3 Strategies in networks:

the essence

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next, we put ourselves in the position of an actor faced
with the capriciousness of network-like decision making. What strategies are
there that enable this actor to realize his goals in these decision-making
processes?1 To serve his interests in the room with the dancing table? In this
chapter, we deal with a number of central notions. In Chapter 4, we elaborate on
them.
First, a brief recapitulation of Chapter 2. Decision making in networks is capri-
cious and unstructured. This is a given, because there happens to be no hierar-
chically superior actor in a network. Models that represent decision making as an
orderly, sequential and phased process are misleading. There are innumerable
such models: from project-managerial models in all kinds of variants to the well-
known ‘Plan Do Check Act’ cycle. Many models for strategic management,
knowledge management or change management, for example, are based on the
assumption that their implementation should be sequential and phased. However,
actual decision making takes a completely different course. Those who look at
decision making through the spectacles of these models are blind to the real
course of events. The prescriptive function of the models is also limited. Those
who want decision making in a network to be project-based, assume that there is
agreement about problems, goals and solutions, but this is almost by definition
not the case in a network.
In a network, the attention shifts from a project approach to the process of
interaction between the interdependent players in a network. Table 3.1 summa-
rizes the main differences between a project approach and a process approach,
and we discuss these differences in this chapter.
In a project approach, the accent will be on the content of decision making. The
actors are interested in the factors that determine the nature of a problem. The
project manager needs information, including a thorough analysis of it, to solve
a problem. The quality of this solution mainly depends on whether the problem
was formulated correctly and whether the information was used properly. The
solution will therefore be judged by the right–wrong dimension.
In a network, decisions are made in a process of interaction. This implies that
an actor’s attention shifts towards the question of how the process of interaction
36 Strategies in networks: the essence
Table 3.1 Project-managerial approach versus process-managerial approach

Project Process

Factors and content Actors and process

Information Relations
Right–wrong Gain–loss
One-issue Multi-issue

can be influenced. Who might contribute to serving the interests of this actor?
How to commit them to these interests? The focus is therefore not primarily on
the content of the problem, but on the actors whose support is needed. From a
content perspective, information is a key resource, from an actor perspective,
relations are key resources. This focus on actors and relations means that the
result of the process will be judged in terms of gain and loss: Which actors can
be regarded as winners and which are the losers?
Since gain and loss are important, there tends to be multi-issue decision
making: the more issues there are on the agenda, the more possibilities there
are for offering each actor something attractive (see also Section 3.3). This is
completely different in a project, in which there is simply no need to use a strat-
egy of multi-issue decision making.
This chapter is built up as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss the importance
of actors and actor analyses. Section 3.3 deals with the need for multi-issue deci-
sion making. In Section 3.4, we deal with the importance of relations and in
Section 3.5 with the importance of win-win situations.

3.2 Actors and actor analyses

It is clear that decision making in networks requires attention to be paid to the actors
whose interests may be harmed by the decision making. In this section, we pay atten-
tion to the various types of actors (Section 3.2.1), and to the phenomenon of ‘strate-
gic behaviour’, which limits the opportunities of an actor analysis (Section 3.2.1).

3.2.1 Types of actors

Those in a network who take the initiative for a decision and are dependent on
other actors for this decision, at a bare minimum will find the following charac-
teristics of these other actors interesting.2

• The stances of actors: What view do they take?

• The underlying interests of actors: Why do they take that particular view?
• The resources of actors: What means do they have to block or promote a
decision?
• The relations of these actors: With what other actors do they maintain relations?
• The repetitive character of the relation with the actor: How often and in con-
nection with what subjects will the initiator meet the other actors again?
 Strategies in networks: the essence 37
Opinions and interests
Actors have opinions about an initiative. Behind these opinions lie interests. The
difference between opinion and interest is often illustrated with the example of
the orange. Suppose that two parties have a conflict about an orange: both want
to have the orange, the parties are dependent on each other. The statement ‘I want
the orange’ is an opinion. The question is then what interest do they have in the
orange: Why do they have this opinion? Conceivably, one party wants to use
the orange to prepare a fruit juice, while the other party claims the orange to use
the peel for the production of skin-care articles.
Knowing not only the opinion of the other party, but also the underlying interest,
creates room for decision-making. So long as the discussion is conducted on the
the level of opinions, there is hardly any room for negotiation: both parties claim
the same orange and the orange is likely to be cut in half eventually. When the
discussion is conducted on the level of interests, room is created. Given the inter-
ests, one party is likely to get the flesh of the fruit and the other party is likely to
get the peel. So an initiator will always have to look for the interests behind the
views of the parties.

Resources, relations and the repetitive character of relations

It is important to have an insight into the resources of actors, since these largely
determine the influence actors can use to realize their interests. Resources may
be, for example, funds, authority, knowledge or reputation.
A special resource that we mention here in particular is an actor’s network of
relations. The more relations an actor has, the more possibilities he has of gain-
ing support among other actors. We pay special attention to the importance of
these relations in Section 3.4. An initiator who is confronted with an actor will
therefore always wonder how extensive that actor’s network of relations is. The
greater his network of relations, the more important is the support of this actor. If
a conflict arises between the actor and the initiator, there is a risk that the actor
will activate his relations and set others against the initiator.
An initiator will also want to know whether his relation with an actor is repet-
itive: Will they meet again in the future? If so, then good cooperation with this
actor is important. If not, then there are more possibilities for entering into the
conflict.
The sum of resources, relations and the repetitive character of relations leads
to three types of power positions:

• production power
• blocking power
• a diffuse power position.

Production power means that an actor can make a positive contribution

towards the realization of something. A Minister of Finance or a CFO have
38 Strategies in networks: the essence

Actors with Actors with blocking Actors with a diffuse

production power power power position

Proponents

Opponents

Fence sitters

Figure 3.1 Types of actors.

production power: they can make funds available, allowing, for example, a
positive decision to be taken about an initiative. Blocking power means that an
actor can only halt something. When a line department has drawn up a new plan,
a staff department can block it. The same staff department usually does not have
the expertise to draw up such a plan itself; it can only halt it.
A diffuse power position means that it is unclear to an initiator what the power
position of the other actors is, that this position may change or that it is unclear
whether an actor will want to use his resources and relations.
These notions can be used to make a typology of actors. Suppose an initiator
wants to take a particular decision and knows that he is dependent on other actors.
A first question is what stances and interests do these actors have. Three options
are possible:

• An actor supports the decision and sides with the proponents’ camp.
• An actor opposes the decision and opts for the opponents’ camp.
• An actor opts for the ‘keeping-options-open’ strategy: he does not express
any preferences yet; such an actor is sometimes referred to as a ‘fence sitter’:
a party that is still on the fence between the camps of the proponents and the
opponents and so can still choose either side.

