HEDONISM and the PLEASURELESS LIFE

In PlatoÕs Philebus

GABRIELA ROXANA CARONE

ABSTRACT
This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the Philebus.
According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure,
or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken
the Òmixed lifeÓ of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the Philebus
to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral
condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly,
scholars such as Irwin have seen the PhilebusÕ arguments against false pleasures
as an actual attack on hedonism, showing in IrwinÕs words Òwhy maxi-
mization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life.Ó Against
these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented
in the Philebus as a rst best and not just as a second best for humans, and that,
accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate rather than reject pleasure as
one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I o er alternative
readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpre-
tation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures
are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that PlatoÕs argu-
ments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedo-
nism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order
to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not
fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this
cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intel-
ligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves.

How friendly or hostile was Plato to hedonism? This question has long
divided interpreters of Plato. As a matter of fact, his dialogues seem to
o er the most diverse suggestions. On the one hand, Plato has Socrates
argue for hedonism in the Protagoras,1 which might make the reader think
that, at least at this point of his career, he does take pleasure to be the
good or the supreme good. On the other hand, in the Gorgias he has
Callicles defend and Socrates attack a hedonistic position. 2 In the Phaedo
the pleasures associated with the body are seen as distractions from a

Accepted April 2000

1
Prot. 351b-358d.
2
Gorgias 493d-501c.

2000 Phronesis XLV/4

258 GABRIELA R. CARONE

purely philosophical pursuit, 3 and the Republic emphasizes that the Good
cannot be pleasure.4 Yet he is there also willing to argue that the philo-
sophical life is the pleasantest, and that virtue should be pursued both for
its own sake (as mental health) and for its pleasurable consequences. 5
Plato undertakes his lengthiest, although intricate, treatment of pleasure in
his later dialogue Philebus, where Socrates submits the argument that the
good or happy life cannot be one of intellect alone, nor one of pleasure
alone, but it must consist of a mixture of both. Even though this would
seem to show a side of Plato which is somehow friendly to hedonism,
and, for that matter, sensitive to the nuances of being human, recent inter-
preters have queried the strength of SocratesÕ concession in the Philebus.
Thus, D. Frede among others contends that Socrates allows pleasure in
the happy life only as a second best, the rst best being one of a neutral
condition, where one would experience no pleasure or pain. 6 And T. Irwin
takes the considerable length Plato devotes to dealing with false pleasures
as an actual attack on hedonism, showing Òwhy maximization of pleasure
cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life.Ó7
Since these views have become pretty much representative of the cur-
rent state of the question on the subject of hedonism and the role of pleas-
ure in the happy life in the Philebus, I think it is important to reopen the
discussion in order to assess whether the arguments presented for them
are conclusive. I believe they are not. Thus, in this paper I undertake to
challenge the interpretations I have just outlined, and present a view of
the Philebus by which the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is one
to which Socrates is seriously committed throughout the whole dialogue,
as a rst best and not just as a second best for humans. Accordingly, his
attitude to hedonism is not so much one of rejection as one of incorpora-
tion into a larger picture of the happy life, which will include genuine

3
Phaedo 64e-69d.
4
Republic VI 505b-c.
5
See below, p. 274.
6
D. Frede, ÒDisintegration and Restoration: Pleasure and Pain in PlatoÕs Philebus,Ó
in The Cambridge Companion to Plato, R. Kraut, ed. (Cambridge, 1992), 440 and
Plato. Philebus (Indianapolis, 1993), xliii. See also J.C.B. Gosling, Plato: Philebus
(Oxford, 1975), 103, 225. Compare C. Hampton, Pleasure, Knowledge and Being
(Albany, 1990), 65.
7
T. Irwin, PlatoÕs Ethics (Oxford, 1995), 329; compare also Frede 1992, 443 and
448. Along similar lines, M. Nussbaum takes Socrates in the Philebus to be claiming
that pleasures cannot be ranked by a quantitative standard. Cf. M. Nussbaum, The
Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, 1986), 462 n. 58.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 259

pleasure as one of its intrinsically desirable aspects. While the mixed life
put forward in the Philebus is certainly not one purely measured by hedo-
nistic standards, it still remains possible to argue for it on hedonistic grounds,
a strategy to which Plato was not blind in the Philebus. In order to back
up this thesis, my paper is divided into two main sections. First, I show
that a neutral state of absence of pleasure or pain is not the most desir-
able life for Socrates. Second, I argue that PlatoÕs arguments against false
pleasures do not constitute by themselves an attack on hedonism. Conversely,
I demonstrate that the reasons Plato may have had for arguing against
false pleasures are to be taken seriously by hedonists themselves. In this
way it will become clear why Plato should have reservations about false
pleasures while still allotting pleasure an indispensable role for happiness.

I. The neutral condition and happiness in the Philebus

Let us then start by considering the way the dialogue proposes the mixed
life for the rst time. Socrates and Protarchus are each trying to point out
Òa state and disposition of the soul which can bring about the happy life
for all human beingsÓ (11d4-6).8 Protarchus initially contends such is the
condition of pleasure; Socrates, that of wisdom, though they agree that if
another life is found superior to both, then that candidate will win which
is most akin to it (11d-12a). Further, at 20c-d it is agreed that the good
is complete (t¡leon), su cient (ßkanñn) and the goal of human choice and
pursuit which makes such a life choiceworthy (aßretñw, 21e4); under this
light, however, neither the life of wisdom nor the life of pleasure seem to
ful l these criteria if taken in isolation. For one would not like to feel
pleasure without having memory or knowledge, true opinion, or calcula-
tion (21a-d), nor would Òanyone choose to live possessing wisdom and
intelligence and knowledge and complete memory of all things, but to
have no share in pleasure, either great or small, nor indeed of pain, but
to be completely insensate (Žpay®w) to all such thingsÓ (21d9-e2). From
this passage it would seem clear that Socrates in the Philebus is far from
the later Stoic ideal of insensitivity (Žp‹yeia) when putting forward his
ideal of a human life, as one which satis es the criteria of completeness,
su ciency and choiceworthiness for a human. If this is so, that is, if both
pleasure and intelligence are now regarded as essential constituents of the
good human life, the rest of the dialogue can be seen as an attempt to

8
Translations of Plato are my own and follow the text established by J. Burnet,
Platonis Opera (Oxford, 1900-5).
260 GABRIELA R. CARONE

classify pleasure and knowledge in order to see which kinds of them ought
to play a role in the happy human life.
The interpretation just proposed, however, cannot be accepted without
further argument. For another line of interpretation would disagree and
contend that SocratesÕ move is rather more sinuous than I have expounded.
According to this view, the rest of the dialogue can be seen as a modi-
cation of, rather than as an elaboration upon, SocratesÕ initial claim at
21d-e. A sign of modi cation of, and even departure from, that claim
could be found at 32d-33c. Socrates has been arguing so far that pain can
be understood as a dissolution, and pleasure as the restoration, of the har-
mony of a living being; now, at 32d-33a, he considers a third, neutral,
condition, Òbesides the condition in which one is feeling pleasure or in
which one is in painÓ (32e9-33a1): a state where living beings su er no
destruction or restoration. Socrates adds: ÒYou know that there is nothing
to prevent one living in this way for one who has chosen the life of
thought,Ó since Òwe then said in our comparison of lives that there is no
need to feel pleasure great or small for the one who has chosen the life
of intelligence and thoughtÓ (33a8-9). The dialogue continues:
Soc: This might well be available for him, and perhaps there is nothing strange
if it is the most divine of all lives.
Pro: It is at any rate not likely that the gods experience either pleasure or the
opposite.
Soc: Indeed it is not. The occurrence of each of them is something quite unbe-
coming. But we shall examine this question later on if it is relevant for our
argument, and we shall make it a consideration in support of intelligence for the
second prize, even if we cannot do so for the rst prize.
Pro: Most de nitely. (33b6-c4)

Frede takes this passage to hint that Òpleasure is at best a remedial good
and that the state of pleasureless imperturbability is actually preferable,Ó
and on this she agrees with other interpreters of the dialogue. 9 In support
of this claim, Frede makes two others:
1. SocratesÕ contention at 21e that a life without pleasure is not desirable
for a human being was only an initial concession to Protarchus for the
sake of argument, and Òpart of the work of the critical part of the dia-
logue is to undermine that agreement.Ó

9
Frede 1993, xliii. A similar claim is made by Gosling (1975, 103): Òwe get the
suggestion that pleasure is only part of the good for man, and only because man is
an inferior sort of being. It would be better to be a god, and so better to be able to
live a perfect life without pleasure.Ó See also Hampton 1990, 65 and below in n. 10.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 261

