International Journal of Research & Method in Education

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How to be reflexive: Foucault, ethics and writing

qualitative research as a technology of the self

David Bright, Amanda McKay & Katherine Firth

To cite this article: David Bright, Amanda McKay & Katherine Firth (08 Dec
2023): How to be reflexive: Foucault, ethics and writing qualitative research as a
technology of the self, International Journal of Research & Method in Education, DOI:
10.1080/1743727X.2023.2290185

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/1743727X.2023.2290185

How to be reflexive: Foucault, ethics and writing qualitative

research as a technology of the self
a b c
David Bright , Amanda McKay and Katherine Firth
a
Faculty of Education, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia; bManchester Institute of Education, The University
of Manchester, Manchester, UK; cThe University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This paper explores reflexivity in qualitative research, challenging Received 12 July 2022
conventional perspectives that revolve around the binary of ‘insider’ Accepted 9 October 2023
and ‘outsider’ positioning. While traditionally reflexivity has been
KEYWORDS
understood through the lens of a researcher’s socio-historical Insider; outsider; reflexivity;
positionality, we argue for a more dynamic understanding, emphasizing writing as a method of
that academic self-formation is an ongoing process of self-creation. inquiry; Foucault
Drawing inspiration from the ancient Akadēmía, where writing was a
method of self-reflection, we recontextualize reflexive qualitative
writing, aligning it with Foucault’s interpretations of Ancient Greek and
Renaissance concepts. We posit that writing, especially in doctoral
research, is not just a tool for communication but a means of self-
formation. This perspective redefines reflexivity as a transformative
intellectual and existential process. The paper critically examines the
prevailing insider/outsider binary in the research literature, suggesting
that researcher identities are fluid and constantly shaped by
interactions. By integrating Foucault’s later work on ethics, we explore
the ethical dimensions of reflexivity and the formation of the ethical
subject. Ultimately, this paper contributes to the academic discourse on
reflexivity, offering a more fluid, transformative view of the doctoral
process and reflexive writing in qualitative research.

Introduction
Reflexivity has become an intrinsic element of much qualitative research, often understood through
the lens of the researcher’s socio-historical positionality and how this positionality might shape the
researchers’ interpretations. A prominent narrative within this domain revolves around the binary of
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positioning – an idea criticized yet frequently featured in discussions on
reflexive practices. The conventional wisdom warns that researching in settings familiar to the
researcher may compromise the data collected, prompting a call for researchers to contemplate
and articulate their past experiences that might affect the data they collect and their analysis of
this data.
In this paper, however, we argue for a paradigmatic shift in understanding reflexivity. We chal-
lenge the notion of fixed ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ positions, contending instead that the process of aca-
demic self-formation is continuous and dynamic – a process of constant self-creation. This is not a

CONTACT David Bright david.bright@monash.edu Faculty of Education, Monash University, 19 Ancora Imparo Way,
Melbourne, VIC, 3800, Australia
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article has been published
allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
2 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

new argument; it is, in fact, as old as the Akadēmía – where writing served as a method of self-reflec-
tion, philosophical self-enquiry, and scholarly identity formation. Hence, in this paper we recontex-
tualise reflexive writing, placing it back into its long and more recent histories – particularly through
Foucault’s utilization of Ancient Greek and Renaissance concepts of hupomnemata, ascesis and the
essay; and current educational scholarship on academic reflexivity. We return to a Foucauldian
understanding of reflexivity, one rooted in the care of the Self – an aesthetic relationship with
oneself that can foster transformation through specific practices or exercises.
While relevant to all stages of a research career, our argument holds particular relevance in the
context of academic identity formation in doctoral research, the process through which academic
identity is manifested. Our perspective redefines reflexivity as an intellectual and existential
process that challenges established norms in doctoral education and training. Drawing on the writ-
ings of Foucault, we posit writing not merely as a tool of communication but as a means of self-for-
mation. In this way, writing a doctoral dissertation or thesis becomes not only a means of
communicating research, but an exercise in self-creation, a process that allows researchers to
write themselves into academia. We argue that reflexivity, and by extension reflexive writing, is
not a static, pre-defined practice but a dynamic process that shapes us as subjects of our own
research. Instead of merely reducing researcher bias or positioning oneself in the context of estab-
lished debates, the reflexive process should recognize that a researcher’s self-representation through
texts is a moment of ontological creation. Thus, this paper engages with and challenges prevailing
ideas about reflexivity, introducing new perspectives that highlight the transformative potential of
the doctoral process and the role of reflexivity therein. Consequently, our paper contributes to the
ongoing academic discourse on reflexivity by broadening its scope to incorporate self-transform-
ation and offering a more fluid, transformative view of the doctoral process and reflexive writing
in qualitative research.
In this article, we first survey the state of the field in ‘reflexivity’: challenging the insider/outsider
binary; interrogating the assumption that the object of reflexivity is found in fieldwork and not in the
writing process; and questioning the positioning of the Self within the research as a danger to ethical
rigorous research. In the second section, we turn to Foucault to identify both the Self and reflexive
thinking about the Self (the rapport a soi) as central to research ethics. Drawing on the ancient Greek
philosophical traditions, as well as Renaissance letters such as the essais (or trials/attempts) of Mon-
taigne and the twentieth-century poet Raymond Roussel, Foucault identifies writing and reflection
as a technology of the Self, a practice of transforming or creating the Self in order to achieve states of
happiness, purity or wisdom. We conclude that qualitative research writing, and doctoral writing in
particular, is a process of self-formation, as the researcher identifies themselves with, and creates
themselves in the image of a new scholarly identity. The presence of reflexivity, subjectivity and
insider perspectives are not ethical challenges to the research but rather are inherent to the
ethical process of becoming a researcher. Moreover, the location of the Self is to be found not
only in the fieldwork, experiments or analysis; but is essentially and always part of the writing
process, and, perhaps more importantly, is created within the process of writing.