Then the question is what power position do the actors have: production power,
blocking power or a diffuse power position. Figure 3.1 shows a typology of actors
that results from this combination of stances and interests on the one hand and
power on the other hand.

3.2.2 Strategic behaviour: the need for, and the limits of, an
actor analysis
It will be clear that an initiator that wants to take a particular decision will always
have to conduct an actor analysis: Who are the main players, what are their views
and interests and what are their resources and relations?
The problem here is that actors in a network tend to behave strategically. In
short, strategic behaviour means that an actor’s behaviour is not determined by
his opinions, but is aimed at consolidating his power position in the network.
 Strategies in networks: the essence 39
Suppose actor A needs the support of actor B to execute plan X. And suppose that
in actor B’s opinion, plan X is a very good plan, which not only serves actor A’s
interests, but also those of actor B. If actor A asks actor B’s opinion, two reac-
tions are possible. The first is that actor B will indicate that he fully agrees with
plan X. But actor B can also react strategically: he indicates that he will not sup-
port the plan or positions himself as a fence sitter. This might be very attractive
to actor B: if actor A wants actor B to come out for plan X, he will have to start
a process of giving and taking, which might generate extra gain for B. Strategic
behaviour is always very tempting in a network, so tempting, that some actors
display strategic behaviour without being conscious of it. It is an ingrained habit
of many actors that have been participating in networks of interdependencies for
some time.
This strategic behaviour will also occur when an actor analysis is made.
Suppose an initiator asks a party about its views on a particular plan. There are
three options: the party can express its support, it can state that it is against
the plan and it can keep its options open. Although a party may agree with the
substance of the plan, it is attractive for it to oppose the plan or at least to keep
its options open, since the initiator will then have to make extra promises to
commit this party to the plan. As a consequence, actor analyses are nearly
always unreliable.
A second aspect of strategic behaviour is that a party will rarely be explicit
about its interests, since a party that reveals its interests might reveal its negoti-
ating position and the room available for decision-making by the initiator. When
initiators are uncertain about the underlying interests of actors with whom they
have to cooperate, this strengthens the position of these actors. This also limits
the possibilities of an actor analysis.
A third aspect of strategic behaviour concerns an actor’s resources and rela-
tions. Suppose the initiator manages to map them out – which is by no means a
matter of course – it may, again, be in an actor’s interest to hide them or exaggerate
them. If actor A overestimates actor B’s resources, this might strengthen actor
B’s position. In many cases, the perception of someone’s power is far more
important than someone’s actual power position.
Fourth, once resources have been mapped out, the question is whether an actor
will be prepared to use them. As an example, we take initiator A again, who needs
actors B and C to realize his plan X. Actor B agrees with this plan and has good
relations with actor C. The question is now whether actor B wants to use these
relations to help realize actor A’s plan. Actor B may also need these relations
with actor C, perhaps for completely different goals; for example to realize plans
Y and Z as well. When he can use his relations with C for the realization of plans
Y and Z, the risk is that he will not support plan X, although he agrees with it.
The mere fact that he has a resource – relations – says nothing about his willing-
ness to use it.
Fifth, besides these forms of strategic behaviour, there is the problem that opin-
ions, interests, resources and relations may be unknown, even to the actor in ques-
tion. An actor may take a view without knowing, or knowing exactly, why he
40 Strategies in networks: the essence
does so or what his underlying interest is. An actor may not know, or not know
exactly, how strong or how weak his power position is. Well-known is the phe-
nomenon of the actor who, in his perception, is hierarchically superior to other
actors, but in fact is not. He overestimates his own power position.
These limits of an actor analysis do not mean that such an analysis is useless. It
is, of course, important to gain an insight into the multi-actor network. However, an
actor analysis has important limitations. This means that the attention shifts:

• From an actor analysis as an ex ante, analytic activity to an actor analysis

as an ongoing learning process By continually maintaining relations with
as many actors as possible, an initiator will learn what the opinions, interests,
means and relations of the other actors are. By continually exploring during
the decision-making process what the opinions, interests, means and rela-
tions of the other actors are and to what extent they change, an initiator will
stay informed about the other actors. Those who only rely on an ex ante actor
analysis will have to do with incomplete and superseded information.
• From a focus on the right analysis to a focus on the right actions If the
right actor analysis does not exist, due to strategic behaviour and the many
unknowns, the attention should shift from the question of what a good actor
analysis is to the question of how an actor can behave as effectively as pos-
sible in a network of interdependencies, even when it is not known exactly
what the opinions, interests, means and relations of the actors are. This and
the following chapter deal with this effective behaviour, because even an
ongoing actor analysis yields limited information. Actors that behave strate-
gically do not show their hand.

Involving whom?
Figure 3.1 prompts the question as to which parties should be involved in the
process of decision making and how much influence they will be allowed on the
final decision. An extreme position is that all parties should be involved in
the decision making and that the decision should be based on consensus. There
are three disadvantages of this position.
The first is that it causes excessive complexity. A process in which many par-
ties participate may bring excessive interaction costs that are disproportionate to
the benefits.
A second disadvantage is, again, that parties behave strategically. When an
initiator expresses the intention to reach decisions through consensus, there will
be a strong incentive for some parties to block the consensus, since those who do
so strengthen their own negotiating position.
Third, ‘the involvement of all’ is not an objective criterion. How do we define
‘all parties’? A definition might be ‘parties whose interests are affected by the
proposed decision’. For parties whose interests are hardly affected by the deci-
sion making it may nevertheless be attractive to apply for participation in the
process. Although actor D’s interests are not harmed by actor A’s plan X, D
 Strategies in networks: the essence 41
might be interested in participation, since he has strong relations with actors
B and C and a strong interest in the execution of plans Y and Z. Such strategic
behaviour may cause a golden-goose effect, giving rise to excessive interaction
costs. In a complex society, everyone is connected to everyone else and in the end
they all might participate in every process.
Involving all players is therefore rarely an option. Set against this is the selec-
tive activation of a network: the selection of parties is a strategic decision, in
which the following considerations are important.

