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Question The Supreme Court has suggested that confidential portions of the

document could be redacted, and a summary of the document’s contents


could be provided to fairly exclude materials after a successful public
interest immunity claim. The Supreme Court last week set aside the
Centre’s order imposing a broadcast ban on the Malayalam news channel
MediaOne. The top court set aside a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Kerala
High Court that had upheld the I&B Ministry’s order. In making its
decision, the High Court had relied on material disclosed solely to it by the
Home Ministry in a ‘sealed cover’. The SC, which has repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with so-called “sealed cover jurisprudence”, also devised a
procedure for “public interest immunity claim” as a less restrictive
alternative to sealed covers for deciding claims involving state secrets. The
Supreme Court said that the validity of a claim involving national security
considerations must be based on the test of “(i) whether there is material to
conclude that the non-disclosure of information is in the interest of national
security; and (ii) whether a reasonable prudent person would draw the same
inference from the material on record”. However, in the MediaOne case, the
court said that even if one assumes that the non-disclosure was in the
interests of confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the
government did not satisfy the proportionality standard.
“The non-disclosure of a summary of the reasons for the denial of security
clearance to MBL (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd, the company that owns
MediaOne) which constitutes the core irreducible minimum of procedural
guarantees, does not satisfy the suitability prong,” the court said. The court
also said that it assesses the validity of public interest immunity claims,
which address the same harms as the sealed cover procedure, based on the
“structured proportionality” standard. This is essentially a “standard of
review” used by courts in public interest immunity claims — and “the lack
of such a standard in sealed cover proceedings to protect procedural
safeguards indicates that public interest immunity claims constitute less
restrictive means”, the court said. The court added that while public interest
immunity claims also impact the principles of natural justice, sealed cover
proceedings go a step ahead and infringe on the principles of natural justice
as well as the principles of open justice. Alternatively, the court suggested
that confidential portions of the document could be redacted, and a
summary of the document’s contents could be provided to fairly exclude
materials after a successful public interest immunity claim. A “public
interest immunity claim is a less restrictive means”, the court said, adding
that dilution of procedural guarantees while hearing the claim could not be
ignored. “It is only the court and the party seeking non-disclosure of the
material who are privy to the public interest immunity proceedings,” it said.
It was also clarified that the court must consider factors like “the relevance
of the material to the case” while using the proportionality standard to test
the public-interest immunity claim. “While there may be material on serious
concerns of national security which cannot be disclosed; the constitutional
principle of procedural guarantees is equally important, and it cannot be
turned into a dead letter,” the court said. Being the “highest constitutional
court”, it has a responsibility to balance the two conflicting considerations,
the SC said. Thus, to safeguard the “claimant against a potential injury to
procedural guarantees in public interest immunity proceeding”, the court
reiterated its power to appoint an amicus curiae. “The appointment of an
amicus curiae will balance concerns of confidentiality with the need to
preserve public confidence in the objectivity of the justice delivery
process,” it said.
Source: What is the SC’s public interest immunity claim procedure?,
The Indian Express, April 20, 2023.
The government of a country initiates a project involving the
construction of a new, highly advanced telecommunications
infrastructure. The project is shrouded in secrecy due to its potential
impact on national security. An investigative journalist, Neil, files a
petition seeking disclosure of the project’s details, arguing that the
public has a right to know about government projects funded by
taxpayer money. The government refuses to disclose detailed
information, citing national security concerns. The case goes to court,
and the government provides the judge with classified documents in a
sealed cover, asserting that the project’s details, if disclosed, could
compromise national security. In evaluating the government’s claim of
non-disclosure due to national security concerns, what should be the
primary consideration under the legal principle described in the
passage?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The government’s claim should be upheld without scrutiny, as all matters
labeled as national security by the government are beyond judicial review,
and the court must respect the executive’s judgment in these matters.

Option The court should assess whether the withheld information, as per the
classified documents, genuinely pertains to national security and whether a
reasonable prudent person would agree that its disclosure could
compromise national security.

Option The court should prioritize public interest and the right to information,
mandating the disclosure of the project’s details, as the government’s claim
of national security is often used to withhold information without
substantial grounds.

Option The court should defer to the government’s assessment without examining
the classified documents, as national security concerns are inherently within
the purview of the executive branch’s expertise.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle outlined in the passage.
The court must evaluate the material to determine if its non-disclosure
genuinely serves national security interests and whether a reasonable
prudent person would draw the same conclusion from the material. Option
A is incorrect because the principle in the passage suggests that claims of
national security must be scrutinized and not accepted at face value. Judicial
review is necessary to ensure that the claim is valid. Option C is incorrect
because, while public interest and transparency are important, the principle
requires a balanced approach. The court must assess the validity of the
national security claim rather than automatically prioritize public interest
over potential security concerns. Option D is incorrect as it suggests
complete deference to the executive without judicial scrutiny. The passage
emphasizes the need for the court to independently assess the validity of the
national security claim, not just defer to the government’s assertion.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The Supreme Court has suggested that confidential portions of the
document could be redacted, and a summary of the document’s contents
could be provided to fairly exclude materials after a successful public
interest immunity claim. The Supreme Court last week set aside the
Centre’s order imposing a broadcast ban on the Malayalam news channel
MediaOne. The top court set aside a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Kerala
High Court that had upheld the I&B Ministry’s order. In making its
decision, the High Court had relied on material disclosed solely to it by the
Home Ministry in a ‘sealed cover’. The SC, which has repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with so-called “sealed cover jurisprudence”, also devised a
procedure for “public interest immunity claim” as a less restrictive
alternative to sealed covers for deciding claims involving state secrets. The
Supreme Court said that the validity of a claim involving national security
considerations must be based on the test of “(i) whether there is material to
conclude that the non-disclosure of information is in the interest of national
security; and (ii) whether a reasonable prudent person would draw the same
inference from the material on record”. However, in the MediaOne case, the
court said that even if one assumes that the non-disclosure was in the
interests of confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the
government did not satisfy the proportionality standard.
“The non-disclosure of a summary of the reasons for the denial of security
clearance to MBL (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd, the company that owns
MediaOne) which constitutes the core irreducible minimum of procedural
guarantees, does not satisfy the suitability prong,” the court said. The court
also said that it assesses the validity of public interest immunity claims,
which address the same harms as the sealed cover procedure, based on the
“structured proportionality” standard. This is essentially a “standard of
review” used by courts in public interest immunity claims — and “the lack
of such a standard in sealed cover proceedings to protect procedural
safeguards indicates that public interest immunity claims constitute less
restrictive means”, the court said. The court added that while public interest
immunity claims also impact the principles of natural justice, sealed cover
proceedings go a step ahead and infringe on the principles of natural justice
as well as the principles of open justice. Alternatively, the court suggested
that confidential portions of the document could be redacted, and a
summary of the document’s contents could be provided to fairly exclude
materials after a successful public interest immunity claim. A “public
interest immunity claim is a less restrictive means”, the court said, adding
that dilution of procedural guarantees while hearing the claim could not be
ignored. “It is only the court and the party seeking non-disclosure of the
material who are privy to the public interest immunity proceedings,” it said.
It was also clarified that the court must consider factors like “the relevance
of the material to the case” while using the proportionality standard to test
the public-interest immunity claim. “While there may be material on serious
concerns of national security which cannot be disclosed; the constitutional
principle of procedural guarantees is equally important, and it cannot be
turned into a dead letter,” the court said. Being the “highest constitutional
court”, it has a responsibility to balance the two conflicting considerations,
the SC said. Thus, to safeguard the “claimant against a potential injury to
procedural guarantees in public interest immunity proceeding”, the court
reiterated its power to appoint an amicus curiae. “The appointment of an
amicus curiae will balance concerns of confidentiality with the need to
preserve public confidence in the objectivity of the justice delivery
process,” it said.
Source: What is the SC’s public interest immunity claim procedure?,
The Indian Express, April 20, 2023.
The government initiates a large-scale surveillance program, allegedly
to monitor potential terrorist activities. A human rights organization,
Liberty Watch, files a lawsuit challenging the legality of the program,
citing concerns over privacy violations. The government, while
acknowledging the program’s existence, refuses to disclose specific
operational details, arguing that such information is sensitive and could
compromise national security if made public. In response to the
lawsuit, the government submits detailed documents to the court,
requesting that they be reviewed in a sealed cover. Liberty Watch
argues that this lack of transparency hinders their ability to effectively
challenge the program’s legality. Considering the principle of handling
confidential information in court proceedings, what approach should
the court take in this case?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should review the documents in a sealed cover as provided by the
government, without providing any summary or redaction, to fully respect
and preserve the confidentiality of sensitive national security information.

Option The court should reject the sealed cover approach and demand full public
disclosure of all details of the surveillance program, prioritizing the public’s
right to information and the organization’s ability to challenge the program.

Option The court should allow the sealed cover review but also require the
government to provide a redacted version of the documents and a summary,
to balance the need for confidentiality with the procedural rights of Liberty
Watch.
Option The court should dismiss Liberty Watch’s lawsuit on the grounds of national
security, accepting the government’s assertion of sensitivity without
reviewing the documents, either publicly or in a sealed cover.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it aligns with the principle outlined in the passage. By
requiring both a sealed cover review and the provision of a redacted
document and summary, the court can maintain confidentiality while
ensuring that Liberty Watch has enough information to meaningfully
participate in the legal proceedings. Option A is incorrect because it
disregards the principle of balancing confidentiality with procedural
fairness. The passage suggests that the court should not solely rely on
sealed cover procedures without considering more transparent alternatives.
Option B is incorrect as it overlooks the legitimate concerns of national
security. The passage implies that while transparency is important, it should
not come at the cost of compromising sensitive information that could harm
national security. Option D is incorrect because it suggests an outright
dismissal without considering the procedural rights of the challenging party.
The principle emphasized in the passage is to find a middle ground that
respects both national security and legal procedural rights.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The Supreme Court has suggested that confidential portions of the
document could be redacted, and a summary of the document’s contents
could be provided to fairly exclude materials after a successful public
interest immunity claim. The Supreme Court last week set aside the
Centre’s order imposing a broadcast ban on the Malayalam news channel
MediaOne. The top court set aside a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Kerala
High Court that had upheld the I&B Ministry’s order. In making its
decision, the High Court had relied on material disclosed solely to it by the
Home Ministry in a ‘sealed cover’. The SC, which has repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with so-called “sealed cover jurisprudence”, also devised a
procedure for “public interest immunity claim” as a less restrictive
alternative to sealed covers for deciding claims involving state secrets. The
Supreme Court said that the validity of a claim involving national security
considerations must be based on the test of “(i) whether there is material to
conclude that the non-disclosure of information is in the interest of national
security; and (ii) whether a reasonable prudent person would draw the same
inference from the material on record”. However, in the MediaOne case, the
court said that even if one assumes that the non-disclosure was in the
interests of confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the
government did not satisfy the proportionality standard.
“The non-disclosure of a summary of the reasons for the denial of security
clearance to MBL (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd, the company that owns
MediaOne) which constitutes the core irreducible minimum of procedural
guarantees, does not satisfy the suitability prong,” the court said. The court
also said that it assesses the validity of public interest immunity claims,
which address the same harms as the sealed cover procedure, based on the
“structured proportionality” standard. This is essentially a “standard of
review” used by courts in public interest immunity claims — and “the lack
of such a standard in sealed cover proceedings to protect procedural
safeguards indicates that public interest immunity claims constitute less
restrictive means”, the court said. The court added that while public interest
immunity claims also impact the principles of natural justice, sealed cover
proceedings go a step ahead and infringe on the principles of natural justice
as well as the principles of open justice. Alternatively, the court suggested
that confidential portions of the document could be redacted, and a
summary of the document’s contents could be provided to fairly exclude
materials after a successful public interest immunity claim. A “public
interest immunity claim is a less restrictive means”, the court said, adding
that dilution of procedural guarantees while hearing the claim could not be
ignored. “It is only the court and the party seeking non-disclosure of the
material who are privy to the public interest immunity proceedings,” it said.
It was also clarified that the court must consider factors like “the relevance
of the material to the case” while using the proportionality standard to test
the public-interest immunity claim. “While there may be material on serious
concerns of national security which cannot be disclosed; the constitutional
principle of procedural guarantees is equally important, and it cannot be
turned into a dead letter,” the court said. Being the “highest constitutional
court”, it has a responsibility to balance the two conflicting considerations,
the SC said. Thus, to safeguard the “claimant against a potential injury to
procedural guarantees in public interest immunity proceeding”, the court
reiterated its power to appoint an amicus curiae. “The appointment of an
amicus curiae will balance concerns of confidentiality with the need to
preserve public confidence in the objectivity of the justice delivery
process,” it said.
Source: What is the SC’s public interest immunity claim procedure?,
The Indian Express, April 20, 2023.
A pharmaceutical company, PharmaCorp, develops a new drug that it
claims is highly effective against a rare disease. However, several
patients experience severe side effects after taking the drug. A
consumer rights group, HealthWatch, sues PharmaCorp for allegedly
withholding critical data about the drug’s safety during clinical trials.
PharmaCorp responds by submitting detailed trial data to the court,
claiming that full public disclosure would compromise proprietary
secrets and harm its competitive position. HealthWatch argues that the
data is crucial for assessing the drug’s safety and the public’s right to
know outweighs PharmaCorp’s commercial interests. How should the
court apply the structured proportionality standard in assessing
PharmaCorp’s claim of confidentiality in this situation?

Type Multiple Choice


Option The court should prioritize PharmaCorp’s commercial interests and accept
the confidentiality claim without reviewing the trial data, as disclosing
proprietary information could harm the company’s competitive position.

Option The court should reject PharmaCorp’s confidentiality claim outright and
order full disclosure of all trial data, given the public interest in knowing the
safety profile of the drug.

Option The court should apply the structured proportionality standard by assessing
whether withholding the trial data is necessary to protect PharmaCorp’s
legitimate interests and whether this need outweighs the public interest in
knowing the drug’s safety.

Option The court should review the trial data in private but prohibit HealthWatch
from accessing it, considering PharmaCorp’s confidentiality claim sufficient
to override the public interest in this case.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it reflects the application of the structured


proportionality standard. The court must weigh PharmaCorp’s need to
protect its proprietary information against the public’s right to know about
the drug’s safety, ensuring that any limitation on disclosure is necessary and
proportionate. Option A is incorrect because it does not consider the balance
between PharmaCorp’s commercial interests and the public’s right to
information. The structured proportionality standard requires a nuanced
assessment, not a blanket prioritization of one interest over the other.
Option B is incorrect as it disregards PharmaCorp’s legitimate interest in
protecting proprietary information. The structured proportionality standard
necessitates a balanced approach, considering both the public interest and
the company’s confidentiality claims. Option D is incorrect because it
denies HealthWatch access to information that could be vital for its lawsuit.
The structured proportionality standard requires that both parties’ interests
be fairly considered, and access to information is a key part of this.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The Supreme Court has suggested that confidential portions of the
document could be redacted, and a summary of the document’s contents
could be provided to fairly exclude materials after a successful public
interest immunity claim. The Supreme Court last week set aside the
Centre’s order imposing a broadcast ban on the Malayalam news channel
MediaOne. The top court set aside a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Kerala
High Court that had upheld the I&B Ministry’s order. In making its
decision, the High Court had relied on material disclosed solely to it by the
Home Ministry in a ‘sealed cover’. The SC, which has repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with so-called “sealed cover jurisprudence”, also devised a
procedure for “public interest immunity claim” as a less restrictive
alternative to sealed covers for deciding claims involving state secrets. The
Supreme Court said that the validity of a claim involving national security
considerations must be based on the test of “(i) whether there is material to
conclude that the non-disclosure of information is in the interest of national
security; and (ii) whether a reasonable prudent person would draw the same
inference from the material on record”. However, in the MediaOne case, the
court said that even if one assumes that the non-disclosure was in the
interests of confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the
government did not satisfy the proportionality standard.
“The non-disclosure of a summary of the reasons for the denial of security
clearance to MBL (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd, the company that owns
MediaOne) which constitutes the core irreducible minimum of procedural
guarantees, does not satisfy the suitability prong,” the court said. The court
also said that it assesses the validity of public interest immunity claims,
which address the same harms as the sealed cover procedure, based on the
“structured proportionality” standard. This is essentially a “standard of
review” used by courts in public interest immunity claims — and “the lack
of such a standard in sealed cover proceedings to protect procedural
safeguards indicates that public interest immunity claims constitute less
restrictive means”, the court said. The court added that while public interest
immunity claims also impact the principles of natural justice, sealed cover
proceedings go a step ahead and infringe on the principles of natural justice
as well as the principles of open justice. Alternatively, the court suggested
that confidential portions of the document could be redacted, and a
summary of the document’s contents could be provided to fairly exclude
materials after a successful public interest immunity claim. A “public
interest immunity claim is a less restrictive means”, the court said, adding
that dilution of procedural guarantees while hearing the claim could not be
ignored. “It is only the court and the party seeking non-disclosure of the
material who are privy to the public interest immunity proceedings,” it said.
It was also clarified that the court must consider factors like “the relevance
of the material to the case” while using the proportionality standard to test
the public-interest immunity claim. “While there may be material on serious
concerns of national security which cannot be disclosed; the constitutional
principle of procedural guarantees is equally important, and it cannot be
turned into a dead letter,” the court said. Being the “highest constitutional
court”, it has a responsibility to balance the two conflicting considerations,
the SC said. Thus, to safeguard the “claimant against a potential injury to
procedural guarantees in public interest immunity proceeding”, the court
reiterated its power to appoint an amicus curiae. “The appointment of an
amicus curiae will balance concerns of confidentiality with the need to
preserve public confidence in the objectivity of the justice delivery
process,” it said.
Source: What is the SC’s public interest immunity claim procedure?,
The Indian Express, April 20, 2023.
In a high-profile espionage case, a suspected spy, Alex, is accused of
leaking sensitive state secrets to a foreign government. The prosecution
submits crucial evidence to the court, requesting that it be reviewed in
a sealed cover due to its highly sensitive nature, potentially affecting
national security. Alex’s defense team argues that access to this
evidence is critical for a fair trial and that complete non-disclosure
violates Alex’s constitutional rights, including the right to a fair
defense. How should the court reconcile the constitutional principle of
procedural guarantees with the concerns of national security in
assessing the prosecution’s request for a sealed cover review of the
evidence in Alex’s case?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should permit a sealed cover review of the evidence, considering
national security as an overriding concern, and fully exclude Alex’s defense
team from accessing the evidence, prioritizing state security over procedural
guarantees.

