b). Ethical conduct has long been an expectation of profes-
sors (see Braxton & Bayer, 1999), but there is little to no external oversight of pro-
fessorial conduct; and alleged or actual misconduct is often handled as an internal
human resources matter, meaning that cases are kept confidential and rarely dis-
closed to the public. As Bruhn et al. (2002) have pointed out, attempts to regulate
higher education in the same way that professions such as medicine or engineering
are regulated, have repeatedly failed. National professional bodies such as the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) in the United States do not
get involved with individual cases of fraud or malpractice (Bruhn et al., 2002). To
make matters worse, there is much less ethical training required in higher education
than in industry, apart from compulsory research ethics training to undertake
research with human or animal participants (see Eaton, 2021b; Kezar & Sam, 2011)
In terms of regulatory oversight, higher education is one of the least regulated pro-
fessions globally.
Although an argument could be made that if a professor has a fake or fraudulent
degree that the offense is not as egregious as in professions where lives could be at
risk because of quack practitioners, we contend that such an argument is ill-
informed. If loss of life were the only criteria to be considered that argument might
hold, but other kinds of losses must be considered. As Besvinick (1983) pointed out
in the early 1980s:
“a university does not exist in a vacuum. It must be concerned with what ought to be. It is a
social entity and must take cognizance of its own impact upon the society of which it is a
part and of the legitimate demands that society may make of it.” (p. 568)
In other words, universities can and should be held responsible by society itself to
ensure that the quality of the credentials it awards are authentic and legitimate. That
cannot happen when individuals working in the academy claim degrees that they did
not legitimately earn themselves.
Professors hold a position of trust within the academy and within society as a
whole. When those with bogus credentials pose as legitimate professors, they enjoy
the prestige, respect, authority, and trust that come with having earned a high aca-
demic standing (not to mention a comfortable salary, in some cases), but without the
same effort as those who legitimately earned their credentials. Professors with fake
or fraudulent credentials violate the trust others have put in them, including trust
from students, colleagues, administrators, and even society at large.
Those who attain academic positions in universities with illegitimate credentials
and carry on to have successful careers in higher education could be classified as
“long-term violators” (Cressey, 1973, p. 114). One of the best-known fraud scholars
and experts, Donald Cressey (1973), describes long-term violators as those whose
fraud extends over a long period of time during which they rationalize their behav-
iour and may claim that their fraud was a necessity for their survival. Long-term
fraudsters can become trusted employees with a pattern of trust violation that
becomes normalized and routinized over time (Cressey, 1973).
Academic Malpractice
It is important to differentiate between individuals working as professors whose