Parties with production power: the need for multiple sourcing Parties with pro-
duction power are necessary, of course, because the resources they have are
needed to take and then implement a decision. A question here is whether the
same resource can be delivered by more parties. When an initiator is completely
dependent on one party for the funding of a plan, this party clearly has a strong
power position. This is why it is an important strategic question for an initiator as to
whether there are possibilities for multiple sourcing, i.e. tapping several resources.
Multiple sourcing has two variants:

• The first is that the initiator is dependent on another actor for the funding of
a plan, for example, but ensures that more parties are activated that have the
resources the initiator needs.
• The second is that, although the initiator is dependent on one party that has
the unique resource, he ensures that this party is also strongly dependent
on the initiator’s resources.

Parties with blocking power: the risk of ‘catch-as-catch-can’ and the Trojan
horse Parties with blocking power are both necessary and unnecessary for deci-
sion making. Unnecessary because they can make no positive contribution to the
decision making, but the support of these parties is necessary if, and in so far as,
they exert their blocking power and halt decision making. Involving such parties
in the decision making may have several effects. In the best case scenario, they
support the eventual decision. In the worst case, actors are involved, but they
throw in the towel at some stage, block further decision making and can use the
information they have gained during the process to strengthen their blocking
power.
This creates a major dilemma. Excluding these parties increases the risk that
they will exert their blocking power and, besides, develop a kind of ‘catch-as-
catch-can’ attitude: unrestrained behaviour, making every effort and using every
possibility for blocking decision making, since they have nothing to lose because
they have been excluded.
The risk of involving these parties is that the Trojan horse may be brought in:
the parties whose only interest is to block the decision enter the process. This
means that the question that needs to be asked with regard to these parties shifts.
The main question is not so much whether they should be involved in the process,
42 Strategies in networks: the essence
but under what conditions they will behave cooperatively. We discuss this
question in the following sections, particularly in Section 3.3.

Parties with a diffuse power position: keeping their entry option open As
regards these parties, it is not immediately apparent how strong their power posi-
tion is and what resources they have. They may develop into parties with unique
resources, parties with strong blocking power or parties that have no power posi-
tion at all. This is why it is important to always offer parties the possibility of
joining during the process. Those who exclude such an entry cannot handle
dynamic: the chance that the small parties of yesterday are the big parties of
tomorrow.

The importance of representative coalitions Numerous questions present them-

selves in the selective activation of a network. Should small parties be involved?
What parties with blocking power should be involved? Might parties with hardly
any power position have to be involved on moral grounds? There is every temp-
tation for an initiator to focus on the big parties with production power, since they
are a sine qua non when taking a decision. However, as we mentioned earlier,
excluding other parties may be risky. On the other hand, involving all is impos-
sible in many cases.
An important consideration when making this difficult choice is that at least
the interests that play a role in a decision are represented in a process. Suppose
the decision making deals with the construction of a large infrastructure project.
All kinds of environmentalist groups make themselves heard here: local and
national groups, moderate and radical groups, one-issue groups and groups with
a broad orientation. As these groups might have hardly any power position, there
is every temptation to exclude them. The risk of this – ‘catch-as-catch-can’, the
small party of today is the big player of tomorrow – can be mitigated by inviting
at least one party. When the other parties complain about exclusion, the defence
may be that the environmental interests were represented and that they had access
to the process. This may also contribute to the authority of the eventual decision:
it is true that not all environmentalist groups were represented, but environmental
interests were taken into account in the decision making.
All this deals with the question of who should be involved in the decision making.
The next question is, of course, how these parties can be encouraged to cooperate.
We discuss this question in the remaining part of this chapter and in Chapter 4.

3.3 Relation management: redundancy

In a network, an actor is by definition dependent on other actors. These depend-
encies are complex and tend to be intricate (see Chapter 2). Dependencies may
block decision making but may also offer major opportunities for decision
making. An important aspect of decision making in networks is the constant
 Strategies in networks: the essence 43
maintaining of relations. These relations have at least two functions: they
facilitate a good information supply for an initiator (Section 3.3.1) and they may
strengthen his power position in the network (Section 3.3.2).
The relations that an actor maintains can be characterized in two ways:

• Functional and extrafunctional relations Functional relations have a clear

significance for an actor. He cannot perform his core tasks without having
relations of this kind. Extrafunctional relations, on the other hand, have no
direct significance for an actor’s core tasks. The relations that an environ-
mental enforcement agency maintains with companies are functional; rela-
tions with an association of archaeologists are extrafunctional.
• Strong and weak relations (‘strong ties’ and ‘weak ties’) Strong ties are rela-
tions that are used intensively. Weak ties are relations that are kept warm for
incidental use. The above-mentioned enforcement agency may maintain strong
relations with the Ministry of the Environment and weak relations with, for
example, a department at a university conducting environmental research.

Relation building often has a utilitarian connotation: an actor enters into rela-
tions with parties he needs. This utilitarian attitude may lead to a strong tendency
to develop mainly functional and strong relations. However, research by
Granovetter shows that weak relations and extrafunctional ties may be very
important for an actor’s position in a network, because networks are always
dynamic.3 Actors’ positions may change, making them more important than they
used to be. New actors may join the network, presenting new problems and
making new solutions available. This dynamic means that an actor that plays a
marginal role in a network today may occupy a central position tomorrow. Weak
ties with this actor may then suddenly become very important. When the manager
of a fourteenth-century castle complains about damage caused by polluting activ-
ities of a neighbouring industry, the relations of the environmental enforcement
agency with the association of archaeologists may prove very valuable. When a
conflict arises with a company about the environmental effects of certain pro-
duction processes, the relations with the university can be used, for example,
because the university conducts authoritative research into the environmental
effects of this type of production process.
When an actor maintains the four types of relations, we speak of redundant
relations: he maintains constant relations with other actors even when it does not
seem useful at a particular stage, while giving explicit attention to his weak ties.
In some cases, redundancy has a negative connotation – superfluity, a waste of
energy – but it is meant in a positive sense here.4
As we said before, an actor that has his relation management in order will gain two
advantages: relations are an important means to strengthen his information position
(Section 3.3.1) and to strengthen his strategic position in a network (Section 3.3.2).
Before discussing these two advantages, we draw attention here to a possible
confusion of concepts. In this book, we use the term ‘networks’ in the meaning
of a pattern of interdependent relations. When an actor is in a network, he is
44 Strategies in networks: the essence
dependent on others for the realization of his goals, the other actors depending on
him and on each other.
However, the concept ‘network’ can also have another meaning: the whole of
relations that an actor maintains. We do not speak then of an actor that is in a
network, but of an actor that has a network.
Since these two definitions of ‘network’ may cause confusion, we will speak
of ‘redundant relations’ in this book when ‘network’ has this second meaning.
However, the two meanings of ‘network’ are closely related. An actor that is in a
network (as a pattern of interdependencies) needs networks (redundant relations)
to keep in touch with the other actors.

