Petitioner Issue 1(CONSITUTIONALLY INVALID)

Q.Whether the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, is constitutionally invalid?

1. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act, 1958, was enacted particularly to maintain law and order and to ensure
peace and security in only the exceptional areas declared as ‘disturbed areas’. The
armed forces cannot be deployed in any state or any part thereof of the state of the
union of Aryabrata without the prior approval of the governor of that state, the
administrator of that union territory, or the central government.
2. It is mentioned herein that during exceptional situations of internal disturbance in
India, the Aryabrata Army is called in to primarily counter the militant insurgency in
the disturbed areas while ensuring the security of the civilians. However, in such
scenarios, unprecedented powers bestowed upon the armed forces often end up
threatening the security of the very civilians they aim to protect. Accordingly, Section
3 of the act entails the armed forces.
3. In Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of India and
Another, the Supreme Court of Aryabrata ruled, ‘If members of our armed forces are
deployed and employed to kill citizens of our country on the mere allegation or
suspicion that they are 'enemy,' not only the rule of law but our democracy would be
in grave danger’. In addition to the imminent threat to democracy, this Act,
unapologetically, violates the fundamental right to life in a rather inhumane manner.
It also impressed upon the restriction of the armed forces to use excessive and
retaliatory force during counter-insurgency operations in areas designated as
‘disturbed areas’ under the Act in question. The Act authorizes the Armed Forces to
exercise force ‘even to the extent of causing death’ which is completely against the
inevitable right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of
Aryabrata.
4. It is further submitted that the Constitution of Aryabrata has always boasted about its
adherence and allegiance to Article 14, i.e., the right to equality; however, the very
existence of Sections 4 and 6 in the AFSPA not only underestimates the very essence
of the article but also disharmonizes its legal efficacy, to the extent where it ventures
into numbing the long-standing principle that the Constitution upholds.
5. It is pertinent to mention herein that Section 4(d) of the AFSPA authorizes the armed
forces to enter and search without a warrant and to make an arrest or recover any
 property, arms, ammunition, or explosives that are believed to be unlawfully kept on
the premises.
6. Section 46(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides for the police officer
to exercise ‘all means necessary to affect the arrest’. However, the subsequent sub-
section restricts this possible use of force by enacting that the officer shall not have
the right to cause the death of the person unless they are accused of an offense
punishable by death or life imprisonment. However, Section 4(a) of the AFSPA
delegated the power to any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned
officer, or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces to ‘fire upon, or
otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, against any person’, which clearly
contravenes the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the provisions of the Constitution
of Aryabrata, and the well-established principles of natural justice. While the CrPC
forbids police from killing someone who isn't suspected of a crime that carries a death
or life sentence, Section 4(c) of the AFSPA gives the army permission to "use such
force as may be necessary to effect the arrest" without setting any restrictions on the
amount of force that can be used to save an individual from death.
7. As succinctly laid out by the law of Aryabrata, the primary goal of the 24-hour
production period before a magistrate, as required by the Constitution and the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1973, was to prevent the chances of torture while a person had
been held in police custody and to expeditiously subject the police power of arrest to
judicial review. Article 22 of the Constitution mandates that any person who has been
arrested has to be informed of his grounds of arrest and he also has the right to
consult an advocate, as well as the person should be produced before a judicial
magistrate within 24 hours from his arrest. It is pertinent to mention herein, that none
of such safeguards are provided under the AFSPA.
8. In the case of Nungshitombi Devi v. Rishang Keishang, CM Manipur (1982), the
husband of the petitioner was detained by the CRPF on January 10, 1981, and as of
February 22, 1981, he continued to be missing. He was detained in accordance with
AFSPA Section 4(c). The court determined that this delay was excessively prolonged
and unwarranted.
9. With regard to any conduct or alleged actions in the execution of the authorities
granted by the Act, the armed forces are granted blanket immunity under the AFSPA,
which bars prosecution, suit, or other legal procedures against any individual from the
armed forces. This exemption is predicated on the idea that the armed forces maintain
strict service standards, robust safety protocols, and ample internal investigative
processes to hold offenders accountable. Nonetheless, operational immunity has been
permitted by law to the point that victims have no recourse. Just 50 cases between
1989 and 2011 had prosecution sanction requested; 26 cases were rejected and 16
were still awaiting sanction (Source : “Shroud of Impunity,” India Together, 10
December 2011, available at http://www.indiatogether.org/2011/dec/hrt-afspa.htm).
Eight cases have been recommended for censure by the home department, but not a
single one has been granted. Then, asserting that they were following orders from
higher authorities, the police have repeatedly and flagrantly failed to file formal
complaints against members of the armed forces.
ISSUE 2 :

Q. The alleged torture inflicted upon Biren Yumkham and the alleged custodial rape of
Thanjam Maanvi Devi violates their right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment under Article 21?