credentials are fake or fraudulent and other types of academic misconduct or mal-
practice. Professorial malpractice can be academic or non-academic in nature and
can be either malicious or neglectful. For example, sexual violence against others,
including but not limited to students or colleagues is a form of non-academic faculty
misconduct (Braxton et al., 2011). Academic malpractice can be malicious or
neglectful, but as others have argued, there should be little tolerance for either
(Braxton, 2011; Braxton & Bayer, 1999; Braxton et al., 2011; Eaton, 2021b; Young
& Wiley, 2021).
Approaches to misconduct in the academy vary among countries. Bretag (2019)
pointed out that in the United States, there has been a “strongly moralistic approach”
(p. 6) whereas in Australia researchers and others have questioned the educational
systems that have enabled misconduct in the first place. In Australia, the UK, and
Canada, misconduct in the academy has been regarded more as a behavioural issue,
rather than a moral failing (Bretag, 2019; Eaton, 2021b). It is much easier to remedy
behavioural issues than it is to redress moral failings.
Pointing out these differences is relevant because much of the existing scholarly
literature relating to faculty misconduct originates from the United States. The
underpinnings of a moralistic approach to faculty misconduct are evident in much
of the existing literature. For example, Braxton et al. (2011) outlines a series six
types of “improprieties” in teaching and learning. The first is “condescending nega-
tivism” (p. 69), which refers to mistreating colleagues or others by demeaning them
or being condescending towards them. The second is “inattentive planning” (p. 70).
This refers to the professor failing to plan their courses adequately including, but
not limited to, failing to prepare course syllabi in a timely manner and failing to
order required textbooks on time. The third is “moral turpitude” (p. 70). This refers
to “depraved, unprincipled acts by faculty” (p. 70). Braxton does not elaborate on
this point, but examples are easy to find. Young and Wiley contend, for example,
that faculty sexual misconduct “is pervasive within academia” (p. 276), highlighting
at least 13% of women in academia have experienced sexual harassment perpetrated
by a faculty member. Braxton’s fourth category of impropriety in teaching is “par-
ticularistic grading” (p. 70), which occurs when certain students benefit from pref-
erential grading. The penultimate category relates to “personal disregard” (Braxton,
2011, p. 70) which includes lack of personal hygiene and uttering profanities in
class. Braxton’s final category of impropriety is “uncommunicated course detail”
(p. 70), which is a failure on the part of the professor to communicate important
information to students such as changing the class location, day, or time without
informing students. Not informing students about expectations relating to missed or
make-up examinations is another example that Braxton et al. (2011) shares. Braxton
elaborates on other types of “inviolable norms” (p. 70) in higher education, but
these six that speak specifically to teaching and learning are especially pertinent in
this chapter because they highlight professorial conduct within the classroom that
directly affects the student experience. They also serve to highlight how behavioural
issues and moral decision-making have been intertwined in research on faculty
misconduct.
There can be similarities between student and professorial academic misconduct,
which is sometimes referred to as being intentional or unintentional (Eaton, 2021b;
Paterson et al., 2003; Sutherland-Smith, 2008). However, it is important not to
conflate the similarities between student and professorial misconduct. Students are
at the institution to learn, whereas professors are at the institution to teach, conduct
research and scholarship, and to provide service and leadership. Unintentional mis-
conduct among faculty members is a notion that should be questioned, if not rejected
entirely. The reason is that professors have supposedly moved up through the ranks
of the institution, having had opportunities to learn when they themselves were
students and having been acculturated to institutional norms at every stage of their
academic training – at least in theory. We ought to expect more of professors in
terms of their conduct than we expect of students. That is not to say that students
should not be held accountable for their behaviours, but rather that fellow members
of the academy should reject excuses from colleagues who claim innocence on the
grounds that they did not know that their own misconduct was wrong. In other
words, professors should know better than to plagiarize, fabricate or falsify data,
mistreat others, or engage in any other form of professional misconduct pre-
cisely because they have had every opportunity along the way to learn what is
expected of them.
This assumes, of course, that professors have indeed worked their way up through
the ranks of the academy to their professorial roles. Everything changes when indi-
viduals bypass those years or decades of training and acculturation and instead buy
fake or fraudulent credentials and use them to gain employment in the academy. In
the section that follows, we highlight examples of the impact of fake or fraudulent
degrees on the academy.
Key Issues
We discuss four types of issues related to academic credential fraud among profes-
sors: (a) the threat to institutional reputation; (b) the threat to the credentials awarded
by the institutions; (c) the impact on students; and (d) material costs to the
organization.
Issue #1: Threats to Institutional Reputation
When cases of professors with fake degrees are reported by the mainstream media,
it can reflect poorly on the institution threating its reputation. For example, in a case
in Canada in 2017 highlighted on national television, Dubravko Zgrablić, a faculty
member at several institutions, including the University of Toronto’s School of
Continuing Studies, was found to have questionable credentials. Journalists asked
the institutional employers, as well as the minister of advanced education for com-
mentary (see Szeto & Vellani, 2017b). In other words, doubt was cast not only on
the individual, but also on the institutions that employed him.
Issue #2: Threat to Credentials Awarded by the Institution
There is an assumption that when students earn academic credentials that their
courses and programs are taught by credible academic staff. If the professors’ cre-
dentials are fake or faulty, there can be a cascade effect that results in the work done
by the fraudsters being questioned. For example, it would be reasonable to ask
whether courses taught by a fraudster professor should result in an academic credit
for students who take their courses. An even more complicated question is whether
masters or doctoral degrees are valid when the professors who served as students’
supervisors were found to have fraudulent credentials themselves. These are ques-
tions without easy answers, and we do not propose to have the solution, but we can
say that posing as a professor without actually holding valid academic credentials
poses a threat to the credentials of the learners who took classes from a fraudster. As
we discuss next, posing as a professor is not a victimless crime.
Issue #3: The Impact on Students
Imagine a scenario in which you are a student who has just found out one of your
professors was discovered to have a fake degree. What thoughts, questions, or emo-
tions might arise? Extend that scenario to a situation in which you were a graduate
student and you have just found out that your academic supervisor was dismissed
due to fake or fraudulent credentials. What questions might you have? Such infor-
mation might only be revealed to students if details are publicly released, such as in
a media story, but it is not the only way that students find out about such scenarios.
Watercooler gossip can be shared even in instances where an academic employee is
dismissed due to fake credentials, and it would be naïve to think that students would
be immune to finding out about such cases. To our knowledge the emotional, psy-
chological, and academic impact on students who have been taught or supervised by
professors found to hold faulty or fraudulent credentials has not been studied, or at
least not to a great extent. This is a topic that merits not only discussion, but also
investigation.
We contend that students who have been directly or indirectly impacted by pro-
fessors with questionable credentials deserve academic and emotional support. It is
incumbent upon the institution that employed the fraudulent professor to provide
such support and it is imperative that students not be blamed or held accountable for
a professor’s wrongdoings. Further, students should not be subjected to academic
penalties, such as the withdrawal of credentials, requirements to re-take courses or
exams, or requirements to pay additional fees to extend their programs so additional
learning can occur. If the institution determines that the quality of learning that stu-
dents received under a professor who was found to have illegitimate credentials was
so poor as to bring the quality of the overall credential into question, then it is up to
the institution who hired that professor, and not the student, to bear the burden of the
costs associated with rectifying the situation.
Issue #4: Material Costs to the Institution
The risks to the institution are not only academic or reputational, but also material.
There are direct costs to the institution in terms of the salary, benefits, and pension
paid to an employee with fake or fraudulent credentials (see Lee, 2005). Although
there have been legal cases in the United States in which employers have won the
right to terminate employees with bogus credentials or terminate benefits for active
employees found to have committed resume fraud (see Lee, 2005), such legal cases
themselves are costly.
In the event that credential fraud is found to have occurred with an existing
employee, there can be considerable time spent in managing the situation, from a
variety of angles including human resource management, administrative manage-
ment, and if the case becomes public, additional resources are spent on internal and
external communications. These activities result in additional indirect costs to the
institution in terms of human hours invested to manage the situation and mitigate
risk. We know of no such studies that have attempted to track the costs to an institu-
tion if a professor is found to have fake or fraudulent credentials. However, we
contend that such costs could be significant, particularly if deans and members of
the executive leadership team become involved in managing and mitigating the
situation.
Regardless of whether the institution is publicly or privately funded, the costs of
salaries, benefits, and pensions can make up a significant portion of the organiza-
tional operating budget. Safeguarding how that budget is spent is a sound argument
for ensuring that employees hold the credentials they claim to have. The issues we
have outlined here comprise direct and indirect threats to the institution and to stu-
dents’ education. In the section that follows, we outline recommendations to pre-
vent, if necessary, remedy, the occurrence of credential fraud in higher education.
Recommendations
Although there are no easy solutions to the problem of fake or fraudulent degrees in
higher education, there are steps institutions can take to reduce the likelihood that
individuals with bogus credentials get jobs in the first place and to mitigate some of
the threats we discussed above. In this section we present seven recommendations
to reduce the risks outlined above: (a) verify applicant credentials; (b) develop or
update internal risk assessment plans; (c) conduct an internal qualifications audit;
(d) develop or update institutional codes of conduct; (e) develop an internal process
to investigate allegations of credential fraud; (f) develop and follow internal quality
assurance processes for courses, programs, and curricula; and (g) develop or update
crisis communications plans to include guidance on how to respond to credential
fakery or fraud.
Recommendation #1: Verify Applicant Credentials
There are no federal or international registries or publicly accessible databases of

professors who have fake or fraudulent degrees. This means that it is up to the
employer to check the credentials of professors. International bodies, including the
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) and the United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2009) have called
upon educational institutions to “urge employers to become informed and use tools
to authenticate credentials presented by prospective and current employers” (p. 9).
This call, however, seems to be directed at employers other than the higher educa-
tion institutions themselves. We noted that there was no call for educational institu-
tions to lead the way by checking the credentials of their own academic staff. We
contend that it is both a moral and professional imperative that higher education
institutions make every effort to verify the credentials of applicants for academic
positions.
Credentials of employees not only must be verified, but background checks
should be conducted during the hiring process and there is legal justification for
doing so (Lee, 2005). We contend that credential verification of applicants ought to
be conducted before candidates are short-listed. In the United States, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) outlines and regulates the conditions under which a back-
ground check can be conducted, including informing prospective candidates at the
time of application (Lee, 2005). To that end, we recommend stating in job postings
that all applicants are subject to background checks and credential verification.
Stating this in the job ad might deter some would-be applicants, but disclaimers by
themselves are insufficient. It is imperative to follow up and actually conduct the
credential check. Because there are potential legal implications of this work, we
recommend that credential checks be undertaken by qualified human resources or
legal personnel who have the authority to act on behalf of the institution in
this manner.
ecommendation #2: Develop or Update Internal Risk

R
Assessment Plans to Include Fake or Fraudulent Credentials
Among the recommendations of the Commonwealth Fraud Control Framework

