POLISH FOREIGN POLICY: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Author(s): PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

Source: The Polish Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1975), pp. 58-63
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the Polish Institute of Arts &
Sciences of America
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27920632
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PIOTR S. WANDYCZ

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Professor Genciala s able paper deals with stereotype interpretations

of interwar Polish foreign policy which seldom advance but often obscure
our understanding of its nature. The present conference centers on the
period when J?zef P?sudski was in full and undisputed control of
Poland's diplomacy but the theory "of two enemies" was not Pifeudski's
invention. The theory was grounded in the proverbially bad geopolitical
situation of the country which most Poles have always recognized. It
may be useful therefore to devote some attention to the basic assumptions
underlying Polish foreign policy.
Both Pilsudski and his chief antagonist Roman Dmowski insisted
that there was no room for a small Polish state between the two giants
and former partitioners, Germany and Russia. Dmowski sought to
strengthen the country by his "annexationist" approach, i.e. establish
a Poland with boundaries extensive enough to permit assimilation of
some of the contested eastern borderlands without unduly antagonizing
Russia. P?sudski attempted to undo the partitions by pushing back
Russia to the borders of Peter the Great and organizing a vast bloc
centered on Poland along "federalist" principles. By 1921 the former
plan was only partly fulfilled; the latter collapsed. Poland entered inter
national relations as a weak middle-sized state, and the French historian
Louis Eisenmann diagnosed well the situation when he worte: "It was
a tragedy for Poland to have been reborn too weak to be a power, and
strong enough to aspire to more than the status of a small state."1
The existing situation imposed on Poland two simultaneously pursued
lines of policy: alliances designed to make the country less vulnerable,
and attempts to tear apart the pincers of German-Russian cooperation
threatening Poland. The two lines of policy were connected which does
not mean that they stood not occasionally in contradiction to each other.
Alliance with France signed in 1921 was designed to cover Poland
against Germany and strengthen Poland vis-?-vis the Soviet Union. It
was partly complemented but only with regard to Russia by the Polish
1 Louis Eisenmann, "La Question de Teschen" La Vie des peuples I, 1920, 837.

58

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Polish Foreign Policy: Observations 59
Rumanian alliance of 1921.2 Vaster schemes of central European co
operation foundered on the rocks of Czechoslovak-Polish difficulties and
the related Hungarian and other problems. Nor was it possible to
associate the Baltic states with Warsaw.3 Only limited cooperation in
the military sphere ? general staff contacts ? between Poland and
Czechoslovakia existed for almost a decade (1925-1935).
The thinly veiled hostility of the Weimar Republic toward Poland
went hand in hand with rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow.
The Treaty of Rapallo, Russo-German military cooperation, schemes
"to push Poland back to her ethnographic frontiers"4 were accompanied
by revisionist campaigns. The specter of a Russo-German combination
threatening the very foundations of the postwar settlement haunted
the Western diplomats, particularly the British. In that sense Locarno
represented a wedge driven into German-Soviet cooperation at the price
of Western conciliation of Germany. For Warsaw this was an arrange
ment fraught with dangers. Although Russo-German cooperation did
suffer a blow, its anti-Polish aspects were least affected. The Treaty of
Berlin and continuing clandestine German-Soviet military cooperation
showed this clearly enough.
Pilsudski's coup of 1926 found Poland in this precarious international
situation. Freedom of maneuver for Polish diplomacy was indeed limited
and the first sub-period to 1932-33 was characterized by a continuation
of Skrzy?skis foreign policy by the Marshal's new foreign minister
August Zaleski. Vis-?-vis France Warsaw attempted to operate in the
framework of Briand's Locarno diplomacy; Pilsudski was only able to
pursue a somewhat negative policy by preventing the new 1925 alliance
from superseding the 1921 convention. Similarly the Marshal sounded
out Stresemann, directly and indirectly, seeking a relaxation of German
Polish tension. As for Russia Warsaw tried merely to dispel Moscow's
fears, real or purposefully displayed for propagandistic reasons, that

2 There are several new studies in depth of the Polish-Rumanian alliance by

Henryk Bulhak, notably "Poczatki sojuszu polsko-rumunskiego i przebieg roko
wan o konwencj? wojskowa, w latach 1919-1921" (The Beginnings of the Polish
Rumanian Alliance and the Course of Negotiations about a Military Convention in
the Years 1919-1921), Dzieje Najnowsze^ (Modern History), V, 3, 1973; "Mate
riary do dziej?w sojuszu polsko-rumunskiego w latach 1920-1931" (Materials to
the History of the Polish-Rumanian Alliance in the Years 1920-1931), Studia
Historyczne (Historical Studies), XVI, 3, 1973; "Pr?by przeksztafcenia sojuszu woj
skowego Rumunia. w tr?jstronne przymierze polsko-francusko-rumunskie w la
tach 1923-1924" (Attempts at a Transformation of the Military Alliance with Ruma
nia into a Tripartite Polish-Franco-Rumanian Alliance in the Years 1923-1924),
Przeglad Historyczny (Historical Review), LXIV, 3, 1973.
3 The most recent book on the subject is Andrzej Skrzypek, Zwiazek Baitycki
<Baltic Alliance), Warsaw, 1972.
4 Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, "The Russian Overture to Germany of December
1924", The Journal of Modern History, XXX, June 1958, p. 103.

