Ghatak RecentReformsPanchayat 2002

Recent Reforms in the Panchayat System in West Bengal: Toward Greater Participatory
Governance?
Author(s): Maitreesh Ghatak and Maitreya Ghatak
Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Jan. 5-11, 2002, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan. 5-11, 2002),
pp. 45-47+49-58
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4411568
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Special articles _____l.
Recent Reforms in the Panchayat

System in West Bengal
Toward Greater Participatory Governance?
The experience of West Bengal under the panchayat system stands in sharp contrast with
that of other states and, together with land reform, it has been credited for playing an
important role in the impressive economic turnaround of the state since the mid-1980s. West
Bengal is the first and the only major state to have had timely panchayat elections on a
party basis regularly every five years since 1978. However, despite its pioneering status in
terms of reforms of the panchayat system, West Bengal lags behind several other states
today in terms of devolution of power, finances and functions to the panchayat. Also, the
extent of people's participation in the planning process is significantly less compared to that
in Kerala. This paper studies a particular component of a set of recently introduced reforms
of the panchayat system in West Bengal that is aimed precisely at addressing this concern -
the introduction of mandatory village constituency (gram sansad) meetings.
MAITREESH GHATAK, MAITREYA GHATAK
voice their demands and criticisms in the those where the panchayat system has
Introduction formal institutional structures [Dreze andotherwise made significant progress, such
Sen 1995, pp 105-07]. While education,as Kerala and Karnataka [Mathew 2001].
Avery unique and large-scale ex- health and poverty alleviation programmes Numerous studies have showed that for
periment in economic and political take up a fair share of the budgets of theanti-poverty and employment generation
decentralisation was introduced in central and the state governments, a ratherprogrammes that are funded by the federal
the late seventies in the Indian state of small fraction of the benefits trickles down government and therefore provides a basis
to the intended beneficiaries because of cor- for interstate comparison, West Bengal
West Bengal. The provision and mainte-
ruption at various levels of the govern-stood out in terms of reaching target groups
nance of all local public goods, and imple-
ment. It is common to observe the serious
mentation of most local public projects and being relatively free of corruption
problem of absenteeism of salaried teachers [Gazdar and Sengupta 1997]. The involve-
were handed over to formally elected village
councils (gram panchayats). Previously, in rural public schools and of doctors in rural ment of the villagers in construction and
public health clinics [Bardhan 1996, pp 141]. supervision has led to dramatic reduction
these functions were discharged by bureau-
crats working under state and central
The experience of West Bengal under in costs of public projects (e g, minor
governments, a system that received wide-the panchayat system stands in sharp irrigation services) compared to the pre-
spread criticism as inefficient, corrupt contrast
and with the other states in India and vious arrangement where these projects
inequitable. The historical roots of thistogether with land reform it has been were awarded to private contractors from
system go back to the colonial period.credited
As for playing an important role in outside the area [Mookherjee 1998].
Dreze and Sen (1995, p 106) point out,the impressive economic turnaround of the However, despite its pioneering status
state since the mid-1980s [Rawal and
while hierarchical centralisation might have in terms of reforms of the panchayat sys-
Madhura Swaminathan 1998]. It is the first
been necessary for a handful of foreigners tem West Bengal lags behind several other
and only major state which has had timely
to administer a large and potentially rebel- states today in terms of devolution of power,
panchayat elections on a party basis regu-
lious population, there was no good reason finances, and functions to the panchayat.
larly every five years since 1978, a year
for it to have been consistently perpetuated Also, the extent of people's participation
by the successive governments of indepen-
after the Left Front government was elected in the planning process is significantly less
dent India. There is much evidence that the to power in the state. The Left Front compared to that of Kerala where under
poor functioning of local public services government in West Bengal has not post- the ambitious People's Plan Campaign
in India relates to the centralised and non- poned or rescheduled panchayat elections launched in 1996 villages were directly
participatory nature of their management. even when electoral compulsions dictated empowered to prepare detailed develop-
Moreover, there is little scope for citizens to otherwise unlike other states, including ment plans that are then put to vote in
Economic and Political Weekly January 5, 200245

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
popular village assemblies. For detailed
respects. Section V concludes with a dis-
council is a very powerful and influential
discussions of the Kerala case see Isaac
cussion of ongoing plans to develop fur-body, wielding effective control over
and Heller (forthcoming) and Isaac (with substantial resources and political power.
ther the current system in West Bengal in
Franke) (2000). It is true that the terms
very of participatory decision-making. Above the village council, there is the
durability of the panchayat reforms in West panchayat samity (PS) at the block level.
Bengal has enabled detailed studies to II Each PS covers, on an average, about 115
reveal many of its shortcomings compared villages and a rural population of about
Panchayat System in West
to Kerala where the reforms started almost 1,65,736, of whom 1,01,387 are eligible
two decades later. Nevertheless, the need
Bengal - A Brief Outline voters. In 1998, there were 329 PSs in
for reforms that will bring the panchayat
11 (1) Organisational Structure West Bengal with a total of 8515 members,
system in West Bengal closer to the ideal of Panchayats all elected by the people. An elected
of participatory governance, something that sabhapati or (president) heads the PS.
The panchayat system as a form of local
goes beyond the mere right to vote elected The once all-powerful bureaucrat at this
self-government
officials out of power every five years, is has been embodied as an level, the block development officer
widely recognised [Government of 'aspiration'
West in the 1950 Constitution. In (BDO), is now an executive officer to the
Bengal 1995]. practice it was devolved to the states for panchayat samity. This provides a direct
In this paper we study a particular com-implementation [Datta and Datta 1995]. linkage of the panchaysts with the adminis-
ponent of a set of recently introduced Almost no action was taken on this matter tration. It also allows a popularly elected
reforms of the panchayat system that by anyis state till the late seventies and early body to exercise some control over the
aimed precisely at addressing this concern eighties when opposition parties were administration.