(Australian Government, 2017) are that organizations conduct fraud risk assess-
ments on a regular basis, as well as develop and implement a fraud control plan.
Some universities already have internal risk assessment plans and if they exist, they
may focus on financial or other risks to the university, but rarely, if ever, acknowl-
edge the risks posed to the learning institution if staff or faculty are found to have
fake or fraudulent credentials. We recommend adding qualification fraud to internal
risk assessment plans not only to acknowledge and manage the risks, but also to
keep the issue on the table when the plans undergo regular (e.g., annual) review by
committees or executive leaders.
Recommendation #3: Conduct an Internal Qualifications Audit
If an institution has historically had no mechanisms in place to verify the credentials

of applicants, then the threat of having an individual infiltrate the organization with
fraudulent qualifications is higher. In Nigeria, when the Executive Secretary of the
National Universities Commission (NUC), set up a national directory of full profes-
sors across that country and the process included a credential review, it was found
that about 100 professors had questionable credentials (Ekpu, 2019). Although that
was not a qualifications audit per se, it served to demonstrate that when there is a
body responsible for the oversight of professorial credentials, then anomalies can be
found and addressed.
The question of who would be responsible for conducting a qualifications audit
would vary depending on the jurisdiction, and one possibility is for individual insti-
tutions to conduct their own internal qualifications audits. We contend that govern-
ment ministries of higher education or external quality assurance bodies can play a
role by setting up programs that require institutions to conduct qualification audits
of academic staff as part of program accreditation and evaluation processes.
ecommendation #4: Develop or Update Institutional Codes

R
of Conduct
When institutions develop or update their codes of conduct, adding a clause stating
that qualifications fraud is considered an egregious form of misconduct is appropri-
ate. We recommend that institutional policies that all students and staff (including
academic and executive employees) are expected to represent themselves, their cre-
dentials, and their achievements honestly and accurately. Doing so gives the organi-
zation means to address conduct that does not meet expectations that have been
outlined in policy.
ecommendation #5: Develop or Update an Internal Process

R
to Investigate Allegations of Credential Fraud
Many institutions have internal processes to address fraud. Based on what we have
learned through our inquiry into credential fraud in higher education, we expect that
such processes are unlikely to explicitly include qualifications fraud in their scope.
We recommend that when institutions are developing or updating their internal
fraud investigation processes that fake, fraudulent, and questionable credentials be
included as a form of fraud that falls under the jurisdiction of the department respon-
sible for investigating internal fraud. We further recommend that the scope of this
work can include all students and employees, so that all members of the organiza-
tion understand that such fraud is not acceptable by anyone in the institution.
ecommendation #6: Develop and Follow Internal Quality

R
Assurance Processes for Courses, Programs, and Curricula
Because we have identified that student experience can be directly impacted when
professors are found to have fake or fraudulent credentials, it is imperative to have
quality assurance processes in place for courses, programs, and curricula. That way,
if a professor is found to have faulty qualifications, the students do not suffer as a
result. It would be natural for individuals to question whether the credit they were
awarded for a course taught by a bogus professor is even valid. The remedy for this
lies in ensuring that internal quality assurance processes are established and fol-
lowed so checks and balances are in place to ensure the overall quality of the course
does not rest with the professor alone. We are in no way suggesting that academic
freedoms should be compromised, but instead, that quality assurance include rou-
tine reviews of course syllabi by departmental leaders with the authority to request
that updates be made to ensure the course aligns with program expectations. The
question about the role academic labour unions play with regards to quality assur-
ance in higher education is beyond the scope of this chapter; however, it is a worth-
while one to explore in future research. Notwithstanding the role of unions and
academic freedom, we recommend that program and curricula review are performed
regularly as part of the overall quality control for academic programming.
ecommendation #7: Develop or Update Crisis Communications

R
Plans to Include Guidance on How to Respond to Fraud
and Misconduct
In the event that credential fraud is uncovered within an educational institution, it is

essential to have a clear plan of action about how to communicate this to internal
and external audiences. Refusal to communicate anything at all, claiming that the
institution does not want to violate privacy laws, can be construed as a cover up, or
as the institution being complicit in the fraud. It is equally important to avoid plati-
tudes or dismiss the incident as being a “one off” or “an isolated incident”. In order
to maintain credibility both internally and externally, it is essential communicate
that the institution takes the situation seriously.
It is our recommendation that when institutions develop or update their crisis
communication plans, to include a clear process to address academic misconduct or
fraud among its professors and staff. Although it may not be appropriate to share
every detail, it is essential to communicate that this is a serious offence that will be
investigated thoroughly, with consequences being applied as appropriate. When
academic misconduct or fraud happens among the professoriate or senior leaders,
ensuring that trust is maintained within and beyond the institution is paramount.
We recognize that the recommendations we propose may be expensive, particu-
larly in terms of labour costs; however, we argue that preventing those with bogus
credentials from attaining academic employment in the first place is worth the
investment. If qualifications fraud is discovered after the fact, there must be clear
policies and processes in place to investigate and address it.
Conclusions
Moral outrage will not solve the problem of professors with fake or fraudulent
degrees. Universities and university systems (including ministries of higher educa-
tion) create the conditions in which professors with fake degrees can enter the acad-
emy. Therefore, it is up to those working in higher education itself to solve the
problem.
In this chapter we have limited our discussion to higher education, and we recog-
nize that there may be applicability or transferability of some of the ideas we have
presented here to broader educational contexts including primary and secondary
educational systems. Another limitation of this work is that we have approached this
discussion from the perspective of scholars (one emerging; one established), rather
than that of professionals working in human resources, risk management, or law. As
study in this area develops, we acknowledge that it would be important for individu-
als with expertise in those fields to weigh in. Since we originally wrote this chapter
in early 2022, the topic of academic fraud in Canada has also been linked with the
issue of Indigenous identity fraud (see Leo, 2022a, b, c, d, e, f). The issue of
Indigenous identity fraud is outside the scope of this chapter, but it is one that must
not be ignored, especially when the cases in question point to the possibility
of “long-term violators” (Cressey, 1973, p. 114).
Increased dialogue about qualifications fraud among educators and educational
leaders is an important first step, but it is insufficient by itself. We conclude with a
call to action for academics and educational leaders to develop and follow clear
policies and processes for preventing fraud in the academy, and to investigate and
address such fraud if it is discovered. The higher education system itself must stand
as an exemplar of excellence to ensure that academic integrity includes upholding
credential validity and preventing fraud of all kinds.
Acknowledgements We are grateful to Jennifer (Jenn) Hauck and Todd Maki for their feedback
on this chapter.
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Chapter 13
Fake Degrees and Fraudulent Credentials
in Higher Education: Conclusions
and Future Directions
Abstract This book has brought different aspects of credential fraud within higher
education to the surface. It is the first book of its kind to examine this problem
through a transdisciplinary and cross-cultural lens, with authors and practitioners
hailing from different parts of the world and working in varying fields. The accumu-
lation of knowledge within these pages brings a comprehensive and in-depth analy-
sis to the problem of fake degrees and credentials today. In this concluding chapter,
we summarize key findings from throughout the book. We have grouped the key
concepts covered in the book into seven main categories: (a) historical perspectives
and terminology; (b) a trend of global indifference; (c) criminal enterprises and
security; (d) fraud in standardized language proficiency testing; (e) athletic creden-
tialism; (f) the role of the institution; (g) hiring, and (h) technology. We discuss the
significance and limitations of the book, concluding with calls to action for more
research and resources to better understand and address the growing problem of the
ecosystem of academic fraud that continues to grow.
Keywords Academic misconduct · Academic integrity · Ecosystem · Fake degrees

· Fraud · Contract cheating · Academic cheating · Academic dishonesty
S. E. Eaton