Option The court should deny the prosecution’s request for a sealed cover review
and insist on full public disclosure of the evidence, upholding Alex’s
constitutional rights to a fair defense, despite potential risks to national
security.

Option The court should conduct a balanced assessment by considering the


provision of a redacted version of the evidence or a summary to Alex’s
defense team, ensuring Alex’s right to a fair defense while safeguarding
sensitive information that could impact national security.

Option The court should defer entirely to the prosecution’s assessment of national
security risks and allow a sealed cover review without any form of
disclosure to Alex’s defense team, as the court is not equipped to evaluate
national security implications.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it reflects the approach of balancing the need to


protect national security while upholding procedural guarantees. Providing
a redacted version or a summary of the evidence to the defense team aligns
with the principle of maintaining a fair trial without compromising national
security. Option A is incorrect because it disregards Alex’s constitutional
rights to a fair defense by completely excluding the defense team from
accessing the evidence. Balancing procedural guarantees with national
security concerns requires more nuanced consideration. Option B is
incorrect as it fails to consider the potential risks to national security. While
procedural guarantees are crucial, they must be weighed against genuine
national security concerns. Option D is incorrect because it suggests a lack
of judicial oversight in matters of national security. The court has a
responsibility to balance the concerns of national security with
constitutional rights, rather than deferring entirely to one party’s
assessment.
Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The Supreme Court has suggested that confidential portions of the
document could be redacted, and a summary of the document’s contents
could be provided to fairly exclude materials after a successful public
interest immunity claim. The Supreme Court last week set aside the
Centre’s order imposing a broadcast ban on the Malayalam news channel
MediaOne. The top court set aside a March 2, 2022 judgment of the Kerala
High Court that had upheld the I&B Ministry’s order. In making its
decision, the High Court had relied on material disclosed solely to it by the
Home Ministry in a ‘sealed cover’. The SC, which has repeatedly expressed
unhappiness with so-called “sealed cover jurisprudence”, also devised a
procedure for “public interest immunity claim” as a less restrictive
alternative to sealed covers for deciding claims involving state secrets. The
Supreme Court said that the validity of a claim involving national security
considerations must be based on the test of “(i) whether there is material to
conclude that the non-disclosure of information is in the interest of national
security; and (ii) whether a reasonable prudent person would draw the same
inference from the material on record”. However, in the MediaOne case, the
court said that even if one assumes that the non-disclosure was in the
interests of confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the
government did not satisfy the proportionality standard.
“The non-disclosure of a summary of the reasons for the denial of security
clearance to MBL (Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd, the company that owns
MediaOne) which constitutes the core irreducible minimum of procedural
guarantees, does not satisfy the suitability prong,” the court said. The court
also said that it assesses the validity of public interest immunity claims,
which address the same harms as the sealed cover procedure, based on the
“structured proportionality” standard. This is essentially a “standard of
review” used by courts in public interest immunity claims — and “the lack
of such a standard in sealed cover proceedings to protect procedural
safeguards indicates that public interest immunity claims constitute less
restrictive means”, the court said. The court added that while public interest
immunity claims also impact the principles of natural justice, sealed cover
proceedings go a step ahead and infringe on the principles of natural justice
as well as the principles of open justice. Alternatively, the court suggested
that confidential portions of the document could be redacted, and a
summary of the document’s contents could be provided to fairly exclude
materials after a successful public interest immunity claim. A “public
interest immunity claim is a less restrictive means”, the court said, adding
that dilution of procedural guarantees while hearing the claim could not be
ignored. “It is only the court and the party seeking non-disclosure of the
material who are privy to the public interest immunity proceedings,” it said.
It was also clarified that the court must consider factors like “the relevance
of the material to the case” while using the proportionality standard to test
the public-interest immunity claim. “While there may be material on serious
concerns of national security which cannot be disclosed; the constitutional
principle of procedural guarantees is equally important, and it cannot be
turned into a dead letter,” the court said. Being the “highest constitutional
court”, it has a responsibility to balance the two conflicting considerations,
the SC said. Thus, to safeguard the “claimant against a potential injury to
procedural guarantees in public interest immunity proceeding”, the court
reiterated its power to appoint an amicus curiae. “The appointment of an
amicus curiae will balance concerns of confidentiality with the need to
preserve public confidence in the objectivity of the justice delivery
process,” it said.
Source: What is the SC’s public interest immunity claim procedure?,
The Indian Express, April 20, 2023.
A large-scale environmental disaster occurs, allegedly caused by
negligence on the part of a major chemical company, ChemCo. The
government launches an investigation and discovers evidence
suggesting ChemCo’s culpability. However, the evidence also contains
details about the company’s proprietary chemical processes, which are
considered trade secrets. ChemCo argues that the disclosure of this
evidence in court would severely harm its competitive position and
should therefore be treated as confidential. Environmental groups and
affected communities argue that full disclosure is essential for justice
and accountability. Given the case’s complexity and the sensitivity of
the information, the court considers appointing an amicus curiae to
assist in its review. In this case involving ChemCo, how should the
court utilize the appointment of an amicus curiae as per the principle
outlined in the passage?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae to independently review the
evidence and advise the court on whether the proprietary information
should be kept confidential, ensuring a balanced consideration of ChemCo’s
trade secrets and the public’s right to information.

Option The court should rely solely on the government’s assessment of the
evidence’s confidentiality and not appoint an amicus curiae, as the
involvement of an external party could complicate the confidentiality
concerns.

Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae with expertise in environmental
law only, disregarding the proprietary trade secrets aspect, as the public
interest in environmental accountability outweighs ChemCo’s
confidentiality concerns.

Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae to represent the environmental
groups and affected communities, ensuring their interests are prioritized
over ChemCo’s trade secret claims.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it aligns with the principle of appointing an amicus


curiae for a fair and objective assessment of the case. The amicus curiae can
provide an independent review of the evidence, helping the court balance
ChemCo’s confidentiality concerns with the public interest in transparency
and accountability. Option B is incorrect because it overlooks the value of
an independent assessment by an amicus curiae, which can provide a more
nuanced understanding of the issues at stake, especially in cases involving
complex and sensitive information. Option C is incorrect as it narrows the
role of the amicus curiae to environmental law expertise only, neglecting
the importance of understanding the proprietary trade secrets aspect. The
principle suggests a balanced approach considering all relevant aspects of
the case. Option D is incorrect because it suggests an amicus curiae’s role as
an advocate for one party, which is not their purpose. An amicus curiae is
meant to assist the court impartially, not to represent the interests of a
specific party.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Last week, a political analyst called Mithun Vijay Kumar sent a legal notice
to streaming giant Netflix over an episode of The Big Bang Theory
allegedly used a “derogatory term” against Bollywood actress Madhuri
Dixit. As per the legal notice, Kumar asked the OTT platform to remove the
first episode of season two where the character of Raj Koothrappali, played
by Kunal Nayyar, along with the character of Sheldon Cooper, played by
Jim Parsons, compared Aishwarya Rai with Madhuri Dixit. In the legal
notice, Kumar pointed out that the remarks made by Kunal’s character were
not only offensive but also defamatory. He also asked the streamer to
remove the episode in question or face legal action for promoting
discrimination against women. The scene which Mithun Vijay Kumar took
offence to involved an argument between Raj and Sheldon comparing
actresses Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit. The duo seem to be watching a
Hindi film – we never get to see which film but the song playing in the
background is from Kaho Na Pyaar Hai, which does not have either actress.
Nitty gritties aside, Sheldon and Raj get into a disagreement about who
among Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit is prettier. Sheldon refers to
Aishwarya as “a poor man’s Madhuri Dixit”. To which, Raj, seething with
anger, responds by saying that Aishwarya is a “godess” in comparison to
whom, Madhuri is a “leprous prostitute”.
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with the term
“Notice”. It says that except in the manner provided under sub-section (2)
of Section 80, no suits shall be instituted against the government or a public
officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in an official
capacity, until after two months have elapsed since the “notice in writing’
has been delivered to or left at the office of either the Secretary’s office or
the office of the General Manager’s of a particular railway if it’s intended
for the Central Government or railways respectively. However, it clarified
that if a suit is against the J&K government, then the notice must be sent to
its Chief Secretary or any other officer authorized by the government.
Besides this, for suits filed against the state government, the notice should
be sent to the State government’s Secretary or the Collector of a particular
district. The object of Section 80 is to provide the government and public
officers with an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and settle the
claim before going to trial, preferably without resorting to litigation. The
intent behind carving this provision was to avoid unnecessary litigation and
waste of the litigant and the court’s time and money. It is also to provide
ample opportunity to the opposing party to examine the claim made against
them and to respond to it appropriately. If the notice is intended for a public
officer, it should be delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of
action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the
relief which he or she is claiming. Additionally, the plant also has to contain
a statement that the notice has been delivered or left. According to Section
80 (3), no suit instituted against the government or a public officer “in
respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity” shall be dismissed merely because of any error or defect in the
notice, provided that the notice has the name, description and the residence
of the plaintiff so as “to enable the appropriate authority or the public
officer to identify the person serving the notice” and that such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Source: Netflix sent a notice regarding The Big Bang Theory’s
derogatory reference to Madhuri Dixit: What is a legal notice?, The
Indian Express, April 7, 2023.
A famous author, Sarah, writes a bestselling novel in which she
includes a character loosely based on a public figure, a renowned chef
named Chef Ramsey. In the novel, this character is portrayed as a
fraudulent chef who deceives customers by using low-quality
ingredients while charging high prices. Chef Ramsey, upon reading the
novel, feels that this portrayal is a direct attack on his reputation and
professional integrity. He sends a legal notice to Sarah, claiming that
her depiction of the character in her novel constitutes defamation and
demands that she withdraw the book from the market or face legal
action. Considering the definition of defamation, should Sarah’s
portrayal of a character based on Chef Ramsey in her novel be legally
considered as defamatory?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Yes, because Sarah’s depiction of the character resembling Chef Ramsey in
a negative light directly harms his professional reputation, fitting the
definition of defamation as it lowers the regard in which he is held by the
public.

Option No, because as a public figure, Chef Ramsey is subject to higher scrutiny
and criticism, and the fictional nature of Sarah’s novel exempts her from
defamation claims.

Option Yes, because the novel induces disagreeable opinions about Chef Ramsey
among its readers, thereby fulfilling the criteria of defamation by harming
his reputation.

Option No, because the character in the novel is not explicitly named as Chef
Ramsey, and any similarity to real persons is coincidental and not sufficient
grounds for a defamation claim.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it aligns with the legal definition of defamation. If the
character in Sarah’s novel is sufficiently recognizable as Chef Ramsey and
portrays him negatively, it could harm his reputation, fitting the criteria for
defamation. Option B is incorrect because being a public figure does not
automatically exempt someone from protection against defamation. The
fictional nature of the work is a relevant factor, but it does not provide
absolute immunity from defamation claims if real individuals are clearly
recognizable and depicted negatively. Option C is incorrect because while
the novel may induce disagreeable opinions, defamation requires a clearer
indication that these opinions are about the actual person (Chef Ramsey),
not just a fictional character. Option D is incorrect as the key issue in
defamation is not just explicit naming but whether the portrayal of the
character can be reasonably understood to represent Chef Ramsey. If the
resemblance is clear and defamatory, the claim could be valid even without
explicit naming.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Last week, a political analyst called Mithun Vijay Kumar sent a legal notice
to streaming giant Netflix over an episode of The Big Bang Theory
allegedly used a “derogatory term” against Bollywood actress Madhuri
Dixit. As per the legal notice, Kumar asked the OTT platform to remove the
first episode of season two where the character of Raj Koothrappali, played
by Kunal Nayyar, along with the character of Sheldon Cooper, played by
Jim Parsons, compared Aishwarya Rai with Madhuri Dixit. In the legal
notice, Kumar pointed out that the remarks made by Kunal’s character were
not only offensive but also defamatory. He also asked the streamer to
remove the episode in question or face legal action for promoting
discrimination against women. The scene which Mithun Vijay Kumar took
offence to involved an argument between Raj and Sheldon comparing
actresses Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit. The duo seem to be watching a
Hindi film – we never get to see which film but the song playing in the
background is from Kaho Na Pyaar Hai, which does not have either actress.
Nitty gritties aside, Sheldon and Raj get into a disagreement about who
among Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit is prettier. Sheldon refers to
Aishwarya as “a poor man’s Madhuri Dixit”. To which, Raj, seething with
anger, responds by saying that Aishwarya is a “godess” in comparison to
whom, Madhuri is a “leprous prostitute”.
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with the term
“Notice”. It says that except in the manner provided under sub-section (2)
of Section 80, no suits shall be instituted against the government or a public
officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in an official
capacity, until after two months have elapsed since the “notice in writing’
has been delivered to or left at the office of either the Secretary’s office or
the office of the General Manager’s of a particular railway if it’s intended
for the Central Government or railways respectively. However, it clarified
that if a suit is against the J&K government, then the notice must be sent to
its Chief Secretary or any other officer authorized by the government.
Besides this, for suits filed against the state government, the notice should
be sent to the State government’s Secretary or the Collector of a particular
district. The object of Section 80 is to provide the government and public
officers with an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and settle the
claim before going to trial, preferably without resorting to litigation. The
intent behind carving this provision was to avoid unnecessary litigation and
waste of the litigant and the court’s time and money. It is also to provide
ample opportunity to the opposing party to examine the claim made against
them and to respond to it appropriately. If the notice is intended for a public
officer, it should be delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of
action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the
relief which he or she is claiming. Additionally, the plant also has to contain
a statement that the notice has been delivered or left. According to Section
80 (3), no suit instituted against the government or a public officer “in
respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity” shall be dismissed merely because of any error or defect in the
notice, provided that the notice has the name, description and the residence
of the plaintiff so as “to enable the appropriate authority or the public
officer to identify the person serving the notice” and that such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Source: Netflix sent a notice regarding The Big Bang Theory’s
derogatory reference to Madhuri Dixit: What is a legal notice?, The
Indian Express, April 7, 2023.
Emily, a citizen, suffers injuries due to a poorly maintained public road
in her town. She believes that the negligence of the local municipal
corporation and its officers in maintaining the road caused her injury.
Emily decides to sue the municipal corporation for damages. However,
she files the lawsuit without serving a prior notice as required under
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the urgency of
the situation and the clear negligence on the part of the municipal
corporation justify immediate legal action. Given the requirements of
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, how should the court
address Emily’s lawsuit against the municipal corporation?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should proceed with Emily’s lawsuit without regard to the notice
requirement, as the evident negligence of the municipal corporation in
maintaining public roads constitutes an extraordinary situation that
overrides the need for prior notice.

Option The court should dismiss Emily’s lawsuit for non-compliance with the
Section 80 notice requirement, as serving notice is a mandatory procedural
step before suing a government body or public officer.

Option The court should allow a conditional hearing of the case, with the
requirement that Emily serves the notice during the proceedings, thereby
adhering to the procedural norms while addressing her urgent grievances.

