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SECTION 378 CrPC

CrPC Chapter XXIX

S. 378 Appeal in case of acquittal

Description
1. Save as otherwise provided in Sub-Section (2) and subject to the provisions of
Sub-Sections (3) and (5),
1. the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor
to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal
passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable
offence;
2. the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to
present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate
order of an acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court [not
being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the
Court of Session in revision.";
2. If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been
investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the
Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or by any other
agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under any Central
Act other than this Code, the Central Government may, subject to the
provisions of Sub-Section (3), also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal—
1. to the Court of Session, from an order of acquittal passed by a
Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
2. to the High Court from an original or appellate order of an acquittal
passed by any Court other than a High Court [not being an order
under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of
Session in revision.
3. No appeal under Sub-Section (1) or Sub-Section (2) shall be entertained
except with the leave of the High Court.
4. If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint
and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this
behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the
complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
5. No application under Sub-Section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the
expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days
in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.
6. If, in any case, the application under Sub-Section (4) for the grant of special
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order
of acquittal shall lie under Sub-Section (1) or under Sub-Section (2).

State of Odisha (Vig.) v. Debasis Dixit- bribe case

Orissa High Court has advised the State to exercise its right to appeal against acquittal
Held- Thus, an order of acquittal should not be disturbed in appeal under section 378 of
Cr.P.C. unless it is perverse or unreasonable. There must exist very strong and compelling
reasons in order to interfere with the same. Findings of fact recorded by a Court can be held
to be perverse, if the same have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant materials
on record or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible materials or if they are
against the weight of evidence or if they suffer from the vice of irrationality.”

Rulings of the Apex Court

Babu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1983
In the State appeal against acquittal, appellant Babu, his father Munna and Tulaiyan were
convicted by the High Court of Allahabad and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The prosecution case as unfolded in the First Information Report and the evidence
is that Dhani Ram, the deceased who was living with his father-in-law in village Euretha
came on 7th of October 1969 to tho house of his father Ajudhya in village Therro for
getting his lands ploughed. On the 8th October 1969 at about 9 A.M., he along with his
father left village Therro for village Kurotha for getting seeds from one of Dhani Ram's
friends. When the two reached the field of Malkhan which is said to be near the temple of
Ram Kund, the appellants came out from inside the Jhunri field of Malkhan and started
beating Dhani Ram with lathis. While Tulaiyan, appellant No. 3 caught hold of
Ajudhya and prevented him from having his son Dhani Ram rescued, the other
two continued to beat him to death pursuant to the F.I.R. filed at S.30 p.m. at the
police station which was about 12 miles away, Sub Inspector Prem Narain reached the
spot at 3 A.M. on 9th October, found the dead body of Dhani Ram Iying between the fields
of Halkha and Malkhan, sent it for postmortem and after investigation filed the chargesheet.

All the appellants entered a plea of non-guilty. Babu's defence was that the case was
foisted against him as he had earlier on 17th of July 1969 filed a complaint under section
498 I.P.C. against Dhani Ram, his brother Ghurka, their maternal uncle Halka and one Ram
Charan for enticing Babu's wife away. Tulaiyan took tho plea that he was being implicated
as he was one of the witnesses in the earlier case under section 498 I.P.C.
On appraisal of evidence the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the evidence
produced by the prosecution was too feeble to base any conviction on that. In his opinion
there was no motive on the part of the appellants, and the witnesses could not be said to be
independent and they were mere chance witnesses. Ho further found that tho probability of
Dhani Ram being attacked while it was dark before he had evacuated or takeon his
breakfast could not be weeded out and in all probability the occurrence had taken place not
at tho place alleged by the Prosecution. On those findings he acquitted all the accused.
On appeal, however, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted the
appellants under section 302 road with section 34 I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to
undergo imprisonment for life. Hence tho appeal under section 2 of the Supreme
Court (Enlargomont of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act 1971.
HELD: 1:1 The appellate court should be slow in disturbing the finding of
fact of the trial court and if two views are reasonably pos4sible of the evidence on the
record, it should not interfere simply because it feels that it would have taken a different
view if the case had been tried by it, because the trial judge has the advantage of seeing
and hearing the witnesses and the initial presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused is not weakened by his acquittal. [335 P-G]
State of U.P. v. Samman Dass, [1972] 3 S.C.R. 58, followed.
1:2 In the instant cases a perusal of tho evidence produced and the two judgments of
the courts below make it clear that tho conclusions arrived at by the Sessions court were
fully justified and should not have been lightly set aside by the High Court. The
cumulative effect of the various circumstances in the opinion of the Sessions Judge did
throw doubt on the prosecution case and if the learned Sessions Judge in the circumstances
did not think it safe to rely upon the evidence produced on behalf of the Prosecution,
he committed no error either as to the time of occurrence or the venue of the occurrence,
or the motive for murder, or the motive of PW 1 to implicate tho appellants by treating the
witnesses as interested and/or chance witnesses. [336 D-E, 334 B-C]

Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2006- reasonable and plausible view
The High Court in appeal re-appreciated the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that
the trial court's judgment was perverse and unsustainable. It therefore set aside the trial court
judgment and convicted the accused under section 302 IPC for the murder of the deceased
and under section 324 IPC for injuring Brij Raj Singh and sentenced him to life imprisonment
and for six months R.I. respectively.
36. Against the impugned judgment of the High Court, the accused appellant has preferred
appeal to this court. We have been called upon to decide whether the trial court judgment was
perverse and the High Court was justified in setting aside the same or whether the impugned
judgment is unsustainable and against the settled legal position?
37. We deem it appropriate to deal with the main reasons by which the trial court was
compelled to pass the order of acquittal and the main reasons of the High Court in reversing
the judgment of the trial court.
MAIN REASONS FOR ACQUITTAL BY THE TRIAL COURT:
38. The trial court acquitted the accused for the following reasons:
1. The prosecution story of single shot injury to two persons one standing horizontally and
the other vertically stands totally discredited by the medical and the evidence of Ballistic
Expert.
2. According to the FIR, the deceased received a spherical ball (ball shot) bullet injury and
Brij Raj Singh P.W.2 received pellet injuries. The accused's gun had a cartridge that could
only contain pellets. The Ballistic Expert has clearly stated that a cartridge containing pellets
cannot contain a bullet. As such, it appears that two weapons were used.
3. Dr. Ram Kumar Gupta, P.W.5 who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased, clearly
stated that the deceased received injuries from a bullet whereas Dr. Govind Prasad Bakara
who had examined Brijraj Singh P.W.2 clearly stated that both injuries were caused by a
pellet.
Therefore, according to medical evidence coupled with the evidence of the Ballistic Expert,
two firearms must have been used.
This version is quite inconsistent with the prosecution story.
4. The injuries received by Brij Raj Singh P.W.2 were from the back side and the injury
received by the deceased was from the front side and this shows that two weapons may have
been used.
5. Removal of the body of the deceased from the place of occurrence also created doubt with
regard to the veracity of the prosecution version.
6. The possibility that the deceased and the complainant's side were aggressors and had gone
there and caused pharsa and lathi blows on the accused cannot be ruled out because of the
marks on the gun Ex.3. That the said gun was fired in snatching all of a sudden, injuring the
deceased also cannot be ruled out from the circumstances of the case.
7. The trial court did not discard the defence version of right of private defence as pleaded by
the accused.
8. The trial court observed that it is difficult to separate falsehood from the truth, where some
material aspects of the occurrence seem to have been deliberately withheld. It is a well-
established principle of criminal jurisprudence that when two possible and plausible
explanations co-exist, the explanation favourable to the accused should be adopted. MAIN
REASONS FOR REVERSAL OF ACQUITTAL ORDER:
39. The High Court gave the following reasons for setting aside the acquittal:
1. A perusal of the post-mortem report goes to show that autopsy conducted on the dead body
of the deceased revealed ante-
