Tian Wenlin

Disintegration and Remodeling of the Islamic

World by Western International Order

Tian Wenlin*

Abstract: Irreparable consequences to Middle East geopolitics ensued as

the political systems in the Islamic world declined in a process that began
under the persistent infiltration and influence of the Western ideal of
nation-state. Three progressive stages in this conceptual transformation show
how longstanding multinational imperial systems in the Islamic world
disintegrated after the introduction of“one nation, one state”forced upon Middle
East states an unrealistic model and eroded the principle of supremacy of
sovereignty that had just been established. Interventionist theories that took
hold meant that the Islamic world’s self-transformation has never caught
up with the demand of Western strategies. The Islamic realm has failed to
achieve what it set out to do because political systems that would have
been adaptive to the reality of the Islamic world had collapsed.
Keywords: Western international system, Islamic world, disintegration
and remodeling

Theinternational
Western international system profoundly influenced the Islamic
system. Modern European countries rose to center stage
by taking the opportunity wrought by the Great Voyage and Industrial
Revolution, while the Islamic world missed this round of power transfer
and declined from its peak. The Islamic world fell behind the West in only
200 years, but the shift the West underwent was far greater than the pace of
the changes that took place in the 2000-year span from ancient Greek and
Roman times to the 18th century.1 With the West’s growing military and

*
Tian Wenlin is a CICIR research professor focusing on the Middle East and
international politics. This paper is a part of the National Social Science Fund project,
The Islamic World of the Middle East in the International System (Approval No.: 17FGJ009).
1
Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrew Rippin ed., Islam in the Eyes of the West
(Routledge, 2010), 1.

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 Disintegration and Remodeling of the Islamic World by Western
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economic supremacy, what had been an equal cross-cultural exchange

became a one-way penetration of Western values into the Islamic world.
Europe’s fragmented geopolitical landscape was the format upon which the
strategic culture of the West gelled. Characterized by“division,”split-ism
and separation, the model re-shaped Islamic geopolitics, with serious
aftereffects.
I. The West deconstructed the imperial system of the Islamic
world with the nation-state system, which led to the disintegration of
the Ottoman Empire
The initial wave of conceptual impact that the Islamic world
encountered was the transformation and re-modeling of its imperial system
after the introduction of the Western nation-state system. Also called the
sovereign state system, it grew out of the Westphalia system established
after the Thirty Years’War, with characteristics that called for division into
sovereign states, none of them recognizing a supreme authority. These
individual states implemented laws and resolved disputes, while
international laws only worked out minimal agreement on co-existence.
With each state dependent on weak international law, inter-state disputes
could devolve to forceful conflict.1 This first stage would lead to the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
The European nation-state, as the standard political unit, was rooted
in the geopolitical environment that evolved after the Roman Empire (27
BC-AD 395). The extensive empire united what today is Spain, Gaul and
Britain in the west, to the upper Euphrates River in the east, from Northern
Africa to the Rhine and Danube rivers, at least until AD 395 when
Theodosius the Great divided the empire in half for his sons. After the
Western Roman Empire collapsed in AD 476, fragmentation was the norm.
Numerous small European states existed, only briefly unified, for example
under Charlemagne. When the grandsons of King Charlemagne signed the
Verdun Treaty in AD 843, dividing the empire into three parts, once again
1
David Held et al., Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture,
trans. Yan Xuedong et al. (Social Science Academic Press, 2001), 51-52.