Option The court should suspend the lawsuit until Emily serves the necessary
notice to the municipal corporation, as per Section 80, after which the
proceedings can be resumed based on the corporation’s response.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the legal requirement under Section 80.
Serving a notice is a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit against a government
body or public officer. Non-compliance with this requirement typically
leads to the dismissal of the lawsuit. Option A is incorrect because, while
the urgency and negligence might be evident, Section 80 requires serving a
notice as a mandatory procedural step before initiating a lawsuit against a
government body or public officer. The court generally cannot overlook this
requirement based on the nature of the claim alone. Option C is incorrect
because Section 80 requires the notice to be served before instituting the
lawsuit. Allowing a conditional hearing without prior notice does not
adhere to the procedural norms outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure.
Option D is incorrect because the court usually does not suspend lawsuits
for later resumption upon compliance with procedural requirements. The
standard procedure would be to dismiss the case for non-compliance,
allowing the plaintiff to refile after serving the required notice.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Last week, a political analyst called Mithun Vijay Kumar sent a legal notice
to streaming giant Netflix over an episode of The Big Bang Theory
allegedly used a “derogatory term” against Bollywood actress Madhuri
Dixit. As per the legal notice, Kumar asked the OTT platform to remove the
first episode of season two where the character of Raj Koothrappali, played
by Kunal Nayyar, along with the character of Sheldon Cooper, played by
Jim Parsons, compared Aishwarya Rai with Madhuri Dixit. In the legal
notice, Kumar pointed out that the remarks made by Kunal’s character were
not only offensive but also defamatory. He also asked the streamer to
remove the episode in question or face legal action for promoting
discrimination against women. The scene which Mithun Vijay Kumar took
offence to involved an argument between Raj and Sheldon comparing
actresses Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit. The duo seem to be watching a
Hindi film – we never get to see which film but the song playing in the
background is from Kaho Na Pyaar Hai, which does not have either actress.
Nitty gritties aside, Sheldon and Raj get into a disagreement about who
among Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit is prettier. Sheldon refers to
Aishwarya as “a poor man’s Madhuri Dixit”. To which, Raj, seething with
anger, responds by saying that Aishwarya is a “godess” in comparison to
whom, Madhuri is a “leprous prostitute”.
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with the term
“Notice”. It says that except in the manner provided under sub-section (2)
of Section 80, no suits shall be instituted against the government or a public
officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in an official
capacity, until after two months have elapsed since the “notice in writing’
has been delivered to or left at the office of either the Secretary’s office or
the office of the General Manager’s of a particular railway if it’s intended
for the Central Government or railways respectively. However, it clarified
that if a suit is against the J&K government, then the notice must be sent to
its Chief Secretary or any other officer authorized by the government.
Besides this, for suits filed against the state government, the notice should
be sent to the State government’s Secretary or the Collector of a particular
district. The object of Section 80 is to provide the government and public
officers with an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and settle the
claim before going to trial, preferably without resorting to litigation. The
intent behind carving this provision was to avoid unnecessary litigation and
waste of the litigant and the court’s time and money. It is also to provide
ample opportunity to the opposing party to examine the claim made against
them and to respond to it appropriately. If the notice is intended for a public
officer, it should be delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of
action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the
relief which he or she is claiming. Additionally, the plant also has to contain
a statement that the notice has been delivered or left. According to Section
80 (3), no suit instituted against the government or a public officer “in
respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity” shall be dismissed merely because of any error or defect in the
notice, provided that the notice has the name, description and the residence
of the plaintiff so as “to enable the appropriate authority or the public
officer to identify the person serving the notice” and that such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Source: Netflix sent a notice regarding The Big Bang Theory’s
derogatory reference to Madhuri Dixit: What is a legal notice?, The
Indian Express, April 7, 2023.
A technology company, TechGen, develops an advanced drone
technology, which it claims can significantly enhance national security.
The government contracts with TechGen to deploy these drones for
surveillance purposes. However, allegations arise that the drones are
being used for unauthorized surveillance of citizens, infringing on their
privacy rights. A civil liberties group files a lawsuit against TechGen
and the government, demanding disclosure of the contract details and
the operational protocols of the drones. The government and TechGen
seek to withhold this information, claiming public interest immunity
due to national security concerns. They argue that disclosure could
reveal sensitive information that might be exploited by hostile entities.
In this scenario, how should the court approach the public interest
immunity claim by the government and TechGen regarding the non-
disclosure of drone technology details?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should accept the public interest immunity claim without
scrutiny, as national security concerns are paramount and should not be
compromised by demands for transparency in drone operations.

Option The court should reject the public interest immunity claim and order full
disclosure, prioritizing the public’s right to know and the need for
transparency in government surveillance activities.

Option The court should assess the validity of the public interest immunity claim
by carefully evaluating whether the non-disclosure of drone technology
details is genuinely in the interest of national security and whether a
reasonable prudent person would agree with this assessment.

Option The court should defer to the technical expertise of TechGen and the
government’s assessment of security needs, assuming that their claim of
public interest immunity is justified without requiring detailed examination.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it aligns with the principle of assessing the validity of
public interest immunity claims. The court must critically evaluate the
claim, considering both the importance of national security and the
principles of transparency and accountability. Option A is incorrect because
it suggests an uncritical acceptance of the public interest immunity claim.
The principle requires courts to scrutinize such claims to ensure they are
genuinely in the interest of national security. Option B is incorrect as it
overlooks the potential legitimate national security concerns. The principle
calls for a balanced approach, weighing the need for transparency against
the potential risks of disclosure. Option D is incorrect because it suggests
complete deference to the government and TechGen without judicial
scrutiny. The court has a responsibility to independently assess the validity
of the public interest immunity claim.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Last week, a political analyst called Mithun Vijay Kumar sent a legal notice
to streaming giant Netflix over an episode of The Big Bang Theory
allegedly used a “derogatory term” against Bollywood actress Madhuri
Dixit. As per the legal notice, Kumar asked the OTT platform to remove the
first episode of season two where the character of Raj Koothrappali, played
by Kunal Nayyar, along with the character of Sheldon Cooper, played by
Jim Parsons, compared Aishwarya Rai with Madhuri Dixit. In the legal
notice, Kumar pointed out that the remarks made by Kunal’s character were
not only offensive but also defamatory. He also asked the streamer to
remove the episode in question or face legal action for promoting
discrimination against women. The scene which Mithun Vijay Kumar took
offence to involved an argument between Raj and Sheldon comparing
actresses Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit. The duo seem to be watching a
Hindi film – we never get to see which film but the song playing in the
background is from Kaho Na Pyaar Hai, which does not have either actress.
Nitty gritties aside, Sheldon and Raj get into a disagreement about who
among Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit is prettier. Sheldon refers to
Aishwarya as “a poor man’s Madhuri Dixit”. To which, Raj, seething with
anger, responds by saying that Aishwarya is a “godess” in comparison to
whom, Madhuri is a “leprous prostitute”.
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with the term
“Notice”. It says that except in the manner provided under sub-section (2)
of Section 80, no suits shall be instituted against the government or a public
officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in an official
capacity, until after two months have elapsed since the “notice in writing’
has been delivered to or left at the office of either the Secretary’s office or
the office of the General Manager’s of a particular railway if it’s intended
for the Central Government or railways respectively. However, it clarified
that if a suit is against the J&K government, then the notice must be sent to
its Chief Secretary or any other officer authorized by the government.
Besides this, for suits filed against the state government, the notice should
be sent to the State government’s Secretary or the Collector of a particular
district. The object of Section 80 is to provide the government and public
officers with an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and settle the
claim before going to trial, preferably without resorting to litigation. The
intent behind carving this provision was to avoid unnecessary litigation and
waste of the litigant and the court’s time and money. It is also to provide
ample opportunity to the opposing party to examine the claim made against
them and to respond to it appropriately. If the notice is intended for a public
officer, it should be delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of
action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the
relief which he or she is claiming. Additionally, the plant also has to contain
a statement that the notice has been delivered or left. According to Section
80 (3), no suit instituted against the government or a public officer “in
respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity” shall be dismissed merely because of any error or defect in the
notice, provided that the notice has the name, description and the residence
of the plaintiff so as “to enable the appropriate authority or the public
officer to identify the person serving the notice” and that such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Source: Netflix sent a notice regarding The Big Bang Theory’s
derogatory reference to Madhuri Dixit: What is a legal notice?, The
Indian Express, April 7, 2023.
A pharmaceutical company, PharmaGen, is accused of causing
environmental harm through the improper disposal of hazardous
waste. Environmental activists demand disclosure of PharmaGen’s
internal documents, which allegedly contain details of the disposal
practices and the chemicals involved. PharmaGen, citing proprietary
information and trade secrets, argues against the disclosure of these
documents, claiming that it would harm their competitive position and
intellectual property rights. The case goes to court, where PharmaGen
requests the documents to be reviewed under public interest immunity,
citing the potential harm to their business interests. How should the
court apply the structured proportionality standard in reviewing
PharmaGen’s public interest immunity claim against the disclosure of
its internal documents?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should prioritize PharmaGen’s business interests and accept the
public interest immunity claim without examining the documents, as the
potential harm to the company’s competitive position outweighs the
public’s right to information.

Option The court should dismiss PharmaGen’s public interest immunity claim and
order full disclosure of all internal documents, emphasizing the public’s
right to information about environmental practices over PharmaGen’s
business concerns.

Option The court should apply the structured proportionality standard by carefully
weighing the potential harm to PharmaGen’s business interests against the
public interest in knowing about the environmental practices and deciding
whether non-disclosure is necessary and proportionate.

Option The court should allow a limited review of the documents by appointed
experts only, keeping the documents confidential from the public and the
environmental activists, assuming that the protection of PharmaGen’s trade
secrets justifies the public interest immunity claim.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it aligns with the principle of applying the structured
proportionality standard. The court must evaluate both the public interest in
environmental transparency and PharmaGen’s concerns about proprietary
information, making a decision based on which interest is more compelling
in this context. Option A is incorrect because it fails to properly balance
PharmaGen’s business interests with the public interest in environmental
practices. The structured proportionality standard requires a nuanced
assessment, not an automatic prioritization of one interest over the other.
Option B is incorrect as it overlooks the legitimacy of PharmaGen’s
concerns about proprietary information and trade secrets. The structured
proportionality standard involves a careful consideration of all interests
involved, including the protection of sensitive business information. Option
D is incorrect because it suggests a restricted review that might not
adequately address the public interest in environmental practices. While
protecting trade secrets is important, the court must ensure that the public
interest is also sufficiently served.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Last week, a political analyst called Mithun Vijay Kumar sent a legal notice
to streaming giant Netflix over an episode of The Big Bang Theory
allegedly used a “derogatory term” against Bollywood actress Madhuri
Dixit. As per the legal notice, Kumar asked the OTT platform to remove the
first episode of season two where the character of Raj Koothrappali, played
by Kunal Nayyar, along with the character of Sheldon Cooper, played by
Jim Parsons, compared Aishwarya Rai with Madhuri Dixit. In the legal
notice, Kumar pointed out that the remarks made by Kunal’s character were
not only offensive but also defamatory. He also asked the streamer to
remove the episode in question or face legal action for promoting
discrimination against women. The scene which Mithun Vijay Kumar took
offence to involved an argument between Raj and Sheldon comparing
actresses Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit. The duo seem to be watching a
Hindi film – we never get to see which film but the song playing in the
background is from Kaho Na Pyaar Hai, which does not have either actress.
Nitty gritties aside, Sheldon and Raj get into a disagreement about who
among Aishwarya Rai and Madhuri Dixit is prettier. Sheldon refers to
Aishwarya as “a poor man’s Madhuri Dixit”. To which, Raj, seething with
anger, responds by saying that Aishwarya is a “godess” in comparison to
whom, Madhuri is a “leprous prostitute”.
Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 deals with the term
“Notice”. It says that except in the manner provided under sub-section (2)
of Section 80, no suits shall be instituted against the government or a public
officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by him in an official
capacity, until after two months have elapsed since the “notice in writing’
has been delivered to or left at the office of either the Secretary’s office or
the office of the General Manager’s of a particular railway if it’s intended
for the Central Government or railways respectively. However, it clarified
that if a suit is against the J&K government, then the notice must be sent to
its Chief Secretary or any other officer authorized by the government.
Besides this, for suits filed against the state government, the notice should
be sent to the State government’s Secretary or the Collector of a particular
district. The object of Section 80 is to provide the government and public
officers with an opportunity to reconsider the legal position and settle the
claim before going to trial, preferably without resorting to litigation. The
intent behind carving this provision was to avoid unnecessary litigation and
waste of the litigant and the court’s time and money. It is also to provide
ample opportunity to the opposing party to examine the claim made against
them and to respond to it appropriately. If the notice is intended for a public
officer, it should be delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of
action, the name, description, and place of residence of the plaintiff, and the
relief which he or she is claiming. Additionally, the plant also has to contain
a statement that the notice has been delivered or left. According to Section
80 (3), no suit instituted against the government or a public officer “in
respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official
capacity” shall be dismissed merely because of any error or defect in the
notice, provided that the notice has the name, description and the residence
of the plaintiff so as “to enable the appropriate authority or the public
officer to identify the person serving the notice” and that such notice had
been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority.
Source: Netflix sent a notice regarding The Big Bang Theory’s
derogatory reference to Madhuri Dixit: What is a legal notice?, The
Indian Express, April 7, 2023.
A defense contractor, DefenseTech, is accused of illegally selling
sophisticated weapons to a foreign country under the guise of a
technology transfer agreement. The government, citing national
security, classifies the details of the agreement and the investigation. A
watchdog group, Global Watch, files a lawsuit seeking disclosure of the
agreement’s details, arguing that the public has a right to know about
potential illegal arms deals. The government insists on the case being
reviewed under public interest immunity, submitting the relevant
documents in a sealed cover. Given the case’s complexity and national
security implications, the court considers appointing an amicus curiae.
In the context of the DefenseTech case, how should the court utilize the
appointment of an amicus curiae, in line with the principle of balancing
confidentiality with justice and transparency?

Type Multiple Choice


Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae with expertise in national
security and arms control to review the classified documents and advise the
court on the appropriateness of the public interest immunity claim, ensuring
a fair and informed judicial review.

Option The court should avoid appointing an amicus curiae, as the involvement of
an external party might compromise the confidentiality of sensitive national
security information.

Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae to represent Global Watch’s
interests, ensuring that the watchdog group’s concerns are fully addressed in
the court’s review of the sealed documents.

Option The court should appoint an amicus curiae to solely focus on the legal
aspects of public interest immunity claims, avoiding any review of the
classified documents to maintain strict confidentiality.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it reflects the role of an amicus curiae in providing


expert advice to the court, particularly on sensitive matters involving
national security and legal complexities. This appointment helps ensure that
the court’s review is balanced, informed, and fair, considering both the need
for confidentiality and the principles of justice and transparency. Option B
is incorrect because the appointment of an amicus curiae is a tool
specifically designed to assist the court in complex cases without
compromising the confidentiality of sensitive information. The amicus
curiae can provide an independent perspective that aids in the judicial
review process. Option C is incorrect as the role of an amicus curiae is not
to represent the interests of one of the parties but to assist the court
impartially. The amicus curiae should provide an objective assessment, not
advocate for the position of the watchdog group. Option D is incorrect
because the amicus curiae’s role should include reviewing the content of the
classified documents to advise the court properly. Avoiding review of the
documents could limit the effectiveness of the amicus curiae in assisting the
court.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The bench allowed the challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of
the High Court on account of the principles of natural justice
constitutionalized by its judgment in its 1978 ruling in “Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India”. The Court observed that “that there is an inherent value in
securing compliance with the principles of natural justice independent of
the outcome of the case.”Actions which violate procedural guarantees can
be struck down even if non-compliance does not prejudice the outcome of
the case, the court held. It also stated that “the core of the principles of
natural justice breathes reasonableness into procedure”. Additionally, the
court clarified that in the present case, the burden is on the claimant to
prove that the procedure followed infringes upon the core of procedural
guarantees. In its judgment, the court also observed that the duty to act
fairly that is derived from common law is not exhaustively defined in a set
of concrete principles, and courts, in India and abroad, have demonstrated
considerable flexibility in the application of the principles of natural justice
by fine-tuning them to different situations. However, the court also added
that such a concept of natural justice “cannot be put into a ‘straitjacket
formula’” and is “incapable of a ‘precise definition’”. The Court asserted
that Media One had proved that MBL’s right to a fair hearing “was
infringed by the unreasoned order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022” and
“the non-disclosure of relevant material to the appellants, and its disclosure
solely to the court.” In such a situation, the burden shifts on the Centre to
prove that the procedure that was followed was reasonable and in
compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
the court noted while adding that the standard of proportionality was used to
test the reasonableness of the procedure in the present case. Finally, the
court upheld its judgments in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services and Digi
Cable Network to hold that while “principles of natural justice may be
excluded when on the facts of the case, national security concerns
overweigh the duty of fairness”, “the state has been unable to prove that
these considerations arise in the present factual scenario.”
The judgment went on to explain that the validity of the claim of
involvement of national security considerations must be assessed on the test
of (i) whether there is material to conclude that the non-disclosure of
information is in the interest of national security; and (ii) whether a
reasonable prudent person would draw the same inference from the material
on record; “Even assuming that non-disclosure is in the interest of
confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the respondents
do not satisfy the other prongs of the proportionality standard,” the Court
noted. The top court then reiterated that courts can assess the validity of
public interest immunity claims albeit based on the “structured
proportionality standard”. On the practice of sealed covers, the court
observed that “the power of courts to secure material in a sealed cover when
contradistinguished with the scope of assessment of public interest
immunity claims is rather unguided and ad-hoc.” Additionally, the Court
said that “while public interest immunity claims conceivably impact the
principles of natural justice, sealed cover proceedings infringe the principles
natural justice and open justice.” It also suggested that the court could have
taken the course of redacting confidential portions of the document and
providing a summary of the document’s contents. “The challenge to the
order of MIB is allowed on substantive grounds. The non-renewal of
permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the
press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasons for denying a security
clearance to MBL, that is, its alleged antiestablishment stance and the
alleged link of the shareholders to JEI-H, are not legitimate purposes for the
restriction of the right of freedom of speech protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. In any event, there was no material to demonstrate any
link of the shareholders, as was alleged,” the court said allowing the appeal.
Source: ‘Natural Justice’ and ‘Proportionality’: Why Supreme Court
ruled in Media One’s favour, The Indian Express, April 6, 2023.
A local municipal council revokes the business license of a small
restaurant, “Gourmet Bites,” owned by Alice, citing multiple health
code violations. The council’s decision is based on an inspection report
that Alice has never seen nor been informed about. Alice claims that
her restaurant adheres to all health codes and that she was never given
an opportunity to address or rectify the alleged violations before the
license was revoked. She challenges the council’s decision, arguing that
it violates the principles of natural justice as she was not informed
about the inspection findings nor given a chance for a fair hearing. In
assessing Alice’s challenge to the municipal council’s decision, how
should the principle of natural justice be applied in this scenario?