Reflexivity, and the insider/outsider researcher

Reflexivity and its critiques
Reflexivity, as both concept and practice, has thoroughly permeated the discourse of qualitative
research, in large part as a response to questions of representation and legitimacy in post-positivist
inquiry (Pillow 2003). Discussions of reflexivity as a practice have become commonplace in both
research books and articles, particularly those aimed at novice researchers and doctoral students,
with an emphasis on ‘researcher subjectivity in the research process – a focus on how does who I
am, who I have been, who I think I am, and how I feel affect data collection and analysis’ (Pillow
2003, p. 176). Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 275) describe reflexivity as a core characteristic of
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION 3

qualitative research, asserting that, ‘good qualitative research contains comments by the researchers
about how their interpretation of the findings is shaped by their background, such as their gender,
culture, history, and socioeconomic origin’. In a similar vein, Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p. 15)
argue that reflexivity:
acknowledges that the orientations of researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical locations, including
the values and interests that these locations confer upon them. What this represents is a rejection of the idea
that social research is, or can be, carried out in some autonomous realm that is insulated from the wider
society and from the biography of the researcher, in such a way that its findings can be unaffected by social
processes and personal characteristics.

In short, it is widely accepted that understanding who we are when we conduct our research, which
is largely constructed as a function of who we have been and what we have experienced, is crucial to
the research process. Denzin (1997, p. 223) states that ‘reflexivity is not an option’. Fox and Allan
(2013, p. 102) agree, arguing that ‘When we research and when we write, our selves are inextricably
involved and our interpretation of what takes place is informed by our points of view’.
Despite this, reflexive writing has also been critiqued as lacking the clarity, discipline and objec-
tivity of ethical, rigorous research. Silverman (2013, p. 817) is dismissive of the concept, describing
reflexivity as ‘A term deriving from ethnomethodology where it is used to describe the self-organizing
character of all interaction so that any action provides for its own context. Mistakenly used to refer to
self-questioning by a researcher’. Davies et al. (2004, p. 361) observe reflexive writing:
being dismissed as self-indulgent, or narcissistic, or lacking in method or validity, or too literary and not theor-
etical enough – as creating no more than an illusion of intimacy and verisimilitude or of making false claims
about authenticity and objectivity.

Pillow (2003, p. 176) similarly suggests that ‘some scholars see the proliferation of reflexivity talk
as at best self-indulgent, narcissistic, and tiresome and at worst, undermining the conditions necess-
ary for emancipatory research’. Merriam and Tisdell (2016, p. 65) warn, following Pillow (2003), that a
lack of balance in reflexivity can make a study appear ‘more about the researcher than the partici-
pants and the findings of the study’. Further, Pillow (2003, p. 176) suggests that ‘Most researchers
use reflexivity without defining how they are using it, as if it is something we all commonly under-
stand and accept as standard methodological practice for critical qualitative research’.

Researcher positioning and the insider/outsider binary

In foregrounding the importance of ‘background’ (Creswell and Creswell 2018, p. 275) and ‘socio-his-
torical locations’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p. 15), an engagement with notions of insider/out-
sider positioning features in many accounts of how to be reflexive. For example, Merriam and Tisdell
(2016, pp. 64–65) write that ‘it is incumbent upon the critical researcher to be reflexive: to consider
issues such as positionality and insider/outsider stances in research and to try to own their effects in
the process in so far as this is possible’. Indeed, reflexivity as critical reflection is often, though not
exclusively, conceived as a necessary process of interrogating the relationship of the researcher
with the group or area being researched, often in terms of the binary categories – and their contra-
dictions – that construct the lives of researchers in the field, in interactions with participants, and in
the process of writing-up research (Lincoln et al. 2018).
This insider/outsider researcher binary persists in the research literature, with a particular empha-
sis on the ethical problems of ‘insider’ research. Drake (2010) raises questions about what happens
when the researcher is studying something they are deeply familiar with, given that research is (by
nature) collaborative and emotionally charged, and the processes of researching a group or context
one is familiar with – such as one’s own workplace – can be difficult. Sikes (2006, p. 111) agrees that
qualitative research is often intimate and personal and cautions that research that focuses on family,
friends, or acquaintances can be – though not necessarily is – ‘dodgy’. Creswell and Creswell (2018,
4 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

