1 SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS ‘The purpose of the first part of the book, ‘The ancient states systems’, is to see what we can discern about the organization of relations between different peoples in other civilizations. In the light of our findings we will be able in the second part to examine ‘The European international society’, which derived much from previous experience ‘The third part examines ‘The global international society’. The contemporary international system grew out of the European one, and many of the rules and institutions of the European society have simply been applied globally; but it also incorporates ideas and practices from earlier systems. The other civilizations which we want to examine, and the relations between their communities, were of course highly individual and changed continually. What general terms can we use to describe and classify the great variety of these relations? Words like ‘state’, ‘empire’ and system’ are useful so long as we remember that they are no more than broad categorizations which cover a considerable range of distinct individual phenomena, and that different users of these terms mean slightly different things by them. The simple distinction between free and subject peoples, or between sovereign and vassal rulers, is hopelessly overcharged with rhetoric, and obscures many of the issues we need to examine. We need more dispassionate terms Thave become increasingly doubtful about sharp distinctions between systems of independent states, suzerain systems and empires. Inow prefer that, when for us to describe them as forming a (whether independent, suzerain, imperial or whatever), the organization It is convenient for purposes of comparison to divide the spectrum into four broad 13‘THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY of relationship: independence, hegemony, dominion and which are great boons. But there is a price. for the reasons set out by Hobbes and others. But in so far as the order is imposed by the actual or potential force of a hegemonial authority, it can be felt as oppressive. This is especially the case with imperial and other authorities which intervene in the to what would be an inchoate system by co-ordinating, and thus modifying, the behaviour of their members. That is an aspect of what the European system called raison d'état. and make it into a society. That is an aspect of raison de systéme, the belief that it pays to make the system work. In so far as such agreements, including commitments to collective security, are voluntary, and are not imposed by a victor power or group of powers, they fall within the multiple independences area of the spectrum, and often also by voluntary choice. more effectively ‘As we move along the spectrum to the point where one or more powers are able to exercise a hegemony, the other forms of co-ordination shade off into the benefits which derive from the hegemonial authority ordering the system in such a way that al its members see a balance of advantage 4SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS in accepting the hegemony. So also imperial powers usually find it advantageous to respond to the interests and welfare of subordinate Some scholars than resort to ugly words like ‘para-hegemonial’. Moreover, a hegemony is not'a dictatorial fiat The hegemonies which I have looked at, whether exercised by an individual power or a small group, involve continual dialogue between the hegemonial authority and the other states, and a sense on both sides of the balance of is a vaguer concept. In it usually SRB In many historical contexts it means a shadowy overlordship that amounts to very little in practice. Some scholars like Wight and Bull spoke of suzerain systems or societies to mean those in which the members accepted hegemony as legitimate. There is a difference between systems whose members are in general agreement that there ought to be a suzerain authority, even when it is in abeyance in practice, and those whose members accept suzerain authority only tacitly. Tacit acceptance is the same as acquiescence, and is necessary for any effective hegemony, whether de jure or de facto. Examples are recent yhere the states were formally independent, Augustus to Herod’s kingdom and the relation 15‘THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY of the British raj to the Indian princes. Here the part played by the ability to coerce is more obviou: Finally there is 10 more absolute in practice than independen meaning (centre. The freedom of action even of imperial governments is limited practice by the constraints which involvement with other communities imposes. When we look at historical examples, in the world today or in the systems of the past, we are of course aware that these categories are not watertight with an abrupt transition from one to another, but rather a continuum, like wavelengths of light in a rainbow which we find it convenient to divide into different colours. No actual system remains fixed at one point in this spectrum. The relation of the various communities to each other shifts constantly along the spectrum over time. The ways in which a system tightens or loosens, and one hegemonial or imperial power supplants another, will be of special interest to us. There is also, at any one time, a variation in space. Communities involved in a system do not all stand in the same relationship to each other, or to an imperial power. There are many gradations, even between independent states; and when looked at closely every relationship between two communities has in practice a special nature of its own, conditioned by history, geography and other differentiating factors. One question we must examine is the extent to which empires usually have a hard core of direct administration, beyond which lie layers of dominion and hegemony until fully independent states are reached that lie outside imperial control or influence. Such ‘layers’ are, of course, gradations along our spectrum and therefore concentric circles on a diagram rather than a map. In addition to these continuing variations of reality in time and space, the communities which we have treated as the components of systems are far from being constants. Obviously the area under the control of a government will fluctuate. Sgt igre ey such as may grow or shrink in importance and size: it may absorb other elements, or break up, or become assimilated or otherwise disappear. ‘We must use terms like community and state also in as neutral a sense as possible. For instance, it seems to me that it obscures our understanding of the nature of states to maintain dogmatically that to count as states they must be independent. Since systems and the communities which compose them vary greatly from each other, with widely differing cultures, past experiences and degree of development, and since within a given system the degree of 16SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS control which one, or two, or five powers can exercise over other ‘communities also varies, can we make any valid generalizations about the pressures which induce such changes? Especially, can we see any indications of the way our own system may develop? Has there been any general tendency away from the pole of centralized authority, empire and world government towards multiple independence, as some people claim? Has there been a corresponding counter-tendency in known systems of independent states for the strongest power to move towards hegemony, trying to control the foreign relations of client states and lay down the rules