PROGRESS IN TOURISM AND HOSPITALITY RESEARCH, VOL.
3, 17–33 (1997)
Disneyland Paris: A Permanent
Economic Growth Pole in the
Francilian Landscape
Anne-Marie d’Hauteserre
Department of Geography, Southern Connecticut State University, 501 Crescent Street,
New Haven, CT 06515, USA
ABSTRACT
Disneyland Paris was located in the Francilian
landscape to increase the capital accumulation
of the Walt Disney Company. It has settled
there permanently thanks, in part, to the
convention signed by the Company with the
French government who needed an economic
growth pole in the Eastern part of the Paris
Basin. Disney accepted the partnership and its
constraints because it had ambitious real estate
development plans. The French government,
with its New Town policy was the only
European country that could provide such a
large acreage which it used to lever Disney’s
presence. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Received 30 January 1996; Accepted 3 July 1996
Prog. Tourism Hospitality Res. 3, 17–33 (1997)
No. of Figures: 6 No. of Tables: 0 No. of Refs: 58
Keywords: capital circuits; new towns;
economic growth pole; landscape formation;
public/private partnership
CCC 1077–3509/97/010017–17 $17.50
INTRODUCTION
T
he arrival of the Magic Kingdom in the
Francilian1 landscape ignited a vituper-
ative press campaign by French
intellectuals who stood adamantly opposed to
American cultural imperialism. It is the latest
(although only) international theme park ven-
ture by the Disney Company. Why did this
highly successful company, selling an American
specific cultural product which would not
benefit from production cost reduction decide to
internationalize? It certainly would not reduce
labor costs as illustrated by the migration of
European car factories to the United States, while
it would require major construction costs. Was
the prospect of a widened European market by
the time of the opening of Disneyland Paris in
April 1992 the main incentive for a foreign foray,
and why? Was it established to act as an
economic growth pole, complementing the
French state’s policy of urban development of
the Eastern suburbs of Paris? Large theme parks,
like mega-events, promise potential economic
development of the areas they localize in. This
new geographic landscape was produced not
just by private capital, to be dismantled at
capital’s whim (Harvey, 1989), but by the syner-
gic action of several different agents. This paper
will demonstrate how the continued economic
success of Disneyland Paris is not simply just the
result of its capacity to create profits through its
consumption in a new locale, however semi-
otically explained, and/or the result of the
judicious choice of the localization of this cul-
tural capital circuit at the apex of European
accessibility. Its success is circumscribed by and
dependent on the French government’s develop-
© 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
18
ment strategies and judicial structures Capital
has had to negotiate with government the design
of its commodified landscape, the continued
organization of which has also been subject to
pressures by its potential consumers. The con-
vergence of these agents guarantees that
Disneyland Paris will remain embedded in
Marne-La-Vallée in spite of all the difficulties it
has faced until now such as a financial restruc-
turing in March 1994.
The paper will first discuss how different
approaches to economic globalization explain
the Disney Company’s move to internationalize
and how the choice of the site was based on more
traditionally geographic reasons such as accessi-
bility and availability of land. It will then
demonstrate how the Company’s designs to
ensure continued growth in the far future could
only be accommodated by France with its New
Town development strategy. This allowed the
state to impose constraints on this private ven-
ture to ensure that it would remain a permanent
part of the Francilian landscape whose new
design the company had to negotiate. The paper
will then show how Disneyland Paris is not the
white elephant that the French government was
accused of subsidizing but will continue to act as
a major economic growth pole.
CAUSES OF DISNEY COMPANY’S MOVE TO
INTERNATIONALIZE
The circuits of capital approach emphasizes the
totally interconnected nature of finance, produc-
tion, commodity trade and consumption.
“Capitalism is a process of reproduction of social
life through commodity production. The laws of
capital circulation are consistent” (Harvey, 1989:
343). The primary requisite of a capitalist econ-
omy is a continuous circulation of capital.
Jean-Paul Sartre had noticed already in 1945 that
“over and above greed, a genuine economic
principle motivates Americans: ‘Money is sup-
posed to circulate’ (Combat)”. As capital
circulates it is transferred from one investment to
another. It follows only one cardinal rule: that
value be increased. Competition has become
increasingly global. Disney Company, like all
TNCs is essentially a capitalist enterprise driven
by profit. “The odd thing about postmodern
cultural production is how much sheer profit
seeking is determinant in the first instance”
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
(Harvey, 1989: 336). The domestication of fantasy
in visual consumption is inseparable from cen-
tralized structures of economic power.
Disney-land Paris is a private instrumental space
designed for the efficient circulation of commod-
ities, which is itself a commodity produced for
profit. Cultural capital may represent an
infinitely more expandable resource for capital
accumulation than traditional investment capi-
tal, both for private companies and for
governments. Cultural capital is considered here
as a form of economic capital invested in the
production of culture, rather than as symbolic
capital, a person’s or group’s knowledge. These
circuits of capital are not abstract notions, they
are anchored in space where they create geo-
graphical landscapes. The company and its
imagineers have been pushed by investors to
create more and more circuits. The Bass brothers
controlled nearly 25% of equity and so named
Michael Eisner as the new company chairman in
1984, following other hostile takeover attempts
because the company was not exploiting its full
potential to create more circuits of capital (Wal-
lace, 1985; Taylor, 1987). The company, in 1984,
was already a powerful brand name with annual
revenues of $1B. Disney’s profits had soared to
$783M in 1989 and its revenues had reached
$8.5B in 1991 thanks to a very successful theme
park in Japan, through enlarging the Orlando
area and through other ventures. Its new direc-
tors wanted to capture more of the surplus value
the name generated by entering the real estate
business. They wanted to collect more than just
royalties, as in Japan, to control more hotel
development (they own only a small portion in
Orlando), and to draw in more potential custom-
ers. “They are banking on Eurodisney as the
principal engine of Disney’s growth in the 90’s”
(Business Week, 1990). Disneyland Paris was
considered a major investment potential by 1984
because of the worldwide shift in capitalism
from an emphasis on production to consump-
tion. The organization of consumption has just as
important an effect on economic and social
structure as the organization of production
(Lash, 1993; Zukin, 1991). Shopping, consuming
is the most important contemporary social activ-
ity in North America (Levine, 1990; Williamson,
1986). The consumption landscape can be
viewed as a by-product of the changes in the
distribution of income in the constant struggle of
Disneyland Paris
labor and capital over economic surplus. Con-
sumption is also emphasized inside the parks.