pp. 260–261), invoking the insider/outsider dichotomy with the notion of ‘Backyard research’, argue
that:
Another aspect of reflecting on the role of the researcher is to be aware of connections between the researcher
and the participants or the research sites that may unduly influence the researcher’s interpretations. ‘Backyard’
research (Glesne and Peshkin 1992) involves studying the researcher’s own organization, or friends, or immedi-
ate work setting. This often leads to compromises in the researcher’s ability to disclose information and raises
issues of an imbalance of power between the inquirer and the participants. When researchers collect data at
their own workplaces (or when they are in a superior role to participants), the information may be convenient
and easy to collect, but it may not be accurate information and it may jeopardize the roles of the researchers and
the participants. If studying the backyard is essential, then the researcher is responsible for showing how the
data will not be compromised and how such information will not place the participants (or the researchers)
at risk.

Drake (2010), echoing this concern about the personal nature of the fieldwork that insider status
can bring, suggests that insider researchers can encounter difficulties in relation to what they rep-
resent within the institution and to participants, with interviewing colleagues a potential social
minefield. Floyd and Arthur (2012) note that researchers who remain in their institution will live
with the consequences of their research for many years, while Nowak and Haynes (2018) note the
ways friendships can evolve and the subsequent implications for knowledge production for
insider researchers or researchers who are working with friends.
Although in some ways useful, the insider/outsider dichotomy has also been critiqued as being
restrictive and simplistic, eliding the complexities of similarity and difference that subsist within
both categories (Dwyer and Buckle 2009, See further: Adler and Adler 1987, Blix 2015, Kerr and
Sturm 2019). Nakata (2014) argues that researcher identities should not be reduced to a dualistic
position of insider/outsider, suggesting instead that researcher identities shift in interactions with
different people, in different contexts, and through different studies. In a similar theme, Sikes
(2006) refers to researcher identities as being not stable but instead unfixed, and constantly being
formed and reformed through social interactions. Dwyer and Buckle (2009, p. 60) argue for an under-
standing of a ‘space between [that] challenges the dichotomy of insider versus outsider status …
noting the ways in which we are different from others requires that we also note the ways in
which we are similar’. McNess et al. (2015) also argue for a ‘third space’ in which we might exceed
the essentialist confines of the insider/outsider dualism. Thomson and Gunter’s (2011, p. 17) prop-
osition of liquid identities, based on the work of Bauman, alongside their analysis of their own experi-
ences, provides one example of how researcher identities might be thought of as shifting and
unfixed in different contexts, as they trouble the kinds of fixed, single and stable identity they
find presented in ‘reflexive accounts of research which aim to develop understandings about the
ways in which the researcher ‘self’ both influences and has been influenced by/in research processes
and how this can be a positive/negative influence on the research’.

How to be reflexive
In this third space, though, what do we do? If reflexivity is conceived, as Lincoln et al. (2018, p. 144)
suggest, as ‘a process of discovery: discovery of the subject (and sometimes of the problem itself)
and discovery of the self’, what is this Self that waits to be discovered, how is this Self discovered,
and how is it fashioned through writing? The limits of reflexivity are not a new concern, as Lather
(1993, p. 685) observed:
There are few guidelines for how one goes about the doing of it, especially in a way that both is reflexive and, yet,
notes the limits of self-reflexivity. To attempt to deconstruct one’s own work is to risk buying into the faith in the
powers of critical reflection that places emancipatory efforts in such a contradictory position with the poststruc-
turalist foregrounding of the limits of consciousness.

Nevertheless, many accounts of how to be reflexive do seem to buy into the power of critical reflec-
tion. Dowling (2012, p. 748) writes that reflexivity ‘requires consideration and examination of
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION 5

decisions made at each stage of the research process’. Creswell and Creswell (2018, p. 260) suggest
that researchers can incorporate reflexivity through the writing of notes and memos about their per-
sonal experiences and observations of data collection, what they are learning, and what concerns
they have during their research with participants:
Sufficient reflexivity occurs when researchers record notes during the process of research, reflect on their own
personal experiences, and consider how their personal experiences may shape their interpretation of results.
Also, qualitative researchers need to limit their discussions about personal experiences so that they do not over-
ride the importance of the content or methods in a study.