mortem gunshot wound of entry 2.5 cm x through and through on right side neck 2 cm lateral
to midline of neck front aspect having corresponding wound of exit 5 cm x 4 cm on right side
back of neck 5 cm below right ear. Therefore, this injury was almost horizontal.
2. Medical examination of injured Brij Raj Singh revealed a round lacerated wound of entry
0.3 cm x 0.5 cm on right side back 10 cm away from midline and 9 cm below lower border of
scapula having wound of exit 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm x 0.5 on right side back 0.8 cm away and
lateral from injury no. 1. Thus, this injury was also almost horizontal.
3. The observation made by the trial judge that firearm injury caused to the deceased was
vertical and to that of Brij Raj Singh horizontal is wholly fallacious.
4. A layman does not understand the distinction between a cartridge
containing pellets and the bullet. In common parlance, particularly in villages when a
person sustains injuries by gun shot, it is said that he has received `goli' injury. Ghurey Lal
fired at his uncle with his gun causing him Goli (bullet) injury and Brij Raj Singh also
received pellet (chhara) injury which goes to show that injuries received by them were caused
by two different weapons. There is hardly any difference between bullet and pellet for a
layman. From 12 bore gun cartridge is fired and 12 bore cartridge always contain pellets
though size of pellets may be different.
5. A perusal of the post-mortem reports goes to show that autopsy conducted on the dead
body of the deceased revealed ante- mortem gun shot wound of entry 2.5 cms.
through and through on right side neck 2 cm lateral to midline of neck front aspect having
corresponding wound of exit 5 cm x 4cm on right side back of neck 5 cm below right ear.
Therefore, this injury was almost horizontal.
6. The medical examination of injured Brij Raj Singh revealed a round lacerated wound of
entry 0.3 cm x 0.5 cm on right side back 10 cm away from midline and 9 cm below lower
border of scapula having wound of exit 1.5 cm x 0.5 cm x 0.5 cm on right side back 0.8 cm
away and lateral from injury no.1. Thus, this injury was also almost horizontal.
7. The learned trial judge had noted the evidence of B. Rai, Ballistic Expert, C.W.1 that both
the injuries would have been caused by two shots. While B. Rai, Ballistic Expert, C.W.1 had
given the said opinion, he had also stated in his cross- examination by the prosecution that if
the assailant fired from place `C' and the person receiving pellet injury standing at place `B'
would have turned around, on dispersal of pellets he could have received the pellet injuries if
deceased and injured both would have stood in the same line of firing.
OUR CONCLUSIONS:
40. We disagree with the High Court. Admittedly, the deceased died of a bullet injury whereas
Brij Raj Singh, P.W. 2 received pellet injuries. It is well settled that a cartridge cannot contain
pellet and bullet shots together. Therefore, the injuries on deceased and injured P.W. 2 clearly
establish that two shots were fired from two different fire arms.
41. The High Court also observed that the laymen, meaning thereby the villagers, hardly
know the difference between a bullet and a pellet. This finding has no basis, particularly in
view of the statement of all the witnesses on record. Wherever the witnesses wanted to use
`bullet' they have clearly used `Goli' or `bullet' and wherever they wanted to use `pellet' they
have clearly used the word `Chharra' which means pellets, so to say that the witnesses did not
understand the distinction between the two is without any basis or foundation.