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European unification ended. Even the Holy Roman Empire was not a
unified state. The Habsburgs’attempted expansion met resistance from the
rest of Europe, and the subsequent war and Westphalia peace treaty left a
territorial-divided Europe. In AD 800 under the Charlemagne Empire,
Western Europe had fewer than ten states, but more than 200 in 1300.1
A fragmented Europe intensified heterogeneity among peoples and
within-group homogeneity. This helped assemble the current nation-state
ideal, a nation composed of culturally homogenous people ruled by a
sovereign state.
Some scholars point out the operation of the sovereign state system is
underpinned by three logical assertions: recognition and identity politics
among in-system states, structural competition within the system, and an
outward expansion dynamic. This operational logic deepened rivalry, and
split and re-aligned Europe’s great powers as the influence of the Western
European system unfurled.2
The Islamic world’s situation was more akin to an imperial system.
By seeing all Muslims as equals and by tolerating different religions, the
Abbasid Dynasty transformed the Arab world into an Islamic one and
established an Islamic world order.3 Whether seen in theory or in practice,
this Islamic order was poles apart from the state system that rose later and
hence ran into conflict with it. The Ottoman Empire would keep such an
order intact for more than 600 years. Islamic powers—the Safavid Dynasty
and the Mughal Empire—were traditional imperial regimes that extended
the Islamic system into modern times. This international system, an
imperial one, overrode nations:“In Europe, the end of great migration has
gradually consolidated the territorial states,”writes John Darwin, with people
under“tighter controls of the feudal lords, the rulers of the kingdoms and their
priest allies, while in the Islamic world, a‘world empire’was established
1
Jan Luiten van Zanden, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The
European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000-1800, trans. Sui Fumin (Zhejiang
University Press, 2016), 41.
2
Zhang Ximo, Shengzhan yu wenming: yisilan yu xifang de yongheng chongtu
[Jihad and civilization: the perpetual conflict between Islam and the West] (Sanlian
shudian [Joint Publishing Co.], 2014), 112.
3
Zhang Ximo, 55.

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with the fragmented smaller tribes and dynastic regimes caught in fierce
contests.”1
Before the European nation-state concept was introduced to the
Islamic world, no concept of nation functioned as political identity. In the
Ottoman Empire, various cultural groups had religious identity (Muslim,
Eastern Orthodox Christian, Judaist) rather than ethnic or national identity,
such as Turk, Arab, Kurd, Albanian, Armenian, Romanian, Greek and Slav.2
There, what concerned people most was whether an individual believed in
Islam:“If they were Muslims, they would be basically equal with other
Muslims,”and be under Caliphate laws despite different geographical
background.“If not, they would be regulated in accord with Islamic laws.” 3

In 1912, a British diplomat expressed surprise that Shiite and Sunni

Muslims, Turks, Arabs and Kurds were all recorded as Muslims in their
household registration.4 Although Turks ruled the Ottoman Empire, the
ethnic title of“Turk”was seldom mentioned. Later, the term was used
pejoratively, referring to nomadic Turkmens or Anatolia peasants who
spoke Turkish.5 Non-Muslims, such as Greeks and Bulgarians, attached
little significance to differences in language and ethnicity but valued their
common belief in Eastern Orthodox religion. For Christians in the Ottoman
Empire, it mattered little whether a person was Serb, Bulgarian or Greek.
Despite the empire’s complex ethnic composition, different peoples
lived together peacefully. The Ottoman view was self-consistent in that a
group’s language or religion was a marker of one’s occupation rather than
a basis for political independence. Among Ottoman ruling elites, Greeks
dominated the bureaucracy. The Christian Mamluk slave soldiers increased
in number among military and political upper-levels. Arab aristocrats and
1
John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400-
2000, trans. Lu Weifang and Gao Fangying (Elephant Publishing House, 2011), 30.
2
Lefen Stavros Stavrianos, Global Rift: The Third World Comes of Age, First
Volume, trans. Chi Yue and Wang Hongsheng, proofread by Huang Xiqun and Luo
Rongqu (Commercial Press, 1995), 117.
3
Zhang Ximo, 64.
4
Mark Mazower, The Balkans: A Short History, trans. Liu Huiliang (Tianjin
People’s Publishing House, 2007), 41.
5
Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, trans. Fan Zhonglian
(Commercial Press, 1982), 8.

