Urban Studies, Vol. 37, No.
5–6, 895–908, 2000
Changing Patterns of Regional Governance in the
EU
Peter Newman
[Paper Ž rst received, December 1999; in Ž nal form, January 2000]
Introduction
Finding the right scale at which to manage a
competitive European economy, solve en-
vironmental problems and ensure social co-
hesion is no nearer now than at the beginning
of the 1990s when the prospect of a Europe
of regions seemed to provide the answer.
Political agendas have moved on. The Eu-
ropean Commission has become increasingly
interested in urban rather than regional pol-
icy. Economic and monetary union have
highlighted differences in the speed of inte-
gration between Euroland and other member-
states. Enlargement of the EU brings a new
geography with regional disadvantage con-
centrated in the east. Some regionalist aspira-
tions—in Scotland, for example—have been,
achieved, at least in part. Other, new, re-
gionalist claims, such as that for Padania,
have emerged. Europe still contains a variety
of experiences of regional governance. Re-
gional reform remains on the agenda in most
European states and nowhere is there the
feeling that the institutional mixture is about
right.
The deŽ nition of regions at some inter-
mediate level between nation-state and local
government has always been problematic.
The concept of region has to work even
harder to accommodate the range of contem-
porary uses applied to new spaces of econ-
omic change and political ambition. In recent
Peter Newman is in the School of the Built Environment, University of Westminster, 35 Marylebone Road, London, NW1 5LS, UK.
Fax: 0207 911 5171. E-mail: newmanp@westminster.ac.uk.
0042-0980 Print/1360-063X On-line/00/05–60895-14 Ó
years, a strong theme in academic discourse
has been economic regionalisation and the
new institutions required for effective re-
gional governance in response to economic
competition (Scott, 1998; Barnes and Lede-
bur, 1998). The Ž rst part of this paper argues
that, whilst competition may well be the
driving force behind the search for new
forms of regional governance, more explicit
political explanations of the development of
regions are required. Three sets of factors are
identiŽ ed which interact to shape the devel-
opment of regional governance. These are,
mobilisation around regional identities, na-
tional constitutional and political contexts
and the Europeanisation of regional policy.
Focusing on economic development and
planning, the paper then goes on to examine
two contrasting scales at which European
regions are being redeŽ ned—the super-
regions promoted by the European Com-
mission and the level of city-region gover-
nance—and where politics intervenes
strongly to shape the form and scope of
regions.
Economic Regions and Functional Institu-
tions
A common reference point in academic dis-
course about regions is contemporary global-
2000 The Editors of Urban Studies
896 PETER NEWMAN
isation and the search for regional competi-
tive advantage. This type of argument is
exempliŽ ed by Brenner (1999). The idea of
the ‘denationalisation’ of space (Brenner,
1999, p. 435) has become a starting-point for
understanding new forms of government.
Brenner imagines a state turned ‘inside out’
as it Ž rst attempts, from the ‘inside’, to pro-
mote the competitiveness of its cities and
regions and secondly, on the ‘outside’, tries
to regulate economic change through higher-
level institutions such as the IMF or EU.
From this perspective, the driving force of
institutional change is the need to match
government institutions to the new economic
spaces of a global economy. Economic
change and the shift from an economics of
regions based on comparative advantage to
concern with competitive advantage has ‘in-
stitutional prerequisites’ (Brenner, 1999,
p. 440). Scott (1998) makes a similar case for
new necessary governance institutions to
manage regionalised economies. The scale of
some of these functional institutions is not
that clear. Brenner, for example, talks about
the south of England or a Frankfurt–Paris–
London axis as new ‘regions’. What is clear,
however, is the functional necessity of gover-
nance at the appropriate scale. It is the new
spatial regime of global economic change
that requires new sets of institutions. The
weakness of this form of reasoning is ex-
posed, however, when the necessary institu-
tions fail to appear. Our view is that political
processes will intervene to shape or obstruct
the formation of new forms of regional gov-
ernance.
A slightly different perspective on rela-
tions between new regional economies and
governance suggests that it is the particular
quality of governance institutions that gives
an edge in the regional competition which
characterises the modern economy. For
Amin (1999), it is not simple autonomy at an
appropriate regional scale which makes a
difference, but the character and density of
both politics and civil society. Thus,
Many of the prosperous regions of Europe
are also regions of participatory politics,
active citizenship, civic pride, and intense
institutionalization of collective interest—
of society brought back into the art of
governance (Amin, 1999, p. 373).
The ‘prosperous regions’ cited include the
Italian industrial districts and Baden-
Württemburg. It is clear that having the right
institutions creates economic advantage.
Amin acknowledges that not all regions may
develop such institutions—some rural areas,
for example—but the message is that those
who can should follow the lead of economi-
cally successful regions. Those factors which
might inhibit such a transition—differences
in political culture, electoral cycles, party-
political con ict—and which might account
for some of the variation between regions are
not part of the argument. Building regional
governance of the right sort does, however,
need the right Ž scal policies and Amin ar-
gues that institutional reforms need a context
of economic support at EU level. What is
functionally necessary may thus be thwarted
by the failure of international policy. How-
ever, there is a clear relationship between
new economic challenges and appropriate
governance institutions. The economics of
regionalism drive institutional reforms even
if macro policies are wrong or some regions
are further ahead in their institutional devel-
opment. The politics of the ‘prosperous re-
gion’ may, for Amin, be the model to follow,
but effective new institutions could equally
emerge from the historically blurred
boundaries between public and private
spheres in less-favoured regions (Seixas,
1999). However attractive the prospect of
‘society brought back into governance’ may
be, we have to avoid regarding governance
institutions as a simple adjustment to econ-
omic forces and as following a single model
of change.