Bannareddy v. State of Karnataka

High Courts were advised not to interfere with well-reasoned orders of Trial Courts unless the
same are arbitrary, irrational or improbable.
JJ ACT
JJ act 2000
2015 amendments

Hari ram v State of Rajasthan

Background:
Hari Ram was charged with a number of criminal offences. There was dispute as to Mr
Ram’s age at the time of the offence, which determined whether he would be tried as a
juvenile or an adult. According to the Juvenile Justice Act ("1986 Act"), a juvenile is a boy
under 16 or a girl under 18. According to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act (“2000 Act”), a juvenile is a child under 18. The High Court considered
testimony from Mr Ram’s father as well as medical reports, and concluded that at the time of
the offence Mr Ram was over 16, thereby excluding him from the juvenile justice system. He
appealed on the basis that by adopting such a technical approach to determining his age, the
Court had defeated the purpose of the juvenile justice laws (namely, the rehabilitation of
young people in conflict with the law). Furthermore, the 2000 Act had raised the age until
which a male child in conflict with the law would be treated as a juvenile from 16 to 18 years.
Issue and resolution:
Juvenile justice. Whether Mr Ram falls within the definition of ‘juvenile’ under the “1986
Act” (under 16) or the 2000 Act (under 18). The Court allowed his appeal and set aside the
order of the High Court, finding that he was under 18 at the time of the offence and also when
the 2000 Act came into force, therefore the provisions of the 2000 Act would apply in his
case such that he was to be treated as a ‘juvenile’.
Court reasoning:
Under amendments to the 2000 Act, for all cases that were pending on the date on which
the 2000 Act came into force (1 April 2001), a person will be determined to be a ‘juvenile in
conflict with the law’ if they are alleged to have committed an offence when they were under
18. Mr Ram, who was over 16 at the time of the offence but under 18 when the 2000 Act
came into force, was therefore to be treated as a ‘juvenile’ and the 2000 Act applied to his
case.
Abdul Razzaq Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
Is Juvenile Justice Act retrospective effect?
The provisions of the JJ Act have been interpreted by this Court time and again, and
it has been clearly explained that raising the age of "juvenile" to 18 years from 16
years would apply retrospectively.
173(8) CrPC Jurisprudence
Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat
Investigation after the coming into force of the Cr.PC, 1973 will include all proceedings
under Cr.PC for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer. “All” would
undoubtedly then include Section 173 (8) as well. The power therefore, under Section 190, of
a Magistrate ordering such investigation, would encompass further investigation under
Section 173 (8).
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali
“Further investigation” is where the investigating officer obtains further oral or documentary
evidence after the final report has been filed before the court in terms of Section 173(8). This
power is vested with the executive. It is the continuation of previous investigation and,
therefore, is understood and described as “further investigation”. The scope of such
investigation is restricted to the discovery of further oral and documentary evidence. Its
purpose is to bring the true facts before the court even if they are discovered at a subsequent
stage to the primary investigation. It is commonly described as “supplementary report”.
“Supplementary report” would be the correct expression as the subsequent investigation is
meant and intended to supplement the primary investigation conducted by the empowered
police officer. Another significant feature of further investigation is that it does not have the
effect of wiping out directly or impliedly the initial investigation conducted by the
investigating agency. This is a kind of continuation of the previous investigation. The basis is
discovery of fresh evidence and in continuation of the same offence and chain of events
relating to the same occurrence incidental thereto. In other words, it has to be understood in
complete contradistinction to a “reinvestigation”, “fresh” or “de novo” investigation.
Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar
Magistrate can direct further investigation under Section 156 (3) which is the power of the
police to investigate a cognizable offence, and require them to make a further report.
Hemant Dhasmana v. CBI
although the section is not specific in respect of the Court’s power to order further
investigation, the power of the police can be set into motion upon the order of such a court. It
was further observed that this order should not be interfered with even in the exercise of the
revisional jurisdiction of a higher court.
Devendra Nath Singh v. State of Bihar
there is no specific requirement to seek leave of the court for further investigation or to file a
supplementary report but investigation agencies, have not only understood it to be so but
have also adopted the same as a legal requirement. The doctrine of contemporanea exposito
aids such an interpretation of matters which have been long understood and implemented in a
particular manner to be accepted into the interpretive process. In other words, the requirement
of permission for further investigation or to file a supplementary report is accepted within
law and is therefore required to be complied with.
PEETHAMBARAN versus STATE OF KERALA 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 402
Inspector of Police, Vaikom conducted further investigation as per Order No.D2-43642/16/K,
passed by a police officer and not by any duly empowered judicial officer
Held- Have to take permission, relying on Devendranath singh v bihar. The Chief Police
Officer of a district is the Superintendent of Police who is an officer of the Indian Police
Service. Needless to state, an order from the District Police Chief is not the same as an order
issued by the concerned Magistrate………. The doctrine of contemporanea exposito aids
such an interpretation of matters which have been long understood and implemented in a
particular manner to be accepted into the interpretive process. In other words, the requirement
of permission for further investigation or to file a supplementary report is accepted within
law and is therefore required to be complied with.”