Switzerland AG 2023
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21796-8_13
Introduction
The term ecosystem is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as follows:

All the living things in an area and the way they affect each other in the environment;
Any complicated system consisting of many different people, processes, activities etc.,
especially relating to technology, and the way that they affect each other;
All the plants, animals, and people living in an area considered together with their envi-
ronment as a system of relationships;
A group of businesses or business activities that affect each other and work well together
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2022).
The problem of fake degrees and fraudulent credentials operates within a complex
ecosystem, with various components, in the form of commercial services, character-
ized by different fraudulent activities in academia (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a).
These activities overlap and intersect strengthening the business model of these oper-
ations (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a). They certainly “work well together,” as the last
definition proclaims (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). Eaton and Carmichael (2023a)
interpret the ecosystem of academic fraud through four intersections: Contract cheat-
ing, paper mills, admissions fraud, and degree mills. The chapters, which are sum-
marized into seven categories below, are reflected in these identified intersections.
Historical Perspectives and Terminology
This is not a new problem, as outlined by Eaton and Carmichael in Chap. 1, but it
has not received the same academic review as plagiarism or contract cheating, for
example. This chapter noted that selling parchments was not historically the first
appearance of credential fraud but was instead a barter of services for substandard
education in the early days. The transition from trade to monetary profit was seen in
the 1700s in the U.S. (Angelo, 2016, as cited in Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a), and
most of these exchanges involved the tertiary education sector (Eaton & Carmichael,
2023a). The Internet was a catalyst that fueled these businesses, and billion-dollar
enterprises like Axact capitalized on using technology to expand and prolifer-
ate (Ezell, 2019, 2022). Resemblances to the contract cheating business model are
also highlighted in this chapter. Eaton and Carmichael (2023a) observe that Ezell
and Bear wrote their book about degree mills in 2005 (Ezell & Bear, 2005), and in
2006, Clarke and Lancaster coined the term “contract cheating” (Clarke & Lancaster,
2006). These forms of fraud had not been previously connected and were reinforced
in Chaps. 2, 6, and 11 in data collection (Carmichael & Eaton 2023a, b; Orim &
Glendinning, 2023). This overview chapter provided an introductory frame for the
book by creating a historical timeline, linkages to other forms of academic fraud,
and defining the various terms used, which are numerous without clear delineation.
Defining the problem clearly, and understanding the connections, is the first step
toward putting complete solutions in place and for scholars to continue this impor-
tant work.
13 Fake Degrees and Fraudulent Credentials in Higher Education: Conclusions… 271
Survey Data: Trend of Global Indifference
With the problem defined, other layers investigated the prevalence of this activity
today and the practices and processes in existence to circumvent, or conversely,
those that enable this behavior. Carmichael and Eaton conducted a survey (Chap. 2)
that spanned Canada from coast-to-coast to obtain a pulse point on this issue. The
participants were primarily from the Registrar’s Office or Admissions services, with
a small percentage of faculty contributing from the viewpoint of academic hiring
committees. The objective of the survey was to target individuals working with
admissions files and processing records daily. The results revealed that 54.7% did
not feel confident detecting fake credentials, despite 68% having received training
and 90% experiencing workload issues. While 58.8% reported that they saw 1–20
known cases, this number might not be accurate if confidence and resource levels
are low. Regardless of these findings, when participants were asked whether degree
fraud was a concern at their institution, 60% had a negative detractor rating.
Leveraging technology for digitization was defined as the way forward, with 11.6%
contemplating blockchain as a solution.
We wanted to dive into these themes further. We included two supplementary
data points to our study: a media review of the response to Operation Varsity Blues
in Canadian news articles and a comparative analysis with an international fraud
and corruption survey completed by Glendinning et al. (2019). Coincidentally the
media analysis highlighted a ‘not in Canada mentality,’ notably due to the emphasis
on grades and the lack of the Ivy League hierarchy or focus on sport (Carmichael &
Eaton, 2023a). Irrespective of the blinders contributing to our inaction on this
Gordian knot, it did bring out inequities in the admissions process, how disability
documentation may be interpreted, a stress to remain competitive in a global market
without proper funding, and the unregulated agent industry (Carmichael & Eaton,
2023a). The final data component was the survey by Glendinning et al. (2019),
which also used mixed methods, open-ended questions, and non-mandatory
responses. The response rate was equivalent to ours. It did differ in that the survey
was designed to measure corruption in higher education and addressed those work-
ing in quality assurance and accreditation. However, despite these variances, there
were parallels, allowing us to measure how Canada was faring compared to other
countries. Glendinning et al. (2019) examined six categories overall; however, in
admissions and recruitment specifically, this lack of concern was apparent. False
advertising was problematic to respondents, but the issues around bribery of offi-
cials, fake documents to cheating on exams required for admittance were of minor
concern (Glendinning et al., 2019, as cited in Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a).
This survey was also directly featured in Chap. 6, authored by Orim and
Glendinning, along with examples of fraud in higher education across the globe.
This work was part of a larger research project for the Council of Higher Education
Accreditation’s International Quality Group (CIQG) in 2017 and 2018. While the
survey was one element, the project included a literature review and interviews. In
their chapter, they narrowed in on two survey areas: admissions and recruitment, as
well as qualifications and credentials. The first area was discussed in the previous
section, and the trend of “unconcern” was repeated within this second category.
Respondents were given six use cases to rank their level of concern: use of degree
mills, fake admission documents, bogus information on hiring applications, to
awarding either academic or honorary degrees to individuals in power. In tabulating
the overall result, the researchers found that only a third of respondents were con-
cerned about this question, demonstrating international indifference to this problem.
As mentioned, the chapter also encompassed examples from multiple continents,
with diverse cases that ranged from bribery of admissions officials, leaked exam
papers, sexual harassment of the applicant, “scammers” (pg. 4) impersonating
admissions staff, suspect marketing in the race to recruit, invasive and inhumane
technology-use to thwart exam cheating, and lastly, education agents (Orim &
Glendinning, 2023). Due to its scarcity, most of these cases originated from news
stories versus academic literature.
As a result of their comprehensive investigation into corruption in higher educa-
tion, Orim and Glendinning (2023) put forth detailed guidance for those in quality
assurance and accreditation, as well as other factors for consideration for all stake-
holders involved. In summary, they promote advocacy that involves a governmental
review of their terms of reference, vigilance in addressing suspected cases, transpar-
ency, review of practices that encourage corruption, and legal protection for those
who challenge such behaviors and “swim against the tide,” (p.1) training, and tech-
nology (Orim & Glendinning, 2023). Orim and Glendinning (2023) encourage
readers not to lose heart, as change takes time; however, collaboration on this issue
will provide strength for the long fight.
Criminal Enterprises and Security
Whereas Glendinning and Orim emphasized a series of cases worldwide, in Chap.

