Scott Cook Stone Age Economics Review

Review: 'Structural Substantivism': A Critical Review of Marshall Sahlins' Stone Age
Economics
Reviewed Work(s): Stone Age Economics by Marshall Sahlin
Review by: Scott Cook
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Jun., 1974), pp. 355-379
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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'Structural Substantivism': A Critical
Review of Marshall Sahlins' Stone Age
Economics
SCOTT COOK
The University of Connecticut
I. INTRODUCTION: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND WHAT

THE 'ECONOMY' IS NOT
Stone Age Economics is the most important book in the field of econ
anthropology produced by an American cultural anthropologist
M. J. Herskovits published The Economic Life of Primitive Peo
1940. Its theoretical and analytical superiority to that earlier book sh
cheer those of us who feel depressed because of the slow and tor
course of progress in this sub-field of anthropological inquiry.
Sahlins' book is original and provocative, however, it is not lik
revolutionize thinking in the field as much as the recent work by G
(1967). Even though it lacks the theoretical scope and scholarly ju
ness of the latter work, it should nevertheless become a minor classic
literature dealing with 'primitive' (or tribal) economic life.
It is an uneven book consisting of a series of chapters loosely integ
by common themes, but lacking a proper conclusion. In conten
eclectic and yet partisan, embodying as it does ethnography, social p
phy, Marxian, Neoclassical and 'Substantivist' economics, specul
tedious exegeses of facts, imaginative syntheses and interpreta
flights of wishful thinking, and incisive logic sometimes applied in
of moot propositions. In essence, it is a collection of essays writ
provoke as well as to document: vintage Sahlins, vintage ethnolog
Although Sahlins identifies himself with the so-called 'substan
school of economic anthropology (Cook, 1966), his approach is
means a carbon copy of Polanyi's transactional substantivism nor
material substantivism of certain Marxist-oriented scholars (Cook
1973). His approach is distinctive, combining elements of the oth
representing what I will call 'structural substantivism,' i.e. the vi
the economy, as a function of society, provisions society by maintai
social relations or the social structure regardless of the degree to
the material needs of a given population are satisfied. It is pre
355
356 SCOTT COOK
on the assumption of a dichotomy between cultural forms and concrete
human activity in which the former take precedence in analysis over the
latter.
The different meanings assigned to the term 'anthropological economics'
by N. S. B. Gras, the economic historian who coined it in 1927, and by
Marshall Sahlins are suggestive of the peculiar intellectual history of
'primitive' economics. Gras (1927:10) defined 'anthropological economics'
as 'a study of the ideas that primitive peoples held about economic matters',
distinguishing this type of study from 'economic anthropology', or the
'synthesis of anthropological and economic studies' involving the 'study of
the ways in which primitive peoples obtained a living'. He suggests that
anthropologists and economists collaborate so that 'anthropologists
could provide those in the economic field with facts in return for ideas and
the fundamental issues involved in getting a living' (1927: 22). Sahlins,
on the other hand, dedicates his collection of essays to the 'hope of an
anthropological economics' which he conceives of as a 'culturalist study
that as a matter of principle does honor to different societies for what they
are' and is in opposition to business-like interpretations of primitive
economies and societies (pp. xi-xii). As a sympathizer of the anti-econo-
mics posture of the Polanyi group (Cook, 1966; LeClair and Schneider,
1968), Sahlins discourages collaboration between economists and anthro-
pologists (or cross fertilization between economics and anthropology)
because Neoclassical economics is ethnocentric and hence inapplicable
to the study of 'primitive' or 'tribal' economies. He does not, however,
place Marxist economics in the same ethnocentric category and, para-
doxically, proceeds to make use of Neoclassical micro-economics at
various points in his analysis.
Since Stone Age Economics is largely a product of the decade of the
1960s, a period in economic anthropological discourse dominated by the
controversy between 'formalists' and 'substantivists', and since Sahlins
allied himself with the latter group of protagonists, it will be necessary for
me to briefly review some of the salient issues in this controversy and
Sahlins' view of them. My task in this regard is complicated by the fact
that this book lacks a proper introduction which would appraise the
theoretical and methodological issues involved. In a footnote to an essay
entitled 'Economic Anthropology and Anthropological Economics'
written in 1969, Sahlins informed us that it was originally written as an
introduction to a book, Essays in Stone Age Economics (p. 13); for reasons
unexplained this plan was dropped. Instead, the present book carries an
introduction which is all too long on polemic and all too short on reasoned
analysis of the fundamental issues of scope, method and theory which
emerge from his work. He is thus open to criticism for not providing us
with an adequate methodological rationale for the alleged superiority of
'STRUCTURAL SUBSTANTIVISM' 357
'substantivism' over 'formalism' and of their presumed theoretical
irreconcilability.
In Stone Age Economics Sahlins regrettably treats the formalist-sub-
stantivist controversy in terms of its ideological rather than its methodo-
logical content. He reduces it to 'the following theoretical option: between
the ready-made models of orthodox Economics, especially "micro-
economics," taken as universally valid and applicable grosso modo (orig.
italics) to the primitive societies; and the necessity-supposing the formal-
ist position unfounded-of developing a new analysis more appropriate to
the historical societies in question and to the intellectual history of Anthro-
pology' (p. xi). Those readers familiar with the work of the 'formalists'
in economic anthropology will immediately recognize Sahlins' portrayal
as a caricature of their actual method. He asserts further that the choice
between formalism and substantivism is 'between the perspective of
Business'... and 'a culturalist study'. The decisive differences, then,
between the two approaches are 'ideological'. In his words:
Embodying the Wisdom of native bourgeois categories formal economics flourishes as

ideology at home and ethnocentricism abroad. As against substantivism, it draws great
strength from its profound compatibility with bourgeois society... (pp. xiii-xiv).
In Sahlins' version of substantivism Polanyi's 'market mentality' bogey is