- the introduction of mandatory village elected to power in some states, notably At the highest level, there is a zilla
constituency (gram sansad) meetings. West Bengal and Karnataka. parishad (ZP), one for each district. In
These are public meetings held twice every After a decade of political violence and 1993, there were 16 ZPs with 873 elected
year at the lowest possible level ofupheavals,
the the Left Front (LF), a combine members. The head of the ZP, the sabhadhi-
panchayat system participated by elected of leftist parties led by the Communistpati, enjoys the rank of a minister of the
members of the village council and their Party of India (Marxist) (known as thestate government.
constituents. The goal of the meeting is CPI(M))
for came to power in 1977 on the
villagers to: (i) discuss local needs, suggest
promise of vigorous agrarian and political 11 (2) Reform Agenda of Left Front
new programmes and allocate existing reform. Its agrarian reform programme in- Government and Panchayats
funds among competing needs; (ii) discuss volved forceful implementation of exist-
selection of beneficiaries of anti-poverty ing tenancy laws that gave security of The first panchayat elections were held
programmes and logistical issues concern- tenure and a legally stipulated minimum in 1978. The Left Front leadership realised
ing sanctioned schemes (e g, location of
crop-share to tenants, and distributing land-that their success or even sheer survival
an irrigation project); and (iii) monitorholdings
and above the legally permitted limits as an administration depended on dislodg-
review the performance of elected repre- from landowners to small and marginal ing the landlord-moneylender class who
sentatives regarding the implementation farmers as well as the landless rural poor. yielded enormous power in countryside.
of public projects and use of public funds.In terms of its achievement on both these However, their legitimacy as a democratic
They also have access to the accounts countsof it is by far the leading state in the regime meant eschewing radical methods.
country [Gazdar and Sengupta 1995,
expenditure and are able to question elected Here they were immensely helped by the
officials for the use of public funds p and
136]. Its political reform programme presence of laws regarding land tenure and
implementation of public projects. consisted of empowering the three-tiered empowering panchayats that were enacted
Except for some anecdotal accounts, panchayat
little system with a gram panchayat by successive administrations of the Con-
is known about who participates in these (village council) for a cluster of villages gress Party but were never implemented
meetings, what issues are discussed, at and the bottom, a panchayat samity covering seriously. In this instance there was a rare
whether women and members of back- the area of a block, and a zilla parishad coincidence of the electoral compulsions of
ward castes actively participate in the for the district. a political party with its ideological commit-
proceedings. With these questions in mind Table 1 gives an idea about the various ment to egalitarian reforms and this explains
we observed the functioning of these panchayat units and their area of opera- the political will and seriousness with which
meetings in a cross section of 20 villages tion. The lowest level of electoral unit in the administration carried these out.
in May 1999 and interviewed a numberthe of panchayat system in West Bengal is The Mukarji-Bandyopadhyay Report
villagers in each village after the meetingthe gram panchayat or village council which points out how the stranglehold of the
including those who attended the meeting covers around 10-12 villages totallinglandowners had already received a jolt
and those who did not. We report our around 10,000 residents. It has 15-20 seats through massive drives in 1967-70 under
findings in Section III of this paper. In the
of representatives elected every five years. the two United Front governments for
next section we give a brief description Inof the 1998 elections, there were 3,226detection and taking over lands that had
the organisation and functioning of grain the panchayats or village councils in been clandestinely retained by landown-
panchayat system in West Beh gal for those West Bengal with 49,199 members. An ers. violating the land ceiling laws. Over
unfamiliar with it. In Section IV we make electorate composed of around 700 voters a million acres of good agricultural land
some general observations comparing theelects each member. This village council was taken over during 1967-70. This
West Bengal experience with decentralisedis headed by a 'pradhan' (chief) and an considerably weakened the hold of the big
governance with that of Kerala where major 'upa pradhan' ( deputy chief) elected from landlords who had traditionally led the
reforms were initiated almost two decadesamongst themselves by the gram panchyat rural society. Thus, when the first panchayat
members. At the ground level, the village elections took place in 1978, the power
later, but were more flar reaching in some
46 Economic and Political Weekly January 5, 2002

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
structure in the rural areas had already provision of drinking water, maintenanceand economically weaker sections like
altered considerably. "As a result, instead of public utilities, agricultural extension,scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes
of empowering the already-powerful irrigation, poverty alleviation, land reform,(ST) should have representation in all levels
panchayats in West Bengal placed power electrification, and housing provision.of the panchayat in proportion to their
in the hands of newcomers who could be Resources for various poverty alleviationpresence in the district population. This
relied upon to implement land reform programmes are now distributed throughamendment also reserved one-third of the
measures faithfully. In this way, landthe panchayats instead of the state-levelseats at all levels of the panchayats for
reforms and the panchayats supported each ministries. More than half of the develop-women. So far, the panchayats even in
other" [Gazdar and Sengupta 1997]. With-ment expenditure of the state is madeWest Bengal were a male-bastion, women
out agrarian reforms it is very likely that through the panchayats. While charges ofconstituting hardly 2 per cent of the
the panchayat system would be dominated leakage and partisan use of resources meantmembers. In the last two elections, a large
by the rural landowning elite in spite offor poverty alleviation programmes are not number of women as well as members of
the elections. unheard of, the situation is much betterSC and ST have started taking part in
In turn, the panchayats played an activethan many other states of India.1 public affairs (Table 3). While there are
role in the enforcement of the agrarian Another distinguishing feature of Westinstances of women candidates contesting
reform programme of the LF administra-Bengal panchayats is that many peopleas a proxy for their male family members,
tion. This involved identifying the benefi- from the lower and middle rungs of theor not asserting themselves in panchayats
ciaries, supporting them against possiblerural society, poor peasants, sharecrop-still dominated by men, there are many
threats by the landlords, and helping thepers, agricultural labourers and schoolinstances of women taking an increasingly
land bureaucracy register the leases ofteachers for the first time came to hold assertive role, an issue which we will
sharecroppers so as to enable them to take seats of power and resource address
distribution in the next section.