Lather (1993, p. 675), on the other hand, argues of reflexivity, ‘It is not a matter of looking harder or
more closely, but of seeing what frames our seeing – spaces of constructed visibility and incitements
to see which constitute power/knowledge’. Skeggs (2002, p. 352) similarly suggests that reflexivity
happens when:
we direct our attention to the ways in which the relations between persons and cultural resources are organized
by particular cultural technologies, and to the variable forms of work on the Self, or practices of subjectification,
which such relations support.

Skeggs draws here on Foucault’s ideas of how the ‘relations between persons and cultural resources’
might be organized and how these inner and outer relations are structured. In order to understand
the ‘practices of subjectification’ that reflexivity demands we attend to, therefore, we now turn to
Foucault.

Ethics, reflexivity and Foucault’s subject

Foucault’s ethical subject
In his later work on ethics, Foucault turned his attention to the subjective individual and their ethical
behaviour towards themselves and others. Foucault distinguished between three aspects of moral-
ity: prescriptive moral codes, individual acts in relation to the code, and the sensibility or manner that
leads one to act in relation to the code (Foucault 1997a). For Foucault (1985, p. 25), the moral code
referred to ‘a set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the inter-
mediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the family (in one of its roles), educational insti-
tutions, churches, and so forth’. However, Foucault did not dwell on moral codes, believing them
to ‘ultimately revolve around a rather small number of rather simple principles’ and to be remarkably
stable across history (Foucault 1985, p. 32).
The second aspect of morality for Foucault was ‘the real behaviour of people in relation to the
moral code [prescriptions] imposed on them’ (Foucault 1997a, p. 263). This behaviour comprises:
the manner in which they comply more or less fully with a standard of conduct, the manner in which they obey
or resist an interdiction or a prescription; the manner in which they respect or disregard a set of values. (Foucault
1985, p. 25)

But as Bennett (1996) observes, Foucault also refused to place this second aspect at the centre of
ethics. Instead, he concentrated his interest on the third aspect: ‘the manner in which one ought
to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make
up the code’ (Foucault 1985, p. 29). This is what Foucault referred to as:
another side to the moral prescriptions, which most of the time is not isolated as such but is, I think, very impor-
tant: the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport à soi, which I call ethics, and which deter-
mines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions. (1997b, p. 263)

This focus on ethics as rapport à soi, the relationship with the Self, is the consequence of viewing
ethics as necessarily involving an ‘intertwining of code and subjectivation’ (Bennett 1996, p. 665).
Campbell (2010, p. 27) sees this as a key point in understanding Foucauldian ethics, arguing that
‘while Foucault recognizes that ethics may refer to prescribed rules of action, ethical conduct
6 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

cannot be simply read off from the moral code associated with it … In short, moral principles are
ethically insufficient’. Thus, ethics for Foucault (1985, p. 31)was neither code nor behaviour but
‘the attitude that caused one to respect’ the law and its application. For Foucault:
all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it is carried out, and a relationship with the Self.
The latter is not simply ‘self-awareness’ but self-formation as an ‘ethical subject’, a process in which the individ-
ual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the
precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires
him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself. (1985, p. 28)

Ethics, then, requires thought and action in practices of self-formation as a ‘dynamic process of sen-
sibility-formation’ (Campbell 2010, p. 35). It is in the formation of Self as an ethical subject, in the
relationship that one has with oneself, and through the practices employed to act upon, monitor,
test, improve and transform oneself that ethics is actualized. Discovery or Self-awareness is insuffi-
cient; it is not enough to better understand who we are and why we act. The task of this ethical prac-
tice is thus ‘not to decipher what we ‘really’ are, but to strive to cultivate what we might become …
The idea of the care of the Self thus conceives of subjectivity on a model of becoming, rather than on
the traditional static model of identity’ (Palmer 1998, p. 408). Ethics and subjectivity are intertwined in
that major work that is the subject itself, a subject that is not given but becoming.
Foucault’s conception of ethics is, as Palmer (1998, p. 408) suggests, ‘explicitly formulated as an
alternative to the epistemic model of subjectivity that takes the primary relationship that one has to
oneself as one of knowledge’. As Foucault demonstrates in The History of Sexuality, the precept ‘Know
yourself’ has supplanted ancient Greco-Roman models of subjectivity centred on the principle of
souci de soi – the ‘care of the self’: ‘In Greco-Roman culture, knowledge of oneself appeared as
the consequence of the care of the Self. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes
the fundamental principle’ (Foucault 1997b, p. 228). Palmer asserts that Foucault’s ethics:
represents a correction of the traditional tendency to think of the subject as something that is given and whose
truth can be deciphered … [and] replaces the primacy of the traditional epistemological relation in our subject
formation with an aesthetic relation whereby our lives are to be viewed as works of art, to be transformed in a
continual process of creation. (Palmer 1998, 409)

Foucault’s ethical analysis, then, focuses on the practices – technologies of the Self – used to con-
stitute oneself as a subject:
technologies of the Self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means, or with the help of others, a
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to trans-
form themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Fou-
cault 1997b, p. 225)

If the Self is not given to us, and there is no essential truth of the Self to be discovered, then what is
left is the possibility of aesthetic creation and the practices or technologies that are employed in this
creation of the Self as a work of art.