Type Multiple Choice


Option The council’s decision should be upheld if the health code violations are
proven to be true, as the accuracy of the violations justifies the revocation
of the license, irrespective of whether Alice was informed or heard.

Option The council’s decision should be struck down, as it violates the principles of
natural justice by not informing Alice of the inspection findings or giving
her an opportunity to respond, regardless of the validity of the health code
violations.

Option The decision should only be reconsidered if Alice can prove that the alleged
health code violations are false, as the principles of natural justice are
secondary to the factual accuracy of the violations.

Option The council’s decision should be upheld as it pertains to public health, a


concern that overrides the need for adhering to procedural formalities such
as informing the restaurant owner or conducting a hearing.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle that adherence to natural
justice is crucial, independent of the outcome. Not informing Alice of the
inspection findings or giving her a chance to respond violates these
principles, and thus, the decision should be struck down. Option A is
incorrect because it overlooks the importance of adhering to the principles
of natural justice. The accuracy of the violations does not negate the need to
inform Alice and give her a chance to respond before revoking her license.
Option C is incorrect as it misplaces the emphasis on the validity of the
health code violations over the process. The principles of natural justice
prioritize fair procedural conduct irrespective of the allegations’ accuracy.
Option D is incorrect because, even in matters of public health, the
principles of natural justice should be observed. Public health concerns do
not automatically override the need for a fair and informed decision-making
process.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The bench allowed the challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of
the High Court on account of the principles of natural justice
constitutionalized by its judgment in its 1978 ruling in “Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India”. The Court observed that “that there is an inherent value in
securing compliance with the principles of natural justice independent of
the outcome of the case.”Actions which violate procedural guarantees can
be struck down even if non-compliance does not prejudice the outcome of
the case, the court held. It also stated that “the core of the principles of
natural justice breathes reasonableness into procedure”. Additionally, the
court clarified that in the present case, the burden is on the claimant to
prove that the procedure followed infringes upon the core of procedural
guarantees. In its judgment, the court also observed that the duty to act
fairly that is derived from common law is not exhaustively defined in a set
of concrete principles, and courts, in India and abroad, have demonstrated
considerable flexibility in the application of the principles of natural justice
by fine-tuning them to different situations. However, the court also added
that such a concept of natural justice “cannot be put into a ‘straitjacket
formula’” and is “incapable of a ‘precise definition’”. The Court asserted
that Media One had proved that MBL’s right to a fair hearing “was
infringed by the unreasoned order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022” and
“the non-disclosure of relevant material to the appellants, and its disclosure
solely to the court.” In such a situation, the burden shifts on the Centre to
prove that the procedure that was followed was reasonable and in
compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
the court noted while adding that the standard of proportionality was used to
test the reasonableness of the procedure in the present case. Finally, the
court upheld its judgments in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services and Digi
Cable Network to hold that while “principles of natural justice may be
excluded when on the facts of the case, national security concerns
overweigh the duty of fairness”, “the state has been unable to prove that
these considerations arise in the present factual scenario.”
The judgment went on to explain that the validity of the claim of
involvement of national security considerations must be assessed on the test
of (i) whether there is material to conclude that the non-disclosure of
information is in the interest of national security; and (ii) whether a
reasonable prudent person would draw the same inference from the material
on record; “Even assuming that non-disclosure is in the interest of
confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the respondents
do not satisfy the other prongs of the proportionality standard,” the Court
noted. The top court then reiterated that courts can assess the validity of
public interest immunity claims albeit based on the “structured
proportionality standard”. On the practice of sealed covers, the court
observed that “the power of courts to secure material in a sealed cover when
contradistinguished with the scope of assessment of public interest
immunity claims is rather unguided and ad-hoc.” Additionally, the Court
said that “while public interest immunity claims conceivably impact the
principles of natural justice, sealed cover proceedings infringe the principles
natural justice and open justice.” It also suggested that the court could have
taken the course of redacting confidential portions of the document and
providing a summary of the document’s contents. “The challenge to the
order of MIB is allowed on substantive grounds. The non-renewal of
permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the
press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasons for denying a security
clearance to MBL, that is, its alleged antiestablishment stance and the
alleged link of the shareholders to JEI-H, are not legitimate purposes for the
restriction of the right of freedom of speech protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. In any event, there was no material to demonstrate any
link of the shareholders, as was alleged,” the court said allowing the appeal.
Source: ‘Natural Justice’ and ‘Proportionality’: Why Supreme Court
ruled in Media One’s favour, The Indian Express, April 6, 2023.
A university student, John, faces disciplinary action for alleged
academic misconduct. The university’s disciplinary committee conducts
an investigation without notifying John or giving him an opportunity to
present his side of the story. Based on their findings, they decide to
suspend him. John contests the suspension, arguing that the university
violated his rights to procedural fairness by not involving him in the
investigation process. The university defends its action, claiming that
the evidence against John was overwhelming and his involvement in the
process would not have altered the decision. How should the principle
of procedural guarantees be applied in John’s case against the
university’s disciplinary action?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The university’s decision should be upheld, as the overwhelming evidence


against John justifies the suspension, making the lack of his involvement in
the investigation process inconsequential to the outcome.

Option The university’s decision should be struck down, as it violates procedural


guarantees by not involving John in the investigation process, regardless of
the evidence against him or the potential outcome of his involvement.

Option The decision should only be reconsidered if John can prove that the
allegations of academic misconduct are false, as procedural fairness is
secondary to the factual accuracy of the allegations.

Option The university’s decision should be upheld as it pertains to academic


integrity, a concern that overrides the need for procedural formalities such
as notifying the accused student or allowing him to participate in the
investigation.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle that violations of


procedural guarantees can invalidate actions, irrespective of the evidence’s
strength or the outcome of involving the accused in the process. Option A is
incorrect because it disregards the importance of procedural fairness. The
strength of the evidence does not negate the need to involve John in the
process and give him an opportunity to defend himself. Option C is
incorrect as it places undue emphasis on the allegations’ factual accuracy
over procedural fairness. The principle asserts the importance of procedural
norms regardless of the allegations’ substance. Option D is incorrect
because, even in matters of academic integrity, procedural fairness should
be observed. The importance of maintaining academic standards does not
automatically override the need for a fair and transparent process.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25


Question The bench allowed the challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of
the High Court on account of the principles of natural justice
constitutionalized by its judgment in its 1978 ruling in “Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India”. The Court observed that “that there is an inherent value in
securing compliance with the principles of natural justice independent of
the outcome of the case.”Actions which violate procedural guarantees can
be struck down even if non-compliance does not prejudice the outcome of
the case, the court held. It also stated that “the core of the principles of
natural justice breathes reasonableness into procedure”. Additionally, the
court clarified that in the present case, the burden is on the claimant to
prove that the procedure followed infringes upon the core of procedural
guarantees. In its judgment, the court also observed that the duty to act
fairly that is derived from common law is not exhaustively defined in a set
of concrete principles, and courts, in India and abroad, have demonstrated
considerable flexibility in the application of the principles of natural justice
by fine-tuning them to different situations. However, the court also added
that such a concept of natural justice “cannot be put into a ‘straitjacket
formula’” and is “incapable of a ‘precise definition’”. The Court asserted
that Media One had proved that MBL’s right to a fair hearing “was
infringed by the unreasoned order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022” and
“the non-disclosure of relevant material to the appellants, and its disclosure
solely to the court.” In such a situation, the burden shifts on the Centre to
prove that the procedure that was followed was reasonable and in
compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
the court noted while adding that the standard of proportionality was used to
test the reasonableness of the procedure in the present case. Finally, the
court upheld its judgments in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services and Digi
Cable Network to hold that while “principles of natural justice may be
excluded when on the facts of the case, national security concerns
overweigh the duty of fairness”, “the state has been unable to prove that
these considerations arise in the present factual scenario.”
The judgment went on to explain that the validity of the claim of
involvement of national security considerations must be assessed on the test
of (i) whether there is material to conclude that the non-disclosure of
information is in the interest of national security; and (ii) whether a
reasonable prudent person would draw the same inference from the material
on record; “Even assuming that non-disclosure is in the interest of
confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the respondents
do not satisfy the other prongs of the proportionality standard,” the Court
noted. The top court then reiterated that courts can assess the validity of
public interest immunity claims albeit based on the “structured
proportionality standard”. On the practice of sealed covers, the court
observed that “the power of courts to secure material in a sealed cover when
contradistinguished with the scope of assessment of public interest
immunity claims is rather unguided and ad-hoc.” Additionally, the Court
said that “while public interest immunity claims conceivably impact the
principles of natural justice, sealed cover proceedings infringe the principles
natural justice and open justice.” It also suggested that the court could have
taken the course of redacting confidential portions of the document and
providing a summary of the document’s contents. “The challenge to the
order of MIB is allowed on substantive grounds. The non-renewal of
permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the
press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasons for denying a security
clearance to MBL, that is, its alleged antiestablishment stance and the
alleged link of the shareholders to JEI-H, are not legitimate purposes for the
restriction of the right of freedom of speech protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. In any event, there was no material to demonstrate any
link of the shareholders, as was alleged,” the court said allowing the appeal.
Source: ‘Natural Justice’ and ‘Proportionality’: Why Supreme Court
ruled in Media One’s favour, The Indian Express, April 6, 2023.
A city council approves a large development project proposed by a
corporation, despite significant opposition from local residents. The
residents, led by a community group, allege that the council did not
adequately consider public feedback and objections, having conducted
only a brief and superficial review of the community’s concerns. The
community group files a lawsuit against the city council, claiming that
the council’s decision-making process violated the principles of
procedural fairness, as their voices and concerns were not meaningfully
considered. In the lawsuit filed by the community group against the city
council, how should the burden of proving an infringement of
procedural guarantees be approached?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The city council must prove that it adequately considered all public
feedback and objections to the development project, demonstrating
compliance with procedural fairness.

Option The community group bears the burden of demonstrating that the city
council’s decision-making process did not meaningfully consider their
feedback and objections, thus violating the core aspects of procedural
fairness.

Option The court should independently verify whether the city council considered
public feedback without requiring specific proof from either the community
group or the city council.

Option The community group must show that the outcome of the city council’s
decision would have been different had their feedback been considered, to
establish a violation of procedural fairness.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle that the claimant (the
community group) is responsible for demonstrating that the city council’s
process infringed upon the principles of procedural fairness. Option A is
incorrect because, in this context, the burden of proving procedural
infringement lies with the claimant (the community group), not the city
council. The council is not initially required to demonstrate compliance
with procedural fairness. Option C is incorrect because, while the court may
play a role in assessing the evidence, it is up to the claimant to provide
proof of the alleged procedural violations. The court does not independently
verify these claims without input from the involved parties. Option D is
incorrect as the focus is not on the difference in outcome but rather on
whether the process itself adhered to procedural fairness standards. The
claimant needs to demonstrate a violation of procedural norms, not
necessarily that the outcome would have been different.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The bench allowed the challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of
the High Court on account of the principles of natural justice
constitutionalized by its judgment in its 1978 ruling in “Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India”. The Court observed that “that there is an inherent value in
securing compliance with the principles of natural justice independent of
the outcome of the case.”Actions which violate procedural guarantees can
be struck down even if non-compliance does not prejudice the outcome of
the case, the court held. It also stated that “the core of the principles of
natural justice breathes reasonableness into procedure”. Additionally, the
court clarified that in the present case, the burden is on the claimant to
prove that the procedure followed infringes upon the core of procedural
guarantees. In its judgment, the court also observed that the duty to act
fairly that is derived from common law is not exhaustively defined in a set
of concrete principles, and courts, in India and abroad, have demonstrated
considerable flexibility in the application of the principles of natural justice
by fine-tuning them to different situations. However, the court also added
that such a concept of natural justice “cannot be put into a ‘straitjacket
formula’” and is “incapable of a ‘precise definition’”. The Court asserted
that Media One had proved that MBL’s right to a fair hearing “was
infringed by the unreasoned order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022” and
“the non-disclosure of relevant material to the appellants, and its disclosure
solely to the court.” In such a situation, the burden shifts on the Centre to
prove that the procedure that was followed was reasonable and in
compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
the court noted while adding that the standard of proportionality was used to
test the reasonableness of the procedure in the present case. Finally, the
court upheld its judgments in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services and Digi
Cable Network to hold that while “principles of natural justice may be
excluded when on the facts of the case, national security concerns
overweigh the duty of fairness”, “the state has been unable to prove that
these considerations arise in the present factual scenario.”
The judgment went on to explain that the validity of the claim of
involvement of national security considerations must be assessed on the test
of (i) whether there is material to conclude that the non-disclosure of
information is in the interest of national security; and (ii) whether a
reasonable prudent person would draw the same inference from the material
on record; “Even assuming that non-disclosure is in the interest of
confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the respondents
do not satisfy the other prongs of the proportionality standard,” the Court
noted. The top court then reiterated that courts can assess the validity of
public interest immunity claims albeit based on the “structured
proportionality standard”. On the practice of sealed covers, the court
observed that “the power of courts to secure material in a sealed cover when
contradistinguished with the scope of assessment of public interest
immunity claims is rather unguided and ad-hoc.” Additionally, the Court
said that “while public interest immunity claims conceivably impact the
principles of natural justice, sealed cover proceedings infringe the principles
natural justice and open justice.” It also suggested that the court could have
taken the course of redacting confidential portions of the document and
providing a summary of the document’s contents. “The challenge to the
order of MIB is allowed on substantive grounds. The non-renewal of
permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the
press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasons for denying a security
clearance to MBL, that is, its alleged antiestablishment stance and the
alleged link of the shareholders to JEI-H, are not legitimate purposes for the
restriction of the right of freedom of speech protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. In any event, there was no material to demonstrate any
link of the shareholders, as was alleged,” the court said allowing the appeal.
Source: ‘Natural Justice’ and ‘Proportionality’: Why Supreme Court
ruled in Media One’s favour, The Indian Express, April 6, 2023.
The national government enacts a new surveillance policy allowing for
increased monitoring of online communications to combat
cyberterrorism. A digital rights advocacy group, NetFreedom,
challenges this policy, arguing that it infringes on citizens’ privacy
rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The government claims
public interest immunity, stating that full disclosure of the policy’s
details would compromise national security. The court, while
examining the case, applies the structured proportionality standard to
assess whether the surveillance policy’s procedures are reasonable and
compliant with constitutional norms. In evaluating the government’s
surveillance policy against NetFreedom’s challenge, how should the
structured proportionality standard be applied to assess the
reasonableness of the policy’s procedures?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should accept the government’s claim of public interest immunity
at face value, considering the government’s expertise in national security
matters, and deem the surveillance policy’s procedures reasonable without a
detailed assessment.