advantage of the tenancy laws [Gazdar andin the rural areas. Sample surveys con-
Sengupta 1997]. 11 (3) Deliberative Bodies: Village
ducted after the 1978 elections suggested
Unlike any other major state in India,that 75 per cent of the elected represen- Constituencies
elections to all three tiers of the panchayattatives of village councils came from
system have been held on a regular basis households owning less than two acres ofTill the early nineties, the gram panchayat
eversince the LF assumed power and keenlyland [Ramachandran 1997]. or village councils had little formal ac-
contested by all political parties. In all the The 73rd amendment to the Indian countability to the people whom they
last five elections, the CPI (M) led Left constitution in 1993 required that socially
represented. The only effective control the
Front and its constituents have retained
theiroverall hold over the panchayat system
Table 1: Area of Operation of the Panchayat Units, Average Population
and Number of Voters
at all levels. The LF' s share of village coun-
Panchayat Unit Area of Operation Average Average Number Average Number
cil seats have ranged between 60 per cent
Population of Voters at Unit of Voters Per Seat
and 70 per cent (Table 2) and it has obtained
at Unit level Level (1998) (1998)
a much higher share of seats at the two
Gram panchayat Cluster of 10-12 villages 16902 10339 678
upper levels which has given it an over-
Panchayat samity Community development block 165736 101387 3917
whelming control of the panchayat system.
Zilla parishad District 3407945 1962154 46587
Still, there is considerable competition
among members of the LF at the village Notes: Based on 1996 population for all rural areas ex
Government of West Bengal.
level and also, there are many village
Source: Health on the March in West Bengal, 1995-96, G
councils which are dominated by opposi-
tion parties. Also, the pattern of the rela- Table 2: Per Cent of Seats by the Left Fro
tive proportion of village council seats (All Per Cent Rounded Off)
going to the LF and the opposition suggest
Party 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
the presence of electoral cycles indicating
some degree .of anti-incumbency voting.Gram Panchayat Elections
LF 69 60 73 64 56
From the middle of the 1980s West Bengal
Opposition 31 40 27 36 44
achieved an impressive breakthrough inTotal seats 46845 46153 52520 61010 49199
agricultural productivity which placed itPanchayat Samity Elections
LF 76 66 79 73 67
as one of the fastest growing states in India.
Contemporary observers have found that Opposition 23 34 22 27 33
Total seats 8467 8664 9128 9453 8515
"...the visible signs of destitution are dis-
Zilla Parishad Elections
appearing from West Bengal's rural areas" LF 92 74 91 89 87
[Bandyopadhyay 1997]. Empirical studiesOpposition 8 26 9 11 13

have attributed a significant share of theTotal seats 648 678 658 656 716
gains in agricultural growth to a combi-
nation of these institutional reforms car-
Table 3: Women, SCs and S
ried out by the LF [Banerjee, Gentler and
Level Total Seats Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Women
Ghatak (forthcoming)].
The responsibilities of the village coun- Gram panchayat 49199 18 7 36
cil have changed over time but typically Panchayat samity 85.15 17 7 35
Zilla parishad 716 17 7 34
, include administration of public health,
primary education, drainage and sanitation, Source: Directorate of Panchaya
Economic and Political Weekly January 5, 2002 47

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
electorate could exercise was through their As a result of this clause people partici-
supposed to: (i) guide and advise the gram
votes in the next election. The situation has panchayats (village councils) in regard pating
to in these meetings in effect do
substantially changed with the introduc- schemes for economic development and participate in actual decision-making and
tion of the institutions of the gram Sabha social justice undertaken or proposed are to not just mere advisors and monitors to
(village council level annual meeting of the actual decision-makers. However,
be undertaken in its area; (ii) identify or
the voters) and the gram sansad (constitu- lay down principles for identification ofcompared to the Kerala case the process
ency level six-monthly meetings of the that connects the people's deliberations to
the beneficiaries for various poverty alle-
entire electorate of a constituency) in the actual decisions is more indirect and sub-
viation programnmes; (iii) constitute bene-
early nineties, subsequent to the 73rd ficiary committees for ensuring active ject to bureaucratic distortion.
Amendment to the Constitution of the participation of the people in implemen-The village constituency meetings are
tation, maintenance and equitable distri-
country in 1993. The gram Sabha or village being held in West Bengal only for the last
council, comprising 10,000-15,000 vot- bution of benefits of schemes in the area;
couple of years. Since 1998 meetings have
ers, would have to meet once a year to (iv) mobilise mass participation for com-
been regularly held in practically all of the
review the proposed budget for the next munity welfare, and programmes for adultaround forty-five thousand constituencies
year and the previous year's performance. education, family planning, and child over the state.