138 NI AND IPC- DOUBLE JEOPARDY

AIR 2012 SC 2844 SANGEETA BHEN MAHENDRA BAI PATEL V GUJARAT
FACTS- appellant had taken hypothecation loan of Rs. 20 lakhs and had not repaid the
same. the appellant issued cheque bearing no. 59447 and on being presented, the cheque
has been dishonoured. Appellant got convicted, pleaded double jeopardy- ie- that he has
been punished under NI act and cannot be punished under IPC again.
RULE- Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Sections 120B, 406, 420 and
34 of IPC
Held- “it would be a violation of Article 20(2) of India's Constitution to file an FIR under the
Indian Penal Code by leveling allegations that the goods were received with malicious intent
and cheques were also issued with such an intent, and to simultaneously seek prosecution
under Section 138 of NIA for the same set of allegations and a similar transaction for the
same amount would violate Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India.” "In the judgment of
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) it was held that the requirement to prove an offence
under the NI Act and an offence under the IPC is different, and it was observed that there may
be some overlapping of facts but the ingredients of the offences are entirely different,
therefore, the subsequent cases are not barred by any statutory provisions
CR 1285 OF 15 M/S. V.S. Reddy & Sons vs Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy
“Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the offences punishable under the
provisions of Section 138 of the NI Act and the case is sub judice before the High Court.
In the instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC. In
the prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not required to be proved. However, in the
case under IPC involved herein, the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence
punishable under Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be
imposed.”
On a perusal of the judgment in entirety, we find that the similar reasoning was given by
the High Court which was not accepted by this Court. The attractability of Section 300
Cr.P.C. was negatived. The facts in the present case are almost similar to the case stated in
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra).
J. Vedhasingh v. R.M. Govindan, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1010
ISSUE- the accused can be tried for an offence under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior conviction
or acquittal or whether the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial.
CONTENTIONS- The complainant/private respondents contended that the case was not only
of cheque dishonor, but also breach of trust accompanied by mens rea. As such, FIR u/s 406
and 420 IPC was not barred. The petitioners, on the other hand, contended that dishonor of
cheque could not be construed as intention to cheat or malicious act on part of the issuer.
Hence, the FIR was liable to be quashed.
QUESTIONS REFERRED TO LARGER BENCH-
(1) Whether the ratio of the judgment, in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav
Rao lay down the correct law? or The view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai
Patel as followed in M/s V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra) which is subsequent and conflicting,
lay down the correct proposition of law?
(2) Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under
NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior
conviction or acquittal and, the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial?

DIFFERENCE OF OPINION-
TEJ KAUR Vs. KIRPAL SINGH
In other words, the difference of opinion between Judges, who constitute the Bench hearing
the appeal, on a point of law alone would be referred to a third or other Judges according to
the rules of that High Court.
https://www.allahabadhighcourt.in/rules/hcrulespartIchItoVIII.pdf
Rule 13- D full court- [13.] Decision in case of a difference of opinion :- In case of a
difference of opinion at 33[Full Court] meeting or a meeting of the Administrative
Committee the decision shall be in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Judges
present, and in case the Judges present be equally divided, the Chief Justice or in his absence
the Senior Judge present shall have a casting vote.
Page 29 - 3. Procedure when Judges are divided in opinion :- When a case 64[to which the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not apply,] is heard by a Division Court
composed of two or more Judges and the Judges are divided in opinion as to the decision to
be given on any point, such point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if
there shall be a majority,. Should the Judges be equally divided they may state the point upon
which they differ and each Judge shall record his opinion thereon. The case shall then be
heard upon that point by one or more of the other Judges as may be nominated by the Chief
Justice and the point decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have
heard the case including those who first heard it.
DIVISON BENCH HAVING SAME JURISDICTION AS
CURRENTY, BUT ISSUE ARISES AND WANT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE
- we take cognizzance0 order eesgistration of PIL AND SEND TOO CHIEF JUSTICE
or to the bench whih has been formed to hear the civil appeal.