3, Ezell targeted one specific company, Axact. Allen Ezell, a retired FBI Special
Agent, penned this chapter. He walked the reader through this criminal enterprise
with a sociological and anthropological lens, which he refers to as the “tower of
frauds and house of lies” (Ezell, 2023, p.1). Axact is based in Pakistan, has over
1800 employees, and is considered one of the largest diploma mills (Ezell, 2019;
Szeto & Vallani, 2017 as cited in Ezell 2023). This enterprise thrived on selling fake
degrees from fictitious American institutions, papers to order, fronting pornography
sites, and further supplemented their income with other miscellaneous service offer-
ings (i.e., cars, travel, website design) (Internet Reputation, n.d. as cited in Ezell,
2023). Even the services were delivered and executed based on fraud, for example,
mail or wire (Internet Reputation, n.d., as cited in Ezell, 2023). It was not unsurpris-
ing that blackmail and threats were intertwined in this web (Ali, 2015, as cited in
Ezell, 2023). We are humbled and honored that Allen has shared his lifework with
us in these pages. The knowledge learned regarding the inner workings of diploma
mills is beneficial and far-reaching to affect change and stop corruption. We also
want to recognize the bravery of the people who have been informants, who have
worked or are working for this organization and trying to find a way out without
harm coming to them or their families. We hope that by bringing forward this
research, we can take away some of their power and give those strength who need
to get out.
Many of the characteristics outlined in the Ezell chapter were emphasized in
Chap. 11 (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023b), where 30 websites were scraped, a topic
model built, and IP addresses explored to understand these businesses more fully.
This technique was novel, examining this problem with text mining, resulting in the
identification of 24 risks. We uncovered much more than selling fake degrees and
transcripts but found many extended products one could purchase to change your
identity. This incorporated personal identification within higher education, such as
a library or student card, to government issued ID. Blackmail was found in one
instance, and sites were legitimatized by using factual information from institutions
containing the names of faculty members. Some of these sites followed prominent
education leaders through social media, even. This rouse did not stop here and
involved issuing a university email address, hacking in to change your grade, or put-
ting one in the graduation database. This is particularly alarming when we consider
what was learned in Chap. 2 (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a) and the disinterest from
survey respondents regarding security vulnerabilities. This particular item was also
discussed in the literature. Kaur & Randhawa (2020) found this activity mentioned
in their research on the illegal underground of the Dark Net. Tracking this activity
through the surface or dark web is challenging. This chapter also examined the IP
addresses of the 30 websites and found that the U.S. was a dominant geolocation.
Twelve websites were found to have changed their IP address in such a way as to be
labeled suspicious or deceptive. Business owners will want their users to have the
best user experience, as a poor connection could jeopardize a sale; therefore, this
chapter argues that they utilize data centres where their demand is most potent, and
this points to the U.S. It is also serendipitous perhaps that Ezell (2023) stated that
many of the fake schools used patriotism with the colours of red, white, and blue in
their website design. Both Chaps. 3 and 11 shine a spotlight on the security issues
surrounding these businesses.
I nequitable Gate-Keepers: Fraud in Standardized Language

Proficiency Testing
Interestingly private chat rooms can be utilized to share information about language
proficiency testing (Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). Sabbaghan and Fazel have been
examiners and designers of language assessments, and are faculty members at a
Canadian university. They bring their experience and expertise to the discussion of
language proficiency testing in Chap. 8 from various perspectives and detail how the
power imbalances of equity, integrity, fairness, and justice plague this test, espe-
cially regarding culture and socioeconomic background. They put forth recommen-
dations that establish more inclusivity versus a “one-size-fits-all approach” (p. 2)
while also contemplating the disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic (Sabbaghan &
Fazel, 2023).
Standardized language proficiency testing can be seen as “door-openers or gate-
keepers” (Bachman & Purpura, 2008, p. 456 as cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023)
because if the test taker is successful, they will be able to immigrate, find employ-
ment, or study abroad. This often translates to increased opportunities and a better
life for the individual and their families. The outcome of this test is in the hands of
a third-party body (McNamara, 2012; Shohamy, 2001, as cited in Sabbaghan &
Fazel, 2023), and one’s financial means should they have to take the test more than
once (Alsogoafi, 2018, as cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). The test is not
designed modular (Alsogoafi, 2018, as cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023).
Therefore, even if the test-taker only scored poorly on one section, they must retake
the test entirely (Alsogoafi, 2018, as cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). Moreover,
the literature revealed gaps in the test design that may advantage some over others,
which brings fairness and justice into question. For instance, the test may ask ques-
tions about common or topical knowledge (Alexander et al., 1991, as cited in
Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). Sabbaghan & Fazel (2023) use the example of a house-
hold pet, which is not a common social construct for Bangladeshi (Khan, 2006 as
cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). Conversely, there may be grading inconsisten-
cies across examiners, with gender and cultural bias playing a role (O’Loughlin,
2002; O’Sullivan, 2000, 2002; Khan, 2006, as cited in Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023).
The current high-stakes environment, with inequality sewn into the test’s seams,
promotes unethical behavior from test-takers and those responsible for administer-
ing the test.
This theme continues in Chap. 9 (Clark, 2023). Clark (2023) examines whether
this one data point, the language proficiency test, truly signifies a student’s aca-
demic readiness in their degree program. Not to mention the lack of guidance pro-
vided to those working in Admission services regarding the interpretation and use
of test scores, which was also touched on by Sabbaghan & Fazel (2023). This is
illustrated by three case studies from Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States that highlight cultural differences and an intense pressure to exceed to change
one’s life circumstances or to gain citizenship. Each of these cases had a different
reaction to the fraud uncovered. For example, in Canada, at Niagara College in
2018, 428 individuals who took the language proficiency test at one testing center in
India were asked to retake the test due to inadequate performance (Civinini, 2018,
as cited in Clark, 2023). The college paid for the retaking of the test (Civinini, 2018
as cited in Clark, 2023). While fraud could not be pinpointed, this incident created
awareness and a closer examination of the test scores at the college in question and
others (LaFleche, 2019, as cited in Clark, 2023). Moreover, this prompted
Citizenship and Refugees Canada to launch a campaign about suspect immigration
agents and recruiters in India (Bascaramurty, Bhatt & Rana, 2021, as cited in Clark,
2023). Meanwhile, in the UK, in 2014, international students were found cheating
on the Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) which permitted
them to renew their visas. Thousands of students were tangled in this highly publi-
cized scandal, and the cheating came to light during the filming of a documentary,
which showed proxies taking the exam for others, and questions being shared
(APPG, 2019, as cited in Clark, 2023). The response involved using new technol-
ogy, voice analysis software, to determine the validity of the test taker’s result
(APPG, 2019; NAO, 2019, as cited in Clark, 2023). Based on this finding, 2468
students were deported from the UK, and 7206 received a strict warning to leave or
face a risk of detention (Gentleman, 2019; NAO, 2019, as cited in Clark, 2023).
Lastly, a comparable case occurred in the United States in 2015 when 15 students
from China, primarily living in Pittsburgh, paid imposters to write their language
proficiency test and used fake passports as their identification (Bidgood, 2015, as
cited in Clark, 2023). Criminal prosecution and deportation were the end result here
(Bidgood, 2015; Welitzkin, 2017, as cited in Clark, 2023). Given these cases,
Clark (2023) offers suggestions for the future that include a re-evaluation of admis-
sion criteria, transitionary support for students who are adjusting to a new country,
and inclusion of a language assessment after students begin their program that con-
nects with their program of study. Both of these chapters discuss language profi-
ciency testing, demonstrating notable similarities. However, they contribute to and
explore nuances of this problem through different experiences and case studies,
resulting in a thorough analysis.
Athletic Credentialism
With admission based on athletic credentials, inequity and fairness are again called
into question. Hextrum has done impactful research on this topic (2018, 2019, 2020,
2021a, b), and in Chap. 5, she shared a fraction of her research that isolated the
themes of invest, market, and authenticate. This research involved analyzing the
demographics of 1487 U.S. college athletes, 47 interviews, and reviewing admis-
sions documents. This chapter details how those in moderate to affluent households,
primarily white, would have access to and the means to invest in extra-curricular
sports. Moreover, once students can apply to higher education, the inconsistency
and lack of transparency across schools are apparent in terms of sports (Hextrum,
2023). The data revealed that those that navigated this murkiness well marketed
themselves, which may be a strategy more comfortable for those from specific
socioeconomic backgrounds (Hextrum, 2023). While the prospective students may
market, what they are marketing is not always verified or “authenticated,” accord-
ingly to Hextrum (2023). These issues create barriers that exclude, thereby creating
a homogenous composition within U.S. college campuses (Hextrum, 2023). Not to
mention encourage fraud, of which the Operation Varsity Blues debacle was the
perfect example (Hextrum, 2023).
Hextrum (2023) sets the stage for fraud today by looking at the origin of college
sports. In 1852, Harvard and Yale were hosting a rowing regatta and had to decide
“whom” was eligible to compete, and followed the practices of schools in the United
Kingdom with the notion of the “gentleman amateur” (Llewellyn & Gleaves, 2014,
as cited in Hextrum, 2023). This label put rules in place that prohibited women,
those from lower economic backgrounds, and immigrants from participating

