Professional Documents
Culture Documents
- The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in the spring of 1954 marked the end of the conflict.
Vietnam before 1945: Occupied by the Japanese empire, when Japan surrendered in 1945, it
created a rhetoric for Vietnamese independence, which was reflected in nationalists such as Ho
Chi Minh. However, the French returned to Indochina after Japan’s surrender which caused a war
to break out between the Viet Minh who wanted independence, and the French who wanted to
maintain the status quo and Indochina to remain its colony.
Truman:
- Helped the French effort to maintain control of Vietnam, because he believed the French
were fighting Communism and the spread of communism in Asia.
- 2 billion dollars in military and technical aid for the French.
- Could be argued that the extent of Trumans commitment was limited, simply supporting
the French and it was purely economic - State Department far East specialist noted that
“the trouble is that none of us know enough about Indochina”.
- In 1950 defence Department official warned: ‘We are gradually increasing our stake in
the outcome of the struggle ... we are dangerously close to the point of being so deeply
committed that we may find ourselves completely committed even to direct intervention.’
- Truman saw the Indochina war as a war against communist expansion rather than
Vietnams independence, thus, aided the French
- Fear of communist expansionism
- Domino theory and effect
- McCarthyism
- Help NATO ally
Eisenhower 1953-61:
- Eisenhower initially continued to aid the French, saying that “ we must not lose Asia”
- Supported Trumans policy of containment.
- Rolling back communism
- Fears of domino theory
- French still could not defeat Vietminh who received supplies and weapons from the
Chinese and were transported via the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos and Cambodia.
The Vietminh had more local knowledge that led to stronger, more effective military
strategies.
- Dien Bien Phu 1954- the turning point in the Indochina war that caused French surrender-
Eisenhower did not intervene in 1954 as he referred to the French in Vietnam as a
“hopeless helpless mass of protoplasm”. Additionally, he did not want to alter the United
States international image which stood against colonialism and preached values such as
independence, democracy, freedom etc.
Reasons behind:
- Fear of losing American markets/raw materials
- Domino theory- which would result in altering the global balance of power
- Initiate nation building program in South Vietnam: to restore American prestige
Eisenhower disobeyed the Geneva Accords 1954 and chose to interpret the temporary ceasefire
line of the 17th parallel as a permanent division between a Communist state and a non-Communist
state.
- Criticism: Although the USA saw itself as defending democracy in the Cold War,
Eisenhower rejected the idea of national elections in Vietnam 1956 because he knew that
Ho Chi Minh would win the majority of the votes. A main characteristic of the Ngo Diem
regime was that it was unpopular. Like Korea, Vietnam had been divided because of the
Cold War.
Eisenhower: Conclusions:
Successes:
Failures:
Kennedy:
- ARVN troops accompanied with American military advisors and personnel refused to
attack the Vietcong.
- Consequently, 5 US helicopters and 3 pilots were lost, and the ARVN troops refused to
mount a rescue mission,
- Ap Bac demonstrated the weakness of the ARVN, the extent of US involvement in the
fighting in Vietnam, and the uneasy relationship between the ARVN and US forces. After
the battle, the JCS, and Secretary of defence McNamara recommended putting American
ground troops into Vietnam, but Kennedy refused.
- Was severely damaged as Diem’s regime was unpopular and unstable. Diems’ refusal to
introduce reforms and his increasing repressive policies made the US give the green light
and encourage the ARVN backed coup against Diem and consequently, his assassination.
Reasons behind his policies:
- Containing communism
- Domino theory
- Protecting democracy and restoring American prestige “ Vietnam is a test for American
responsibility and determination in Asia”
- Commitment trap
- Greatly influenced by figures such as Secretary of Defence McNamara, a firm believer in
US commitment in Vietnam
- Set a precedent for other countries- maintain US credibility
- Did not want to risk being criticized by the public and votes as losing Vietnam the same
way Truman lost China “ I cant give up Vietnam and expect people to re-elect me”
-
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Conclusions Kennedy:
- Kennedy was lured into the commitment trap set by his predecessors.
- Increased military advisors and aid to Diem’s regime
- Did not want to lose Vietnam to communist forces.
- Wanted to ensure US prestige and its global image in containing and fighting
communism.
- Increased his country’s commitment to an unpopular regime that he then helped
overthrow.
- Getting rid of Diem did not improve the instability in South Vietnam, but instead
demonstrated that the US is prepared to use force to achieve its objections.
- The US commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, said US complicity in the
demise of Diem ‘morally locked us in Vietnam’, greatly increasing America’s obligation
to subsequent Saigon governments.