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 60 The Polish Review
Pilsudski's regime was by definition anti-Soviet and still bent on
achieving "federalist* aims. In the 1927 conflict over Voikovs assassina
tion the Polish government emphasized its desire for correa relations
with Russia. The story of Britain trying to use Pilsudski against Russia,
a favorite subject of Soviet historians, finds no real confirmation in
documentary evidence.
During this earlier period the policy of alliances and that of direct
contacts with Germany and Russia had not yet clashed. Although
Pilsudski's personality and style began to affect the conduct of Polish
diplomacy, the first few years after 1926 witnessed a "low profile" in
foreign policy corresponding by and large to the "bartlowanie" period
in domestic affairs.
By 1931 Pilsudski s collaborators noticed that the Marshal had begun
to show an intense interest in matters of foreign policy "and one can
assume that the Commander (that was how his close collaborators re
ferred to Pilsudski) would wish at a certain moment to begin an
offensive in this area".5 Opportunities began to appear on the eastern
front, and in 1932 Poland and the Soviet Union signed the nonaggression
treaty which had been discussed for several years. In 1933 the ascendancy
of Hitler opened new possibilities on the German side. After a period
of feverish diplomatic activity in which the new foreign minister J?zef
Beck played an important part, Warsaw signed in January 1934 the
much discussed Declaration of Nonagression with Germany. The Soviet
German pincers were torn apart but the price paid was heavy. True,
Poland did not undertake any new obligations, which Pilsudski viewed as
a great success, nor had she been obliged to abandon any of her previous
alliances. But in actual fact the alliance with France and the new policy
toward Germany were clashing, and so were in a sense the agreements
between Poland and Germany and between Poland and Soviet Russia.
Pilsudski was fully aware of the fact and warned his collaborators "not
to consider that the peaceful settlement of relations with the two
neighbors would last for ever." He calculated that "good relations with
Germany may last for four more years" but guaranteed no more than
that, a rather prophetic statement He also added that after his death
this state of affairs "will be very hard to maintain, because the Com
mander has an inventive gift of delaying or changing things if it becomes
necessary."6
After 1934 Poland achieved a certain freedom of maneuver, and
5 Conference with Prystor, S?awek and Beck, Zbi?r Zespol?w Szczatkowych: Akta
Sprawy Pik. Kazimierza Switalskiego, Archiwum Akt Nowych, v. 71 (Collection of
Remnant Documents: Files of the Case of Col. Kazimierz Switalski, Archives of
Recent Documents).
6 Conference in Belweder, 7 March 1934, ibid.

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Polish Foreign Policy: Observations 61
one must agree with Henry Kissingers saying that "a power which is
absolutely committed has no negotiating position."7 Did Piisudski and
especially Beck use this negotiating position in the best possible way?
It is of course true that Poland's means were extremely limited and
her pack of cards contained few trumps. Yet to reduce all analysis of
Polish diplomacy to its ultimate dependence on the policies of the
great powers might make this analysis meaningless. In this sense the
style and tone of the Pitsudski-Beck diplomacy may be worthy of a
more detailed discussion, and it is rather the execution of policy than
the general assumptions that is open to criticism. A.J.P. Taylor wrote
once that the French at the time of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 did
nothing and did it very well. Could a policy of great restraint in words
and actions have benefited Polish diplomacy in the mid-1930s? The
paradox was that after 1934 Poland had to "freeze" her relations with
her two neighbors on the level achieved through the nonaggression
agreements, and such a "freeze" was not only extremely difficult in
the dynamic politics of the period but did not suit the essentially dynamic
personality of Beck.
The brief^?oneymoon period in Soviet-Polish relations achieved in
1933 was based on completely different assumptions on the Polish and
Soviet sides. Piisudski wished to normalize relations with the Russians
but not bring them into European diplomacy. Moscow was interested
in a rapprochement if it meant the first step toward full and uncon
ditional readmission to the council of the great powers. The French point
of view was closer to the Russian than to the Polish, hence possibilities
of new differences between Warsaw and her French ally. As regards
Germany, Warsaw regarded the Franco-Polish alliance in military terms:
at the moment of showdown Poland would stand by France, Paris held
a diametrically opposite view: a showdown was to be avoided at almost
all cost, and die Franco-Polish alliance, regarded mainly as a diplomatic
instrument, was to act as a deterrent to war. As French determination
and will power declined Warsaw was increasingly casting its eye toward
Britain. London had approved the German-Polish nonaggression agree
ment, although it was aware of its potential weaknesses.8 The British
also shared to some extent Polish misgivings about Russia's role in
European diplomacy. Yet, given London's attitude to central European
matters, it was not until 1939 that Beck achieved the long-cherished
objective of Polish diplomacy, an alliance with Britain.
7 Cited by Sulzberger in The New York Times, 17 March 1974.
8 Sir Robert Vansittart recording his conversation with the German ambassador
on January 27, 1934 wrote: "It was quite clear that the Ambassador felt this to be
an occasion when his country deserved praise. This view I also shared and did not
fail to show it." F.O. 371/17744, C. 778, Public Record Office.