(Llewellyn & Gleaves, 2014 as cited in Hextrum, 2023). The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) was formed in 1906 and embedded these exclusion
criteria into its rules (Carter, 2006, as cited in Hextrum, 2023). Basketball and foot-
ball, and the revenues they could generate, dismantled the “gentleman amateur” and
permitted special admission based on athletic skill in the twentieth century so the
money machine could be fed (Smith, 2011; Thelin, 2011 as cited in Hextrum, 2023).
Chapters 1 and 5 (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a), show how shockingly early in his-
tory these problems started to arise and how the drive for monetary profits opened
the door (wide) for fraud.
The Role of the Institution
The previous two categories reviewed the inequities of the language proficiency
test, and sport. The institution’s role was present in language proficiency tests in
how students are examined, the interpretation of test scores, and the admission cri-
teria themselves (Clark, 2023; Sabbaghan & Fazel, 2023). In sport, students are
granted special admission by the institution not because they have achieved a spe-
cific ranking, but they have had the financial means to participate in such activities,
were successful in marketing their interests, and know that qualifications are seldom
checked by officials (Hextrum, 2023). Chapter 10 looks at the institutional role
more closely with the application of a theoretical framework (DeCoster, 2023). This
work focuses on the often-punitive measures taken against the individual when
fraud is suspected. At the same time, the role of the institution and the responsibility
they have is often forgotten or minimized. This observation was also demonstrated
in the cases depicted by Clark (2023) in Chap. 9, with one college taking some
ownership by paying for a test retake. DeCoster (2023) outlined a five-level frame-
work for analyzing admissions fraud from different positions of power and sugges-
tions for policy reform. This framework utilized several theories, for example,
Ajzen’s planned behavior (Ajzen, 2020 as cited in DeCoster, 2023), Becker’s label-
ling theory (Becker, 1963 as cited in DeCoster, 2023), Campbell’s law (Campbell,
1979, as cited in DeCoster, 2023), as well as research completed by Bertram Gallant
(2008) and Eaton (2021). This framework, as stated, is multi-layer and contains
micro, metaxy, meso, macro, and acro layers (DeCoster, 2023). These layers encom-
pass the actors, from students to course instructors, groups (i.e., testing companies),
the institution, and government bodies (DeCoster, 2023). The proposed framework
is applied to the case of the ACT GAC cheating scandal in 2016. ACT is a similar
type of test to that of the SAT. It grew in demand due to the Global Assessment
Certificate (GAC) program (Dudley et al. 2016; Selingo, 2020, as cited in DeCoster,
2023) that was a companion service supplied by ACT that allowed students to
develop and work on their academic skills, while receiving transfer credit that part-
ner universities recognized (ACT, 2020, 2021a, b as cited in DeCoster, 2023). The
scandal zeroed in on examiners who shared answers with students taking the ACT
at GAC centres based in China and South Korea (Stecklow & Harney, 2016;
Zhengzhou Cornerstone High School, 2019 as cited in DeCoster, 2023). DeCoster
(2023) concludes Chap. 10 noting that if institutions are not held accountable, they
will be less likely to act against fraud. This provides a connection to Chaps. 2 and 6
(Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a; Orim & Glendinning, 2023) where the trend of indif-
ference was documented from survey respondents. We are not done with this unify-
ing thread yet, which will reappear in Chaps. 7 and 12 (Çelik & Razi, 2023; Eaton
& Carmichael, 2023b) in relation to hiring.
Hiring Practices and the Role of Human Resources
It would be worthwhile to apply the framework outlined in Chap. 10 (DeCoster,