resurrected under the guise of the 'historically specific business outlook'
(p. 186).
So Stone Age Economics mystifies with rhetoric a very complicated set
of epistemological/methodological problems related to the dialectic
between thought categories and social reality (subject/object relations) in
cross-cultural analysis. Without examining in detail the implications of
these problems for economic anthropology (see Cook, 1973b: 803-8), a few
points must be raised here. First, no one can reasonably deny the close
relationship between science and society or thought and existence which
operates in all cultures. The relationship between thought categories
(concepts)-whether native or non-native, indigenous or foreign-and
social reality is clarified only through analysis and praxis; thought cate-
gories can never be more than conceptual tools in the approximation of
social reality. Moreover, thought categories may be class- and culture-
specific to a degree, but their degree of class- or culture-specificity is a
matter for empirical determination.
While I am among those economic anthropologists who believe that a
combination of 'ethno-economics' and Marxian theory will prove more
productive in the development of economic anthropology than the appli-
cation of Neoclassical theory, I do not agree that many of the episte-
mological/methodological problems encountered in applying the latter
to the study of non-capitalist economies disappear in ethno-economic
358
358SCOTT
SCOTTCOOK
COOK
and/or
and/orMarxian
Marxian analysis.
analysis.
The insider's
The insider's
view of aspects
view ofof aspects
pre-industrial
of pre-industr
economic
economic life
life
(where
(whereobtainable)
obtainable)
is necessary
is necessary
to the understanding
to the understanding
of a of
given
giveneconomy
economy but but
it is it
only
is aonly
partial
a partial
approximation
approximation
to understanding;
to understandin
it
it must
mustbebe considered
considered and evaluated
and evaluated
in interplay
in interplay
with thought
with
categories
thought categor
of
of outside
outside origin
origin
(e.g. (e.g.
fromfrom
orthodox
orthodox
Neoclassical
Neoclassical
economics, economics,
unorthodox unorthod
Marxian
Marxian political
political
economy,
economy,
ethnological
ethnological
theory proper).
theory Inproper).
this context,
In this conte
we
wemust
mustnot
not
forget
forget
that that
orthodox
orthodox
economics
economics
and its unorthodox
and its unorthodox
varieties varieties
are
arecommon
common creatures
creatures
of western
of western
EuropeanEuropean
thought. Both
thought.
traditions
Bothhadtraditions h
their
theirbirth
birth
in in
the the
capitalist
capitalist
society.
society.
In fact, In
both
fact,
the Marxist
both theand Marxist
non- and no
Marxist
Marxist traditions
traditions
in western
in western
economic
economic
thought suffer
thoughtfrom
suffer
'ethnocentrism'
from 'ethnocentris
vis-a-vis
vis-a-vis non-European,
non-European,precapitalist
precapitalist
economiceconomic
formationsformations
(Godelier, (Godelier
1967:
1967:Ch.Ch.1).1).
Consequently
Consequently
a basicatask
basic
of task
economic
of economic
anthropology
anthropology
is to is t
selectively
selectively apply
apply
concepts
concepts
and principles,
and principles,
models and
models
paradigms,
and drawn
paradigms, dra
from
fromvarious
varioustraditions
traditions
of western
of western
economiceconomic
thought, in
thought,
order to refine,
in order to refine
clarify,
clarify, elaborate
elaborate
or reject
or reject
them athem
posteriori
a posteriori
in the context
in the
of the
context
analysis
of the analys
of
of non-western
non-westerneconomies,
economies,
ratherrather
than negating
than negating
their applicability
their applicability
a
priori.
What about the role of Marxist thought in Stone Age Economics?
Is it crucial or peripheral to the themes and arguments of the book?
Walter Neale contends that in this book Sahlins' 'Marxism appears to be
totally unnecessary to his argument', that 'several extended references to
Marx ... appear to be deletable without loss', and, finally, that the 'argu-
ments are not Marxist but 20th century and operational' (1973:373).
Notwithstanding the fact that these comments come from a staunch
member of the Polanyi group who predictably thinks that Marx's contribu-
tions to political economic enquiry are as outmoded as Brahe and Kepler in
astronomy (ibid.), he has exposed a central paradox in Sahlins' Stone Age
Economics-a flirtation with materialism a la Marx in areas where a
marriage seems more appropriate, while simultaneously conducting
serious courtship with structuralism. What is at issue here is not whether
Sahlins is or is not 'Marxist' in certain of his arguments but how he recon
ciles his materialist sentiments of the past with his commitment to Polan
substantivism and to a structuralism in which kinship and other elements
superstructure create a social contract which rescues society from
'WARRE'. Much of Sahlins' intellectual output has been associated wit
the Michigan (or Whitean) school of 'cultural evolutionism' (see Harri
1968: ch. 22). Yet it is apparent that in the realm of 'primitive economics
proper he has usually pursued White's leads most intensively and system-
atically in areas where these coincide with tenets in Polanyi's though
(e.g. kinship embeddedness of economy, anti-economics, socially dis
ruptive influences of the 'market') and has not emphasized those elements
rooted in White's technological determinism (e.g. the production conce
as providing an analytically sound criterion for distinguishing the econo-
'STRUCTURAL
'STRUCTURALSUBSTANTIVISM'
SUBSTANTIVISM'359359
mic
mic essence
essenceof
oflabor
laborand,
and,
consequently,
consequently,
forfor
operationalizing
operationalizing
the the
'materiality'
'materiality'ofofthe
theeconomic
economic field-cf.
field-cf.
Cook,
Cook,
1969:
1969:
384-6;
384-6;
1973a:
1973a:
38-9).38-9).
Sahlins'
Sahlins' more
morerecent
recentsojourn
sojourn(1967-9)
(1967-9)
in France
in France
provided
provided
him him
with with
a a
second
second opportunity
opportunitytotodevelop
develop hishis
economic
economictheory
theory
along
along
materialist
materialist
lines-this
lines-thistime
timeininananatmosphere
atmosphere pervaded
pervadedwithwith
the the
'structuralism'
'structuralism'
of of
Levi-Strauss.
Levi-Strauss.ItItisisevident
evidentfrom
fromthethe
citations
citations
in Stone
in Stone
Age Age
Economics
Economics
that that
Sahlins
Sahlins was
wasexposed
exposedtotothe
thework
workof of
certain
certain
Marxist-oriented
Marxist-oriented
contributors
contributors
to
to economic
economicanthropological
anthropological
thought
thought(Meillasoux,
(Meillasoux,
Godelier,
Godelier,
Terray)
Terray)
for for
whom
whom the
theproduction
productionconcept
concept
holds
holds
a central
a central
role.role.
Indeed,
Indeed,
the influence
the influence
of
of these
these scholars
scholars(and
(andofof
Marx
Marx
himself)
himself)
is manifest
is manifest
in the
in two
the chapters
two chapters
on on
the
the 'Domestic
'DomesticMode
ModeofofProduction'
Production'(Chs.
(Chs.
2 and
2 and
3) in3)which
in which
such such
Marxian
Marxian
distinctions
distinctionsasas'production
'productionfor
for
use'use'
andand
'production
'productionfor for
exchange',
exchange',
'infra-
'infra-
structure'
structure'and
and'superstructure',
'superstructure',
'forces
'forces
of production'
of production'
and 'social
and 'social
relations
relations
of
of production'
production'are
areprominent.
prominent. These
These
references
references
are not
are not
superfluous
superfluous
to to
Sahlins'
Sahlins' arguments
argumentsasasNeale
Nealewould
would
have
haveus believe.
us believe.
TheyThey
do, however,
do, however,
render manifest the fundamental contradiction between cultural evolution-
ism and Polanyi substantivism, and between materialism and structuralism
which bedevils Stone Age Economics.
That Sahlins seeks to resolve these contradictions non-dialectically
(i.e. failing to recognize the interpenetration of thesis-antithesis)-avoiding
the course of reconciliation through synthesis-is clear from his handling
of the 'economy' problem. There is no systematic, explicit, coherent con-
cept of 'economy' in Stone Age Economics; Sahlins never really says what
it is but emphasizes what it is not (e.g. it is not 'economizing'). Conse-
quently, he permits himself to shift from 'consumption' (Ch. 1) to 'produc-
tion' (Chs. 2-3) to 'distribution' and 'exchange' (Chs. 4-6) without ever
specifying how these operate together in the economic process.
Implicitly Sahlins means by 'economy' the results of things that people
related socially in groups do that can be categorized under rubrics such as
production, distribution, exchange and consumption. 'Economy', he
says, 'is a category of culture rather than behaviour; it deals not with the
need-serving activities of individuals, but the material life process of society
(p. xii). Later on he makes the following statement:
For the present purpose, 'economy' is viewed as the process of provisioning society (or
the 'socio-cultural system'). No social relation, institution, or set of institutions is of
itself 'economic'. Any institution, say a family or a lineage order, if it has material conse-
quence for provisioning society can be placed in an economic context and considered
part of the economic process ... Here (in primitive culture) we find no socially distinct
'economy' or 'government', merely social groups and relations with multiple functions,
which we distinguish as economic, political, etc. (pp. 185-6).
What does Sahlins mean by 'material life process' and by the 'process of
internally provisioning society'? He does not mean the 'need-satisfying
process of individual behavior' (ibid.). Among the transactions which he
360 SCOTT COOK
considers 'economic' are those that 'do not materially provision people and
are not predicated on the satisfaction of human material needs'. However,
they do provision society or, as he expresses it, 'they maintain social rela-
tions, the structure of society, even if they do not to the least advantage the
stock of consumables' (p. 187). It appears, then, that to Polanyi's well-
known 'two meanings of economic' (the 'formal' or economizing and the
'substantive' or supply of want-satisfying material means-1968:145)
Sahlins has added a third: the 'functional' or'social structure-maintenance'
meaning. 'Structurally, the economy does not exist,' says Sahlins, 'but,
rather, it exists for the structure' (orig. italics; p. 76). "'Economy"', he
asserts, 'is rather a function of the society than a structure, for the armature
of the economic process is provided by groups classically conceived
"noneconomic"' (ibid.).
In short, Sahlins in Stone Age Economics is only incidentally concerned
with the life-supporting processes that enable a population to socially
reproduce itself, and most concerned with the processes which enable
society as an organized configuration of forms (structure) to perpetuate
itself. Along with many contemporary economic anthropologists Sahlins
realizes that the absence of what may be classed as specifically economic
institutions or structures in tribal societies does not indicate the absence of
economic process in those societies; but he has refused to specify what
that process is, and he denies the possibility that Neoclassical micro-econo-
mic theory can provide a general orientation or explanations regarding
some of its aspects. In this ambiguity surrounding his conception of the
'economy' lurks the crypto-materialism of Stone Age Economics; a
'materialism' embedded in an eclectic 'structuralism' to the point of
dissolution.
II. PRODUCTION IN SOCIETAS ECONOMIES: HOBBESIAN 'WARRE',

