sel W. 0, Nefvencs: Ford Arkvi'a,, Te Pest trscion ool C Sng ih ona a Soe eh None he thsi rh Te (pon nh wth ton at he wk 3 can san itscampeue geo i hme kon ape and etnloga cant tly nrg Iason thea in per though mais ot opi God and Foreign Policy ery ens The sn deen rs at Weta a elpecepton 252 devlping cont: Despite fee ‘the world, China recog- : luxuries that they cannot afford. No doubt this sense ‘han ed by the shelerntraaaalbcehnna Nfs a ao. however, cla clemetsin van 4 oP pn, 2009); yp. lof /2k erate the importance of culture, using tas a fagade for pol- ies grounded in interest. But there are some real and impor tant dliferences between Chinese and Wester (particularly American) workdviews that are worth exploring, They begin with God. In the 2007 Pew survey, when asked whether one ‘must believe in God to be moral. a comfartable majority of ‘Americans (57 percent) said yes. In Japan and China, however, much large majorities said no—in China, a whopping 72 pet. Cent! Thi ia sttkng ad unesual divergence from the nom ¥en in Asia. The point is not that either country is immoral in fact all hard evidence suggests quite the oppasite—but ‘ather that in neither country do people believe in God, This might shock many in the West, but for scholars ofthe subject. itis a wellknown reality: East Asians do not believe that the world has a Creator who laid down a set of abstract moral laws that must be followed, That is an Abrahamic, or Semitic, conception of God shared by Judaism, Chistian and Islam, but quite alien to Chinese civiization. People sometimes describe China’ religion as Confucianism, But Joseph Needham, an eminent scholar of Confucianism, notes that if you think of religion “as the theology of a transcendent ‘reator-dity.” Confucianism is simply not a religion.#€ Conf. ‘ius was a teacher, nota prophet or holy mas in any sense. His ‘writings, o the fragments of them that survive, are strikingly nonreligious. He explicitly warns against thinking about the divine, instead setting out rules for acquiring knowiedge, behaving ethically, maintaining social stability and creating 2 vrellordeted civilization. His work has more in common with } writings of Enlightenment philosophers than with rele sious tracts ‘In fact, during the Enlightenment, Confucius was hot, The1am reports, "were read with avidity fy ale ast formar ofthe French Reouto, By nats Enianent nko eet Conf fr its reliance on reason rather than on divinity as a guide to ‘on merit, not patronage}, and a “practical a ae atchs, Frederick the Great, wrote his Report of Phibibu, a series ‘of leters from a fictitious Chinese ambassador in Europe to the emperor of China, Frederick's purpose was to contrast the bigotry ofthe Catholic Church with Chinese eationality. Westerners have often found it difficult to understand the iilference between the place of religion in China and its place in the West, Consider the experiences ofa Portuguese mission ay in the Far East, Matteo Ricci, as recounted by the great Yale historian Jonathan Spence.* In his early days ia China in the 1580s, Ricci, in an effort to present himself as an honored figure, shaved his head and beard and shrouded himself in the robes of « Buddhist. Only several yeats later did Ricci realize how misguided this was, Monks and holy men were not held in bigh esteem in China, He began traveling by sedan chair or hiring servants to cary him on their shoulders, “as men of rank. se accustomed todo,” Ricci later wrote to Claudio Acquaviva, general of the Jesuits, in 1592. °[T]he name of foreigners and priests is considered so vile in China that we noed this and other similar devices to show them that we are ant priests a3 vile as their own." By 1595, Ricci had cast of the ascetic trap pings of monk, which had hindered his missionary work, and instead adopted the dress of a Confcian scholar, Ricci had at fist scomned the Confucians fr not believing ia God. paradise, and the immortality of the soul. The Confucian school, Ricei ‘wrote toa friend, was “the true temple ofthe literati.” But he eventually saw that even though Confacianism maintained “a steitly neutral stance” toward matters of God and the afterlife ithad a strong sense of ethics, morality, and justice, Like other ray tho rough dos tthe Chie omg theEalgcnment figs, he came to seve that the West Soul eo fom Coico Wat dn God ave todo wth sign po? His tocsndueneed by Chistian and dn hve devel simple to spread the news nd comer ee tah The sre ct odor the fn poy of Chins av dene a rin, the United Sates, Fes St Ak nants Bin te Ca Shs re ss hy ve Bon owl she Pateaae ene pose at th cre ota fren poli sede esp mah on ga is, Chia in conta wy noe sure star os ef esi Sey Bg Cin nd cna pve a al ie toa purpose eda ned to spend athing tao shone isl So shen Bling seme oodles i ance on Raman sight is ot simpy tt the ome 8 ones aes ma ee rl The Chine seth es thw hat ein ple ~ Cherny rth aes ahs and ngs wh Soca rca ht sees ara ging pry Wem fesessmen have often sted that he Chie nae rules, laws, and con- counerpats seem pce er