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62 The Polish Review

Looking at the two principal lines of Polish diplomacy: alliances and

attempts to prevent a German-Soviet cooperation at Poland's expense,
one can say that Warsaw had achieved, at least formally the first and
failed with regard to the second. In September 1939 Poland faced the
war with Germany in the company of Britain and France; isolation had
been avoided. Yet, at the same time Soviet-German pincers closed with
the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact culminating in joint action of the two
powers against Poland. The theory of the two enemies received a specta
cular confirmation. Was there no other way out? Instead of contributing
yet another series of speculations, perhaps one could end this brief
comment by raising a series of questions.
Could Poland have achieved more meaningful cooperation with
either Germany or Russia within the framework of collective security
or in full harmony with the existing Polish alliances? Was Warsaw
right in its analysis of German and Soviet foreign policy motivations
and was its estimate of France, Britain, the League of Nations, and
Collective Security correct? With regard to Germany the period of the
Locarno diplomacy 1925-1930 seemed to have offered the best chances
which Zaleski and Pilsudski did try to exploit. Were they doomed to
failure by German refusal to compromise any of its revisionist objec
tives?9 Could the Poles have done anything? With regard to Russia
the period which seemed to offer some possibility of a rapprochement
centered around the year 1933. Did the Poles err in not turning to a
pro-Soviet line or would they have been courting disaster if they had?10
Eastern Pact proposals are also relevant here, but coming after the
non-aggression agreement of January 1934 they seemed to offer only
a chance for exchanging a recently gained stabilization for the doubtful
privilege of taking up a position in the first line of fire.
To turn to the possibility of tearing the German-Russian pincers
apart, temporarily achieved in the years 1932-34, were there other
possibilities of direct and more lasting agreements with Berlin or Moscow
which would have prevented the disaster of 1939? One cannot help
wondering what Pilsudski would have done in 1938-39 had he lived.

9 On Germ?n policy toward Poland see the recent: Harald von Rieckhoff, German
Polish Relations 1918-1933, Baltimore, 1971; Gaines Post, Jr., The Civil-Military
Fabric of Weimar Foreign Policy, Princeton, 1973; Gerhard L. Weinberg, The
Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany, Chicago, 1970. Indirectly relevant is Jon Jacob
son, Locarno Diplomacy, Princeton, 1972.
10 The reader will find stimulating observations in Stanislaw Zabietto, W kregu
historii (In the Circle of History), Warsaw, 1970. ZabiettoY chapter on Piisudski's
foreign policy is particularly interesting and may be compared with a very dif
ferent but equally thoughtful study by Tytus Komarnicki, Pilsudski a polityka wiel
kich mo car stw zachodnicb (Pilsudski and the Policy of the Great Western Powers),
London, 1952.

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Polish Foreign Policy: Observations 63
Was Warsaw correct in its appraisals of Hitler and Stalin and of their
policies toward Poland?
It is obvious that foreign policy is intimately connected with domestic
affairs and yet it enjoys a certain autonomy and is ruled by its own laws.
Did the makers of Polish foreign policy take fully into account the
country's potential ? economic and military ? the state of public
opinion and the views of the opposition? Did they dismiss out of hand
any alternative courses as advocated by some of the political parties,
especially the National Democrats, and were the latter viable alter
natives?
Finally, as regards actual conduct of foreign affairs, were the Polish
diplomats equal to their tasks? There exists no sociological study of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) that would give us a good insight into
the composition of the ministry personnel, the criteria for promotion,
the mentality and the outlook of the diplomats, their background and
working habits. There are vague criticisms about the role of the army
officers in Polish diplomacy or equally vague statements about the role
of the "Galician" Poles in the MSZ. Would a study along these lines
produce some meaningful results and provide us with pertinent infor
mation?
In spite of a large number of monographs, some of them excellent,
there are still areas wide open for further research. The time for a large
and all-embracing synthesis of Polish foreign policy is approaching. It
is to he hoped that conferences of this kind will contribute to its eventual
appearance.

Florida-Poznan Summer Institute

Earn college credit through the University of Florida while
learning Polish at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznaii, Po
land, June 21-August 16,1975. Courses in Polish history, culture,
society, and literature are also available. For further informa
tion write Dr. William Sullivan, 433 Grinter Hall, University of
Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611, or phone (904) 392-2107.

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