The ways in which political factors shape
regional governance are also of secondary
importance to those commentators who em-
phasise the qualities of civil society over
constitutional or formal structures of govern-
ment. For example, Cooke et al. (1998) at-
tempt to deŽ ne ideal regional institutions to
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
support innovation in regional economies.
Whilst the origins and character of regional
governance are identiŽ ed as signiŽ cant fac-
tors, and they remain uncertain about which
factors hold the key to strong innovative
capacity, it is nonetheless asserted that
regions must evolve towards associative
disposition if they are to sustain inno-
vation (Cooke et al., 1998, p. 1579).
There is a preferred destination to institu-
tional change and such conclusions in-
evitably underplay actual reasons why
particular forms, associative or not, of re-
gional politics emerge. Additionally, the em-
phasis on civicness or associative qualities
may well be overstated. Keating (1997) uses
the example of post-war Germany to illus-
trate how, rather than civic tradition shaping
governance institutions, formal institutional
change can impact on civic tradition, devel-
oping, in that case, a new democratic culture
and institutional context for economic suc-
cess. Thus different forms of political inter-
vention and institutional change can impact
on regional governance. Neither economic
nor sociological factors alone provide
sufŽ cient explanation of institutional change
or account for the range of European experi-
ences of regionalisation.
Much contemporary analysis then seems
to underplay the politics of the formation of
regions tending to view regional institutions
as either functional necessities for economic
regions, or as measures of the stock of social
capital. Drawing on recent summaries of the
development of regional institutions from a
political science perspective (for example,
Rhodes, 1995; Le Galès and Lequesne, 1998;
Keating, 1997) three sets of political fac-
tors seem crucial to the understanding of
contemporary regionalisation in Europe.
These are, mobilisation around regional pol-
itical identities, national political contexts
and the Europeanisation of regional policy.
The next section brie y examines the import-
ance of each of these factors in recent devel-
opments in regional governance across
Europe.
897
The Politics of Regionalisation
Political mobilisation and the assertion of
new regional identities are clearly signiŽ cant
factors in shaping European regions. For
example, Italian regionalism in the 1990s
was dominated by the emergence of the
northern political parties. The Lega Nord
had strong roots in the industrial districts of
the region (Wild, 1997). Unlike other re-
gionalist movements (for example, in
Catalonia where the Convergència I Unio
promoted Catalan regionalism and the idea
of Catalonia in a Europe of regions) few of
the new elected members had political ex-
perience, with 80 per cent of them coming
from local SMEs. Wild (1997, p. 99) argues
that the League “is the self representation of
industrial districts in their search for regional
power”. However, whilst the League has
strong economic roots, speciŽ c political fac-
tors account for its impact. It was the weak-
ness of the former majority party, the DC
(Christian Democrat Party), which allowed
new politicians to capture seats. Addition-
ally, if the League cannot gain national
power, the instrumentalist approach of the
Lega Nord supporters could turn to support
for other parties more able to deliver results
(Wild, 1997) or the party could try to de-
velop a cultural politics (such as that around
the idea of an independent and historical
northern state of Padania) to strengthen se-
cessionist claims.
Regional identity has also had profound
impacts on Belgium where regionalisation
has effectively dismantled the relatively
short-lived nation-state. Differences in econ-
omic wealth, language and cultural heritage
served to sharpen regional boundaries and
generate differences between the governance
systems of Flanders and Wallonia (de Rynck,
1998). Spatial planning was made difŽ cult
where, in the case of Flanders and Brussels,
new regional boundaries cut across the econ-
omic space. Political and cultural identities
can foster regionalism, but equally can work
against effective regional governance.
The search for functional regional institu-
tions can underestimate the continuing
898 PETER NEWMAN
in uence of European nation-states. As Keat-
ing argues,
A regional level of government is emerg-
ing in many parts of Europe, but its pow-
ers and status vary and are largely
dependent on the individual state regime
(Keating, 1997, p. 135).
Formal structures of government and politi-
cal regimes shape regional institutional de-
velopment as much as economies or civic
tradition. While for some commentators (see,
for example, Parker, 1997) the nation-state
may be seen as a temporary political con-
struction as European political space returns
to a system of cities, such perspectives over-
play the speed at which constitutional and
political contexts set by European states are
withering away.
Constitutional differences, degree of
autonomy, Ž scal powers, plan-making pow-
ers all make a difference in shaping regional
institutions. There is a clear difference be-
tween regionalisation in federal and unitary
states. European regions vary from those
based in fully federal systems to weak forms
of functional regionalisation. Understanding
differences within European states, however,
requires more than just reference to consti-
tutional factors. Within national boundaries,
not all regions move in the same direction. In
Spain, for example, movement towards re-
gional autonomy is proceeding at different
speeds with Catalonia, Galicia, Andalucia,
Valencia and the Basque country and Ca-
naries having full powers, including some
discretion over taxation, under the consti-
tution.
