The end of philosophy and the task of thinking:

possible dialogues between Herman Dooyeweerd and a Hebrew approach to philosophy.

Pedro Lucas Dulci 1

Invisible College (Brazil)
www.theinvisiblecollege.com.br

This is a work in progress.

Your reading and contribution is very much appreciated.
Write me: pedrolucas.dulci@gmail.com

First part — The end of philosophy

Discourses about “the end of philosophy” have become commonplace in the contemporary
age. 2 An important name for “end of philosophy” projects is that of Martin Heidegger. He
announced the end of philosophy by understanding it as Metaphysics. 3 The last “task of thinking”
for him was to show how the history of philosophy is a long path of metaphysical emptying that
reached its supreme possibilities in a scientific period that he called “the age of technology”. 4
However, despite the extreme situation we have reached, Heidegger is prodigal in showing that the
history of philosophy is based on an immense “forgetfulness of being” that occurred through the
metaphysical substitution of being for entity. 5 The task of thinking will be to go beyond all attempts
to identify being in entity and to push thought back to being—in myth, poetry, or the mystic.
Heidegger's philosophical project was met with much suspicion. 6 It is not our purpose to
discuss the success of the Heideggerian project here. But to admit how it raises a fundamental

1 In 2020 Pedro Lucas Dulci received a PhD in Philosophy from the Federal University of Goiás (Brazil) with a thesis on the uses of
Pauline Messianism in the philosophy of Giorgio Agamben. In 2016, he received an Oxford-Templeton Scholarship from the project
“Latin America and The Big Questions” by the Ian Ramsey Centre, at the University of Oxford, to carry out studies on the dialogue
between Science and Religion at the Abraham Kuyper Center, at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( Netherlands) under the supervision
of Professor Dr. Gerrit Glas. He also has a degree in Theology from the Brasil Central Presbyterian Seminary with a monograph on the
philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd. He currently teaches reformational philosophy and theology at Invisible College.
www.theinvisiblecollege.com.br

2 For Marx, philosophy should come to an end by transforming it into praxis. Wittgenstein also argued for the end of philosophy
through a great analysis of language. When this work was done correctly, its problems would be answered and it would be a chapter in
history. However, what both did not realize is that, seeking the end of philosophy, they opened up new fields of philosophical inquiry—
inaugurating distinct phases even in their own thoughts. cf. Aubenque, P. Faut-il déconstruire la métaphysique? (2009), p. 9-10.

3 Cf. Heidegger, M. Überwindung der Metaphysik (1936) reprinted later as Vorträge und Aufsätze (1956).

4 Cf. Heidegger, M. Die Technik (1962).

5 Cf. Heidegger, M. Sein und Zeit, § 7, p. 32-33. Undoubtedly, in this project of deconstruction of metaphysics Heidegger was
influenced by Nietzsche, who also saw the beginning of the decay of philosophy with Socrates and Plato — but still considered the
pre-Socratics the true philosophers. Cf. Heidegger, M. Nietzsche, II, p. 415. Heidegger, however, admits that forgetfulness of being is
as late as Parmenides, who identified being with thought, establishing an unavoidable path to rationalist and idealist reductionism.
There is, therefore, only one epoch of “being”, that of its suspension (ἐποχή). cf. Heidegger, M. Holzwege (1950), p. 336.

6On the one hand we have the charge of a thoughtless return to myth raised by Theodor Adorno; on the other hand, we had Rudolf
Carnap's sharp accusation of the absence of meaning in certain formulations in Heidegger's texts.
problem for all those who are celebrating the heritage and thinking about the challenges of
philosophy in the Reformed Tradition. Is our philosophical heritage part of this long metaphysical
tradition of “forgetfulness of being”? If not, how does it escape it? 7
It strikes our attention that one of the most radical assaults on metaphysics in contemporary
philosophy has taken a theological perspective without actually appearing to be aware of its more
technical theological implications. 8 God is portrayed within a theological scheme that not only
presupposes but makes previous philosophical commitments impossible. 9 Professor Daniel F. M.
Strauss called our attention to this aspect when he addressed the temptation of theo-ontology by
saying: “key features of creation are then ‘positioned‘ ’within’ God, such that our experience of
these properties is subsequently accounted for by deducing them from the elevated ‘essence’ of
God. This is in line with the traditional claim of theology, namely that it merely listens to the Bible
– a ‘pure understanding’ that should be followed obediently in the scholarly (‘scientific’) theological
reflection about God” (Strauss, 2009: 189).
Of course, the situation is much more complex when this creational location of the terms
used to refer to God is not even recognized. Strauss illustrates this situation with an example from
Emil Brunner: “‘The omnipresence of God is his elevation above space whereas his eternity and
immutability constitute his elevation above time’ (Brunner, 1972:272). Brunner does not realize that
he has to use spatial terms in order to assert that God is ‘above’ space!” (Strauss, 2009: 200).
In all of this, we can see that questions about the conceptual knowledge of God are
fundamental in the Heideggerian “task of thinking” of overcoming the “forgetfulness of being”.
Although Strauss declares that this practice of portraying God within a conceptual theological
framework abstracted from key features of creation is in line with the traditional claim of theology,
he also guarantees that: “we may question this legacy” (Strauss, 2009: 189). 10