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religious leaders in the Turkish province linked state and society.1 This
operational mode united political elites and commoners in parts of the
empire governed under the capital at Constantinople. This distinctive
Islamic world system governing the Middle East for over 1000 years shaped
the Muslims’outlook and understanding of political organization and
operational norms.2
Compared with a nation-state armed with nationalist ideology, the
Ottoman Empire had less cohesion. In Europe, nations and fragmented
sovereign states interacted and helped each other forward, the idea being a
nation-state should realize an optimal match between ruling efficiency and
ruling cost conducive to maintaining the populace’s identity and loyalty.
As Western European autocratic regimes developed and a middle-class
emerged, a longing for unity and order, a higher literacy rate, and improved
technology facilitated mass propaganda, mass education, and highly
integrated state structures through which rulers and ruled had an intimate
relationship unknown before. The 19th and 20th centuries’diplomatic success
belonged to states with a solid national core such as England, France, and to
some extent Russia,“rather than those loosely organized empires like Austria
and Turkey.”3
In contrast, a deficient approach to identity made the Islamic world
vulnerable to the nation-state conception. In the Islamic system, the Empire’s
peoples had dim community awareness and little internal connection. In the
vast Ottoman Empire an inefficient communication network and
complicated national composition meant gaps existed between Muslims
and Christians, among different Christian denominations, and between
Turkish Muslims and Arab Muslims.“In states with such defects, the seeds
of decay have already been sown in its basic organization,”4 said historian
P.K. Hitti. After the industrial revolution, with Europe the power center and
1
Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East (Manchester
University Press, 2003), 15-16.
2
Zhang Ximo, 9.
3
Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy 1814-1914, trans. by
translation section, Department of Foreign Languages, Fujian Normal University
(Commercial Press, 1978), 3.
1
P. K. Hitti, History of the Arab, trans. Ma Jian (Commercial Press, 1995), 857.

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the nation-state the model, active or passive imitation by Asian and African
countries gave it more influence.1 Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798
was under the banner of national liberation, but the West further penetrated
the Ottoman economy infecting it with nationalism, self-doubt and weakness.2
The one nation, one state concept allowed mutual recognition“in
which states recognized each other’s jurisdiction within its territories and
communities.”3 But if the Westphalia system would emphasize separation,
nationalism would create“a state of tension and mutual hatred.”4 The
multinational Austro-Hungary Empire perceived the disaster that might be
wrought by the conceptual nation-state. Austria’s deputy foreign minister
warned in 1853 that creating new states in accord with nations“is the most
dangerous among all utopia schemes,”one that could sever historical ties
and“topple the foundation”of state order.5
The multicultural Ottoman Empire was bound to feel uneasy with
such a shaky foundation since diverse ethnic groups lived on both sides of its
boundaries. Romanians, Serbs and Croatians lived in Habsburg and Turkey;
Romanians, Kurds and Armenians lived along the Russia-Turkey border.
These provincials slightly inclined toward empire but did live, in the main,
peaceably. Measured with the yardstick of nation-state, however, concentrated
areas of a single ethnicity could become a potential time-bomb. In 1862, then
foreign minister of the Ottoman Empire wrote to the French ambassador
that if all peoples could seek their longed-for independence,“Turkey would
be turned into state unimaginable. It would take a century’s bloodshed before
the situation could subside.”6
While Europe claimed economic and military victories, the nation-state
2
Hilal Khashan, Arabs at the Crossroads: Political Identity and Nationalism
(University Press of Florida, 2000), 21.
3
D. Edward Knox, The Making of a New Eastern Question: British Palestine
Policy and the Origins of Israel, 1917-1925 (Catholic University of America Press,
Washington, DC, 1981), 4.
4
David Held et al., 50.
5
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, trans. Zhang Mingming (Central Compilation and
Translation Press, 2002), 110.
6
Mazower, 117.
1
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of
Christianity to the Present Day, trans. Zheng Zhishu (China Friendship Press, 2000), 416.

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system and the concept of sovereignty it championed penetrated the empire

with vitality, ethnic minorities became agitated, and nationalists sought
identity in territory rather than in the church, making impossible the
Tanzimat Reform“which hoped the Christian church would accept the shared
Ottoman identity or Turkish citizenship and eliminate their differences in the
loyalty to the Sultan.”1
In the zeal of geographical expansion, European powers manipulated
these sorts of“time bombs”to expand their interests. Napoleon marching
into Greece in 1797 asked his general Tilly to conquer the Ionian Islands by
utilizing the Greeks’nationalist fervor, by encouraging“their aspiration, and
not hesitate to talk about Greece, Athens and Sparta.” 2
A colonial power that
attempted to scramble Ottoman territories would whip up racial and
religious separation and intensify resistance to authority.3 Nationalism
infected the Greeks, and later the Serbs and Romanians. In 1815 the Sultan
had to recognize Serbian autonomy; in 1821 an uprising for independence
took place in Greece with Britain, France and Russia intervening in the
Greek civil war; in 1829 the Sultan recognized Greek independence and
granted Duchy autonomy to Moldavia and Valahia (Romania).
Greek independence was a blow to the Ottoman Empire. Although
there had been cases of territorial cession by the Ottoman, this was the first
time that a dependent territory in the empire gained independence through
armed struggle, presaging other separatist movements there.4 By late 19th
century, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro had separated from the Ottoman
for good; in the 1890s Macedonia and Armenia became the focus and the
Balkans were a fire barrel,“with all the Balkan states hoping to get back
those ‘unrecovered’ territories and brothers out of their national
boundaries forced upon them by external powers’demarcation.”5 Dreams
of territorial expansion prompted two early 20th century Balkan wars,