2023) to the issue of hiring and favoritism, which is featured in Chap. 7 (Çelik &
Razi, 2023). The term favouritism, in this chapter, refers to the faculty recruitment
process and practices that deviate from competency-based hiring. Suppose the pro-
cess and practices stray from this principle. There can be serious concerns regarding
the quality of the education imparted, research, and the overall tone this sets at the
higher education institute (Çelik & Razi, 2023). Çelik and Razi (2023) state these
are in fact the issues that are affecting Turkish higher education and have become
increasingly contentious, whereby the media is now exposing these cases.
Historically schools were formed in Turkey with the modus operandi of military
purposes (Kılıç, 1999, as cited in Çelik & Razi, 2023); they transferred to the
European higher education model in 1933 and in 1946, obtained independence.
Turkey is classified as a developing country (Çoban, 2014, as cited in Çelik &
Razi, 2023).
This study had three components: (i) review of the Turkish higher education
system; (ii) present recruitment practice; and (iii) extraction of 66 favouritism news
stories. This analysis showed the predominant ways faculty were recruited, mainly
by highlighting the research topics the faculty member obtained to ensure “that
person” was hired without contest. Interviews and exams were other aspects used to
guarantee a faculty member is assigned (Çelik & Razi, 2023). If this type of behav-
iour is left over time, it can fester and facilitate corruption (Safina, 2015, as cited in
Çelik & Razi, 2023). An individuals’ capacity to be concerned when such activities
are witnessed, will eventually be diminished (Vveinhardt & Sroka, 2020, as cited in
Çelik & Razi, 2023).
The researchers propose several recommendations, starting with a national pol-
icy to direct the actions of institutions concerning favouritism, and remove the
opaqueness of such decisions. Recruitment advertisements, which are published,
need to be monitored, and steps taken to address any issues that might be untoward
(Çelik & Razi, 2023). The committees that take place in hiring need to be well-
informed and trained to avoid such missteps (Çelik & Razi, 2023). Examinations
and interviews need to be conducted or have representation from external parties to
avoid conflict of interest and bias (Çelik & Razi, 2023). Lastly, scholars need to
reject this behaviour when observed or known to avoid tarnishing academia (Çelik
& Razi, 2023).
Although this climate is known in Turkey, we are not sure what the state of
affairs is in Canada (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023b) concerning hiring. In Chap. 12,
more rhetorical questions are posed on this topic that provide a springboard for
reflection. Eaton and Carmichael (2023b) consider the implications if a professor is
found to have secured employment in academia with a fake degree or credential,
what this means for students, the mark they have been awarded, and the black cloud
this brings to the institution. Credentialism and the need to have a degree to obtain
employment was noted in the literature review as the impetus for this behavior
(Arnstein, 1982; Johnson, 2006, as cited in Eaton & Carmichael, 2023b). Within
higher education, faculty who earn their credentials from institutions that are
deemed “prestigious” would be considered more attractive, and bring more value to
the institution (Burris, 2004; Nevin, 2019, as cited in Eaton & Carmichael, 2023b).
However, if a fraudulent degree is found, the breadth of the damage will not only
affect the institution where the individual works but will circle back and taint the
school from which the fake school was acquired and the sector as a whole (Eaton &
Carmichael, 2023b). Eaton and Carmichael (2023b) reflect on the possibility of
admitting and graduating a student from a graduate program that gained entrance
through bogus means. When faculty apply for a position, it is assumed that their
credentials are legitimate, as they would be checked upon admittance. This, argued
by Eaton and Carmichael (2023b), would be a naïve assumption, and there are
numerous reports in the media of such cases that have gone sour (Adlakha 2017,
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC], 2017; Lee, 2005, as cited by Eaton &
Carmichael, 2023b).
Misconduct is approached differently depending on where you live in the world,
and Bretag (2019) stated that the United States has a “strongly moralistic approach”
(p. 6) whereas Australia, Canada, and the UK consider the actions to stem from
behavioral issues (Bretag, 2019; Eaton 2021 as cited in Eaton & Carmichael,
2023b). This designation is important as it may determine the consequences applied.
Eaton & Carmichael (2023b) suggest the following steps that institutions can action:
add qualifications fraud to misconduct policies, verify academic credentials when
hiring, include this possibility of this occurrence into risk assessment or business
continuity plans, check and make sure hiring verification is being done through
audits, and lastly, follow quality assurance practices for courses and curriculum
development. In the final categorization, we look at technology through the solution
of Blockchain to combat this problem, which can also be used to share credentials
with employers.
Technology
Chapter 4 (Duklas, 2023) is the only chapter to focus on a solution and provides a
comprehensive analysis of the history and technology of blockchain within Canada
through interviews with subject matter experts and a review of academic and white
literature. The author is a leading expert on this topic as a higher education
consultant, and a former Vice-President and Registrar for one of Canada’s promi-
nent universities (Duklas, 2017, 2019a, b, 2020; Duklas & Schatzman, 2021).
Blockchain is a technology that allows the user to transmit their credentials securely
to other institutions, potential employers or the government (Duklas, 2023). Duklas
(2023) highlighted the extent of the problem, whereby 40% of individuals miscon-
strued their work details in a study encompassing 2.6 million background checks
(Babcock, 2003, as cited in Duklas, 2023). Within this 40%, 20% were false records
or licenses (Babcock, 2003, as cited in Duklas, 2023). In Canada, while progress
has been made towards the digitalization of records, there is still the phenomenon of
the paper record being hand delivered in a sealed envelope (Duklas, 2023). This
reared its ugly head during the COVID-19 pandemic when these “paper” methods
were no longer possible, and institutions were forced towards digital processes,
whether ready or not (Duklas, 2023). There are indeed adoption challenges, with
institutions having many systems, and technical bridges that need to be developed
to have workflows that will be of value (Duklas, 2023). Cost, and resources to
devote to a technology project are realities, as well as the existing processes and
policies that might need to be revamped (Duklas, 2023). This is no small undertak-
ing (Duklas, 2023). However, despite these challenges, Duklas noted gaps in shar-
ing information across our provinces and territories (Duklas, 2019a). Governments
may be part of the conversation to move institutions away from conformity (Duklas,
2023), and looking at the evidence from Canada’s MyCreds™, which supports this
technology, or others My eQuals in Australia and New Zealand (My eQuals, 2017).
In Chap. 2, as stated, respondents believed technology was a piece in the puzzle, but
identifying the “how” was not clear (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a). These examples
of excellence may guide implementations to come.
Significance, Limitations, and Future Directions
We found that frustrating amount of the literature on fake degrees and credentials is
embedded within organizations that require membership or a fee to access the con-
tent. We hope this book, which is available to the public, will be shared widely to
spark conversations and become the catalyst to enact change. Likewise, most of the
literature from the United States, was written predominantly by male authors,
Whereas our book was led and edited by a team of women, two of whom con-
ducted original research included within this volume. The book also introduces the
framing of this problem through an ecosystem that contains other commercial
fraudulent activities found in academia (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a). It was our
objective to provide differing perspectives on this problem. The contributors to this
volume represent a diverse group of international experts, including law enforce-
ment, academics, and higher education professionals.
A call to action is needed as the data clearly demonstrated a lack of concern
regarding fake degrees and credentials (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a; Eaton &
Carmichael, 2023b; Orim & Glendinning, 2023). The literature and media revealed
a focus on individual punishment versus institutional responsibility when fraud is
suspected (Clark, 2023; DeCoster, 2023); there can be far-reaching implications

that will ripple into society as a whole if left unaddressed (Çelik & Razi, 2023).
Societal effects are present in the form of inequalities firmly rooted in our processes,
and procedures, from testing, admitting students to the hiring of our faculty (Çelik
& Razi, 2023; Clark, 2023; Eaton & Carmichael, 2023b; Hextrum, 2023; Sabbaghan
& Fazel, 2023). I (Jamie), as a first-generation university student, recalled feeling
like a fish out of water throughout my academic pursuits. While I (Jamie) was for-
tunate to find mentors along the way, others may not be as successful if they cannot
make those connections and find their way forward. This corresponds to retention,
which is not within our research scope, but may be a future consideration. In sum-
mary, institutions need to work towards making education more egalitarian, which
will minimize fraud by allowing prospective students to imagine and envision them-
selves in higher education.
Limitations
There are limitations, as with any scholarly examination. There is a lack of aca-
demic literature on this topic, a reliance on media stories to date, and the data col-
lection have been modest. A longitudinal study on new stories, and a review of the
existing literature, with emphasis placed on the country of origin, would be benefi-
cial as this is not a new problem (Eaton & Carmichael, 2023a). Research appears to
have been sporadic over the years. Furthermore, undeveloped or developing coun-
tries need a more substantial representation, as this is a global problem, and our
ability to react differs world-wide. The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted higher
education and changed perceptions in terms of academic integrity and research. As
we come out of this period, we need to measure this landscape to see what has
changed. Mental health was briefly discussed in Chap. 2 (Carmichael & Eaton,
2023a), and it is believed this, along with disability, requires more attention.
Moreover, security, given that degree and diploma mills have a digital storefront,
was introduced, but we encourage scholars with a background in this area to dig
further as it will likely uncover a hotbed of activity (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023b,
Ezell, 2023). Even if institutions do all the right things, these businesses will con-
tinue to evolve and look for loopholes to exploit, through technical, legal, or human
means. Blockchain was featured as a promising solution (Duklas, 2023), but mul-
tiple checks and balances need to be incorporated; some of these are technical, a
process to policy (Carmichael & Eaton, 2023a). Fake degrees and credentials are
part of a commercial academic fraud ecosystem, and continuing to understand the
characteristics of these businesses through scholarly examination will allow us to
improve defenses and ensure the right measures are in place (Eaton &
Carmichael, 2023a).
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Ethics and Integrity in Educational Contexts 5