Johnson:
Evidence/significant events:
-Operation Rolling Thunder 1965, consisted of sustained intense bombings in North Vietnam
from 1965-68, a significant escalatory step in the war.
-In his second great escalatory step, Johnson sent the first American ground troops to Vietnam
in spring 1965.
There were around 200,000 American soldiers in Vietnam by late 1965, and over 500,000 by
early 1968. By sending in ground troops and ordering ‘Rolling Thunder’, Johnson had
dramatically changed the nature of the war.
Possible questions: To what extent did President Johnson change the nature of the Vietnam
war
- Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 1964 that justified US intervention in Vietnam and gave the
president the power to do as he sees fit- Consequently, American aircraft started bombing
North Vietnam- Operation Rolling Thunder etc. -Legal foundation for operation rolling
thunder.
- Operation Rolling Thunder and the significant military escalations made Johnson look
tough, his public approval rose from 42 to 72% -a cause for his re-election in 1964-
Also suggests that the country had a united stance behind its president in his Vietnam
policy.
- Domino Theory
- Containing communism
- American anti-communist culture and rhetoric
- Continuing Kennedy’s visions and policies
- Did not want to be the first US president to lose the war
- Restore US prestige and credibility
- Ineffective government in Saigon, it was unstable, corrupt, unpopular. After Diem, the
Saigon regime witnessed a lot of political instability, leaders received a lot of US aid but
still refused to implement reforms, repressive domestic policies were still evident,
remained unpopular, and were corrupt, which was a cause that prompted Johnson to
intervene and escalate the war.
- Viewing North Vietnam as a puppet of Moscow who wanted to conquer all of Asia
(speech in 1965), threat to US security and for anyone who wanted a “free world”
- Commitment trap- since Kennedy and his predecessors committed to Vietnam, it would
undermine the US’s credibility and honour if Johnson withdraws from the war.
Histography:
Why Did the USA get involved? To what extent did the Cold War contribute to US involvement
in Vietnam?
As historian Robert Shulzinger (1997) wrote,‘Had American leaders not thought that all
international events were connected to the Cold War there would have been no American war in
Vietnam.’
Orthodox interpretation:
Orthodox historians such as George Herring, saw the USA containing Communist aggression and
expansion in Vietnam, and as having little choice but to do so.
Post-revisionist historians such as David Anderson, saw the USA as motivated by a variety of
reasons: ‘geopolitical strategy, economics, domestic US politics, and cultural arrogance’.
- Motivated by geopolitics
Theories associated:
- ‘Quagmire theory’. Ignorant of Vietnam and overconfident about American power and
ideals, US leaders became trapped in an expensive commitment in an unimportant area,
unable to exit without losing credibility.
- J. Schell (1976) pointed out a crucial change from the Eisenhower administration to the
Kennedy administration: Exceeded the extent of the ‘territorial domino theory
‘became the ‘psychological domino theory’ or the ‘doctrine of credibility’. It was not
so much that other territories would become Communist if Vietnam did, but that the USA
would lose credibility.
- The commitment trap theory:
- Many historians argue that an inherited commitment to Vietnam made it harder for the
next president to exit without the nation and its leader losing face. Successive presidents
recognized this ‘commitment trap’: Kennedy told French President de Gaulle that he had
inherited SEATO from Eisenhower and that it would look bad if the USA dumped it,
while Johnson told the Vietnamese generals, ‘Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our
word.’
Stephen Ambrose wrote: This was not “Johnson’s war”. It was “Eisenhower’s war”, and
Eisenhower’s actions and assumptions had ensured that it would never be a successful one.’ –
Could be argued that Eisenhower is the one who laid the foundations of the commitment trap
when he helped establish the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) and defied the Geneva
Accords.
1. Unpopularity of the US-backed Saigon regime- they had no support from the locals
2. Military emphasis- most of the aid provided to the South Vietnamese government was
spent on military expenditure rather than allocating it to social and economic
development, this further increased the North Vietnamese’s call for independence and
nationalistic movements
Johnson stated ‘Grab ’em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow’
3. US military operations had high casualty rates amongst the South Vietnamese population
as they did not have effective or accurate methods to distinguish between North and
South Vietnamese which further encouraged resentment from the South Vietnamese
towards the Americans.
4. My Lai massacre 1968 was a significant turning point in American media as American
forces massacred a South Vietnamese village mistaking them for being communist
sympathisers or Vietcong. It generated worldwide criticism and had long-term domestic
consequences in the US especially amongst the youth.