2
Darwin, 243.
3
Stavrianos, 121.
4
Darwin, 304.
5
Wang Shengzu, ed., Guoji guanxishi, dier juan [History of international relations,
Volume II] (World Affairs Press, 1995), 89.
1
Mazower, 98.

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while a third morphed into the First World War, and thereby sealed the
empire’s disintegration.
Appeals for national separation appeared among Arabs who had formerly
been loyal to the Ottoman Empire. In Arabic, there was no such word as Arabia
nor a concept of Arab nation. People on this land called themselves
“Bedouins,”with identity and loyalty usually from an extended family, clan or
tribe. To pressure the Ottoman, Britain talked“nation”to Arabs, inciting their
rebellion and promising support for their war of independence against the
Ottoman.1 After revolutionary ideology to oppose Ottoman authority appeared
in the Arab world, there was even Turkish nationalism among the Turks.
The premise of nation-state requires the ruler to fulfill public duties
while the ruled have civic responsibilities. Its value system is based on
individualism. In most dynasties and empires then, ruler and ruled were
in more of a“rule and obedience”relationship; the ruled were subjects
rather than citizens most of the time. The nation-state theory undermined
the empire’s legitimate authority, and the infiltration of the Western nation-state
concept into Asia and Africa has done more bad than good.2 Taiwanese scholar
Zhang Ximo points out that this national theory would impact empire
legitimacy because the sublimation of Islamic theory hollowed out the Ottoman
Empire’s transcendental ideological tool for integration. Nationalism was more
exclusive, prompting the excluded to find countertheories, to fight back, or to
seek, find or try to create their own nations. Under the rubric of nationalism,
empire authority met resistance from patently oppressed groups. The principle
of coexistence was replaced by mutual-repulsion and antagonism, and the
Ottoman Empire experienced division.3
The grand mansion of the Ottoman Empire was the victim of Western
nationalism.4 According to estimates, out of the empire’s 29 million in 1872,
more than half lived in provinces of the empire in Europe. Almost half of the
empire’s population was non-Muslim. By 1906, the empire’s population was

2
Beijing Continental Bridge Culture Media, Zhongdong zhanhuo [Wars in the
Middle East] (World Affairs Press, 2005), 126.
3
Hilal Khashan, 23.
4
Zhang Ximo, 117.
5
Stavrianos, 121.

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reduced to 21 million, with non-Muslims accounting for a quarter of that.1 The

Western nation-state system that had weakened, fractured and replaced the
imperialist system of the Middle East was a process of vendetta, wars and
turmoil in the Islamic world. In the wake of the First World War, an
ambitious US had few colonies, while the vast but declining British Empire
controlled the bulk of the world market, sea routes, raw materials, and
investment. US President Woodrow Wilson’s post-war proposition favoring
“national self-determination”at the Versailles Peace Conference seemed
idealistic, but schemed overtly to dismantle Ottoman and Austro-Hungary
empires and covertly to replace British and French colonial rule. When the
war ended, imperial territories (except independent states like Egypt and
Iraq within the British sphere of influence, and former Italian colonies
under the British) totaled about 13 million square miles, with a 550 million
population. Colonies under US direct control, like the Philippines,
amounted to only 0.125 million square miles populated by 19 million. This
contrast was behind rising hostility among imperialist powers.2
Some analysts believed Wilson felt“alert or even jealous of its
(British) national strength.”3 The US held that fighting to restore Europe’s
pre-war state was an outdated objective. The US favored reshaping the
future to“bring real change to it.”4
Encouraging national self-determination undermined colonial powers
of Britain and France and fortified the nation-state concept, but initially
Arab intellectuals disagreed with a nation-state concept colored by
secessionist revolt. This was so at least until Arab independence was
revitalized with the spark from the designation of Palestine for a Jewish
national homeland. Advocates for a unified Arab state grew out of
Nasserism, Ba’thism, the Arab Nationalist Movement, calls for the