tock in tote Tht sense feiss ore station f= Chinese Shas etc tis ee ms ge Exel or paid ore taking op new cote. The react of nasa et rome to Chins pat mindset Soil ele thea eat ae fa oe portant tan pape omit wrote Mo could not ot Bling to exer #3 c suntil the company spent ‘tet reper asf ean : Clo and tot develope latoship hh over ‘and made clear that it wanted to help develop China's econ ‘omy and educational system. Once Microsoft had convinced the Chinese government ofits benign intentions, those same laws began to get enforced, Few Chinese have really internal. ized the notion that abstract ules, laws, and contracts are ‘wore important than a situational analysis of a case at hand which means that Chinese politcal and legal development is likely to take @ more circuitous and complex path than one ‘might predict, China's cultural traditions also affect its approach to neg tiation. Boston University’s Robert Weller argues, “The Chi nese base their sense of cause and effect around the idea of qi ‘energs: Qi isthe stuf of fengshui, and the element in the hody that is manipulated by acupuncture or Chinese herbs. It is art of a broad way of understanding the structure of the world as a set of interacting forces, complexly interrelated rather than working through a simple and lineat cause and effec.” "It could also have an effect on foreign policy.” Weller +298." Such speculation can sometimes be overdone and even sound sily: But in talking to Chinese about their ways of thinking, one quickly recognizes that concepts like qi are as central to their mind-set as a motal Creator o¢ fre wills to Westerners, Foreign policy is driven by many universal forces, bat there's no doubt that a basic worldview organizes the way: people perceive, act, and react, particuladly in crises Clture, however, does not exist in a vacuum. China's past and its own DINA ate shaped by its modem history-the impact of the West, communism’ decimation of tradition, the resulting Yawn in nese spivitualisin. and, perhaps most of all its recent efforts to reconcile its taditions with moder- rity: When you talk to Chinese economists, they don't pro-an Conn wy a eet sa eth ori tation, Cina Cera Bk scons ety moder and (a thee erm ts ppronch, Tat # ees tmp onthe Onted tt ast to vais cheney ay tell ‘Core shutratonaism tn abot cure (Aral en changes conic tke ist ie ht he Usted Stats age Joly bens 9 feign goemment here t into dong Me) he Chin hae add Wester ana n ma wae Some Chins frei poly ana cal thnsehes Gran Cenacnsmeaing no ean comes tn chive rp wiha Waeri bginie Chinese ples ih eter ses oF Lic ey nomen cont Chia wil mate wt 0 tunes prt ase some parts Wester — tothein the wenn cet Too Big to Hide Chins biggest problem has odo not with the particulates of culture but withthe nivale of power. China views tect an nation intent on sing pesca ts behavior Trae hy humilis: monntevernse, and edly relations sith al Bue many sising counties in the past have sins believed in their own hengn motves—and sill ended up pvcting the system The politcal stentst Robert Gain o ‘that as a nation’s power increases, it “will be tempted to tay to increase its control over its environment, In order to) increase its own security it wll ty to expand its politica omic, and territorial contro, it wil try to change the interna~ with its particular set of tional system in accorda interests“ The crucial point here is that, throughout histor, ‘reat powers have seen themselves as having the best inten: tions but being forced by necessity to act to protect their ever. ‘expanding interests. And as the world’ number two country, China will expand its interests substantially. ‘Ultimately. China's intentions might be irrelevant. In the messy world of international politics, intentions andl outcomes ‘re not directly linked, (No country was expectinga world war in 1914, Ie’ like a market in which all companies ae trying to ‘maximize profits by raising prices: the systemwide result is exactly the epposite—a fallin prices. Similarly in intesnational Politics, another system with no single, supreme authority, the intentions of countries do not always accutately predict the utcome, Hence the Roman aphorism “If you want peace, prepare for war.” Just how peacefully China can rise will be determined by a combination of Chinese actions, other countries’ reactions, and the systemic effects that this interaction produces. Given its current size, China cannot hope to slip onto the world stage unnoticed. Its search for energy and raw materials, for example, is entiely understandable China is growing fas, consumes energy and all kinds of commodities, and needs to find steady supplies of them. Other countries buy ol, so why. shouldn't Beijing do the same? The problem is size, China ‘operates on so large a scale that it can’t help changing the nature of the game, CChina’s perception of its interests is shifting, Men like Wu Jianmin come from an older generation of diplomats, and the younger generation is well aware of China’s new power, Some China watchers worty