2. What shows pleasure to be a second best to a neutral condition is the

dialogueÕs later treatment (at 53c .) of pleasure as a process of genera-
tion (g¡nesiw) by contrast with proper being (oésÛa).10
I shall proceed to show these claims are unsupported, and that pleas-
ureÕs being at best a remedial good does not follow from a close reading
of the dialogue, nor do FredeÕs claims about its inherently low meta-
physical status. My argument will consist, rst, in situating passages which
might suggest otherwise in context, and providing evidence that Plato
does consider the most desirable life (and not just a second best life) to
include at least some pleasures: on these, I shall show, he is also ready
to confer some divine status and some place even in a god-like life. Next,
I shall address some of the metaphysical assumptions on which FredeÕs
second claim rests in order to prove their inadequacy. In all cases, it will
become obvious that one cannot ignore fundamental distinctions between
various classes of pleasures (such as pure and impure ones), against
FredeÕs indiscriminate treatment of all pleasure as a process of replenish-
ment of a lack and therefore as at best a remedial good.
1. Pleasure and the best life. We have seen so far that 20c-21e pre-
sents an argument for pleasure being an essential part of the best life; this
claim, however, seems countered by the later claim at 32d-33c that the
most divine life would be a pleasureless one. One way to remove this
apparent contradiction would then be to take this latter passage as a cor-
rection of the previous claim, as Frede does. Now, if this were the case,
one would expect Socrates to hold consistently to the end of the dialogue
that the Žpay®w life is indeed the most desirable one. Yet it is not this,
but the opposite, that we nd at the end of the Philebus. After an exten-
sive treatment of pleasure and critique of some sorts of it, at 60c Socrates
refers back to the conclusion of the previous discussion at 21e-22b that
neither a life of pure pleasure nor a life of pure knowledge would be Òmost
completely su cientÓ (ßkanòn teleÅtaton 60c4), and he adds: ÒIf we went
astray in any way then, let anyone at all now reconsider and speak more
correctlyÓ (60d3-4). And it is once more con rmed that Òwhat is complete
and choiceworthy for all and altogether good would be neither of these:Ó
again, no one would choose to have wisdom without any pleasure, even

10
Frede 1993, xliii; see also her ÒThe HedonistÕs Conversion: The Role of Socrates
in the Philebus,Ó in C. Gill and M.M. McCabe (eds.), Form and Argument in Late
Plato (Oxford, 1996), 236-7. Cf. Hampton 1990, who also takes all pleasures to be
gen¡seiw (75), and who thinks that Plato is defending a life of neutral condition over
the mixed life (120, n. 28).
262 GABRIELA R. CARONE

the slightest, rather than with some pleasures, or indeed would choose all
pleasures in isolation from wisdom rather than accompanied by some wis-
dom (60e1-61a2). That Plato is referring to the best life (and not simply
making a compromise given our imperfect condition) is highlighted by his
use of the superlative when he talks of Òthe most beloved lifeÓ (tòn
Žgaphtñtaton bÛon ), which is said to include at least some pleasures,
namely the pure ones (61e6-9). In addition, these pure pleasures (whose
essence consists in freedom from pain, cf. 66c4) are, at the end of the dia-
logue, explicitly distinguished from the ÒnecessaryÓ ones (62e6-9). All this
takes us far from FredeÕs suggestion that all pleasure is at best a reme-
dial good, and suggests, on the contrary, that at least some pleasures can
be intrinsically good, insofar as the grounds for pursuing them are not
merely instrumental to something else. If this is so, then PlatoÕs argument
is not simply that, given that we are human, we cannot help experiencing
pleasure, but rather that it perfects and ful ls our nature to pursue certain
pleasures.
Now, even granting the force of the above arguments, one could still
wonder what sense to make of 32d-33c. For Socrates does seem to sug-
gest there that a life without pleasure or pain would be Òthe most divine,Ó
and he does seem to deny that Òthe gods feel either pleasure or its oppo-
site.Ó I think however that the apparent challenge introduced by this
passage disappears as soon as one situates it in its context, which is a dis-
cussion of mixed pleasures: he has just analysed cases such as drinking
when thirsty, where pleasure arises from the restoration, and pain from
the disruption, of the harmony of a living being (31e-32a), and is about
to consider pleasures and pains of anticipation (33d .); in any case, he
has still a long way to go before he even reaches the point of analysing
the nature of true pleasures (which he does at 51b .). Indeed, the whole
passage is introduced with an explicit premiss: Òif what was just said is
true, and pain consists in dissolutions, and pleasure is a restorationÓ (32d9-
e2), then there might be a third life which is more divine. If this is so,
we can then understand why it might be suggested 11 that the gods do not

11
Though note that even here the suggestion is pretty tentative. For Socrates says
that Òperhaps (àsvw) there is nothing strange if it is the most divine of all lives,Ó and
Protarchus points out (and Socrates agrees) that Òit is at any rate not likely (oëkoun
eÞkñw ge) that the gods experience pleasure or the oppositeÓ (33b6-9). One should take
in a similarly tentative way the early passage at 22c5-6, where Socrates suggests that
divine nous might be the good, even if his (human) nous isnÕt: the end of the dialogue
will anyway make clear that Nous with no distinction between human and divine
is not the good, even though it is most akin to it (64e ., see esp. 65a7-b2). The Òthird
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 263

experience pleasure or pain: i.e., they do not experience mixed pleasures

or pain, where each condition arises out of the preceding one.12
In addition, the Philebus presents positive evidence that Plato associ-
ates at least some pleasures with the divine. At 51e1 Socrates treats the
pleasures of smell as a Òless divine classÓ (¸tton yeÝon g¡now), therefore
suggesting that there is a divine class of pleasures. Further, he treats one
kind of knowledge, concerned with objects such as the Òdivine sphere
itself,Ó as itself divine (62a8, b4), after having pointed out that such kind
of knowledge is typically accompanied by a pure pleasure (52a-b), while
Phil. 63e3-4 reasserts that pure pleasures are Òpretty much properÓ to
knowledge.
Further, let us recall that the life of Òpurest possible thoughtÓ (55a7-8)
belongs to Òthe most divine of all livesÓ (33b7-8): this indicates not only
that the gods perform thinking, but also that the gods have life (cf. 33a7-
b10). Now, if god is a living being (as suggested by these passages, and
as any god having mind would be),13 then god should also, we may presume,

lifeÓ (with no pleasure or pain, but the purest possible thought) reappears at 55a5-8,
but there too the discussion concerns mixed pleasures: see below, pp. 264-270.
12
Interestingly, the denial that the gods feel pleasure-and-pain occurs in the
Philebus precisely after the cosmological passage and the allusion to ZeusÕ royal soul
at 30d1. Thus, it is likely that Plato is in the Philebus, as elsewhere, trying to rede ne
the nature of the Olympians and the very nature of god. Passages from other dialogues
support the thought that the gods do not experience mixed pleasures or pains, and that
it would be unbecoming (sxhmon 33b10) for them to do so. First, they do not expe-
rience disintegrations or restorations caused by external agents. So, in the Timaeus,
where the universe itself is called ÒgodÓ (34b1, 92c7), we are told that such a living
god is complete (zÒon t¡leon 32d1), and there is nothing outside the universe that
might make it age or perish or, for that matter, feel pain (32c-33d): the universe
never gets thirsty or hungry as we do. Further, the gods will also be free from mixed
pleasures of the soul, such as envy (fyñnow) discussed at Phil. 48b .: cf. Tim. 29e1-2,
Phaedrus 247a7. But they will still experience pure pleasures: cf. Tim. 37c6-d1 and
below, n. 14.
13
This evidence is con rmed by other passages in the Philebus: cf. 30d1-2 for Zeus
having a kingly soul; and 29a-30d for the divine universe itself being an organism
composed of body and soul. For evidence in other dialogues, see, for example, Laws
X 899b7-9 for gods being called zÒa, and compare with Tim. 30d3, 32d1, 92c7 and
40a-d for the godly universe or the heavenly bodies as alive. Similarly, at Phaedrus
245c-e ÒsoulÓ is said to be the self-moving principle of life in an organism, and at
246b6-c2 is said to Òtake care of all the inanimate,Ó in a way that includes the Òper-
fectÓ soul of the gods, which Òrule the whole cosmos.Ó On the general issue of god
in PlatoÕs late dialogues see my La noci—n de dios en el Timeo de Plat—n, Buenos
Aires, 1991, passim and esp. pp. 84-99 for more discussion of god as living being.
Also, for nous implying life compare Sophist 249a4.
264 GABRIELA R. CARONE

be included in the general claim, presented at the beginning and con rmed
at the end of the dialogue, that neither the life of intellect only nor that
of pleasure only qualify as the good that would be chosen by Òevery liv-
ing beingÓ (psi . . . zÐoiw 22b5; cf. 60c-d). If, then, the gods do experi-
ence pleasure,14 they will be a model for humans precisely in the sense
that the quality of godÕs experience is better, rather than substantially di
erent, from ours: there is thus no gap between gods and humans. 15 In this
way we can understand why Plato would treat humans and gods conjointly
in his ethical discussion, as for example when trying to decide, at the end
of the Philebus, whether pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest
good and of greater value Òamong humans and godsÓ (65b1-2).
2. Pleasure and g¡nesiw. I have argued so far that PlatoÕs rst best happy
life is one including at least some pleasures, and not a pleasureless one,
as claimed by Frede and others. I have shown in that context that at least
pure pleasures will be capable of being intrinsically good, and that Plato
considers it possible to view them under an unquali edly positive light.
We must now address FredeÕs contention that pleasure cannot in itself be
good insofar as pleasure (without exception) is a becoming or g¡nesiw. To
back up her claim, Frede cites the contraposition between g¡nesiw and
oésÛa at 54c-d (where it seems to be denied that becomings may inher-
ently be good), and the broader passage at 53c-55c, where Socrates
appears to be treating all pleasure as a g¡nesiw. My strategy here will con-
sist in examining the context and intent of these passages, together with
any other metaphysical and cosmological assumptions that Plato may be
employing in his analysis of pleasure, in order to show that it is not true
that pleasure as such is treated as a mere g¡nesiw in the Philebus and that
therefore it is not true that pleasure as such cannot be good. This will in
turn take us to a deeper elucidation of the nature of pure pleasures and
PlatoÕs real stand with regard to anti-hedonism in the Philebus.
I suggest that we should take with a pinch of salt the treatment that
Socrates makes of pleasure as a g¡nesiw at 53c-55c. Even though this char-
acterization has been taken by interpreters to form part of the de nition