Second part — The task of thinking and the limits of conceptual knowledge

The core of this discussion lies in the fact that theology cannot avoid some kind of discourse
about God. Theologians must employ concepts to refer to God. However, Strauss draws our

7 Such questions are not artificial within reformational thought. On the one hand, Dooyeweerd was in wide dialogue with Heidegger's
work and therefore aware of his philosophical provocations. On the other hand, Heidegger himself knew the reformational tradition
through his interlocutors — mentioning the work of Hendrik G. Stoker, Conscience, in Sein und Zeit.

8Someone like Heidegger even claims that theology is not the “science of God,” since it must rather be viewed as reflection on faith.
For this reason theology, according to Heidegger, “avoids any sort of philosophical system”. Heidegger, M. Phänomenologie und
Theologie (1970).

9In the words of Daniel F. M. Strauss: “The decisive point to be observed, however, is that there simply is no single scientific discourse
dealing with God that is not completely in the grip of and determined by some particular philosophical view of reality (‘paradigm’). The
crucial question therefore is not whether such an underlying view of reality is operative in our discourse about God, but much rather
whether or not this (mostly concealed) theoretical worldview is in the grip of the central meaning and radical direction-giving motive-
power of the biblical message” (Strauss, 2009: 196).

10Or, put in other words: “the constructive service to be rendered by a non-reductionist ontology is to help theologians understand
that, in order to speak of God we do not have ac- cess to terms that do not proceed from and make an appeal to what is given within
creation. By using these (creational) terms, however, we precisely want to convey the conviction that God transcends all of creation.
But how can we continue this claim when we are ‘doomed’ to do this in a “creational way” by using “creational terms”?” (Strauss,
2009: 200).
attention to the fact that: “inevitable philosophical presuppositions emerge, because reflection on
the nature of concept formation necessarily delves into the epistemological presuppositions of
theology that are philosophical in nature, since, as we argued, concept formation always entails an
appeal to universal properties that cannot be divorced from universal conditions. But if God is the
origin of all conditions and of being conditioned, can one then still claim that a concept of God is
possible?” (Strauss, 2009: 189).
Here scientific disciplines come up against a frontier that needs philosophical clarification.
Since concepts require universal characteristics, for theology or metaphysics to have a concept of
God, we would need what Strauss called: “an order for being-a-God, i.e. a law-for-being-God,
which in fact subjects God to his law for creation and, in an internally antinomic way, turning God
into a creature, subject to the conditions for being a God!” (Strauss, 2009: 189). 11
In other words, only that which behaves in a way subject to (God's) laws could be
conceptualized. Consequently, to form a “concept of God” it would be necessary to subject God to
the creational order—or to refer to creation using properties of divine being, placing them under the
same condition (i.e. pantheism). Only as a last resort: “The epistemologically sensitive theologian
would, at least at this point, be prepared to support our thesis that humankind is incapable of
comprehending or grasping God conceptually” (Strauss, 2009, p. 198).
On the one hand, this is what motivated centuries of theology and metaphysics based on
what Heidegger called the “forgetfulness of being”.12 On the other hand, for the reformational
tradition this is an unacceptable assumption. Herman Dooyeweerd himself had called the
impossibility of submitting to God his law for creation, “Calvin’s verdict against this
metaphysics” (Dooyeweerd, 1984: 93).13

With these words, we have what is most central to the Reformational philosophy. Through
the biblical distinction between the Creator and creation, Dooyeweerd emphasized that everything
that God created is subject to His law. From this, it follows that law, as well as all expressions of the
divine will, are boundaries between God and the cosmos — keeping only God free from all
subjection. 14

11 cf. Strauss, D. F. M. (1991). Hoe kan ons wetenskaplik oor God praat? In: Journal for Christian Scholarship, 2nd quarter, p. 23-43.