Reflexivity as the care of the Self

Following Foucault, writing reflexively, as research, about the Self might better be understood as a
technology of the Self, a way of transforming rather than deciphering the truth of oneself that points
not to knowledge of the epistemic subject given in the past in terms of identifying the insider or
outsider positions one has occupied, but to the possibilities of aesthetic creation or of becoming.
Questions of positioning are typically presented as questions of knowledge, yet reflexivity about
one’s own positioning is ultimately a question of writing, which is to say it is a question of practice.
On writing, Foucault comments that:
The ‘essay’ – which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes
changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication – is the living
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION 7

substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e. an ‘ascesis’,
askēsis, an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought. (1985, p. 9)

In invoking ‘ascesis’ and the ‘essay’, Foucault is summoning an impressive intellectual genealogy to
his argument. In his extended explanation of ascesis in ‘Enkrateia’ (1985, pp. 67–81), Foucault draws
widely from Aristotle, Plato, Xenophon and Diogenes. In these works, and perhaps most extensively
in Plato’s Socratic dialogues (including those cited by Foucault, The Republic, Laws, Gorgias, Alci-
biades), the identity and beliefs of the interlocutor are developed through discussion, exploration
of ideas, and self-reflection in a dramatization. The instruction to disciplined thought is created
through reflexive practice, and the person/a of the novice philosopher is literally written into
being. The ‘essay’ (French essai) has an equally long-established history, drawing in particular
from Les Essais of Michele Montaigne, a sixteenth-century collection of essays (‘attempts’ or
‘tries’), in which the author captures his thoughts, as he explains in his initial letter to the reader,
in textual constructions that represent his true interior Self: ‘It is myself I paint’, he writes, ‘I am
the matter of this book’ (Montaigne 2004, p. 1). Both the exercise of self-discipline and the exercise
of the student writing were brought together elsewhere by Foucault in ‘Docile Bodies’ in Discipline
and Punish (Foucault 1995, p. 161): ‘the ever-increasing rigorous exercises that the ascetic life pro-
posed became tasks of increasing complexity that marked the gradual acquisition of knowledge
and good behaviour’.
In ‘Self Writing’, Foucault (1997c) further explores self-writing as practiced in Greco-Roman
culture. For Foucault, self-writing goes beyond being a mere reflection or construction of the
subject; it constitutes the subject, emphasizing processes of subjectification, as demonstrated in
pre-Christian practices, which are driven not by the writer’s creative genius but by the cultivation
of the art of living, requiring askēsis, the exercise of oneself in the activity of thought (Allen 2010).
Foucault discusses two modes of self-writing: the hupomnemata and correspondence. The
hupomnemata is a record of thoughts, readings, and heard content, serving as a guide for
conduct and a framework for self-conversations and meditations. Much like the researchers’ arche-
typal reflective journal, the hupomnemata is:
a material record of things read, heard, or thought, thus offering them up as a kind of accumulated treasure for
subsequent rereading and meditation. They also formed a raw material for the drafting of more systematic trea-
tises, in which one presented arguments and means for struggling against some weakness (such as anger, envy,
gossip, flattery) or for overcoming some difficult circumstance (a grief, an exile, ruin, disgrace). (Foucault 1997c,
pp. 209–210)

Foucault stresses that the purpose of the hupomnemata is not just to record, but to be used to estab-
lish an adequate relationship with oneself through the recollection of what the writer has heard and
read, that were subsequently used as guides for the conduct of the Self (Allen 2010). According to
Foucault,
These hupomnemata should not be thought of simply as a memory support, which might be consulted from
time to time, as occasion arose; they are not meant to be substituted for a recollection that may fail. They con-
stitute, rather, a material and a framework for exercises to be carried out frequently: reading, rereading, meditat-
ing, conversing with oneself and with others. … They do not constitute a ‘narrative of oneself’; they do not have
the aim of bringing to the light of day the arcana conscientiae, the oral or written confession of which has a
purificatory value. The movement they seek to bring about is the reverse of that: the intent is not to pursue
the unspeakable, nor to reveal the hidden, nor to say the unsaid, but on the contrary to capture the already-
said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the
shaping of the Self. (1997c, pp. 210–211)