The Magic Kingdoms represent a fantasy land-
scape constructed around an entirely fictive
nexus based on a highly selective memory and
mediated by mass consumption. In the United
States “ . . . the Disney landscape has become a
model for establishing both the economic value
of cultural goods and the cultural value of
consumer products” (Zukin, 1991: 231) and has
legitimized investment in them. In the over-
crowded market place (even or especially that of
theme parks - see Figure 2) imagery has become
increasingly critical as a way of attracting partic-
ular publics and facilitating acts of
consumption.
The decision to internationalize is a major
strategic decision. Disney was looking for econo-
mies of scope and coordination (Dicken, 1992:
143). Although the process of knowledge accu-
mulation obtained from locating in new markets
generates endogenously productivity gains that
can sustain long run growth, the company had to
“compare anticipated streams of monopoly
profits with expected costs of product reloca-
tion” (Grossman and Helpman, 1992: 335). The
innovative phase of its entertainment product
(”Magic Kingdom”) required its location in
California, close to the movie and television
studios its inception and survival depended on
(W. Disney in Schikel, 1968). As the product
matured, the company reacted to the actions of
major competitors. To prevent further entry by
competitors it developed the resort in Florida
and licensed the “Magic Kingdom” to a Japanese
company (Lanquar, 1992). The dynamic nature of
economic and social processes finally led to the
direct penetration of foreign markets, penetra-
tion limited in Europe exclusively for the next
ten years to its French site (Convention, 1987).
Disney Company developed a globally inte-
grated competitive strategy to focus on its
knowhow in resort development which had
taken it thirty years to develop and refine and
which would differentiate it from its com-
petitors. In North America, Disneyworld had
remained the most frequented tourist site, as of
1995. Las Vegas is disputing this ranking today.2
Dunning (1980, 1991) indicates that, at the
micro (firm specific) level, to internationalize,
companies need to fulfill three conditions: own-
ership specific advantages, internalization of the
19
use of these advantages, and location specific
factors, all of which characterize the Disney
Company if not always in the traditional man-
ner. Disney’s ownership specific advantages
reside in intangible assets,3 its perfected know-
ledge in resort development, its ability to create
new imaginative visual consumption products,
its sophisticated imagineering skills, inscribed in
its brand image. Disney’s pursuit of an inten-
tional accumulation of knowledge to respond to
anticipated market conditions (for example, by
engineering new themes for consumption, since
the company has vowed to forever renew its
parks, cf Flower, 1991: 186-8, 205-6, 279, 285)
requires an allocation of resources and invest-
ment of the same magnitude as for creating new
technology. “Internalization of this knowledge
will require [Disney] to operate a network of
[parks] on a world-wide basis” (Grossman &
Helpman, 1991: 82). The application of these
skills is limited to theme park creation although
the idea has been replicated in other arenas of
consumption: mega-malls, for example, seek to
attract and retain customers for the longest time
by presenting Disney-like attractions. Steve
Wynn salutes Disney’s imagineering with his
pirate shows performed against the back drop of
a “Treasure Island” sidewalk decor in Las Vegas.
Copy-cat theme parks have burgeoned too, like
Busch Gardens.
This socio-spatial complex of production can-
not be geographically separated from its
consumers. It has needed to locate (ie to move
outside of the US to where the consumers are)
this new form of consumption as well as to
localize its specific features (creating its own
landscape within another cultural landscape,
both at a geographic site and in the business and
consumption world). The very localized con-
sumption space offered by its theme parks
limited its possibility for expansion. Disney
needed to serve new markets in different loca-
tions directly even though the product is
virtually identical. Marginal increases in num-
bers of visitors would have been minimal even if
the parks in the United States were enlarged (this
was one of the main reasons for Disney’s original
move to Florida). The potential number of
tourists from Europe would not increase either
much above the 2 million now visiting the theme
parks in the United States, considering the slow
growth of European population and of its
20
wealth. Time and cost space convergence have
not been significant enough at the international
level for pleasure travelling and it has not
dissolved the psychic distance (language barrier
for travelling to the United States, if not inside
the Disney theme parks).
GEOGRAPHIC REASONS FOR CHOOSING A
LOCATION IN EUROPE AND A FRANCILIAN
SITE
The Disney Company has mentioned two major
reasons, or more traditional location specific
factors (Euro Disney SCA, 1992). It can draw on
350 million customers (almost one and a half
times the size of the population of the United
States) over an area half its size (Figure 1). Such
a geographic move was to enable it to take
advantage of the growth of short break holidays
in Europe, together with the growth in numbers
and sophistication of tourists while finding its
niche in the increasing tourist market segmenta-
Figure 1. Disneyland Paris in Europe
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
tion. Four groups of tourists have been identified
in Europe: 52% still travel to attractive coastlines
in warmer climes, 13% buy tourist packages, 25%
prefer rural tourism and the rest practice urban
tourism (Shaw & Williams, 1990: 241). It founded
its strategy on the notion that new consumption
practices can take place anywhere and are
eminently transportable. The company wanted
to insure that it would remain the industry
leader while it captured more of the world’s
market share and augmented the size of the firm
(Grover, 1991). Their target, for some sectors, is
up to a 20% yearly increase (Lanquar, 1992: 73).