12 As Professor Strauss summarizes: “Initially, under the influence of neo-Platonism and Augustine we find an inclination towards a
negative theological designation of God in the writings of St. Thomas. […] The conviction that being is the primum notum (that what is
known first) rests on the conception of an analogy of being (analogia entis) which entails that both God and creation are subsumed
under the basic denominator of be- ing. According to St. Thomas being (esse) and essence (essentia) coincide in God (S.Th.I,3,4 and
I,13,11). […] The ultimate epistemological shortcoming in Thomas Aquinas' understand- ing is that he assumes a universal condition
for the existence of God, i.e. he deems it possible to form a concept of God. With regard to entities, however, concepts always either
relate to the order for the existence of a particular type of entity (in which case we form concepts of type laws), or they relate to the
(universal) orderliness of entities (the being an atom of an atom). This approach ultimately levels the difference between God and
creature by subject- ing God to the (implicitly assumed) universal order for being a God. But then there are many instances of ‘Gods’
conforming to these universal conditions for being a God – contradicting the biblical account that unequivocally claims that there is but
one God, that God is unique” (Strauss, 2009: 192-193).

13 According to the full citation: “Calvin's judgment: "Deus Legibus Solutus est, sed non exlex”, ("God is not subject to the laws, but not arbitrary')
touches the foundations of all speculative philosophy by laying bare the limits of human reason set for it by God in His temporal world-order. This is
the alpha and omega of all philosophy that strives to adopt a critical position not in name but in fact. I have laid all emphasis upon the transcendental
character of authentic critical philosophy, because I wish to cut off at the root the interference of speculative metaphysics in the affairs of the Christian
religion. An authentic critical philosophy is aware of its being bound to the cosmic time-order. It only points beyond and above this boundary line to
its pre-supposita. Its task, worthy of God's human creation, is great; yet it is modest and does not elevate human reason to the throne of
God” (Dooyeweerd, 1984: 93)

14 Cf. Spier, J. M. Wat Is Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte? 1950, cap. 5.

 With these boundaries established, the work of human reason in speculative philosophy was
also delimited — without any scope for historical metaphysical interferences. All that a philosopher,
a scientist or even a theologian can achieve through theoretical work is “to get a better view of this
law” (Schuurman, 2003: 36). The goal of the special sciences is to talk about the laws that govern
that aspect of reality — including theology. 15 That's why creatures in all circumstances live under
the law of God, not being able to go beyond it by metaphysical ways. 16
However, all of this still leaves an important question without answer: how can we talk
about the transcendence of God without projecting the diversity of creation “into” the “essence” of
God and then derives creaturely properties from God? (cf. Strauss, 2009: 199).
Although contemporary interpreters of theology — such as Barth and Pannenberg — have
come up with different answers to this question, 17 Strauss is definitive in saying that: “the only way
out of this impasse is to further explore the distinction […], with its deep roots in the philosophical
legacy of the West, namely that between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending
knowledge (idea-knowledge)” (Strauss, 2009: 193). 18
Strauss uses Nicolai Hartmann's ideas to explain that the “thing-in-itself” is not merely an
idea. Because we cannot know the “thing-in-itself,” but nevertheless think it, there must exist a
mode of conceptualization in which we can think (be it as something unknowable) the “thing-in-
itself”. 19 In the words of Strauss himself: “in order to think about that which transcends concept
formation, we still need a ‘conceptual form’ by means of which we can think whatever transcends
the boundaries of conceptual knowing” (Strauss, 2009:195).
At this point, the distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending
knowledge (idea-knowledge) proves to be useful for the Philosophy of Cosmonomic Idea. Similar
to the boundary established by God through his law in creation, the concept-transcending
knowledge also provides us with a religion in which “thing-in-itself” is thought of, even though it

15Professor Egbert Schuurman explores this point a little further by saying that: “The history of the sciences, moreover, shows us that
the description of these laws can change. However, an overview is out of the question, because as academics we are not above this
law, but subject to it. Our approach to the law is ‘by unit’. At best (hence the cosmonomic idea), we can speak of an approach to this
law. In this context, what happens is that each science addresses one of its aspects”. Schuurman, E. (2003). Faith and Hope in
Technology. Cap. 1, p. 36.