In recent years, many national govern-
ments have renewed their interest in regional
government and policy. During the 1990s,
Federal Germany has been adjusting to re-
uniŽ cation. (Later we look at some of the
practical implications of imposing the west-
ern regional system in the east.) In the mid
1990s, the Federal government reviewed the
German urban and regional system in terms
of its global competitiveness and identiŽ ed a
set of ‘European metropolitan regions’ to
enhance competitiveness and accelerate Eu-
ropean integration (Ministry of Environmen-
tal Affairs, 1998). The new map of German
cities showed a familiar balanced, polycen-
tric system which the government thought
already gave Germany some competitive ad-
vantage. The signiŽ cance of the review was
both its federal origins and its emphasis on
cities and groupings of cities as competitive
assets. The city-region was seen to have ad-
vantages over narrowly drawn cities. Berlin,
for example, was acknowledged as not big
enough whereas the newly deŽ ned metro-
politan area has a “wide range of options,
international connections, and competitive
companies, landscape and cultural treasures”
(Ministry of Environmental Affairs, 1998,
p. 16). Critics argue that some of these Eu-
ropean metropolitan regions are artiŽ cial
constructs. While the Rhine-Ruhr region, for
example, may outweigh Frankfurt in some
industrial categories, its economy is dis-
persed and different parts of the regions have
distinctive cultural histories (Dieleman and
Faludi, 1998). Such problems are perhaps
inevitable products of the top-down reformu-
lation of regions.
In European unitary states, national gov-
ernments have also reviewed regional gover-
nance and responded to regional demands.
The nationalist aspirations of Scotland and
Wales have been acknowledged in the estab-
lishment of new elected assemblies, albeit
with limited powers compared to some other
European regions. In Northern Ireland, emer-
gent new regional and international institu-
tions form another part of the wide-ranging
constitutional reforms of the Labour govern-
ment. In England, the aspirations of regions
in the 1980s and 1990s (see Harding et al.,
1996) have not been fulŽ lled. New, centrally
controlled development agencies could be
seen as forerunners of more devolved re-
gional structures. On the other hand, they
have been assigned a clear functional role by
national government to ‘punch their weight’
in international competition (DETR, 1997)
on behalf of the nation-state and further re-
form seems unlikely in the short term.
French regional reforms of 1980s did not
produce dynamic regions (Le Galès and
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
John, 1997). In part, this is because the state
remains strong, controlling budgets, dis-
tributing of EU funds and tying the regions
into four-yearly ‘contracts’ of infrastructure
expenditure. In addition, the bigger cities and
départements also have economic develop-
ment and planning powers and continue to be
involved in regional-scale decisions. Under
the Jospin government elected in 1997, there
has been debate about more radical regional
reform led by Dominique Voynet, the en-
vironment Minister, from the Verts party.
Any devolutionary ambitions have, however,
been countered by the Minister of the In-
terior, concerned about the integrity of the
French state. The expression of regionalist
ambitions in Corsica is also seen as a chal-
lenge to national unity.
Within this strong nationalist context, spa-
tial planning has some regional dimensions
with French regions involved in numerous
international planning bodies across national
borders. This international planning and the
perceived need to Ž nd the right scale of
regional planning to compete effectively in
Europe have become the main focus of na-
tional planning (CIADT, 1998). In a similar
way to Germany, thought has been given to
the map of regions and to competitive groups
of cities—Strasbourg–Nancy–Metz, the
Nord–Pas de Calais region, Rennes–Nantes,
Toulouse–Bordeaux, Lyon–Montpellier–
Marseilles and the Paris basin. These group-
ings of cities cut across formal regional
boundaries. Only in the case of the Paris
basin, comprising 8 of the 22 French regions,
has such co-operation been formalised and
joint development plans agreed. The process
of joint planning between state and regions
has, since its introduction in the late 1980s,
been dominated by the state.
In many of the peripheral states of the EU,
regionalisation is relatively underdeveloped.
In Portugal, however, at the end of the 1990s
there was a prospect of regional reform.
The proposals were rejected in a referendum
in 1998. There are numerous explanations
put forward to account for the rejection of
reform. A history of strong central govern-
ment and national cultural identity probably
899
gave little foundation to regionalist senti-
ments.
In those countries expected to join the EU
over the next few years, the variety of re-
gional government is as great as in the exist-
ing member-states. There are increasing
economic disparities between capital-city
regions and provincial regions and varying
capacities to respond to such challenges. In
most states, the creation of an ‘intermediate
tier’ of governance is seen as an urgent issue
(Bachtler and Downes, 1999), but an ac-
knowledged danger is that regionalisation
may be seen as a substitute for effective
central government action to develop re-
gional economies (Horváth, 1999).
The contexts in which regional governance
operates are complex and vary considerably
across Europe. However, the expansion of
European regional policy can be argued to
have given some common direction to the
development of regional institutions. The Eu-
ropean Commission encourages regionalisa-
tion and interregional co-operation, and
legitimises the development of the Com-
mittee of the Regions beyond the limited role
set out for it in the Maastrict Treaty (War-
leigh, 1997). Support from the European
structural funds has in Scotland (Danson et
al., 1999) and elsewhere been a necessary
catalyst to the formation of cross-sector part-
nerships. Groups of cities have actively mar-
keted themselves as European regions and
have lobbied Brussels for funding. Across
Europe, it can be argued that money has led
institutional development and new regional
identities. But evidence of lasting reform of
regional governance is less clear. In the uni-
tary states, national governments negotiate
European budgets on behalf of their regions.