that, in time, power will go to China's head. In a delicately phrased set of warnings delivered inChina in 2005, Lee Kuan Yow described his concems not about China's current leadership, or even the next generation, bt about the generation after that, which will have been born ina time of stability, prosperity, and sising Chinese influence ~hina’s youth must be made aware of the need to reassure the world that China's rise will not turn out to be a disruptive force.” he said in a speech at Fudan University. Lee implied that what has kept Chinese leaders humble since Deng Xizo- pingis the bitter memory of Mao’ mistakes —fomenting revo lutions abroad, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution, which together resulted in the deaths of about forty million Chinese. “It is vital” Lee went on, "that the younger generation of Chinese who have only lived through a period of peace and growth and have no experience of China's tumultuous past are made aware ofthe mistakes China made asa eit ofhbsisand ees inideloy” For now, China's foreign policy remains entirely commer- cially focused, though that, too, ast its shadow. In Aica, for ‘example, China is working to build economic tes, The conti nent has natural resources, particularly cil and natural gas, that China aceds in order to grow, Both Beijing and Aftican govern- ments have welcomed new trade relations—in part because there is a0 colonial pastor difficult history to complicate mat tersand business is booming, Trade is growing around 50 ‘percent a year, Chinese ivestments in Affica even faster. In ‘many African countries, economic growth is at record highs, fact that many attribute to theit new connections with China. Some on the continent see the relationship as exploitative and resent Chinas new power, so Being is taking pains to demon- strate its good intentions. In November 2006, President Hu Jintao held 2 summit on Sino-Aitican relations, All fortycight African countries that have diplomatic ties with China attended, most of them represented by their presidents or prime ministers. It was the largest African summit ever held outside the continent. At the meeting, China promised to dou bile aid to Africa in two years, provide 85 billion in loans and credits, set up a $5 billion funel to encourage further Chinese ‘vestment in Africa, cancel much of the debt owed to China, provide greater access to the Chinese market, tain fifteen thousand African professionals, and build new hospitals and schools across the continent. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles- Zenavi, gushed, “China is aa inspiration for al of us.""5 What could be wrong with building such ties? Nothing — except that as China moves into AMrica it is taking up eco nomic, politcal, and military space that was occupied by Britain or France or the United States, This will necessarily mean friction as each great power struggles to promote its fown interests and its own conception of doing the right thing. in Alice. China's interpretation ofits actions is that it doesn't interfere in these countries’ domestic affairs—that iti, in a sense, value neutral. But is it? Moisés Nat editor of Forsign Policy magazine, tells a story about the Nigerian government ‘negotiating a $5 milion loan for train systems with the World Bank in 2007, The bank had insisted that the government clean up the notoriously corrupt railway bureaucracy before it approved the loan. The deal was alinost done when the Chi- nese government stepped in and offered the government a $9 billion loan to rebuild the entice train system—with no strings, ‘0 requirements, no need for any reform. The Worid Bank was come within days. Needless to say, much ofthat Chinese ‘money wll yo into the bans accounts of key government off- cial rather than toward better train service for Nigerians.Beijing has found it useful to deal ditectly with govern meats, because they almost always maintain ownership of the resources that China needs. Transactions are simpler when dealing with one centralized authority particulary if itis an ‘outcast and has nowhere to turn but to China. So China buys platinum and iron ore from Zimbabwe and in tur sells Robert Mugabe weapons and radio-jamming devices—despite a U.S, and European Union ban—which he uses to intimidate arrest, and kill domestic opposition. Beijing is Mugabe's most important supporter on the UN Security Council In Sudan, China’ involvement runs evel deeper. It has invested $3 billion in the oil fields there since 1999. Chinese companies are the majority shareholders in the two largest ol conglomerates in the county, and China buys 65 percent of Sudan’ oil exports. It maintains a military alliance with Sudan and, despite UN restrictions, appears to have provided arms that end up in the hands of progovernment militias in Darfur, Chinese officals often confirm that they have a close military relationship with Sadan and intend to keep it that way Explaining bis country’s position, China's deputy foreign min- ister was frank "Business is business. We