16This special place of God’s law in Reformational philosophy shines through in its own name. While Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea (De
Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee) what the philosopher, scientists and theologians have is an idea of this law. Never will they be above it, in a position that
would make them autonomous, capable of complete and unchanging knowledge. That is why, for Dooyeweerd, Calvin's verdict against this
metaphysics exposes the limits of human reason established by God.

17Pannenberg, for exemple, argues: “Christian theology, in contrast to Heidegger's construal of it, is essentially an inquiry into God and
his revelation. Everything else that occurs within theology can become a theme for the theologian only ‘in relation to God’, as Thomas
Aquinas put it: sub ratione Dei. Christian theology would lose not only its specific content but also, and most importantly, the
conscious- ness of truth that is intrinsic to it, if it were to follow Heidegger's advice to stop speaking of God in the realm of thought”.
Pannenberg, W. Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie, 1990:120.

18The genealogy of this distinction is rooted in the problem of universals, as well as in Plato's discussion of negative theology, until it
reached its apex in the thought of Immanuel Kant and mainly in the critique of knowledge by neo-Kantiann school of Marburg. Cf.
Strauss, 2009: 195; Ouwendorp, C. 1994. Het probleem van het universele en individuele. In: Philosophia Reformata, 59(1):26-57.

19 It is important to remember a detail that Strauss calls our attention when he says: “Although the German term ‘Grenzbegriff’ is
normally captured with the English translational equivalent: limiting concept, this practice may cause misunderstanding. For that
reason we explained that the intention is not to emphasize what lies within the boundaries of this limit, but rather to refer to that which
transcends it” (Strauss, 2009: 195).
cannot be conceptualized. 20 Once again, as Strauss explains: “the best way to capture this intention
is therefore to view ideas as those forms of thought through which we approximate that which
transcends the limits of a conceptual grasp. Ideas therefore refer to limit-transcending
knowledge” (Strauss, 2009: 195).

Third part — Reformational Philosophy and the Canonical Hebrew Approach

With these conclusions, we find a differentiation that can be very useful, both for systematic
philosophical inquiry and for scientific theological work. It enables us to explain the positive and
direct biblical way of speaking about God. 21 When we evoke the Bible as a concrete book, we need
to remember that it works in all aspects of reality—and appeals to the core of the human religious
dimension. However, when it comes to its positive and direct way of talking about God as God,
Strauss reminds us that: the Bible: “fully employs modal terms and metaphors. God as Father and
God as King are the most familiar metaphors used in a concept transcending way [idea-knowledge].
In addition, the Bible uses terms from every aspect of creation in a similar concept transcending
manner: God is unique (number), God is omnipresent (space), God is what He is (Ex. 3:14 –
kinematic: persistence), God acts (physical), God is life (biotic), God's will (sensitive psychic
aspect) […]” (Strauss, 2009: 200) and so on.
Using the distinction mentioned earlier — between conceptual knowledge and concept-
transcending knowledge (idea-knowledge) — we can say that, in the Bible, whenever modal terms
are used within the limits of their specific aspect, they are being employed in a conceptual way.
However, when these terms are used to designate everything that transcends its specific aspect, they
are being used in a concept transcending way.
Of course, all the modal terms the Bible uses to refer to God will be in a concept
transcending way—since God will never be subject to creational laws. However, the Bible also
makes uses of modal concepts within the temporal limits of its specific aspect—speaking of all
entities created by God, such as animals, people, families, kingdoms, and all sorts of temporal
experiences, generating familiar uses of such concepts. Later these familiar biblical usages will be
used to refer to God — now in a concept transcending way.
Thus, all that usual distinction between what is knowable and what is unknowable in God
becomes meaningless. Despite its long history in metaphysical constructions, in light of the biblical
way of talking about God, it appears to be more an intrusion of Greek motives into Western thought

20Strauss further explores what this means within systematic philosophy: “In a certain sense the modal (aspectual) dimension of reality
conditions both the employment of concepts and that of (limit-transcending) ideas. This follows from the fact that the different
modalities always serve as points of en- try to our experience of and reflection on created reality. Modal concepts are always formed in
relation to universal features of the different modal aspects – for example the concept natural number, set, dimension, cause and effect
(causality), and so on. Ultimately, the nuclear meaning of every distinguish- able modality is indefinable, providing as such the primitive
terms used for our concept-formation and definitions. In the final analysis, therefore, com- prehension is only possible by employing
terms that are themselves beyond the reach of concept formation – evincing the self-insufficiency of rational thought” (Strauss, 2009:
195).