Long holidays occur over the summer months
whereas shorter trips (their targeted travel niche)
are taken year round. In 1985, more than 19%
had taken a second holiday in the European
community, 27% in France. Unfortunately, that
kind of travelling could not maintain its early
fast growth: it had increased 10% yearly in Great
Britain between 1976 and 1985. France was also
then the European leader in international confer-
ences (Shaw & Williams, 1990: 242). The
Disneyland Paris
recession combined with the staging of several
mega-events in Europe in 1992 absorbed much of
the disposable income for that year and beyond
(Winter Olympic Games in Albertville, France;
World Fair in Sevilla, Spain; Summer Olympic
games in Barcelona, Spain). Disney Company
also relied on the fact that its products-division
received 50% of its worldwide revenues from
Europe. Fifty five million copies of The Journal
Mickey are published yearly in Europe, including
now a Russian version, but only 13 million in the
United States. At least 250 European societies
have signed licensing contracts with the Disney
Company (Rencontres, 1992: 89). Walt Disney
Animation, one of the largest European studios
for the production of cartoons had been
implanted in France earlier (Saffarian, 1992).
European consumption habits already included
Mickey Mouse paraphernelia. Disney Compa-
ny’s organizational apparatus leads, now across
the world, to an increasing consumption synergy
as its merchandise acts as both commodity and
advertisement. In 1990, one third of its revenues
were generated from foreign sales (Grover, 1991:
200). Name recognition is crucial even if often
taken for granted in the consumer world
(Flower, 1991: 21, Grover, 1991: 187). “Disney”
has become a shared term in world culture.
Disney Company’s megadesigns (”Dream,
diversify . . . and never miss an angle”, W.
Disney, 1988: 7), part of the dynamism and
growth of transnationals, boosted competition
for the park between European countries where
it was considered a potential economic growth
pole by itself and because it cooperates with
other large multi-nationals. Cultural consump-
tion contributes to capital accumulation by
enhancing profits on entrepreneurial investment
in production and distribution. European gov-
ernments were anxious to anchor this new circuit
of capital on their soil where it would spawn
more circuits. In the first ten years of Disney-
land’s existence in California, the Disney
company took in $273M, the peripherals $555M
(Sorkin, 1992: 224). What distressed Walt Disney
even more than the loss of surplus value was the
disorderly and sullying form of this growth. In
Orlando it has led to the construction of 76,800
hotel rooms, 5000 of which are under direct
Disney management, 12,000 under licensing
agreement (Rencontres, 1992). All the others are
the result of spillover effects which include the
21
implantation of 23 attraction parks around Dis-
ney World (Figure 2). The two other main
contending countries besides France were Spain,
for its sunshine (access, however was very
constricted) and Great Britain because of the
successful entertainment complex of Blackpool.
The creation of Disneyland Paris opened new
spaces for the service economy where it should
have a positive effect on capital accumulation in
real estate development. Cultural goods and
services gain economic significance through their
role in interacting circuits of economic and
cultural capital (Zukin, 1991: 260). In the contem-
porary (European, French) market economy
investment in cultural capital would offset cycli-
cal devaluation in other parts of the same circuit
or in other circuits.
European governments regard tourism as hav-
ing an important economic role through its
impact on foreign earnings, employment crea-
tion and regional development because the
activity is labour intensive and employment can
be generated relatively cheaply by those govern-
ments. In the United Kingdom tourism supports
1.4 million jobs (Urry, 1990). Urban tourism is
being used as a spur to regeneration in many
deindustralized(zing) areas in spite of the strong
dependance of tourist activities on part time and
seasonal as well as low-skilled, and thus low-
waged, labour (Shaw and Williams, 1990, Urry,
1990). Many governments were desperate to
stem unemployment. In the mid eighties, 16
million workers were unemployed in the Euro-
pean Union. The unemployment rate hovered
around 10% between 1983 and 1992 with highs
of 12% in France and 21.2% in Spain. The rate for
young people was 18% across the Union but
reached 30% in Spain and Italy (Commission des
Communautés Européennes, 1992). Many of the
recruits of Disneyland Paris are young and
unskilled (Lanquar, 1992: 117). Cultural and
environmental problems can also be exaggerated
by the introduction of mass tourism (eg. Disney-
world’s problem with sewage effluents in the
Orlando area, Flower, 1991: 252). Such economic
development can occur only if it does not put
undue pressure on vulnerable natural resources.
European governments are involved in tourism
development because of its multiple impacts.
Tourism, in turn, has commercialized “civiliza-
tion”: in France, the transformation of “the
places of memory” into “places to visit” has
22
returned handsome benefits. The French govern-
ment takes a broad perspective on tourism: it is
more socially and culturally informed and less
biased toward economic issues (OCDE, 1992,
Rencontres, 1992: 157).
Why did Disney Company choose a rainy site
close to Paris? It is one of three major population
concentration poles in Western Europe, the other
two being London and the Rhine Valley, and it is
the most accessible to these other two (see Figure
1). Spain or the London area would have given
access to the European Union market but from a
peripheral location. Accessibility underpins the
pull of centrality. The Paris Basin is at the
juncture of North and South Europe: lt is an
Figure 2. Attraction parks of Central Florida
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
unavoidable thoroughfare. Paris is also one of
the most attractive cities with 25 million foreign
visitors throughout the year. It is fewer than the
60 million visitors of London, but the majority of
these are domestic (Shaw & Williams, 1990).
Those who will come to Disneyland Paris, the
Company reasoned, will remain in the Euro-
disney hotels 2 or 3 nights to visit Paris too.