THE ANARCHIC CENTRIFUGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE, AND THE
IMPOSING CENTRIPETAL FORCE OF SUPERSTRUCTURE1
In his 1969 essay Sahlins observed that 'in selecting for a cert
arrangement .. adaptation is normally a principle of non
source use.... The remarkable and world-wide feature
economic performance ... is not how well societies do, but
relation to what they could do' (1969: 30). While he views
mediator between culture and nature, he considers it to be co
regulated in its mediation by established cultural forms.
often 'barriers opposed to the productive forces' or 'fetters u
ductive forces' though they can also be promoters or movers
1 I am adopting the term 'societas' for expository purposes to refer collectiv

ist kin-based societies which Sahlins considers to be organized by the DM
usually lumps together under the rubrics of 'primitive' or 'tribal'.
Sahlins emphasizes that the analyst must recognize the 'contradictions

within the cultural order, resulting in a less-than-optimum relation to
nature' (1969:30). These statements set the theme for his analysis of
production in band and tribal societies.
In Chapter I, 'The Original Affluent Society', Sahlins capitalizes on
recent studies of hunting-gathering societies (especially the Bushmen and
Australian aborigines) to reject the thesis that these peoples lived a uni-
formly hard life, constantly pressed by resource scarcities, and survived
only by economizing in the extreme. His counter-interpretation is that
hunters-gatherers 'work less than we do; and, rather than a continuous
travail, the food quest is intermittent, leisure abundant, and there is a
greater amount of sleep in the daytime per capita per year than in any other
condition of society' (p. 14). This is what he means by the 'original
affluent society'. This notion is rooted in a paradox and strains the meanings
of both 'original' and 'affluent'. Sahlins himself suggests the major drawback
to his tactic of 'reading modern hunters historically, as an evolutionary
base line' (p. 38). All of the cases he examines are from the relatively recent
ethnographic record (e.g. Woodburn on the Hadza, Lee on the Bushmen,
McCarthy and McArthur on the native Australians); none are from the
archaeological record. Given the extent to which all of these cultures have
been substantially influenced by contact with more 'advanced' cultures,
there is no doubt that the 'original affluent society' will have to be
re-thought, at least, for its originality (cf. p. 39).
By 'affluence' Sahlins means a high ratio of leisure time to work; his ana-
lysis of the ethnographic record leads him to conclude that this conditon
prevails in hunting-gathering societies. The figure for average hours worked
at food-connected activities in the Bushman, Hadza, and native Australian
societies is given as on the order of 3-5 hours daily or 15-25 hours week-
ly. These estimates do not include labor and time spent at non-food
related productive activities (e.g. tool manufacture, construction, etc.)
and in the case of the Bushmen they do not include food preparation
activities; but Sahlins does not feel that the availability of such data would
change his interpretation markedly. Moreover, the term 'affluence'
implies that in a hunting-gathering society 'all the peoples' material wants
usually can be easily satisfied' (p. 37) or, as Sahlins expresses it, 'the
"economic problem" is easily solvable by paleolithic techniques' (p. 39).
He admits, however, that the objective standard of living is low and that the
culturally required needs of the population are limited (i.e. 'wants are
scarce and means plentiful' p. 13). Consequently, hunting-gathering
peoples are 'poor' in material possessions but don't suffer from 'poverty'
because their needs and wants are culturally limited so as not to exceed
the results of their productive efforts. In Sahlins' words, 'Want not, lack
not' (p. 11). Those who would accuse Sahlins of a Rousseauian idealiza-
362 SCOTT COOK
tion of primitive society on the basis of this interpretation would appear to

be justified.
When we recall Sahlins' commitment to the anti-economics posture
which eliminates a concern for scarcity regarding means-ends relation-
ships in analyzing a non-market economy, his argument that the hunting-
gathering economy is 'seriously afflicted by the imminence of diminishing
returns' (p. 33) is puzzling. His discussion in support of this argument im-
plies that the real issue of hunting-gathering adaptations is not whether
hunters-gatherers perceive means-ends disparity, but that they do have to
cope regularly with the consequences of limited material means to achieve
their limited ends. This would appear to contradict his 'original affluent
society' thesis and its corollary that the key to understanding the hunting-
gathering adaptation lies in normative restrictions on wants, not in material
restrictions on satisfying them.
I would maintain that the wants of any population are mutually related
to the competing production possibilities confronting it in view of the
resources and procurement techniques at its disposal. If hunters-gatherers
are 'affluent', it is only because of their relative efficiency in relating scarce
means to limited ends, i.e. in successfully resolving the conflicting demands
on time and labor caused by the presence of competing production possi-
bilities. Rather than emphasizing how hunters-gatherers 'underuse their
objective economic possibilities' (p. 17) as Sahlins does, it seems more
appropriate to emphasize how and why labor power and time available to
a given hunting-gathering population are allocated between competing
production possibilities so as to, in effect, preclude the overexploitation of
any given food source. Among hunter-gatherers, it is important to remem-
ber, every allocation of labor (or time) to one procurement activity is
simultaneously a non-allocation to another (one is selected, another is
forgone)-just as in the bourgeois economy, according to Sahlins, 'every
acquisition is simultaneously a deprivation' (p. 4).
To my knowledge, Sahlins first introduced his 'original affluent
society' thesis at the Wenner-Gren conference on hunting and gathering
societies in Chicago in 1966 (see Lee and DeVore, eds. 1968: 85-89) where
it received a mixed reception from the experts. For example, Balikci on the
basis of his research among the Eskimo and Steward on the basis of his
Great Basin research rejected the thesis, while Woodburn (Hadza), Lee
(Bushmen) and others tended to support it. Such disagreement is inevitable,
given the differing ecological/economic situations of various hunting-
gathering populations. Is the issue of 'privation vs. abundance' acceptable
as a legitimate analytical problem ? Probably not. It precludes, for example,
consideration of how and why hunting-gathering populations settled down
in non-hunting-gathering production modes during the course of cultural
evolution. An emphasis on their relative affluence makes it difficult to
explain why they abandoned hunting and gathering if it was so satisfying