Sarah Elaine Eaton

Editorial Board Members

Fake Degrees and Fraudulent

ISSN 2731-779X ISSN 2731-7803 (electronic)

Calgary, AB, Canada Sarah Elaine Eaton

Ottawa, ON, Canada Jamie J. Carmichael

Calgary, AB, Canada Helen Pethrick

Calgary, Canada Sarah Elaine Eaton

Ottawa, Canada Jamie J. Carmichael

Calgary, Canada Helen Pethrick

1 Fake Degrees and Credential Fraud, Contract Cheating,

Sarah Elaine Eaton, PhD, is an associate professor at the Werklund School of

Jamie J. Carmichael is the Associate Registrar of Scheduling and Systems at

Sarah Elaine Eaton and Jamie J. Carmichael

Abstract In this introductory chapter we provide an overview and historical per-

Keywords Fake degree · Credential · Degree · Fraud · Academic misconduct ·

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

A Brief History of Fake and Fraudulent Credentials

education and accreditation/quality assurance and national governments” (CHEA &

A reasonable question to ask is whether it is illegal to buy or sell bogus academic

Defining Key Terms

status of a post-secondary institution in that country (United States Department of

Degree Mill/Diploma Mill

A fraudulent degree is one that appears to be from a legitimate university (and

Types of Fake and Fraudulent Products and Services

 he Connection Between the Fake Degree and Contract

Blacklists of Fake Schools: An Exercise in Futility

matter of minutes, to set up a new online storefront quickly (Comas-Forgas et al.,

Blackmail, Extortion, and Links to Organized Crime

We began this work as academic integrity scholars, with knowledge of cheating,

Fig. 1.1 The ecosystem of commercial academic fraud

 n Updated (and Still Incomplete) Valuation of the Academic

Limitations and Recommendations

Technological solutions, such as blockchain, machine learning, and artificial

Adam, L. (2016). Student perspectives on plagiarism. In T. Bretag (Ed.), Handbook of academic

Jamie J. Carmichael and Sarah Elaine Eaton

Keywords Canada · Corruption · Higher education · Admissions fraud ·

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

The research project, Degrees of Deceit: A study of counterfeit credentials, began in

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in-depth examination of admissions

made standardized testing optional because of COVID-19 (Carnevale, 2020, as

Survey: Design, Demographics, and Distribution

Comparative Survey Analysis

Survey: Process, Practice, and Technology

To begin, we report on the admissions and registrarial processes and practices

Survey: Emerging Themes in Admissions Fraud

After collecting general information about admissions and registrarial processes

Theme 1: Confidence Level

Theme 3: Equity of Admissions Process

In Canada, admittance to a post-secondary institution is based on grades, and 75.8%

This action is contemplated to maintain academic standards; however, it results in

Theme 4: Frequency and Causality of Fake Credentials

Theme 5: Propensity for Change

Survey questions regarding change were presented: (i.e., is change needed, is it a

Similar to the collective concern about admission fraud, security seemed to be a

Theme 7: Workload Issues

Media Review: Canadian Response to Varsity Blues

Trend 1: “Not in Canada” Mentality

Trend 2: Socio-Economic Inequalities in the Admissions Process

Statistics Canada reported an increase in students from lower-income families in

Trend 3: Remaining Competitive in a Global Market

on “…fundraising; they rely on inflated international student tuition and deregu-

Calgary, AB, Canada Sarah Elaine Eaton

Ottawa, ON, Canada Jamie J. Carmichael

Calgary, AB, Canada Helen Pethrick

1 Fake Degrees and Credential Fraud, Contract Cheating,

A Brief History of Fake and Fraudulent Credentials

Defining Key Terms

Degree Mill/Diploma Mill

Types of Fake and Fraudulent Products and Services

he Connection Between the Fake Degree and Contract

Blacklists of Fake Schools: An Exercise in Futility

Blackmail, Extortion, and Links to Organized Crime

n Updated (and Still Incomplete) Valuation of the Academic

Limitations and Recommendations

Survey: Design, Demographics, and Distribution

Comparative Survey Analysis

Survey: Process, Practice, and Technology

Survey: Emerging Themes in Admissions Fraud

Theme 1: Confidence Level

Theme 3: Equity of Admissions Process

Theme 4: Frequency and Causality of Fake Credentials

Theme 5: Propensity for Change

Theme 7: Workload Issues

Media Review: Canadian Response to Varsity Blues

Trend 1: “Not in Canada” Mentality

Trend 2: Socio-Economic Inequalities in the Admissions Process

Trend 3: Remaining Competitive in a Global Market

Trend 4: Manufacturing a ‘Fake’ Disability

Trend 5: Unregulated Education Consulting Industry

Comparative Survey Analysis: Glendinning et al. (2019)

Category 1: Regulation of Corruption in Higher Education

Category 2: Admission and Recruitment

Category 3: Student Assessment

Category 4: Credentials and Qualification

Recommendations and Conclusions

ecommendations for Administrative and Professional Practices

Recommendations for Researchers

Recommendations for Policy Reform

Pakistan’s History, Laws, Prisons, and Justice

Pakistan and the United States of America

Axact: A Criminal Enterprise

Axact’s History and Finances

Protect the Castle at All Costs!

How Did Axact Continue to Operate for 24 Years?

mid-year growth is a phenomenon familiar to most Axactians, simply because other

Let’s Take a Tour of Your ‘University’

Processing Trail of a ‘New’ University

Domain Purchase and Hosting

wo Separate Paths: An FBI Sting and the Arrest

rossing Paths: Suffield University and Manhattan

Back to Axact in May 2015

Sheikh and Axact React

After 2015: Still Selling Diplomas and Transcripts!

Publicly Blemished: New Name(s) for Axact

The Worst of the Worst: Extortion and Blackmail!

Axact Extortion Travel Teams

TCurve Amnesty Period for Employees

Devaluing Degrees: Why Should We Be Concerned?

How Do I Recognize a Fake School?

Examples of Fake Schools

The Value of the Written Word

Trends in Axact’s New Fake Universities

Personal Message to Shoaib Ahmed Sheikh

Tomorrow and Axact

Context for Document Issuing

doption Challenges of Digitized Documents and Trusted

Growth in Degree/Diploma Mills