Studies conducted in 1985 determined there was
great demand potential for theme parks in
Europe (only one in ten people had even been in
a theme park) that was largely unfulfilled
(Rencontres EPA, 1992). “The large Paris metro-
politan area is missing a theme park that could
restore its tradition as a center for recreation”
Disneyland Paris
(Ousset 1986). He felt that Disneyland Paris
would fulfill that role. There existed only two
large recreational complexes in Europe: Black-
pool Pleasure Beach in England (7 million
visitors a year) and more than one hundred year
old Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen (3.8 millions)
(Urry, 1990).4
Its site (in Marne-La-Vallée) illustrates the
importance of geographical location (Figure 3) in
its traditional materialist interpretation, which is
even more critical at the micro-level. The com-
pany had definitely opted for the French site in
1985, in spite of its unfavorable weather condi-
tions, following studies conducted since the
1970s in several European countries on the
feasibility of a number of sites (Grover, 1991:
187–8). Disney Company was looking for a site
that was easily accessible to a large number of
potential customers year round. When the com-
pany returned to court French authorities in the
early 1980s, it had also realized that its projects
needed a minimum critical mass to allow them
to function as resorts. They were thus looking for
a site whose size would allow them to plan the
final project right from the beginning, a site that
would guarantee the land area needed not only
for its theme parks (a total of three are planned
into 2017) but also for the hotels, restaurants,
residences, offices that would be built because of
Figure 3. Main Access Routes to Disneyland Paris
23
the demands generated by the parks (Figure 4).
At the same time, social practices are structured
in time as well as in space as they structure that
space. Spain had offered the Walt Disney Com-
pany a better deal than France, but it was not
able to put together a large enough parcel of land
(Grover, 1991: 188). The Paris area was the best
equipped to handle such a large real estate
project thanks to the state’s “New Towns Policy”
initiated 30 years ago: large virgin plots of land
were ready for rapid urbanization, minimizing
the cost of infrastructure provision and of the
environmental disruption caused by such con-
struction (Roullier, 1993). Four million cubic
metres of land were moved, 68,000 cubic metres
of rocks were molded and 85,000 trees planted
while work on sanitation and drainage was
equivalent to that required by a town of fifty to
sixty thousand inhabitants during the construc-
tion of the Disney park (Nouveau Courrier, 1992).
This readiness includes not just the transport and
other physical infrastructure, but also the judicial
and administrative mechanisms for integrated
project developments conducted by both the
state and private companies.
NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
AND THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE
“CONVENTION”
New Towns were created by the French Govern-
ment in 1964 to guarantee a more harmonious
economic development of the lIe de France by
emphasizing the Eastern side until then
neglected (Bastié, 1991: 88). Major industries had
located on the Western and Southern side of
Paris, while their pollutants blew East. The
French government’s planned office centre, La
Défense, was built on the western fringes of
Paris. These new towns were to offer a dynamic
urban life within an architecturally stimulating
environment and to remedy the earlier uni-
formity of suburban high rising apartment
projects constructed to house the lower French
classes, and little else (Roullier, 1993). The
government chose suburban locations for the
new towns (Figure 5) to counteract the main
characteristics of all suburbs: their distance from
town centers which turns suburban dwellers in
Europe into second-class citizens (Merlin, 1989).
More than a million people now live and work in
24
these new towns, 225,300 in Marne-La-Vallée
alone in 1993 (Figure 6, EpaMarne/EpaFrance,
1994). Their exact location as well as their layout
was to respect the physical characteristics of the
area and to take advantage of its environmental
amenities. Disney Company came on board
when the third section (Bussy-St-Georges: 7000
housing units, 600,000 square meters of offices
and a 90 hectare technological industrial park)
was just started (Etablissements Publics, 1991).
The park’s size made it an ideal addition to the
new town. Disneyland Paris was not just an
amusement park, but a large urban develop-
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
ment, supported by major improvements in the
transport network financed by the French gov-
ernment (Boyer, 1994).
In the French Government’s view, for the
French new towns to really develop, ie. grow
beyond the need for constant state subsidies and
to successfully change into old towns, attracting
private investment was as important as con-
structing subsidized housing. The implantation
of Disneyland Paris crowned a development
strategy conceived many years before (Roullier,
1993). The long term objective was to make this
area one of the main economic pivots of Europe,

Figure 4. Master plan for Eurodisney Resort. Source: EPAMarne, Projet d’Interet
General 16 Mars 1987
Disneyland Paris
Figure 5. The general urban plan of the Seine Valley. Source: G. I. E. Villes
Nouvelles, Twenty Five Years of French New Towns
as revealed by its name “Val d’Europe”. This
objective was based on improvements in trans-
port systems that would restore freedom of
choice to town dwellers, provide access to the
labour force and offer distribution networks for
businesses. Transportation has been a key to new
town development from its inception. The exist-
ing transport network is capable of draining
towards Disneyland Paris all those millions of
anticipated visitors (Figure 3). All main commu-
nication routes in Europe or within France
converge towards this area. Even if the Magic
Kingdom were to fail (close its doors), these
transport improvements would remain as the
basis for attracting other private investors to an
area that has always been designated for urban
growth. Continuous urbanization from the other
three sectors had been planned for this area, for
some indefinite time in the future. The park only
accelerated the process. There are two main
themes to the development of Marne-La-Vallée
as a new town. One is an office complex ten
kilometers from Paris, with direct links to the
capital. The other is the complex of Val d’Europe
centered around Disneyland, one of its featured
attractions, with a large number of offices serv-
ing as headquarters for Disney in Europe
(100,000m2) that should attract other office func-
25
tions to occupy another 200,000m2.