try to separate poi- tics from business, Secondly, I think the internal situation in Sadan is an internal affair. and we are not in a position to Impose upon them.” If China were a bt player on the global stage, it woulda't ‘matter much what it was doing in Zimbabwe or Sudan. Cubs, for all we know, has extensive dealings with both governments, Dut no one cares. Bejing, on the other hand, cannot hide its| light under the bushel anymore. China's dealings with these counties give them a lifeline, retard progress, and. in the long, run, perpetuate the cycle of bad regimes and social tensions that plagues the Aftican continent. This kind of relationship abo ensures that while Africas governments might view China favorably its people will have more mixed views—as they have had of Western governments through the years Beijing has been slow to recognize its broader responsibility in this region, arguing that it is simply minding its own busi- fess. But in fact, it isnt even doing that. Beijing has often shown itself to be well aware of its power, One reason it has focused on Altica is that the continent has long. included a rnamber of countries that have been friendly with Taiwan, Although seven of the twenty-six governments in the world that have relations with Taiwan today are in Aftica, six posing toa rendu on ava independ 2002. For the most pact, Bing has pursued is long Plan of “normalizing” relations with the island's main opposi- tion party and smothering it with conciliation, But nt always, In March 2005, Bejing passed an “anti-secession” law, threat, ening Taiwan with military force if it dared to anger China ig any way. Asa result, among other things, the European Union Postponed its plan to lift an arms embacgo.on China, ‘Taiwan offers the most vivid and important example of how {he economic incentives for integration and the politcal unges for nationalism diverge and yet can be managed, The rational decision making that guides economic policy isnot so gay applied in the realm of politics, where honer, history, pride, and anger all play a large role. In recent years, Bejing has Switched to a smarter, less aggressive course with regard to Taiwan (and even with Japan), recognizing that time is on its side. ‘Thus it has made several clever moves that have increased Taiwaa's dependence on the mainland —mos signi ‘cantly the reduction of tarifs on farm products that come from the most independence-minded pars of Taiwan, All the while of course, China's military has grown rapidly its prin. pal strategic objective being to prevail quickly in any conflict ver Taiwan. In other words, economic growth and globalica- ‘ton have made Beijing plan for integration and yet given it the ‘power for military and political confrontation, ‘The Dragon and the Eagle ‘The importance of China’ elation with every county in the world is dwarfed by its celations with one—the United States of America. Or, to put it differently; none of the potential problems that China faces matter unless they trigger theinvokement of America. Without U.S. involvement, a war over Taiwan might be bloody and tragic, but only if t turned into a Sino-U.S, confrontation would it have far-reaching, salobal consequences. The China challenge also has greater implications for the United States than for other countries, Historically, when the world’s leading power is challenged by a risingoone, the two have a difficult relationship. And while nei- ther side will admit it publicly, hoth China and the United States are worried and planning for trouble. For three decades, Chinese loreign policy has been geared toward satis fying the United States for a vartety of practical reasons. First it was anti-Soviet strategy, then a desire for markets and reform, then rehabilitating the country after Tiananmen Squate, membership in the World Tzade Organization, and finally the Beijing Olympics. But ineeasingly. Chinas younger lites believe that their country needs to think of itself as a competitor to Washington in several senses. In Washington, there have always been those who see China as the next com prehensive threat to American national interests and ideals. To say this is not to assume war or even conflict, but merely to note that thet is likely to be tension. How the two countries handle it will determine their future elations—and the peace of the world. For now, the forces of integration have triumphed, in both Beijing. and Washington. The Chinese-American economic relationship is one of mutual dependence. China needs the [American market to sell its goods: the United States needs Chinato finance its debt—it’s globalization’ equivalent of the nuclear age’s Mutual Assured Destruction. (And to add to the forces of stability the Chinese and American nuclear arsenals also act as deterrents, The reality of globalized world forces Aetca an China no an alice tt ue geplts Gaoqe W But pay teen a tan peste orion Us-chan sensi pe toip sd poniiog tows Amacom fone ka gu. Dt dapte ote bar ey a Betng oe ven snd ard nan oo ere sion, a more