a way of life; and it seems to imply that there were no contradictions in the
culture/economy/nature relationship which ultimately propelled such
populations into new production modes. In defense of the thesis, however,
is the fact that while the data are drawn from only a handful of hunting-
gathering societies-all of them 'acculturated' to some degree-they are
the most complete, precise data available from the ethnographic record.
Generally supportive of this thesis, also, is the long-term evolutionary
success (and persistence) of the hunting-gathering adaptation; it supported
homo sapiens for 99 percent of its career on earth as a culture-bearing
species (Lee and DeVore, 1968:3).
In Chapters 2 and 3 Sahlins continues to focus on production as a
theoretical and empirical category by delineating and explicating his con-
cept of 'Domestic Mode of Production' (DMP). We must remember that
he considers the economy in primitive societies to be structurally non-
existent, 'something that generalized social groups and relations, notably
kinship groups and relations, do' (p. 76). It becomes clear in these chapters
that Sahlins employs the concept of'mode of production' idiosyncratically;
he is referring to the organizational hallmarks of entire production 'epochs'
in the evolution of human society (i.e. societas economies vs. civitas econo-
mies) rather than to specific socioeconomic formations within these epochs
(e.g. p. 76). He ignores the crucial distinction between 'socioeconomic
formations' and 'modes of production', as well as the relationship between
concepts subordinate to, implied by and contained within the 'mode of
production' concept (cf. Terray, 1972:177-9 et passim). Consequently, he
circumvents (or rejects) the role of the economic base (i.e. productive
forces + productive relations) as the determining factor within the produc-
tion mode (cf. Terray, 1972: 98). That this is not simply a matter of seman-
tics or oversight but reflects a conscious choice of method by Sahlins to
coincide with his analytical/explanatory program is clear from his reference
to Terray's work (op. cit.). There he discounts the 'theoretical importance
accorded various forms of cooperation ... as constituting corporate struc-
tures in control of productive forces over and against the domestic units'
(p. 76). He thus argues against a position which is fundamental to a
'materialist' approach but incompatible with a 'structuralist' one.
It is obvious that Sahlins is well informed of Terray's critique of struc-
turalism (Terray, 1972:139-41), but has consciously rejected it. Indeed
Sahlins' conceptualization of the DMP (which is very much in the tradi-
tion of Leslie White and other so-called 'cultural-materialists'; see Harris,
1968) precludes his acceptance of the thesis, expressed by Terray and shared
by Marxist scholars, that '. . ."kinship" should not be seen as specific
phases characteristic of modes of production "realized" in "primitive"
socioeconomic formations' (1972:143-4).
364 SCOTT COOK
What precisely does Sahlins mean by 'domestic mode of production'
(i.e. the societas epoch of production) ? Citing as a precedent Karl Biicher's
notion of 'independent domestic economy' (see Biicher, 1901:89-90) he
constructs his own ideal-typical model around the proposition that in
societas economies, 'The household is as such charged with production,
with the deployment and use of labor-power, with the determination of the
economic objective' (p. 77). Sahlins anticipates and addresses himself to
two obvious objections to his model: (1) his identification of 'domestic
group' with 'family' is too loose and imprecise, and (2) the apparent impli-
cation that the 'household everywhere is an exclusive work group, and
production merely a domestic activity' (ibid.). It is possible to sympathize
with Sahlins in regard to the first objection. We must, however, be critical
of his second point which, to reiterate, is the hinge upon which swivels his
selection of the structuralist rather than the materialist paradigm. The
defense he offers to justify his choice (p. 78) is strained and unrealistic-
given considerable ethnographic documentation supporting the view that
man as a producer in societas economies circulates between various produc-
tion units, many of which are not domestic groups. In many societas
economies on record each production unit through which people circulate
is associated with a specific (and not necessarily isomorphic) set of rela-
tions of production, particular rules pertaining to the ownership of the
means of production, to the distribution of total product, and to specific
authority relations (see Thurnwald, 1932; Udy, 1959; Terray, 1972:136-38
et passim). Cooperation in production, contrary to Sahlin's interpretation,
is much more than a technical fact. It is a necessary response to techno-
ecological conditions with structural ramifications for exchange, consump-
tion and distribution.
I will add a third objection to those anticipated by Sahlins: his apparent
assumption that in Tribal Society the production unit is always and every-
where coterminous with the consumption unit. It is plausible that the
former determines the structure of the latter but an exact correspondence
between the two is the exception rather than the rule (see Forde, 1960: 335;
Godelier, 1967: 273-74; Terray 1972:102).
The dynamic of the DMP is seen as an inherent tendency to minimize-
production is regularly low in societas economies relative to existing possi-
bilities. Sahlins proposes that in pre-agricultural and agricultural tribal
economies 'labor power is underused, technological means are not fully
engaged, natural resources are left untapped' (p. 41), and he proceeds to
document this tendency with respect to the underuse of resources and labor
power, and household failure (pp. 43-69). This section of the book demon-
strates Sahlins' skill in manipulating the comparative method since it
requires an extensive knowledge on the part of the analyst of how a given
society hangs together; it lends itself less readily to the 'scientific' extra-
polation of social facts from their total cultural context. In contrast to the
statistical refinements of the HRAF method, Sahlins' method, however,
enables the analyst to ignore contradictory cases or to select those which
reinforce strategic propositions. But it puts the burden of disproof on those
who disagree with its tentative generalizations while providing the possi-
bility of replication with the same or a different sample or cases. It is thus
an effective tool for assembling provisional support for thought-provoking
tentative generalizations, though not for providing or verifying hypotheses.
Given these limitations of method Sahlins has built a convincing case
in defence of his three theses; but there are so many variables involved
and this argument is cast at such a high level of generalization that I
remain skeptical, if respectful. For example, the fact that labor is underused
for food production in a given economy does not mean that it is underused
for non-food producing economic activities. And, of course, the questions
of underuse with regard to which set of criteria, standards of performance,
etc. remain unanswered. Furthermore, this particular proposition assumes
an undifferentiated labor force (except for sex and age) and ignores such
factors as differentiation by occupation or skill. Are all segments of a given
primitive society's labor force underutilized? Sahlins' approach cannot
provide answers to such specific questions. While the proposition that
societas economies generally underuse resources may be a plausible hypo-
thesis for heuristic purposes, I cannot accept Sahlins' thesis that the institu-
tionalized underuse of labor and household failure are uniquely charac-
tersistic of these economies. In fact, it seems to me that both patterns
might be more highly institutionalized in the modern capitalist economy
than in any other (one need only call to mind the perennially high un-
employment rates, not to mention overburdened welfare rolls or high
rates of family indebtedness in the U.S. economy).
Sahlins attempts to explain the underproductive nature of the DMP
theoretically through the isolation and analysis of seven interrelated as-
pects: division of labor, the primitive relation between man and tool,
production for livelihood, Chayanov's rule, property, pooling, and anarchy
and dispersion. He focuses on what he calls 'social relations of production'
in societas economies apart from the 'forces of production', and argues
that in the 'primitive relations of man to tool the balance of these is in
favor of man; with the inception of a "machine age" the balance swings
definitely in favor of the tool' (p. 80). In other words, the social relations
of production (kin-based labor) dominate the forces of production (tools/
technology) in societas economies of the pre-machine age-the key to
understanding the structure and functioning of these economies thus lies
in the recognition of the strategic role of kinship (cf. pp. 80-2).
In this phase of his argument Sahlins has, perhaps, gone too far in
reducing the role of technology in its relationship to population, organiza-
366 SCOTT COOK
tion and environment-which is one of mutual interdependence. He does
not deal with the issue of the interdependence of land use and technological
change in the development of agriculture (see Boserup, 1965:23-7),
and his view that the peasant tiller, whether wielding a digging stick, hoe or
plough, is using the tool rather than being used by it is debatable. One
thing is certain: the peasant tiller works harder physically with these tools
than does the modern farmer with machinery. However, the labor in-
gredient is essential to both technological regimes (i.e. pre-machine and
machine). This point is tangential to his basic argument which is that the
development of societas economy comes as a consequence of political
pressure (p. 82). The obvious question here is, 'But what creates the
"political pressures"?' In one sense the remainder of the book embodies
Sahlins' response, namely, that the dynamic of societas economy and its
gradual transformation to civitas economy lies not in the forces of produc-
tion nor in the economic process generally but in the realm of cultural
superstructure: kinship, politics, ritual.
This returns us to the DMP as a use-production system geared to under-
production. Sahlins draws upon Marx's distinction between 'production
for use' and 'production for exchange' (cf. Marx, 1930: parts 1 and 2).
According to Sahlins, exchanges of material goods are important in
societas economies with the qualification that 'exchange, and the produc-
tion for it, are oriented to livelihood, not to profits' (p. 83). And, unlike
those economies in which production is organized by and for exchange
value, in societas economies-where production for use reigns-produc-
tion is 'discontinuous and irregular, and on the whole sparing of labor
power' (p. 84). The DMP, then, is a cousin to Marx's mode of 'petty
commodity production' or 'simple circulation of commodities'. While
Sahlins excludes 'peasants' from his vision of societas economics, he assures
us that his primitives are like peasants because they 'remain constant
in their pursuit of use values, related always to exchange with an interest
in consumption, so to production with an interest in provisioning' (p. 83).
Therefore, primitives and peasants are historical opposites of bourgeois
entrepreneurs with their interest in profit.
Ambiguity in Sahlins' use of the Marxist terminology emerges here.
Marx discusses 'use-value' as separate and distinct from 'exchange-
value', implying that the former can exist without the latter (at least for
heuristic purposes). In his words:
A thing can be useful and the product of human labour without being a commodity. One
who satisfies his wants with the product of his own labour, makes a use-value but does
not make a commodity... To become a commodity, a product must pass by way of
exchange into the hands of the other person for whom it is a use-value (1930:9-10).
Even in a peasant economy where simple commodity circulation is preva-
lent, it is still appropriate to refer exclusively to 'use-value' when focusing
on products destined for consumption by the producing household. More
specifically, the products of t peasant producer may be considered either
as exchange-values or as use-values depending on their destination-
whether they are consumed within his own household unit or are exchanged
in the marketplace (Galeski, 1972:11).
Marx, however, did not argue (as Sahlins does) that precapitalist
peoples were disinterested in exchange values, nor that the mutual opposi-
tion of use and exchange value continues in simple commodity circulation.
As I understand him, Marx argues that in a system of simple commodity
circulation exchange and use value are best understood as two sides of the
same coin, two necessary components or aspects of one valuational/
circulatory process; without one there is not the other-no value-in-use,
no value-in-exchange and no commodity circulation. It is not necessarily
true that in a system of simple commodity circulation a product having
use-value to its producer must have exchange-value to a non-producer if,
in fact, its value is to be realized. It is true, on the other hand, that a
product having exchange-value to its producer (i.e. non use-value) must
have use-value to a non-producer if, in fact, it is to enter into circulation
as a commodity. As the above quote by Marx indicates: a 'commodity' is
a material product which combines value-in-use (for the non-producer)
with value-in-exchange (for the producer; cf. Marx 1930:17 et passim).
Sahlins correctly notes that commodities circulate in both precapitalist
and capitalist economies but he fails to point out that this means that
precapitalists are interested in value-in-exchange as well as value-in-use
(cf. Marx 1930:156-7).
What makes peasants and primitives unlike the capitalist is not that they
lack an interest in exchange value while he is dedicated to its acquisition,
as Sahlins contends, but rather their disinterest in 'processional value'
while he is dedicated to its acquisition. To quote Marx:
In simple circulation, the value of commodities acquires nothing more than the inde-
pendent form of money as confronting their use-values; but now, in the circuit,
M-C-M, in the circulation of capital, this same value suddenly presents itself as
substance endowed with an independent motion of its own, a substance of which com-
modities and money are themselves merely forms.... Value thus becomes processional
value [my italics] ... and as such capital. It falls out of circulation, and then returns to
circulation, maintains itself and multiplies itself in circulation, comes back out of
circulation enlarged, and is always beginning the same circuit over and over again.
By and large, precapitalist peoples are not pursuers of 'processional value';