In many smaller states, the participation of
regional institutions in European projects
continues to be weak. For example, in
Greece, the Community Support Frameworks
which justify bids for European funding have
been determined by national, not regional,
government. This continues to be the case for
the 2000–06 funding period, even though the
European Commission lays emphasis on re-
gional participation in developing these pro-
900 PETER NEWMAN
grammes. Local government is excluded
both from the formulation of new pro-
grammes and discussion of the results of the
last round. Allocation of European funds is
done by Ministry and by sector (Tsoulouvis,
1999). There is little involvement of the vol-
untary sector and where business is brought
into funding partnerships few of these insti-
tutional arrangements survive the end of
funding.
In the case of the UK, it is not however
clear whether it is regional, national or Eu-
ropean institutions which have beneŽ ted
most from the Europeanisation of regional
policy (Martin, 1998). Relationships between
different scales of government have undoubt-
edly become more complex and some at-
tempts have been made to schematise the
uncertain emerging structures of European
governance. Governance can be seen as
‘multilevel’ (Marks, 1993) or perhaps better
as a system of overlapping ‘spheres’ of auth-
ority (Benington and Harvey, 1994).
The negotiation of regional governance
will involve some or all of varying local,
regional, national and international spheres.
Regions may increasingly be in search of
European funds and all face competition for
development, but regional governance is not
a simple functional prerequisite. Regional
governance develops from the interaction of
European and national institutional contexts
and through the mobilisation of regional
identities. In the next part of the paper, we
examine two contrasting scales of regionali-
sation at super-regional and city-regional
level. At super-regional level, national poli-
tics confront European ambitions and the
attempt to identify and reorient states and
citizens to a new super-regional scale raises
potential con icts with more localised re-
gional and national identities. In the exam-
ples of city-regional governance, we examine
new regional institutions that have failed to
take hold. The reasons for this have to do
with short-term and localised political inter-
ests. At both the supranational and the city-
region scales, governance is the outcome of
con ict and negotiation around different
deŽ nitions of ‘region’.
Super-regions
Globalisation is argued to impact on both
regional groupings of cities (Scott, 1998;
Hall, 1998) and on the structure of city-
regions (Kunzman, 1996). We look Ž rst at
attempts to rethink the European urban and
regional system and redeŽ ne regions at a
supranational scale. In recent years, both the
European Commission and the member-
states have made several attempts to recon-
ceptualise ‘super-regions’ transcending
national boundaries and relating the con-
struction of European space to broad econ-
omic trends. We look in particular at the
attempt to deŽ ne a European spatial develop-
ment perspective (CSD, 1999) and at how
appropriate regional responses to globalisa-
tion are deŽ ned in this and other related
policy documents.
The statistical deŽ nition of European re-
gions has always been fraught with difŽ culty.
One recent review claims that the use of
NUTS regions overestimates regional dispar-
ities (Casellas and Galley, 1999). The
character of regions (for example, Hamburg
and Calabria) varies as much as the Ž gures
pointing to statistical divergence (from 192.5
per cent of average GDP to 59.2 per cent, for
example; CEC, 1999). The reduction of dis-
parities lies at the heart of EU policies. The
map of regions changes over time as the
Commission attempts to distinguish varying
regional fortunes. In its most recent review
of regional convergence, the Commission
identiŽ es three types of region: ‘large urban
service centres’, ‘industrial regions’ based on
medium-sized cities and rural regions (CEC,
1999). These distinctions are used to high-
light the different pace of convergence in
some states. For example, Dublin and Lisbon
as large urban centres are developing faster
than their rural hinterlands.
The geography of regional difference con-
tinues to throw up more regional
classiŽ cations. For example, in constructing
an argument against convergence, Heidenre-
ich (1998) disentangles eight types of region:
‘metropolitan’, ‘semiperipheral service re-
gions’, ‘poor service regions’, ‘industrial
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
core’, ‘semi periphery’ and ‘periphery’, ‘col-
lapsed industrial regions’ and ‘Mediterranean
agricultural regions’. Such a reconceptualisa-
tion of regional space leads to the conclusion
that there has been little of the expected
industrialisation of the periphery, whereas in
the core of the European economy industry
and services have successfully adapted to
global competitive challenges. DeŽ ning re-
gions has become all the more difŽ cult when
we start to see ‘regions’ at a level above the
nation-state in the form of the super-regions
mapped by the European Commission (CEC,
1994).
Such attempts to give some economic and
geographical coherence to regions interest
policy-makers as well as academics. In a
series of research reports (CEC, 1990, 1994),
the European Commission logged economic
and spatial trends and developed the idea of
a set of ‘super-regions’. The reports’ view
was that global competition may worsen im-
balances within Europe and offered a vision
of city-regions as specialised production cen-
tres with educated workforces and with de-
veloped capacities to adapt to change. The
super-regional spaces were intended to cap-
ture common sets of problems, but proved
contentious. At the heart of Europe, the
‘Centre Capitals’ region stretched from Paris
to Bonn, to Amsterdam, Brussels and Lon-
don and outweighed others in economic and
political importance. Political renegotiation
produced a new set of super-regional
boundaries. The previously excluded cities of
Dublin and Glasgow now feature in the
North West Metropolitan Area (NWMA,
1998). There has also been a shift in objec-
tives
The aim is to move towards a more cohes-
ive, balanced and sustainable development
so that Europe can enjoy the long-term
beneŽ ts offered by the complex competi-
tive environment in which we now Ž nd
ourselves (NWMA, 1998, preface).