21 In this regard, professor Strauss still remembers: “the decisive point to be observed, however, is that there simply is no single
scientific discourse dealing with God that is not completely in the grip of and determined by some particular philosophical view of
reality (‘paradigm’). The crucial question therefore is not whether such an underlying view of reality is operative in our discourse about
God, but much rather whether or not this (mostly concealed) theoretical worldview is in the grip of the central meaning and radical
direction-giving motive-power of the biblical message” (Strauss, 2009: 196).
than the distinctly Hebrew orientation of the biblical text. 22 Nor do we need a notion of
“accommodation” in which God has to submit to the laws of creation in order to reveal himself in a
way that is understandable to us. On the contrary, when the Bible says positively and directly that:
“God is love, just or wise, then there is nothing ‘unknown (and therefore different)’ behind this
revelation, for if it were the case, God turns into a Deus absconditum, a God that cannot be
revealed. God simply is the love, wisdom and justice the Bible tells us about, but in His love,
wisdom and justice He transcends what we can conceptually know” (Strauss, 2009: 203).
Instead of submitting God under his creational law, as in all historical expressions of Theo-
ontological temptation, “we can take God's Word seriously and accept that God is the love, wisdom
and justice the Bible asserts […] without conceptually encompassing any one of these affirmations.
We can believe God's Word” (Strauss, 2009: 2003). This means arguing that, within temporal
creation, we have a conceptual capacity even to overcome the limitations of conceptual knowledge
— in the use of concept transcending knowledge, for example. The turning point lies in the fact that
the way the Bible communicates knowledge of God exploits this capacity of (concept transcending)
human knowing through metaphors and modal terms.
In view of all this, the suggestion that I put in the subtitle of this paper — about the possible
dialogue between Dooyeweerd and a Hebrew approach to philosophy — may make more sense
now. Giving up all attempts to subject God to creational laws has great resonances with the
canonical-linguistic turn 23 — as a theological method controlled by the emphasis on the uses of
biblical metaphors. In the theological sphere, this debate is complex and multiple. 24 However, the
interdisciplinary importance of these questions is already perceived for systematic philosophical
investigation. Writing the preface to Dru Johnson's Biblical Knowking, Professor Craig
Bartholomew shows us that the gap between theology and philosophy is not exclusive to the
reformational tradition: “recent decades have witnessed a remarkable renaissance in Christian
philosophy, a development unimaginable some thirty years ago. […] Amidst this renaissance a
neglected element has been the relationship between Scripture and philosophy, an important gap
that we are starting to see bridged” (Bartholomew, 2013: 2).
In a direction very close to what we are looking for in this paper, Dru Johnson's work in
recent years has been to argue that: “the biblical scheme for truth and its epistemic effects better
describes the realities of knowing today and more aptly fits with modern scientific epistemology

22Gordon Fee commenting on the biblical text that talks about God “lives in unapproachable light” says that: "The description reflects Psalm 104:2. lt
arose in Judaism in conjunction with the concept of his blinding glory, which no human eye can see (cf. Exod. 24:15-17; 34:29-35; 1 Kings 8:11). The
motif of God as pure light is played on from several angles in the Johannine literature (John 1:7-9; 3:19-21; 1 John 1:5-7). Him no one has seen or can
see (cf. "invisible" in 1:17). These clauses reinforce his dwelling in unapproachable light and reflect a common OT theme (Exod. 33:20; cf.19:21).The
emphasis in these last two items is not the Greek one, that God is unknowable, but the Jewish one, that God is so infinitely holy that sinful humanity
can never see him and live (cf. Isa. 6:1-5)” Fee, G. 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, p. 153-154.

