Lecture 10:

Pre reading:
El Partido Comunista de Chile 1922-47, Andrew Barnard:
- Pg183: Rios was more conservative than Cerda – he had received support from a few
on the right despite being a leftist leader.
- Although Rios’ relations with the communist party were initially frosty, they
improved over the course of his presidency, particularly during the war years.
- Pg184: during the war years, Unidad Nacional replaced the idea of Frente Popular in
terms of leftist alliance. However, after the war ended and cold war tensions began
to set in, the objectives of the UN also changed, worsening relations between Rios
and the communists again.
- Although he became more right-wing throughout his presidency, his party did not
suffer from internal conflicts like the PS and PC did – Rios led an efficient
government.
- War increased market for Chilean exports. However, it closed off American market
for South America. Also, PC protests regarding machinery sent off to Spain, as it could
have helped the Axis powers.
- Pg185: In short, the war forced Chile to sell cheap and buy expensive. According to
Walchoz, economics minister under Videla, the war cost Chile 14,000 million pesos.
- Exports in copper and carbon increased 1942-44, but mining exports decreased on
the whole constantly. Only agriculture showed an increase in exports during these
years.
- Inflation was a real problem for Rios, and by 1943, salaries fell to 15% below their
real value in comparison to 1938. Therefore, there was a real sentiment of discontent
amongst workers during the war years.
- Pg186: Rios only allowed liberals in his government, having many centrists in his
cabinet – moderate leftists and liberal conservatives. – conditions of war meant he
had to co-operate over all political beliefs.
- Pg188: Rios and the PR managed to come to an agreement at last after they had
been upset with his introduction of right-wingers into his cabinet.
- Police killed 8 protesters at Plaza Bulnes in Santiago in Jan 1946.
- Pg189: however, PR and Rios’ agreement did not last long, as they rebelled under
Duhalde’s temporary presidency, only returning to government when Videla was
elected.
- PS took part in the first cabinets of Rios’ presidency, but remained critical of his
policies.
- PS split into 2 factions: those willing to collaborate with government and those who
were very critical of Rios: PSA lead by Grove collaborated and PS led by Bernardo
Ibanez did not.
- Pg190: Rios’ election was not good news for Communists, but the war years forced
them to collaborate.
- Pg191: Unidad Nacional had very different objective to the Frente Popular. The UN’s
objectives were the following: defence of democracy in Chile and abroad, following
of the resolutions made at the Panamerican conference in Habana in 1940, and the
maximisation of the Chilean contribution to the Allies in the war effort.
 - UN’s political alliance was far more broad, combining parties from the left, but also
the right.
- Pg192: PC of Chile changed their views to align with Browder’s plan – basically was
necessary to make some concessions for the greater good, such as working
collaboratively with the traditional right.
- Pg193: However, with the growing disagreements between USA and Russia, it
became harder to see Browder’s plan as being viable.
- PC cooperation was not unconditional though, as they made sure that they argued
for sacrifices to be made across all classes for the war effort and that it was not only
just the workers whose living standards decreased.
- Pg195: Unlike the radical left, the PC were able to see that international factors were
important, aligning with Rios who was in favour of a split with the Axis powers, so
that Russia, an important global force of communism, was kept alive in the struggle.
- PC also tried to convince PR to rejoin the cabinet – something that Rios welcomed
and appreciated.
- Pg197: split of PS into Grovist and Ibanist section – Grovists left so PS started a policy
of anti-government sentiment – ‘contra la UN’.
- Pg198: huge numer of strikes at the end of 1943 threatened to break the political
peace between the PC and the UN.
- Pg199: as the war drew to a close, the PC became increasingly harsh with the
government over labour relations.
- Pg200: Both the PC, and Rios for that matter, upheld democracy with the latter
presiding within the law. In this way, the Communists were successful in this
objective. However, perhaps this was more down to government decision to cut ties
with Axis, as Allied win was the best thing for worldwide promotion of democracy.
- Pg202: PC’s alliance with Rios paid off politically for various reasons: Argentine
Comintern leader Codovilla was liberated with Rios’ help and Rios also publicly
recognised the CTCh – technically illegal under the Codigo de Trabajo.
- Up to pg203.s

Las propuestas de reforma/cambio structural – Gonzalez Videla (1946-52) y Carlos Ibañez

(1952-58)
Grugel, J. (1992). Populism and the Political System in Chile: Ibañismo (1952-
1958). Bulletin of Latin American Research, 11(2), 169–186. https://doi.org/10.2307/3338121
- read this if I have time

Las limitaciones del modelo desarrollista – (industrializacion por sustitucion de

importaciones + beneficios sociales) – (“cuellos de botella”)
- Chile is a relatively small country compared to its counterparts such as Brazil and
Argentina.
- The whole country is not modernised for production etc.
- 50% of population lived in the countryside
- Some jobs are not payed in money – especially for a campesino – ‘no es
monitarizado’ – they receive a low salary. They produce agricultural products.
Discusses what they wear.
 - Population is only semi-integrated into the methods of modernisation and
technologization.
- This is one of the primary reasons for agrarian reform.