‘Balance’, ‘cohesion’ and ‘sustainability’ are
clearly related to competition in this framing
of large regional spaces. Competition also
underlies the development during the 1990s
901
of a European spatial development perspec-
tive or ESDP (CSD, 1999). The ESDP
re ects many of the complexities of de-
cision-making between member-states. Orig-
inally an idea of Jacques Delors to produce a
spatial framework for development in the
single market, the work had to proceed infor-
mally though the Committee on Spatial De-
velopment (CSD) with periodic meetings of
the planning ministers of the member-states.
Work proceeded faster when the European
Presidency fell to those states with strong
planning traditions. A Ž rst draft was pro-
duced at the Leipzig meeting in 1994, setting
agreed goals of balancing economic and so-
cial cohesion, sustainable development and
competitiveness. The objective spelled out in
the Ž nal version of the ESDP is to achieve
development of a balanced and polycentric
city system and a new urban rural partner-
ship securing parity of access to infrastruc-
ture and knowledge; and sustainable
development, prudent management and
protection of nature and cultural heritage
(CSD, 1999, p. 11).
The argument suggests that stronger inte-
gration of European regions into the global
economy beneŽ ts the competitiveness of the
European economy. The ESDP identiŽ es
leading regions as ‘global economy inte-
gration zones’.
The creation and enlargement of several
dynamic global economy integration zones
provides an important instrument for ac-
celerating economic growth and job cre-
ation in the EU, particularly in regions
currently regarded as structurally weak
(CSD, 1999, p. 20).
The leading regions are regarded as models
to follow. The earlier objective of balancing
strong and weak regions has taken on a
different meaning. For, now, “competition is
very positive” (CSD, 1999, p. 65), as those
successful regions strengthen the whole Eu-
ropean economy. In earlier drafts and in the
Europe 2000 studies, competition had also
been associated with the negative impacts of
congestion on environmental quality in the
902 PETER NEWMAN
regions of the core of the European econ-
omy. The policy debate now echoes those
academics who describe a system of globally
competitive regions, with, at best, the hope
that the less competitive will catch up.
This process of rethinking the European
urban and regional system throws up a num-
ber of problems. The Ž rst is that the
boundaries of European ‘regions’ have be-
come further confused. ‘Global economy in-
tegration zones’ could not be expected to
follow traditional administrative boundaries.
The mapping of regions which supports the
ESDP is that created by the Commission to
deŽ ne zones for international co-operation
and funding support through its INTERREG
programmes. Thus, in so far as competitive
funding  ows from the ESDP, it does so to a
set of relatively incoherent super-regions.
More important than the confusion of regions
are the political consequences of the project.
The ESDP attempts to overlay an idea of
polycentrality on the long-standing concep-
tion of a Europe of core and periphery. This
is an obviously less politically contentious
concept. But nonetheless the political conse-
quences of this attempt to reconceptualise
European space create difŽ culties for the
spatial planning project. Jensen and Richard-
son (1999) identify two dissenting voices.
First, states on the southern periphery may be
prepared to go along with the idea of catch-
ing up core regions as long as the  ow of
funds for infrastructure projects continues.
However, after the current round of structural
funding in 2006, such support may no longer
be available. The GDP of the ‘cohesion’
countries (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portu-
gal) is forecast to be at 78 per cent of the EU
average in 1999 rising from 65 per cent 10
years ago. Looking ahead, in the case of
Greece, whereas in 1993 GDP stood at 64
per cent of the EU level, by 2006 this is
expected to have risen to 80 per cent (Tsou-
louvis, 1999). The claims for funding support
from those countries hoping to join the EU in
the near future will be greater. Regional
development support for Hungary alone is
estimated at between ECU 1.5–2 billion
(Horváth, 1999). With the accession of cen-
tral European states, the consensus around
‘positive competition’ may start to fall away.
Problems can also be foreseen on the
northern periphery. One argument there is
that whilst the ESDP favours support for
globally competitive cities, most of Europe is
not urbanised. The ESDP makes mention of
urban–rural relationships, but rural regions
do not Ž gure as ‘global economy integration
zones’. A further political issue lies in the
varying responsiveness of different, more or
less developed, local democratic systems to
the imposition of a large-scale regional
model of the future of European space.