The fundamental role of writing the hupomnemata lay in self-improvement and self-cultivation.
Rather than narrating or confessing who one is or was, instead, they aim to harness and focus
what has already been expressed and understood in order to shape the Self through a process of
active and reflective engagement with one’s thoughts and ideas in the ongoing journey of self-
development. As Allen (2010, pp. 368–369) puts it, ‘self-writing is not simply the process of
8 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

figuring out what I already know, who I already am. Rather, care of the Self, which involves multiple
practices that shape the Self, makes possible knowledge of one’s self’.
Turning to correspondence, Foucault (1997c) suggests that the act of writing for another, such as
in a letter or missive (or, we might add, a thesis or dissertation), provides another opportunity for self-
reflection and personal growth even though the text is written for others. This is because, as noted
by Seneca, when we write or speak, we essentially become both the producer and consumer of our
thoughts. We read what we write and hear what we say, which can stimulate introspection and self-
assessment. For Foucault, then, the act of writing a letter has a dual function: it influences both the
writer and the reader. The writer is influenced through the act of composition, while the reader is
influenced through reading and rereading the content. This dual role makes correspondence
similar to hupomnemata as a practice of the art of living.
However, as Svoboda (2020) argues, for Foucault, the act of correspondence is a significant step
forward in self-cultivation compared to the composition of hupomnemata, because correspondence
in this manner aims to provide an account of one’s relation to oneself, going beyond the mere col-
lection and synthesis of external ideas. According to Foucault (1997c, p. 216), writing for others ‘is
something more than a training of oneself by means of writing, through the advice and opinions
one gives to the other: it also constitutes a certain way of manifesting oneself to oneself and to
others’.
In this tradition, we see that researchers write, that writing is an exercise of oneself in the activity
of thought and a way of manifesting oneself as a researcher. It is, as such, ascesis, an exercise ‘not in
the sense of a morality of renunciation but as an exercise of the self on the self by which one
attempts to develop and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of being’ (Foucault
1997d, p. 282). The researcher’s persona – particularly, but not exclusively, the novice researcher –
is constituted by the texts they produce: they are the matter of and manifest by their writing. Fou-
cault wrote of Roussel that:
after his first book he expected that the next morning there would be rays of light streaming from his person and
that everyone on the street would be able to see that he had written a book. That’s the obscure desire of a
person who writes. It is true that the first text one writes is neither written for others, nor for who one is: one
writes to become someone other than who one is. Finally there is an attempt at modifying one’s way of
being through the act of writing. (Foucault 1986, p. 184)

In other words, it is possible to conceive of the act of writing research – particularly the doctoral
thesis (the first text one writes) – as constituting the researcher’s mode of being, permitting recog-
nition of the Self as writer, researcher, scholar, insider, outsider, and so on. This is not so much a
process of researcher producing writing but writing producing researcher (Bright 2017). As Atkinson
asserts of ethnographic research, for example:
the monograph also constitutes the field and its author … they too become linked through the monograph. So
Whyte is Street Corner Society (1981); Willmott and Young are Bethnall Green; Lacey is Hightown Grammar
(1971). They have other personae too, but we know scholars and their fields through the work of the mono-
graph. (Atkinson 1992, pp. 10–11)

This is not the way reflexivity and positioning in researching and writing is usually understood. But,
following Foucault, perhaps it is better, or at least possible, to understand the work of reflexivity and
positioning not as an epistemic project of knowledge about who or what we really are, or were, or
how we were positioned when we conducted our fieldwork, but as a creative process that produces
the researching subject – and its positions – through aesthetic practices of reflexivity and writing.
This is a way of becoming positioned through writing that asks us to:
try to understand that someone who is a writer is not simply doing his work in his books, in what he publishes,
but that his major work is, in the end, himself in the process of writing his books. The private life of an individual,
his sexual preference, and his work are interrelated not because his work translates his sexual life, but because
the work includes the whole life as well as the text. The work is more than the work: the subject who is writing is
part of the work. (Foucault 1996, p. 405)
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION 9

Such a position might seem to be at odds with the imperatives of epistemic reflexivity, predicated on
knowledge of the Self. Creswell and Creswell’s (2018, p. 260) discussion of reflexivity, for example, in
their book aimed at doctoral researchers, is worth quoting at length:
Reflexivity requires commenting on two important points:

Past experiences. Include statements about past experiences with the research problem or with the participants
or setting that help the reader understand the connection between the researchers and the study. These experi-
ences may involve participation in the setting, past educational or work experiences, or culture, ethnicity, race,
SES, or other demographics that tie the researchers directly to the study.

How past experiences shape interpretations. Be explicit, then, about how these experiences may potentially shape
the interpretations the researchers make during the study. For example, the experiences may cause researchers
to lean toward certain themes, to actively look for evidence to support their positions, and to create favorable or
unfavorable conclusions about the sites or participants.

Here, reflexivity is conceived primarily as a retrospective activity, a historical epistemic project of

knowing oneself, or discovering who one was, based on what one has experienced, how these
experiences affect the relationship (or positioning) of the researcher to the study, sites, and partici-
pants, and how this may shape (or have shaped) the researchers’ interpretations.
We do not want to suggest that such advice is bad, but rather that it may not be sufficient. In
addition to a consideration of how past experiences might shape interpretations (knowing
oneself), we suggest reflexivity also requires a meditation, or ascesis, on how the essay produces
the Self that has written. Whitaker and Atkinson (2019) argue that ‘Reflexivity refers to the inescap-
able fact that the research act, however conducted, in part constructs or defines the phenomenon
that is the object of that research’. We would add that it also, inescapably, constructs or defines the
researcher who is the subject of the research.

