18 Months

$~1 TO 3 & 42
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Date of decision: 2nd February, 2024
+ O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 426/2023
LARSEN AND TOUBRO LIMITED ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. J. P. Singh (Sr Adv), Mr.
Subhash Gulati, Mr. Shashank
Sharma, Advs. (M. 9811077674)
versus
IIC LIMITED & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through:
Mr. Rajat Navet, Mr. Shashi Kant,
Mr. Kushagra Pandit, Mr. Harshpal
Singh Negi, Advs. for R-2 (M.
9650881816)
2 WITH
+ O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 427/2023
Sharma, Advs. (M. 9811077674)
versus
IIC LIMITED & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajat Navet, Mr. Shashi Kant,
9650881816)
3 AND
+ O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 20/2024
Sharma, Advs. (M. 9811077674)
versus
SINNAR THERMAL POWER
LIMITED & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Utkarsh Singh, Adv. for R-1 (M.
Signature Not Verified

Digitally Signed O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 426/2023 & connected matters Page 1 of 31
By:RAHUL
Signing Date:08.02.2024
17:41:04
9872464483)
9650881816)
42 AND
+ O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 637/2023
Sharma, Advs.
versus
ELENA POWER AND INFRASTRUCTURE
LIMITED & ANR. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Abhishek Anand, Mr. Sikhar
Tiwari, Advs. for R-1 (M.
9198040001)
9650881816)
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGMENT
Prathiba M. Singh, J.
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.

2. These four petitions raise an important issue concerning the
interpretation of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(hereinafter, ‘1996 Act’). The parties in all the four petitions are set out in
the following table:

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Case Number Petitioner Respondents Project
O.M.P.(MISC.) Larsen and IIC Ltd. & RPL EBOP Nashik
(COMM.) 426/2023 Toubro Limited
O.M.P.(MISC.) Larsen and IIC Ltd. & RPL EBOP Amravati
(COMM.) 427/2023 Toubro Limited
O.M.P.(MISC.) Larsen and Sinnar Thermal CHP Nashik
(COMM.) 20/2024 Toubro Limited Power Limited
& RPL.
O.M.P.(MISC.) Larsen and Elena Power and CHP Amravati
(COMM.) 637/2023 Toubro Limited Infrastructure
Limited & RPL.
The facts in each of the four petitions are as under:
O.M.P.(MISC.) (COMM.) 426/2023
3. The Petitioner- Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (hereinafter, L&T) was
awarded a Letter of Intent (hereinafter, ‘LoI’) dated 5th October, 2010 in
respect of the Thermal Power Plant located at Sinnar, Nasik, Maharashtra,
India (hereinafter, ‘Nashik Project’). The Letter of Award (hereinafter,
‘LoA’) is dated 19th October, 2010 with respect to the said Nashik Project.
Further, in pursuance of LoI and LoA, two contracts were entered into
between parties, i.e. a Supply Contract dated 18th February, 2011 and a
Service Contract dated 18th February, 2011.
4. In the present petition, the Respondent No. 1 is M/s. IIC Limited
(hereinafter, ‘IICL’), and Respondent No. 2 is M/s. Rattan India Power
Limited (hereinafter, ‘RPL’). As per the petition, in 2010, RPL initiated the
Nashik Project for which the IICL invited bids.
5. According to L&T, the Nashik Project was concluded and the plant
was commissioned on 30th May, 2017. Thereafter, in terms of the LoI and
the LoA, payments were due to L&T, which were allegedly not paid by the
Respondents- IICL and RPL, due to which L&T invoked the arbitration

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17:41:04
clause on 26th February, 2020 in terms of Clause 11.0 of the General
Conditions of Contact (hereinafter, ‘GCC’).
6. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 19th May, 2020, headed by
a retired Supreme Court Judge and two retired Delhi High Court Judges.
Proceedings commenced on 8th June, 2020. During the arbitral proceedings,
RPL filed an application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act on 27th October,
2020, seeking dismissal of the claims. The said application was dismissed by
the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 1st March, 2021.
7. In the arbitral proceedings, issues were framed on 17th June, 2021.
Shortly thereafter, on 20th September, 2021, IICL entered into insolvency,
and a moratorium was imposed under Section 14 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, in the case titled ‘Fidus Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. IIC
Ltd.’ [(IB) 112(ND)/2021]. Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal adjourned
the proceedings sine die on 16th October, 2021, granting the parties the
liberty to seek revival.
8. Vide email dated 10th January, 2022, the L&T coordinated with the
Resolution Professional (hereinafter, 'RP'), and requested the RP to
participate in the arbitration proceeding relating to the Nashik project and
pursue its counterclaim. As per L&T, no response was received from the RP,
who chose not to participate in the arbitral proceedings. On 15th February,
2022, the RP sent a communication requesting that the bank guarantees
issued by L&T in favour of IICL, be maintained. Thus, according to L&T,
though the RP was consistently communicating with the L&T in respect
extension of the bank guarantees, there was no participation.
9. Following this, on 13th April 2022, L&T filed an application under
Section 19 of the 1996 Act seeking revival of the arbitral proceedings. In the