The village council meetings cover a largewelfare; and (v) record its objections to
number of voters and as a result offer them
any action of the village council chief or Ill
any member of the village council for
limited opportunities to exercise effective
Participatory Governance in
control over their elected representativesfailure to implement development schemes
properly or without active participation
Action:
of
Village Constituency
as well as to provide inputs to the planning
the people of the area.
process. We focus instead on the village
Meetings
constituency meetings. These meetings are The village constituency meetings might
III (1) Design of Study
at first glance appear to be a purely con-
held twice a year covering about 700 voters
sultative and monitoring forum vis-a-visThe village constituency meetings take
in which the elected officials and villagers
meet in a public place to discuss localthe elected panchayat representatives. place twice a year, in May and November.
needs, new programmes, and choose bene- Our aim was to attend and observe the
However, they do enjoy a legal status. The
ficiaries of existing programmes, to re- village councils have to consider every functioning of a cross section of these
view the past and proposed programmes, resolution adopted at the village constitu-
meetings in May 1999 and speak to a few
and inspect the accounts of expenditure ency meetings and decisions and actions villagers after the meeting including those
and budgets. All eligible voters in a par- taken on them will have to be reportedwho at attended the meeting and those who
the next such meeting. If a village council
ticular village constituency area (i e, every- did not. The observer, ideally, needed to
one who is 18 years or older) are eligible fails to consider the constituency level be one who was familiar with the local
to attend the meetings. meeting resolutions or fails to place thesituation and personally knew the people
The Village Constituency meetings are draft budget, statement of accounts and assembled. An NGO that had village-based
audit reports in such meetings, that would
thus an instrument of direct participation workers in several districts of West Bengal
of the people in the planning process be
as considered a serious lapse and the
assisted us select 20 villages from under
auditors would declare all expenditures its
well as monitoring elected representatives. of area of operation.2 The interviewers
Under the laws, the gram sansads are selected for observations personally be-
the village council as illegal in their report.
Table 4: Per Cent Share among Eligible Voters and among Those Present in Constituency Meetings*
Men Women SC ST Others Muslims
Village Among Among Among Among Among Among Among Among Among Among Among Among
Voters Those Voters Those Voters Those Voters Those Voters Those Voters Those
Present Present Present Present Present. Present
Sitalia(1) 51 97 49 3 94 91 0 0 0 0 6 9
Sitalia(2) 52 97 48 3 48 69 30 18 21 12 0 0
Banstala 51 75 49 25 51 26 20 31 29 43 0 0
Madhabpur 59 93 41 7 32 33 4 7 31 35 33 24
Kantamari 55 84 45 16 77 82 5 4 10 14 8 0
Eganpur 60 100 40 0 70 100 28 0 2 0 0 0
Sadhupur 52 94 48 6 92 84 7 14 1 2 0 0
Pakhiralaya 51 87 49 13 64 61 1 2 34 30 1 8
Chandipur. 52 89 48 11 55 25 5 15 40 60 0 0
Manmathnagar 56 91 44 9 44 34 24 16 32 40 0 0
Sonagan 52 100 48 0 11 11 1 3 88 86 0 0
Kalidaspur 53 71 47 29 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kalidaspur(south) 50 100 50 0 95 93 3 7 2 0 0 0
Dayapur 53 100 47 0 92 100 7 0 1 0 0 0
South Harishpur 57 76 43 24 43 60 38 29 19 12 0 0
Mathurakhand 55 96 45 4 80 90 5 5 15 5 0 0
Ganahar 48 100 52 0 51 35 25 15 24 50 0 0
Baptain 54 100 46 0 13 40 3 9 49 42 35 8
East Nimpur 51 100 49 0 39 19 43 71 5 0 13 10
Nimgachhi 54 68 46 32 33 35 46 46 21 19 13 6
All 54 91 46 9 58 55 15 13 23 29 4 3
*All per cent rounded off.

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longed to the areas where the observations West Bengal as a whole (16 per cent). meetings. The largest single category is
were made. The small sample size and the However, given that an attendance rateagricultural
of labourers (43 per cent) fol-
fact that the sample was purposively cho- 10 per cent voters is necessary for a quo- lowed by farmers with less than two acres
sen must be taken into account in inter- rum, it is not negligible. It is also to of beland (41 per cent). Those with more land
preting our findings and applying them noted that voters from the same village areor had non-farming sources of income,
to West Bengal as a whole. Nevertheless, often members of the same extended fam- who are also likely to belong to the 'Other'
the exercise contributes in developingily a or close-knit social network. A person category, constituted about 16 per cent of
methodology for a larger study. attending the meetings (often the house- those present.
hold head) is likely to represent the'views A distinct feature of the village constitu-
111 (2) Profile of Districts and Village of more than one voter, and so in terms ency meetings is that those who participa-
Councils Covered by the of effective popular participation, the ted were largely members or supporters of
Study attendance rate may appear lower than it some political party or the other (Table 6).
really is. Those who do belong to any political party
The observations were carried out in 20 If we compare the composition of the kept away from the meetings. Second,
eligible voters to those attending the
village constituency meetings located under without any exception, in each of the 20
village councils in five blocks of three meetings (Table 4) a striking fact is that constituencies, a majority of the voters
districts of West Bengal (North 24these meeting were overwhelmingly a male- who were present belonged to the party of
Parganas, South 24 Parganas and South
dominated event in spite of official poli- the elected member, which was the Left
Dinajpur). The 20 village constituencies cies targeted towards empowering women, Front in 65 per cent of the constituencies.
such as reserving one-third of the seats in
are under 14 village councils. The 14 village Indeed, the simple correlation coclfficient
the village councils. Not that women did between the party of the elected member
councils taken together have 203 elected
representatives or members. About 35 per
not come at all, but their participation level and the percentage of voters participating
cent of the members of these village was extremely low - while men constitutewho belong to the same party is 0.95. Still,
councils are women, which is slightly 54 per cent of the eligible voters in these it would not be fair to conclude that there
higher than the percentage of seats re-constituencies, among those participating were no voices of opposition in these
served for women (namely, one-third). in the meetings, 91 per cent were men. meetings. The average percentage of par-
Except in two village councils, the LeftAmong the socially and economically ticipants who did not belong to the party
Front has an absolute majority in the re-
weaker groups, the SCs and STs constituteof the elected representative among all the
maining 12. In all the areas covered the
the largest category. 'Others' include the twenty constituencies was approximately
relatively higher caste groups.5 Taking all 20 per cent.