14
For the gods experiencing pleasure in other dialogues, see e.g. Tim. 37c6-d1:
ÒWhen the father that had created it [= the universe] viewed it in motion and alive,
as a generated image of the eternal gods, he rejoiced and was pleased (±g‹syh te kaÜ
eéfranyeÛw), and so he undertook to make it even more similar to the model.Ó
15
This is again con rmed in the cosmological section, where the universe is said
to contain all the same elements as us, but in a manner which is Òin every way nerÓ
(Phil. 30a6-7). Pace Gosling 1975, 103.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 265

of pleasure to the point that Frede thinks that all pleasures in the Phi-
lebus can be described as ÒprocessesÓ of replenishment of wastage 16 one
should however pay attention to the hypothetical mode in which the whole
passage is put, and to the fact that Socrates does not express any com-
mitment to that thesis. Instead, he starts by asking: ÒHave we not heard
about pleasure that it is always becoming and that pleasure has no being
at all? There are certain clever people (komcoÛ) who try to declare this
argument to us, and we should be grateful to themÓ (53c4-7). Here is
Socrates, while seemingly nding the theory helpful, nonetheless main-
taining a certain distance by putting it into the mouth of others, namely
the komcoÛ.
In this context, oésÛa is said to belong to the kind of thing that is by
nature noblest (semnñtaton) and itself by itself (aétò kayƒ aêtñ), whereas
g¡nesiw belongs to the kind that is inferior to that one (¤llip¢w ¤keÛnou)
and desiring some other thing (¤fi¡menon llou): whereas the latter always
exists for the sake of something, the former is the end for the sake of
which the latter comes into being (53d-e). In this sense, becoming or gen-
eration (g¡nesiw) is for the sake of being (oésÛaw §neka), not vice versa, as
shipbuilding is for the sake of ships (54a-b). The end pertains to the cat-
egory of the good, whereas Òthat which comes to be for the sake of some-
thing should be placed in a di erent categoryÓ (54c9-11). And the result
is that Òpleasure, if it really is becoming (²don® ge, eàper g¡nesiw ¤stin),
would necessarily come to be for the sake of some being.Ó And Òif pleas-
ure really is becoming (²don® ge, eàper g¡nesiw ¤stin), then we shall be
placing it correctly if we place it in a category other than that of the goodÓ
(54c6-7, d1-2).
Note here the conditional manner in which Socrates treats pleasure as
generation: he never actually commits himself to such a thesis, 17 though
he reiterates the usefulness of it insofar as it Òmakes a mockery of those
who claim that pleasure is goodÓ and of Òthose who nd ful lment in gen-
erations,Ó such as thirst and hunger and other a ections, and say they would

16
See Frede 1992, 440, 448 and 454-5; cf. Hampton 1990, 74 and 122 n. 37.
17
In this regard, FredeÕs (1993) translation of eàper as ÒsinceÓ in the passages
highlighted above misleadingly suggests commitment. By contrast Hackforth (1945,
105-6) rightly notices the hypothetical character of the passage. For Hackforth, the
recurrence of the phrase ²don® ge eàper g¡nesiw ¤stin is Òintended to show that the
whole argument is provisional or tentative, and that Plato does not endorse . . . the pre-
miss with which it starts; but he is grateful to its authors . . . because it leads to a con-
clusion with which he agrees, namely that pleasure cannot, as Philebus thinks, be the
good for man.Ó
266 GABRIELA R. CARONE

not choose to live without them if they could not experience all those
things which follow these a ections (54e). What is particularly ridiculous
in that picture is that, since the opposite of generation is destruction, these
people Òwould be choosing destruction and generation, instead of that
third life in which there was no pleasure or pain, but the purest possible
thoughtÓ (55a5-8). 18
This whole passage, then, seems to be aimed at ruling out the possi-
bility that pleasure as a generic kind can constitute the good, as the hedo-
nist (represented by Philebus and Protarchus, 13b7, 60a9, 66d7) would
claim. Pleasure cannot be the good if it pertains to the realm of g¡nesiw;
if pleasure were the only good, then one would be good or bad not accord-
ing to the virtues, but according to whether one is experiencing pleasure
or pain, with the absurd consequence that the best of men would be bad
when experiencing pain (55b; cf. Gorgias 498a-499b). Exploring the the-
ory that pleasure is a g¡nesiw is therefore a useful anti-hedonist tool to
de ate any hedonistic pretence to erect pleasure as the only good. Yet
does Socrates want to apply this theory which he has presented as the
arguments of the komcoÛ to the whole of his treatment of pleasure in the
Philebus?
The answer to the latter question should be no. We should note that
Plato introduces his contraposition between g¡nesiw and oésÛa, with the
critique of pleasures as gen¡seiw that comes with it, precisely after his
introduction of pure pleasures at 50e .:
Soc: Naturally after the mixed pleasures we should proceed in turn by some
necessity to the unmixed . . . For I am not at all persuaded by those who claim
that all pleasures are a cessation of pains, but, as I said, I use them as witnesses
regarding the fact that certain things seem to be pleasures but are not pleasures
at all, and that certain pleasures appear at the same time great and numerous,
but are in reality all mixed together with pains and cessations of the greatest
woes and confusion of body and soul.
Pro: But which ones, Socrates, might one rightly suppose to be true?
Soc: Those concerning what are called ne colours, and shapes, and most pleas-
ures of smell, and those of [hearing] distinct sounds, and all those whose lacks
are unperceived and painless, and provide perceived and pleasant ful lments,
which are free from pain [such as the pleasures of knowledge, cf. 52a-b] (50e5-
51b7).

18
This passage too has suggested to people such as Hampton (1990, 120 n. 28)
that Plato is defending the life of neutral condition over the mixed life, on the grounds
that all pleasure is a g¡nesiw for Plato (cf. 1990, 74); a premiss however which I call
to question here.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 267

After expanding on these various kinds of pure pleasure,19 and separating

them from mixed or impure pleasures, he next adds:
. . . Òintense pleasures have disproportion (ŽmetrÛa), whereas the pure ones, on
the contrary, have proportion (¤mmetrÛa) . . . And those which admit of the big
and intense, and often or sometimes become such, we shall put into the class of
that in nite (ŽpeÛrou) which uctuates more or less through both body and soul;
the latter, by contrast, we shall put into the class of proportionate things (tŒw d¢
m¯ tÇn ¤mm¡trvn).Ó (52c3-d1)

This passage inserts the current discussion of pleasure within the onto-
logical framework of the earlier discussion at 23c ., where the class of
tò peiron had been distinguished by its lack of limit or completion (cf.
Žtel° 24b8), and said to be always Òbecoming more and lessÓ (24e7-8):
it Ò ows and doesnÕt restÓ (proxvreÝ kaÜ oé m¡nei 24d4), by contrast with
the class of limit (p¡raw) which, by introducing proportion or measure
(m¡tron 25a6-b2), is Òat restÓ (24d5). What important consequences does
this have for our interpretation of the komcoÛ passage at 53c-55c?
It seems, in the light of 52c3-d1, that the arguments of the komcoÛ, treat-
ing pleasure as a g¡nesiw, are well suited to pleasures that belong to the
class of tò peiron, which, by its uctuating nature, Òappears to become