but this does not mean that they are innocent of M-C-M' types of
transactions (e.g. Godelier, 1971:65-69). Sahlins, if I interpret his argu-
ment correctly, is unwilling to admit this.
I would argue that Marx's 'simple circulation of commodities' is a
368 SCOTT COOK
process which is much more widespread in precapitalist tribal economies
than Sahlins is able or willing to admit. With his DMP model Sahlins
seeks to reduce societas economies to a degree of unity, of operational
simplicity which, in reality, they do not possess. They are not structural
opposites of civitas economies of the capitalist variety, displaying none of
the operational principles or features, even in embryonic form, of the
latter. Marx himself clearly recognized that the germs of the capitalist
mode of production are found in precapitalist economic formations (cf.
1930:156-57 et passim). Maurice Godelier in his analysis of production
and exchange of salt among the Baruya of New Guinea has expressed this
succinctly as follows:
'Primitive', therefore, does not mean 'simple'. Primitive reality contains not only the
germ of some of the conditions, i.e., of the complexity of the future, but it often shows
'developed' forms of social practices, the 'analogue' of which is to be found in other
periods of historical evolution (1971:68).
In sum, Sahlins' view of the DMP as encompassing the 'production of

use values' with an inherent 'antisurplus principle' (i.e. not organized to
produce an output above the producers' requirements) strips societas
economies of their internal complexity and dynamics; it makes it impossible
for us to identify and analyze what makes these economies grow, change,
diversify or undergo transformation. Sahlins has taken a highly differen-
tiated range of societies, lumped them together under one rubric, DMP,
and locked them into an underproducing 'production for use' routine
with predictable results: limited goals, limited use of resources and labor,
limited output.
In A. V. Chayanov's work (1966) dealing with the pre-Bolshevik Russian
peasantry Sahlins finds statistical and theoretical support for his under-
production thesis. Chayanov's analysis (originally published in Russian in
1925) of 25 Russian farm families resulted in the formulation of the follow-
ing proposition which Sahlins refers to as Chayanov's rule: 'the intensity
of labor in a system of domestic production for use varies inversely with
the relative working capacity of the producing unit' (p. 91) or, more simply,
'in the community of domestic producing groups, the greater the relative
working capacity of the household the less its members work' (p. 87).
Using this 'rule' as a point of departure Sahlins analyses in some detail
statistics of domestic group output in various tribal economies to document
the thesis that a '. . . social system has a specific structure and inflection
of household labor intensity, deviating in a characteristic way and extent
from the Chayanov line of normal intensity' (p. 103). His analysis depends
upon graphical and statistical procedures to exhibit deviations from the
Chayanov line. He finds significant variation in labor intensity and house-
hold productivity in the economies examined-those families with
manpower shortages underproducing and those with an abundance of

manpower overproducing. The underproducers and overproducers are
linked together in one system which is organized along kinship and political
lines. Different kinship systems and political systems, according to Sahlins,
have differential impacts on economic activity in tribal societies; they
always operate to counter the tendency toward 'anarchy and dispersion'
in the DMP-but some lead to more economic intensification (i.e. higher
productivity) than others. This is a matter for empirical determination, and
Sahlins makes an effort toward it under the limitations imposed by the
ethnographic record. Unfortunately, he is vague about the role of popula-
tion growth in the intensification of production under the DMP but
apparently sees it as a dependent variable with political organization as the
prime mover (p. 130).
Overall, Sahlins' analysis in this section of the book is impressive. If
one accepts his basic conception of the DMP and its inherent propensity
toward 'anarchy and dispersion', then the results should be tentatively
satisfying. An indication of the high level of generalization to which
Sahlins' analysis leads him is provided by the extent to which he relies
upon the thought of the social contract philosophers Hobbes and
Rousseau for intellectual precedents. It is ironic to find Sahlins, on the
one hand, chiding anthropologists of the 'formalist school' for detaching
the 'principle of individual maximization from its bourgeois context' and
spreading it 'around the world' (thereby pitting the individual against
society) while, on the other, resurrecting the atomized, fragmented,
anarchic 'state of nature' model of human society from the pages of Hobbes'
Leviathan (thereby pitting individual against individual in the 'war of all
against all'). This latter model, according to Sahlins, reflects the 'essence'
of primitive society but not its 'appearance' (p. 95). And in a series of
paragraphs which contain some of the most obscure prose in Sahlins'
repertory (e.g. 'economically, primitive society is founded on an anti-
society', p. 86; 'Considered on its own terms, as a structure of production,
the DMP is a species of anarchy', p. 95) he elaborates on this statement.
This culminates in what he candidly terms his 'wildest point of speculation'
with thle assertion that '... the deeper structure of the economy, the
domestic mode of production, is like the state of nature, and the charac-
teristic movement of the latter is also its own' (p. 97).
Whatever else may be said of these arguments, it is clear that they are
creatures of a fundamentally anti-materialist theoretical orientation. A
historical materialist looking at the production infrastructure of any
society would expect to find contradictions, as well as correspondences,
between base or infrastructure, structure and superstructure. He would
emphasize that a transformation of the basic pattern of relationships
between these sectors of a sociocultural system can be initiated in any
370 SCOTT COOK
sector-but cannot be consummated until conditions internal to all of

the others are altered. The materialist bias, of course, is that such trans-
formative changes are usually initiated within the infrastructure (forces of
production) and there is considerable historical, ethnographic and archaeo-
logical data to reinforce it. Sahlins, in arguing that the infrastructure is
uniformly a source of dispersal, fragmentation and stagnation (centrifugal
forces)-an arena where deviations from the systemic status quo are regu-
larly counteracted rather than amplified-and that transformative change
must be initiated outside of the infrastructure, is turning the materialist
paradigm upside down.
In the Marxist tradition the production infrastructure of society is seen
as the locus of social cooperation. Social production is the fundamental
prerequisite for the existence and reproduction of society itself, and is the
distinguishing feature between human society and animal aggregations
(Cook, 1973a: 35-41). Needless to say, Sahlins' Hobbesian view of the 'state
of nature' of human society-with the negative role it assigns to the pro-
duction infrastructure in sociocultural dynamics-stands in direct op-
position to the Marxist view.
III. EXCHANGE IN SOCIETAS ECONOMIES: SUPERSTRUCTURE