(EPAMarne/EPAFrance, 1994; Boyer, 1994)
By attracting large numbers of tourists, Dis-
neyland Paris will act as an investment magnet
on other circuits of capital, based on the provi-
sion of hotels, tourist and leisure facilities, and
office buildings, that the French government will
channel precisely through its new town of Marne
La Vallée and as per the 173 page accord signed
by the two on March 24 1987 after 27 months of
arduous negotiations The complete document
with its appendices totals more than 400 pages
(Convention, 1987). Results in real estate values
remain way below predictions because Europe
has been mired in an economic recession since
the opening of the park. Although the French
government seems to have given in to Disney
Company’s demands (Grover, 1991), for example
by agreeing to an international rather than a
French court to settle disagreements, the detailed
contract attributes obligations to both sides. The
French government spent 2.7 billion FF to pro-
vide first rate transportation links, but it has
meant added jobs for the area (4500 for the rail
line, 1300 for the RER). Disney Company must,
in turn, guarantee a minimum number of rides
for the Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens
(RATP) on the extended regional metro (RER) A
26
line, or pay for the difference (Convention 1987,
Article 11). A detailed program of development
of the land offered to Disney schedules each step.
It was not given all 1945 hectares to speculate
with at will, contrary to some press accounts
(Business Week, 1990; Smadja, 1988). Disney
Company spent only 500MFF to acquire the land
necessary for its first theme park (covering the
costs of the infrastructure provided with the
land) but it led to private investments of 10BFF
(Lanquar, 1992: 109). Other major projects, such
as an international soccer stadium and centres of
higher learning, are being erected in the area,
encouraged in part by the presence of Disney-
land in Paris (Boyer, 1994).
Disney Company also appreciated dealing
with one main negotiating team, the EPA (Eta-
blissement Public d’Aménagement), whose
existence was permitted by the new town judi-
cial structure (Rencontres, 1992: 99–122). This is a
public development corporation which fulfills
Figure 6. Perimeter of Marne-la-Vallée. Source: EPAMARNE, EPAFrance, 1994
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
both commercial and financial functions. It is
established by government decree and has pow-
ers of pre-emptive and compulsory purchase, as
well as legal and financial autonomy. It can thus
function as developer in the new town, while it
also represents the government. Communication
remains remarkably static free between this
private company and French authorities, thanks
to the single government voice and thanks to the
detailed blueprint that indicates who does what,
when, and how (Convention, 1987). The com-
pany also underlines the importance of
continuity on the French side, adhered to
through the years, since the first negotiations in
1985, by the French government in spite of
political changes at the helm (Rencontres, 1992:
100).
The French state did require that this develop-
ment occur within guidelines set up in a “Projet
d’lnteret General” (EPAMarne, 1987, Limery,
1996) that seeks to insure a coherent approach
Disneyland Paris
that will, for example, enable the villages in the
area to maintain their present specific character-
istics. The requirement was not made in a spirit
of simulated heritage but to maintain archi-
tectural variety while enabling new construction
to be fully integrated in the new town’s land-
scape. This evolution will transform the living
conditions of the residents of the old villages of
the area who thought they could maintain a rural
lifestyle only thirty minutes away from Paris and
who are going to be invaded by millions of
tourists. Agriculturalists and ecologists have
joined forces to fight for the preservation of
agricultural areas within the new town to coun-
terbalance this mounting urbanization. See
Roullier, 1993; Bastié, 1991.
The Departement of Seine et Marne has seen
an increase of 18,000 hotel rooms between 1985
and 1992. This includes the 5,200 rooms con-
structed by Disney Company (Rencontres, 1992:
165). It wants to develop the potential attraction
of the southern part of the departement, ie. the
region farthest from the park that includes
Fontainebleau, from Melun to Chateau-Landon
and from Barbizon to Montereau. Its cultural and
natural landscapes are rather exceptional since
they include a number of famous castles (Fon-
tainebleau and its museum, Vaux le Vicomte,
Morêt sur Long) and beautiful natural forests. It
is also an area frequented by locals (9 millions
per year) and by many foreign visitors (Maison
Départementale, 1994). Disneyland Paris is a
wonderful opportunity to increase the level of
visits by outsiders to the area which has suffered
until now from its location in the shadow of
Paris (25 million foreigners visit the capital, less
than a million come to this area). The convention
that Disney Company signed includes the obli-
gation for it to advertize other tourist sites in the
area beside its own, as per article 10 of the 1987
Convention (see, for example, the Michelin Guide
to the Magic Kingdom). Tourist operators who
do not have exclusive contracts with Disneyland
Paris are also solicited to include these other
stops in their packages. The Departement is also
trying to increase partnership agreements with a
variety of service providers. Europcar, the official
car rental agency of Disneyland Paris, will put
inside each vehicle a tourist map of the whole
Departement, as well as discount coupons for
castles and restaurants in the area (Convention,
1987; Conseil General, 1991).
27
NEGOTIATING THE DESIGN OF THE
FRANCILIAN LANDSCAPE
The French government must have recognized
that behind the vitriolic cultural debate about
Disneyland Paris stood a high level of capitalist
investment in performance, in the machinery of
reproduction, investment designed to create a
“product”. The French government did not bow
to capitalism which, like technology “does not
invite a close examination of its consequences. It
asks for trust and obedience . . . because its gifts
are truly bountiful” (Postman, 1993: xiii). Con-
trary to popular opinion which accused it of
caving in to the bullyish tactics of Disney and the
lure of many jobs, the French government had
already resisted approaches by the company in
1976. French negotiators needed proof that this
product could be exported. Tokyo Disneyland
could not serve as a model in European negotia-
tions and development, because the Disney
Company was not a direct participant. It sold the
exploitation rights to a Japanese company (Ori-
ental Land Company) who financed, owns, and
runs the park. It did, however, serve the purpose
of proving that the Magic Kingdom could be
successfully transplanted onto foreign soil. “We
were finally able to convince the French negotia-
tors that we really meant business” (Rencontres,
1992: 113).