Implications for the doctoral researcher

In this final section, we outline some suggestions from Foucault’s ethics about how we might engage
in the exercise of reflexive self-writing as a research practice. Foucault (1985, pp. 26–28) outlines four
major aspects of his ethics: (1) the determination of the ethical substance – ‘the aspect or the part of
myself or my behaviour which is concerned with moral conduct’ (Foucault 1997a, p. 263); (2) the
mode of subjection (mode d’assujettissement) – ‘the way in which people are invited or incited to
recognize their moral obligations’ (Foucault 1997a, p. 264); (3) the forms of elaboration, of ethical
work (travail éthique) – ‘the means by which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical
subjects’ (Foucault 1997a, p. 265); and (4) the telos of the ethical subject – ‘the kind of being to
which we aspire when we behave in a moral way’ (Foucault 1997a, p. 265). We suggest that these
aspects of Foucault’s ethics could provide doctoral students with one framework by which to
engage in the exercise of intellectual and existential reflexivity. Though it is beyond the scope of
this article to elaborate an example, we offer a starting point here for how such a reflection might
proceed.
The ontological element or ‘ethical substance’ could refer to those aspects of one Self or behav-
iour that are the traditional focus of moral concern and transformation in methodological reflexivity.
In the context of doctoral research, this might involve a focus on academic integrity, a commitment
to rigour and truth, activism and impact, and critical reflection on the balance between personal per-
spectives and objective analysis in one’s work. These aspects reflect the original drive towards reflex-
ivity that stemmed from questions about representation and legitimacy in qualitative research
(Pillow 2003). Considering the ‘ethical substance’ in writing would prompt doctoral researchers to
engage deeply with the moral and ethical dimensions of their work, beyond reductive statements
of having observed institutionalized ethical standards or having occupied particular insider and/or
outsider positions in relation to their participants. This would involve reflecting on academic integ-
rity, commitment to rigorous and truthful investigation, dedication to activism and impact, and the
10 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

challenging equilibrium between personal viewpoints and objective analysis in their scholarly prac-
tice. Writing would then become an arena for ethical self-examination and commitment, a space
where doctoral students consider, articulate, and work to embody these foundational elements of
academic morality. Such introspection could result in more ethically conscious, responsible research
practices and enhance the credibility and integrity of research, leading to a deeper and shared
understanding of the ethical implications and responsibilities of the work, fostering a sense of
responsibility that extends beyond the doctoral process to their broader role as researchers in
society.
The ‘mode of subjection’ or deontological element refers to the way individuals are obligated or
encouraged to recognize their moral obligations. Contemplating this in writing would necessitate
the acknowledgement and interrogation of the moral obligations that underpin academic endea-
vours, frequently framed by adherence to the ethical norms and codes of conduct established by
the scholarly community such as institutional ethical review processes and broader initiatives like
the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). As doctoral researchers, understanding and complying
with these norms is typical, but critically interrogating such norms is also paramount for the assur-
ance of ethical research practices and for making meaningful contributions to the academic dis-
course. Through writing, doctoral students could not only articulate their compliance (or
otherwise) with these norms but also explore their deeper implications, question their limitations,
and posit potential improvements. Again, this a process that could enrich the ethical depth of aca-
demic work, ensuring that it is not just procedurally sound, but substantively and critically engaged
with the ethical dimensions of research for the benefit of the wider community by encouraging doc-
toral students to cultivate an active, critical stance towards ethical norms, fostering a sense of aca-
demic citizenship that goes beyond passive compliance to active contribution to the evolution of
ethical standards. Ultimately, this element underscores the principle that ethics in research is not
a static checklist, but a dynamic, dialogic process of continuous reflection and growth, a principle
that can be embodied in and through the act of writing itself.
The ascetic element or ‘ethical work’ signifies the conscious efforts and actions one undertakes in
the process of self-transformation in accordance with ethical norms and objectives. For doctoral
researchers, this involves the ethical labour of transitioning into the role of a researcher. Again,
this work is not limited to the adherence to institutional codes but encapsulates the personal and
professional development necessary to cultivate an ethical researcher identity. This may comprise
the development of robust research skills, continuous learning and adaptation to enhance scholar-
ship, and the critical negotiation of the complex ethical landscapes that researchers navigate, all of
which imply sustained engagement in reflexivity. Here, we acknowledge the danger of such work
being read as narcissistic or self-indulgent, but we argue that reflecting on this ‘ethical work’ in
writing provides a venue to record, evaluate, interrogate, and effectuate these ethical self-transform-
ations, particularly when it is written to provide an account of the Self to others. Reflexivity then
enables a meta-reflection on the process of becoming a researcher through research, where
researchers can critically assess their progress, recognize the ethical challenges they face, and docu-
ment the strategies they employ to address them. Writing, therefore, serves not only as a site of self-
accountability but also as a platform for intellectual growth, where researchers can learn from their
own experiences, adapt their approaches, and continually refine their ethical praxis. Once more, this
process of written reflection can also provide a valuable resource for the wider scholarly community
by sharing experiences, challenges, and solutions, and contributing to broader discussions about
ethical research practices.
The teleological element, or ‘telos’, represents the envisioned ideal or end state that one aspires
to achieve through the ethical work. For doctoral students, this traditionally represents the attain-
ment of the title ‘Doctor’ following successful examination of the thesis or dissertation and gradu-
ation from the doctoral programme. However, in line with our reconsidered understanding of
reflexivity and self-formation, we propose a more fluid interpretation. In our view, the telos of the
researcher is not a fixed end point to be reached, but a dynamic, ongoing process of becoming. It
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH & METHOD IN EDUCATION 11

