Good on Paper: The Site C Dam

In this essay, I will argue that the Site C Dam would have not been approved if not for the

growing GDP and population of British Columbia. This sets an awful precedence for when

future sources of power will need to be built and it changes the conservations surrounding the

approval of these energy generation plants. Questions that arise surrounding the Site C Dam

mostly have to do with the value of energy for the Canadian and provincial government. At what

point does clean energy trump over the value of land heritage, environmental concerns, and

community concerns. The constantly growing population of Canada leads me to believe that the

federal government will turn a blind eye to the different groups that are against new energy

production plants and that they would rather side with the power companies. Environment

Minister Catherine McKenna has shown full support for the Site C Dam after it got approved by

the federal government (The Canadian Press, 2018).

In 2015, the British Columbia Supreme Court changed the Crown’s story of Treaty 8, the

court added that the Crown is not obligated under the Constitution Act of 1982 to determine if

the taking of the land for the construction of the Site C Dam is an infringement of treaty rights

(Gutman, 2018, p. 5). This ruling often referred to as the Prophet River ruling, means that the

Crown does not have to give a reason to take the land from the Treaty 8 First Nations. The

Prophet River ruling does not give the Crown power to take all of the lands. By building Site C

Dam, the Treaty 8 First Nations are robbed of their Treaty rights to maintain and continue their

way of life (Gutman, 2018, p. 18-19). These rights of fishing and hunting are hindered by the

loss of forest and land due to reservoirs being built. Gutman (2018) does not deny that the Crown

has a right to take up the lands under Treaty 8 (p. 27), but the Crown must consult and

accommodate the Treaty 8 First Nations. The British Columbia Supreme Court is the large
obstacle that the Treaty 8 First Nations face. After the completion of the Site C Dam, the British

Columbia Supreme Court will rule on whether or not Indigenous rights were violated. The

decision will come down to the understanding of the semantics in the Treaty 8 law and the

Prophet River ruling.

The Site C Dam created a power-struggle between the provincial government, federal

government, and BC Hydro. The provincial government passed the Utilities Commission Act in

1980, creating the the British Columbia Utilities Commission (BCUC). This act was created to

contain BC Hydro and stop them from starting more projects (Dusyk, 2011, p. 876). The BCUC

reviews major energy projects and regulate public utilities and the petroleum industry in the

province (Dusyk, 2011, p. 876). The Site C dam is one of those projects that has been delayed

over and over again until it became economically beneficial for the federal government to

approve it. 20 years ago, the Site C Dam did not out-value the environmental value that the land

has had. Today the Site C Dam is regarded as a source of clean energy that is needed to reach

carbon targets. By proposing the Site C Dam, BC Hydro has created a precedence for the

provincial government to decide whether or not the land value overweighs the potential value.

BCUC acts more as a land valuing commission and once the economic value outweighs the

environmental value, the B.C. government acts upon the potential economic growth.

According to Duysk (2011), the B.C. provincial government intends to export clean

energy to the U.S. even though there is a need for domestic energy (p. 877). In the BCUC Site C

Dam final report (2017), BC Hydro has said that it wants to renegotiate the Columbia River

Treaty and possibility even terminate the treaty (Appendix B-5). The logic behind BC Hydro’s

decision is that the Site C Dam will provide more energy than the Columbia River Treaty will.

The Columbia River Treaty also provides unnecessary risk for flooding in the reservoirs for the
BC Hydro Dams. The Site C Dam has put the B.C. government and BC Hydro against

Bonneville Power Administration and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (BCUC, 2017,

Appendix B-2). The cancelling of the Columbia River Treaty means lower costs for ratepayers,

but it puts BC Hydro in an awkward situation with the U.S. because they rent out out reservoir

storage to Bonneville Power Administration. We see a power struggle here because the location

of the Dam benefits from the Columbia River and both countries are trying to get the most out of

the river.

Just as important as the problem of the government weighing economic growth versus

environmental land value, there are problems revolving having truthful discussions surrounding

Site C Dam. It is concerning to see that only four out of the eight B.C. indigenous groups have

taken a stance against the Dam. It makes it seem like it has become a not-in-my-back-yard

problem instead of it being a stance of solidarity between the Treaty 8 First Nations. The Treaty

8 Tribal Association also believed that the third stage of the Site C Dam could not be started until

the Stage two consultation had been completed. This proved to be wrong as the premier of

British Columbia in 2010 flew out the Hudson’s Hope community and announced that stage one

and two have been accepted and the Site C Dam would move on to stage three: environmental

and regulatory review (Duysk, 2011, p. 878).