For the present, the CSD has few ways of
tying its model of competitive regions to
national and regional plans. Some states
(Netherlands, Denmark) have adapted na-
tional planning documents. Others (UK) will
write the ESDP into regional plans. The only
line of budgetary support for the ideas of the
ESDP is through the INTERREG pro-
gramme. International co-operation around
cross-border super-regions has been develop-
ing for some time—although developing
workable institutions at this level has been
faced with severe political constraints. For
example, the Euroregion established in 1991
between UK, France and Belgium has had a
chequered history. The objective of regional
planning at this scale—one below the Centre
Capitals super-region—was to share ap-
proaches to what were perceived as common
issues arising from the shared, cross-Channel
border. The regional geography, however,
proved more complex, with little coherence
between the depressed former coalŽ eld areas
and more prosperous parts of Kent and Flan-
ders. National constitutional differences also
hindered co-operation. The UK partner in
Euroregion was the administrative county of
Kent, dependent on national government
both for Ž nance and policy guidance. Nord-
Pas de Calais had the advantage of elected
regional government, although with limited
autonomy from the French state. On the
other hand, the Euroregion coincided with
the fragmentation of Belgium into three re-
gions—Flanders, Wallonia and the Brussels
city-region—with each having almost com-
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
plete constitutional autonomy. These differ-
ences inhibited the ability to set up and agree
to implement common programmes. Further
difŽ culties arose from cultural differences.
The nationalist aspirations of the new Bel-
gian regions limited their willingness to en-
gage in joint action with each other, let alone
with international partners. Political
difŽ culties got in the way of international
regionalism. What broke the Euroregion was
competition between the partner regions and
the cities within them. The Euroregion con-
tains some large cities: Brussels 1.6 million,
Lille conurbation 1 million, and Liège over
half a million population. Lille and Liège had
their own development agendas and bid
against the Euroregion for funding from the
European Commission.
The range of problems in the way of de-
veloping international institutions concerned
national politics, cultural difŽ culties (over
the language of discussion, for example) and
a lack of consensus about the region as the
appropriate boundary for bidding for funds.
For the major cities, it was the city or city-
region that made political sense as a unit for
economic development. Euroregion was re-
constituted in 1999, but this time pro-
grammes aim to tackle common urban
problems. It was no longer looking at re-
gional solutions, but at solving problems and
developing demonstration projects for com-
petitiveness, infrastructure and sustainability
(NWMA, 1998). In the context of the ESDP,
with the emphasis now on dynamic cities in
‘global economy integration zones’, this
scale of international region takes on a differ-
ent dynamic. The shift from region to city
can also be seen in the growing in uence of
city networks. The leading cities of Eurore-
gion are members of the 90-city-strong Eu-
rocities network which lobbies on behalf of a
self-deŽ ned set of dynamic cities which
share technical knowledge and expertise.
Each seeks an international reputation and
most have sought to enhance their inter-
national status through undertaking large
projects (Gachelin, 1998). Their shared spa-
tial imagination is of a ‘functional urban
area’ rather than any wider region.
903
Eurocities believes this concept will be-
come a key element in the approach to
urban development (Eurocities, 1998,
p. 69).
The network also wants the European Com-
mission to have a competence in urban as
well as regional issues. The Commission and
the major cities have a common view of a
Europe of city-regions within some larger-
scale conceptualisation of European space.
The space of regions is not Ž xed and is
moving in particular ways both towards a
large international scale and down to the
city-regional area. These ambitions obvi-
ously come up against established regional
boundaries and competencies in the nation-
states. Constitutional differences and the rel-
ative economic position of cities and regions
create differing capacities to respond to such
a super-regional reshaping of space. What is
signiŽ cant in the development of the super-
regional scale is how debate about a Europe
of regions or regional planning has become
dominated by concern about competitive-
ness. It is cities, their functional regions and
wider networks, which are now seen as the
drivers of a competitive European economy.
It may be that regionalisation in Europe is
being shaped as much by the interaction of
the European Commission and cities, than by
formal attempts to reorganise regions within
nation-states. Rescaling European regions
does not follow inevitably from economic
imperatives but is the outcome of speciŽ c
interactions of European, national, regional
and city institutions.
Making City-regions Work
City-regions are now seen by many commen-
tators (see, for example, Hall, 1998) as the
motors of a European economy. The re-
conŽ guration of city-regional economies
raises a set of concerns about appropriate
institutional responses. Some states have at-
tempted to change the boundaries and func-
tions of formal institutions of regional
government. Elsewhere, there is developing
interest in deŽ ning new mechanisms of co-
904 PETER NEWMAN
operation to exploit economic opportunities
and to ameliorate the environmental and so-
cial impacts of economic restructuring. How-
ever, whilst both academics and
policy-makers would like to see effective
regional institutions emerge at this level, it is
difŽ cult to Ž nd positive examples and in this
section we examine the reasons why co-
operation, however desirable, can fail to take
root. Actual forms depend on national con-
text, but also on the interaction of national
and sub-national institutions and the extent to
which new regional identities can transcend
economic and political constraints.
As far as the European Commission and
the CSD are concerned, the future of Eu-
ropean regionalism lies with competitive
‘zones’ exempliŽ ed by the groups of cities at
the core of the European economy. Leading
cities see European space as constructed
from a network of functional urban areas.
There is increasing interest in understanding
forms of intergovernmental co-operation at
city-regional scale. European debate overlaps
to a certain extent with the development in
the US of a ‘new regionalism’ and renewed
interest in relating central cities to their sub-
urbs (see Swanstrom, 1996; and Savitch and
Vogel, 1996).