3.3.1 Relations and information

Redundant relations provide an actor with a large number of channels by which
he can receive information. Some of the information that an actor receives is sub-
stantive: information about the nature of problems, the available solutions, simi-
lar problems and solutions elsewhere, etc. Other information that an actor
receives is strategic: information about the positions and perceptions of parties,
the problems they are faced with, their resources, the extent to which they are able
to cooperate and the conditions under which they are willing to do so.
In a network, such strategic information is necessary because it allows an actor
to estimate his chances of successful interventions. It also allows him to keep in
touch with the various decision-making processes in the network (or in other net-
works). This increases the number of opportunities for him to take the right steps
at the right time.

Strategic information from redundant relations

Suppose a country consists of several regions, each with their own government
and parliament. In one of these regions, none of the parties has a majority in
parliament and there is a coalition cabinet of the liberal and labour parties.
The traffic alderman in one of the cities in this region, concludes that conges-
tion around his city is increasing rapidly. In consultation with his advisers, he
concludes that building a ringroad will improve the flow of traffic and reduce
congestion. By definition, ringroads encircle a built-up area, often outside the
municipal boundaries. The alderman is therefore dependent on the cooperation of
the adjoining towns and cities and of the regional government.
The alderman requests an interview with a member of the regional executive
and presents his plan for the ringroad. Much to the alderman’s disappointment,
the regional executive reacts negatively to his proposal. However, the alderman
is not discouraged by this ‘no’.
What would the alderman with a project-based DNA do? DNA meaning that
the project-managerial logic determines the behaviour, just as human DNA deter-
mines who people are. He would collect information that would make the regional
executive think again. He would, for example, commission a firm of traffic
 Strategies in networks: the essence 45
consultants to forecast the length of the tailbacks for the year 2020 and compare
the outcome with the situation in which there is a ringroad.
It is highly doubtful whether this action would persuade the regional executive.
He might react with a counterstudy that shows that the ringroad will attract new
traffic, causing new tailbacks. The result might be a fruitless ‘report war’.
What would the alderman with a more process-based DNA do? He would
wonder what this ‘no’ from the regional executive actually means. Is it a cate-
gorical no, or is it an opening bid in a negotiating process that might end in a con-
ditional yes? The alderman understands that he cannot ask the regional executive
such a direct question, but how can he find out the meaning of his rejection?
Suppose the alderman is a member of the Labour Party and the regional exec-
utive is a Liberal. This may limit the possibilities for approaching the latter
informally. There is a chance, however, that another member of the regional
government is a member of the Labour Party. The alderman and this Labour
member of the regional government know each other from a job they did a few
years ago. They were both members of a committee in charge of editing a sec-
tion in the then election manifesto of the Labour Party. The alderman decides
to phone his colleague party member and after reminiscing about their work for
the committee, he casually asks the member of the regional government
whether the ringroad has ever been discussed in a government meeting. The
member of the regional government answers that it was only mentioned in a
general sense. A few pros and cons were exchanged, but there was no final
decision making.
The alderman then wonders what other contexts might be relevant for the
regional executive. The Liberal Party in the regional parliament of course! He
suddenly remembers that, some years ago, one of his advisers turned to him
asking whether he could get a day off each week for working on his campaign.
He was standing for the Liberal Party in the regional elections. The alderman had
invited this official into his office and had a pleasant conversation with the can-
didate. He had asked him about his private life, had told him that, although it
would be difficult to combine private life and politics, it would be interesting and
that he, as an alderman, felt it was a good thing that knowledgeable advisers were
also active in politics. He had made a joke, saying that he was sorry that
his adviser was in the wrong political party, but that he did respect this of course.
The alderman decides to phone his former adviser and asks him to come to his
office. In this conversation, they evaluate the past few years – Does he manage to
combine politics and private life? – and the alderman asks whether he can assist
the official in any further way. In passing, they talk about the ringroad and the
official tells him that his party has not yet adopted a final view about the ringroad.
The alderman concludes from the two conversations that the ‘no’ from the
member of the regional executive still leaves room for manoeuvre and decides to
venture a second attempt. This new attempt is framed differently, however. The
alderman decides to focus on a plan aimed at the overall improvement of the
spatial quality on the outskirts of his city. This will have to encompass room for
recreation, environment, industry and … traffic.
46 Strategies in networks: the essence
In the event that the Labour member of the regional government and the
Liberal member of the regional parliament should give the same signals – the
regional government is unanimously against the ringroad and so are the Liberals
in parliament – a wise alderman would have given up his attempts, because one
should not flog a dead horse.
The information that the alderman receives from the Labour member of the
regional government and from the Liberal member of the regional parliament is
strategic. It is information that says something about the position taken by a
crucial actor. He receives this information thanks to the redundant relations (weak
ties) he maintained with his two informants.

Checking and double-checking information

Redundancy also means that an actor can receive information about the same
subject through several channels. This is very important, because actors in a net-
work behave strategically and will spread information strategically. The latter
may mean that an actor only supplies to other parties biased information that
strengthens his own position. The time when the information is supplied may also
be of strategic importance.
Given this strategic behaviour, an actor that is dependent for his information
on only one relation runs a great risk. He lacks information that other actors do
have or he receives information that he cannot place or put in perspective because
of its biased colour. However, if he receives information through several rela-
tions, he can check and double-check it. He can compare the information he
receives through the various relations, find out what the similarities and dissimi-
larities between the pieces of information are, check information he does not
trust, ask critical questions about it and thus use it more intelligently.

‘Coincidental’ information
In addition, a system of redundant relations increases the chance that an actor
will receive ‘coincidental’ useful information to solve a problem. ‘Coincidence’
plays an important role in decision making in networks, because, when a large
number of actors are involved in decision making, each of whom is the owner of
particular information, the chance of receiving interesting information increases.
Remember actor A, wanting to implement plan X, who needs the support of
actors B and C. Actor B is interested in plan X but also in plans Y and Z. Actor
C is merely interested in plans Y and Z. Actor D has no interest in plan X, but
strong interests in plans Y and Z and might, for that reason, try to block plan X.
The more redundant relations actor A has, not only with actors B, C and D but
also with many others actors, the greater the chance that one of these other
actors knows something about actor D that actor A can use to strengthen his
cooperation with D. The stronger this cooperation, the fewer possibilities actor
D has to block plan X.
 Strategies in networks: the essence 47
The more relations an actor maintains, the greater is the chance that he will
receive useful information, seemingly coincidentally and more by a matter of luck
than good management, but in reality, redundant relations will bring good luck.