19
As shown by my translation above, at 51b3-7 I take the succession of kaÜ . . .
kaÜ . . . kaÜ as a simple enumeration of examples, in turn displayed by the passage that
follows. Thus, at 51c1-d3 we are told more about the pleasures of beauty of form and
colour; at 51d6-9, about those of ne sounds; at 51e1-4, about those of smell, and at
51e7-52b8 the pleasures of learning are given as an example of pure pleasures as long
as they do not originate in painful hunger for learning. (For an interpretation along
these lines, see Hackforth 1945, 98-9.) By contrast, Frede translates 51b5-7 as follows:
pure pleasures are Òthose that are related to so-called pure colors and to shapes
and to most smells and sounds and in general all those that are based on impercepti-
ble and painless lacks, while their ful llments are perceptible and pleasantÓ (1993, 60,
my italics). From this, she infers that: (i) since all pure pleasures are llings of a lack,
then the gods could not feel them (1992, 440; 1996, 235-6); and (ii) for the same rea-
son, all pure pleasures too must be processes of lling, or gen¡seiw (1993, 60 n. 2).
Against (i), let us note that no Òin generalÓ is mandated by the Greek, so one neednÕt
commit to the thesis that all pure pleasures are llings of a lack. In any case, and
against (ii), we should add that pl®rvsiw at 51b6 does not need to mean a mere
ÒprocessÓ of lling, but it can also mean a result, or a Òstate,Ó of ful lment (as con-
veyed by the ambiguity of the su x -siw, which in ancient Greek can refer both to a
process and to a result). This interpretation, as I shall show below, proves to be more
congenial to the rest of the PhilebusÕ suggestions about the nature of true pleasures.
For another view against the treatment of all pleasures as replenishments of lacks in
the Philebus see Gosling 1975, 122-3 ad 51e7-52b8; J.C.B. Gosling and C.C.W.
Taylor, The Greeks on Pleasure (Oxford, 1982), 138-9.
268 GABRIELA R. CARONE

more and lessÓ (faÛnhtai mllñn te kaÜ ¸tton gignñmena 24e7-8; cf. 24b).
It is the Calliclean kind of hedonism that the passage is clearly attacking,
and with which Plato is not willing to compromise. The insatiability of
those pleasures seems to be rooted in the fact that they gain intensity pre-
cisely insofar as they come along with painful lacks (cf. Gorgias 493d .);
therefore, anyone who chooses those pleasures (as gen¡seiw) would also
be choosing their opposite, pain and destruction (fyor‹ 55a5). Insofar as
tò peiron is Žtel° (24b8, cf. 31a) it becomes obvious why it should be
ridiculous to attempt to nd ÒcompletionÓ (cf. Žpoteloum¡nvn 54e2) in
forms of generation; it is by contrast p¡raw that achieves completion or
perfection (cf. teleÅtata 26a4). However, we have seen that PlatoÕs intro-
duction of pure pleasures in the dialogue marks a substantial turn in his
attitude towards pleasure.20 Insofar as pure pleasures have ¤mmetrÛa, they
have p¡raw and therefore stability (cf. 24d5, 26d9, 25a6-b3, 26b2); now,
¤mmetrÛa or summetrÛa is precisely, at the end of the dialogue, one of the
aspects in which the good is manifested: ÒFor measure and proportion turn
out to be everywhere beauty and goodnessÓ (metriñthw gŒr kaÜ summetrÛa
k‹llow d®pou kaÜ Žret¯ pantaxoè sumbaÛnei gÛgnesyai 64e6-7, cf. 65a). As
opposed to intense mixed pleasures, which are mere Òbecomings,Ó one can
then treat pure pleasures as conveying a state of completion, thus enjoy-
ing the stability of its internal structure and/or of its object21 and qualify-
ing as a candidate for some kind of oésÛa.22 In this sense, at least some

20
This is congenial with SocratesÕ initial resistance in the dialogue to treating pleas-
ure as an undiscriminated unity, and his insistence on the need to apply the method
of division to it (12b-13d). This method will take him beyond his initial treatment of
pleasure as peiron at 27e, which seemed very much introduced as a concession to
Protarchus (28a3-4), after he had anyway made it clear that he was referring to pleas-
ures unmixed with limit (meiktow 27e1).
21
Nussbaum (1985, 148-50) comments that the criterion of ¤mmetrÛa captures Òthe
absence of internal ebb and owÓ; at 59c ¤mmetrÛa (which she loosely translates as
ÒstabilityÓ) Òis explicitly listed, along with purity (unmixedness) and truth, as a mark
of value.Ó Stability, she analyses, can be understood in two di erent ways: one, as the
feature intrinsic to the activity; second, as a feature proper to the object of the activ-
ity. So pure pleasures are stable in either of these two ways, or in both. ÒOn the rst
account, smelling a rose will be stable in spite of the transience of roses, whereas on
the second it will not.Ó The pleasure of intellectual activity, for its part, is stable in
both senses (148-9).
22
That the distinction between becoming (g¡nesiw) and being (oésÛa) at 53c-54d is
mainly, or at least includes, one between process and result seems clear from the
respective examples of shipbuilding and ships. While I donÕt rule out that the passage
might also leave room for a more metaphysically loaded distinction between being and
becoming, I do think that Plato is here, as in the whole of the Philebus, somehow
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 269

pleasures will be capable of being intrinsically good, if, as Socrates

argues, it is being, as the goal of becoming, that pertains Òto the category
of the goodÓ (54c10). 23 Let us note also that pure pleasures are included
in PlatoÕs nal ranking of goods (66c4-6). If pure pleasures were regarded
as mere gen¡seiw, then they could not gure in that list of goods, since Òif
pleasure really is becoming, then we shall be placing it correctly if we
place it in a category other than the goodÓ (54d1-2). 24 PlatoÕs treatment

extending his notion of ÒbeingÓ to include not just transcendent Forms (if it were the
case that they are postulated in the Philebus, a question whose answer either way
leaves my main claim untouched), but also things in the phenomenal world having
p¡raw, or even p¡raw itself, as conveying some kind of stability (cf. e.g. Phil. 27b8-9
which treats the mixture as a gegenhm¡nh oésÛa, and 24d5 for p¡raw being stable). In
this latter sense things like pure pleasures can belong to the realm of oésÛa. Further,
the possibility that in the Philebus the sensible world is in radical ux (by being always
changing and never at rest) must be dismissed, despite the suggestion at 43a3 that
ŽeÜ . . . ‘panta nv te kaÜ k‹tv =eÝ. Note that this theory is attributed by Socrates to
Protarchus, as if the hedonism initially submitted by him were committed to an onto-
logical theory of ux; an argument however from which Socrates wants to escape
(43a8), and which he concedes only for the sake of argument, to show how, even on
that premiss, they must come back to his original suggestion that there is such a state
as being free from pleasure-and-pain in the body (43c-e): pace R. Mohr, ÒPhilebus
55c-62a and Revisionism,Ó Canadian Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. IX (1983),
169. For more discussion on being and becoming in the Philebus see R. Shiner, Knowl-
edge and Reality in PlatoÕs Philebus (Assen, 1974), 67-8; R. Bolton, ÒPlatoÕs Distinction
between Being and Becoming,Ó Review of Metaphysics 29 (1975), 84-5; R. Water eld,
ÒThe Place of the Philebus in PlatoÕs Dialogues,Ó Phronesis 25 (1980), 284-7;
H. Teloh, The Development of PlatoÕs Metaphysics (Pennsylvania, 1981), 179-88; E.E.
Benitez, Forms in PlatoÕs Philebus (Assen, 1989), 102-8.
23
It seems conceivable, from PlatoÕs example at 51e7-52b8, that experiences hav-
ing the same name (such as the pleasures of ÒdiscoveringÓ or Òknowing,Ó tŒw perÜ tŒ
may®mata ²don‹w, 51e7-52a1) may constitute either a pure or a mixed pleasure
depending on context: e.g. contemplating beauty is likely to provide a true pleasure to
the person who has reached the top of the ladder of love in the Symposium, but, pre-
sumably, it will still involve some felt dissatisfaction (and in that sense pain) for any-
one below on the ladder. Pure pleasures as a kind of undisturbed state must still
be distinguished from neutral conditions in that the former, unlike the latter, are accom-
panied, like any pleasure, by the soulÕs awareness (aàsyhsiw 43b-c, cf. 34a) of the
positive feeling it is undergoing. While the simple absence of pain is insu cient to
call something a pleasure (43d4-5), in the case of pure pleasures, by contrast, the soul
positively enjoys the state of ful lment they represent (51b) pace Frede 1992, 448,
453-4, who seems to regard all undisturbed states as neutral conditions.
24
Even though my claim here has focused on pure pleasures, I donÕt rule out that
it could extend to the other kinds of pleasures that Plato includes in the nal good,
such as the ÒnecessaryÓ pleasures, or those accompanying health and moderation (62e,
63e), insofar as, far from being in a raw state of ŽpeirÛa, they have become good
270 GABRIELA R. CARONE