Several arguments can be put forward for
the revival of interest in Europe in co-
operation at this level. In reviewing recent
trends for the OECD, Heinz (1998) suggests
three main reasons. First is the functional
dispersal of urban activities. Kunzman
(1996) presents a stylised picture of the new
European city-regions which incorporate new
technology zones, high-level service cores,
and tourist and airport zones. These activities
spread beyond central-city boundaries and
their functional links require institutional and
policy co-ordination. The second reason is
the regionalisation of funding and in particu-
lar the encouragement given to intraregional
co-operation by European funding pro-
grammes. Where co-operation develops
around funding there is, however, a tendency
to see the same agenda reproduced from
place to place in order to Ž t funding criteria.
The third reason advanced is the familiar
issue of competition. Fragmented authority
across functional regions may work against
competitiveness.
However, whilst there may be good rea-
sons for city-regional co-operation, examples
of effective institutions at this level are not
easily found. In some states, mechanisms for
intergovernmental co-operation already ex-
ist—for example, the legislative framework
for single-purpose (SIVU) or multipurpose
intercommunal agencies (SIVOM) in France.
Such legislative backing for co-operation is
rare. Voluntary co-operative networks are
common in Germany—for example, the MAI
(Munich, Augsburg, Ingolstadt) network fo-
cused on co-operation between central city
and surrounding suburbs. Where it exists,
intraregional co-operation may not always
re ect local initiative, but may be imposed
by higher-level governments which—
especially at election time—may sense politi-
cal advantage in being seen to devolve power
(Rehfeld and Weibler, 1998).
The most comprehensive city-regional
structure is the French communautés ur-
baines (Lefèvre, 1998). These institutions
were established in most large cities in the
1960s and share multiple functions including
planning and development and in some cases
sharing tax revenues between communes. In
the search for such comprehensive metro-
politan government, other states have been
considering formal changes to the structure
of government in their large conurbations. In
Rotterdam and Amsterdam, such ventures
failed when put to referendums.
The recent history of Frankfurt and its
region points to some of the complexity of
the process of reform. Concerned about in-
creasing interregional competition, the cham-
bers of commerce and large municipalities
pressed for structural reforms and the re-
placement of the UVF (Umlandverband
Frankfurt) by a new regional union, which
would have a range of powers, its own re-
sources and measures for equalising local
government Ž nances. An alternative proposal
preferred a Regionalkries Rhein-Main which
would operate as a single tier between the
land and local authorities. In these debates, it
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
was apparent that different functional areas
threw up different ideal territories (Heinz,
1996). Relationships between organisational
form and policy orientation had to be deter-
mined. For example, market-led or redis-
tributive approaches would demand different
types of regional agency. The legitimacy of
new agencies also needed much greater re-
gional consciousness in the local population.
In his review of metropolitan co-operation,
Lefèvre (1998) Ž nds few cases of metropoli-
tan government at the right scale. Numerous
factors get in the way, and, not surprisingly,
building political alliances and maintaining
legitimacy is difŽ cult. For example, the Ré-
gion Urbaine de Lyon proposed in the late
1980s was the product of the political ambi-
tions of the mayor of Lyon. The fact that this
functionally deŽ ned urban region accounted
for 80 per cent of the GDP of the existing
Rhône-Alpes region drew the understandable
opposition of the President of the elected
regional council (Bardet and Jouve, 1998).
Political cultures can also stand in the way of
new forms of governance. Whilst, for exam-
ple, in Lisbon there are some signs of interest
in new forms of metropolitan governance,
Seixas (1999) argues, that there are limits to
such initiatives. The existence of big projects
and national political bases in the main urban
regions works against the development of
new structures. Traditions of clientèlism pre-
pare few local mayors for new forms of
governance. At metropolitan level, Lisbon is
made up of 18 municipalities with each
mayor capable of blocking co-operation. The
mayors tend to prefer informal arrangements
and there have been no meetings of the stra-
tegic council of the city of Lisbon in recent
years because it is politically irrelevant. It
was fear of charges of favouritism which
stalled the city-centre modernisation agency.
One positive example in the early 1990s was
that of Bologna where popular regional gov-
ernance focused on the voluntary and  exible
‘Accordo per la Cittá Metropolitana’ which
groups 48 municipalities (see Lefèvre, 1998).
However, at city-region level, formal solu-
tions—redrawing boundaries and setting up
new regional governments—tend not to work
905
for long. The history of London metropolitan
government makes this clear. Recently, Lon-
don business élites established new agencies
(London First) to respond to competition, but
this London-wide lobby did not have the
legitimacy of elected government (Newman
and Thornley, 1997). To solve the legitimacy
problem, new regional government has been
imposed from above, but this does not have
the advantages of  exible boundaries or the
single-mindedness of its informal predeces-
sors. The functional region is now managed
by three separate economic development
agencies. Such institutional fragmentation
may work against competitiveness and lead
before long to calls for further reform.
In contrast to such formal attempts to pro-
duce competitive city-regions, in other
metropolitan areas there are attempts to re-
build regional governance from the bottom
up. We can look in some detail at such
developments in the Berlin region and at the
types of lesson to be drawn for the future of
intraregional co-operation.
The extent to which actors may wish to
co-operate depends on their perception of
economic interest and their perception of
whether they are gaining or ceding power. In
political theory, the idea of governance rests
on a particular conception of power. Co-
operation and putting together governing al-
liances draws on the concept of power as
‘power to’ achieve goals rather than power
over territory (Keating, 1997). If city-regions
are increasingly functionally integrated, then
new development wherever located should
bring advantages for all. Rather than compet-
ing against neighbouring authorities, co-
operation ought to make sense. Co-operation
can also help gain access to external funding.