CPI (M) and its partner in the Left Front,
RSP, are traditionally dominant.3 the 20 constituencies together, the 'Other' Our observers spoke the day after the
Of the 20 village constituencies whose
category, representing those who are not meetings to a cross section of men and
SCs and STs and are relatively better-off women who did not attend the meeting to
meetings were observed all are not equal
in size in terms of number of voters. The than them, is the only social category whose find out the reasons of their absence. The
20 constituencies, in all, have 30 members. participation level was higher than theirtypical responses from non-participants
The larger ones have more than one electedshare among eligible voters. suggested that relatively affluent individu-
member of the village council. All the Table 5 provides the occupational back- als do not attend these meetings because
members of the village council are requir-ground of the voters who attended the they do not see any immediate benefits as
ed to attend their village constituency
meetings. Of the 30 village council mem- Table 5: Occupational Background of Voters Present in Village Constituency
bers elected from the village constituencies Meetings
covered by our study, about a quarter are
Village Total Present Percentage of Attendees
women - all of whom listed their occu-
(Number) Landless Agricultural Marginal and Others
pation as being housewives.4 The average Labour Small Farmers
representative is male, 40 years old and

agriculture is the main source of income. Sitalia(1) 150 56.67 20.00 23.33
Sitalia(2) 65 61.54 30.77 7.69
Also, a large majority of the members Banstala 103 39.81 31.07 29.13
belong to parties that constitute the Left Madhabpur 54 31.48 46.30 22.22
Front (RSP, CPI(M) and the CPI) with about Kantamari 93 43.01 32.26 24.73
30 per cent of the members belonging to Eganpur 9 0 66.67 33.33
Sadhupur 105 41.90 52.38 5.71
opposition parties (BJP, TMC, SUCI). Pakhiralaya 157 41.40 43.95 14.65
Chandipur 55 63.64 29.09 7.27
111 (3) Participation Rates in Manmathnagar 380 46.84 47.89 5.26
Meetings and Profile of Sonagan 75 13.33 26.67 60.00
Kalidaspur 120 50.00 32.50 17.50
Participants
Kalidaspur(South) 71 54.93 40.85 4.23
Dayapur 34 5.88 29.41 64.71
The 20 constituencies have an average South Harishpur 42 59.52 40.48 0
of around 940 voters each. The average Mathurakhand 112 5.36 69.64 25.00
number of voters per elected member of Ganahar 200 65.00 35.00 0
Baptain
the village council from these constituen- 130 30.77 38.46 30.77
East Nimpur 21 23.81 38.10 38.10
cies is 628. The average attendance rates
Nimgachi 155 38.71 54.84 6.45
per village constituency was around 12 per
All 2131 43.27 40.87 15.86
cent, which is less than the average for

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
they are not eligible for financial support In Sadhupur, demands were raised for
political parties, trade unions or peasant
'under the various poverty alleviation organisations are concerned with such. as to pump out saline water that had
action
programmes. Political minorities and those economic liberalisation, privatisationaccumulated
of in some parts of the village.
not directly associated with political par- In Manmathanagar, women expressed their
public sector enterprises, minimum wages,
ties stay away as they feel their opinion etc. These are conducted in forums where priority for drinking water supply. In
would have little effect. They feel that the people at the lowest rungs of society are Kalidaspur, the priority of those present
dominant party would do whatever they empowered to voice their opinions, criticisewas for repairing houses which were
want to do anyway. Members of backward elected officials, and suggest solutions to damaged in last year's storms. In Dayapur,
groups (SC/ST) felt that they did not have practical problems. This has the advantagepeople voiced their opinion for taking
much voice in their own party where the of exploiting local information and pre-up a new road repairing scheme. In
leadership consists largely of members of venting leakage of funds due to patronage, South Harishpur, demands were made for
higher castes. Women, too, felt that they corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.old-age pension under a central govern-
are not encouraged to participate. This In most of the meetings, the village council ment programme, drainage, tube wells
is consistent with the finding of earlier functionaries who were present gave anfor drinking water and supply of good
studies [Webster 1992]. account of the work done in the last six quality seeds.
To summarise, there is some evidence months, i e, since the November 1998 Women participants in several villages
that participation rates are particularly low meeting. In several meetings, though not (Sitalia (1), Banstala, and Manmathnagar)
for the relatively affluent, people belong- in all, the accounts for the previous year demanded increased opportunities for
ing to opposition parties, women and and budgets for the next year for the entire earning by women by funding skill-devel-
minority groups. The negative wealth bias village council area were placed. Also, opment training programmes and recruit-
has to do with the fact that these meetings while deliberations are often characterised ing more women for wage-labour work in
deal mainly with welfare programmes for by lively debates, winners and losers, public programmes. In Banstala women
the poor and not enough with investment participants find reasons that they candemanded formation of committees con-
in infrastructure. This feature, and the accept in collective actions, even thoughsisting of only women to oversee women-
strong caste and gender bias shows up in it does not coincide with their most pre-related projects.
the Kerala case as well as we discuss in ferred choice. (2) Designing the Projects: This came out
Section IV and will be obstacles for any We discuss the specific deliberations in to be an area where deliberations were very
participatory effort in India. However,terms
one of the following categories: limited, but there were several interesting
has to remember that these patterns (1)of
Agenda Setting: In several meetings,instances. The choice of specific locations
participation reflect existing social participants
and demanded new programmeswithin a constituency for road building or
gender inequalities, which have a long for their own areas. In Banstola village, digging of ponds were important topics of
history, and are present in even sharper where 60 per cent of the voters presentdeliberation in several villages. In
forms in most other Indian states. One were farmers of various categories, de-Kantamari the participants planned the
mands were raised for the installation of
hopes that the process of decentralisation physical details of a road repair project.