Because circuits of cultural capital are formed
in real spaces, they suggest how space in an
advanced service economy is really formed.
“Capital creates and destroys its own land-
scapes” (Harvey, 1989). Space is structured by
circuits of capital as they leave messages embed-
ded in their surroundings. “Since the nineteenth
century, shifting from one landscape to another
has depended less on individual mobility than
on a broad scale varied remaking of landscape
itself” (Zukin, 1991: 18). Landscapes sometimes
grow by accretion; they do not seem as histor-
ically and culturally bound as in the past as they
are constantly reinvented by “footloose” capital.
The French government could not have forced
Disney Company to choose a location in France.
Some incentives to influence it might have
overcome any benefit government intervention
could command. Tax concessions may eliminate
any gains or lead to a transitory gains trap. The
wages obtained from the supplementary jobs
might be very low, leading to minimal tax and
28
spillover gains, while increasing the need for
services. The landscape is broader, has deeper
roots, and relies on more interconnections than
government alone can control, especially on the
international scene since government interven-
tion is restricted to its territory. Strategies of
cultural consumption may only complement,
rather than contradict, strategies of capital accu-
mulation. The competitive edge of the French
government to capture the Disney investors was
by means of product differentiation, offering a
space they enhanced through design and desig-
nation. The linkage between cultural capital and
real estate development enables new economic
structures to be localized and to acquire specific
geographic locations: Marne-La-Vallée for Dis-
neyland Paris. Disneyland Paris demanded
specific efforts to insert this large international
project into a suburban new town within which
it is to evolve rapidly. These are efforts of
coordination in planning strategies, in capturing
spillovers and in image development (Ren-
contres, 1992).
Disneyland Paris could not, by itself have
acted as a growth pole that would economically
ressucitate the Eastern suburbs of Paris. The
circuit of cultural capital it represented fizzled
out within two years: Disneyland Paris was
ready to close its doors in March 1994 because it
was bankrupt due to blunders before and at the
time of the opening in cultural, financial, and
economic matters. A capital asset that cannot
earn income has no value; it becomes a liability.
It did subject Disney Company to some ridicule
by the press (Solomon, 1994). The tension
between globalization forces that led to its
expansion in Europe and localization forces, the
result of local differences in production and
marketing techniques has forced Disney Com-
pany to change and adapt its much prized
knowhow: for example, it has had to accept the
sale of alcohol in the park. Losses were mounting
too dangerously to ignore subtly different cul-
tural practices. It was assumed that traditional
status systems and parochial loyalties would
wither away in the course of economic growth.
Globalization has not done away with culture
specific modes of consumption. One of Disney
Company’s continued problems is the minimal
amount spent by these millions of Europeans
within the park: an average, in 1992, of 310FF
instead of the expected 333 (Commission du
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
Tourisme, 1993) down to 224FF in 1995 (Revenu,
1996). These spectators (Disney Company’s
terms for the visitors of its parks) have chosen
other non-pecuniary forms of participation in
Disney’s spectacle. The resort was, however,
integrated in a long term project of the French
government, dedicated to the balanced economic
growth of the Parisian Basin. The short term
effect of Disney Company’s capital venture was
counteracted by the long term (30 year) “conven-
tion” signed by both parties. Disney Company
could not withdraw, especially if the circuit was
no longer profitable. This convergence, in
Marne-La-Vallée, of capitalist action and social
action created the synergy for Disneyland Paris
to be financially restructured in March 1994 so
that it could again generate profits. Mutual
effects of economics (circuits of capital pushing
Disney Company to find new investment oppor-
tunities), politics (the French government
looking for economic growth poles), and culture
(the acceptance of a not-so-foreign popular cul-
tural trait) are restructuring the Francilian
landscape.
Landscape includes the geographical meaning
of “physical surroundings” and the ensemble of
material and social practices: it is the entire
panorama. It connotes a contentious, compro-
mised product of society, but on which powerful
institutions have a preeminent capacity to
impose their view: both the French government
and Disney Company in this case, not just the
private company Disney, (i.e. capital). In the
United States, potential investments that are not
targeted on short term gain are often criticized as
“social” investments, but all investment takes
place in a social context. Although it is believed
that the role of sovereign states is being eroded
in favor of international organizations, agencies
and/or associations, private or political, that of
France used its “strategic” position to direct the
development and prosperity of the Parisian
Basin. The French government tried to avoid that
public value be held captive to private value. It
wanted to avoid that improvement explicitly
reject the social variety of habitation or explicitly
seek security by exclusion. Capitalism’s most
lasting product is landscape (new geographies)
which in many places it has rendered imperma-
nent, for ever exhibiting a new repertoire. Such
shifting landscapes illustrate the structural
charges of the global economy (Harvey, 1989;
Disneyland Paris
Zukin, 1991; Dicken, 1992). The spatial media-
tion of cultural consumption affects the
redistribution of benefits among social classes
and explains the direct interest of the French
government in a Disney theme park, and its offer
of the Marne-La-Vallée location. Space does
make material form for the differentiation of a
market economy but places can be selectively
configured to promote community goals. The
French government’s intervention restricted the
commodification of land in Marne La Vallée
from matter to property so that development
(localized economic growth) would not lead to
obsolescence and dereliction here or in other
parts of the Paris basin. It demonstrates that
capitalism is not a monolithic force operating
alone at the universalizing level to carve up the
world according to its sole designs.
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF THE PARTNERSHIP
Both parties emphasize positive results in spite
of the vituperative press campaign which accom-
panied the arrival of Disneyland in the
Francilian landscape (a “cultural Chernobyl!”).
