Simulation 1

This simulation is focused on a distributive negotiation scenario involving the sale of a piece of
land. The land in question was acquired a decade ago at a price of £35,000. Following the recent
sale of my house, the prospective buyers expressed minimal interest in the land and made a low
offer of £10,000 for its purchase. In an effort to secure a more favorable price, I approached a
neighboring individual to inquire about their potential interest in acquiring the land. The primary
objective of this negotiation is to maximize the selling price of the land before my relocation to
Scotland.

This negotiation simulation exemplifies a distributive bargaining situation characterized by fixed

resources, wherein the goals of the parties involved are inherently conflicting (Lewicki et al.,
2019). As noted by Lewicki et al. (2021: 27), the primary focus in this context is on "value
claiming," which refers to the maximization of individual shares for both the seller (myself) and
the potential buyer (neighbour). In this case, the fixed amount of land available for sale and the
limited budget of the buyer further accentuate the divergence of interests between the parties.

In distributive negotiations, understanding the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement

(BATNA) for each party is crucial, as it determines the relative bargaining power of each party
(Sebenius, 2017). Research conducted with participants from universities and staff in the United
States has demonstrated that individuals with stronger BATNAs are more likely to set ambitious
goals and make fewer and smaller concessions compared to those with weaker BATNAs
(Anderson and Galinsky, 2006; Magee et al., 2007). Consequently, parties with stronger
BATNAs tend to achieve more favorable outcomes for themselves in the negotiation process. I
intend to sell the land to the new owner for £10,000, that í my BATNA - which I believe is less
than a third of the price I paid for it. The £10,000 offer from the new owner of my property also
serves as my reservation point in this negotiation. The reservation point, as defined in the
literature (Lewicki et al., 2019), represents the lowest acceptable outcome or the threshold below
which you are unwilling to negotiate. In this context, I have established £10,000 as the minimum
price that I am willing to accept for the sale of the land, and I am resolute in not accepting any
offers below this amount during the negotiation process. My target price is around £40000 to
£45000, at least this land have to bring some benefits to me after 10 years. I had no idea about
my counterpart’s BATNA was.

In the context of negotiations, the concept of direct assessment pertains to the systematic
procedure of acquiring pertinent information from the opposing party through the act of posing
inquiries and endeavoring to elicit from them a comprehensive understanding of their present
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) and reservation points (Lewicki et al.,
2021). Therefore, at the initial stages of the negotiation, I employed the technique of direct
assessment with the intention of ascertaining the degree of interest exhibited by my neighbor in
acquiring the land, exploring the potential alternatives available to them (i.e., their BATNA), and
discerning the range of prices they might be amenable to accepting. Nevertheless, it is crucial to
note that in distributive negotiations, the counterpart also endeavors to extract information from
me. Therefore, it becomes imperative to exercise caution and discretion in sharing information,
only doing so when it confers a strategic advantage upon me (Lewicki et al., 2021). Fortunately,
during the course of discussions, my company accidentally revealed that she wanted to expand
the kitchen because it is too small for her and she concerned about the costs of this expansion
could be over her budget. This information boosted my position in this negotiation above her. It
was at this point that we discussed prices. I asked for £80000, but my counterpart embraced a
hardline, competitive stance in the negotiation process. A competitive stance entails the adoption
of a confrontational approach by one party, driven by the objective of maximizing their
individual gains (Krause et al., 2006). Some scholarly sources argue that such stances can offer
advantages in distributive negotiations. However, it is important to note that they also carry the
potential to detrimentally affect the relationship between the involved parties (Huffmeier et al.,
2014). During the negotiation, I made a commitment, which in the context of negotiations, refers
to a definitive and binding statement of intention (Lewicki et al., 2021). In this particular
negotiation, I made a commitment that I would not make any further concessions until my
counterpart demonstrated a willingness to move closer to my position.

Ultimately, we reached a settlement point of £65,000, which exceeded my initial target point.
However, upon discovering that the buyer had the capacity to spend up to £70,000, I realized that
I could have been more resolute in my decision. As a result, I experienced a sense of
dissatisfaction with the outcome, a phenomenon commonly referred to as buyer's remorse in
distributive negotiation (Kwon and Weignart, 2004). If given the opportunity to engage in a
similar simulation again, I would strive to capitalize on the information that the buyers disclosed,
maximizing its potential impact on the negotiation process.

Simulation 2

Based on scenario of simulation 2, I roled as a manager for music artists. This negotiation
focuses on the intergrative negotiations which I have to negotiate with the organizers of the
Glasstonbury Festival. However, before being invited to perform at the Glasstonbury Festival, I
received an invitation from the 'Aviemore Festival' with a price of 157,000 pounds but the scale
of attendies was 2.5 times smaller than the Glasstonbury Festival. And in this integrative
negotiation, I will apply 4 steps in negotiation of Lewicki (Lewicki, Roy, et al., 2020).