1
Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela, ed., Empires at War 1911-1923, trans.
Liang Zhanjun et al. (People’s Publishing House, 2015), 24.
2
R. P. Dutt, The British Empire, trans. Su Zhongyan et al. (World Affairs Press,
1954), 141.
3
Margret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World, trans.
Rong Hui and Liu Yanru (Chongqing Publishing Group), 15.
4
Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations
(Second Volume), trans. Zhang Zhenjiang et al. (Xinhua Publishing House, 2004), 40-41.

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liberation of Arab land, independence from European powers, and socialist

development.
II. Replacing nation-state with sovereign state resulted in multiple
small states in the Arab world
The sovereign state system might mean independence, liberation and
freedom to other countries or regions but was detrimental to Arab
geopolitics. Where a“great Arab state”was possible under the one nation,
one state principle, for such a huge state to become a major power pole
might be the last thing the West wanted. Their nation-state concept was
mainly intended to weaken the Ottoman Empire rather than create a rival
for themselves. From this, it is easy to understand why, regarding
restructuring the Middle East geopolitical system, Britain and France in
1915-1916 abandoned the idea of forming a unified Arab state. They
relinquished the“one nation, one state”principle they formerly promoted.
The principle of “national self-determination” they adopted, instead,
birthed the systemic mandatory rule ideal for expanding their sphere of
influence.1 When the Sykes-Picot Agreement was secretly reached in 1916,
Britain and France divided the Arab world into several states under
“mandatory rule,”incorporating the Middle East into the colonial system.
The international system in the Middle East was engraved with“made
in the West,” whether that is derived as unconscious influence or
politically force. A partial connection between“mandatory rule”and
“national self-determination”boosted nationalism, but these nationalist
movements evolved, delivering several sovereign states. These were only
along the lines of the map pre-drawn by Britain and France. The
customized system Britain and France made for the Arabs was not based on
the kind of nation-states they had emphasized, but sub-national states
fashioned to suit“mandatory rule.”
After the Middle East geopolitical landscape changed from a unified
Arab national state to a fragmented system of Middle East sovereign states,
the US and Soviet Union replaced Britain and France as the region’s main
influences. For the two superpowers, though they would be rivals, toppling

1
Kedourie, Nationalism,128-129.

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the global colonial system led by Britain and France would make room for
their strategic game. Just as Britain, the dominant economic power in the
19th century, preferred“free trade imperialism”so as to get into the world
market, the US’dominant 20th century economic power stood for putting
an end to colonial imperialism so it could force its rule on people recently
liberated from British oppression.
To this end, the US and the Soviet Union, as if by prior agreement,
jointly promoted decolonization, such that Roosevelt and Stalin would join
in advocating“national self-determination”and make it a principle for
international law. Roosevelt emphasized,“as the US and the Soviet Union
are not colonial powers, it is much easier for us to talk about these
problems. I think the colonial empires will exist for long after the end of
the war.”1 Roosevelt viewed the colonial empires as reactionary, inefficient,
and conservative. But, says John Darwin,“what is worse is that they had
created economic isolation that closed the door on American trade, thus
impeding America’s export growth.”2
The British were aware of this. British Foreign Minister Robert
Anthony Eden recalled that Roosevelt hoped breakaway colonies“would
depend on America politically and economically.”3 France’s leader Charles
de Gaulle was also clear about how Roosevelt supported colonies’
independence in hopes that immature states would depend on America for
survival, and their government personnel and decision-making would be
under remote control by Washington and Roosevelt.4 It was no secret that
the US was pursuing expansion, waging“cold war”on the Soviet Union,
while staging a less open one on the British. Although couched in the
rhetoric of mutual respect and friendship, the latter cold war was as real as
the other and coincided with the objective of American imperialism to
control or weaken old European powers.5
1
Vallejin Bereshkov, Memoir by Stalin’s Private Interpreter, trans. Xue Fuqi (Hainan
Publishing House, 2004), 245.
2
Darwin, 363.
3
Stavrianos, 667-668.
4
Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, trans. Zhang Fan et al. (Citic Publishing
House, 2005), 283.
1
Dutt, 142, 148.