TRIUMPHANT
Like the formalists in economic anthropology whose w

Sahlins approaches economics and the role of economy
the relations of exchange and distribution rather than
and relations of production. Structure and superstructu
locus of society, emerge for him through exchange
these, in turn, impose themselves upon the anti-soc
production. He has thus inverted the cultural mat
model of society-superstructure is base, society is s
top down (ideology-sociopolitical structure-techno-e
ture). This, in a nutshell, is the message of the secon
Economics (chs. 4-6) which deals with exchange and dist
in tribal society.
Quite appropriately, this half of the book begins with
'The Spirit of the Gift'-an extended commentary o
contribution to the study of exchange which emph
the Maori hau (i.e. force or spirit of reciprocity). The t
tions of this chapter, which is essentially a sophisticate
graphic clarification, are twofold: (1) to emphasize
economic anthropology of Mauss' concept of 'total
1954: 3-4 et passim) which views trade in primitive soc
social reality, so that each social activity, like trading,
ings and functions; and (2) to emphasize the fact that a
tion involving a material flow is also a social transaction and that 'every
exchange, as it embodies some coefficient of sociability, cannot be under-
stood in its material terms apart from its social terms' (p. 183). These two
propositions reinforce Sahlins' position that the 'economy' cannot be
posited as a heuristic category for the analysis of primitive society because
the latter is a generalized totality (pp. 181-2).
The second of these propositions is given extensive ethnographic docu-
mentation and theoretical elaboration in Chapter 5 'On the Sociology of
Primitive Exchange'-an essay that has been standard reading in graduate
courses in economic anthropology since it was originally published in
1965. In this long and ambitious essay Sahlins reduces Polanyi's tripartite
scheme of transactional modes (reciprocity, redistribution, market ex-
change) into two basic types: reciprocity (vice-versa movements between
two parties), and pooling or redistribution (centralized movements in-
volving 'collection from members of a group, often under one hand, and
redivision within this group', p. 168). Following Polanyi, he points out that
redistribution is a system of reciprocities associated with collective action
within a social unit, as distinct from the reciprocity system which is asso-
ciated with individual action between two parties. The redistribution system
implies social unity and centricity, while the reciprocity system implies
social duality and symmetry. In both, however, Sahlins' rule is operative,
namely, that 'a material transaction is usually a momentary episode in a
continuous social relation' (pp. 185-6).
Sahlins' 'scheme of reciprocities', a continuum that takes as its major
criterion the stipulation of material returns (i.e. the 'spirit of exchange'
moves from disinterested concern for the other party to mutuality of self-
interest), enables him to impose order on the ethnographic diversity of
transactional modes. It is essentially a descriptive synthesis of insights
culled from the works of Malinowski, Mauss, Thurnwald, Polanyi and
White, and serves to some extent as Sahlins' pigeonholing supplement to
the familiar Bands-Tribes-Chiefdom-State (societas to civitas) typology of
precapitalist societies. He seems to prefer to identify these societies in
terms of a series of exchange criteria (transactional modes) rather than in
terms of production criteria (modes of production).
The typological continuum is defined by its poles and its midpoint as
follows: (1) generalized reciprocity, the solidary extreme involving un-
stipulated reciprocation; (2) balanced reciprocity, the midpoint, involving
direct reciprocation with time and equivalency stipulation; and (3)
negative reciprocity, the unsociable extreme, involving a two-party con-
frontation in which each party seeks to maximize utility at the other's
expense. He also proposes and documents a relationship between types
of reciprocities and kinship distance, suggesting that reciprocity is inclined
toward the generalized extreme by close kinship and toward the negative
372 SCOTT COOK
extreme in proportion to an increase in kinship distance; and that it varies

with other factors such as social rank, relative wealth and need, and type
of goods.
In reworking the Polanyi scheme of transactional modes what Sahlins
gains in codification and clarification of reciprocity systems (balanced vs.
generalized reciprocity is a distinct improvement over Polanyi's 'reciproca-
tive sequence among fixed partners', Polanyi et al. 1957:vii-ix), he loses
in his handling of 'market exchange' or the 'random market sequence'
(Polanyi et al. ibid.). Here he lumps together such diverse activities as
haggling, barter, gambling, chicanery, theft, and other varieties of seizure
under the rubric of 'negative reciprocity, the unsociable extreme' (p. 195).
As he expresses it: '. . negative reciprocity is the attempt to get something
for nothing with impunity, the several forms of appropriation, transactions
opened and conducted toward net utilitarian advantage' (ibid.); also, he
says it is the 'most impersonal sort of exchange' where the parties are seek-
ing to 'maximize utility at the other's expense', their ultimate aim being an
'unearned increment' (ibid.).
The original Polanyi group's approach to 'market exchange' is, I
believe, operationally more sound and more precise than Sahlins' revision.
They argued, among other things, that the distinctiveness of this transac-
tional mode is its randomness, a relative lack of predictability as to the
identity of the parties who confront each other on any given occasion.
This has the merit of calling attention to the problem of the derandomiza-
tion of market exchange which often operates situationally (e.g. trading
partnerships of the 'pratik' variety; regularized inter-village trade in
periodic or sectional systems, etc.). Moreover, in many of the ethnographic
situations encompassed by economic anthropology-especially in the
monetized peasant-artisan market economies where petty commodity
circulation (C-M-C') is the rule-it is simply not true, as Sahlins im-
plies, that the typical transaction is one in which parties are out to make
a profit or to maximize gain. On the contrary, the prevailing strategy in
such situations is often to convert embodied labor power into cash and to
reconvert the latter into complementary goods or services; this is best
understood as a strategy of minimizing loss rather than maximizing gain
(cf. Cook 1970:789 et passim).
Finally, the thesis that market exchange is less social, sociable or per-
sonal than reciprocity is untenable. Surely, we must realize that coopera-
tion and competition, hostility and friendliness, altruism and greed are
potentially operative, if not uniformly manifest, in all human transactional
situations-even when the latter are exclusively affairs between kinsmen.
Sahlins seems to acknowledge this when he says that 'vice-versa movements
in the ethnographic record do grade into each other along the whole span'
but he thinks the continuum is salvageable if 'one can specify social or
economic circumstances that impel reciprocity toward one or another of

the stipulated positions. . .' (p. 196). He believes that this can be accom-
plished and, admittedly, he has assembled significant, if inconclusive,
evidence to reinforce his belief. The challenge for those who disagree has
been formidably presented. Finally, Sahlins' digression on the origin of
money (pp. 226-30) provides one thought-provoking illustration of the
potential utility of his scheme in generating research.
The ultimate usefulness of Sahlins' approach to the comparative study
of exchange depends in large part on the extent to which one accepts his
'structural substantivist' conceptualization of the economy. His distinc-
tion between 'instrumental' (non-utilitarian) and 'utilitarian' exchanges
(i.e. those in which material flows are not commensurate and immediate
material interests of the transacting parties not served, and those in which
they are) is an outgrowth of his view that 'exchange in primitive communi-
ties has not the same role as the economic flow in modern industrial
communities', and that the 'place of transaction in the total economy
different: under primitive conditions it is more detached from production
less firmly hinged to production in an organic way' (p. 187). In support of
this generalization he asserts that primitive exchange is less involved than
'modern exchange in the acquisition of means of production, more in
volved with the redistribution of finished goods through the community'
(ibid.). This is a difficult thesis to substantiate. In any case, Sahlins'
contention that exchange is differently related to production and has
different role in 'primitive' and 'modern' economies is untenable. In a
economies the exchange of material goods must be preceded by their
production, just as inevitably as their distribution and consumption must
be preceded by their exchange, even if on an intrahousehold basis. The
flows may be subject to significant spatial and temporal differentials whic
affect the relationships between the component processes accordingly
(e.g. almost no gap between production and consumption in hunting
gathering economies but progressively longer gaps in agricultural and
industrial economies), but the sequence itself is fundamental and invariant
(Cook, 1973a: 31-2). For example, the transfer of objects which have cere-
monial or symbolic value only and which may have been produced o
appropriated in the past, is by no means restricted to 'primitive' econo
mies-though, perhaps, it might be true, if the data were available to prove
it, that proportionally speaking these transactions loom larger in pre
capitalist economies than they do in capitalist economies.
It is clear, in retrospect, that whatever influence the work of the Polanyi
substantivists has had on Sahlins' 'sociology of primitive exchange' the
admirable programmatic concern (which rarely carried over into thei
research) for reducing abstract concepts to a series of empirically identi-
fiable referents has not been emulated by him. In Stone Age Economic
374 SCOTT COOK
he never penetrates beneath the abstract level of 'institutions' to expo