• Identify and define the problem

I begin by recognizing the central issue at hand. This involves engaging in negotiations with my
partner to optimize the economic advantages for the singer's management company, while
concurrently advocating for the singer's best interests when discussing the terms of the
collaboration contract with the festival organization. The successful outcome of these
negotiations will have long-term benefits for me, particularly in my role as a manager for
renowned artists. Additionally, I have taken into account the event organizers' interests, which
revolve around ensuring a substantial nationwide audience for the event and maximizing profits
for their organization.

• Surface interests and needs

During the negotiation process, I did not know the maximum budget that the organization could
pay to our side. To know this, I apply the highballs strategy, Negotiators employing the
lowball/highball tactic initiate the negotiation process with an intentional extreme and unrealistic
opening offer, either exceptionally low or high, fully aware that it will not be accepted. The
underlying concept behind this strategy is that the extreme offer prompts the other party to
reassess their own initial proposal and potentially adjust it closer to, or even surpass, their own
resistance point (Lewicki, Roy, et al, 2020). My first price proposal is 200,000 pounds, because I
already have my BATNA of 157,000 pounds from another event organizer, so I offer this price
to determine the maximum price of financial level that the Glasstonbury fesstival organizer can
pay to our artist. The company immediately rejected this proposal because it exceeded the
budget. I immediately asked them what price they wanted? The partner offered me a price of 128
thousand pounds, and additional terms that were beneficial to us such as meet and greet fans,
social media campaign.

• Generate alternative solutions

Since both sides could not agree on each other's proposals, I had to make an alternative proposal.
I apply expanding the pie strategy and win-win strategy, I propose a price lower than my
BATNA, 145,000 pounds with the terms that the artist will perform on the main stage again,
promote her image and meet and greet fans after the festival. In return, the partner will save
costs such as building a private dressing room for the artist, luxury car to pickup, chapaign and
flowers in the dressing room. This helps both me and my partner achieve each other's interests.

• Evaluate and select alternatives

Ethicsare broadly applied social standards for what is right or wrong in a particular sit-uation, or
a process for setting those standards. They differ from morals, which are in-dividual and
personal beliefs about what is right and wrong (Lewicki, Roy, et al, 2020). I believed in end
– result ethics, and that why I lied to my partner. I told them that I was offered by the 'Aviemore
Festival' organization with 200000 pounds for the price. I did this because I do not understand
what was my counterpart’s maximum price that they could pay for us. As soon as I knew their
interests, I could change my strategies to reach my goals in this negotiation.

Even though the final price is lower than my BATNA, by using appropriate strategies to
determine the other party's interests, we can make offers that are mutually beneficial and
beneficial to both sides. We came to a final agreement that both sides were satisfied with.
However, at the beginning of the negotiation, it was not appropriate for me to use the highball
strategy when I wanted to probe the other side. If I have the opportunity in the next negotiation, I
will use other strategies to better understand my partner's interests so that I can negotiate more
smoothly.

References:

Anderson, C. and Galinsky, A. (2006) Power, optimism, and risk-taking. European Journal of
Social Psychology 36: 511-536.

Fisher, R. C., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (2011) Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without
giving in, 2nd ed, New York, Penguin.

Huffmeier, J., Freund, P.A., Zerres, A., Backhaus, K. and Hertel, G. (2014) Being tough or being
nice? A meta-analysis on the impact of hard- and Softline strategies in distributive negotaitions.
Journal of Management 40 (3): 866-892.

Krause, D., Terpend, R. and Petersen, K. (2006) Bargaining stances and outcomes in buyer-seller
negotiations: experimental results. The Journal of Supply Chain Management 42 (3): 4-15.

Kwon, S. and Weingart, L. (2004) Unilateral Concessions From the Other Party: Concession
Behavior, Attributions, and Negotiation Judgements. Journal of Applied Psychology 89 (2): 263-
278.

Karrass, L. Chester. The Art of Win– Win Negotiations, - Purchasing, 1999.

Lewicki. R., Saunders., D and Barry, D. (2021) Essentials of Negotiation (7th edition). McGraw-
Hill Education, New York, USA.

Sebenius, J. (2017) BATNAs in Negotiation: Common Errors and Three Kinds of “No”.
Negotiation Journal 33 (2): 89-99.

Neale, M. A. and Bazerman, M. H. (1991) Cognition and rationality in negotiation, New York,
Free Press.