Such a large attraction was recognized as both a
chance and a challenge: “The chance we
grabbed, and together with our American part-
ners we have worked to make the park a success
so the 12 million visitors will bring wealth to this
whole eastern region. The challenge we are
facing is to become a strong pole of attraction
culturally and economically” (Rencontres, 1992:
196). Daniel Robert (of Bison Futé fame) added:
“Marne-La-Vallée is blessed with an extraordi-
nary opportunity to sell its millions of square
metres of office space, its ideal of an urban area,
its strategic position” (Rencontres, 1992: 55). The
presence of such a large investment has embold-
ened Marne-La Vallée to combat the skepticism
that smaller potential private investors show
when solicited by New Towns.
Visitors poured into Eurodisney: 6.8 millions
by October 1992, 19.5 millions by February 1994
(Eurodisney SCA, 1992, 1994). Its basic allure-
ment is its Americanness. It has been the best
received park ever in Europe and it is the
number one paid admission attraction there:
Beaubourg Center received only 8.2 million
visitors in 1993, 3.8 million of which were free
entries to the library; La Villette saw 5.8 million
entries, the Eiffel Tower 5.4; the Louvre wel-
29
comes 5 million visitors per year (Eurodisney
Resort, 1993: 5). These numbers are insufficient,
however, for the park to break even since it
needs 11 miIlion per year to do so and reached
just that number only its first year of operation.
Numbers of visitors followed a downtrend until
1994: 6,708,551 averaged 1.45 visits in 1993. In
1994, only 5.574.059 ( 2 16.9%) pushed the turn-
styles 1.61 times. Visits by residents of the
Parisian Basin had dropped by 31.3%. In 1995,
however, the park registered a 21.5% increase in
attendance. The percentage of foreign visitors
had dropped by 15% between 1992 and 1993
down to 56% of the visits but it was back up to
61% in 1994. The majority of the customers
(93.3% of the 5,777 hotel rooms and bungalows
(more than are available in the city of Cannes)
are tourists versus less than a two third average
for the Ile de France but here too the number of
foreigners has dropped (72% in 1994, 75% in
1993, vs 82% in 1992). The occupancy rate of
hotels has remained way below Orlando’s rate of
79%, even if it did increase from 55% in 1992 and
1993 to 61% in 1994 and 68.5% in 1995. Every
hotel night sold by Disneyland Paris engenders
the sale of at least one other hotel night in the
area. In 1994, Eurodisney hotels started welcom-
ing guests who were not necessarily attracted by
the theme park (EPAMarne, 1994, EPAFrance,
1995).
Marne-La-Vallée is a creation in progress and
it needs to become credible in the eyes of private
investors. Although a negative image of Disney-
land Paris was diffused by the press during the
construction phase, based on its American cul-
tural attributes, its business of selling false
reality for pleasure and its bullyish negotiating
tactics with the French government and later
with private companies and labour, the more
positive one of leisure and festivities and of
successful business knowhow has since been
emphasized. Disneyland Paris is more than the
Magic Kingdom because of the hotels, leisure
resources, offices and residences it plans to
construct (Figure 4). It has developed an image
as a solid capitalist enterprise, the kind Marne-
La-Vallée wants to attract. Knowhow can be
applied to both Disneyland Paris and Marne-La-
Vallée, so that Mickey’s notoriety in Europe can
increase that of Marne-La-Vallée, its present
location. There does exist the danger that it
become “Disney Vallée”. The social construction
30
of the regional identity of Marne La Vallée will
be dominated by Disney’s cultural capital and
the various other capital circuits it will engender.
Two strategies have been suggested to counter-
act such a danger. At the national level, the state
should put in place structures that define the
identity of Marne-La-Vallée separate from the
company’s trademark. At the local level, endoge-
nous and original solutions need to be found to
allow each and every inhabitant to identify
culturally with the specific part of the Brie
plateau s/he lives in.
Disneyland Paris has fulfilled its role as an
economic growth pole both directly and indi-
rectly, distributing spillover effects in the Eastern
suburbs of the Paris Basin while bringing eco-
nomic benefits to the country. Within the
Perimeter of Disneyland Paris, the ratio between
public and private investment is 1 to 8, similar to
the one found in most new towns. The French
government invested 2.7BFF in public infra-
structure while private companies and
individuals disbursed 23BFF (Eurodisney Resort,
1993: 2). Construction employed 5,100 local
workers and 180 companies, for a cost of 13BFF,
47% of which went to lIe de France companies,
76% in the case of residential developments. The
company also had to construct 1,800 housing
units occupied by 3,500 of its employees. In 1992,
Disneyland Paris paid 81 MFF in local taxes and
250MFF in sales taxes. On opening day it
employed 11,500 people, two thirds of whom
were French (70% by 1995), one fifth of other
European origin. There are now 9,700 employ-
ees, representing a saving of 7% in operating
costs. The downsizing came as part of the
financial restructuring of March 1994. They were
paid 2BFF in salaries and benefits, a substantial
addition to the revenue stream of the new town.
They generated, with Disneyland, another 25,000
jobs in the area. The fifty tons of laundry
produced daily by the resort, for example, led to
the construction of two plants in the area. A little
over 40% of these employees live in the Seine et
Marne Département and thus consume within
the area. There are another 5,000 seasonal jobs,
10% of which are filled by local residents. The
economic activities of Disneyland Paris in 1993
generated 9.2% less revenue than in 1992,
although visitor spending outside of Disneyland
Paris increased by 3.8%. Another decrease of
6.9% was registered in 1994. In the fiscal year
A.-M. d’Hauteserre
1991–2, the company Spent 2.7BFF, but only 2.2
in 1993, a decrease of 20%, in goods and services
(insurance, laundry, electricity . . . ). Purchases
registered a gain of 14% in 1994, and investments
for improvements and maintenance, of 22%.
