Drought and Mexico's Struggle for Independence

Author(s): Susan L. Swan

Source: Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), pp. 54-62
Published by: Forest History Society and American Society for Environmental History
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 and
Mexico's Struggle
for
Independence

Susan L. Swan
Washington State University

In an agricultural economy, perhaps no other environmental factor is

of such concern as bad weather. Problems like poor soil, pests, para-
sites, and diseases can often be related to weather conditions. How
directly can human events be related to weather?

For some researchers, the connection is direct. H. H. Lamb, for

example, links Viking colonization of Iceland, Greenland, and North
America with a warming trend from A.D. 400-1200, a trend that peaked
about A.D. 800-1000. On the other hand, E. L. Ladurie is more cau-
tious regarding the influence of weather on human events and doubts,
for example, whether meteorological conditions during the "Little
Ice Age" (circa 1590-1850) had significant impact on agriculture in
Europe.1

Nevertheless, there are places and times in history when the

temptation to link weather conditions and human events is strong.
One such period is the early years of struggle for Mexico's indepen-
dence. As in other Latin American countries, revolution broke out in
54
Mexico at the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century.
Elsewhere, however, the struggle for independence was led by
American-born upper-class Creoles. But in Mexico, although the ini-
tial movement was led by a middle class Creole priest, Miguel Hidalgo
y Costilla, it soon took on the tones of class warfare. The result
was that Mexico's Creoles turned against the revolution and helped
delay independence for a decade, until 1821. Father Hidalgo could
count on only fourteen workers from his pottery factory and thirty-
one soldiers from the local Regiment of the Queen. The question,
then, is why this modest beginning exploded into an army of 80,000
proverty-stricken Indians.2 Without those untidy, illiterate
peasants, the Hidalgo revolt would have remained a mere incident
relegated to an historical footnote. Why, then, did the masses rise?
In response to revolutionary rhetoric? To follow Hidalgo's charisma-
tic leadership? In class hatred against the Spaniard? Probably none
of these was as much a factor as something far more prosaic: the
weather.

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 This theory is not new. In the late 1960s, Mexican economic
historian Enrique Florescano suggested that the revolution for inde-
pendence began as a result of a sustained thirty-year increase in
the price of maize, which meant also an increase in the price of
other cereals and of meat. Florescano arrived at this hypothesis by
graphing maize prices from 1708-1810. Comparing his graphs with
those of William Beveridge for European wheat prices -- graphs which
Beveridge connected with European weather conditions -- Florescano
was able to assess the impact of weather conditions in Mexico. He
proposed that the revolutionary outbreak of 1810 was in response to
an agricultural crisis caused by severe droughts in 1808 and 1809,
the latter of which affected nearly all of Mexico's cereal-producing
zones.3

Unfortunately, weather data are limited for colonial Mexico. 4

Where weather data are available for the period, they support the
thesis that weather conditions affected Mexico's revolutionary move-
ment. This is true, for example, of documents pertaining to the
hacienda of Tulancalco. Letters between the property's administrator
and its owners indicate that there was drought from 1808 to 1811 in
north central Mexico. 5

Another reason this material is significant is because it is

doubtful whether economic hardship spread over a generation, as
Florescano proposed, could spark revolution. Rather, a sudden econo-
mic disaster over a three or four-year period would incite rebellion.
What happened in 1810 was that a very minor revolt, which might other-
wise have been quickly forgotten, became a major conflagration due to
the desperation of hungry men. And chronic dissatisfaction with their
lot on the part of the masses, which might otherwise have produced no
more than scattered food riots, found focus in the revolutionary
rhetoric of Miguel Hidalgo. The marriage of the two resulted in the
opening guns of Mexico's struggle for independence, but had it not
been for severe drought from 1808-1811, those cannons may have been
no more than popguns.