itself, and the reservation of seats for
a deep tube well for irrigation, ensuring In Madhavpur the people chose the stretch
women and lower caste groups will lead supply of good quality seeds and fertiliser
of road which would be taken up for repair
to some progress on this count. Indeed,anda educating the farmers about newwork currently as a part of a larger road-
recent study shows that the reservationseeds
of and proper use of fertiliser andrepair project. In the same village the
pesticides.
seats for women have had a significantly participants during the course of the
positive effect on the attendance of women
Table 6: Political Affiliation of Elected Representatives and That of Voters Present
in village constituency meetings, as well
as their participation in the deliberations
Village Total Representative's Member of Total Voters Total Opposition/
[Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2001]. Repre- Party Left Front Present Left Front Non-Left Front
sentatives (LF=1, (Number) (Per Cent) (Per Cent)
Oppn =0)
11! (4) The Deliberations
Sitalia(1) 1 CPI 1 150 86.67 13.33
Sitalia(2) 2 CPI(M) Spt Ind 1 65 89.23 10.77
Under the existing rules, each village
Banstala 1 TMC 0 103 33.01 66.99
constituency meeting should be conducted
Madhabpur 1 CPI(M) 1 54 77.78 22.22
by the chief or the deputy chief of the Kantamari 2 SUCI .0 93 24.73 75.27
village council of which the concerned Eganpur 1 TMC 0 9 33.33 66.67
Sadhupur 2 RSP 1 105 81.90 18.10
village constituency is a part. The locally
elected representatives or member/s mustPakhiralaya 3 RSP 1 157 90.45 9.55
Chandipur 2 RSP 1 55 81.82 18.18
also be present. This allows the people Manmathnagar
to 2 CPI(M) and RSP 1 380 100.00 0
meet face to face with their elected rep-
Sonagan 1 RSP 1 75 73.33 26.67
resentatives, provide their input into the
Kalidaspur 1 BJP 0 120 16.67 83.33
decision-making process, and monitor theKalidaspur(South) 2 BJP 0 71 9.86 90.14
Dayapur 1 TMC 0 34 32.35 67.65
implementation of previous plans. South Harishpur 1 CPI(M) 1 42 88.10 11.90
These deliberative meetings are centred
Mathurakhand 2 CPI(M) 1 112 77.68 22.32
around very practical and concrete prob-
Ganahar 1 BJP 0 200 25.00 75.00
Baptain 1 CPI(M) 1 130 84.62 15.38
lems within a village or cluster of villages:
East Nimpur 1 CPI(M) 1 21 100.00 0
proposals for road repair, where should a
Nimgachhi 1 RSP 1 155 61.29 32.26
tube-well be installed, who should receive
All - - 0.65 2131 67.39 32.61
loan, as opposed to broader issues which

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
get priority. In Dayapur, the people were
meeting decided the principles on the basis and the work for repairing the protective
of which a pond re-excavation scheme involved in long deliberations about a list embankment on the river.
could be taken up and chose a specific of priority for a poverty alleviation pro- (5) Another issue around which there
pond on the ground that it would have the gramme. In Mathurakhand and Ganahar, was heated discussion in some villages
maximum amount of benefit for the vil- the voters present formed a Beneficiary was the charge of corruption in programme
lagers. Whether the work should be un-Committee at the request of the chair to implementation. In Sadhupur, the local
dertaken in one or another part of theoversee selection of beneficiaries and panchayat had leased out part of a canal
village sometimes divided the people. Somelocations for various programmes. to a private individual. This created some
argued for a private individual's pond (4) Monitoring and Review: Criticism heated
by discussion and people wanted to
because the individual was ready to allow participants of past performance was knowaabout the nature of the deal and what
the people to use the water for bathing. Butprominent feature of practically all the be done with the money. In Sonagan,
would
others insisted on a pond on public land.meetings. These related to: people wanted to know about how much
A similar problem arose in Manmathanagar money
(1) The poor performance and failure to has actually been spent on a drain-
age scheme in their village. In Dayapur
where the participants were asked by theimplement programmes promised earlier
elected functionaries to decide on norms drew severe criticism. Such criticisms were there were charges of corruption in a road
for distribution of irrigation water fromheard
a in more than half the villages. The building project. It was pointed out that
pond dug with panchayat funds. In a simi- members and other village council func- the labourers who worked on this poverty
tionaries were asked to explain their poor
lar debate in Kantamari village, the village alleviation project were paid a lower wage
council chief proposed that a private performance. These ranged from failure to rate than what was officially stipulated. In
complete a road or drainage scheme, another village, Nimgachhi, there were
individual's pond be selected for re-exca-
building of a culvert, installation of a tube angry comments and questions from the
vation . In return for letting the people use
the pond for bathing, the individual shouldwell, re-excavation of silted canals, raising assembly of voters who charged that the
be allowed to use some water for irrigatingthe river embankment for protection of cost shown for a road project in their
his agricultural land. Water for irrigationfields from saline water, digging of a pond, village was inflated. That belonging to the
being a scarce resource, many peopleto the inability to provide loans or houses same party does not necessarily mean that
objected to the proposal of the villagefor people who were selected for such people would come and endorse whatever
programmes in the past.
council chief and it was finally agreed that their party leaders said was evident in
the individual may be allowed to use the(2) Not giving priority to the felt need South Harishpur. There one wage labourer,
pond for growing fish. of a constituency was another area of belonging to the same Left Front Party that
criticism. It could be repairing a road, controls the village council, stood up and
(3) Selection of Beneficiaries: There are
several poverty alleviation and welfaredigging of a pond or installation of a hand said that a sum of Rs 14,000 was sanc-
programmes for which the major part of pump. In some cases (Madhavpur village) tioned for building his house. The ac-
even the locally elected representative counts showed that the money had been
the funds comes from the central govern-
agreed with the voters and requested the paid but he has actually been paid Rs 4,000.