Duysk (2011) says that “within the region, the existing hydroelectric dams and the

original Site C hearings have left a different legacy -- one that appears to be increasingly at odds

with both the government’s energy planning objectives and processes (p. 880). In June 2010, the

B.C. provincial government passed the Clean Energy Act which circumscribes the role of the

BCUC giving the planning oversight to the provincial cabinet. According to Duysk (2001), this

means that the Site C Dam no longer needs to meet “the requirement for regulatory review under
the Utilities Commissions Act” (p. 878). The Clean Energy Act eliminates any opportunities for

independent scrutiny and public debate regarding the Site C Dam (Duysk, 2001, p. 878).

The lack of public debate has consequences, for example, the policies that the BCUC

have suggested in Site C Dam final report probably will never be considered. These policies aim

to mitigate risk and meet future energy needs. These policies include reopening Burrard

Thermal, a natural gas plant which is used as a back-up power generation plant for emergencies.

Another policy the BCUC suggests is leaving the Columbia River Treaty to benefit the Site C

Dam and not risk the chance of floods. Finally, the BCUC suggests that government should rely

more on the market to provide enough energy for the 16-hour winter peaks (BCUC, 2017, p.

186). The B.C. provincial government has different ideas, they plan to export more energy out of

the province and keep the Burrard Thermal plant closed to reach carbon targets. The Canadian

Center for Policy Alternatives says that completing the Site C Dam will further increase the debt

of BC Hydro and increase rates of BC Hydro costumers, which will impact lower income

households that have and will continue to experience major affordability challenges (BCUC,

2017, p. 77).

Conversation between the parties against the Dam and the provincial and federal

government have been non-existent. It seems that the government has no interest in halting the

construction of the Dam. When Sarah Cox (2016) wanted answers about the cost and social

impacts of the Site C Dam, she contacted the Ministry of Aboriginal Relations and

Reconciliation, she was referred to the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resources, who in

turn referred her to ask BC Hydro. The different Canadian Ministries are pushing the

responsibility to produce an answer to each other. It seems as though none of them have a clear

status of the Site C Dam. While people were trying to ask questions surrounding the construction
of the Dam in 2016, the BC Liberal government of the time cancelled the fall 2016 session of the

B.C. Legislature (Mackin 2016).

The treatment of the Indigenous community surrounding the Dam has been a concern for

international committees like the United Nations. The UN have come out and said that the

continued construction of the Site C Dam would infringe Indigenous People’s rights which are

protected under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination (The Canadian Press, 2019). Treaty No.8 encompasses over 840,000 kilometres

of land and a member of the treaty has rights within this whole territory to use the land to hunt,

fish, participate in cultural activities, and use as a burial ground. Four parties from the Treaty 8

First Nations have said that the new highway built to reach the Dam will build over possible

burial sites and in doing so will desecrate their graves (Cox, 2016). An eight-year permit was

given to BC Hydro from the B.C. Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations.

This permit allows BC Hydro to alter 163 archeological sites for the Site C Dam. Cox (2016)

says that this includes “the construction of permanent roads, clearing, surface stripping,

excavations and inundation from the reservoir.” So far, BC Hydro have not run into any bodily

remains.

In conclusion, the Site C Dam has provided the B.C. provincial and federal government

with the confidence to flood more land in order to provide enough electricity to growing

populations. Since hydro-electric power is clean energy, there is little opposition from the public

as long as it’s not in their backyard. We know that the Site C Dam is only the third of five

potential dams first identified in 1958 by BC Hydro. Knowing that another two potential dams

could be made in the future and the large environmental footprints Canadians leave, we could see

even more forests and land being replaced with reservoirs.

 Reference list

British Columbia Utilities Commission. (2017). BCUC Site C Inquiry Final Report. Retrieved
from https://www.wildernesscomittee.org/sites/all/files/publications/2017%2011%2001%20-
BCUC-Site-C-Inquiry-Final-Report.pdf.

Cox, S. (2016). First Nations Chiefs Say Site C Highway Route Will Desecrate Graves, BC
Hydro Disagrees. The Narwhal. Retrieved from http://thenarwhal.ca/first-nations-chiefs-say-site-
c-highway-route-will-desecrate-graves-bc-hydro-disagrees/.

Duysk, N. (2011). Downstream Effects of a Hybrid Forum: The Case of the Site C Hydroelectric
Dam in British Columbia, Canada. Geographies of Energy, 101, 873-881.

Gutman, R. (2018). The Stories We Tell: Site-C, Treaty 8, and the Duty to Consult and
Accommodate. Appeal, 23, 4-26.

Mackin, B. (2016). BC Liberals nix fall Legislature sitting. Business Vancouver. Retrieved from
https://biv.com/article/2016/10/bc-liberals-nix-fall-legislature-sitting

The Canadian Press. (2018). B.C.’s Site C dam project behind schedule, plagued by problems,
expert claims. CBC News. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/b-c-
s-site-c-dam-project-behind-schedule-plagued-by-problems-expert-claims-1.4754337

The Canadian Press. (2019). UN committee warns that Site C dam may violate Indigenous rights
agreement. CBC News. Retrieved from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/un-
site-c-dam-indigenous-rights-agreement-1.4978411.