Repertoire building
The risk of redundant relations is that they cause an information overload. An
actor constantly receives new and partly conflicting information and is no longer
able to handle it usefully.
However, redundant relations can also be used for repertoire building:5 the
building up of experiences that can help to interpret new information and give it
the right meaning. The more relations an actor maintains, the more types of expe-
riences an actor has. This creates a frame of reference that makes it possible to
give meaning to an abundance of information. Once an actor has a repertoire of
experiences, it may be relatively easy for him to estimate the meaning of new
information correctly. An actor that is able to do so combines the best of redun-
dancy: he receives a lot of information, which gives him great problem-solving
power and he also builds up the ability to interpret this information.

3.3.2 Relations and power

A redundant pattern of relations also brings an actor a number of strategic advan-
tages: it strengthens an actor’s power position in a network.

Room for manoeuvre

Redundant relations provide an actor in a network with room for manoeuvre.
Those who maintain many relations always have an alternative: an alternative
channel, an alternative ally or an alternative route to a key actor in a network.
One form of redundancy is multiple sourcing: an actor resolutely ensures that
he is not dependent on one single other actor for the realization of certain goals.
This is also conducive to an actor’s strategic positioning: there is always an alter-
native ally or coalition.
We now look at an illustration from the world of international diplomacy. Otto
von Bismarck, the Prussian prime minister in the second half of the nineteenth
century, was faced with a very fragmented and politically instable Europe. He
developed alliances and maintained all kinds of relations – political, military,
commercial – in all kinds of directions – with almost every country in Europe.
This led to a pattern of partly overlapping and partly competing alliances, many of
which were also mutually related. This resulted in such a complex whole of rela-
tions that ‘Prussia would always be closer to each of the contending parties than
they were to each another’.6 If France, for example, wanted to cooperate with other
European countries, it found time after time that Prussia also had ties with these
countries, which made it extremely difficult to challenge Prussia.
48 Strategies in networks: the essence
At first sight, the entire set of relations seems chaotic: a spaghetti-like structure,
in which numerous relations criss-cross. In reality, this spaghetti is an actor’s
strength: the more relations there are, the more room for manoeuvre there is and
the more difficult it is to fight this actor.

Predictability is limited for third parties

Predictability in a network may be a major strategic disadvantage. The more pre-
dictable an actor is, the easier it is for other actors to attune their behaviour to this
actor.7 Redundant relations diminish the predictability of an actor’s behaviour. It is
difficult for the other actors to estimate how the actor with the redundant relations –
Otto von Bismarck’s Prussia in the above example – will behave. An actor with
many relations always has possibilities for influencing the other actors indirectly. If
actor A negotiates with actor B and actor B has redundant relations, actor B might
try to influence actor A by activating actor C. Or actor A has an alternative ally
D, in case the cooperation with actor B fails. If we place ourselves in actor B’s
position, we can understand that actor B might fear actor A’s unpredictability. He
never knows which other actors will be activated by actor A or whether actor A
will surprisingly leave the table.

Redundancy makes an actor attractive

An actor with redundant relations is an attractive partner for the other parties in a
network, because this actor can be a gateway to others. Through this network, he
manages a large number of problems and solutions and is able to facilitate many
decision-making processes. However, the advantage of weak ties also manifests
itself here. Maintaining weak ties tends to keep an actor’s costs low, which makes
him more attractive.

Redundancy forces other actors to adopt moderate behaviour

Finally, a major consequence of all this is that others will tend to behave moder-
ately towards the actor with redundant relations. Others are likely to meet this
actor in a number of decision-making processes and in connection with a number
of subjects, and this forces them to show moderate and cooperative behaviour.
When they snub the actor in question with regard to subject A in network X, this
may turn against them when they meet the same actor in connection with subject
B in network Y.

Two warnings
Two warnings are appropriate in this context. In the first place, an actor that has
many relations will, in many cases, also have to show moderate behaviour to
preserve these relations. ‘The spider in the web’, as the expression goes, ‘may
 Strategies in networks: the essence 49
also become the fly in the web’. This became quite clear in our study into the fail-
ure of Sport 7, a Dutch commercial sports channel. A consortium including two
big companies (i.e. Philips and KPN, the Dutch counterpart of British Telecom)
and the Royal Dutch Football Association (KNVB) had founded Sport 7, a com-
petitor of the public broadcasters. As two of the major Dutch multinationals,
Philips and KPN have good relations with the Dutch government. This made
them very attractive for the other consortium partners because Sport 7 needed the
support of the Dutch government on a number of occasions. However, exactly
because Philips and KPN had such good relations, which were very important to
them, they had to behave moderately to the Dutch government. Philips and KPN
needed the Dutch government not only for Sport 7 but also for numerous other
subjects. After the fall of the sports channel, John de Mol, the shareholder, dis-
appointedly stated that Philips and KPN had yielded too soon to informal politi-
cal pressure and had not used their relations. This is the law of the spider and the
fly: the more relations an actor has, the less he can use them as he pleases.8
On a second point, it is also necessary for an actor’s strategic position that he
should be a reliable partner for the other actors. An actor that constantly reposi-
tions himself in a network may lose his reliability as far as the other actors are
concerned. In Chapter 5 we discuss how the strategies in this chapter relate to the
need for reliability.

3.4 Multi-issue decision making

A major risk of decision making in a network is that it remains limited to one
subject: one-issue decision making. If different actors take different views about
this issue, there is the risk of a deadlock. When a number of actors support view A
and a number of other actors support view B, there is little room for a compromise.
Let us use the example here of an experiment that will be recognizable and is
easy to enact. Take five people forming a family that has to take a decision about
their summer holiday destination. Each person is given a role: the father, the
mother and the three children aged eighteen, sixteen and fourteen, respectively.
Each family member takes a different view about the holiday destination. The
father and the mother both have an income and so have production power. The
eldest child is of age and has blocking power: she might decide to go on holiday
without her parents.
Suppose the father is asked to lead the process of decision making. He can use
his production power by stating that he will pay for the whole of the holiday and
make an amount of X available for it. Suppose he relies on the rule that ‘he who
pays the piper calls the tune’ and unilaterally proclaims what the destination will
be. The result is easy to guess: resistance among the other family members, some
of whom also have production power (the mother) or can use their blocking
power (the eldest child). In the worst case scenario – at least for the father – the
proposal will drive the mother and the eldest child into each other’s arms and they
will try to make the other children join their coalition. In the best case scenario,
the other family members will shrug their shoulders and simply not react – there
50 Strategies in networks: the essence
simply is nothing in it for them, the mother and the eldest daughter can block the
father’s idea, which means that there will be no family holiday. In either case, the
father’s unilateral, command and control-like attitude is an incentive for resist-
ance. Once there is resistance, the family is unlikely to reach agreement. There is
only one issue on the agenda – the summer holiday – and opposing viewpoints
will soon become entrenched because of the father’s stance.
An alternative is that the father transforms the decision making into a multi-
issue game. This implies that:

• there are several issues on the agenda, and

• there are sufficient interesting issues for each actor on the agenda,
• which makes it attractive for these actors to participate in the decision-
making process.