Option The court should apply the structured proportionality standard to critically
examine whether the surveillance policy’s procedures are necessary and the
least restrictive means to achieve the stated goal of combating
cyberterrorism, while also respecting citizens’ constitutional rights.

Option The court should prioritize national security over privacy rights, assuming
that the surveillance policy’s procedures are inherently reasonable due to
the government’s national security concerns.

Option The court should demand full public disclosure of the surveillance policy’s
details, disregarding the government’s public interest immunity claim, to
ensure transparency and adherence to constitutional rights.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it reflects the structured proportionality standard’s


application. The court must balance the policy’s necessity for national
security against the infringement of constitutional rights, ensuring that the
procedures are the least restrictive means to achieve the security objective.
Option A is incorrect because it suggests an uncritical acceptance of the
government’s public interest immunity claim. The structured proportionality
standard requires a thorough and critical examination of the policy’s
procedures. Option C is incorrect as it overlooks the need for a balanced
approach. The structured proportionality standard requires the court to
weigh national security concerns against the impact on constitutional rights,
not to prioritize one automatically over the other. Option D is incorrect
because it neglects the validity of the public interest immunity claim. The
structured proportionality standard does not automatically mandate full
disclosure, especially in cases involving national security.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question The bench allowed the challenge to the order of the MIB and judgment of
the High Court on account of the principles of natural justice
constitutionalized by its judgment in its 1978 ruling in “Maneka Gandhi vs
Union of India”. The Court observed that “that there is an inherent value in
securing compliance with the principles of natural justice independent of
the outcome of the case.”Actions which violate procedural guarantees can
be struck down even if non-compliance does not prejudice the outcome of
the case, the court held. It also stated that “the core of the principles of
natural justice breathes reasonableness into procedure”. Additionally, the
court clarified that in the present case, the burden is on the claimant to
prove that the procedure followed infringes upon the core of procedural
guarantees. In its judgment, the court also observed that the duty to act
fairly that is derived from common law is not exhaustively defined in a set
of concrete principles, and courts, in India and abroad, have demonstrated
considerable flexibility in the application of the principles of natural justice
by fine-tuning them to different situations. However, the court also added
that such a concept of natural justice “cannot be put into a ‘straitjacket
formula’” and is “incapable of a ‘precise definition’”. The Court asserted
that Media One had proved that MBL’s right to a fair hearing “was
infringed by the unreasoned order of the MIB dated 31 January 2022” and
“the non-disclosure of relevant material to the appellants, and its disclosure
solely to the court.” In such a situation, the burden shifts on the Centre to
prove that the procedure that was followed was reasonable and in
compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution,
the court noted while adding that the standard of proportionality was used to
test the reasonableness of the procedure in the present case. Finally, the
court upheld its judgments in Ex-Armymen’s Protection Services and Digi
Cable Network to hold that while “principles of natural justice may be
excluded when on the facts of the case, national security concerns
overweigh the duty of fairness”, “the state has been unable to prove that
these considerations arise in the present factual scenario.”
The judgment went on to explain that the validity of the claim of
involvement of national security considerations must be assessed on the test
of (i) whether there is material to conclude that the non-disclosure of
information is in the interest of national security; and (ii) whether a
reasonable prudent person would draw the same inference from the material
on record; “Even assuming that non-disclosure is in the interest of
confidentiality and national security, the means adopted by the respondents
do not satisfy the other prongs of the proportionality standard,” the Court
noted. The top court then reiterated that courts can assess the validity of
public interest immunity claims albeit based on the “structured
proportionality standard”. On the practice of sealed covers, the court
observed that “the power of courts to secure material in a sealed cover when
contradistinguished with the scope of assessment of public interest
immunity claims is rather unguided and ad-hoc.” Additionally, the Court
said that “while public interest immunity claims conceivably impact the
principles of natural justice, sealed cover proceedings infringe the principles
natural justice and open justice.” It also suggested that the court could have
taken the course of redacting confidential portions of the document and
providing a summary of the document’s contents. “The challenge to the
order of MIB is allowed on substantive grounds. The non-renewal of
permission to operate a media channel is a restriction on the freedom of the
press which can only be reasonably restricted on the grounds stipulated in
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The reasons for denying a security
clearance to MBL, that is, its alleged antiestablishment stance and the
alleged link of the shareholders to JEI-H, are not legitimate purposes for the
restriction of the right of freedom of speech protected under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution. In any event, there was no material to demonstrate any
link of the shareholders, as was alleged,” the court said allowing the appeal.
Source: ‘Natural Justice’ and ‘Proportionality’: Why Supreme Court
ruled in Media One’s favour, The Indian Express, April 6, 2023.
A journalist, Emma, publishes a series of articles alleging government
corruption in a defense procurement deal. The government, claiming
these allegations compromise national security, initiates legal action
against Emma, seeking to restrain further publications. The
government submits classified documents to the court, arguing that the
details in these documents, if made public, would pose a serious threat
to national security. Emma counters that the public has a right to know
about potential government corruption and that her right to free
speech is being unjustly curtailed. In determining the balance between
the principles of natural justice, open justice, and national security
concerns in Emma’s case, what should be the court’s primary
consideration?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should prioritize national security and accept the government’s
claim without examining the need for transparency or Emma’s right to free
speech, as national security outweighs other considerations.

Option The court should maintain the principles of natural justice and open justice
by rejecting the government’s national security claim, ensuring Emma’s
right to free speech and the public’s right to information are upheld.

Option The court should assess whether the government’s national security
concerns genuinely warrant a restriction on Emma’s free speech and the
public’s right to information, carefully balancing these rights against the
duty to protect national security.

Option The court should automatically defer to the government’s assessment of


national security risks, assuming that such claims are justified and that the
restriction on Emma’s journalistic activities is necessary.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it reflects a balanced approach. The court must


critically assess the validity of the government’s national security claims
while also considering the principles of natural justice, open justice, and
Emma’s right to free speech. Option A is incorrect because it suggests an
uncritical acceptance of the government’s national security claim without
considering the principles of natural justice and open justice. The court
needs to balance national security concerns with other fundamental rights.
Option B is incorrect as it neglects the potential validity of national security
concerns. The court must weigh the government’s national security claims
against the rights to free speech and open justice. Option D is incorrect
because it implies complete deference to the government’s claims without
judicial scrutiny. The court has a responsibility to independently assess the
balance between national security and other fundamental rights.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question On 28 March, a bench of Justices Ravindra Bhatt and Dipankar Datta


directed that an undertrial booked under the NDPS Act nearly seven-and-a-
half years ago for possession of cannabis be released on bail. NDPS is an
exception to the ordinary rules for granting bail. Under Section 37 of the
Act, for a court to grant bail it has to be satisfied that “that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence”
and that upon release, “isn’t likely to commit any offence.” This high bar,
requiring the accused to prove innocence at the time of seeking bail, ensures
getting bail under the law is virtually impossible for certain offences. Now,
the SC has said that the condition seeking the court’s satisfaction to the
extent that an accused is not guilty of an offence “has to be interpreted
reasonably.” In the current case, the SC recorded that the accused
Mohammad was in custody “for over 7 years and 4 months” and the
progress of the trial had been at a snail’s pace, “with 34 witnesses remaining
to be examined still”. The Court said that the stringent conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the general law for granting
bail for undue delay in the trial. Section 436A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires an accused to be granted bail if the trial is not concluded
within specified periods. Moreover, the expression “reasonable grounds”
used in Section 37 is not defined in the statute, thereby widening the scope
of judicial interpretation.
Section 436A of the CrPC provides, “Where a person has, during the period
of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any
law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for
a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court
on his personal bond with or without sureties.” However, this is subject to
the fact that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for
reasons given in writing, order the continued detention of the accused for
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail. Section 436A
also requires that no person shall be detained during the period of
investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the offence. In the landmark 1979 ruling in
‘Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar’, the SC recognised the right to a
speedy trial as “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21”. “No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21,” the court had
said. In the current ruling, the court also spoke of the dangers of “unjust
imprisonment” which puts the inmates at risk of “prisonisation”, a “radical
transformation” by which a prisoner loses his identity. Legislations which
prescribe an alternate criminal law framework, such as the NDPS Act,
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act make bail the exception, rather than the rule. In its 2021
decision in ‘Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb’, a three-judge bench led by
Justice NV Ramana had granted bail to an accused facing incarceration for
an extended period “with little possibility of early completion of trial”
under the UAPA. Section 43-D of UAPA, reverses the burden of proof on
the accused and says that a court can reject bail if a prima facie case exists
against the accused.
Source: What the SC said on bail after ‘undue delay’ in trials, even for
stringent laws such as NDPS, The Indian Express, April 3, 2023.
Alex, a young man, is arrested and charged under the NDPS Act for
alleged possession of a significant quantity of a controlled substance.
The evidence against him primarily consists of a testimony from an
informant and the recovery of the substance from a location Alex
frequents. Alex’s lawyer applies for bail, arguing that the evidence is
circumstantial and does not conclusively prove Alex’s guilt. The
prosecution opposes the bail, citing the seriousness of the offense and
the quantity of the substance involved. In considering Alex’s bail
application under the NDPS Act, what must the court primarily assess
to decide on granting bail as per the principle outlined in the passage?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should focus on the seriousness of the offense and the quantity of
the controlled substance involved, denying bail based on the potential
danger Alex poses to society.

Option The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that Alex is not guilty of the offense charged, and that he is unlikely to
commit any offense upon release, to grant bail.

Option The court should grant bail if Alex can provide a strong alibi or evidence
that contradicts the prosecution’s claims, irrespective of the nature of the
offense under the NDPS Act.

Option The court should automatically grant bail due to the prolonged duration of
the trial and the circumstantial nature of the evidence against Alex, without
needing to assess his innocence.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle stated in the passage.
Under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, for bail to be granted, the court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not
guilty, and that they are unlikely to commit any offense upon release.
Option A is incorrect because it focuses solely on the seriousness of the
offense and not on the specific requirement under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, which necessitates the court to be convinced of the accused’s
innocence for granting bail. Option C is incorrect as it simplifies the bail
process under the NDPS Act. While providing an alibi or contradicting
evidence is important, the court’s satisfaction regarding the accused’s
innocence and likelihood of not committing any offense upon release is the
key requirement. Option D is incorrect because, under the NDPS Act, the
duration of the trial and the nature of the evidence are not the sole
determinants for granting bail. The court must specifically assess the
likelihood of the accused’s innocence.

Positive Marks 1
Negative Marks 0.25

Question On 28 March, a bench of Justices Ravindra Bhatt and Dipankar Datta


directed that an undertrial booked under the NDPS Act nearly seven-and-a-
half years ago for possession of cannabis be released on bail. NDPS is an
exception to the ordinary rules for granting bail. Under Section 37 of the
Act, for a court to grant bail it has to be satisfied that “that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence”
and that upon release, “isn’t likely to commit any offence.” This high bar,
requiring the accused to prove innocence at the time of seeking bail, ensures
getting bail under the law is virtually impossible for certain offences. Now,
the SC has said that the condition seeking the court’s satisfaction to the
extent that an accused is not guilty of an offence “has to be interpreted
reasonably.” In the current case, the SC recorded that the accused
Mohammad was in custody “for over 7 years and 4 months” and the
progress of the trial had been at a snail’s pace, “with 34 witnesses remaining
to be examined still”. The Court said that the stringent conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the general law for granting
bail for undue delay in the trial. Section 436A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires an accused to be granted bail if the trial is not concluded
within specified periods. Moreover, the expression “reasonable grounds”
used in Section 37 is not defined in the statute, thereby widening the scope
of judicial interpretation.
Section 436A of the CrPC provides, “Where a person has, during the period
of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any
law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for
a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court
on his personal bond with or without sureties.” However, this is subject to
the fact that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for
reasons given in writing, order the continued detention of the accused for
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail. Section 436A
also requires that no person shall be detained during the period of
investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the offence. In the landmark 1979 ruling in
‘Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar’, the SC recognised the right to a
speedy trial as “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21”. “No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21,” the court had
said. In the current ruling, the court also spoke of the dangers of “unjust
imprisonment” which puts the inmates at risk of “prisonisation”, a “radical
transformation” by which a prisoner loses his identity. Legislations which
prescribe an alternate criminal law framework, such as the NDPS Act,
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act make bail the exception, rather than the rule. In its 2021
decision in ‘Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb’, a three-judge bench led by
Justice NV Ramana had granted bail to an accused facing incarceration for
an extended period “with little possibility of early completion of trial”
under the UAPA. Section 43-D of UAPA, reverses the burden of proof on
the accused and says that a court can reject bail if a prima facie case exists
against the accused.
Source: What the SC said on bail after ‘undue delay’ in trials, even for
stringent laws such as NDPS, The Indian Express, April 3, 2023.
Robert, an individual, has been detained for four years under charges
of financial fraud, an offense that carries a maximum imprisonment
period of ten years. Despite the lengthy duration of his detention, the
trial has progressed slowly, with several key witnesses yet to be
examined. Robert’s lawyer files a petition for his release on bail under
Section 436A of the CrPC, arguing that he has already served 40% of
the maximum possible sentence and the slow progress of the trial
justifies his release. In Robert’s case, how should the court apply the
principle of Section 436A of the CrPC in deciding on his bail petition?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should grant Robert bail, as he has been in detention for a
significant portion of the maximum sentence for the offense, and the slow
pace of the trial warrants his release under Section 436A of the CrPC.

Option The court should deny bail, as financial fraud is a serious offense, and the
length of Robert’s detention is not sufficient grounds for release if the trial
is ongoing and the maximum sentence has not been reached.

Option The court should release Robert on bail only if it is proven that the delay in
the trial is solely attributable to the prosecution and not due to any actions
by the defense.

Option The court should continue Robert’s detention, as Section 436A of the CrPC
applies only to offenses with a maximum imprisonment of less than ten
years, and financial fraud exceeds this threshold.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it aligns with the principle of Section 436A of the
CrPC. Since Robert has been detained for a substantial duration (40% of the
maximum imprisonment period for the offense), and considering the slow
progress of the trial, he is eligible for release on bail under this section.
Option B is incorrect because the seriousness of the offense does not negate
the application of Section 436A. The section explicitly provides for the
release on bail if the accused has been detained for a period extending up to
half of the maximum sentence for the offense. Option C is incorrect as
Section 436A does not condition the release on bail solely on the cause of
the trial’s delay. The key consideration is the length of detention relative to
the maximum possible sentence. Option D is incorrect because Section
436A of the CrPC does not specify a maximum imprisonment threshold for
its application. It applies as long as the accused has undergone detention for
a period extending up to half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for the offense.
Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question On 28 March, a bench of Justices Ravindra Bhatt and Dipankar Datta


directed that an undertrial booked under the NDPS Act nearly seven-and-a-
half years ago for possession of cannabis be released on bail. NDPS is an
exception to the ordinary rules for granting bail. Under Section 37 of the
Act, for a court to grant bail it has to be satisfied that “that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence”
and that upon release, “isn’t likely to commit any offence.” This high bar,
requiring the accused to prove innocence at the time of seeking bail, ensures
getting bail under the law is virtually impossible for certain offences. Now,
the SC has said that the condition seeking the court’s satisfaction to the
extent that an accused is not guilty of an offence “has to be interpreted
reasonably.” In the current case, the SC recorded that the accused
Mohammad was in custody “for over 7 years and 4 months” and the
progress of the trial had been at a snail’s pace, “with 34 witnesses remaining
to be examined still”. The Court said that the stringent conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the general law for granting
bail for undue delay in the trial. Section 436A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires an accused to be granted bail if the trial is not concluded
within specified periods. Moreover, the expression “reasonable grounds”
used in Section 37 is not defined in the statute, thereby widening the scope
of judicial interpretation.
Section 436A of the CrPC provides, “Where a person has, during the period
of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any
law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for
a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court
on his personal bond with or without sureties.” However, this is subject to
the fact that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for
reasons given in writing, order the continued detention of the accused for
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail. Section 436A
also requires that no person shall be detained during the period of
investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the offence. In the landmark 1979 ruling in
‘Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar’, the SC recognised the right to a
speedy trial as “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21”. “No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21,” the court had
said. In the current ruling, the court also spoke of the dangers of “unjust
imprisonment” which puts the inmates at risk of “prisonisation”, a “radical
transformation” by which a prisoner loses his identity. Legislations which
prescribe an alternate criminal law framework, such as the NDPS Act,
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act make bail the exception, rather than the rule. In its 2021
decision in ‘Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb’, a three-judge bench led by
Justice NV Ramana had granted bail to an accused facing incarceration for
an extended period “with little possibility of early completion of trial”
under the UAPA. Section 43-D of UAPA, reverses the burden of proof on
the accused and says that a court can reject bail if a prima facie case exists
against the accused.
Source: What the SC said on bail after ‘undue delay’ in trials, even for
stringent laws such as NDPS, The Indian Express, April 3, 2023.
Linda, a college student, is arrested for allegedly possessing a
prohibited substance under the NDPS Act. The evidence against her
includes a testimony from a fellow student who claims to have seen
Linda with the substance and the recovery of a small quantity of the
substance from her locker. Linda maintains her innocence, stating that
the locker is accessible to other students and she was unaware of the
substance’s presence. Linda’s lawyer argues that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that she is not guilty, considering the possibility of
someone else placing the substance in her locker. In assessing Linda’s
bail application under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, how should the
court interpret the term “reasonable grounds” in determining her
eligibility for bail?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should interpret “reasonable grounds” strictly, requiring concrete
evidence of Linda’s innocence, such as surveillance footage proving she did
not place the substance in her locker.

