PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

CASE STUDY - MRITYUNJOY DAS V. SAYED RAHAMAN AIR 2001 SC 129

By Anushka Singh, PRN – 19010223012

SUMMARY

The idea and legal developments about contempt of court in India is fundamental to
upholding the authority and dignity of the Judiciary. Every coin has two sides, and every
concept has two perspectives i.e., a “for” and an “against”. While the legal framework behind
contempt of courts ensures that they can function effectively without any interference and
administer justice fairly it also brings up unbeknownst limitations on our freedom of speech
and expression. A fairly famous topic, Contempt of court has had its fair share of limelight
and newsroom discussions post the contempt proceedings of Senior Advocate Prashant
Bhushan and Comedian Kunal Kamra1 in the recent years. Between all this glitz, it is
imperative to reiterate the objective of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which states that the
Act aims to:

“Define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempt of courts and to regulate their
procedure in relation thereto.”2

This is where the 2001 judgement in Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Rahaman3 comes into play
with its ration that the exercise of powers under the Act must be used cautiously and
sparingly and only after viewing it with the impact of the contemptuous act in question.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the vibrant tapestry of the Indian Constitution's fundamental rights, freedom of speech
stands out as a jewel, sparkling with the promise of open discourse and robust exchange of
ideas. Yet, like any precious gem, its brilliance can be dimmed by careless handling.
Exercising this right without due awareness of the limitations outlined in Article 19(2) can
result in a double bind: defamation on one hand, and the looming shadow of "criminal
contempt" on the other.

1
“https://indianexpress.com/article/india/attorney-general-clears-contempt-proceedings-against-kunal-kamra-
7049509/”
2
Objective, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
3
AIR 2001 SC 129, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/403270/

1
Here's where the Supreme Court strides in, draped in the cloak of Articles 129 and 142,
empowered to safeguard its own dignity and wield the thunderbolts of contempt against
transgressors. But this power isn't a solitary crown; the High Courts, too, rise as sentinels of
justice, bearing the mantle of "courts of record" thanks to Article 215. Their purview,
however, extends beyond their own walls, encompassing the watchful gaze over subordinate
courts through the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This act, like a wise
counsellor, whispers that while subordinate courts can raise the red flag of contempt, the
ultimate judgment rests with the High Court.

So, one must tread lightly when exercising their right to speak their mind. For while Article
19(1)(a) sings a siren song of unfettered expression, Article 19(2) acts as a sobering
counterpoint, reminding us that our words, like arrows loosed from a bow, can wound and
scar. The dance between freedom and accountability unfolds on the stage of the judiciary,
where judges, like skilled weavers, strive to thread together the warp and weft of individual
rights and the sanctity of courts, creating a vibrant tapestry of a just and vibrant democracy.

ISSUES AND CONFLICTS

The issue at hand is a clear violation of the orders of this Court, which amounts to contempt
of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The Act defines civil contempt under
Section 2(b) as "wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court." The actions of the
Revenue Officer and the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, English Bazar, Malda, in this
case, clearly fall within this definition. The Court had explicitly ordered a status quo to be
maintained regarding the possession of the land in question until further orders. Despite this,
the officers not only initiated proceedings for vesting of the land but also took possession of
the land. This is a clear and wilful disobedience of the Court's order.

“ The Supreme Court in the case of M.Y. Shareef & Anr. v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court
of Nagpur & Ors.4 held that "if a gross and patent contempt is committed, it is the duty of the
”

Attorney-General, and of the legal profession generally, to bring the matter to the notice of

4
AIR 1955 SC 19, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1396889/

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the Court." The actions of the officers in this case are a gross and patent contempt of this
Court's order.
“ Furthermore, the officers cannot claim ignorance of the Court's order as a defence. The order
was served to the authorities of the Land Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal
for its compliance. The petitioner also furnished a reply to the notice issued by the Revenue
Officer along with a copy of the Court's order. Therefore, the officers were fully aware of the
Court's order when they took possession of the land . ”

The Supreme Court in the case of R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors 5. held
that "the object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally from
imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to
the public whose interests would be very much affected if by the act or conduct of any party,
the authority of the Court is lowered and the sense of confidence which people have in the
administration of justice by it is undermined." The actions of the officers in this case have
undermined the authority of this Court and the administration of justice.

ARGUMENTS AND REASONING

“ The court's contempt jurisdiction serves a crucial role in upholding the majesty and dignity of
the law. This principle is well established in Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia & Anr.6 The
Court in this case emphasised the importance of the contempt jurisdiction in maintaining the
respect and authority commanded by Courts of Law, which acts as the greatest guarantee to
an ordinary citizen . ”

“ The exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 should be cautious and
sparing, and it should only be invoked when the conduct complained of amounts to
obstruction of justice that threatens to permeate our society. This is a special jurisdiction
conferred on the courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to
the majesty of law. ”

“ In the present case, the issue revolves around the interpretation of the Court's order to
maintain status quo. The applicant contends that the order includes all members presenting
the Petition before this Court, whereas the respondent argues that the order is limited to the
5
AIR 1988 SC 2237, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1984096/
6
2000 (2) SCC 367, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1860842/

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members who filed the writ petition before the High Court. ”

It is pertinent to note that the burden and standard of proof in contempt proceedings are akin
to those in criminal proceedings, as they are quasi-criminal in nature. This principle is
supported by the observations of Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale7, where he stated that a
contempt of court must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Given the nature of these
proceedings, the respondents, as the alleged contemners, are entitled to the benefit of the
doubt. This is particularly the case when the interpretation of the order is ambiguous, as in the
present case.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court should exercise its powers under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
cautiously and sparingly. Only when the conduct complained of amounts to obstruction of
justice that threatens to undermine the respect and authority commanded by Courts of Law,
should the Court invoke its contempt jurisdiction.

7
1969 3 All ER 1062, https://www.casemine.com/judgement/uk/5a8ff7e460d03e7f57ea8a6d