of pure pleasures as a kind of good shows then that he does not mean all
pleasures to be gen¡seiw, so his theory of pleasure cannot be equated to
that of the komcoÛ.
Now, to grant that some pleasures can be intrinsically good does not
yet mean that Plato is falling back to the hedonistic position that pleasure
is the good. Two things, say, pure pleasures and pure knowledge, may
each be intrinsically good and yet they may individually not su ce to con-
stitute the good we are seeking when we talk about the happy human life.
Further, we have seen that what some people call ÒpleasuresÓ are in fact
complex situations in which only one part is actually pleasurable the
rest belonging to the opposite a ection; and so it would be wrong to call
those so-called pleasures Ògood.Ó But it seems at least clear that Plato is
very far from endorsing an unquali edly anti-hedonistic position. His cri-
tique of pleasures as gen¡seiw, when put in context, turns out to be a cri-
tique of only one kind of pleasure, even though it is certainly true that
such is the kind of pleasure about which Plato is most concerned, since
that is the kind of pleasure advocated by most people. In this regard, we
can explain why he must be referring to intense mixed pleasures (cf. Phil.
65e-66a) and, maybe a little unfairly, leaving out pure pleasures when
he later argues for the superiority of nous over pleasure with regard to
truth, measure and beauty (65b-66a). For it can easily be shown that pure
pleasures participate in those three aspects of the good, by being true pleas-
ures (51b1), proportionate (52d1) and ne (53c2). If one goes along with
the suggestion that pleasures are not bad Òexcept through being falseÓ
(40e9-10), and takes the disjunction between good and bad as exhaustive
with regard to pleasure (as Socrates seems to take it at 13a7-b3), then one
is back to the thought that true pleasures are in themselves good, and
again, not simply derivatively or remedially good. Let us then turn to an
analysis of the ways in which pleasures can be false, and what conse-
quences that has for PlatoÕs attitude to hedonism.

ÒmixturesÓ by the proper introduction of measure (for some mixed pleasures as mix-
tures cf. Hampton, 1990, 7; and above, n. 22, for the right mixture of p¡raw and °peiron
as one kind of oésÛa). With Cooper, I donÕt even rule out that certain pleasures, such
as eating, could be both ÒnecessaryÓ or derivatively good (insofar as their satisfaction
is a means to the ful lment of other goods, e.g. contemplation) and intrinsically good,
for the moderate person who can enjoy them qua having a limit. Cf. Cooper 1977,
717. For the possibility that something might be a good both derivatively and intrin-
sically in Plato, compare the examples of health and virtue in Rep. II 357b-358a,
where, interestingly, Òharmless pleasuresÓ which are included in the nal good at
Phil. 63a4 are presented as good in themselves (357b6-8).
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 271

II. False pleasures and hedonism in the Philebus

Now, we have said that for Plato pleasure cannot be the good, and that
all so-called pleasures cannot even be called ÒgoodÓ, mainly on the grounds
that there are false pleasures. The question to ask next, however, is
whether this kind of critique of false pleasure is meant to prove (as Irwin
has it) that hedonism is false as a strategy for eudaimonia. Do PlatoÕs argu-
ments against false pleasures really demolish a hedonistic argument that
would advise one to maximize the quantity of pleasure in oneÕs life if one
wishes to achieve happiness?
IrwinÕs argument is that Plato is far from endorsing the quantitative cri-
terion, since the quantitative criterion as such cannot ground what is di
erent between good and bad pleasures. PlatoÕs analysis of false pleasures,
according to Irwin, is devised as an objection to hedonism. If hedonistic
arguments could explain what is bad about the pursuit of false pleasures,
Òobjections to a life devoted to such pleasures would not constitute an
objection to hedonism.Ó Yet, according to Irwin, Plato is far from trying
to persuade the hedonist that lives aiming at various kinds of false pleas-
ures are to be dismissed on hedonistic grounds. On the contrary, it is
PlatoÕs task Òto show that there is something clearly bad about each of
these lives and that a hedonist cannot identify what is bad about them.Ó25
At this point Irwin employs dialectically certain philosophical arguments
to show how Plato could not accept hedonistic arguments in his discus-
sion of pleasure and the best life. For my part, I wish to query the strength
of such philosophical arguments and show, in addition, that the evidence
in the text is not only insu cient to prove IrwinÕs point, but can in fact
be seen to suggest the opposite. Even if one concedes to Irwin that there
are serious philosophical problems with a crude hedonism which is only
concerned with seizing the most pleasure available at one given moment,
one should note that this is not (or at least not all there is to) the hedo-
nism with which Socrates is confronted at the beginning of the dialogue;
since it is also agreed that hedonists and intellectualists are each going to
argue for a speci c state of the soul (§jin cux°w) that can bring about
the happy life (tòn bÛon eédaÛmona), which would possess such a feature
stably (bebaÛvw 11d4-6, e2).26 If this is part of the hedonistÕs project, I

25
Irwin 1995, 329.
26
This agreement is made between Socrates and Protarchus (who has taken over
the argument on behalf of hedonism from Philebus), without PhilebusÕ objecting. It is
interesting, however, that a little later, at 12a7-8, Philebus explicitly rejects SocratesÕ
proposal to subject both hedonism and intellectualism to a test, and stubbornly and
272 GABRIELA R. CARONE

contend that Plato does not, pace Irwin, need to be attacking hedonism
when he attacks false pleasures. Rather, I wish to show that we make most
sense of the text if we take such criticism as a strategy, on PlatoÕs part,
to show the hedonist that, in order to be a optimal hedonist, or even a
consistent hedonist, he or she should go for true, and not fake, pleasures,
if after all pleasure is the object of their pursuit. But since this cannot be
achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life is to be accepted even
by hedonists themselves.
So let us begin by looking a little more closely at IrwinÕs arguments.
He mentions a couple of reasons to show how quantitative hedonism fails
to di erentiate between good and bad pleasures, or, for that matter,
between true and false ones:
1. According to Irwin, Plato argues that the hedonist cannot give grounds
for preferring a life of virtue to a life of vice if the only criterion for pref-
erence is maximization of pleasure. ÒThis objection to quantitative hedo-
nism is rst presented in the Gorgias, where Plato suggests that if purely
quantitative considerations are all that matter, the cowardÕs pleasures may
be equal to, or greater than, those of the brave personÓ (497d-499b), in
which case cowardice would present no disadvantages over bravery.27
2. Plato emphasizes the importance of having right beliefs associated with
our pleasures for the latter to be true and choiceworthy. However, having
false beliefs is not something that would matter to a hedonist, except inso-
far as it could cause the pain of disappointment (as when one discovers,
e.g., that oneÕs pleasant expectations were ungrounded). But if such a pain
could be mitigated, or the discovery of truth avoided, then false beliefs
can be at least as good as true ones for the purposes of maximizating pleas-
ure. In sum, a hedonist has no arguments, coming from within hedonism
itself, to make a life without cognitive defects preferable to one based on

dogmatically asserts: Òit seems to me and it will always seem to me that pleasure wins,
at all costs ( p‹ntvw).Ó After that, Philebus withdraws from the discussion and
Protarchus will be the only spokesman for hedonism. PhilebusÕ early withdrawal has
already attracted attention in the literature (cf. Frede 1996, 218-20): one must note that
he withdraws without Socrates making the slightest attempt at keeping him as an inter-
locutor. This must suggest, inter alia, that Socrates cannot take Philebus seriously, and
that amenability to dialogue and readiness to argue for oneÕs views, as shown instead
by Protarchus, is a necessary prerequisite for this kind of elenchos and for hedonism
to be a proper theory. See also below, n. 30.
27
Irwin 1995, 331.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 273

cognitive deception, if the latter can obtain at least equal pleasure to the
former.28
With regard to 1., one could easily argue against a claim like IrwinÕs29
that the Gorgias example concerns only the immediate pleasure that is
available to both the coward and the brave, and does not concern a life
devoted to attaining the largest quantity of pleasure available. If the lat-
ter is the hedonistÕs concern, then it is still arguable that the brave obtains
more pleasure in his life overall than the coward does. In a passage rem-
iniscent of the Gorgias, Plato certainly has Socrates in the Philebus
exclaim:
IsnÕt it absurd that there is nothing good or ne either in bodies or in many other
things except in the soul, and that there only pleasure is good, whilst courage
and moderation and intelligence and any other of the good things which the soul
has are nothing of that sort? It is absurd furthermore to be forced into saying that
one who is not feeling pleasure but pain is bad at the very time when he is in
pain, even if he be the best of all, and that in turn the one feeling pleas-ure is
more distinguished in excellence the more he feels pleasure, at the very time
when he feels pleasure. (Phil. 55b1-c1)

One should note however that the absurdity here arises only insofar as
one identi es the good with the feeling of pleasure at a given period of
time (tñte ÷tan xaÛrú 55c1). Yet this was not the hedonistic claim at the
beginning of the dialogue, where Socrates and Protarchus were each rather
trying to point out Òa state and disposition of the soul which can bring
about the happy life for all human beingsÓ (11d4-6). It is clear, then, that
the initial hedonistic claim in the Philebus is not concerned with momen-
tary feelings of pleasure, but with pleasure as a good candidate for bring-
ing about the happy life (cf. also ŽeÜ diŒ bÛou z°n 22b6; and diŒ bÛou at
21b3). 30 From this latter point of view, then, even a committed hedonist
could argue that a person who feels pain at a certain moment can still be
virtuous because his virtue or goodness does not have to do with the
momentary feeling of pleasure or pain he experiences at that time, but
rather, with the overall quantity of pleasure he obtains in a lifetime.