- Estrechez del mercado interno – ampliacion

- Desequilibrio en beneficios sociales - empeados-obreros industrials-campesinos

Not much distinction between rural and industrial workers
Also structural problems – cambio internacional

- Escaez de divisas – dependencia del cobre

Cobre no vende en Chile – fue vendido un otros lugares.
- Aumento del gasto publico – estancamiento productive – limited petrol supply –
needed to import.
- Dollar differentiated in ‘real’ value- much corruption of the dollar
- Hipertrofia estatal – corrupcion/negociados
- Inflacion

Physical production was better than anything else.

Little investment – meant machinery and technology was not modernised.
State taxes- business did not support them.

Carga mayor? Costs were very high. Deficit?

Ibáñez’s government was particularly difficult – new institutions could not be payed for –
such as Institution of Sanitary Health
Construction of houses? Works projects?
State paid for hospitals.
State-paid schools?
Cost of consumer products were at their highest between 53 and 55. From 1956 onwards
the levels decreased.

Higher salaries and slightly more people employed – 1940-54

Real high levels of poverty in this period

Propuestas económicas:
- Apertura economica/mas felxibilidad – propuesta liberal – exportacion hacia
mercados regionals
- Mas control economico – propuesta de izquierda
mayor fijacion de precios
planificacion economica
- Reforma agrarian
modernizacion (tecnificacion creditos)
cambios en estructura de la propiedad
- Intervencion en el mercado del cobre
The problems that we can see in the 50’s, arguably lead to the ability for Allende and
socialism to progress towards ‘la vía chilena’ – socialism by democratic means.

No cambiar el Sistema de pensiones? Get rid of anything that is not necessary? Only offer
medical protection?

Caja = profits

Grugel page 180-181:

As a result, there was a corresponding downgrading of the pressing questions of anti-
inflationary strategies, copper policies, trade, industry spending and labour policy, all of
which emerged as major issues during the Ibañez government, and received only secondary
attention from the executive in the first period of government until 1955. As the economic
climate worsened in the early 1950s, partly due to a fall in international copper prices, and
living standards fell, it was difficult for Ibanez to continue to project successfully the image of
a president representing the ‘people’ against economically privileged groups.
Secondly, ibañismo suffered from a high degree of ideological confusion which paralysed the
government and eventually destroyed the movement. In reality, there were a variety of
antagonistic political project inside, each of which tended to block the others. These projects
included ism and caudillismo of Ibaiiez himself; the moderately na and Catholic ideology of
the Agrario Laboristas (PAL), th identified with Ibaiiez; the more extreme nationalist and
headed by Jorge Prat, Estanquero; the 'independents', tors from the first Ibaiiez government;
some military off but some (for example, Benjamin Videla) still on activ Popular Socialist
Party (PSP), which had decided to join the intention of strengthening its 'popular' elements.
The what mistakenly, that Ibafiez represented the 'anti-feudal impulse of the masses' (Jobet,
1963:69-71). The PSP, w PAL was one of the two planks of the incoming administr establish
any permanent influence over policy, however, government at the end of 1953, little more
than a year af
Thirdly, Ibafiez was unable to establish a new framework for civil-state relations, an essential
step if the people' were to be brought into government.
The image of a powerful presidency resting on popular support was not enough in the Chile
of the 1950s to merit description as a new system of popular domination, nor for Ibanez's
electorate to believe that Yet Ibanez was unable to create new institutional channels for
mediation
between the state and society which would stand as legitimate and stable alternatives to the
party system. In this sense, Ibanez's labour policy was to prove another decisive failure. The
new labour federation formed in 1952, the CUT, with whom the PSP and to some extent the
PAL enjoyed good relations, chose nevertheless to remain independent from attempts at
government co-optation and was later to move clearly into the opposition camp. In 1955 the
government tried to create an alternative federation to the CUT, managed from the
executive, in the form of the Confederacion de
Trabajadores Independientes, but it was unable to penetrate the labour movement. In the
final years ofthe government, Ibanez returned to the policy established by Gonzalez Videla
of repression through the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia and the Circular Holger-Letelier,
now reissued as the Circular Koch- Yanez, which gave the government the right to intervene
in trade union elections. These factors together created the conditions for the emergence of
the fourth, and decisive, reason for the collapse of ibanismo: the revival ofthe party system.