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17:41:04
said application, a detailed order was passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on
13th July, 2022 which revived the arbitral proceedings qua RPL. The
observations in the said order are set out below:
"16. It was also argued by the Ld. Counsel for
Respondent No. 2 that the issues falling for
determination in these proceedings are premised upon
the alleged breach of commitments under the Contract
primarily between the Claimant and Respondent No. 1,
which issues cannot be adjudicated in the absence of
Respondent No. 1, who would be in a better position to
lead evidence in rebuttal, as the project was to be
executed only by Respondent No. 1. It was argued that
any kind of trial in the absence of a necessary Party
i.e. Respondent No. 1, would, amount to an ex-parte
trial, on material facts and issues, causing grave
prejudice to Respondent No. 2, besides practical
difficulties in the segregation of the oral evidence,
which the Parties propose to adduce in support of
their respective stands.
17. The Tribunal has bestowed its anxious
consideration to a rather piquant situation. There is
little scope for debate that the mandate of Section 14 of
the IBC is confined to the Corporate Debtor during the
CIRP proceedings and does not provide any protection
to any party other than the Corporate Debtor. It is now
well settled that the IBC carves out a clear
demarcation between the interests of the Corporate
Debtor from those who are its directors or even in
management.
18. Thus, having regard to the scheme of the IBC, the
Tribunal is unable to hold that the protection as
provided in Section 14 of the IBC, to Respondent
No.1, needs to be extended to Respondent No.2 as
well, merely because the averments in the Statement
of Claim may be, to a large extent, overlapping qua
both the Respondents. The Tribunal holds
accordingly.

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17:41:04
19. In so far as the plea of Respondent No. 2 that
bifurcation of these proceedings between the Claimant
and Respondent No. 2 wil1 cause severe prejudice to
the said Respondent, as it ,wil1 not be able to meet the
Claimant's evidence, which, going by the pleadings
and the documents on record, would primarily be
directed against Respondent No. 1, is concerned, it
would suffice to observe that at this stage the Tribunal
cannot possibly assess or evaluate what would be the
nature of oral evidence which the Claimant may
adduce in the changed scenario, particularly, when in
the Statement of admission/denial of the Claimant's
documents, the majority of documents have neither
been admitted nor denied by Respondent No. 2 on the
ground of being third party documents. In the
circumstances, therefore, at this stage, it may not be
proper for the Tribunal to comment on the impact of
restricting the present proceedings only between the
Claimant and Respondent No. 2.
20. In view of the above, the Tribunal does not find any
impediment on facts or in law in not reviving the
proceedings qua Respondent No. 2 only because
moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC has come into
operation only qua Respondent No. 1.”
10. The above order is stated to have not been challenged by any party
and has attained finality.
11. After the petition's revival was permitted on 13th July, 2022 qua RPL,
evidence was led by the parties. L&T's evidence was concluded on 6th
January, 2023, and RPL is in the process of leading evidence. At this point,
RPL submitted an application to the Arbitral Tribunal on 17th July, 2023,
notifying that the Tribunal's mandate had expired on 1st March 2023. Since
consent for extension had not been obtained from IICL, the Arbitral
Tribunal's mandate had effectively ended. The application emphasized that

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17:41:04
unless the Court extended the mandate, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot
continue. In response, the Arbitral Tribunal made the following observation
in its order dated 1st August, 2023:
“5. Having heard the Ld. Counsel for the Parties at
considerable length, the Tribunal is of the view that the
mandate of the Tribunal under Section 29A (1) of the
Act having expired on 28.02.2023, in the light of the
decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in
Shapoorji Pallonji (supra), the present proceedings
cannot continue till Respondent No.1 gives its
consent in terms of Section 29A(3) of the Act,
notwithstanding the joint consent by the Claimant
and Respondent No.2 as recorded in the proceedings
of the Tribunal held on 24.05.2023, to extend the
period specified in Sub-Section (1) of 29A for a
further period of six months. Pertinently, it is the
Claimant’s own stand that Respondent No.1 presently
being in liquidation, can participate and pursue the
proceedings albeit through the Liquidator.
6. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal refrains
from passing any further orders in the matter, till
such time the proceedings get revived in accordance
with law.”
12. Following the above order, vide letter dated 9th August, 2023, L&T
sought the consent of IICL’s Liquidator for a six-month extension of the
Arbitral Tribunal's mandate under Section 29A(3) of the 1996 Act.
However, as per the petition, the IICL did not reply to their request. Hence
the present petition, seeking extension of the mandate of the Tribunal in
terms of Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act.

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17:41:04
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 427/2023
13. The background of this petition is that the L&T was awarded the LoI
dated 5th October, 2010 in respect of the Thermal Power Plant located at
Nandgaon Peth, MIDC Area, District Amravati, Maharashtra, India
(hereinafter, ‘Amravati Project’). The LoA is dated 19th October, 2010 with
respect to the said Amravati Project. Further, in pursuance of LoI and LoA,
two contracts were entered into between the parties, i.e., a Supply Contract
dated and a Service Contract both dated 18th February, 2011. Respondent
No. 1 is IICL, and Respondent No. 2 is RPL. As per the petition, in 2010,
RPL initiated the said Amravati Project, for which IICL invited bids.
14. According to the L&T, the Amravati Project was concluded and the
plant was commissioned on 30th March, 2015. Thereafter, in terms of the
LoI and the LoA, payments were due to L&T, which were allegedly not paid
by the Respondents- IICL and RPL, due to which L&T invoked the
arbitration proceedings on 26th February, 2020 in terms of Clause 11.0 of
the General Conditions of Contact (hereinafter, ‘GCC’).
15. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 19th May, 2020, headed by
a retired Supreme Court Judge and two retired Delhi High Court Judges.
Proceedings commenced on 8th June, 2020. During the arbitral proceedings,
RPL filed an application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act on 21st October,
2020, seeking the dismissal of the claims. The said application was
dismissed by the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 1st March, 2021.
16. In the arbitral proceedings, issues were framed on 15th June, 2021. On
20th September, 2021, IICL, went into insolvency, and a moratorium was
imposed under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 in