In the family experiment, all kinds of other issues are conceivable and these can
transform the decision making into a multi-issue game: entertainment rules, pocket
money arrangements, the winter sports holiday, the purchase of particular goods.
Issues may appear on the agenda that have nothing to do with the summer holiday
but that are very important to one of the family members. After all, the question is
not whether the substance of an issue is related to the summer holiday, but whether
an issue helps to make the process of decision making attractive to the family
members. The family members will ask the simple question ‘What’s in it for me?’.
Issues that have nothing to do with the summer holiday but that concern the inter-
ests of one of the family members are therefore particularly important.
What are the advantages of a multi-issue decision-making process?

Room for giving and taking

The first advantage is that room is created for a process of giving and taking. In
one-issue decision making, there is substantial risk of a deadlock. A multi-issue
game creates possibilities for exchanges. Actors have room for giving and taking,
and this is necessary for the smooth progress of decision making in networks.
Those who do not want to come along to the destination that the father has in
mind may be persuaded if they have their way on other issues; they may then be
willing to go along with this destination.

Incentives for cooperative behaviour

A second advantage is that a multi-issue game will result in changing coalitions
and therefore contains incentives for cooperative behaviour. A one-issue game
tends to contain strong incentives to show resistance. There is one issue on the
agenda, actor P1 takes a view that actor P3 dislikes, which automatically puts P3
in the position of resisting P1. Figure 3.2a illustrates this.
In Figure 3.2b we see the same constellation of parties, but now there is a
multi-issue game. For each issue there are different coalitions of proponents and
 Strategies in networks: the essence 51

P2
P2
P1
P1
P3
P3

P5 P5
P4
P4

a: One-issue coalitions b: Multi-issue coalitions

Figure 3.2 Multi-issue game and changing coalitions.

opponents. Parties that discuss the issues on this agenda, will learn that, depend-
ing on which issue is on the table, coalitions are changing continuously. When the
first issue is being dealt with, P1 and P3 are each other’s opponents. When the
second issue is being discussed, P1 and P3 support each other, etc.
These changing coalitions yield incentives for cooperative behaviour: when P1
and P3 enter into a head-on confrontation with each other on the first issue, it is
likely to harm their mutual relations and reduce the chances of good cooperation
on a second issue. P1 and P3 will be aware of this, so they will behave moder-
ately towards each other when dealing with the first issue. In other words, the
multi-issue character of the decision making leads to repetitive interdependencies
that – as we said earlier – tend to induce moderate behaviour.

Chances of desired and unforeseen outcomes

When discussing redundant relations, we indicated that a decision-making
process in which an initiator maintains many relations brings many chances of
unforeseen events and therefore of unforeseen outcomes. Something similar is
true of multi-issue decision-making processes, as Table 3.2 shows. What do the
family members do in the decision-making process? They couple issues. P3 is
willing to support P1 on the holiday destination if P1 is willing to support P3 on
the pocket money arrangement. This is an example of a bilateral deal, but many
more couplings are possible in a multi-actor, multi-issue process. Suppose that
(a) each party places four issues on the agenda and that (b) each issue can be cou-
pled to every other issue. Table 3.2 shows the number of possible couplings.9
The table makes clear that an infinite number of couplings between issues are
possible in a multi-issue game. When six players each contribute four issues,
1,961,256 different packages of ten issues are possible! Of course, it cannot be
predicted what couplings will eventually take place – you cannot plan beforehand
which of the 1,961,256 couplings should be selected.
52 Strategies in networks: the essence
Table 3.2 Couplings in a multi-issue game10

Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of

parties issues possible possible possible
couplings if couplings if couplings if
there are there are there are
only only only
packages of packages of packages of
six issues eight issues ten issues

3 12 924 495 66
4 16 8,008 12,870 8,008
5 20 38,760 125,970 184,756
6 24 164,596 735,471 1,961,256

In the above calculation, it has not yet been assumed that a package must be
attractive to each party. The 1,961,256 different packages also contain packages
in which only three parties participate (two parties with four issues and one party
with two issues). Of course, this may be the outcome of a process: three parties
drop out and the three others manage to make a package deal.
When we make another assumption – all parties must participate in the pack-
age and the issues must be distributed evenly about the parties11 – 20,736 possi-
ble packages remain when there are six parties and packages of ten issues.
Again, it is impossible to foresee what couplings will be made. That means that a
multi-issue decision-making process will always have unforeseen outcomes. This is
even more true when we remember that this process is dynamic in at least two ways:

• During the process, parties can reformulate their issues. They learn that a par-
ticular issue stands little chance of success and reformulate it into a slightly dif-
ferent issue. Although the number of issues remains the same, this increases
the unpredictability of the outcome.
• During the process, parties can put forward new issues. They learn that, given
the course of the process, a new issue stands a fair chance. The number of issues
on the agenda rises, also causing the unpredictability of the outcome to increase.

At first sight, a multi-issue decision-making process seems a form of horse-

trading or bargaining. There are many issues on the agenda and this allows
exchanges to be considered. The decision-making process may also lead to what
is called enrichment. Enrichment by negotiating means that parties not only
exchange issues, but that they also use the large amount of couplings available to
make a deal in which synergy between the issues is created and, as a conse-
quence, in which the whole is more than the sum of the parts.