23 Vanhoozer, K. J. The drama of doctrine (2005).

24Writing the preface to John Peckham's Canonical Theology, Craig Bartholomew explains to us that: “The issues involved in the
canon debate are complex and multiple. At their heart, however, as John shows in this book, they come down to where we locate final
authority, whether in Scripture or some version of “the community.” The issue of authority is central to the current challenges facing
modernity, and this is as true of Western societies as it is of the church. Thus, where we land on canonicity really matters! There is
hardly a major issue dividing Christians today that does not come down finally to the question of the intrinsic authority of Scripture, i.e.,
canonicity. In our day it takes courage and wisdom to grasp the nettle of canonicity and John Peckham manifests both in this
important new book. […] He takes hold of what I argue is one of the most pressing issues facing the church today, and does so clearly,
with a refreshing and astonishingly wide range of engagement, pushing towards the conclusion that Scripture is intrinsically
authoritative as the Word of God” (Bartholomew, 2016: 2)
than the Platonic view or the so-called Standard View of knowing today” (Johnson, 2021: 12). 25 It
is important to say that Johnson's project avoids two fundamental mistakes. He doesn't simply seek
to extract quotes from the Bible that can be collected to form a Hebrew epistemology—typical of
“bible-text-support” biblicism; and he doesn't even keep the Bible as a church book that has nothing
to say to philosophy—which would be a type of dualism.
On the contrary, he finds in the canonical “language games”, which form the drama of the
comprehensive biblical narrative, a distinct and unified approach to knowing the world correctly.
Canonical terms and metaphors control the entire process of orientation in the reality created by
God — giving us to Christendom another model of knowledge integration. 26
The possibility of a dialogue between Dooyeweerd and a Hebrew approach to philosophy
exists. However, as Dru Johnson himself acknowledges: “demonstrating that there is such a thing as
a Hebraic philosophical style requires that I step on the toes of my colleagues in biblical studies,
ancient Near East studies, philosophy, and theology. This would presumably require a certain
competence (or insanity) on my part and charity on the reader's part. […] amongst philosophers,
this looks like biblical scholarship; amongst theologians, philosophy, amongst biblical scholars,
theology. Never belonging fully to one guild, this project shows why interdisciplinary endeavors
such as this are vital to understanding the Hebraic intellectual world and even our world
today” (Johnson, 2021: 18).
Although it may take a long time to create a vigorous field of interdisciplinary discussion,
we undoubtedly have great possibilities for mutual enrichment from all areas here. 27

25 On another occasion, Johnson exemplifies his point by explaining that: “Philosophy is the academic discipline traditionally
concerned with the processes that produce the most reliable ways of knowing. Logic most often gets thrust forward as the best way to
justify our beliefs about the world. Mathematic truths, which are also known through process, help us to feel better about that which
we must be sure… For its part, Scripture certainly reasons with the reader using classical logic (e.g., if all wet fleeces amidst dry
ground act as a signal from God, then asking for a sign of dry fleece and wet ground acts as confirmation of that divine signal; Judg
6:36–40). Surprisingly, Scripture’s process of reasoning does not usually involve things called “beliefs” which we then justify by using a
logical calculation. Rather than give facts to plug into logical formulas (e.g., If all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then Socrates
is mortal), the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures are most often concerned with making Israelites able to see that which is being shown
to them. The God of Israel tries to show the pharaoh of Exodus that he and his Egyptian pantheon are not actually in control of fertility,
creation, fields, flocks, and more, for instance. By walking Egypt and Israel through that process, Israel’s God is trying to show Egypt
and Israel something which they cannot see unless they submit to the process of knowing (Johnson, 2012: xii).

26In the very personal words of professor Bartholomew: “I conclude this foreword with two more personal comments. At The Paideia
Centre for Public Theology in Ancaster, Ontario, of which I am Principal, we recently hosted a consultation on Transdisciplinarity. The
basis for discussion was a paper that I and the psychologist Eric Johnson produced, arguing that the “integration model” in Christian
higher education has failed and that we need a new model, one which we name “Transdisciplinarity.” It occurs to me that Dru’s work is
a good example of the kind of trans-disciplinary work we urgently need if we are to overcome the fragmentation of the disciplines
bequeathed to us by modernity” (Bartholomew, 2013: 2).

27 In Bartholomew’s words: “My hope is that this book will further set ablaze the work we are starting to see being done on the
Scripture-philosophy-theology relationship. Dru would be the first to acknowledge that there is far more work to be done on the Bible
and epistemology, to say nothing about the Bible and ontology, anthropology, and ethics, as well as second order philosophical
disciplines such as political philosophy, philosophy of art, of law, etc. Rich work cries out to be done in all these areas and the work is
far more than one scholar can do alone. We need a community of biblical scholars, philosophers, and theologians who will work
together with people like Dru in order to reap the rich harvest of the direction in which Dru points us in this work” (Bartholomew, 2013:
2).