5. Vietcong treated peasants with respect
6. Vietcong had more local knowledge which affected the battle on the ground and their
military strategies, while US forces had little local knowledge and could not adapt to the
wild environment in Vietnam that consisted of deep forests, lakes etc.
7. American forces were not united- African Americans had a disproportionate number of
drafted soldiers which attracted much criticism.
8. Domestic home front was disunited.
9. Referred to as “the unwilling, led by the unqualified, doing the unnecessary for the
ungrateful”
10. American fighters were too comfortable- they could be transported anytime from the
jungle to a luxurious base, General Westmoreland said that “this is the only way you
could get Americans to fight”
11. President Richard Nixon wrote in his diaries that the measures taken by the US to ensure
the comfort of its soliders “softened them up rather than toughed them” which had major
consequences in the battle field that caused US retreat
Timeline:
- Anti-war feeling developed in the universities, but the gulf of Tonkin resolution and
presidential election showed that at this stage Johnson had near unanimous support for his
Vietnam policy from the voters and congress.
- Turning point that had consequences reflecting themselves in the midterm elections in
1966. Democrat congressmen blamed Vietnam for losses in the election and urged
Johnson to end the war.
- There was no change however, as congress countined to fund the war
- Anti war protests grew, a popular chant “ Hey hey LBJ how many boys have you killed
today”
In January 1968 Hanoi launched an offensive against South Vietnamese cities and
military installations. The American ambassador had to flee the embassy in Saigon in his
pyjamas. Although it took them 3 weeks to clear Saigon of Communist forces, it was not
without consequences, most significantly reflected in the high civilian causality rate.
Tet demonstrated that while the US could help stop the takeover of Saigon, and the
Saigon government, it could not defeat the communists.
The Johnson administration had been clamming that America was winning the war but
dramatic TV pictures of Communists in the grounds of the US embassy suggested
otherwise.
- Walter Cronkite the most respected TV journalist in the US was ‘s coverage was
progressively going against US involvement in Vietnam after seeing the tet offensive on
TV, Cronkite asked “ I thought we were winning the war” “If I lost Cronkite I’ve
lost America” said Johnson. This shows how media played an important part in the shift
and change from people’s opinions in this war.
- A journalist reported a solider said “ we had to destroy the town to save “, many
Americans questioned what was being done in Vietnam and its ethicality.
- Tet was a psychological rather than a military defeat., It certainly shook the
confidence of the American government, administration and people.
The underlying reason for the American defeat in Vietnam was that South Vietnam
was an artificial state, created, and sustained only by the USA. To sustain this
artificial creation, South Vietnam required further dependency on the US, and a lot of aid.
When the worldwide communist threat decreases, and the nature of the warfare and
criticism back home led to the apparent collapse of the home front and American forces
in Vietnam, it was inevitable that the USA would get out and lose the war.
- Tet offensive suggested that Washington and Saigon were nowhere near defeating the
communists
- The loss of McNamara, a firm believer in the US’s commitment in Vietnam, had an effect
on the Johnson administration and shook its confidence, which made them advocate for
some kind of retreat after the Tet Offensive
- Further reflected in Johnsons rating as it fell from 48% to 36%, was a cause that led
him to not run for the presidential race as he lost popularity amongst his own people.
- This is further reflected in a poll conducted in 1968 that concluded that 74 per cent that
Johnson was not handling it well showing that he was losing the hearts and minds of his
own people.
- From an economic perspective, the war let to a twin deficit. This is reflected as the
government deficit rose from 1.6 billion to 25.3 billion in 1968 resulting in austerity
policies by the government leading to high inflation, higher taxes and lower government
spending which affected American’s economic well-being, and grew resentment towards
Johnson’s policies.
On the international front, the dollar was significantly hit as the current account
witnessed a deficit causing a gold crisis which was the final straw for many Americans.
Richard Nixon
- Cambodian offensive
- Vietnamization policy
- Withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam
- “ending” war
- Tet offensive
- Economic budget deficit
- Americans highly critical of US involvement in the war
- No on the ground victories
- Sino-Soviet split
- Détente
- Desire to be a peacemaker “the most honourable name that history can bestow upon
someone is a peace maker” in one of his speeches in 1969
It is important to note that Nixon was a cold warrior that advocated for a tougher line against
communism throughout Johnsons presidency. Whatever the Democrat Johnson did, Republican
Nixon urged him to do more. However, Nixon had changed his stance specifically in regard to
Vietnam, he wanted to get out. The context in this respect was also favourable and can be argued
to have contributed to shape this shift. This reflected by a variety of factors such as the
unsustainable economic twin deficit, tet offensive, Americans highly critical of US involvement,
no on the ground victories, sino soviet split, desire for détente, desire to be a peacemaker.