There are, however, many obstacles in the
way of co-operating and mobilising ‘power
to’. Short-term electoral cycles are one such
obstacle. The problems of regional and local
government Ž nance are another.
In the Berlin region, incentives to co-
operate look particularly strong. Both Berlin
and the Land Brandenburg have Ž nancial
problems. Since the setting up of the two
Land governments at the beginning of the
906 PETER NEWMAN
1990s, population and business have moved
across formal regional boundaries. Between
1991 and 1997, about 72 000 Berliners
moved into neighbouring suburbs. Functional
integration can also be seen in airport devel-
opment, the location of new distribution cen-
tres and out-of-town shopping development.
In fact, these interdependencies are so strong
that both the Berlin and the Brandenburg
governments supported a centralisation of
decision-making. However, the referendum
on merging the two Länder in 1996 failed to
win popular support in Brandenburg. The
alternative to constitutional reform was co-
operation. The Länder identiŽ ed economic
development, hospital and university plan-
ning, and security as areas for urgent co-
operation. A joint planning department and
joint regional plan for an area extending
about 20 km from Berlin’s borders has been
in place since 1998. However, the intended
joint economic development agency has not
been set up, although there is some co-
operation on international marketing. Joint
planning, however, faces severe challenges
when municipalities take their own deci-
sions—in particular in relation to large retail
developments. Those areas where some
agreement has been reached are those where
both Länder stand to win. These are: tourism
policy, joint applications for European and
federal funding, and international marketing.
However, once they have been attracted to
this part of Germany, individual authorities
then Ž ght over speciŽ c locations for foreign
Ž rms.
Both Länder have falling revenues and
high unemployment, and face high costs as-
sociated with modernisation. These Ž nancial
pressures on political leaders get in the way
of co-operation. Some innovative sub-
regional planning has emerged in various
sectors crossing the border between the two
Länder. Such processes have been facilitated
by external consultants and involve munici-
palities and districts of Berlin rather than the
city itself. The involvement of the city would
be politically unacceptable to Brandenburg
politicians. These relatively weak forms of
co-operation produce strategic plans, but do
not tackle fundamental issues of housing or
economic development (Senatsverwaltung
für Stadtenwicklung, 1996). There are other
informal co-operation mechanisms—around
the development of environmental strategies,
for example, but all of these attempts to build
regional co-operation from the bottom up
depend for resources and political support
from higher-level governments, the Länder.
Thus whilst functional imperatives suggest
co-operation in regional planning, existing
structures shape actual outcomes and the pol-
itical and Ž nancial realities of local govern-
ments determine the speed and degree of
co-operation.
Conclusions
Intraregional co-operation in most city-
regions is underdeveloped. Yet this arena of
regional co-operation is identiŽ ed as import-
ant by both academics and policy-makers at
city and European levels. Local political fac-
tors shape the forms of co-operation which
do emerge. Several commentators point to
the in uence of external funding in encour-
aging co-operative arrangements. On the
other hand, it can be argued that
External incentives usually only initialise
co-operative arrangements; how they are
established and sustained depends on the
cost–beneŽ t expectations of the partici-
pants (ARL, 1998, p. 2).
In the Berlin–Brandenburg case, these expec-
tations were constrained by the search for
short-term economic gain and the need to
maintain local political support. Where co-
operation does occur, it is around policies
where each side sees positive gains. Regional
co-operation in Berlin and elsewhere is most
likely where the expectation is ‘win–win’.
Such narrow thinking may, however, be
missing opportunities. It may be possible to
show that regional development is not a zero-
sum game. However, enforcing such views
may require the intervention of higher-level
authority. It was the French national govern-
ment that imposed the communautés ur-
baines on French conurbations. Where such
 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU
institutions do not exist—for example, in the
Parisian suburbs—competition overrides
symbolic strategic co-operation (Boyer et al.,
1999).
Recent academic work suggests both that
regionalised economies need effective gover-
nance institutions and that the best examples
of such institutions are to be found in those
developed regions with ‘associative disposi-
tions’. Leading European cities promote the
idea of city-regions as an appropriate scale of
governance and European policy aims to
transfer the success of city and regional mo-
tors at the core of the European economy to
the rest of Europe. Current debates about
regionalisation focus on the super-regional
level of European competitiveness and on
competitiveness created through co-operation
at city-region scale. The driving force behind
contemporary debate about European re-
gional governance is competition. However
actual patterns of regional governance in Eu-
rope remain varied, with few examples as-
piring to the expectations of academics or
policy-makers. We have argued that, in order
to understand how actual governance institu-
tions emerge and change, we need to pay
more attention to national and local political
contexts. A political problem facing regions
at whatever scale they are conceived is how
to create and sustain legitimacy for new insti-
tutions and policies. In the case of the ESDP,
there may only be a temporary consensus on
the model of competitive European space
which the document presents. The gradual
withdrawal of funding from the periphery
will expose con icting visions of European
development. Many commentators also agree
that monetary union will widen disparities
between rich and poor regions. At a different
scale, intraregional co-operation only seems
to work when beneŽ ts are visible and tan-
gible to all parties. The legitimacy of new
institutions depends on their ability to break
out of short-term electoral politics and how
well they can establish consensus around
wider regional goals.
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