the underlying reality of concrete behavior where specific human beings,
as individuals or in groups, think and act. In the introduction to Trade an
Markets in the Early Empires (Polanyi et al. 1957) a distinction is ma
between goods-handling and goods-receiving processes, and the recom
mendation is made that certain questions be asked of ethnographic ca
(e.g. 'Who passed on goods to whom, in what order, how often, and w
what response among those listed under whom?' (p. vii)). Until these a
many more related questions, framed in a similar spirit of operationalism
are asked of the ethnographic record and in ethnographic work, provision
generalizations of the kind Sahlins offers will remain provisional indeed.
The erudite final chapter in Stone Age Economics entitled 'Exchang
Value and the Diplomacy of Primitive Trade' is an exploratory probe into
largely uncharted territory. The central problem here is to determine th
nature of so-called 'equivalences' in precapitalist trade (i.e. rates of ex
change)-how they are arrived at, under what conditions they fluctuat
how they can be explained. In short, this essay contains Sahlins' contribu-
tion to that esoteric branch of comparative catallactics known as axiology
(i.e. the study of exchange values).
The material covered here is more specific to Melanesia than in preced-
ing chapters; his ethnographic sample is limited to three cases: the Vitiaz
Straits and Huon Gulf systems of New Guinea, and the intertribal tra
chain of northern Queensland, Australia. In the first half of the essa
Sahlins carefully describes and analyzes these 'areal exchange networ
in terms of an anthropological version of the supply/demand framework
goods circulate pretty much in accordance with supply/demand principles
their value in exchange increasing as they pass from areas where they are
produced (abundant-low demand) to areas where they are not produc
(scarce-high demand). Both an economic and ecological rationality is
operative here. The only apparent exception to this is the Huon Gu
where exchange values for various goods produced at various places
the system are not directly inferrable from lineal supply/demand relatio
ships but are determined through a system-wide supply/demand network
(complete with delayed feedback processes) which Sahlins explains (pp
290-4).
Once this exercise is completed Sahlins warns the reader that nothing of
any substance has really been explained about these trading systems
because '. .. the competitive mechanisms by which supply and demand are
understood to determine price in the marketplace do not exist in primitive
trade' (p. 297). What he means is that supply/demand analysis is applicable
only to situations of 'pure competition' which do not exist in the primitive
economies under analysis. So, he reasons, the fact that the forces of supply
and demand do seem to be operative there is a mystery. While I will not
'STRUCTURAL
'STRUCTURALSUBSTANTIVISM'
SUBSTANTIVISM'375 375
quibble
quibbleabout
aboutthe
the
degree
degree
to which
to which
supply/demand
supply/demand
analysis
analysis
'explains'
'explains'
anything
anythingabout
aboutthe
the
Melanesian
Melanesian
or any
or any
otherother
empirical
empirical
situation,
situation,
my under-
my under-
standing
standingisisthat
thatit it
is is
certainly
certainly
applicable
applicable
to market
to market
situations
situations
deviating
deviating
substantially
substantiallyfrom
fromthethe
'pure
'pure
competition'
competition'
modelmodel
(i.e. such
(i.e.assuch
'imperfectly
as 'imperfectly
competitive'
competitive'market
marketsituations
situations
ranging
ranging
fromfrom
oligopoly/oligopsony
oligopoly/oligopsony
to to
monopoly/monopsony);
monopoly/monopsony); andand
thatthat
it can
it partially
can partially
enhance
enhance
our under-
our under-
standing
standingof
ofsuch
such
situations,
situations,
if not
if not
adequately
adequately
explain
explain
them. them.
Most Most
importantly,
importantly,itsits
use
use
exposes
exposes
andand
raises
raises
manymany
questions
questions
and problems
and problems
for for
further
furtherinvestigation.
investigation.
In
In any
anycase
caseone
oneshould
shouldnotnot
expect
expect
an explanation
an explanation
of sociocultural
of sociocultural
process process
from
from supply/demand
supply/demand analysis
analysis
which,
which,
afterafter
all, isall,
simply
is simply
a logical-deductive
a logical-deductive
tool
tool kit
kitfor
fordealing
dealingwith
with
price-quantity
price-quantity
behaviour.
behaviour.
All of All
the of
so-called
the so-called
exogenous
exogenousvariables
variables
covered
covered
under
under
the the
ceteris
ceteris
paribus
paribus
(other (other
things things
remaining
remainingequal)
equal)rubric
rubric
areare
precisely
precisely
thosethose
whichwhich
are fundamental
are fundamental
in any in any
sociocultural
socioculturalexplanation
explanation
of of
economic
economic
behaviour.
behaviour.
What What
is therefore
is therefore
sur- sur-
prising
prisingisisthe
theextent
extent
to to
which
which
supply/demand
supply/demand
paradigm
paradigm
served served
Sahlins Sahlins
in in
delimiting
delimitingbasic
basicproblems
problems forfor
analysis
analysis
and provided
and provided
him with
himpartial
with partial
theoretical
theoreticalorientation.
orientation. In fact,
In fact,
thisthis
analysis-in
analysis-in
whichwhich
SahlinsSahlins
replacesreplaces
'economizing'
'economizing'with
with'generosity'
'generosity'
as the
as the
institionalized
institionalized
behavioral
behavioral
pro- pro-
pellant
pellantof
ofexchange
exchangeso so
as to
as demonstrate
to demonstrate
hoW hoW
it affects
it affects
patterns
patterns
of goodsof goods
exchange
exchangebetween
betweentrading
trading
partners
partners
in societas
in societas
economies-could
economies-could
not not
have
have been
beenperformed
performedwithout
without
the the
use of
usethe
of supply/demand
the supply/demand
paradigm
paradigm
as a heuristic tool.
To support his interpretation of the fundamental non-market character
of Melanesian trade, Sahlins says that competitive bidding, haggling, and
similar business-like price-determining kinds of behaviour are only spora-
dic and occasional (pp. 298-9) and, indeed, that there are no markets in
aboriginal Melanesia (or, for that matter, in other archaic societies)
(pp. 300-1). He criticizes the Bohannan and Dalton thesis that the 'market
principle' (Bohannan and Dalton, 1962, cf. Belshaw, 1965: 6-9) was peri-
pherally present in pre-industrial African societies on the grounds that
'market exchange' as a 'mode of economic organization' (as opposed to a
'form of economic transaction') is universally absent from societas
economies (ibid.).
In reaction to Sahlins' argument points can be made. First, by definition
'market exchange' of the specific type Sahlins refers to is restricted to
capitalist economies-but there are 'markets' and 'market principles'
at work in precapitalist aboriginal economies nevertheless. Secondly,
reciprocity, redistribution and market exchange often integrate an econo-
my only partially, are not mutually exclusive transactional modes, and
often operate together in the same economy (cf. Thurnwald, 1932). I
agree with Salisbury that these '. . are not terms that characterize
"entire economies" or "modes of integration", nor are they terms which
376 SCOTT COOK
fit economies into a unilineal progression from "primitive" to "archaic"
to "market"' (1968:480) as Sahlins, following Polanyi, implies. Finally,
in his 'either/or' argument (market or non-market) Sahlins seems to pre-
clude investigation of what many scholars, including Polanyi, would con-
sider to be one of the central problems of comparative economic inquiry-
the emergence in human society of the 'market' in its locational, trans-
actional and allocational dimensions. Indeed, his failure to separate out
these various dimensions of the market concept precludes the possibility
of his contributing toward our understanding of this central problem.
Two decades ago Melville Herskovits observed that exchange ratios in
non-monetary economies are customarily not negotiated by trading
partners, but emphasized that this did not mean that all goods in these
economies ipso facto change hands without deviation from prevailing
schedules of equivalences (1952: 210-11). Sahlins looks into this significant
indeterminacy in Melanesian exchanges where similar products change
hands at different ratios in different transactions. He documents how in
specific cases this variability of exchange values reflects sensitivity to forces
of supply and demand in the long run, but only as these operate through-
out the entire network of trading relations. For example, in the Huon Gulf
trade network the relative value of one village's pots for another's taro
'represents the respective demands of these goods in the Huon Gulf as a
whole' (p. 291) rather than the respective demands generated only by the
two trading populations. As a general rule, however, he argues that short-
run supply/demand disequilibrium in Melanesian partnership trade is
balanced by pressure on trade partners rather than on exchange rates. That
is, the latter remain constant and the goods flow in the direction of either
the giving or the receiving partner, depending on the nature of the dis-
equilibrium. If the situation becomes intolerable for either partner (as it
probably does quite often), the relationship may be renegotiated or
terminated, with each partner entering into new negotiations with new
partners (pp. 311-12).
What Sahlins seems to suggest in this discussion is a fundamental
opposition between 'trading partnerships' and 'market processes'-that the
former are exclusive to and operative only in 'primitive' (non-market,
non-monetized) economies; and that they operate as 'functional counter-
parts' of the 'market's price mechanism' (p. 311)-implying that they
cannot serve meaningful functions within the context of monetized market
economies. This argument overlooks the fact that trade partnerships are
found in monetized peasant market economies as adaptations to the risk
and uncertainties of competitive trading. One classic ethnographic example
of this is the pratik relationship of Haiti (Mintz, 1967: 100). In other
words, given the widespread ethnographic documentation and analysis of
trade partnerships in a variety of non-Melanesian tribal and peasant
economies (see Cook, 1973b), Sahlins' leap in generalizing on the role of
trade partnerships in affecting terms of trade, from a few Melanesian cases
to Primitive Society, is unwarranted. His proposed explanation should,
nevertheless, be given appropriate attention in any future effort to achieve
an analysis and synthesis of data on trade partnerships and exchange
values in precapitalist trade.
IV. IN RETROSPECT AND CONCLUSION: THE 'FROZEN DIALECTIC'