1970’s was not the same as the 1940’s and 50’s, the communist expansionist threat was less
likely, especially with the deteriorating relationship between the two leading communist
leaders, USSR and China. Nixon hoped he could play Russia and China off against each other
and improve relations with both.
Peacemaker: Nixon said, ‘The greatest honour history can bestow is the title of peacemaker.
‘Improved relations with China and the USSR and peace in Vietnam would contribute to an
atmosphere of détente and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, it will ensure Nixon’s re-
election in 1972.
Vietnamisation:
Nixon set up the Saigon regime with President Thieu, a US backed leader, in an independent
South Vietnam. By this, Nixon hoped to establish a long lasting South Vietnamese regime
and ensuring peace with the USSR and China.
1969,1970
Although Nixon advocated a policy of Vietnamization, there were some drawbacks that had
intercepted his aim for peace and the withdrawal of US troops in Vietnam, most notably,
this can be reflected in escalating the war to Cambodia.
- Détente was not agreed upon between the two spheres of influence.
- US casualty rates in Vietnam increased.
- Stopped the drafting of troops into the US 1969
Nixon extended the war to Laos and Cambodia in 1970 when he launched the Cambodian
offensive with heavy bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This was done to “intimidate Hanoi”,
pressure the USSR to gain better peace terms.
- Nixon sent 30,000 American and ARVN forces into Cambodia, but found no
Communists. There were high causality rates as 1600 Americans and 3500 ARVN
forces were wounded and many killed. It was a great embarrassment for the US, however,
it did achieve some results.
- Many sites were destructed and weapons captured from the trail which was a
consequence that made Hanoi unable to launch a major offensive in South Vietnam
for the next 2 years.
- The media heavily criticized Nixon, most notably, The New York Times where it claimed
that the offensive was reflective of American weakness, divisions and restraints on
the president.
By 1971, the Morale of the American forces in Vietnam had plummeted. Many came back with
physical and mental disorders.
- Vietnamization was not working and was not followed through as reflected with the
Cambodian offensive
- However, détente was looking more promising at that time due to a variety of
reasons, (USSR economic deterioration and problems, sino-soviet split…), USSR and
China held talks with the US to pressure Hanoi and recognise Thieu’s South Vietnam as a
pre-requisite for peace.
To speed up US-Soviet détente, Nixon was extremely pragmatic, reflected in when he hinted
that North Vietnamese forces could stay in South Vietnam and that he would accept a
collation that will contain Communists.
Kissinger thereby agreed that the Communists were a legitimate political force in South
Vietnam, which Thieu had always denied.
Nixon bombed North Vietnam in 1972 to reassure Thieu of American strength and support
Kissinger said, ‘We bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions’.
Hanoi had to promise not to ‘take advantage’ of the ceasefire or increase troop numbers. Thieu
remained in power
Nixon Conclusions:
Had Nixon truly achieved “peace with honor” a long term consequence of Saigon’s unpopularity
and refusal to reform its policies were reflected in 1975 when South Vietnam was overrun by the
Communists and consequently, Vietnam was united.
economy-society-politics
Economy:
- Budget deficit
- Higher taxes – austerity fiscal policy
- Allocated budget 120 billion to war instead of on the “Great Society” program. Only
spent 15.5 billion on it.
- High inflationary pressures
- Increased poverty
- Debt heavily increased
Society:
- Deeply divided
Nixon recognised this as he stated in one on his speeches that Americans should be united for
peace, as only Americans could ‘defeat or humiliate the USA’.
Over 200,000 Americans were wounded or killed in Vietnam. Many came back with alcohol and
drug problems.
- University protests increased in Vietnam a lot
Largest anti-war protest in American history 1969 “the moratorium” where millions took to the
streets in every major city
In Kent State University, 4 students were shot dead by the National Guard.
Politics
It could be argued that the war cost Nixon the presidency. The difficulties of gaining ‘peace with
honour ’ in the face of domestic opposition and Vietnamese intransigence were all factors that led
to the fall of his presidency and decline.
This was specifically reflected in the Watergate scandal. Had Nixon felt confident about his
policies in the Vietnam War, Watergate would probably not have happened.
It could be argued that the Vietnam War made the USA more careful and wary in regard to
foreign interventions and their consequences, however this was not continued or sustained, as
further involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq would prove otherwise.