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17:41:04
the matter titled ‘Fidus Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. IIC Ltd.’ [(IB) 112(ND)/2021].
Consequently, the Arbitral Tribunal adjourned the proceedings sine die on
12th November, 2021, while granting parties the liberty to seek revival.
17. Vide email dated 10th January, 2022, the L&T coordinated with the
RP, and requested the RP to participate in the arbitration proceeding relating
to the Amravati project and pursue its counterclaim. As per the L&T, no
response was received from the RP, who chose not to participate in the
arbitral proceedings. On 15th February, 2022, the RP sent a communication
to the L&T requesting that the bank guarantees issued by L&T in favour of
IICL, be maintained. Thus, according to L&T, though the RP was
consistently communicating with the L&T in respect extension of the bank
guarantees, there was no participation.
18. Following this request, on 13th April 2022, the Petitioner filed an
application under Section 19 of the 1996 Act seeking revival of the arbitral
proceedings. In the said application, a detailed order was passed by the
Arbitral Tribunal on 13th July, 2022 which revived the proceedings qua
RPL. The observations in the said order are set out below:
"16. It was also argued by the Ld. Counsel for
Respondent No. 2 that the issues falling for
determination in these proceedings are premised upon
the alleged breach of commitments under the Contract
primarily between the Claimant and Respondent No. 1,
which issues cannot be adjudicated in the absence of
Respondent No. 1, who would be in a better position to
lead evidence in rebuttal, as the project was to be
executed only by Respondent No. 1. It was argued that
any kind of trial in the absence of a necessary Party
i.e. Respondent No. 1, would, amount to an ex-parte
trial, on material facts and issues, causing grave
prejudice to Respondent No. 2, besides practical

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
difficulties in the segregation of the oral evidence,
which the Parties propose to adduce in support of
their respective stands.
17. The Tribunal has bestowed. its anxious
consideration to a rather piquant situation. There is
little scope for debate that the mandate of Section 14 of
the IBC is confined to the Corporate Debtor during the
CIRP proceedings and does not provide any protection
to any party other than the Corporate Debtor. It is now
well settled that the IBC carves out a clear
demarcation between the interests of the Corporate
Debtor from those who are its directors or even in
management.
18. Thus, having regard to the scheme of the IBC, the
Tribunal is unable to hold that the protection as
provided in Section 14 of the IBC, to Respondent
No.1, needs to be extended to Respondent No.2 as
well, merely because the averments in the Statement
of Claim may be, to a large extent, overlapping qua
both the Respondents. The Tribunal holds
accordingly.
19. In so far as the plea of Respondent No. 2 that
bifurcation of these proceedings between the
Claimant and Respondent No. 2 wil1 cause severe
prejudice to the said Respondent, as it ,wil1 not be
able to meet the Claimant's evidence, which, going by
the pleadings and the documents on record, would
primarily be directed against Respondent No. 1, is
concerned, it would suffice to observe that at this
stage the Tribunal cannot possibly assess or evaluate
what would be the nature of oral evidence which the
Claimant may adduce in the changed scenario,
particularly, when in the Statement of
admission/denial of the Claimant's documents, the
majority of documents have neither been admitted
nor denied by Respondent No. 2 on the ground of
being third party documents. In the circumstances,
therefore, at this stage, it may not be proper for the

By:RAHUL
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Tribunal to comment on the impact of restricting the
present proceedings only between the Claimant and
Respondent No. 2.
20. In view of the above, the Tribunal does not find any
impediment on facts or in law in not reviving the
proceedings qua Respondent No. 2 only because
moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC has come into
operation only qua Respondent No. 1.”
19. The above order is stated to have not been challenged by any party
and has attained finality.
20. After the petition's revival was permitted on 13th July, 2022 qua RPL,
evidence from the parties was presented. L&T's evidence concluded on 11th
January, 2023, and the RPL did not lead any evidence. According to L&T,
the original 12-month deadline for issuing an arbitration award, as mandated
by Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, was extended due to the order of the
Supreme Court dated 10th January, 2022 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (C) No.
3/2020, which excluded the period from 15th March, 2020, to 28th February,
2022 from limitation. The said extension resulted in the new deadline
expiring on 28th February, 2023. Thereafter, in terms of order dated 24th
May, 2023, the L&T and RPL mutually agreed to further extend this
deadline by six months until 31st August, 2023.
21. In the meantime, vide judgment dated 30th May, 2023, in Shapoorji
Pallonji Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Elena Power and Infrastructure Limited
[O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 95/2023, decision dated 30th May, 2023], this
Court held that extending the Tribunal's mandate requires the consent of all
parties involved, as per Section 29A (3) of the 1996 Act. As per the L&T,
RPL highlighted the said decision before the Arbitral Tribunal and filed an
application on 17th July, 2023 arguing that the Tribunal's mandate had

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expired on 1st March, 2023, due to lack of consent from Respondent No.
1/IICL. The L&T responded to the said application, and the Tribunal
concluded vide order dated 1st August, 2023 that its mandate expired on 28th
February, 2023. Subsequently, L& T sought consent from IICL’s liquidator
for an extension to make an award, from 1st March, 2023, to 31st August,
2023, but received no response, prompting the filing of this petition.
22. The Arbitral Tribunal made the following observations in its order
dated 1st August 2023:
“5. Having heard the Ld. Counsel for the Parties at
considerable length, the Tribunal is of the view that the
mandate of the Tribunal under Section 29A (1) of the
Act having expired on 28.02.2023, in the light of the
decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in
Shapoorji Pallonji (supra), the present proceedings
cannot continue till Respondent No.1 gives its consent
in terms of Section 29A(3) of the Act, notwithstanding
the joint consent by the Claimant and Respondent No.2
as recorded in the proceedings of the Tribunal held on
24.05.2023, to extend the period specified in Sub-
Section (1) of 29A for a further period of six months.
Pertinently, it is the Claimant’s own stand that
Respondent No.1 presently being in liquidation, can
participate and pursue the proceedings albeit through
the Liquidator.
6. In that view of the matter, the Tribunal refrains
from passing any further orders in the matter, till
such time the proceedings get revived in accordance
with law.”
Hence the present petition seeking extension of the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal.
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 20/2024
23. In this petition, the L&T was awarded the LoI dated 30th April, 2010