Parties learn how to make trade-offs

One risk of multi-issue decision making is that, once actors are aware of this strat-
egy, they submit long wish lists. Suppose that the eldest daughter recognizes the
 Strategies in networks: the essence 53
father’s strategy – she knows he is always trying to solve family problems with
the multi-issue strategy. And she has developed a counter-strategy: she places as
many wishes as possible on the agenda. Moreover, she suggests that her brother
and sister do the same, to frustrate their father’s strategy.
She might, however, underestimate the power of a multi-issue game. The idea
of multi-issue decision making is that it makes it attractive for parties to partici-
pate in the process of decision making. When parties present wish lists and these
are placed on the agenda, an incentive is created for these parties to participate in
the process of interaction. If the father accepts his children’s wish lists and puts
them on the agenda – instead of rejecting them – it becomes difficult not to enter
the decision-making process. That will be the father’s first interest: to involve his
family members in the process.
Once parties have entered the process, it is not so easy to leave it. They develop
prospects of gain. If they leave, they might not only risk their own prospects of
gain, but also those of the other parties. In the future, they will need the other
parties for other issues, so they have an interest in not harming their relations with
these other parties.
Then they will start to exchange information and will probably become sensi-
tive to what is possible and feasible and what is not. It will also become clear that
trade-offs have to be made. When the holiday is spent in their own country, there
will be possibilities for a handsome pocket money arrangement, but these possi-
bilities are slimmer in the case of distant destinations. The idea is that the involve-
ment of parties in a process makes them not only sensitive to the fact that
trade-offs have to be made, but also forces them to actually make them. This will
boost the willingness to abandon particular wishes. Parties learn during a process
that successful decision making is possible only when they make trade-offs.
Reducing wish lists and making trade-offs between different wishes therefore
takes place during the process. The father who knows this, also knows that reducing
wish lists before this process – by not putting them on the agenda – merely
encourages resistance and might imply that the process will not start at all.
So in the end, our family may reach a package deal: a number of decisions on
several issues, which are mutually connected. The package is attractive to each of
the family members and each one knows that the only way to secure their own
gain is to support others when they want to secure their gains. See the following
section.

Actors should be willing to abandon their goals

Multi-issue games have an important implication. Suppose actor A wants to reach
a particular goal, faces resistance and designs a multi-issue agenda. This may
motivate an exchange process, in which actor A is able to realize his goal by
granting other actors their objectives. These other objectives are thus the lubri-
cant to realize actor A’s goal.
Most likely, however, something else will happen: the other actors demand –
explicitly or implicitly – that actor A should declare his original goal negotiable,
54 Strategies in networks: the essence
because only then can serious negotiations take place. Actor A can only realize
his goal, or rather part of his goal, by declaring it negotiable. The alternative, real-
izing goals through command and control, is unlikely to succeed in a network.
The paradox is therefore that actor A can only realize his goal by abandoning
it. Or, formulated conversely, if he persists in his goal without making any
concessions, he will certainly not realize it.

3.5 Managing winners and losers

In a multi-issue game, the parties will try to design a package deal: a set of deci-
sions containing a large number of solutions for a large number of problems. This
is often referred to as seeking a win-win situation: for each individual actor, the
package should bring more ‘gain’ than ‘loss’, creating gain for each party and
ensuring sufficient support for the package.12
In this section, we discuss such win-win situations in more detail. We elabo-
rate the concept (Section 3.5.1), deal with how to manage losers (Section 3.5.2)
and with the dynamic of win-win situations (Section 3.5.3).

3.5.1 Win-win situation: the essence

What is the essence of a win-win package deal? We map this out by discussing a
number of misunderstandings about win-win situations.

A positive profit and loss account for each party

A first misunderstanding is that no distinction is made between synergy and win-win
situations. Synergy means that parties manage to create added value thanks to their
cooperation. Synergy may develop when a technical university cooperates with a
number of technology-intensive companies in its neighbourhood. The university
gains by it, the companies gain by it and an environment develops that may attract
new, technology-intensive companies, by which everybody gains. Thanks to such an
environment, the university can attract more top scientists, the companies are closer
to the source of the knowledge and may be the first to benefit from this knowledge.
Such synergy may, of course, be a win-win situation. However, synergy does
not necessarily mean that a win-win situation has been created. From a win-win
perspective, the question is not so much whether the whole benefits, but whether
there is a positive profit and loss account for each individual party.
Suppose one of the companies, an important player, will incur substantial costs
because of the cooperation. Suppose this company also concludes, regretfully,
that the growth in the number of companies in the locality of the university
increases competition in the area. For this company, the profit and loss account
may be negative. Although there is still synergy – the company may even be
crucial for the success of the cooperation – there is no win-win situation for this
company. The consequences are easy to guess: incentives may arise for this
company to leave the coalition of cooperating parties.
 Strategies in networks: the essence 55
Win-win situations always involve a positive profit and loss account for each
actor. If there is synergy, this may mean that there is also a win-win situation, but
this is not the case by definition.

What matters is the perception of the gain

A second misunderstanding is that ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ are objectivizable. When
there is a win-win situation for each actor, the question is always what the gain
and the loss are in this actor’s perception, and these cannot be objectivized.
Although an actor may stand to gain, he might have expected more gain and may
very well be disappointed and hinder the progress of the decision-making process
out of frustration.

Perceptions of gain and loss change during the process

As we observed earlier, during the process of decision making actors will learn:

• about their own power position and the power of the other actors in a network;
• about new opportunities that arise as a result of the multi-issue game.

We call the first of these positional learning: What are the power positions in
a network, what production power and blocking power do actors have? We call
the second substantive learning: What substantive opportunities are there?
The perception of gain and loss may change under the influence of these learn-
ing processes. An actor that would very much like to realize issue A may learn
during the process that the chance to do so is very slim, unless he is prepared to
make a great sacrifice. However, during the process issue B looms up, for which
there is strong support. The perception of the gain may change for this actor
during the process: he learns that if issue B is realized, there is gain, which puts
issue A into perspective.

Power plays a major role in influencing perception

In some cases, win-win situations have an idyllic connotation: parties exchange
their views and reach a package deal that is attractive for everybody – in a world
of peace, understanding and harmony.
Above, we put this idyllic connotation in perspective to some extent. During the
process of interaction, parties change their perception of what is ‘gain’ and what is
‘loss’. In addition to this, during the process, all parties will try to use their power
position and optimize their gain. They will behave strategically and exert pressure
on the other parties. This exertion of power – which is far from heavenly – may
strongly influence the perception of the gain; see also Chapter 6, in which we pres-
ent the example of someone who puts a pistol to someone else’s head. The threat-
ened person might immediately have a completely different perception of gain and
loss than he had one minute earlier.
56 Strategies in networks: the essence
‘Enlarging the shadow of the future’
Even after the decision about the package has been made, there is the risk of ex-post
opportunism: actors have made their gains and start to behave opportunistically. For
example, they withdraw from the win-win coalition.13 Win-win decision making
therefore has an important temporal component. It is not only important for the actors
to hold out the promise of gain to each other, but it should also be clear when each
of them will make their gain. So long as parties still have a prospect of gain, the risk
that they will behave opportunistically is smaller than from the moment they have
made the gain. When the gain is paid out too early, incentives for opportunistic behav-
iour may arise, as Axelrod points out: ‘Enlarge the shadow of the future’ is his advice
to promote a cooperative attitude.14 Dixit and Nalebuff formulate it as follows:

To avoid the unraveling of trust, there should be no clear final step. As long
as there remains a chance of continued business, it will never be worth-
while to cheat. So when a shady character tells you this will be his last deal
before retiring, be especially cautious.15

Managing losers
Finally, win-win decision making does not detract from the fact that decision
making may also bring losers. These are the parties that are not involved in the
package deal. They have not participated in the process, although the decision
making does concern their interests. Or they left the process during the realiza-
tion of the package deal because there was insufficient prospect of gain for them.
In such a situation, there is a win-win situation for the coalition, while for other
parties this is a win-lose situation. These losers may gain from challenging the win-
win package. The coalition will then also have to invest in a ‘management of losers’,
particularly when they have a power position to challenge the package deal or when
these parties will still be needed in the future. For example, the parties in the coalition
will have to be sufficiently flexible to admit losers when they become too threatening
for the coalition. This flexibility also concerns the content of the package deal,
because the entry of new parties may change the content of the package.

3.5.2 Losers: strategies

In this section, we deal with the strategies adopted by losers. What will losers do,
if there is a coalition of actors that has developed a win-win package? We discuss
these strategies and give a number of counter-strategies to deal with them.

Forming coalitions with other parties

A loser may go in search of allies. These are parties that are also affected by the
decision and that also have no interest in the package deal. These parties may
have an interest in reversing it or frustrating its implementation.
 Strategies in networks: the essence 57
Utilizing meetings elsewhere
A loser can make strategic use of the fact that he will meet the parties in the win-
win coalition again in the future and in connection with other issues. In this new
meeting, the parties in the win-win coalition may urgently need the support of the
losers. The strategy of the loser may be to feed this ‘we will need the loser in
the future’ perception. For the parties in the win-win coalition, this may mean that
the profit and loss account of the package changes: set against the gain in the
package is the (loss in the package + the future loss on other subjects). For these
parties, this may mean that there is no longer any gain, as a result of which
supporting the fellow coalition members and the package is no longer a matter
of course.

Trying to detach parties from the win-win coalition

When a win-win coalition has been built, it may contain a number of parties that
are hardly loyal. For example, those parties that have scarcely more gain than loss
or have already had their gain paid out. Alternatively, certain parties in the coali-
tion might see their profit and loss account worsening because of changing
circumstances. These are potential allies for the losers.

Creating a small risk of a major loss

When the actors in the win-win coalition run a small risk of a major loss, this may
be a strong incentive for these parties to leave the coalition, because not only has
the loss to be deducted from the gain they may still enjoy, but also the costs of
these risks, if they become reality.
A loser might fuel the feeling that there are small risks of a major loss. For
example, a loser that is excluded from the package deal may start legal proceed-
ings against the package. Even when the chance of success is small, it means that
the sword of Damocles will be hanging over the ‘winners’ for a long time, since
the proceedings may be lengthy. There is a risk, however small it may be, that their
agreements in the package will prove legally untenable. This may strengthen the
loser’s position.

Challenging the legitimacy of the decision because of exclusion

Another strategy is for a loser to invoke the fact that he was not involved in the
decision-making process. This mere fact may threaten the win-win situation
when a number of parties in the coalition have doubts about the package. They
then have a procedural argument for withdrawing from the coalition. The rea-
soning will then be that the mere fact that certain parties were excluded is suffi-
cient grounds to give up support for the win-win coalition. Parties may invoke
procedural arguments without having to put the content of the package up for
debate, which might be very satisfying for them.
58 Strategies in networks: the essence
‘Catch-as-catch-can’
In some cases, the core of the loser’s interests may have been affected. If so, the
result may be that the loser will fight the coalition with a ‘catch-as-catch-can’
strategy. He will sail close to the wind in fighting the package, no longer observ-
ing the usual conventions. This may be an unequal fight because the winners are
expected to observe normal forms of behaviour.

3.5.3 The dynamic of win-win situations

The main risk in the win-win coalition is that actors that have enjoyed their gain,
or for whom the gain-loss balance is no longer positive for other reasons, will
leave the coalition.
The initiator has a number of strategies to deal with this. The central feature
of these strategies is that a head-on confrontation between winners and losers is
prevented as much as possible.

Making the multi-issue process a continuous game

The first strategy has already been discussed extensively: if a loser becomes
active, broaden the agenda and add new issues. The more issues there are on the
agenda, the less vulnerable is the win-win coalition – new issues might make it
attractive for a loser to join the coalition. This may create new possibilities for
win-win situations, in which the initial losers might be involved. Creating a win-
win situation is therefore not a one-off activity, but a constant process.

Keeping relations with losers open

It may be necessary during the process to invite one or more losers to join the
coalition; for example because the blocking power of these losers has become too
great.
This will change the content of the package deal – possibly to the disappoint-
ment of the original coalition members – but it will enhance its feasibility,
because certain actions may be so threatening to the win-win coalition that it may
be necessary to admit the loser to this coalition.

Compensating elsewhere
Losers can also be compensated elsewhere on other issues. If an initiator has
redundant relations, he will also meet the loser in connection with other matters
and be able to use these relations to compensate the loser.

Giving winners sufficient prospect of gain

It is also important here that it should constantly be made clear to the partici-
pants in a coalition that they have a positive profit and loss account. When the
 Strategies in networks: the essence 59
participants are convinced of this, the risk that the losers’ strategies will be
successful is far less than when the winners have doubts about the profit and
loss account. It is important here that the members of the win-win coalition
should realize that opportunistic behaviour or leaving the coalition may harm
relations with the fellow coalition members and hamper future cooperation in
other areas. When the coalition members realize this, their gain is the ‘gain
from the package’ less the ‘loss from the package + the loss that is suffered
when leaving the coalition’.

Framing the loss as a joint loss

As we said before, gain and loss is always a matter of perception. In some cases,
it is possible to manage or frame these perceptions. It may be possible to frame
loss as gain, or as not so much loss as it seems, or to explain that the loser has
gained a right to future gain with his loss – actually, he is not a loser – or to explain
that the winner is also a loser – ‘everybody is a loser’, ‘this game had no winners’.
Both strategies will prevent future over-reactions by the losers in the game.