28
Cf. Irwin 1995, 328-330.
29
As has been done by Gosling and Taylor in trying to make the GorgiasÕ attack
on hedonism consistent with the defence of quantitative hedonism in the Protagoras:
cf. Gosling and Taylor 1982, 74. See also G. Rudebusch, Socrates, Pleasure and Value
(Oxford, 1999), 24-5, for another congenial attempt at reconciling the Protagoras with
the Gorgias.
30
This important concession on the part of hedonism will also help explain why a
274 GABRIELA R. CARONE

Plato himself had ended up arguing in the Republic that the virtuous
person is one who will experience not less, but more pleasure than the
vicious one: The just person Òhas the pleasantest lifeÓ (583a3). Even though,
certainly, Plato is in the Republic far from maintaining that this is the only
argument for pursuing virtue, he certainly does consider pleasurable con-
sequences as one argument. This is already made clear at the very begin-
ning of Rep. II (357b-358a), where he argues that virtue must be pursued
both for itself and for its consequences. While book IV, in particular,
proves the rst point (virtue must be pursued for its own sake, as psychic
health, cf. 444a-445c), book IX contributes to proving the latter (in terms
of pleasure, cf. 580d .). So, as Annas points out, Plato is far from advo-
cating virtue on purely intrinsic grounds: he also makes use of conse-
quentialist arguments, as two distinct but still related aspects of a single
project.31 In like manner, I donÕt think Plato believes in the Philebus that
pleasure is all that matters in a happy life. For one must also include in
it wisdom and intelligence, which are treated as virtues (55b4, c5) and
said to share in the good for reasons that are in principle independent of
pleasure, so that we should honour them on their own grounds (64b-66a,
59d1-2). Yet, I wish to argue, pleasure is in the Philebus one of the desir-
able aspects of happiness, and even of virtue, as it was in the Republic,
and in this respect Plato does not want to exclude but rather to incorpo-
rate hedonistic tactics of argumentation into his overall description of the
happy life. This project goes hand in hand with his view of the best life
as one of intelligence allied with pleasure. For, as we have seen, without
pleasure such a life would not be desirable for a human being, nor com-
plete or su cient (21d-e, 60d-61a).

life of cognitive deception is not preferable or not even equally as good for the hedo-
nist. In this respect, see R. Kraut, ÒTwo Conceptions of Happiness,Ó Philosophical
Review 88 (1979), 177-9, whose argument can be seen as exactly supporting the point
I am making, contrary to the contention by Irwin (1995, 329 and 391 n. 24), who
seems to oversimplify the hedonistic position presented in the Philebus. It may cer-
tainly be true that Protarchus is not quite aware of the implications of his initial con-
cessions or agreements as a hedonist (e.g., he might not be aware that claiming that
pleasure can bring about the happy life is a very di erent theory from just claiming
that pleasure can bring about happy feelings); yet the whole dialogue can be seen as
an attempt by Socrates to make the position initially put forward by that hedonist
utterly consistent with itself.
31
See J. Annas, An Introduction to PlatoÕs Republic (Oxford, 1981), 60-64, 294,
318. Cf. also Laws II 662d-663d and V 732e-734e for PlatoÕs attempt at reconciling
a life of virtue with a life enjoying the most pleasure.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 275

If this is so, then we need to look more closely into PlatoÕs arguments
against false pleasures in order to assess how they can be grounded even
hedonistically and thus meet IrwinÕs second challenge (which consisted in
precisely querying that one could make oneÕs preference for true pleasures
rely on hedonistic considerations).
In essence, Plato distinguishes three or four kinds of false pleasures: (i)
false anticipatory pleasures (32b-40e); (ii) false pleasures due to error in
respect of their magnitude (41a-42c); (iii) false pleasures arising from a
misconception of the neutral condition (42c-44a). He thereafter discusses
mixed pleasures (44a-50e), which some interpreters group as a fourth kind
of false pleasures (namely, pleasures whose falsity arises from their
admixture with pain), even though Plato doesnÕt explicitly call them false
in that context. 32 Socrates nds the whole issue hard to introduce, since it
would seem to go counter to our ordinary intuition that, if one thinks one
is having a feeling, then one is genuinely having that feeling (36e).
SocratesÕ overall strategy will consist in treating pleasure not just as an
undiscriminated feeling, but as a propositional attitude. In other words,
pleasure and pain have facts or states of a airs, under a certain descrip-
tion, as their intentional objects: as Socrates himself would put it, thirst
is not simply a desire for drink, but for being lled with drink (34e13-
35a2). In this way, the particular belief that a person has with regard to
the object of pleasure and which makes her enjoy that object is not sim-
ply accidental to having that pleasure, but constitutive of it, if pleasure is
de ned as a mental attitude directed at a certain propositional content. 33
In this way falsity can infect a pleasure, insofar as what is being denied

32
Cf. Frede 1993, xlv-vi and Irwin 1995, 328-9 treating mixed pleasures as a fourth
kind of false pleasures. In one sense, it is eloquent that Plato should not call all mixed
pleasures straightforwardly false, since his main criticism will concern only one kind
of mixed pleasures, namely the intense ones, as opposed to the moderate ones which
are included in SocratesÕ nal listing of goods (see above, n. 24). In a second sense,
however, all mixed pleasures could be regarded as false insofar as they can all be seen
as having a propensity to mislead a person (particularly when she hasnÕt experienced
pure pleasure) in various directions, such as making her overestimate their size, or
think that they constitute unquali ed instances of pleasure when they donÕt. In this
second, strong sense Socrates privileges pure, unmixed pleasures as true (51b, 62e).
On this ambiguity see Cooper 1977, 723-4.
33
For discussions of false pleasures and their relation to false beliefs see B. Wil-
liams, ÒPleasure and Belief,Ó Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 33 (1959),
57-72; J. Dybikowski, ÒFalse Pleasure and the Philebus,Ó Phronesis 15 (1970), 147-
65; T. Penner, ÒFalse Anticipatory Pleasures,Ó Phronesis 15 (1970), 166-78; D. Frede,
ÒRumpelstiltskinÕs Pleasures: True and False Pleasures in PlatoÕs Philebus,Ó Phronesis
276 GABRIELA R. CARONE

is not that the person has a feeling, but that such a feeling is being had
about a true proposition. This is how Socrates can explain false anticipa-
tory pleasures: If someone looks forward to ful lling a dream that will
not come true, thinking that it will, then oneÕs pleasure is false insofar as
it is had (however truly) about an object under a false description. Cf. e.g.
40d7-10: ÒThe one who feels pleasure in any way whatsoever, always
really feels pleasure, but sometimes it is not directed to real things in the
present or past, but often, and even perhaps mostly, it is directed to things
which are never going to come about.Ó
Now, Irwin contends, with regard to this argument, that no hedonist
could be persuaded to avoid false anticipatory pleasures on purely hedo-
nistic grounds. For a hedonist could still want to go for false pleasures as
long as he or she could mitigate the pain caused by disappointment, or
could avoid nding out the truth in certain circumstances.34 How could a
proponent of SocratesÕ argument persuade the hedonist in this dialogue that
it is not a good hedonic strategy to pursue false anticipatory pleasures?
The argument might run in several complementary ways. First, one
could remind the hedonist that what he is seeking is the most pleasurable
life available (see, again, Phil. 11d4-6 and 22b6). 35 For that, certainly,
intelligence needs to calculate pleasures versus pains. Even Irwin con-
cedes this instrumental role of intelligence for the hedonist: Òthe rational
person planning her life can follow simple rules prescribed by intelligence,
with the aim of maximizing the balance of pleasure over painÓ.36 Now,
it is precisely on calculative grounds for maximizing pleasure that one
could argue that nding out the truth is always preferable to being igno-
rant of it. One could argue, rst, that the person who is not likely to su
er disappointment would be more likely to enjoy more overall pleasure.
Second, any method that someone might nd to shun or mitigate the pain
of disappointment would be comparable to medicines one has to take to
avoid feeling sick after an excess of food. In the latter case, one could
tell the hedonist that the reason to avoid the excess of food, even if its