Data from the hacienda of Tulancalco underscore this, for the

property itself lay within the area of revolutionary violence.
Located in the semiarid to arid Mezquital near the town of Actopan in
Hidalgo state, Tulancalco was chronically short of water. Neverthe-
less the hacienda yielded a variety of staples, such as maize, barley,
turnips, and frijoles. But the mainstay of the hacienda was maguey,
the plant used to produce the intoxicant, pulque. Livestock produc-
tion consisted of sheep, horses, burros, mules, and goats. 55

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 Although drought was chronic at Tulancalco, the situation
worsened when the rainy season changed about 1808. The wet season not
only came a bit earlier, probably foiling established planting customs,
but even worse, was shorter as well. For example, from 1799 to 1808,
the rainy season was generally from late May to the end of August,
with most precipitation falling from mid-June until the end of August
and continuing, at a lesser pace (at least through 1803), into Novem-
ber. After 1808, however, the rains began in mid-April and ended by
the end of August, if not before. Significantly, in 1810 nearly a
month of drought separated the bit of rain that fell in mid-June,
mid-July, and mid-August, traditionally the wettest months of the year.

Not surprisingly, just as the rainfall pattern shifted at Tulan-

calco, so did that for drought. Basically, the rainy season decreased
in duration, as noted above, and drought correspondingly increased.
With rain coming earlier, in mid-April, May became dry. The years
from 1808 to 1811 were particularly bad ones, with dryness from early
May through August. Prior to this, dryness during the rainy season
was more likely from mid-May to mid-August. Thus the period during
which drought interrupted the wet season increased a half-month at
each end from 1808 to 1811 and, worse, was more continuous as well.
(Again, it should be kept in mind that this dryness was during the
growing season, usually the wetter season of the year.) That the
drought years from 1808 to 1811 were ones of acute agricultural hard-
ship, both for crops and livestock, is painfully clear from the haci-
enda manager's letters.

The impact of drought can be surmised from the fact that, with-
out irrigation, rainfall in Mexico's highlands is sufficient for only
a single annual crop during the summer. Crops destroyed by bad
weather cannot be replaced.

Tulancalco's crops suffered throughout the first decade of the

nineteenth century, with the months of May, June, July, August, and
October almost uniformly bad. The greatest problem was drought, par-
ticularly from 1808 to 1811. All crops on the hacienda suffered,
including the property's mainstay, maguey. Although maguey is highly
drought resistant, conditions became so severe that they retarded the
flow of sap from which pulque is made. Compounding the problem was
the fact that, due to the failure of the area's maize crops, there
were no buyers for the pulque that was produced. Due to price
increases, however, Tulancalco's pulque revenues did not significantly
decline. Instead, the area's masses were deprived of what little
56 solace existed in a desperate time.6

But bad weather conditions affected livestock as well. Dryness

meant starvation, disease, and ultimately for many, death due to their
weakened condition. Worse, increased livestock mortality was accom-
panied by a failure to maintain an adequate birthrate. Thirst-weakened
females aborted, gave stillbirth, produced offspring too weak to
survive, or were unable to produce sufficient milk for their young.7

Of all Tulancalco's lifestock, sheep were most susceptible to

drought. Prior to 1808 sheep losses occurred due to drought. In July
1804, the hacienda's owner noted a decrease of 495 sheep. These
losses were expected to be overcome through lambing, but during the
following May, drought caused the deaths of 300 additional head. The
problem was chronic, for in May 1807, the hacienda's manager reported
that the sheep were dying from starvation. The only remedy was rain
to make the pastures green. In April 1807, ninety-three sheep died.

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The situation did not improve in 1808 when in two categories of sheep
alone (new lambs and those recently castrated), 227 head were lost.8

The year 1808 marked the beginning of the especially severe three-
year drought. During this period Tulancalco's sheep losses increased.
By August of 1810, for example, the mortality for the year was 715
sheep of all categories. In March 1811, the manager reported an inven-
tory of 2026 head as compared to the 2537 head he had reported for
March, 1810.9

As might be expected in an agricultural economy, these losses

in crops and livestock had an impact on people as well. Not only was
there a shortage of food, but the price of the food that was avail-
able rose. When transport animals like mules died or became too
weak to carry grains to market, carting fees went up. Enrique Flores-
cano noted that in 1779 and 1788, freight charges increased fifty
per cent.10 Moreover, losses in one grain crop meant that others
would rise in price as well.11

Unfortunately, these phenomena were not mere quirks of the

market, but a stable pattern. As Florescano pointed out, each year,
soon after harvest, prices would be low as the small operators sold
their crops. As this supply diminished in the spring, the large
landholders would move into the market with their high-priced re-
serves. The result, especially in years of shortages was disease,
theft, begging and vagrancy.12