of the system; and for hegemony to develop into dominion? Imagine our spectrum laid out in the form of an are, with its midpoint at the bottom of the pendulum’s swing, somewhere between hegemony and dominion. Was there in ancient systems any noticeable pendulum effect, any gravitational pull on systems away from the theoretical extremes and towards some central area of the spectrum, even though the momentum of change and other factors may carry the system past that area? Or does the pattern vary too much from one system to another for us to make any valid general inferences? Another important issue is how far the arrangements between ‘communities in a system are accepted as legitimate. distinguished from the power to coerce, How does legitimate authority, as opposed to power exercised by compulsion or the threat of it, operate between communities in a system, and acquire international significance? that they can further some of their interests and their principles, ‘especially the preservation of their independence, by co-operation with allies; which involves taking the views and desires of their allies into account and modifying their own behaviour accordingly. Other interests can be promoted by general agreements and rules that restrain and benefit all members of the system. This awareness of the advantages of co-operation between independent partners corresponds to the ways in which hegemonial and imperial powers find it advantageous to respond to the interests and welfare of subordinate peoples. To what extent do such policies depend for their success on a wide measure of acceptance? ‘The rules and institutions and the accepted practices of a society of substantially independent states need legitimate authority to ensure habitual compliance. Is legitimate authority as necessary for the successful exercise of hegemony or dominion? 7‘THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY If we want to understand how the civilizations of the past organized the relations between their different communities, we cannot simply leave such evidence as historians and archaeologists have been able to uncover asa mass of uncorrelated data, It can be very useful to impose a diagram or a grid of categories on the multiple variety of actual relations, for possible classification and comparative analysis. There is nothing unusual about this. We have to group different individuals and communities together into categories for juridical purposes: for instance, when we say that all the very different nominally independent states in our present international system are equal in international law. And it was regularly done in ancient times, as it is today, in order to further a political goal. But while the division of reality into categories can assist our understanding of what actually happens, there is the inherent danger that our categories may come between us and reality. We may slip into the assumption that phenomena lumped together in a category are more alike than they really are, or that because some things are true about all of them, other things are true also. We have noted the danger of category words with emotional overtones like ‘independence’ and ‘empire’. Equally misleading are the categories used by past civilizations to classify their communities, and especially those which rulers and political leaders proclaimed for their own purposes. It will therefore pay us to look a little more closely at the changing patterns of relationship of various systems in all their individuality, and then compare them. 18THE ANCIENT STATES SYSTEMSPREFACE In this section I want to examine a number of systems of states in the ancient world: that is, the world before the rise of European civilization, It will not be possible, or necessary for our purpose, to examine every known system that binds together distinct political entities. We need to look at the more important and well-documented ones, and to cover a representative range of developed systems across our spectrum, from the most imperial integrated to the most fragmented clusters of multiple independences, in the same way that a general comparative study of states needs to extend from centralized and homogeneous examples to loosely federated and diverse ones. We begin in the atieient near ea with SURE) This is the earliest point at which the archaeological written record enables us to discern, with some difficulty, how a states system operated; and what we find which adapted Its successor, the ultimate classical synthesis; which in and. discussed at the beginning of the next section of the book. This succession of systems will enable us to examine the (ontinuity; how a system can inherit and adapt from its predecessors institutions and practices, specific ways of organizing the relations 21‘THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY between political entities, and also assumptions about what those relations were and ought to be. ‘Alongside this linked succession, we also examine two more distinct Asian systems: the ancient Indian, and the Chinese system of the warring states before the establishment of the Han Empire ke Indian sdieby OP Gialedis interesting because ofits elaborate indigenous development and Decase ul the dmpact on tof Persian and Macedonian practices. The impressive practices and theories of the Chinese system developed in Virtual isolation. These two systems will provide a useful basis of comparison with the near eastern succession. ‘When examining these ancient systems, we shall need to bear in mind two sets of fundamental questions that are also relevant to the European system and are of topical concern today. The first set concerns The second set of questions concerns hegemonial and imperial Does the evidence of the ancient systems support the generalization that all such authority curbs independent freedom of action but is in turn limited by anti-imperial and anti-hegemonial strivings for greater autonomy? In this context we shall need to remember how limited a degree of imperial coercion was practicable in ancient times, ‘We shall also assess the evidence for a pendulum effect, holding ancient societies towards the centre of the spectrum as they tightened and loosened over time. To what extent was there a propensity to hegemony in systems of comparatively independent states, and a propensity to autonomy in ‘more imperial ones? Also, in so far as there were dominant or hegemonial ‘powers in the ancient systems, how far were they political entities at the centre of the civilization and the system, and how far were they less civilized but more vigorous marcher communities? Our examination of the evidence will also throw light on other concepts formulated in Chapter 1. We will be concerned with legitimacy in ancient societies of states. The authority which the conventions and 2PREFACE institutions of a society, both formal and informal, were able to command, the degree of continuity of a society with its predecessors, and the degree of cultural affinity of its members, all helped to determine its legitimacy, What was the relation between the comparatively stable legitimacy of a changing and developing society of states, and the more rapidly evolving practice, concerned with expediency and the balance of material advantage? How did the legitimacies of individual member communities of the society, as opposed to those of the society asa whole, affect the society's stability? In Chapter 12 we will consider what answers can be given to these questions, and what their implications are for a theoretical understanding of states systems.