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In advocating national self-determination and“decolonization,”the

US and the Soviet Union boosted the national liberation movements’
development, making a nation-state system conceived in Europe be adopted
worldwide. More than 80 overseas European colonies gained independence
between 1940 to 1980, affecting about 40 percent of the global population.1
In the Middle East, British and French colonial rules were likewise
collapsing. France relinquished mandatory rule over Lebanon. Britain
annulled mandatory role over Transjordan recognizing it as an independent
kingdom, and abandoned its rule in Palestine.2 Britain and France were
badly defeated in the Suez Crisis, marking the“decisive defeat of the old
imperialism in the Middle East.”3
The saying goes,“wolves are stopped at the front door, but tigers get
in from the back,” and the power vacuum left by colonial powers’
withdrawal was soon filled in by the US and Soviet Union. Confronted
with the problematic geopolitical order left by Britain and France, the US
and Soviet Union did not take it seriously and deliberately or unwittingly
ignored Arabs’appeal to establish nation-states. By the 1950s and 1960s,
Middle East national liberation movements were for the self-determination
of artificial states rather than the self-determination of an Arab nation. The
resulting regional system was only composed of sovereign states in the
sense of international law. The two transnational ideologies of Arab
nationalism and Islamism even now have been trying to transform the region,
from a sovereign state system left over by European colonial powers, to a
unified nation-state, yet now influenced by even higher levels of theocracy.
This ideological challenge is the root cause of regional turbulence.4
In juridical logic, because nation-state does not overlap sovereign
states, Arab states waver between nation and state. In the Arab world, the
external inconsistency between nation and state produced revisionism with
2
James Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? trans. Huang Gongxia
(Elephant Publishing House, 2011), 151.
3
Cohen, 372.
4
Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: the United States and the Soviet Union
in World Politics, 1941-1991, trans. Wang Zhenxi et al. (Xinhua Publishing House,
2003), 260.
1
Gause, 26-27.

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a nationalist nature (Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism) while

internal inconsistency between nation and state translated into Arab states’
lack of cohesion. This revisionism interacts with non-cohesion within a country,
making the region particularly prone to war.1 For example, Saddam rose to power
under the banner of“statism,”then self-proclaimed as a Babylonian descendant,
later boasted himself as the man to unify the Muslims, and attempted to annex
by force the feudalist Kuwait using radical secularism.2 In the context of a
collapsing Islamic world system, what these states needed most was the
creation of an“imaginary community,”but Western powers like Britain
and France mandated nation building in the Middle East, in an opposite
direction, which fragmented the power distribution among Middle East states.
III. Challenging the sovereign state theory with neo-interventionism
meant Middle East states would suffer continuously under hegemonic
coercion
In the Arab world in the 1950s to 1970s, the sovereign state concept
was at loggerheads with the nation-state concept. Arab nationalism,
represented by Nasserism, advocated Arab solidarity. The Arab world
engaged in several rounds of national merger. Unfortunately, all failed. In the
1970s, a turn of the situation occurred when Nasser passed away and Sadat
succeeded to Egypt’s presidency, after which the Middle East countries
abandoned the Arab nationalism vigorously promoted during the Nasser era,
and turned to holding the banner of“Egypt First.”A typical case was that,
despite opposition from other Arab states, Egypt made peace alone with
Israel; in 1977 Sadat made a sudden visit to Israel; in 1978 Egypt and Israel
signed the Camp David Agreement; and in 1979 Egypt signed a peace
agreement with Israel.
Egypt’s“clearing the snow only at its front door”influenced Jordan,
among others, to follow suit in making peace with Israel, frustrating the
cause of Arab unity. Arab states had to reluctantly recognize a regional
system based on the Westphalia model. Authorities in these countries no

2
Benjamin Miller, States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional
War and Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 132.
3
Guy Sorman, Les enfants de Rifia’a, trans. Ruan Nuoque (Yunchen Cultural
Industry Co., Ltd., 2007), 239.