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in respect of the Thermal Power Plant located at Sinnar, Nashik,
Maharashtra, India (hereinafter, ‘CHP Nashik Project’). The LoA is dated
11th June, 2010 with respect to the said CHP Nashik Project. Further, in
pursuance of LoI and LoA, two contracts were entered into between parties,
i.e. a Supply Contract and a Service Contract dated 1st October, 2010.
24. Respondent No. 1 is Sinnar Thermal Power Limited (hereinafter,
‘STPL’) (previously known as Rattan India Nasik Power Limited/RNPL and
Indiabulls Realtech Limited/IRL), a company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act, 1956, with its registered office in New Delhi. Respondent
No. 2 is RPL. L&T was contracted to supply, store, and commission the
Coal Handling Plant, including all related accessories and equipment
necessary for the operation of the Thermal Power Plant. This involved the
design, engineering, procurement, construction, and commissioning
activities to bring the plant to operational status.
25. According to L&T, in due course of the project, the STPL and RPL
are stated to have failed to comply with the terms of the contracts. It is stated
that only 2 out 5 units of the Thermal Power Plant have been completed yet.
The petition also states that due to operational issues, which the STPL has
acknowledged and for which extensions of time were granted, the L&T
managed to complete and hand over two out of five units of the Thermal
Power Plant by 2015. However, the work fronts for the remaining units 3, 4,
and 5 were not made available to L&T by January 2016. Thereafter, STPL is
stated to have unilaterally revised the commissioning dates for these units to
later dates in 2016 and 2017. Thereafter, in terms of the LoI and the LoA,
payments were due to L&T, which were allegedly not paid by the
Respondents-STPL and RPL, due to which L&T invoked the arbitration

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clause on 12th March, 2020 in terms of Clause 11.0 of the General
Conditions of Contact (hereinafter, ‘GCC’).
26. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 22nd May, 2020, headed by a
retired Supreme Court Judge and two retired Delhi High Court Judges.
Arbitral proceedings commenced on 17th June, 2020. Respondent No. 2/RPL
filed two applications, the first, dated 27th January, 2021, requesting deletion
from the memo of parties, and the second, dated 19th June, 2021, under
Section 16 of the 1996 Act, seeking dismissal of the L&T’s Statement of
Claim against them. However, both applications were dismissed by the
Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 11th November, 2021.
27. In the arbitral proceedings, issues were framed on 19th June, 2021. On
19th September, 2022, STPL, went into insolvency, and a moratorium was
the matter titled ‘M/s. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s. Sinnar
Thermal Power Limited, (IB)-2561/ND/2019. Vide e-mail dated 21st
January, 2023 STPL, and RPL vide e-mail dated 28th January, 2023
requested for sine die adjournment of proceedings. However, in response to
STPL’s e-mail, the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 24th January, 2023
stated that arbitration would continue as scheduled with regards to RPL. In
response to the RPL’s e-mail, the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 31st
January, 2023 stated that arbitration would continue as far RPL as is
concerned. As per L&T, no communication by L&T to the RP was
warranted in view of email dated 21st January, 2023 filed by STPL. Further,
due to the above two orders, no request was also made for revival of the
arbitral proceedings.
28. According to the L&T, the original 12-month deadline for issuing an

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arbitration award, as mandated by Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, was
extended due to the order of the Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition
(C) No. 3/2020, which excluded the period from 15th March, 2020, to 28th
February, 2022. The said extension resulted in the new deadline expiring on
28th February, 2023. L&T and RPL mutually agreed to further extend this
deadline by six months until 31st August, 2023, as per the order of the
Tribunal dated 21st February, 2023.
29. However, in the meantime, vide judgment dated 30th May, 2023, in
Shapoorji Pallonji Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Elena Power and Infrastructure
Limited [O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 95/2023, decision dated 30th May,
2023], this Court held that extending the Tribunal's mandate requires the
consent of all parties involved, as per Section 29A (3) of the 1996 Act. In
terms of the said decision, L&T wrote a communication to the RP for the
STPL on 25th September, 2023, requesting their consent for a six-month
extension of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate, from 1st March, 2023, to 31st
August, 2023, as per Section 29A(3) of the 1996 Act. However, there has
been no response from the RP of STPL to this request. Hence, L&T was
constrained to file the present petition.
O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 637/2023
30. In this petition, L&T was awarded the LoI dated 30th April, 2010 in
respect of the Thermal Power Plant located at Nandgaon Peth, Amravati,
Maharashtra, India (hereinafter, ‘CHP Amravati Project’). The LoA is dated
5th May, 2010 with respect to the said CHP Amravati Project. Further, in
pursuance of LoI and LoA, two contracts were entered into between parties,
i.e. a Supply Contract and a Service Contract dated 10th August, 2010.
31. Respondent No. 1 is Elena Power and Infrastructure Limited

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(hereinafter, ‘EPIL’) and Respondent No. 2 is RPL.
32. According to the L&T, the CHP Amravati Project was concluded and
the plant was commissioned on 28th December, 2015. Thereafter, in terms of
the LoI and the LoA, payments were due to the Petitioner, which were
allegedly not paid by the Respondents, due to which L&T invoked the
arbitration proceedings on 19th March, 2020 in terms of Clause 11.0 of the
General Conditions of Contact (hereinafter, ‘GCC’).
33. The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 22nd May, 2020, headed by a
retired Supreme Court Judge and two retired Delhi High Court Judges. The
arbitral proceedings commenced on 17th June, 2020. During the arbitral
proceedings, RPL filed an application under Section 16 of the 1996 Act on
16th October, 2020, seeking the dismissal of the claims, which the Arbitral
Tribunal deferred vide order dated 4th February, 2022.
34. In the arbitral proceedings, issues were framed on 4th February, 2022.
On 6th May, 2022, EPIL, went into insolvency, and a moratorium was
the matter titled ‘M/s. Fidus Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. EPIL, (IB)-356/ND/2021.
EPIL, vide application dated 20th September, 2022, requested for sine die
adjournment of proceedings. However, in response to the EPIL’s
application, the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 17th October, 2022
dismissed the said application and stated that arbitration will continue as
scheduled with regards to RPL.
35. As per the L&T, the Arbitral Tribunal vide order dated 25th May,
2022 duly intimated the RP about the arbitration proceedings. The RP
appeared and informed its decision to not continue with arbitration
proceedings on 1st September, 2022, although the RP was consistently