ment. In most states of the country, there
village council chief who was present to He demanded to know what has actually
is a high degree of leakage and corruption
in the distribution of these resources. change the priority of some programmes happened to the money. The chair and the
Selection of ineligible beneficiaries is so that building of a culvert, considered local member hurriedly stood up and
also
known to exist on a large scale. Even in by the villagers, could be taken up promised an enquiry within seven days.
urgent
West Bengal, till a few years ago, before
the other programmes. In at least two (6) There were some instances where
selection of beneficiaries was under the villages, landless wage labourers stood up women and members of lower castes
and demanded to know why schemes like criticised the allocation of funds and design
control of the powerful leaders in the local
village council. In recent years, particu- road-building, pond digging which were of projects to be insufficiently responsive
larly after the Village Constituency meet- meant to provide some employment to to their groups. In Kalidaspur, women
ings started picking up, in many areas them were always taken up just before the participants openly criticised the village
people themselves are participating in the monsoon rains when they would get wQrk council functionaries for diverting the
process. Sometimes they directly identify in agricultural fields anyway. They de- money sanctioned for a nutritional pro-
manded that such activities should be
potential beneficiaries. On other occasions, gramme for pregnant women for other
Beneficiary Committees are formed by the taken up earlier, during the lean season purposes. The latter explained that the
voters for selection of beneficiaries. For when they do not have any work in the
previous village council administration did
example, in Madhavpur, there was provi- fields. not utilise these funds which were lying
sion for support to two persons for a housing (3) The inadequate provision of money idle. Since there has been long delays in
scheme. The participants themselves se- or non-release of money for schemes the disbursement of funds for several other
sanctioned earlier were criticised in sev-
lected two very poor individuals. There important projects under the tenure of the
eral villages.
was some apprehension that if money was current village council administration, they
handed over to them, it would probably(4) The poor quality of the projects were reluctantly using these funds. At this
be spent on other things. So the partici- undertaken by the village council also drew point, they were criticised by the women
severe criticism in several villages. In
pants decided to supervise the work through participants for demonstrating the low
a committee to ensure that money was Sitalia(2), the villagers compared the poor priority they gave to projects involving. In
properly spent. development activities in their own village East Nimpur village, members of sched-
In Kantamari, two individuals were with development work in two neigh- uled tribes who have their own hamlet
selected for housing. But since a limitedbouring village. In Kalidaspur, people within the village demanded that their
amount of money was available at that grilled the village council representatives locality should be given more importance
time, the participants decided who should about the poor quality of road repair work in road repair schemes.

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
(7) Inefficient utilisation of funds or tions and also certain concessions he was IV (1) Two Different Models?
injudicious utilisation of funds was an- obliged to make to other elected members
other issue that generated deliberations. In of the panchayat (village council). For all There is much to admire in the achieve-
Sonagan, a particular drainage project had practical purposes the pradhan was anments of West Bengal as a pioneering
been undertaken. The people of the village model of participatory government. It has
extremely powerful man - there used to
pointed out that the money was not being be a saying in the rural areas of West
enjoyed by far the longest and most stable
used properly and as a result wastage was Bengal that Above there is God, and below existence among similar experiments car-
taking place. In Dayapur village, a sum of ried out in other Indian states, including
there is the Pradhan. If the local represen-
Rs 10,000 was shown as office expendi- tative belonged to the pradhan's own
that of Kerala. Until very recently the people
ture by the village council. Many pointed political party, then he could have some in West Bengal did not have as much
out that it was excessive and if this type influence on the pradhan in getting funds access to information about development
of expenditure was allowed, soon there allocated for his/her area. Even then, the programmes and availability of funds for
would be very little money left for devel- common people remained generally igno- their own areas as they have today. The
opment work. rant. But if the local representative be- only control they had was the ability to
vote elected officials out of power every
longed to a rival political party, then the
II1 (5) Summary and Assessment pradhan generally did everything to deny five years. While this was a marked im-
any benefit, beyond the bare minimum, toprovement compared to other Indian states,
Our discussion of the deliberations in
the area. The Pradhan's power could be it was quite far from the ideal of partici-
maintained mainly by the fact that the
the village constituency meetings suggest patory governance. With the introduction
that review and monitoring of project of the system of mandatory village con-
common villagers were not privy to infor-
mation about allocation of resources and
implementation receives the highest em- stituency meetings the people participate
phasis, followed by agenda setting, and there was no forum to voice their opinions in deciding the kind of programmes that
selection of beneficiaries. The impact andof criticisms. The village constituency should be undertaken in their villages and
the deliberations on project design is notmeetings seem to be an important institu- who should get priority for specific pro-
totally absent but surfaces much less fre-tional innovation to contribute to the ideal grammes, and question elected officials
quently. The participants actively voice of participatory governance, although from on the use of public funds and imple-
demand for new projects, suggest how our study we cannot judge how much ofmentation of public projects.
allocated funds should be spent and debatean effect it will have in making the allo- However, the performance of West
how projects should be designed. The cation of resources responsive to public Bengal in terms of devolution of power,
pradhan (village council chief) and the demand, or improving the implementation finances, and functions to the panchayat
of projects.