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longer pursued Arab unity nor a unified Arab nation-state, but accepted the
status quo. They learned to rely on the principle of“inviolability of
sovereignty”to protect national interests and oppose Western penetration,
with supremacy of sovereignty the last firewall for Middle East countries
to guard national rights.
As the principle of“inviolability of sovereignty”stands in the way of
the Western major powers’scramble for the Middle East, they will next try
to undermine the sovereign state principle.“State-centric”theory is besieged
by neo-interventionist arguments. Three rationales, on global politics, human
rights, and a“just war,”directly impact the sovereign state principle.
One rationale emphasized replacing sovereign politics with global
politics. Globalization challenges the Westphalia system based on
sovereign states and political order based on realism. International
organizations and non-state actors, on the increase worldwide, challenge
the position of sovereign state. NGOs under the United Nations numbered
more than 4000 in 2015. That the mission of many NGOs is to safeguard
“human rights”1 erodes sovereign states’legitimate rights, and economic
globalization also enables the capital power of multinationals. According to
some data, of the top 100 world economies, 51 are multinational corporations
and 49 are sovereign states. The economic power of the 200 largest
multinationals is larger than that of 182 countries combined.2 Multinationals
are no longer confined to issuing instructions or engaging in unequal deals,
but directly re-structure and integrate territories and population, a
significant challenge to sovereign states. Multinationals produce“not only
commodities, but also subjects”in such a way that they“have determined
the political structure of the world in the new environment.”3
While the traditional division between domestic and international,
internal and external, and territorial and non-territorial began being smashed

1
Gerald M. Steinberg and Joshua Bacon,“NGO Links to Middle East Terror,”
Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2017.
2
Graham Vanbergen,“The Rise of the Corporatocracy,”Global Research, June
21, 2016.
3
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, trans. Yang Jianguo and Fan Yiting
(Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2005), 36.

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by multinationals, the US had been following“failed state”theory since the

mid-1990s, believing weak and failed states would give rise to terrorism,
regional turmoil, criminal activities, diseases and environmental disasters
that could pose major threats. The theory provides cover for the US to“go
out”on its own initiative to stabilize these countries and assist their state
building. As in Afghanistan and Somalia, this theory threatens the application
of the“supremacy of sovereignty”principle in less developed countries.
A second rationale places the abstract principles of human rights and
democracy above national sovereignty. The doctrines of“human rights see
no borders,” “a legitimate state should be one that protects certain shared
democratic values,”and“human rights take precedence over sovereignty”
articulate a belief that sovereignty no longer directly guarantees international
legitimacy. The International Bill of Human Rights, the conventions on the
elimination of discrimination against women, and on the rights of the child,
and the declaration on the rights of persons belonging to national, racial,
religious and linguistic minorities, issued in 1992 by the UN General
Assembly, are the legal basis for international human rights protection, and
promoting these rights can be viewed by some sovereign states“as an
unauthorized violation of internal affairs of a state.”1
The 21st century popularity of“responsibility to protect”(R2P), which
means that when a country is unable to provide effective protection for its
citizens, the international community has the right to take decisive action,2 is
rising. This theory involves not only response, but also“responsibility to
prevent”and“responsibility to re-build,”with the implication of a regime
change. A scholar of the US Council on Foreign Relations said that, while
for more than 350 years,“the border is inviolable”and“monopoly of force”
had been sovereignty’s official hallmarks, adopting the“responsibility to
protect”was a watershed in the international community, marking the end
of the sovereign era.3
1
Held et al., 94.
2
Ramesh Thakur,“R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging Emerging Powers,”
Washington Quarterly, Spring 2013, 61-76.
3
Jayshree Bajoria and Robert McMahon,“The Dilemma of Humanitarian
Intervention,”Council on Foreign Relations, June 12, 2013, accessed January 1, 2019,
http://www.cfr.org.

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A third rationale abuses the concept of“just war”by giving it a