anti-Taiwanese statement than any ever made aesincca pent Matron dete Bente ites neste Das ae ee content with the administration. On the issue it cares about, Dub hace Band Wag we oy tocnpte, Get power cot soniye sd aca Cali Ittwactonts deena gee owt, an Now Kowe eed oe SH me ena ts more The onward movement of ecmore and paid wt cron redid alot fed ae thw di tani, Chins loan een tat reo Werte United Star sole boxe ‘et fndanensy dare sede Ce ne Cia tr nga Ered cereal Wen aime twister nee nna Be tio st ert Schnee a and globalization. : Tea genpof Anat, nao chiy of onsenate ad some Pestago filth as en ove wath alarms athe Chins ent spdigott rl wag tems But thefts dont oppo thei ce China is certainly expanding its military, with a ae tht hasbeen owing 1 pent ree Bu asain ton cat Anes er 1 rato he Feng’ anna bi The United Sts bs ake ndesepowered iat cars that can each field She ta Chinen ating eth fn. China has twenty malar mises tht al reach USS. shores, according to Pentagon estimates, but these statlandcumberome” weapons are nike vlerie wa een se” Te Une Sits creo tari sand intact nla vorhends sd nd seeps wae” Spe ches undemtandho pied th ay bx is The Chine chaleoe crn illo ok ke ater Sov Union th Bejing string o hep pce tay tm Chee ema" pone eases exploring and developing wns comp iend ene Aneean milan suprenasy sch a Pe sade! techelop en mor importa rea coromic eng apd split ilo ache Ses wns rg tt ia oe Cha ceecostwanto invade and copy Tan: iemor helo Scop une tive independence eet stulyscumaling advange and wenng nth pent fae Teg Conan in Sens Joa Cope ae pe Chas toi pl ats ing Ss ower, bristling with arms and! intolerant of others’ world views" he writes, “China's emerging power is based on the example of their omn model, the strength of theit economic system, and thei rigid defense of... national sovereignty Ramo describes an elite that understands that ther country’s sing power and less interventionist style mabe tan attractive Partner, especially in a world in which the United States is seen as an overbearing hegemon. “Ihe goal for China is not conflict but the avoidance of confit.” he writes. “Tue success in strategic issues involves manipulating a situation so effec. tively that the outcome is inevitably in favor of Chinese inter- ests. This emerges from the oldest Chinese strategic thinker, Sun Zi, who argued that ‘every batile is won or lost before it ic ever foughe. "8 ‘The United States understands how to handle a traditional iiltary-political advance. After all, this was the nature of the Soviet threat and the Nazi rise to power. The United States has a conceptual ramework as wellas the tools weapons, aid packages alliances—with which to confront such an advance Were China to push its weight around, anger its neighbors, and frighten the word, Washington would be able to respood With aset of effective polices that would take advantage of the natural balancing process by which Japan, India, Australia, and Vietnam—and perhaps others—would came together to limit China's emerging power, But what if China adheres to its asymmetrical strategy? What if it gradually expands its eco nomic tes, acts calmly and moderately and sony enlarges its sphere of influence, secking only greater weigh, friendship. and influence in the work? Wat it slowly pushes Washing: ton onto the sidelines in Asi in an effort to wear out Amer. ica’ patience and endurance? What iit quietly positions itsas the alternative to a hectoring and arrogant America? How will America cope with such a scenario—a kind of Cold Wat, Dut this time with a vibrant market society with the worlds largest poptlation, a nation that isnot showcasing a hopeless model of state socialism or squandering its power in pointless military interventions? This is a new challenge for the United States, one it has not tackled before, and for which t is largely unprepared, 7 In thinking through how to approach China, American political elites have fixed their gaze on another rising power, close to, and close on the heels of, China—India The Ally 1 the fall of 1982, [took an Ai Ina light from Bombay's Santa Cruz airport to go to college in the United States The preceding decade had been a rough one in India, ‘marked by mass protests, riots secessionist movements, insur tencies, and the suspension of demozra Underneath it all ‘was a dismal economy, one that combined meager growth with eversworsening inflation. Economic growth barely out paced population growth. It would have taken the average Indian fifty-seven years to double his income, given the rate of| increase in per capita GDP at the time. Many talented and ambitious Indians believed that their only real future lay in leaving the country. Over 75 percent of the graduates of the Indian Institutes of Technology in the 19808 emigrated 1 America The decade since 1997 could not have been more different India has been peaceful, stable, and prosperous. The fires of secession and militant nationalism have died down. National and state governments changed hands without incident. There