A pattern existed of selling in time of plenty and of hoarding

in time of scarcity. In November, 1803, with fair weather, Tulan-
calco's owners directed its manaqer to sell maize. Instructions were

the same when weather was good in July 1805.13 This marketing philo-
sophy supports Florescano's belief that the Mexican revolution in
1810 was a result of a sustained thirty-year increase in the price
of maize, which meant also an increase in the price of other cereals
and of meat.14
57
Indeed, the manager's letters from Tulancalco vividly depict the
social unrest that resulted from the agricultural shortages during
these years. As early as October, 1809, he informed the owning family
that the Indians from the communities of the area were rustling live-
stock. As of that date, they had stolen sixteen cows and four bulls.
In May, 1810, the manager again complained about Indians stealing
cattle, not only on Tulancalco but on all the haciendas in the area.
Although some had been caught and punished severely, the problem
continued. While he acknowledged that there was poverty in the area,
he maintained that the Indians were so corrupt that they did not want
to work. A week later he evidently had been able to reduce Tulan-
calco's losses from thievery, but he noted that even though the jails
were full of Indians, they did not seem to learn from experience.15

Then, on 4 August 1810, less than a month and a half before the
outbreak of hostilities, the manager wrote:

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 181o

1809 l__

1808B

1807

1806

1805
1804

1803

1802
1801

1800

1799

5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 5 10 15 20 2530

JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH

- DROUGHT DROUGHT AD IL

- ~FROST DROUGHT AND SNOWC SNOW

1811 IX

-1810. l Xl i <
1809 _
1808

1807

1806
1805

1804
58
1803

1802
1801
D

1799 _lD0
5 10 15 25 30 5 |10 15 30 5 10 15 20 25
201 20A 251 130
APRIL MAY JUNE

DROUGHT DROUGHT AND FROS HAIL

S D_ -H
ERS DRUH-N SNOi E l |

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1811

1810
1809 X XX DocD<
1808 D<x XD X X X / 8
1807

1806

1805

1804

1803
1802 XX
1801

1800

1799 = I
5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 15 20 25 30

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER

DROUGHT DROUGHT AND FROST HAI

FROST DROUGHT AND SNO SNOW

1811
1l810 '9 A I I 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'

1809

1808
1807

1806

.1805

1804
59
1803

1802

1801
1800

1799

5 10 15 20 25 30 5 10 115 20 25 30 5 10
l 15 20 25 30

OCTOBER NOVEMBR DECEMER

DROUGHT DDROUGHT AND FROST HaIL

FROST DROUGHT AND SNOW SNOW

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 .. nowadays there is such necessity among the Poor People
that they cannot find anything to Eat, and the Indians from
these villages are robbing cattle even in broad daylight;
this is General on all these Haciendas ... since on the one
hand they are caring for the Livestock, and on the other
they are robbing by day and by Night.16

It was, unfortunately, at this time that he decided to collect the

back rents and debts of his tenants and workers. Although he was
unsuccessful, his attempt to do so in a time of great economic
necessity aggravated hacienda-employee relations. Since other
hacienda owners in the area were probably pursuing similar policies,
it is little wonder that the Indians, suffering conditions of famine,
found the situation unbearable.17

Unfortunately, the social and economic dislocations caused by

the revolutionary activity in the area made matters no better. On
15 September 1811, the manager wrote that, due to their great distress,
the Indians were even venturing into the corrals by night to steal
sheep and cattle. Tulancalco's cowboys captured two rustlers. When
they took the thieves to the jail at Actopan, they found it full.18

Yet, during the period covered by the manager's letters, insur-

gents rarely visited Tulancalco. Violence did occur at other hacien-
das in the area, so he moved his family to Aetopan. This was fortu-
nate, for in December, 1811, there was a skirmish at Tulancalco
involving the insurgents.

What this indicates is that, even before the outbreak of violence

in the area about Tulancalco, there was considerable social unrest due
to food shortages caused by the drought from 1808 to 1811. It took
only Hidalgo's small spark to fire this unrest into a blaze of revolu-
tionary violence. To conclude, then, there is considerable reason to
believe that meteorological inclemency had much to do with the Revolu-
tion of 1810, if not in its origin, then certainly in its scope and
intensity -- that, indeed, there was a link between weather and poli-
tics that helped shape Mexico' s struggle for independence.