30 (1985), 151-80; C. Hampton, ÒPleasure, Truth and Being in PlatoÕs Philebus,Ó

Phronesis 32 (1987), 253-62.
34
Irwin 1995, 329: ÒThe hedonic disadvantages of false pleasures might be out-
weighed or mitigated if we could get used to forming less intense feelings of disap-
pointment in the frustration of our expectations, or if we could avoid nding out the
truth in cases where the instrumental disadvantages of deception would not be too
serious.Ó
35
Cf. above, n. 26 and 30.
36
Irwin 1995, 327.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 277

immediate painful e ects could be mitigated by a remedy, is simply

because that remedy does not make such an excess any less likely to dis-
turb oneÕs bodily health, which is a necessary condition to enjoy maximal
overall pleasure. Likewise, in the case of false anticipatory pleasures,
ignorance is to be avoided not simply because of the immediate pain of
disappointment ( pace Irwin), but because of its unhealthy e ects on oneÕs
mind and oneÕs choices, which make it overall less likely to be in the right
shape to calculate maximal pleasures in oneÕs life. Even in this respect,
then, ignorance (gnoia) turns out to be an evil (kakñn) for the soul (Phil.
48c2). 37
In FredeÕs example, the dairymaid fantasizes about all the wealth she
will make when she sells her milk. 38 Now, letÕs change the story and
assume that she loses her milk unawares after having agreed to sell it to
someone, thus incurring a large debt on the assumption that she is about
to receive a huge sum of money. Much as she can mitigate the pain of
disappointment when she sooner or later nds out the truth, she has cre-
ated, through her false beliefs, circumstances which are objectively more
likely to conspire against her overall pleasurable life and make it less
likely to be one of maximal pleasure against one based on knowledge. To
take another example, say your neighbour is a thief and you enjoy his
company believing he is an honest man: you have there a false pleasure,
because you enjoy your neighbour under a false description. Certainly, it
could happen that you never realize that he stole a gold ring from you,
since you forget that you had a gold ring. Even in this case, though, it
seems plausible that you are exposing yourself to potential problems if
you continue trusting your neighbour, problems which again threaten the
overall state of maximal pleasure available in your life. Even if you might
exceptionally not nd out the truth and be untouched by that circumstance,
the argument would go that no rational planning of oneÕs life can really
rely on the hope, or the assumption, that one will be an exception.

37
At 48c Plato focuses on one special kind of ignorance, namely lack of self-knowl-
edge (which is the way in which svfrosænh is, after the Delphic oracle, viewed here).
At 45d7-e7, this is treated as an unhealthy condition ( ponhrÛa ) of the soul, and
identi ed as causing us to choose intense mixed pleasures which, as we shall see, Plato
also criticizes as failing to maximize the hedonistÕs goals. At 63b7-c3, again, Socrates
has pleasures themselves acknowledge the importance of knowing themselves and all
other things, by which he presumably wishes to emphasize that it is important for the
hedonist not to be deceived about the real nature of pleasure and the states of a airs
about which pleasure is had.
38
Cf. Frede 1992, 445.
278 GABRIELA R. CARONE

Precisely in that respect, Socrates does not disagree with Protarchus that
it is ÒmaybeÓ possible to include all kinds of pleasure (including false
ones) in the mixture; his point, however, is that such a procedure Òis not
secureÓ (oék Žsfal¡w), and that they should try to make the mixture Òwith
less riskÓ (Žkindunñteron) (61d1-5). After all, even the hedonist would
agree that the superior life would have its components stably (bebaÛvw
11e2); but stability requires the presence of intelligence and under-
standing (cf. 59c2-d2, and Protagoras 356c8-e2 where Socrates tries to
convince the hedonist of a similar point). This is how the hedonist, after
having seen the reasons, is made at the end of the dialogue to con rm his
initial agreement that one wouldnÕt go for pleasure Òif one had no true
belief that one was feeling pleasure, nor any knowledge of the experience
he was having, nor again any memory of the experience for any time
whatsoeverÓ (Phil. 60d7-e1). Ignorance, then, is no bliss; indeed, it is not
as good as knowledge even for a consistent hedonist who doesnÕt just want
some pleasure, but the maximal pleasure securely attainable in oneÕs life.
The arguments I have just given with regard to false anticipatory pleas-
ures apply, mutatis mutandis, to the other kinds of false pleasures that
Plato recognizes in the Philebus. The second kind of false pleasure is due
to a mistake in calculating the real sizes of pleasures and pains (41b-42c);
as the Protagoras had explained much earlier precisely in the context of
a hedonistic argument, a reason why oversized pleasures are to be avoided
is because their choice often later causes regrets which threaten our sta-
bility and peace of mind, as soon as the same pleasures are seen under a
di erent light that de ates their overrated appearance. 39 Here, once more,
having knowledge of the real size of pleasures and pains guarantees the
right hedonic calculus and secures our control over the circumstances;
having wrong beliefs, conversely, based as they are on uctuating appear-
ances and no reality (cf. Phil. 41e9-42c3) prevents us from correctly cal-
culating our maximum pleasure. Even if some pleasures may in certain
contexts ÒappearÓ bigger than they are, the right hedonic calculus should
subtract that incorrect apparent excess (Phil. 42b8-c3, cf. 51a5-9). For
example, say the good for you is gold and so it is all you want. It may
happen, while you are searching for gold, that you will encounter some
glittery material only partially made of gold, which appears in larger quan-
tities than smaller pieces which contain in reality more gold. Say you
choose the former rather than the latter driven by appearances: in that
case, you are certainly failing to be a maximal acquirer of gold. Along

39
Cf. Prot. 356a-e.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 279

similar lines, one can tell the hedonist here that in order to be able to
maximally attain pleasure he should not be deceived about the real quan-
tities of pleasure; to do otherwise would threaten the achievement of the
hedonistÕs goals.
With regard to the third kind of false pleasures, namely those arising
from a misconception of a neutral condition, Socrates comments that those
who think they feel pleasure whenever they are not in pain Òhave a false
belief about pleasure, if it is the case that the nature of pleasure is dis-
tinct (xvrÛw) from not being in painÓ (44a9-10). The analogy can be drawn
with a gold-seeker who has a false opinion about the properties of gold,
and so she thinks she is nding gold every time she is nding brass. This
gold-seeker or, in the case of pleasure, the pleasure-seeker who mistakes
pleasure for a neutral condition is failing to attain the goal she seeks,
again due to her own false beliefs about her goals. The same failure may
befall the hedonist who chooses mixed pleasures (the last kind of plea-
sure that Plato criticizes): mixed pleasures are associated with pain and
therefore we cannot unquali edly call them pleasures. The hedonist,
accordingly, should be aware of this fact in order to pursue consistently
and successfully her goals, and perform the right hedonic calculus. If, say,
drinking beer gives you 10 positive hedons, but the hangover 8 negative
ones, you cannot ignore the latter when asssessing whether you should
drink beer or water, even if the latter gives you only 5 positive hedons,
but only one or no negative ones. In weighing pleasures against pain, then,
one should subtract from mixed pleasures the negative quantity caused by
the accompanying pain. The reason why mixed pleasures are unreliable is
because, through the intensity created by their admixture with pain, they
are likely to deceive us about their net hedonic magnitude. Such pleasures
Òappear at the same time great and numerous (kaÜ meg‹law kaÜ pollŒw
fantasyeÛsaw), but are in reality all mixed together (eänai dƒ aétŒw sumpe-
furm¡naw) with pains and cessations of the greatest woes (ôdunÇn tÇn
megÛstvn) and confusion of body and soulÓ (51a6-9). 40 Even in this con-
text, then, ignorance is one of the greatest evils of the soul to watch
against, whereas moderation and knowledge prove advantageous, since it
is manifest that such confusing mixture of pleasures and pains Òarises in
some evil state of soul and body, not in excellence,Ó as shown in the case
of the foolish (Žfrñnvn) and insolent (êbristÇn) (45d2-e7).
In all these ways, it appears, pace Irwin, that there are good philo-
sophical reasons, even for the hedonist, to avoid on her own grounds all

40
Cf. also 45a . and the discussion below, pp. 281-282.
280 GABRIELA R. CARONE

the categories of false pleasures that Plato identi es in the Philebus.

Again, the argument is clearly that the hedonist should not be deceived
about the true character of her goal, and that it is not even possible to
attain such a goal without a proper understanding of pleasure and the real
nature of things, nor without self-knowledge or moderation. A good sum-
mary of this attitude is found at the end of the Philebus, where Socrates
represents the hedonistÕs position by having all pleasures say: ÒFor any
class to be alone and solitary in its purity is neither at all possible
(dunatñn) nor bene cial; but we think that, of all classes, comparing one
to one, the best for us to live with is that of knowing all other things and
each one of ourselves completely, insofar as it possibleÓ (63b7-c3). There
are therefore good reasons for the hedonist herself to see the importance
of combining pleasure with knowledge and even virtue for the happy life.
Certainly, PlatoÕs own story is much longer than this, since he does not
think pleasure is the only reason for pursuing truth and goodness; though
he must certainly think that pursuing genuine pleasures and being a good
human are virtually coextensive when claiming that Òbad people gener-
ally rejoice in false pleasures, and good people in true onesÓ (40c1-2).
Now, so far I have shown that PlatoÕs arguments against false pleas-
ures are compatible with hedonism and strategies devoted to the maxi-
mization of pleasure. Yet there is still a nal challenge that we need to
address. For it is a common intepretation of the Philebus that Plato is here,
as he is not in the Protagoras, dissatis ed with a quantitative criterion for
pleasure, and he instead privileges quality. Thus Irwin contends that the
Philebus presents an Òobjection to quantitative hedonism.Ó 41 This conten-
tion is not new. Much earlier, Hackforth asserted, with regard to true pleas-
ures: Òpurity, not magnitude or intensity, is the mark of truth.Ó42 And such
an interpretation may have been thought to have some basis in the text:
ÒWhat should we say relates to truth? The pure and unsullied, or the intense (tò
sfñdra), and the large (tò polç) and the great (tò m¡ga) . . .?Ó (Phil. 52d6-8)

The answer is provided by an analogy with colour:

ÒIf we then say that a little pure white is whiter and at the same time more beau-
tiful and truer than a lot of mixed white (memeigm¡nou polloè leukoè), then we
shall be speaking altogether correctlyÓ (53b4-6).