Much of the income from these purchases
remains in the area: 93% of food products are
bought in France, 65% in Ile de France. Statistics
were culled from Eurodisney Resort, 1993, EPA-
Marne, 1994, EPAFrance, 1995, Eurodisney SCA
1992, 1993, 1994.
The French government received 4BFF in
foreign currency (3.4% of foreign currency earn-
ings through tourism in France in 1993), 812MFF
in taxes, and 9 to 15,000 jobs, depending on the
season. Although totals fluctuate from year to
year, they remain a plus for the economy.
Disneyland Paris led to a more than 3% increase
in the total number of foreign tourists in France,
60.1 M in 1993, 61.3 M in 1994. The combined
activities and purchases of all 61.3 million
tourists provide 5.1% of the French GNP and
7.1% of its foreign currency earnings. The park is
placed seventh as a major tourist operator in
France, with 4.9BFF in revenues, behind Air
France, SNCF, Accor, Club Med, Aéroports de
Paris and Nouvelles Frontières (EPAMarne, 1994,
EPAFrance, 1995). Other theme parks come way
behind: Futuroscope earned only 300MFF,
Astérix 194MFF. The financial restructuring of its
annual debt which amounted to $370M in March
1994, allowed the park to announce a profit of
$35 million in the second quarter of 1995 and
increased attendance helped consolidate profits
for the remaining of the fiscal year . . . at least
prior to debt payments (New York Times, 1995:
D7).
There was wide-spread optimism that Dis-
ney’s presence in Europe would enhance the
attraction sector’s image, help improve stan-
dards of presentation and raise consumer
expectations and especially willingness to pay. It
has increased investment in smaller-scale attrac-
tions in France. Astérix Park (25 miles north of
Paris) which had required an investment of $208
million receives 1.5 million visitors per year. The
comic books it represents three-dimensionally
have been translated in 40 languages. It con-
quered 7% of the potential market in the Paris
basin in three years. Disneyland Paris aims for
17%. Under the influence of Disneyland Paris it
has begun a five year refurbishment program. It
Disneyland Paris
has also been forced to define its product more
clearly (Saffarian, 1992). Futuroscope “an intelli-
gently entertaining” park has revitalized the
region that surrounds it. It opened in June 1987
and boasted profits of I5MFF from revenues of
300MFF paid by 2 million visitors in 1994. Its
theme is moving images. When innovators must
compete in integrated product markets, they
have reason to pursue distinctive ideas, and
thereby contribute to the global accumulation of
knowledge. “Dynamic Cinema”, one of the most
sought after attractions at Futuroscope, thrills,
awes and panics spectators through the use of a
60/second flow of images and hydraulically
controlled seats with computerized links to the
pictures (Tresch, 1994). It has also had repercus-
sions in other European countries. Port Aventura
opened in May 1995 near Barcelona. Four hun-
dred million dollars were invested, 20% of which
by Annheuser Busch, over 20 hectares, ie. 50
acres (Tagliabue, 1995).
CONCLUSION
Both sides have benefitted from this partnership
between a private multi-national corporation
and public authorities. Disneyland Paris has
maintained the momentum of development in
Marne-La-Vallée that the French government
wanted to stimulate. “The success of the office
centres of Marne-La-Vallée, of the Cité Descartes
(an area of higher learning) and the presence of
Disneyland Paris demonstrate that betting on
Marne-La-Vallée to assure the economic devel-
opment of the Eastern part of the Paris Basin was
the way to go, even if success was long in
coming” (Merlin, 1989: 77). New large projects
are being constructed and jobs and their multi-
plier effect, taxes, new transport lines are all
increasing. In 1995 attendance numbers were on
the rebound and hotel revenue and occupancy
rates augmented. Even Orlando had rocky
beginnings before returning its investment many
times over and the two American parks suffered
from lulls (Grover, 1991, Flower 1991). Both the
company and the French government had
remained optimistic since talks for the next
stages of development are right on schedule.
Disneyland Paris obtained a site it can grow in,
with the necessary communication links to one
of the most densely (in numbers and in purchas-
ing power) settled areas in the world while it
31
provides the French government with a major
economic growth pole. The contract binding the
two parties distributes obligations to limit the
ability of private companies to speculate on
investments made by public bodies financed by
the general public, while it guarantees the timely
completion of these investments. Optimism was
justified when Disneyland Paris opened as
scheduled on April 12 1992. It is still justified
today as attendance numbers and spillover
effects are on the increase. (Revenu, 1996: 9),
proving that public/private partnerships can
enhance social benefits and capital accumula-
tion.
ENDNOTES
1
Francilian refers to Ile de France, also called the
Paris Basin.
2
A National Public Radio report in June 1996
indicated that Las Vegas had become the number
one tourist destination among travellers who
booked through travel agents. In a private
communication, J. Brett of the Nevada Commis-
sion on Tourism mentioned that 30 million
visitors were welcomed in the past twelve
months in Las Vegas. Although slightly more
than 30 million visit Disney World, the numbers
quoted are of turnstyle pushes rather than of
head counts. I was not told how the total number
of visitors to Las Vegas was arrived at.
3
All forms of knowledge (all products based on
knowledge) have peculiar properties as eco-
nomic commodities. Knowhow is a “non-rival”
good: using it does not preclude others from
doing it, cf. other theme parks. It is also “non-
excludable”: the very use of information in any
productive way is bound to reveal it in part
(Grossman & Helpman, 1991: 15). Preventing
unauthorized use of it depends on property laws
and their enforcement. One can understand
Disney Company’s sensitivity to any copyright
infringements.
4
The first theme park in the Western world was
built at the end of the 1200’s by Robert II of
Artois at Vieil Hesdin. It included a revolving
castle, a grott within which rain or snow could
be willed, animated marionettes, collapsing
bridges, as well as exotic plants and animals that
symbolized paradise. Charles V destroyed the
park 300 years later.
32
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