60 ENDNOTES

1H(ubert) H. Lamb, The Changing Climate (London: Methuen & Co.,

Ltd., 1966), pp. 4-12; Emmanuel LeRoy Ladurie, Times of Feast, Times
of Famine (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Conpany, Inc., 1971),
p. 243.

2Hugh H. Hamill, Jr., The Hidalgo Revolt: Prelude to Mexican

Independence. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), pp.
119, 183.

3Enrique Florescano, Precios del maiz y crisis agricolas en

Mexico (1708-1810) (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1969), pp. 120-24,
129, 144, 148, 179, 195.

4Charles Gibson, The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule (Stanford:

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Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 303; Jorge A. Vivo' Escoto,
"Weather and Climate of Mexico and Central America," in Robert
Wauschope, gen. ed., Handbook of Middle American Indians, Vol. 1:
Natural Environment and Early Cultures (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1964), p. 187.

5These documents are part of the manuscript collection known as

the Regla Paper, hereafter referred to as RP, which reside in the
Archives Division of the Washington State University Library in
Pullman, Washington. The letters regarding Tulancalco were sent
between the hacienda administrator, Manuel Olguin, hereafter referred
to as Olguin, and a member of the owning family, Marfa Josefa Velasco
y Ovando, hereafter referred to as Maria Josefa. The documents are
organized by folders (F) and, when paginated, verso is indicated by
V.

6Maria Josefa to Olguin, 10 June 1801, RP, F123, p. 46v; 2 May

1804, RP, F127, p. 6v; 3 Oct. 1804, RP, F127, p. 16; 10 July 1805,
RP, F129, p. 7v; 11 Sept. 1805, FP, F129, p. lOv; 2 Oct. 1805, RP,
F129, p. llv; 25 June 1806, RP, F132, p. llv; Olguin to Maria Josefa,
27 Jan. 1810, 11 July 1810, 14 July 1810, 4 Aug. 1810, and 6 Oct. 1810,
RP. F141; 13 July 1811, RP, F143.

70g/
701guin to Maria Josefa, 20 Oct. 1810, RP, F141.

8Maria Josefa to Olguin, 4 July 1804, RP, F127, p. 10; 29 May

1805, RP, F125, p. 5; Olguin to Maria Josefa, 22 May 1807, and 10 May
1807, RP, F134; 7 Jan. 1809, RP, F138.

9oiguin to Maria Josefa, 4 Aug. 1810, RP, F141; 9 Mar. 1811 and
31 Aug. 1811, RP, F143.

'OFlorescano, p. 148.

l"Evidence for these assertions comes from Regla documents con-

cerning other haciendas, as stated in the following correspondence:
Marcos Morales to Mariano de Velasco, 8 Feb. 1778, RP, F86; 15 Apr.
178r, RP, F101; Maria Josefa to Juan Vicente Berazain, 4 May 1799,
RP, F118, p. 30; Maria Josefa to Jose Cristoval Truxillo, 14 Feb.
1801, RP, F123, p. 17v.

12Florescano, pp. 92-93, 150-72.

l3Maria Josefa to Olguin, 2 Nov. 1803, RP, F125, p. 23y; 24 July 61

1805, RP, F129, p. 8. Elsewhere in the Regla Papers, Maria Josefa
instructs managers of other haciendas to hoard in time of bad weather:
Maria Josefa to Jose Cristoval Truxillo, 10 Oct. 1801, RP, F123,
p. 75v; 12 Dec. 1801, RP, F123, p. 97; 10 July 1802, RP, F124, pp.
56v-57.

14Florescano, pp. 129, 144, 148, 179, 195.

1501guin to Maria Josefa, 21 Oct. 1809, RP, F138; 18 May 1810 and
26 May 1810, RP, F141.

161 ..en el dia es mucha nesesidad que hay en estas Pobres Jentes
pues no encuentran ni para Comer, y los Yndios de estos Pueblos aun
de dia claro estan rrobando reses esto es General en todas estas Has.
das . .. pues por un lado se estan cuydando los Ganados, y por otro estan
rrobando esto es de dia y de Noche." Olguin to Maria Josefa, 4 Aug.

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 1810, RP, F141.
/
17
170lguin to Maria Josefa, 14 July 1810, 4 Aug. 1810, and 3 Sept.
1810, RP, F143.

l801guin to Maria Josefa, 5 Sept. 1811, 16 Nov. 1811, and 7 Dec.

1811, RP, F143.

62

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