Option The court should consider “reasonable grounds” as met if there is any doubt
about Linda’s guilt, such as the possibility of someone else placing the
substance in her locker, and grant her bail based on this uncertainty.

Option The court should only consider “reasonable grounds” as met if Linda can
provide an alibi or witness testimony explicitly corroborating her claim of
innocence.

Option The court should interpret “reasonable grounds” by considering the


seriousness of the offense and the quantity of the substance recovered,
prioritizing public safety over the uncertainty of Linda’s involvement.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the flexible interpretation of


“reasonable grounds.” The possibility that someone else could have placed
the substance in Linda’s locker creates a reasonable doubt about her guilt,
which could be considered as meeting the criteria for “reasonable grounds.”
Option A is incorrect because “reasonable grounds” does not necessarily
require concrete evidence proving innocence. The term allows for a degree
of judicial discretion based on the overall assessment of the evidence and
circumstances. Option C is incorrect as it overly restricts the interpretation
of “reasonable grounds.” While an alibi or corroborating testimony is
helpful, the term allows for a broader consideration of circumstances that
might indicate the accused is not guilty. Option D is incorrect because it
focuses on the seriousness of the offense and the quantity of the substance,
rather than assessing the specific circumstances and evidence related to
Linda’s alleged involvement, which is crucial for determining “reasonable
grounds.”

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question On 28 March, a bench of Justices Ravindra Bhatt and Dipankar Datta


directed that an undertrial booked under the NDPS Act nearly seven-and-a-
half years ago for possession of cannabis be released on bail. NDPS is an
exception to the ordinary rules for granting bail. Under Section 37 of the
Act, for a court to grant bail it has to be satisfied that “that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence”
and that upon release, “isn’t likely to commit any offence.” This high bar,
requiring the accused to prove innocence at the time of seeking bail, ensures
getting bail under the law is virtually impossible for certain offences. Now,
the SC has said that the condition seeking the court’s satisfaction to the
extent that an accused is not guilty of an offence “has to be interpreted
reasonably.” In the current case, the SC recorded that the accused
Mohammad was in custody “for over 7 years and 4 months” and the
progress of the trial had been at a snail’s pace, “with 34 witnesses remaining
to be examined still”. The Court said that the stringent conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the general law for granting
bail for undue delay in the trial. Section 436A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires an accused to be granted bail if the trial is not concluded
within specified periods. Moreover, the expression “reasonable grounds”
used in Section 37 is not defined in the statute, thereby widening the scope
of judicial interpretation.
Section 436A of the CrPC provides, “Where a person has, during the period
of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any
law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for
a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court
on his personal bond with or without sureties.” However, this is subject to
the fact that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for
reasons given in writing, order the continued detention of the accused for
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail. Section 436A
also requires that no person shall be detained during the period of
investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the offence. In the landmark 1979 ruling in
‘Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar’, the SC recognised the right to a
speedy trial as “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21”. “No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21,” the court had
said. In the current ruling, the court also spoke of the dangers of “unjust
imprisonment” which puts the inmates at risk of “prisonisation”, a “radical
transformation” by which a prisoner loses his identity. Legislations which
prescribe an alternate criminal law framework, such as the NDPS Act,
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act make bail the exception, rather than the rule. In its 2021
decision in ‘Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb’, a three-judge bench led by
Justice NV Ramana had granted bail to an accused facing incarceration for
an extended period “with little possibility of early completion of trial”
under the UAPA. Section 43-D of UAPA, reverses the burden of proof on
the accused and says that a court can reject bail if a prima facie case exists
against the accused.
Source: What the SC said on bail after ‘undue delay’ in trials, even for
stringent laws such as NDPS, The Indian Express, April 3, 2023.
Michael, a software engineer, is arrested on charges of industrial
espionage, accused of stealing trade secrets from his employer. The trial
has been ongoing for five years, with Michael in detention throughout
this period. The offense for which Michael is charged carries a
maximum imprisonment of eight years. The prosecution has yet to
present key evidence, and several witnesses have not been examined.
Michael’s attorney argues that his prolonged detention without a
conclusion to his trial violates his constitutional rights under Articles 14
and 21, and that he should be granted bail based on the proportionality
standard. Considering Michael’s prolonged detention and the slow
progress of his trial, how should the court apply the proportionality
standard in deciding on his bail application?

Type Multiple Choice


Option The court should grant Michael bail, as the extended duration of his
detention and the slow pace of the trial violate the proportionality standard,
infringing upon his constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 21.

Option The court should continue Michael’s detention, as industrial espionage is a


grave offense, and the seriousness of the charge justifies the lengthy
detention and slow trial process.

Option The court should only grant bail if Michael can provide substantial evidence
of his innocence, as the proportionality standard primarily concerns the
likelihood of the accused’s guilt or innocence.

Option The court should grant bail only if the prosecution fails to present its key
evidence within a set timeframe, as the proportionality standard hinges on
the prosecution’s readiness and ability to proceed with the trial.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct because it aligns with the proportionality standard’s


application in the context of constitutional rights. The prolonged detention
and slow trial progress, especially when the maximum imprisonment is only
eight years, raise concerns under Articles 14 and 21, suggesting that bail
should be granted. Option B is incorrect because the seriousness of the
charge alone does not justify prolonged detention without a trial conclusion.
The proportionality standard requires a balance between the seriousness of
the offense and the accused’s rights. Option C is incorrect as the
proportionality standard in this context is not solely about the likelihood of
guilt or innocence. It’s about assessing the reasonableness of continued
detention considering the trial’s progress and the accused’s constitutional
rights. Option D is incorrect because the proportionality standard does not
depend solely on the prosecution’s ability to present key evidence within a
specific timeframe. It requires a broader assessment of the detention’s
reasonableness in light of the overall trial progress and constitutional rights.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question On 28 March, a bench of Justices Ravindra Bhatt and Dipankar Datta


directed that an undertrial booked under the NDPS Act nearly seven-and-a-
half years ago for possession of cannabis be released on bail. NDPS is an
exception to the ordinary rules for granting bail. Under Section 37 of the
Act, for a court to grant bail it has to be satisfied that “that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence”
and that upon release, “isn’t likely to commit any offence.” This high bar,
requiring the accused to prove innocence at the time of seeking bail, ensures
getting bail under the law is virtually impossible for certain offences. Now,
the SC has said that the condition seeking the court’s satisfaction to the
extent that an accused is not guilty of an offence “has to be interpreted
reasonably.” In the current case, the SC recorded that the accused
Mohammad was in custody “for over 7 years and 4 months” and the
progress of the trial had been at a snail’s pace, “with 34 witnesses remaining
to be examined still”. The Court said that the stringent conditions under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot override the general law for granting
bail for undue delay in the trial. Section 436A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires an accused to be granted bail if the trial is not concluded
within specified periods. Moreover, the expression “reasonable grounds”
used in Section 37 is not defined in the statute, thereby widening the scope
of judicial interpretation.
Section 436A of the CrPC provides, “Where a person has, during the period
of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any
law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been
specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for
a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment
specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court
on his personal bond with or without sureties.” However, this is subject to
the fact that the court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for
reasons given in writing, order the continued detention of the accused for
longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail. Section 436A
also requires that no person shall be detained during the period of
investigation, inquiry, or trial for more than the maximum period of
imprisonment provided for the offence. In the landmark 1979 ruling in
‘Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar’, the SC recognised the right to a
speedy trial as “implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21”. “No
procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of Article 21,” the court had
said. In the current ruling, the court also spoke of the dangers of “unjust
imprisonment” which puts the inmates at risk of “prisonisation”, a “radical
transformation” by which a prisoner loses his identity. Legislations which
prescribe an alternate criminal law framework, such as the NDPS Act,
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act make bail the exception, rather than the rule. In its 2021
decision in ‘Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb’, a three-judge bench led by
Justice NV Ramana had granted bail to an accused facing incarceration for
an extended period “with little possibility of early completion of trial”
under the UAPA. Section 43-D of UAPA, reverses the burden of proof on
the accused and says that a court can reject bail if a prima facie case exists
against the accused.
Source: What the SC said on bail after ‘undue delay’ in trials, even for
stringent laws such as NDPS, The Indian Express, April 3, 2023.
Aaron, an investigative journalist, is arrested under the Unlawful
Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for allegedly publishing classified
documents that supposedly threaten national security. The documents
reveal potential governmental misconduct. Aaron’s legal team argues
for bail, citing his role in upholding the public’s right to information
and the principles of natural justice and open justice. The prosecution
opposes bail, emphasizing the sensitivity of the leaked documents and
the potential threat to national security. In Aaron’s case, how should
the court balance the principles of natural justice and open justice with
the concerns of national security in deciding on his bail application
under the UAPA?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should prioritize national security over the principles of natural
justice and open justice, denying bail to Aaron based on the potential threat
his actions pose to national security.

Option The court should grant Aaron bail, emphasizing the importance of the
principles of natural justice and open justice, and the public’s right to know,
even in the face of national security concerns.

Option The court should assess whether the national security concerns raised by the
prosecution are substantial enough to override Aaron’s rights under the
principles of natural justice and open justice, and the societal importance of
a free press.
Option The court should automatically defer to the prosecution’s assessment of the
threat to national security, assuming that the charges under the UAPA are
sufficient to deny bail without a detailed examination of the principles of
natural justice and open justice.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it reflects a balanced approach. The court must


critically assess both the validity of the national security concerns and the
importance of maintaining the principles of natural justice and open justice,
as well as the societal value of a free press. Option A is incorrect because it
suggests an uncritical prioritization of national security without adequately
considering the principles of natural justice and open justice, and the role of
a free press in a democratic society. Option B is incorrect as it overlooks the
potential legitimacy of national security concerns under the UAPA. While
the principles of natural justice and open justice are crucial, they must be
weighed against genuine national security concerns. Option D is incorrect
because it implies complete deference to the prosecution without judicial
scrutiny. The court has a responsibility to independently assess the balance
between national security and the principles of natural justice and open
justice.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question “Double jeopardy” comes from the Latin maxim “Nemo bis punitur pro
eodem delicto”, which means that no one can be tried for the same offence
twice. It has existed since the days of the Greeks and Romans, even finding
a mention in the Justinian code, Canon law, Common Law, and the Fifth
Amendment. In India, this doctrine existed even before the Constitution
came into being. A case in point would be the now-repealed General
Clauses Act, of 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973, which says that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried
for the same offence. In its 2022 ruling in ‘T.P. Gopalakrishnan vs. State of
Kerala,’ the Supreme Court went so far as to say that Section 300 bars the
trial of a person not just for the same offence but also for any other offence
on the same facts. The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the
Indian Constitution under Article 20 (2), which says, “No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” It
guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished
for the same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954
ruling in ‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996
ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of Maharashtra’, the apex court held that
Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offences
in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover, there are
certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2).
1) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law
or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
2) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous
proceedings.
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3) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in
force at the time of the second trial.
4) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding
must be the same as that of the first proceeding for which the
accused was prosecuted and punished.
5) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of
the General Clauses Act which defines it as any act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
6) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an
accused is being prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence,
this clause does not apply when the later proceedings are a
continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial
on appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial
is for the same offence or offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation
period for money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in
Section 468 of the CrPC, which states that there is no limitation period for
offences punishable with three years imprisonment or more, will apply. In
this case, the court observed that the accused were nearing the completion
of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present complaint under
the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences under
Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the
latter defines “money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced
under ED case: Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian
Express, March 21, 2023.
Raj, a businessman, was acquitted of charges of fraud in a state court
after a full trial. The prosecution alleged that Raj had manipulated
financial records to deceive investors. A year after his acquittal, new
evidence emerged, and the state decided to re-prosecute Raj for the
same fraudulent activities. Raj’s legal team objects, citing the doctrine
of double jeopardy, arguing that he cannot be tried again for the same
offense of fraud for which he was already acquitted. In Raj’s case, how
should the principle of double jeopardy, as per Article 20(2) of the
Indian Constitution, be applied to determine the legality of the new
prosecution?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Raj can be re-prosecuted for fraud since the new evidence could lead to a
different outcome, and double jeopardy does not apply if new facts emerge
after an initial acquittal.

Option Raj should not face re-prosecution for the same fraudulent activities, as
Article 20(2) protects him from being tried again for an offense for which
he was already acquitted, regardless of any new evidence.

Option Raj can be re-prosecuted only if the new evidence indicates a different type
of fraudulent activity, as double jeopardy applies only to the exact same
offense and not to similar or related offenses.

Option Raj’s re-prosecution is valid only if the state court that acquitted him
initially had no competent jurisdiction over the case, as double jeopardy
applies only to proceedings in a competent court.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with Article 20(2) of the Indian Constitution.
Raj, having been acquitted of the fraud charges, is protected by the doctrine
of double jeopardy from being tried again for the same offense, irrespective
of the new evidence. Option A is incorrect because the emergence of new
evidence does not nullify the protection provided by the doctrine of double
jeopardy. Once acquitted, a person cannot be re-prosecuted for the same
offense, regardless of subsequent evidence. Option C is incorrect because
the doctrine of double jeopardy applies to the same offense for which the
person was previously tried, not just to the exact same facts or evidence.
The principle protects against re-prosecution for the same offense,
regardless of whether the facts or evidence in the subsequent case differ.
Option D is incorrect because the protection against double jeopardy applies
as long as the first acquittal was by a court of competent jurisdiction.
There’s no indication that the court that acquitted Raj initially lacked
jurisdiction.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question “Double jeopardy” comes from the Latin maxim “Nemo bis punitur pro
eodem delicto”, which means that no one can be tried for the same offence
twice. It has existed since the days of the Greeks and Romans, even finding
a mention in the Justinian code, Canon law, Common Law, and the Fifth
Amendment. In India, this doctrine existed even before the Constitution
came into being. A case in point would be the now-repealed General
Clauses Act, of 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973, which says that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried
for the same offence. In its 2022 ruling in ‘T.P. Gopalakrishnan vs. State of
Kerala,’ the Supreme Court went so far as to say that Section 300 bars the
trial of a person not just for the same offence but also for any other offence
on the same facts. The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the
Indian Constitution under Article 20 (2), which says, “No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” It
guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished
for the same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954
ruling in ‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996
ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of Maharashtra’, the apex court held that
Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offences
in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover, there are
certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2).

7) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law


or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
8) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous
proceedings.
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9) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in
force at the time of the second trial.
10) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding
must be the same as that of the first proceeding for which the
accused was prosecuted and punished.
11) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of
the General Clauses Act which defines it as any act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
12) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an
accused is being prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence,
this clause does not apply when the later proceedings are a
continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial
on appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial
is for the same offence or offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation
period for money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in
Section 468 of the CrPC, which states that there is no limitation period for
offences punishable with three years imprisonment or more, will apply. In
this case, the court observed that the accused were nearing the completion
of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present complaint under
the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences under
Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the
latter defines “money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced
under ED case: Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian
Express, March 21, 2023.
David, an employee in a government office, was acquitted in a criminal
trial where he was accused of embezzling funds. The acquittal was due
to a lack of conclusive evidence linking him to the embezzlement. Two
years later, a new investigation into a different but related financial
irregularity in the same office implicates David again. The new charge
is based on a similar set of facts as the previous embezzlement case but
pertains to a different time period. The prosecution argues that the new
charge is distinct from the first. David’s defense argues that this
constitutes double jeopardy under Section 300 of the CrPC. In light of
Section 300 of the CrPC, how should the court assess the legality of
prosecuting David for the new financial irregularity charge?

Type Multiple Choice

Option David should not face prosecution for the new charge, as Section 300 of the
CrPC protects him from being tried for any offense based on the same set of
facts as the previous case in which he was acquitted.

Option David can be prosecuted for the new charge, as it pertains to a different time
period and financial irregularity, thereby constituting a distinct offense from
the one for which he was previously acquitted.

Option David’s prosecution is only valid if the new evidence is completely


unrelated to the facts of the previous case, as Section 300 of the CrPC
prohibits trials based on the same or similar facts.