AND 'STRUCTURAL SUBSTANTIVISM'
In retrospect, Stone Age Economics is by no means a perfect b

is original, erudite and provocative. Disappointingly it is not
tion toward the reconciliation of the scope and method controve
apparently, will continue to plague economic anthropological
It is a sophisticated variation on the themes of Polanyi's sub
certainly the most formidable exercise in economic anthropologi
sis yet presented under the banner of the 'master's' thought.
important works by 'bourgeois' cultural anthropologists it suffe
overdose of eclecticism; virtuosity in style and thought, the
penchant for idiosyncrasy in word and concept, often override a
maintain continuity with the collective tradition of the commun
and present scholarly colleagues and the self-effacing, consis
matic, integrated intellectual craftsmanship this implies.
The result is a lack of integration and continuity in analys
planation, a suggestion of planned circumvention of some tr
issues, which is debilitating though not fatal. Sahlins fails, for e
link forces and relations of production with exchange/distrib
tions; he bifurcates his analysis (i.e. production here, exchang
tion there) just as the book itself is bifurcated into two separate
clusters (1-3 on production, 4-6 on exchange/distribution). T
other things, reflects his failure to develop at the outset a comp
systematic and operationally sound conceptualization of th
field'-a task which is, in effect, excluded a priori by his st
orientation.
Perhaps it is not stretching this critique too far to categor
among those cultural anthropologists whom Eric Wolf has ch
as seeing 'cultural forms as so limiting that they have tended
entirely the element of human manoeuver which flows thro
forms or around them, presses against their limits or plays seve
forms against the middle' (1959: 142). What are Sahlins' 'socia
'institutions', 'social structures', 'lineage orders', or 'socio-cu
tems' apart from concrete human behavior in empirically s
situations ? At no point in Stone Age Economics has he defined t
nature of these implicit forms. Culture is reducible to symbolic
378 SCOTT COOK
of concrete human action; but we must always remember that people, as

individuals and in groups, establish and participate in social relations of
production which, in turn, generate culture (structure and superstructure).
In conclusion, I can agree with Sahlins that'... in its bourgeois form the
process (of exchange) is not general, while in its general form it is not
bourgeois' (p. 314) but I cannot accept the ultimate implication of his
'frozen dialectic' of endless opposition, contradiction, incompatibility and
irreconcilability between putative precapitalist and capitalist economic
forms. His method posits a thesis and antithesis but no interplay between
them which yields mutual interpenetration or synthesis. Contrary to the
thrust of his argument throughout Stone Age Economics, the various
precapitalist and capitalist modes of production and exchange were not
born from separate origins and did not develop in mutual isolation; rather
they have diverged and converged in cotplex ways which elude explana-
tion by a method of negation which rejects the interpenetration of oppo-
sites. Stone Age Economics, in essence, embodies the unsynthesized theses
and antitheses of a new eclectic approach in economic anthropological
thought-'structural substantivism.'
REFERENCES
Belshaw, Cyril S. (1965), Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets. Engl

N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Bohannan, Paul and George Dalton (1962) 'Introduction' to Markets in Africa, Bohan-
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Boserup, Ester (1965) The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. Chicago/New York:
Aldine-Atherton.
Bucher, Carl (1901) Industrial Evolution. New York: Holt.
Chayanov, A. V. (1966) The Theory of Peasant Economy. Homewood, Ill.: Irwin.
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Cook, Scott (1966) 'The Obsolete "Anti-Market" Mentality: A Critique of the Substan-
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Oaxaca, Mexico: An Analytical Essay in Economic Anthropology'. American Anthro-
pologist, 72:776-801.
--(1973a) 'Production, Ecology and Economic Anthropology: Notes Toward an
Integrated Frame of Reference'. Social Science Information, XII, 1:25-52.
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Dalton George (1969) 'Theoretical Issues in Economic Anthropology'. Current Anthro-
pology, 10:63-102.
Edel, Matthew (1969) 'Economic Analysis in an Anthropological Setting: Some
Methodological Considerations'. American Anthropologist, 71:421-33.
Forde, Daryll (with Mary Douglas) (1960) 'Primitive Economics'. In Man, Culture and
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Press.
Godelier, Maurice (1967) Racionalidad e Irracionalidad en la Economia. Mexico City:
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Interrelations, ed. W. F. Ogburn and A. A. Goldenweiser, pp. 10-23. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin.
Harris, Marvin (1968) The Rise of Anthropological Theory. New York: Crowell.
Herskovits, M. J. (1940) The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples. New York: Knopf.
- (1952) Economic Anthropology. New York: Knopf.
Kaplan, David (1968) 'The Formal-Substantive Controversy in Economic Anthropology:
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LeClair, E. E., Jr. (1969) Comments on Dalton's Review Article. Current Anthropolog
10:86.
LeClair, E. E., Jr. and Schneider, Harold K. eds. (1968) Economic Anthropology:
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Lee, Richard and Irven DeVore, eds. (1968) Man the Hunter. Chicago: Aldine.
Marx, Karl (1930) Capital. Vol. I. New York: Dutton.
Mauss, Marcel (1954) The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Society,
trans. Ian Cunnison. London: Cohen and West.
Mintz, Sidney (1967) 'Pratik: Haitian Personal Economic Relationships'. In Peasant
Society: a Reader, ed. Potter, J. M. et al., pp. 98-109. Boston: Little, Brown.
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Polanyi, Karl et al., eds. (1957) Trade and Market in the Early Empires. Glencoe, Ill.
Free Press.
Sahlins, Marshall D. (1969) 'Economic Anthropology and Anthropological Economics'.
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New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
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Thurnwald, Richard (1932) Economics in Primitive Communities. London: Oxford
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Review: 'Structural Substantivism': A Critical Review of Marshall Sahlins' Stone Age

The University of Connecticut

I. INTRODUCTION: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND WHAT

Embodying the Wisdom of native bourgeois categories formal economics flourishes as

In Sahlins' version of substantivism Polanyi's 'market mentality' bogey is

II. PRODUCTION IN SOCIETAS ECONOMIES: HOBBESIAN 'WARRE',

1 I am adopting the term 'societas' for expository purposes to refer collectiv

Sahlins emphasizes that the analyst must recognize the 'contradictions

tion of primitive society on the basis of this interpretation would appear to

explain why they abandoned hunting and gathering if it was so satisfying

Even in a peasant economy where simple commodity circulation is preva-

By and large, precapitalist peoples are not pursuers of 'processional value';

In sum, Sahlins' view of the DMP as encompassing the 'production of

manpower shortages underproducing and those with an abundance of

sector-but cannot be consummated until conditions internal to all of

III. EXCHANGE IN SOCIETAS ECONOMIES: SUPERSTRUCTURE

Like the formalists in economic anthropology whose w

extreme in proportion to an increase in kinship distance; and that it varies

economic circumstances that impel reciprocity toward one or another of

he never penetrates beneath the abstract level of 'institutions' to expo

IV. IN RETROSPECT AND CONCLUSION: THE 'FROZEN DIALECTIC'

In retrospect, Stone Age Economics is by no means a perfect b

of concrete human action; but we must always remember that people, as

Belshaw, Cyril S. (1965), Traditional Exchange and Modern Markets. Engl

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