is a continuous progression towards embodying the qualities of a scholarly practitioner, contributing

valuable knowledge to the academic community, and upholding ethical academic principles. The
title ‘Doctor’ represents not a destination but another beginning of a continuous engagement
with the responsibilities and challenges it encompasses. This perspective situates the doctoral
process as a dynamic trajectory of transformation, shaped not by a static destination, but by the
mutable vision of what it means to be a scholar. This vision, made tangible and revisited through
writing, would allow doctoral researchers to navigate their academic journey with purpose, fostering
a proactive and reflexive engagement with their evolving scholarly identity.
Incorporating these four elements of Foucauldian ethics into reflective practices could provide
doctoral students with tools to navigate the process of academic identity formation and doctoral
research with increased awareness and agency. Actively considering these ethical dimensions
allows for a purposeful, intentional, and reflexive trajectory towards scholarly aspirations. This is
not simply about surrendering the Self to standardized processes but about continuously fostering
an ethical Self that meaningfully interacts with the ethical code, transforming it from a mere checklist
into a profound philosophical engagement. In this light, reflexivity becomes more than an academic
exercise – it is an ethical rapport à soi. It becomes a process of self-understanding and self-transform-
ation that places the Self, not as a fixed entity to be discovered, but in a constant state of becoming,
and elevates reflexivity from a methodological obligation to an existential commitment, inviting doc-
toral students to continually write, rewrite, and co-write their evolving Selves into the academic
sphere.

Conclusion: Self-formation through doctoral writing

In this paper, we have proposed an alternative understanding of reflexivity that goes beyond merely
understanding oneself and one’s positionality in terms of a limited insider/outsider binary. We advo-
cate for embracing a Foucauldian notion of ‘care of the self’, a transformative relation with oneself,
continually shaping our existence through certain practices or exercises including academic writing.
In this process of constant self-creation, the use of introspective and retrospective reflexivity reliant
on conventional binaries of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ positioning becomes insufficient. This shift in per-
spective allows us to challenge the established norms and expand our concept of reflexivity.
This novel perspective provides a fresh lens and a practical framework to comprehend the con-
struction of an academic identity through the doctoral process. Unlike existing perspectives that pri-
marily focus on the discovery of researchers’ subjectivities and identities, we argue that reflexivity is a
profound exercise – it’s not only an intellectual endeavour but an existential one that transforms the
researcher’s very being. This not only enriches our understanding of the doctoral process but also
opens up new possibilities for reflexivity in academic research.
Our research contributes to the ongoing discourse on reflexivity in academia in two pivotal ways.
First, drawing on Foucault’s ethics, it broadens the scope of reflexivity to encompass self-transform-
ation, integrating the existential and intellectual dimensions of academic research. Second, it offers a
more dynamic, fluid, and transformative view of the doctoral process, potentially inspiring new
approaches to doctoral education and training. Within this paradigm, writing takes on a transforma-
tive role, not merely serving as a communication tool but as a means of self-formation. Planning and
writing a thesis involves transitioning into being a scholarly ‘insider’ through the process or ‘exercise’
(ascesis), through writing (the essay). When we do this work, we write our scholarly selves into being.
We create our identities as insiders in the academy, understanding the often-hidden rules, interpret-
ing and translating the more explicit rules, and navigating the ways we might write ourselves into
particular positions as academics or researchers. This is reflexivity and reflexive writing as a
process that creates us as the subjects of our own research. Our task may no longer be to ascertain
and describe, in writing, the apparently fixed positions we occupied during our fieldwork, but to
write ourselves into such positions, as researchers.
12 D. BRIGHT ET AL.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID
David Bright http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6024-5988
Amanda McKay http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8306-5202
Katherine Firth http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7599-8093

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