Option The court should allow the prosecution if it can be proven that the new
financial irregularity is of a significantly larger scale or different nature than
the previous case, even if based on similar facts.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct because Section 300 of the CrPC provides protection
against being tried again for the same offense or for any other offense based
on the same facts. If the new charge against David is based on the same set
of facts as the previous case, despite being a different time period, it would
be prohibited under Section 300. Option B is incorrect because even if the
new charge pertains to a different time period, if it is based on the same set
of facts as the previous case, Section 300 of the CrPC would protect David
from being tried again. Option C is incorrect as it suggests a requirement for
the new evidence to be completely unrelated. Section 300 of the CrPC is
concerned with whether the new charge is based on the same facts, not
whether the evidence is unrelated. Option D is incorrect because the scale
or nature of the financial irregularity does not affect the application of
Section 300 of the CrPC. The key factor is whether the charge is based on
the same set of facts as the previous case.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question “Double jeopardy” comes from the Latin maxim “Nemo bis punitur pro
eodem delicto”, which means that no one can be tried for the same offence
twice. It has existed since the days of the Greeks and Romans, even finding
a mention in the Justinian code, Canon law, Common Law, and the Fifth
Amendment. In India, this doctrine existed even before the Constitution
came into being. A case in point would be the now-repealed General
Clauses Act, of 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973, which says that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried
for the same offence. In its 2022 ruling in ‘T.P. Gopalakrishnan vs. State of
Kerala,’ the Supreme Court went so far as to say that Section 300 bars the
trial of a person not just for the same offence but also for any other offence
on the same facts. The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the
Indian Constitution under Article 20 (2), which says, “No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” It
guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished
for the same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954
ruling in ‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996
ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of Maharashtra’, the apex court held that
Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offences
in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover, there are
certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2).

13) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law
or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
14) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous
proceedings.
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15) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in
force at the time of the second trial.
16) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding
must be the same as that of the first proceeding for which the
accused was prosecuted and punished.
17) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of
the General Clauses Act which defines it as any act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
18) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an
accused is being prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence,
this clause does not apply when the later proceedings are a
continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial
on appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial
is for the same offence or offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation
period for money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in
Section 468 of the CrPC, which states that there is no limitation period for
offences punishable with three years imprisonment or more, will apply. In
this case, the court observed that the accused were nearing the completion
of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present complaint under
the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences under
Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the
latter defines “money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced
under ED case: Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian
Express, March 21, 2023.
Anita, a local politician, is arrested and charged with corruption-
related offenses that carry a maximum imprisonment of 10 years. She
has been in detention for 4 years, awaiting trial. Due to various delays,
including procedural complexities and the unavailability of key
witnesses, her trial has made slow progress. Anita’s lawyer files a
motion for her release on bail under Section 436A of the CrPC, arguing
that she has already served 40% of the maximum possible sentence
without a trial conclusion. Considering Anita’s situation, how should
the court apply Section 436A of the CrPC in deciding her eligibility for
release on bail?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Anita should be granted bail under Section 436A of the CrPC, as she has
been in detention for a significant portion of the maximum sentence for the
offense, and the slow progress of the trial justifies her release.

Option Anita’s release on bail should be denied, as the seriousness of the corruption
charges against her overrides the provisions of Section 436A of the CrPC,
which are not applicable in cases involving high-profile public figures.

Option The court should release Anita on bail only if it is proven that the delay in
the trial is solely attributable to the prosecution and not due to any actions
by the defense.

Option Anita should remain in detention, as Section 436A of the CrPC applies only
to non-serious offenses and not to corruption charges, which are considered
grave.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it aligns with the principle of Section 436A of the
CrPC. Since Anita has been detained for a substantial portion (40%) of the
maximum imprisonment period for her offense, and considering the slow
progress of the trial, she is eligible for release on bail under this section.
Option B is incorrect because the seriousness of the charges does not negate
the application of Section 436A. The section explicitly provides for the
release on bail if the accused has been detained for a period extending up to
half of the maximum sentence for the offense. Option C is incorrect as
Section 436A does not condition the release on bail solely on the cause of
the trial’s delay. The key consideration is the length of detention relative to
the maximum possible sentence. Option D is incorrect because Section
436A of the CrPC does not specify exclusions for certain types of offenses.
It applies as long as the accused has undergone detention for a period
extending up to half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for
the offense.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25


Question “Double jeopardy” comes from the Latin maxim “Nemo bis punitur pro
eodem delicto”, which means that no one can be tried for the same offence
twice. It has existed since the days of the Greeks and Romans, even finding
a mention in the Justinian code, Canon law, Common Law, and the Fifth
Amendment. In India, this doctrine existed even before the Constitution
came into being. A case in point would be the now-repealed General
Clauses Act, of 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973, which says that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried
for the same offence. In its 2022 ruling in ‘T.P. Gopalakrishnan vs. State of
Kerala,’ the Supreme Court went so far as to say that Section 300 bars the
trial of a person not just for the same offence but also for any other offence
on the same facts. The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the
Indian Constitution under Article 20 (2), which says, “No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” It
guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished
for the same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954
ruling in ‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996
ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of Maharashtra’, the apex court held that
Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offences
in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover, there are
certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2).

19) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law
or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
20) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous
proceedings.
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21) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in
force at the time of the second trial.
22) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding
must be the same as that of the first proceeding for which the
accused was prosecuted and punished.
23) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of
the General Clauses Act which defines it as any act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
24) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an
accused is being prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence,
this clause does not apply when the later proceedings are a
continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial
on appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial
is for the same offence or offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation
period for money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in
Section 468 of the CrPC, which states that there is no limitation period for
offences punishable with three years imprisonment or more, will apply. In
this case, the court observed that the accused were nearing the completion
of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present complaint under
the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences under
Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the
latter defines “money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced
under ED case: Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian
Express, March 21, 2023.
Karan, an entrepreneur, is arrested on charges of fraudulent business
practices. The maximum imprisonment for this offense is 7 years. He
has been in detention for 3 years without a trial conclusion, primarily
due to frequent adjournments and the complexity of the financial
evidence. Karan’s legal team argues that his prolonged detention
without trial violates his constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 21,
and they seek his release based on the proportionality standard. In
evaluating Karan’s prolonged detention, how should the court apply
the proportionality standard in the context of his constitutional rights
under Articles 14 and 21?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Karan should be granted bail, as the proportionality standard suggests that
his extended detention without trial conclusion is unreasonable and
infringes upon his constitutional rights under Articles 14 and 21.

Option Karan’s continued detention should be upheld despite the delay, as the
seriousness of the fraudulent business practices charges justifies prolonged
detention for the sake of public interest and economic stability.

Option The court should only consider releasing Karan on bail if there is evidence
of intentional delay or misconduct by the prosecution, as the proportionality
standard primarily concerns the conduct of the trial.

Option Karan should remain in detention until at least half of the maximum
imprisonment term has been served, as the proportionality standard under
Articles 14 and 21 only applies after this period.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct because it aligns with the proportionality standard’s


application. The prolonged detention of Karan without trial conclusion can
be considered unreasonable, infringing upon his constitutional rights to
equality and personal liberty, especially given that he has already served a
significant portion of the potential maximum sentence. Option B is
incorrect because the seriousness of the offense does not automatically
justify prolonged pre-trial detention. The proportionality standard requires
balancing the seriousness of the charge with the accused’s constitutional
rights. Option C is incorrect as the proportionality standard does not solely
depend on intentional delay or misconduct by the prosecution. It requires a
broader assessment of the reasonableness of continued detention in light of
the overall trial progress and the accused’s constitutional rights. Option D is
incorrect because the proportionality standard does not stipulate a fixed
period (such as half the maximum term) after which it becomes applicable.
It requires a continuous assessment of the reasonableness of detention
throughout the trial process.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question “Double jeopardy” comes from the Latin maxim “Nemo bis punitur pro
eodem delicto”, which means that no one can be tried for the same offence
twice. It has existed since the days of the Greeks and Romans, even finding
a mention in the Justinian code, Canon law, Common Law, and the Fifth
Amendment. In India, this doctrine existed even before the Constitution
came into being. A case in point would be the now-repealed General
Clauses Act, of 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973, which says that a person once convicted or acquitted cannot be tried
for the same offence. In its 2022 ruling in ‘T.P. Gopalakrishnan vs. State of
Kerala,’ the Supreme Court went so far as to say that Section 300 bars the
trial of a person not just for the same offence but also for any other offence
on the same facts. The doctrine of double jeopardy is enshrined in the
Indian Constitution under Article 20 (2), which says, “No person shall be
prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.” It
guarantees immunity from double punishment and bars a second
prosecution only where the accused has been both prosecuted and punished
for the same offence previously, as held by the Supreme Court in its 1954
ruling in ‘Venkataraman SA vs. Union of India’. However, in its 1996
ruling in ‘AA Mulla vs State of Maharashtra’, the apex court held that
Article 20(2) does not bar subsequent trials if the ingredients of the offences
in the previous and subsequent trials are distinct. Moreover, there are
certain conditions for the application of Article 20 (2).

25) There must have been previous proceedings before a court of law
or a judicial tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
26) The person must have been prosecuted in the previous
proceedings.
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27) The conviction or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in
force at the time of the second trial.
28) The offence which is a subject matter of the second proceeding
must be the same as that of the first proceeding for which the
accused was prosecuted and punished.
29) The “offence” must be an offence as defined in Section 3(38) of
the General Clauses Act which defines it as any act or omission
made punishable by any law for the time being in force. The
prosecution must also be valid and not null, void, or abortive.
30) The subsequent proceeding must be a fresh proceeding where an
accused is being prosecuted for the same offence twice. Hence,
this clause does not apply when the later proceedings are a
continuation of the previous proceedings, nor does it bar a retrial
on appeal with a direction to frame charges, provided the retrial
is for the same offence or offence as the original trial.
The Prevention of Money Laundering Act does not provide for a limitation
period for money laundering. This indicates that the law laid down in
Section 468 of the CrPC, which states that there is no limitation period for
offences punishable with three years imprisonment or more, will apply. In
this case, the court observed that the accused were nearing the completion
of their sentence when the “ED suddenly filed the present complaint under
the PMLA Act” on March 30, 2021, for the commission of offences under
Section 4 read with Section 3. The former deals with punishment for money
laundering, stipulating a minimum of three years imprisonment, while the
latter defines “money laundering”.
Source: After CBI case, two ex-Delhi Jal Board officials sentenced
under ED case: Why ‘double jeopardy’ did not apply here, The Indian
Express, March 21, 2023.
Suresh, a social activist, is arrested under the Unlawful Activities
Prevention Act (UAPA) for allegedly supporting a banned organization
through his writings and speeches. The prosecution claims that his
activities pose a threat to national security and that he should not be
released on bail. Suresh’s legal team argues for his release, citing his
right to freedom of speech and expressing concern that the prolonged
detention without trial violates the principles of natural justice and
open justice. In Suresh’s case, how should the court balance the
principles of natural justice and open justice against the national
security concerns cited under the UAPA in deciding his bail
application?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The court should deny bail to Suresh, prioritizing national security concerns
over the principles of natural justice and open justice due to the serious
nature of the charges under the UAPA.

Option The court should grant bail to Suresh, emphasizing the importance of
upholding the principles of natural justice and open justice, even in cases
involving national security concerns under the UAPA.

Option The court should assess whether the national security concerns presented by
the prosecution are substantial and justify Suresh’s continued detention,
while also considering the impact of prolonged detention on his rights under
the principles of natural justice and open justice.

Option The court should automatically defer to the prosecution’s assessment under
the UAPA, assuming that the charges inherently justify the denial of bail
without a detailed examination of the principles of natural justice and open
justice.

Answer 3

Solution Option C is correct as it reflects a balanced approach. The court must


critically assess both the validity of the national security concerns and the
importance of maintaining the principles of natural justice and open justice,
considering the rights of the individual and the societal implications. Option
A is incorrect because it suggests an uncritical prioritization of national
security without considering the principles of natural justice and open
justice. Even under stringent laws like UAPA, these principles must be
balanced against security concerns. Option B is incorrect as it overlooks the
legitimacy of national security concerns under the UAPA. While the
principles of natural justice and open justice are crucial, they need to be
weighed against genuine national security concerns. Option D is incorrect
because it implies complete deference to the prosecution without judicial
scrutiny. The court has a responsibility to independently assess the balance
between national security and the principles of natural justice and open
justice.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Hate speech laws have been invoked under regimes of all parties to crack
down on criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals. In May
last year, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale was arrested for a Facebook post
allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar. She was booked under the
same provisions in as many as 22 FIRs. And in March 2022, BJP youth
leader Arul Prasad was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for spreading
“defamatory information” about Chief Minister M K Stalin under the same
provisions. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show
that the rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low. In 2020, 1,804
cases were registered, six times higher than the 323 cases in 2014.
However, the conviction rate in 2020 was 20.2%, suggesting that the
process often becomes the punishment. The registration of multiple FIRs
across different states drains the resources of the accused to secure legal
representation. The accused has to move the Supreme Court seeking
clubbing of the FIRs if the FIRs relate to one event. This is what Khera
sought. Given that the provisions are worded broadly, there are safeguards
against its misuse. For example, Sections 153A and 153B require prior
sanction from the government for initiating prosecution. But this is required
before the trial begins, and not at the stage of preliminary investigation. To
curb indiscriminate arrests, the Supreme Court laid down a set of guidelines
in its 2014 ruling in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar. As per the guidelines,
for offences that carry a sentence of less than seven years, the police cannot
automatically arrest an accused before investigation. In a 2021 ruling, the
SC said that the state will have to prove intent for securing a conviction
under Section 153A.
The SC in this case quashed an FIR against the editor of The Shillong
Times, Patricia Mukhim, registered for allegedly creating communal
disharmony through a Facebook post. “The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed,” the SC stated. “Words used in the alleged criminal
speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor
of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an
ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law “the man on the top
of a Clapham omnibus” should be applied,” the court said. Following his
release on interim bail, Khera said that he was “grateful” to the Supreme
Court for upholding his liberties. Accusing Assam Police of arresting him
“illegally without serving any notice”, Khera said, “The law came to my
rescue… Am I a terrorist? Why did they deplane me? I’m fighting for my
country, my rights as a citizen, our Constitution…” However, the SC, while
releasing him on interim bail “in order to protect the petitioner until such
date as he applies for regular bail before the jurisdictional court upon the
FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction”, made clear its
disillusionment over the words used by Khera against Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. It told Senior Advocate A M Singhvi, who appeared for
Khera: “Mr Singhvi, we will protect you. But there has to be some level of
discourse…”.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, The
Indian Express, February 25, 2023.
An independent journalist, Maya, writes an article critically analyzing
the policies of a prominent state minister. The article includes strong
language and harsh critiques of the minister’s performance and
integrity. Subsequently, Maya is charged under Section 153A for
promoting enmity between different groups and defaming the minister.
Maya’s defense argues that the article is a legitimate exercise of free
speech and journalistic duty, while the prosecution contends that the
language used in the article amounts to hate speech and incites
disharmony. In Maya’s case, how should the legal principles related to
Section 153A of the IPC be applied to determine the legitimacy of the
charges against her?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Maya should be acquitted, as her article constitutes a legitimate exercise of


free speech and journalistic responsibility, and does not meet the criteria of
hate speech or incitement under Section 153A.

Option Maya should be convicted under Section 153A, as the strong language and
harsh critiques in her article amount to promoting enmity and defaming the
public functionary, irrespective of journalistic intent.

Option The court should consider the low rate of conviction under Section 153A
and the potential misuse of hate speech laws to suppress criticism, in
determining the legitimacy of the charges against Maya.