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17:41:04
communicating with the Petitioner seeking extension of the bank guarantees.
36. In view of the above, no such application was required by the L&T as
the proceedings continued qua RPL in terms of order of Arbitral Tribunal
dated 17th October, 2022.
37. According to the L&T, the original 12-month deadline for issuing an
arbitration award, as mandated by Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, was
extended due to the order of the Supreme Court in Suo Moto Writ Petition
(C) No. 3/2020, which excluded the period from 15th March, 2020, to 28th
February, 2022. The said extension resulted in the new deadline expiring on
28th February, 2023. L&T and RPL mutually agreed to further extend this
deadline by six months until 31st August, 2023, as per the order of the
Tribunal dated 20th February, 2023.
38. However, vide judgment dated 30th May, 2023, in Shapoorji Pallonji
Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Elena Power and Infrastructure Limited
[O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 95/2023, decision dated 30th May, 2023], this
Court held that extending the Tribunal's mandate requires the consent of all
parties involved, as per Section 29A (3) of the 1996 Act.
39. As per the L&T, RPL highlighted said decision before the Arbitral
Tribunal and filed an application dated 20th July, 2023 arguing that the
Tribunal's mandate had expired on 1st March, 2023, due to the lack of
consent from Respondent No. 1/EPIL. Thus, L&T sent a letter on 19th
August, 2023, to the Liquidator of EPIL, requesting their participation in the
arbitration proceedings and seeking their consent to extend the mandate of
the Arbitral Tribunal for an additional six months, from 1st March, 2023, to
31st August, 2023, in accordance with Section 29A(3) of the 1996 Act.
EPIL, through its Liquidator, responded on 28th August, 2023, indicating

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that the request to extend the arbitration award period was under
consideration. Additionally, on the same date, EPIL mentioned that they
were awaiting further instructions, thus, leading the Arbitral Tribunal to
adjourn the case sine die until the Court could decide on the mandate
extension.
40. As per the petition, the Liquidator for EPIL has not provided consent
for an additional extension of the Arbitral Tribunal's mandate as required by
Section 29A(3) of the 1996 Act. With the extended mandate having expired
on 31st August, 2023, the Petitioner has now filed the present petition under
Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act, is now seeking extension of the mandate.
Submissions:
41. Mr. J. P. Singh, ld. Senior Counsel appearing for L&T submits that
the scheme of Section 29A (4) of the 1996 Act does not require the consent
of all parties for the Court to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. In
O.M.P.(MISC.) (COMM.) 637/2023, since L&T has sent a communication,
the Liquidator is well aware of the proceedings before the Arbitral Tribunal
and has sought extension of the bank guarantees. However, the Liquidator
has chosen not to appear or pursue EPIL’s counterclaim.
42. In O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 20/2024, insofar as the Respondent
No.2/RPL is concerned, RPL is a group company of STPL, and the said
projects belong fully to its owned subsidiary, namely, STPL.
43. In all the four petitions, ld. Senior Counsel submits that the decision
followed by the Arbitral Tribunal i.e. in Shapoorji Pallonji (supra), the ld.
Single Judge has taken a view that unless consent is given by all parties to
the arbitration, under Section 29A (3) of the 1996 Act, resort to Section 29A
(4) of the 1996 Act cannot be taken by the parties.

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
44. For this submission, he highlights an earlier decision of another ld.
Single Judge in Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Limited v. Director
General of Married Accommodation Project (2023 SCC OnLine Del
2990), where a contrary view was taken. In terms of the said decision,
Section 29A (4) of the 1996 Act does not require the consent of parties for
extension of the mandate of the Arbitrator. Both the decisions are placed
before the Court.
45. On behalf of the Respondents, Mr. Rajat Navet, ld. Counsel submits
that the Respondent No.1 in all the four petitions, ought to give consent
their. In O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.) 20/2024 and O.M.P.(MISC.)(COMM.)
426/2023, currently, the Nashik power plant itself is not functional. He
further submits that Respondent No.1 having not given consent, the Arbitral
Tribunal’s mandate ought not to be extended.
46. Mr. Utkarsh Singh, ld. Counsel appearing in O.M.P.(MISC.)
(COMM.)20/2024 submits that insofar as STPL is concerned, he is
appearing for the IRP. The IRP was appointed vide the NCLT’s order dated
19th September, 2022. The same was stayed by the NCLAT on 26th
September, 2022, but the appeal was dismissed on 19th January, 2024.
Accordingly, the insolvency proceedings would now recommence.
Appearing on behalf of Mr. Ashok Kumar, the Liquidator in O.M.P.(MISC.)
(COMM.) 637/2023, the ld. Counsel submits that the Liquidator has no
objection for extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Analysis and Conclusions
47. These petitions seek extension of the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal, under Section 29A of the 1996 Act. The said provision is set out
below for ready reference:

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“29A. Time limit for arbitral award.—
(1) The award in matters other than international
commercial arbitration shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal within a period of twelve months
from the date of completion of pleadings under sub-
section (4) of section 23:
Provided that the award in the matter of
international commercial arbitration may be made
as expeditiously as possible and endeavor may be
made to dispose of the matter within a period of
twelve months from the date of completion of
pleadings under sub-section (4) of section 23.
(2) If the award is made within a period of six
months from the date the arbitral tribunal enters
upon the reference, the arbitral tribunal shall be
entitled to receive such amount of additional fees as
the parties may agree.
(3) The parties may, by consent, extend the
period specified in sub-section (1) for making award
for a further period not exceeding six months.
(4) If the award is not made within the period
specified in sub-section (1) or the extended period
specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the
arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has,
either prior to or after the expiry of the period so
specified, extended the period:
Provided that while extending the period under this
sub-section, if the Court finds that the proceedings
have been delayed for the reasons attributable to the
arbitral tribunal, then, it may order reduction of fees
of arbitrator(s) by not exceeding five per cent. for
each month of such delay.
Provided further that where an application under
sub-section (5) is pending, the mandate of the
arbitrator shall continue till the disposal of the said
application:
Provided also that the arbitrator shall be given an
opportunity of being heard before the fees is

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17:41:04
reduced.
(5) The extension of period referred to in sub-
section (4) may be on the application of any of the
parties and may be granted only for sufficient cause
and on such terms and conditions as may be
imposed by the Court.
(6) While extending the period referred to in sub-
section (4), it shall be open to the Court to substitute
one or all of the arbitrators and if one or all of the
arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings
shall continue from the stage already reached and on
the basis of the evidence and material already on
record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this
section shall be deemed to have received the said
evidence and material.
(7) In the event of arbitrator(s) being appointed
under this section, the arbitral tribunal thus
reconstituted shall be deemed to be in continuation of
the previously appointed arbitral tribunal.
(8) It shall be open to the Court to impose actual
or exemplary costs upon any of the parties under this
section.
(9) An application filed under sub-section (5)
shall be disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as
possible and endeavour shall be made to dispose of the
matter within a period of sixty days from the date of
service of notice on the opposite party.”
48. The Court has perused the two decisions placed by the Petitioner-
L&T. In Wadia Techno-Engineering Services Limited (supra) the ld.
Single Judge has held as under:
“2.1 On the interpretation of the aforesaid
provision, Mr. Mishra submitted that the requirement
of consent of the parties, as expressed in Section 29A
(3) of the Act, is also implicit in Section 29A (4) and
(5) of the Act. He submitted that the present petitions
are not maintainable on the ground that the

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
respondents have not consented to the extension, which
must be treated as a pre-condition for extension of
mandate even under Section 29A (4) of the Act. Mr.
Mishra argued that Section 29A (4) and 29A (5) the
Act do not expressly exclude the requirement of
consent of the parties.
22. I find the aforesaid argument to be wholly

untenable. Section 29A (3) of the Act empowers the
parties to extend the mandate of the tribunal by
consent for a maximum period of six months without
recourse to the Court. Section 29A (4) and 29A (5) of
the Act, read together, empower the Court to do so for
sufficient cause, on an application of any of the
parties, when the period specified in sub-section (1)
or the extended period specified in sub-section (3)
lapses. The plain words of the provision are clear-the
power is available in both situations i.e. when the
consensual extension under Section 29A (3) of the
Act is granted, and when it is not. To read the
requirement of consent in Section 29A (4) and 29A
(5) of the Act, as suggested by Mr. Mishra, would
make the requirement of sufficient cause irrelevant,
and adjudication by the Court unnecessary. Such a
construction does violence to the statutory provision,
and permits a recalcitrant litigant to bring
proceedings to an end, simply by withholding
consent.”
49. The said decision was also followed by another ld. Single Judge of
this Court in ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Ltd. [2023:DHC:8078]. The Court, followed the decision in Wadia
Techno-Engineering Services Limited (supra), and underscored that
Section 29A of the 1996 Act aims to prescribe and regulate arbitral
proceedings' timelines, offering flexibility for time extensions in appropriate

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
cases by either the parties or the Court, especially under Section 29A (4) of
the 1996 Act. Consequently, the Court clarified that under Section 29A(4) of
the 1996 Act, the Court has the authority to decide on the termination or
continuation of the Arbitrator(s)’ mandate "either prior or after the expiry"
of the specified period. This means that a petition for an extension under
Section 29A (4) of the 1996 Act may be filed after the period specified
under Sections 29A(1) or 29A(3) of the 1996 Act has expired, as the
provision specifically empowers the Court to grant such an extension,
contradicting any interpretation that a petition must be filed only before the
expiry of the specified period. The relevant observations of the ld. Single
Judge are as follows:
“9. The issue as to whether this Court has jurisdiction to
entertain a petition under Section 29A(4) after expiration
of the period under Section 29A(1) and/or 29A(3) of the
A&C Act has been the subject matter of prior
consideration by this Court. In the regard, reference is
apposite to the judgement of this court in Wadia Techno-
Engineering Services Ltd. v. Director General of
Married Accommodation Project, 2023 SCC OnLine Del
2990, wherein it has been specifically held as under:-
….
14. The judgment of this Court in Wadia Techno-
Engineering Services (supra) was sought to be
distinguished in Rohan Builders (supra) by observing
that Wadia Techno-Engineering Services (supra) “did
not involve any issue on the significance of the word
extend/extension/extending as used in section 29-A.”
15. Having carefully considered the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court in Rohan Builders (supra), I am
unable to concur with the reasoning contained therein
and the conclusion drawn in the said judgment. The
reasons are enumerated hereunder.
16. No doubt, the purpose of Section 29A of the A&C
Act is to prescribe and regulate the timelines for