meaning that opposes the sovereign state system. The“just war”ideal
attempts to make wars noble and ethical. Such classification of war was
strictly controlled or rejected in the international community composed of
sovereign states. Its greater acceptance in recent years reduces it to the
level of a policing operation, to be more easily initiated. When an act of
war is given an ethical coating, states that start such wars are sanctified and
war“gives legitimacy to itself.”Ethical justification legitimizes military
measures for the sake of order and peace, and can factor into“the ground
for an empire and new tradition.”1 The revival of the“just war”concept is
the sign and external manifestation of the emerging new imperialist system
led by the US. With the Eastern camp mired in a post-Cold War collapse,
the West led by the US has dominated the international system. Anxious to
reshape world order, the US will interfere in internal affairs of Third World
countries, or fabricate reasons for its interference such as possession of
weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian disaster occurring, and the regime
being autocratic or dictatorial. Ignoring the principle of“non-interference of
sovereignty”is a US bid to breach the last protection for the survival of Third
World regimes, allowing the West more maneuvering room to interfere in
other countries’internal affairs.
Although theories differ from foreign policies, they become actual
policies once accepted by rulers. Theories questioning the status of sovereign
states meet the real needs of Western major powers, and are a kind of abstract
accomplice to them. Intervention based on emergency or ethics can happen
when“supported by international consensus. In other words, universal values
have legalized the police power.”2
The US is the creator of neo-interventionism while the Middle East
suffers from it most. US ambitions for hegemony enhance its impulse to
interfere. In this context, some American scholars proposed strategic
blueprints such as“clash of civilizations,”“the end of history,” “great power
tragedy,”and“the rules of the game.” “The grand strategy of the US is to

1
Hardt and Negri, 13.
2
Hardt and Negri, 18.

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 Tian Wenlin

identify the fault lines of geopolitics,”said Charles A. Kupchan, and to be

familiar with the points where“potential global powers would emerge and
collide.”1
Middle Eastern states are victimized by such intervention. The 1991
Gulf War put US interventionism into practice. The 9.11 attack impelled
US hawks to try a strategic breakthrough for a“new world order.”2 The
George W. Bush administration interfered in Middle East affairs mainly
along two policy lines. One was by inheriting the Wilson school’s
neoconservative doctrine endorsing Middle East“democratic transformation.”
The Wilson school took concepts as decisive factors, which led to reasoning
that, since“democracy will lead to peace”and“autocracy will breed
terror,”promoting democracy was the primary task of US diplomacy. The
US had consistently urged traditional allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt to
reform politically, while trying to rebuild Iraq into a democratic model.
Such US democratic reforms abroad directly threaten the sovereign state
system. A second policy line promoted hegemony based on Jackson school
theories that argue force can be applied to achieve US national interests. As
Middle East terrorism posed the gravest threat to American interests, forces
should be used to eliminate it, the reasoning went. The US formulated
preemptive strategy, identified who were“rogue,” “lost”or part of an“evil
axis,”and singly judged the threat to the US before launching strikes. By
fundamentally denying“equality among sovereign states,”this put the US
over the line on existing international law.
Wars waged by the US in the name of counterterrorism, namely in
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, are directed against two independent
sovereign states and extend US influence deep into Central Asia and the
heart of the Middle East. UN Resolution 1973 establishing no-fly zones in
Libya, under“responsibility to protect,”authorized member states to“take
whatever measures necessary”to protect Libyan civilians but also gave

1
Charles A. Kupchan, The End of the American Era, trans. Pan Zhongqi
(Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2004).
2
Dr. Ismail Salami,“The Post 9 / 11 Era and Washington’s Dirty Modus
Operandi in the Middle East,”Global Research, February 9, 2014.

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cover for the West to push an executive power replacement strategy.1 The
Trump administration launched two missile attacks against Syrian targets
under this pretext, asserting that Syria was suspected of using chemical
weapons. This blatantly violates the principle of “non-interference of
sovereignty”and aggravated Syria’s catastrophic crisis.
Conclusion
Western powers repeatedly challenge the“inviolability of sovereignty”
and the sovereign state system by pursuing neo-interventionist policies,
submersing Middle East states under Western hegemony, a situation also
experienced by many Asian, African and Latin American countries.
Erosion and reshaping the Islamic world on the nation-state model extends
the gap between Islamic and Western worlds. In times when Western
and Islamic worlds were equivalent in strength, they would engage in
cross-cultural exchange and mutual modeling, but as European countries
were taking a ride on the industrial revolution, the Islamic world missed
this opportunity. It was then that the Islamic world adopted Western
concepts on state and political systems as a secret recipe for prosperity and
strength. Centuries later, when the Islamic world became aware of the
negative effects in copying the Western system, that system was engrained,
bringing the Islamic world a dilemma in which they cannot return to the
past nor see the future.

(edited by Zhao Jinfu)

1
Jayshree Bajoria and McMahon, June 12, 2013.

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