Option Maya’s charges should be upheld solely based on the complaint by the state
minister, as criticism of public functionaries using strong language typically
falls under the purview of Section 153A.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct as it aligns with the principle of free speech and
journalistic duty. The application of Section 153A requires a balance
between preventing hate speech and protecting the right to free speech,
including critical journalism. Option B is incorrect because mere strong
language and critique in a journalistic context do not automatically
constitute hate speech or incitement under Section 153A. The intent and
context of the article must be considered. Option C is incorrect as the
court’s decision should be based on the specifics of the case, not solely on
the general conviction rate under Section 153A. While the rate of
conviction may indicate challenges in proving such cases, each case must
be judged on its own merits. Option D is incorrect because the charges
against Maya should be evaluated based on the content and intent of her
article, not solely on the basis of the complaint. Section 153A requires an
analysis of whether the speech genuinely incites enmity or constitutes
defamation.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Hate speech laws have been invoked under regimes of all parties to crack
down on criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals. In May
last year, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale was arrested for a Facebook post
allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar. She was booked under the
same provisions in as many as 22 FIRs. And in March 2022, BJP youth
leader Arul Prasad was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for spreading
“defamatory information” about Chief Minister M K Stalin under the same
provisions. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show
that the rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low. In 2020, 1,804
cases were registered, six times higher than the 323 cases in 2014.
However, the conviction rate in 2020 was 20.2%, suggesting that the
process often becomes the punishment. The registration of multiple FIRs
across different states drains the resources of the accused to secure legal
representation. The accused has to move the Supreme Court seeking
clubbing of the FIRs if the FIRs relate to one event. This is what Khera
sought. Given that the provisions are worded broadly, there are safeguards
against its misuse. For example, Sections 153A and 153B require prior
sanction from the government for initiating prosecution. But this is required
before the trial begins, and not at the stage of preliminary investigation. To
curb indiscriminate arrests, the Supreme Court laid down a set of guidelines
in its 2014 ruling in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar. As per the guidelines,
for offences that carry a sentence of less than seven years, the police cannot
automatically arrest an accused before investigation. In a 2021 ruling, the
SC said that the state will have to prove intent for securing a conviction
under Section 153A.
The SC in this case quashed an FIR against the editor of The Shillong
Times, Patricia Mukhim, registered for allegedly creating communal
disharmony through a Facebook post. “The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed,” the SC stated. “Words used in the alleged criminal
speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor
of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an
ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law “the man on the top
of a Clapham omnibus” should be applied,” the court said. Following his
release on interim bail, Khera said that he was “grateful” to the Supreme
Court for upholding his liberties. Accusing Assam Police of arresting him
“illegally without serving any notice”, Khera said, “The law came to my
rescue… Am I a terrorist? Why did they deplane me? I’m fighting for my
country, my rights as a citizen, our Constitution…” However, the SC, while
releasing him on interim bail “in order to protect the petitioner until such
date as he applies for regular bail before the jurisdictional court upon the
FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction”, made clear its
disillusionment over the words used by Khera against Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. It told Senior Advocate A M Singhvi, who appeared for
Khera: “Mr Singhvi, we will protect you. But there has to be some level of
discourse…”.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, The
Indian Express, February 25, 2023.
A political commentator, Arjun, known for his outspoken views, posts a
series of tweets that are critical of various political leaders. These
tweets lead to multiple FIRs being filed against him in different states
under Section 153A for allegedly promoting enmity between different
groups. Despite the similar nature of the accusations in each FIR,
Arjun is required to respond to each case individually, leading to
significant legal expenses and personal strain. Arjun’s legal team
argues that the multiplicity of FIRs and the low rate of conviction
under Section 153A indicate that the process itself is being used as a
punishment. In the context of Arjun’s situation, how should the legal
principle related to the low conviction rate under Section 153A of the
IPC and the punitive nature of the legal process be applied?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Arjun should face each FIR individually, as the unique circumstances of
each case warrant separate legal proceedings, regardless of the strain on
resources and the low conviction rate under Section 153A.

Option The court should consider consolidating the FIRs against Arjun, recognizing
that the multiplicity of similar cases and the low conviction rate under
Section 153A suggest that the process is being used punitively.
Option Arjun’s case should be dismissed outright, as the low conviction rate under
Section 153A indicates that all such charges are likely baseless and solely
intended to harass.

Option The court should proceed with each FIR separately but expedite the process,
acknowledging the low conviction rate under Section 153A while still
ensuring each case is fairly heard.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the principle of avoiding punitive use of
legal proceedings. The court should consider the possibility of consolidating
the FIRs, given their similarity and the low conviction rate under Section
153A, which may suggest that the process is being used to unduly burden
Arjun. Option A is incorrect because it overlooks the potential misuse of the
legal process as a form of punishment, especially given the low conviction
rate under Section 153A and the similar nature of the FIRs against Arjun.
Option C is incorrect because while the low conviction rate is a concern, it
does not automatically mean that all charges under Section 153A are
baseless. Each case still warrants a fair and individual assessment. Option D
is incorrect because simply expediting the process does not address the
underlying issue of multiple FIRs being potentially used punitively. The
focus should be on assessing the necessity and legitimacy of each FIR in the
context of Arjun’s situation.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Hate speech laws have been invoked under regimes of all parties to crack
down on criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals. In May
last year, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale was arrested for a Facebook post
allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar. She was booked under the
same provisions in as many as 22 FIRs. And in March 2022, BJP youth
leader Arul Prasad was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for spreading
“defamatory information” about Chief Minister M K Stalin under the same
provisions. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show
that the rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low. In 2020, 1,804
cases were registered, six times higher than the 323 cases in 2014.
However, the conviction rate in 2020 was 20.2%, suggesting that the
process often becomes the punishment. The registration of multiple FIRs
across different states drains the resources of the accused to secure legal
representation. The accused has to move the Supreme Court seeking
clubbing of the FIRs if the FIRs relate to one event. This is what Khera
sought. Given that the provisions are worded broadly, there are safeguards
against its misuse. For example, Sections 153A and 153B require prior
sanction from the government for initiating prosecution. But this is required
before the trial begins, and not at the stage of preliminary investigation. To
curb indiscriminate arrests, the Supreme Court laid down a set of guidelines
in its 2014 ruling in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar. As per the guidelines,
for offences that carry a sentence of less than seven years, the police cannot
automatically arrest an accused before investigation. In a 2021 ruling, the
SC said that the state will have to prove intent for securing a conviction
under Section 153A.
The SC in this case quashed an FIR against the editor of The Shillong
Times, Patricia Mukhim, registered for allegedly creating communal
disharmony through a Facebook post. “The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed,” the SC stated. “Words used in the alleged criminal
speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor
of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an
ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law “the man on the top
of a Clapham omnibus” should be applied,” the court said. Following his
release on interim bail, Khera said that he was “grateful” to the Supreme
Court for upholding his liberties. Accusing Assam Police of arresting him
“illegally without serving any notice”, Khera said, “The law came to my
rescue… Am I a terrorist? Why did they deplane me? I’m fighting for my
country, my rights as a citizen, our Constitution…” However, the SC, while
releasing him on interim bail “in order to protect the petitioner until such
date as he applies for regular bail before the jurisdictional court upon the
FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction”, made clear its
disillusionment over the words used by Khera against Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. It told Senior Advocate A M Singhvi, who appeared for
Khera: “Mr Singhvi, we will protect you. But there has to be some level of
discourse…”.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, The
Indian Express, February 25, 2023.
An author, Ravi, writes a book that includes critical analysis of various
religious practices and beliefs. Following the book’s publication, several
groups file complaints alleging that the book promotes enmity between
different religious groups, leading to charges under Section 153A.
However, it is later revealed that the necessary government sanction
for prosecuting Ravi under this section was not obtained before the
initiation of the trial. Ravi’s legal team moves to have the case
dismissed on these grounds. In Ravi’s case, how should the legal
requirement of prior government sanction for initiating prosecution
under Section 153A be applied?

Type Multiple Choice

Option The charges against Ravi should be dismissed, as the initiation of the trial
without the necessary government sanction violates the legal safeguards
against the misuse of Section 153A.

Option The trial should continue regardless of the lack of government sanction, as
the seriousness of the complaints overrides procedural requirements in
cases involving potential communal disharmony.

Option Ravi should be prosecuted only if the government can retrospectively


provide sanction for the trial, as the absence of prior sanction does not
automatically invalidate the proceedings.

Option The requirement of government sanction should be considered irrelevant in


Ravi’s case, as the content of his book directly pertains to public interest
and communal harmony.

Answer 1

Solution Option A is correct because it aligns with the legal safeguard requiring prior
government sanction for prosecuting under Section 153A. The initiation of
the trial without this sanction is a procedural flaw, warranting the dismissal
of the charges against Ravi. Option B is incorrect because it overlooks the
procedural safeguard of requiring government sanction. The seriousness of
the complaints does not negate the necessity for following due legal
procedures. Option C is incorrect because retrospective sanction does not
fulfill the requirement of obtaining government sanction before the trial
begins. The absence of prior sanction is a significant procedural lapse.
Option D is incorrect because the requirement of government sanction is a
crucial safeguard, regardless of the content of Ravi’s book or its impact on
public interest and communal harmony.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Hate speech laws have been invoked under regimes of all parties to crack
down on criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals. In May
last year, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale was arrested for a Facebook post
allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar. She was booked under the
same provisions in as many as 22 FIRs. And in March 2022, BJP youth
leader Arul Prasad was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for spreading
“defamatory information” about Chief Minister M K Stalin under the same
provisions. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show
that the rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low. In 2020, 1,804
cases were registered, six times higher than the 323 cases in 2014.
However, the conviction rate in 2020 was 20.2%, suggesting that the
process often becomes the punishment. The registration of multiple FIRs
across different states drains the resources of the accused to secure legal
representation. The accused has to move the Supreme Court seeking
clubbing of the FIRs if the FIRs relate to one event. This is what Khera
sought. Given that the provisions are worded broadly, there are safeguards
against its misuse. For example, Sections 153A and 153B require prior
sanction from the government for initiating prosecution. But this is required
before the trial begins, and not at the stage of preliminary investigation. To
curb indiscriminate arrests, the Supreme Court laid down a set of guidelines
in its 2014 ruling in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar. As per the guidelines,
for offences that carry a sentence of less than seven years, the police cannot
automatically arrest an accused before investigation. In a 2021 ruling, the
SC said that the state will have to prove intent for securing a conviction
under Section 153A.
The SC in this case quashed an FIR against the editor of The Shillong
Times, Patricia Mukhim, registered for allegedly creating communal
disharmony through a Facebook post. “The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed,” the SC stated. “Words used in the alleged criminal
speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor
of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an
ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law “the man on the top
of a Clapham omnibus” should be applied,” the court said. Following his
release on interim bail, Khera said that he was “grateful” to the Supreme
Court for upholding his liberties. Accusing Assam Police of arresting him
“illegally without serving any notice”, Khera said, “The law came to my
rescue… Am I a terrorist? Why did they deplane me? I’m fighting for my
country, my rights as a citizen, our Constitution…” However, the SC, while
releasing him on interim bail “in order to protect the petitioner until such
date as he applies for regular bail before the jurisdictional court upon the
FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction”, made clear its
disillusionment over the words used by Khera against Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. It told Senior Advocate A M Singhvi, who appeared for
Khera: “Mr Singhvi, we will protect you. But there has to be some level of
discourse…”.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, The
Indian Express, February 25, 2023.
Neha, a local activist, organizes a peaceful protest against a
controversial government policy. During the protest, she makes a
speech that is critical of certain government officials. Subsequently, she
is charged with an offense under a section of the IPC that carries a
maximum sentence of three years, alleging that her speech instigated
disharmony. The police arrest Neha immediately after filing the
charges, without conducting a preliminary investigation. Neha’s legal
team argues that her arrest violates the Supreme Court’s guidelines in
Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, as it was made without a prior
investigation for an offense with a sentence of less than seven years.
How should the legal principle from the Arnesh Kumar v State of
Bihar ruling be applied in Neha’s case regarding her immediate arrest?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Neha’s immediate arrest is justified, as the charges pertain to public order,
and the police are empowered to make arrests in such cases without a prior
investigation, regardless of the maximum sentence.
Option The arrest of Neha violates the Supreme Court’s guidelines, as it was
conducted without a preliminary investigation for an offense carrying a
sentence of less than seven years.

Option Neha can be arrested immediately after the charges are filed if the police
believe that her actions during the protest pose an imminent threat to public
order and safety.

Option The guidelines from Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar are applicable only in
matrimonial disputes, so Neha’s arrest does not violate these guidelines.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the Supreme Court’s guidelines. Neha’s
immediate arrest for an offense with a sentence of less than seven years,
without a prior investigation, contravenes these guidelines. Option A is
incorrect because the nature of the charges does not exempt the police from
adhering to the guidelines set in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, which
restrict automatic arrests without investigation, particularly for offenses
with a sentence of less than seven years. Option C is incorrect because the
belief of an imminent threat does not override the requirement for a
preliminary investigation as per the Supreme Court’s guidelines in Arnesh
Kumar v State of Bihar, especially for offenses with a sentence of less than
seven years. Option D is incorrect as the guidelines from Arnesh Kumar v
State of Bihar are not limited to matrimonial disputes but apply to all
offenses with a sentence of less than seven years.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

Question Hate speech laws have been invoked under regimes of all parties to crack
down on criticism of public functionaries and to arrest individuals. In May
last year, Marathi actor Ketaki Chitale was arrested for a Facebook post
allegedly defaming NCP leader Sharad Pawar. She was booked under the
same provisions in as many as 22 FIRs. And in March 2022, BJP youth
leader Arul Prasad was arrested by the Tamil Nadu Police for spreading
“defamatory information” about Chief Minister M K Stalin under the same
provisions. Data from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) show
that the rate of conviction for Section 153A is very low. In 2020, 1,804
cases were registered, six times higher than the 323 cases in 2014.
However, the conviction rate in 2020 was 20.2%, suggesting that the
process often becomes the punishment. The registration of multiple FIRs
across different states drains the resources of the accused to secure legal
representation. The accused has to move the Supreme Court seeking
clubbing of the FIRs if the FIRs relate to one event. This is what Khera
sought. Given that the provisions are worded broadly, there are safeguards
against its misuse. For example, Sections 153A and 153B require prior
sanction from the government for initiating prosecution. But this is required
before the trial begins, and not at the stage of preliminary investigation. To
curb indiscriminate arrests, the Supreme Court laid down a set of guidelines
in its 2014 ruling in Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar. As per the guidelines,
for offences that carry a sentence of less than seven years, the police cannot
automatically arrest an accused before investigation. In a 2021 ruling, the
SC said that the state will have to prove intent for securing a conviction
under Section 153A.
The SC in this case quashed an FIR against the editor of The Shillong
Times, Patricia Mukhim, registered for allegedly creating communal
disharmony through a Facebook post. “The intention to cause disorder or
incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section
153A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in
order to succeed,” the SC stated. “Words used in the alleged criminal
speech should be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded,
firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor
of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. The standard of an
ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law “the man on the top
of a Clapham omnibus” should be applied,” the court said. Following his
release on interim bail, Khera said that he was “grateful” to the Supreme
Court for upholding his liberties. Accusing Assam Police of arresting him
“illegally without serving any notice”, Khera said, “The law came to my
rescue… Am I a terrorist? Why did they deplane me? I’m fighting for my
country, my rights as a citizen, our Constitution…” However, the SC, while
releasing him on interim bail “in order to protect the petitioner until such
date as he applies for regular bail before the jurisdictional court upon the
FIRs being transferred to one and the same jurisdiction”, made clear its
disillusionment over the words used by Khera against Prime Minister
Narendra Modi. It told Senior Advocate A M Singhvi, who appeared for
Khera: “Mr Singhvi, we will protect you. But there has to be some level of
discourse…”.
Source: Pawan Khera arrest | Section 153A: its use and misuse, The
Indian Express, February 25, 2023.
Vikram, a prominent blogger, writes a post criticizing certain
government policies and their impact on different communities.
Following the publication of the post, he is charged under Section 153A
for allegedly inciting enmity between groups. The prosecution claims
that the language used in the blog could potentially lead to communal
tension. Vikram’s defense argues that his intention was to foster
informed debate and not to incite violence or create disorder, and that
his post should be viewed in the context of a larger discussion on
governmental policies. In Vikram’s trial under Section 153A of the
IPC, how should the court assess the requirement of proving intent as
per the Supreme Court’s interpretation?

Type Multiple Choice

Option Vikram should be convicted under Section 153A, as the potential impact of
his blog post on communal tension is sufficient to establish his intent to
incite enmity, regardless of his stated purpose.

Option The court should acquit Vikram, as the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that he intended to incite violence or create disorder, and
mere criticism of government policies does not automatically imply such
intent.

Option Vikram’s conviction should be based on the subjective interpretation of his


blog post by the affected communities, as their perception determines
whether the intent to incite enmity exists.

Option The intent to incite enmity should be presumed if Vikram’s blog post
contains any critical commentary on sensitive issues related to different
communities, simplifying the prosecution’s burden to prove intent.

Answer 2

Solution Option B is correct as it aligns with the Supreme Court’s emphasis on


proving intent. The prosecution must establish that Vikram’s objective was
to incite violence or create disorder, and mere criticism of government
policies does not necessarily constitute such intent. Option A is incorrect
because the potential impact of the blog post is not sufficient to establish
intent. The Supreme Court’s interpretation requires a clear demonstration of
intent to incite violence or create disorder, which goes beyond potential
impact. Option C is incorrect because the legal standard for proving intent
under Section 153A is not based on subjective interpretations by affected
communities. The court must objectively assess the evidence of intent to
incite enmity. Option D is incorrect as it erroneously suggests that intent
should be presumed from the content of the commentary. The prosecution is
required to prove intent as a separate element beyond the mere presence of
critical commentary.

Positive Marks 1

Negative Marks 0.25

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