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
completion of the arbitral proceedings; however, a
perusal of Section 29A of the A&C Act itself makes it
clear that it does not contemplate any inflexible outer
deadline for completion of arbitral proceedings, and
affords flexibility to the contracting parties, and also to
the Court for extension of the time period in
appropriate cases. The purport of Section 29A of the
A&C Act was clearly not to tie the hands of the parties
or the court, and prevent extension of time even where
warranted, simply because the petition under Section
29A(4) of the A&C Act came to be filed a few days after
expiration of the deadline contemplated under Section
29A(1) or Section 29A(3) of the A&C Act. Had it been
intended by the legislature to provide for a blanket
prohibition on extension of time after the expiration of
the period contemplated under Section 29A(1) or
Section 29A(3) of the A&C Act (unless a petition under
Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act was filed prior to expiry
of the said period), nothing would have been easier
than to say so.
18. In the opinion of this Court, it would not be apposite
to selectively focus on one aspect of the report of the Law
Commission [viz. suspension of arbitral proceedings]
and to draw a conclusion that since Section 29A(4) of the
A&C Act, as actually engrafted does not contemplate any
„suspension‟ but rather „termination‟ of mandate upon
expiry of the prescribed timeline, it would, therefore, no
longer be possible for any extension to be granted after
expiry of the prescribed period, even with the consent of
the parties. To so conclude would tantamount to
overlooking/nullifying the conscious departure in the
statutory provisions as actually framed, vis-à-vis the
recommendation/s of the Law Commission.
…
23. Thus, under Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act, the
termination of the mandate of the arbitrator(s) is
subject to the decision of the Court which may be
“either prior or after the expiry” of the specified period.
The Court would take a suitable decision upon a
petition under Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act being

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
filed. Such a petition can be filed either before expiry of
the period referred to under Section 29A(1) or Section
29A(3) of the A&C Act or even thereafter. When the
Court has been specifically empowered to grant the
requisite extension even after expiry of the specified
period, it would not be apposite to read a proscription in
the statutory provision to the effect that a petition under
Section 29A(4) of the A&C Act [seeking extension of
time] must be filed before expiry of the specified period
and not thereafter. Such a proscription simply does not
exist in the statute. On the contrary, as already noticed,
the court has been empowered to grant an extension
even after expiry of the specified period.”
50. In H. P Singh v. G. M. Northern Railways (2023 SCC OnLine J&K
1255), a petition for extension of the period for delivering an arbitration
award under Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act was filed, following the expiry
of the initial deadline. Vide order dated 4th March 4, 2021, the Court
appointed an Arbitrator to resolve disputes between the involved parties.
The arbitration was expected to conclude within twelve months from the
completion of pleadings, with a possible six-month extension by mutual
consent, which did indeed occur, but expired in July 2023 without an award
being made. The Respondents opposed the application, arguing that the
same was not maintainable, since it was filed after the award period expired.
The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh observed that Section
29A(4) of the 1996 Act provides the Court with the authority to extend the
mandate, regardless of whether the parties have already consented to an
extension of up to six months. This judicial power to extend the arbitration
period beyond the initial or consensually extended period is exclusive to the
Court and cannot be exercised by the parties themselves. The relevant
observations are as under:

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
“29. The other method of extension of time is by an
order passed by the Court as contemplated under Sub-
section (4), of which we are directly concerned with.
The intervention of Court for extension of time as
mentioned under Sub-section (4) can be done whether
the time had been already extended by the parties by
consent or not. Even if, the time limit had been already
extended by the consent of parties for further six months,
the Court can still extend the period on an application
filed by either of the parties. This power to extend the
time limit after the original time limit has been extended
by consent of parties, however, is not available to the
parties. It is available only to the Court. The Legislature
though conferred the power to extend the time period for
six months under Sub-section (3) of Section 29A of the
Act to the parties by consent, did not deem it fit to confer
the power to extend, thereafter, to the parties. The power
has been conferred only to the Court. Once the power is
conferred to the Court for extension of time, obviously, it
would require application of judicial mind which an
attribute of a Court and not required nor contemplated
when the extension of time is made by the parties by
consent.
30. The inference, therefore, is clear that extension of
time by the Court, as contemplated under Sub-Section
(4) of Section 29A of the Act, can be done by
application of judicial mind, which invariably would
require that the Court has to be satisfied with the
sufficiency of cause for extension, as also clearly
mentioned in Sub-Section 5 of Section 29A of the Act,
for which purpose the Court can impose such terms and
conditions, as it may deem fit, and, also impose costs, if
necessary. The Court can also impose certain
conditions even on the arbitrator, if the delay is
attributable to him.”
51. On the above aspect, the Kerala High Court in Hiran Valiiyakkil Lal
v. Vineeth M.V., (2023 SCC Online Ker 5151) observed as under:

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17:41:04
“12. According to Sri. Shaji, the mandate of the
Arbitrator can be extended by Court under sub-section
(4) only in cases where the period for passing the award
by the arbitral tribunal is extended for a period not
exceeding six months by the parties, by consent, as
provided under subsection (3). I cannot agree to this
argument. Sub-section (4) of Section 29A deals with
cases where the award is not made within a period of
twelve months from the date of the completion of the
pleadings and it provides that, if the award is not made
within the period specified in subsection (1), the
mandate of the Arbitrator shall terminate unless the
Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of the
period so specified, extended the period. The said sub-
section with the use of the conjunction “or” also applies
in cases where the award is not made within the
extended period not exceeding six months specified in
sub-section (3). It is not as if it applies only to cases
where the period is extended under sub-section (3). In
the case at hand, the period of twelve months from the
date of the completion of the pleadings within which time
the Arbitrator has to make an award is not extended by
the parties, by consent. Therefore, the mandate of the
Arbitrator stands terminated on expiry of the period of
twelve months from the date of completion of pleadings.
However, the sub-section (4) provides that the Court is
empowered to extend the period for making the award
either prior to or after the expiry of the said period.
Sub-section (5) provides that such extension of period
may be on the application of any of the parties and may
be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms
and conditions as may be imposed by the Court. Subject
to the above, the time limit specified for arbitral award
can be extended by Court.”
52. In Suryadev Alloys and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Govindaraja Textiles
Pvt. Ltd. (2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7858), the Madras High Court discussed
the entire law on Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act, and observed as under:

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17:41:04
“15. Let us now juxtapose this position with the
provisions contained in Section 29A which deals with the
time limit for making an award. For the above purpose,
the provisions of Section 29A(1), (3), (4) and (5) may be
analysed and the following propositions arise :
(a) That mandatorily an award has to be made within a
period of 12 months from the date on which the Arbitral
Tribunal enters upon the reference.
(b) If the Arbitral Tribunal does not make the award
within the above stated period of One year, there are
two remedies available to the parties: -
(i) The parties to the proceedings can by consent
extend the period by a furmer Six months and such
discretion should be exercised before the period of
One year specified in Section 29A(1) comes to an end.
The fact that the consent has to be given by the parties
before the period specified in Section 29A(1) comes to
an end is evident from a reading of Section 29A(4)
which lays down that at the end of the period of One
year, the mandate of the Arbitrator comes to an end.
(ii) If the parties are unable to reach a
consensus/agreement on the extension, then before
or after the expiry of the period of One year, any one
of the party can move the Court for extension of the
period and in such circumstances, the Court can
extend the period even beyond the Six months as the
cap on extension for a period of Six months is
prescribed only when the parties by consent extend
the period for making the award as specified in
Section 29A(3).
(c) If the Arbitral Tribunal is unable to make the award
after the period of One year specified in Section 29A(1)
and the parties have not arrived at any agreement for
extending the period or where the parties have entered
into an agreement as provided in Section 29A(3) and
still the Arbitral Tribunal is unable to make an award,
the parties may either before or after the period
specified in Section 29A (1) or the extended period
specified in Section 29A(3) move the Court for an
extension.

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
(d) The above extension would be granted by the Court:
(i) On an application by any of the parties,
(ii) On sufficient cause being shown; and
(iii) On such terms and conditions as the Court may
impose.
16. It is therefore, clear that unlike the provision of
Section 28(1) of the 1940, Act which gave wide powers to
the Court to enlarge the time for making an award even
after the expiry of the time for making the award or even
after the award has been made, the 1996 Act has
curtailed these powers and restricted the extension only
within the provisions of Section 29A(3) and 29A(4)
which has been elaborated in para 12 supra. A reading
of which clearly implies that it is only the Court that
can extend the period for making of the award after the
expiry of the One year period under Section 29A(1) or
the extended period under Section 29A(3). However,
even the Court cannot ratify an award ex post facto by
extending the period in a petition filed under Section 34
by an aggrieved party.”
53. Unfortunately, the above decisions do not appear to have been cited
before the Co-ordinate Bench dealing with Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) and the Court therein has taken a view that only after Section
29A(3) of the 1996 Act is exhausted, the parties can resort to Section 29A(4)
of the 1996 Act.
54. A perusal of Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act would show that it
contemplates various situations as set out below:
• Under Section 29A(1) of the 1996 Act, the award in all arbitration
matters except international commercial arbitration matters is to be
made within 12 months from the date of completion of pleadings
under sub-Section 23(4).
• Under Section 29A(2) of the 1996 Act, if the award is made within six

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
months, the Arbitral Tribunal is given an incentive of payment of
additional fee. Section 29A(2) of the 1996 Act would have no
application in the present case.
• Under Section 29A(3) of the 1996 Act, the parties, by consent can
extend the period of 12 months by another six months i.e. the mandate
would be valid for a period of 18 months.
• Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act, however, contemplates two situations
i.e.,
▪ where the mandate is not extended and the time of 12 months
has expired as per sub-section (1) or
▪ where the mandate has been extended for a further six months
by consent of parties under sub-section (3).
In either situation, the Court has the power to extend the mandate of the
Arbitral Tribunal. The consent of parties is only contemplated under Section
29A (3) of the 1996 Act and not under Section 29A(4) of the 1996 Act.
55. There are multitudinal situations where parties may be unable to give
consent for extension of the mandate as is evident even in the present case
for example, wherein one of the parties is under liquidation or in insolvency
proceedings. The Arbitral Tribunal has already taken a view that the
proceedings can continue against Respondent No.2/RPL and as observed
earlier, the said order has not been challenged. Under such circumstances,
the Court is not powerless to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal.
Since the proceedings were ongoing against Respondent No.2/RPL at the
time when the mandate expired, mere non-giving of the consent by the
Liquidator or the IRP/RP cannot render the entire proceedings before the
Tribunal as null and void or cannot be rendered infructuous.

By:RAHUL
17:41:04
56. Further, as submitted by the Liquidator in O.M.P.(MISC.) (COMM.)
637/2023, the consent has already been given to the extension of the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, in O.M.P.(MISC.) (COMM.)
637/2023, there is no impediment in extending the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal.
57. Arbitral proceedings in the present case involve enormous
commercial stakes for parties and for whatever reasons, the IRP, or RP may
not be giving consent. The power of the Court under Section 29A(4) of the
1996 Act under these circumstances cannot be questioned or doubted as the
Court has the power to extend the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal for
sufficient cause, if the facts require such a decision to be taken.
58. In the facts and circumstances of these cases, this Court has no doubt
that the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate in all the four petitions deserves to be
extended as the proceedings are at an advanced stage, either at the stage of
evidence or final arguments. In the facts and circumstances of these cases,
the Arbitral Tribunal’s mandate is extended from the date when the mandate
had expired till 31st December, 2024.
59. All petitions are disposed of. All pending applications are also
disposed of.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
FEBRUARY 02, 2024
Rahul/dn
(corrected & released on 8th February, 2024)

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17:41:04

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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

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22. I find the aforesaid argument to be wholly

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