41
Irwin 1995, 331.
42
Hackforth 1945, 102. See also Gosling and Taylor 1982, 141; Nussbaum 1986,
462 n. 58.
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 281

We should however analyse what exactly Plato is having Socrates say in

this passage. Is Plato suggesting that mixed pleasures are quantitatively
bigger than pure ones? He certainly calls them ÒgreatÓ (m¡ga) and ÒlargeÓ
(polæ) at 52d7; he calls mixed bodily pleasures Òthe most intenseÓ and
ÒgreatestÓ pleasures (megÛstai tÇn ²donÇn 45a4-5). Yet he also provides a
clue to understanding in what sense he means ÒgreatÓ: When criticizing
mixed pleasures, Plato has Socrates contrapose supposedly small pleasures
to those Òso calledÓ most extreme and intense (tŒw Žkrot‹taw kaÜ sfo-
drot‹taw legom¡naw 45a1-2). At 45a7-b10 the question is considered
whether Òthe greaterÓ (meÛzouw) pleasures take place in those who are
healthy or those who are ill; rst, the suggestion seems to be that the cor-
rect answer is Òin the healthy ones;Ó yet Socrates wishes to illustrate that
in cases of illness people Òexperience greater want, and have greater pleas-
ures when they are ful lledÓ (45b8-9). But it is here clear that ÒgreaterÓ
(meÛzouw 45a7) applies only to ÒgrossÓ pleasures, not to the lesser ÒnetÓ
pleasures that one actually obtains by subtracting the accompanying pain.
At 45e9-10 Socrates urges his interlocutor to analyse Òin what way we
said that they are the greatestÓ (megÛstaw). He will reply by pointing out
many ways in which they can be associated with pain, and even by
emphasizing that unimaginable pleasures (Žmhx‹nouw ²donw) may arise
Òwhenever pains are more numerous than pleasuresÓ (46d7-e3). Ulti-
mately, it will become clear that these supposedly intense pleasures only
Òappear at the same time great and numerous, but are in reality all mixed
together with pains and cessations of the greatest woes and confusion
of body and soulÓ (51a6-9).
It seems then that Plato is suggesting not that mixed pleasures have a
bigger portion of genuine pleasure, but rather, that in many cases the
resulting mixture of pleasure and pain makes the pleasure look big pre-
cisely because of the admixture with pain. The analogy with white is use-
ful: you may mix one liter of white with half a liter of black, and think
that, as a result, you have more white than if you just have one liter of
pure white. Yet that is obviously not true, and it is even arguable that you
have no white at all in the rst case: you just have grey. Plato explicitly
makes his preference for pure pleasures match the quantitative criterion in
a line whose importance most interpreters have overlooked: As with the
example of white, Òevery single pleasure which is small or rare, if free
from pain, will turn out to be pleasanter (²dÛvn), truer and more beauti-
ful than large and frequent onesÓ (53b10-c2). So pure pleasures di er from
mixed ones not only in truth and beauty, but also in quantity.
282 GABRIELA R. CARONE

Now, this however does not mean that we should dismiss the impor-
tance of mixed pleasures altogether. For one thing, in some cases experi-
encing mixed pleasures is the condition of possibility for experiencing
pure pleasures: if we didnÕt go through the pains of learning, we wouldnÕt
be able to get to a nal state of undisturbed contemplative enjoyment.
And if we donÕt eat and drink we are certainly in no position to admire
the beauty of shape or enjoy any other pure pleasure. Further, we have
suggested that mixed pleasures can become good and even inherently
desirable by receiving the limit imposed by intelligence and thus forming
part of proportionate mixtures (cf. 63a1-5, e4-64a2). So, if certain beliefs
are constitutive of oneÕs pleasures, the moderate person (who at this point
coincides with the maximal hedonist) will enjoy mixed pleasures not qua
mixed with pain, but qua having proportion and thus qua helping to max-
imize the overall pleasurable and healthy state of her body and soul.43 So
Nussbaum is not quite fair to Plato when claiming that mixed bodily pleas-
ures Òare revealingly compared, all of them, to itching and scratching
(46a, d).Ó44 For such a comparison was used only in the context of pre-
senting the anti-hedonistÕs argument from which Socrates explicitly dis-
tanced himself (44c-d), and with the aim of illustrating pleasures arising
from disease, not from health and virtue (45d-e). In the nal mixing of
kinds of pleasure and knowledge, as we saw, SocratesÕ main reason for
selecting only certain types of pleasure was to guarantee a stable mixture,
i.e. one with the least risk (61d1-5). In that context, not only pure pleas-
ures were included, but also Òthose which accompany health and mod-
erationÓ and Òthose following the whole of virtueÓ (63e4-5). In general,
one should welcome mixed pleasures as long as they are Òbene cialÓ
(sumf¡ron) and ÒharmlessÓ (Žblab¡w) (63a4).45 We donÕt want, however,

43
Unlike the immoderate or unhealthy person, who enjoys the very release of
pain in her mixed pleasures, so that the existence of pain constitutes part of her choice
and her enjoyment (Phil. 54e-55a). See above, n. 24 and Cooper 1977, 726-8.
44
Nussbaum 1985, 150.
45
If my interpretation is correct, and if all this is consistent with PlatoÕs trying to
educate the hedonist about what pleasures render the largest quantities, a couple of
questions remain. First, one might wonder how PlatoÕs privileging pure pleasures over
false pleasures is not overkill. Why not simply stay with an argument like the ProtagorasÕ,
where no pure pleasures appeared to be mentioned, and yet Socrates seemed pretty
successful at convincing the many that knowledge is necessary to render the most
quantity of pleasure attainable? My answer is that, by the time of the Philebus, Plato
has come to realize the importance of experiencing pure pleasures in order to gain the
correct standards (or criterion, cf. krÛsiw at Phil. 52e3) when judging pleasurable
experiences. To continue the analogy with gold, if someone believes that the only good
 HEDONISM AND THE PLEASURELESS LIFE 283

mixed pleasures which Òaccompany immoderation and the the rest of viceÓ
(63e7-8). These are usually Òthe greatest and most intense pleasures,Ó
which are ÒhindrancesÓ to knowledge, disturb your soul and provoke for-
getfulness, thereby destroying knowledge (63d3-e3). Once the hedonist has
been persuaded of the importance of knowledge to maximize her own
hedonic strategies, then she should even accept this nal dictum against
excessive pleasures. And once the intellectualist has been persuaded of the
charmlessness of a life without pleasures, she should welcome them. Plato
is thus proposing directions that all of us, whether hedonists or intellec-
tualists, shall be well served by pursuing if we Òwish to see the nest mix-
ture and the most free from strife, and attempt to learn what by nature is
good in it, both in humans and in the universeÓ (63e9-64a2).
With this, then, I have shown how a mixed life of pleasure and intel-
ligence is posited by Plato as a rst best for humans, and how his arguments
against false pleasures can be seen as quite consistent with a hedonistic
outlook. Virtue and maximization of pleasure, as we have seen, most often
coincide according to Plato, and even though he doesnÕt just use conse-
quentialist arguments for pursuing virtues such as wisdom and modera-
tion, those arguments are certainly readily available in the Philebus.46

Department of Philosophy
University of Colorado at Boulder

is gold, and proposes to be a maximal acquirer of gold, it is reasonable to expect that

such a person should know gold in its pure state in order to be in better shape to dis-
cern how much or how little gold there may be in otherwise confusing mixtures. Likewise,
the person experiencing pure pleasures will not only experience them as pleasanter
than anything else, but will also have the side advantage of being more likely to max-
imize, without deception, her hedonic calculus on all kinds of pleasures. Second, the
question might be asked how Plato could establish a ranking even among pure pleas-
ures themselves according to the quantitative criterion alone (cf. Gosling and Taylor
1982, 141). One answer to this is that, if stability is a feature proper to pure pleasures
and also one which is desirable in the happy life, the pleasures of knowledge and intel-
lectual activity in general are likely to last longer (and thus render more pleasure) than
those of the senses apart from the fact that pure pleasures, when associated with
knowledge, can be seen as having the ability to multiply pleasure: that is, insofar as
these pleasures accompany the discovery of truth, they present the extra advantage of
conducing to the gain of further genuine pleasures.
46
I wish to thank the editors of this journal and Christopher Shields, Raphael
Woolf, George Rudebusch and Richard Kraut for helpful comments on previous drafts
of this essay.