1. The petitioner humbly submits that the soul of the Constitution of Aryabrata is
democratic and gives primacy to the fundamental rights of the citizens of Aryabrata. It
is pertinent to mention herein that The right to life and the right to personal liberty
are inalienable fundamental rights, as stated in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. The Court concluded that when the 44th Amendment Act of
1978 deprives the right to property of its fundamental significance, no situation
should permit the deprivation of an individual's right to life and personal liberty.
2. Articles 20 and 21 of the Consitution of Aryabrata remain valid even in times of
national emergency owing to this immunity protection. . However, in the event of a
national emergency, fundamental rights might be suspended. In order to preserve
peace and security during such times, the government is permitted to impose
restrictions on these rights. It is imperative that citizens recognize that, even though
the government may temporarily suspend their fundamental rights in times of
emergency, these restrictions must be appropriate and necessary. Ultimately, even in
the face of challenging circumstances, the right to life and the right to personal
freedom continue to be fundamental components of the constitution of Aryabrata.
3. Article 21 includes in its ambit various rights that are incidental and ancillary to the
right entailed under this article. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Francis
Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory Of Delhi And Others, 1981 AIR SC
746, observed, ‘any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would
be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it
would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with
procedure prescribed by law, but no law which authorises and no procedure which
leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test
of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void
as being violative of Articles 14 and 21’
4. The above case reiterated the stance of the apex court in Maneka Gandhi stating that
prior to the apex Court's ruling in the case of Maneka Gandhi versus Union of India
(1978) 1 SCC 248, Article 21 was narrowly interpreted as protecting individuals from
deprivation of life or personal liberty without lawful permission. It was limited to
being a legal safeguard against unconstitutional executive action. Laws allowing
deprivation of life or personal liberty were deemed compliant with Article 21.
However, in the Maneka Gandhi case, this Court established that Article 21 is a
limitation on the ability to enact laws and a safeguard against executive action not
supported by the law under Article 32 of the Constitution. This decision broadened
the interpretation of Article 21 by emphasizing limitations on law enactment and
executive actions. Compliance with Article 21 requires not only a law outlining a
procedure for deprivation of life or liberty, but also a fair and just procedure. Failure
to meet these standards renders the law void for violating Article 21. The Court
significantly broadened the scope of the right to life and personal liberty in Article 21,
paving the way for the evolution of this fundamental right.
5. The judicial pronouncements make it a fundamental duty of the competent legislature
to ensure that the procedure must be fair, just and reasonable. The victims in the
instant case have faced serious repercussions being a citizen of Aryabrata and being
entitled to exercise the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21
of the Constitution of Aryabrata.
6. In the landmark judgement of Olga Tellis And Others v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation And Others, 1985 SCC 3 545, the apex court established that ‘right to
livelihood’ is a right that falls under the ambit of Article 21. In the instant case, Mr.
Biren Yumkham had been a state football player, adding to the glory of the state in
the revered sport, and used to earn his livelihood from the sport of football. Mr. Biren
Yumkham was arrested and also tortured in the course of investigation, which
permanently damaged his left leg, leaving him entangled and forced to give up
football. Mr. Biren Yumkham had left studies after Class X owing to his career in
football, which now has rendered him uninsured of a decent job in his home state,
directly and substantially infringing upon his rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of Aryabrata.
7. In this case, Miss Thangjam Maanbi Devi was arrested on suspicion of being a
member of an insurgent group, and the 17th Assam Rifles issued an arrest memo. It
was confirmed that the arrestee was in good health at the time of the arrest. However,
the family members were informed that she was reportedly killed in a confrontation
while allegedly attempting to escape custody on the night of her arrest. However, the
post-mortem revealed signs of torture, particularly in the genital area, raising concerns
not only about custodial violence but also possible custodial rape, as defined in
Section 376(2) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 376(2)(c) specifically deals
with rape committed by armed forces personnel deployed by the Central or State
Government in a specified area, resulting in a minimum ten-year prison sentence upon
conviction. However, in this case, a story was fabricated claiming that the arrestee,
also known as the victim, was shot and killed while allegedly trying to escape
custody. These circumstances unequivocally violate the rights guaranteed under
Article 21.