local representatives are questioned on the has not been satisfactory. A recent inter-
progress of implementation of projects, state study of panchayats by Jain'(1999)
and often face allegations about misuse of IV covering all the major states put West
funds and selection of beneficiaries. The Bengal not only behind Kerala. but also
Comparing Panchayat Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka on indi-
response of the elected officials to these
criticisms showed that they could not take Reforms in West Bengal cators such as the power to prepare local
the voters present in the meeting for granted. and Kerala plans, transfer of staff, control over staff,
In some cases where there was overwhelm- transfer of funds. In particular, the extent
ing evidence in favour of the criticisms The empowerment of panchayats in West of devolution of state government funds
raised by the people, the village council Bengal in the late seventies when the Left
and programmes to the panchayat level
officials admitted their error. For example, Front first came to power can be viewed
and the extent of people's participation in
faced with a concrete charge of manipu- as something of a first generation effort the planning process in West Bengal is
lating a beneficiary list in Sitalia (1) vil-in decentralisation in India. The subse- significantly less compared to that of
lage, the elected representative and those quent reforms in West Bengal in the form Kerala. Starting in 1996, about 40 per cent
present from the village council had no of introducing participatory forums like of the state government controlled funds
were devolved from the bureaucracy to
alternative to restore the original list on the the village constituency and village council
spot. Sometimes the elected representa- meetings in the mid-nineties, and in Keralapanchayat village planning councils (in
tives and other village council function- in the form of the people's plan in the late
addition to the central government funds
aries gave a detailed account of the finan- nineties can be thought of as second which have been devolved in West Bengal
cial situation in respect of various schemes generation efforts that learn from andas well) in Kerala and the People's Plan
and tried to explain their poor performance progressively deepen the initial devolu-
Campaign was launched to directly in-
in terms of delay of arrival of funds from tionary reforms that have been in place volve
in the people in the planning process
the state government. West Bengal since 1977. In the next sec-
at the grass roots level [Isaac and Heller
This represents a marked improvement~tion (IV (1)) we discuss the main differ- (forthcoming)].
over the previous situation where the power ences between the second generation
Furthermore, a committee set up by the
of the village council (gram panchayat) efforts carried out in West Bengal and West Bengal government itself has criti-
was totally concentrated in the hands of Kerala during the nineties with respectcised
to the district level planning process
the pradhan. He was the sole authority to the original West Bengal model of the involving
late the panchayat system and state
take decisions on how and where resources seventies. Next (Section IV (2)) we trybureaucracy
to for lack of coordination and
understand the nature and causes of these
sanctioned for the village council area were insufficient participation of the people, or
differences. In Section (IV (3)) we discuss their elected representatives at the village
to be utilised. The restraining factors were
his assessment of popular reaction that some common problems the experience of level. Currently the three-tier panchayats
would affect his chances in the next elec- these two cases have thrown up. and municipalities in a district prepare a

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
plan on the basis of mostly central gov- pared
of-political interference or populist by the state government bureau-
pres-
ernment provided funds (about 75 per cent) cracy.of
sures, and achieving better coordination The problem of coordination be-
targeted towards poverty alleviation and tween
plans across different jurisdictions. Thereplans of the different tiers of the
similar programmes. While nominally 50 are two significant disadvantages local
of this
bodies and that of the state govern-
per cent of the state budget for development shows up in the Kerala model as well
approach. First, it is difficult for outsiders
ment expenditure has been devolved to the [Isaac
to elicit local information in the first 2000, p 25]. This has caused a
place
panchayats, the departments of the state (local residents may have an incentive sympathetic
to observer of Kerala's people's
government continue to have a dominant overstate their needs or understate their plan to express the apprehension that: Is
role in planning and implementation. The resources) or to react fast to changes in it not just likely that 900 panchayats will
state government bureaucracy hands out local needs and conditions. The second spend money in uncoordinated and unpro-
district plans to district officials and lower problem is that of accountability: ductive the ways, concerned to build a toilet
tiers of panchayats have no say in the problem of motivating those in charge of here and a piped water supply there,
block
allocation of these funds or the implemen- formulating and implementing the plan buttowith no overall plans for investment
tation of these projects, unless they are take actions that are in the best interests that will lead to sustained production and
requested to lend a helping hand. The of the public and not for their own finan-employment? [Jeffrey 2000, p 4324].
amount of money spent through this chan- cial or political self-interest. Indeed, the Kerala planning board pointed
nel is nfch more than that is directly Decentralisation, a radical version of out that there were many instances of
handled by panchayats. Also, there is little which is Kerala's 'people's plan', empow-duplication of planning activities and also
attempt at coordinating between these two ers the public to formulate and implement critical gaps between the various tiers.
sets of plans at the district level [Govern- the plan and hence allows better acquisi-Even when the projects and plans were
ment of West Bengal 1995, p 6]. tion and use of local information and
available, it was realised that most of them
preferences and better monitoring ofhadthe
to be examined closely for their tech-
IV (2) What Explains the nicalitsoundness and financial viability
implementation of these projects. But
Difference? has the disadvantage that the people [Government
may of Kerala 1998, p 201].
Political
lack the expertise needed for planning or Factors: The design of institu-
Institution Design Issues: There are sig-
implementation. It has been pointed outof participatory governance is not
tions
nificant differences between the Kerala that many villages failed to produce plans, merely an abstract planning problem, but
and West Bengal models in terms ofthe theplans that were submitted were often a political process. A political party might
extent of people's participation in of thevery poor quality, and having a be pro-
ideologically committed to decentralis-
planning process. However, it is important nounced populist and welfare biasation as and participatory governance. It is
not to take a simplistic view that greater opposed to asset creation. A somewhat also likely to care about electoral success
devolution and participation of peoplesuccessful in safeguard was in the form and of
maintaining its power base and these
the planning process automatically trans- voluntary technical committees consisting two can be in conflict with each other.
lates into greater welfare and hence fram- of retired technical experts. These notAlso, only while decentralisation increases the
ing the whole discussion in terms of how provided much needed technical expertise political accountability of elected officials
to increase this element in West Bengal. but also financial discipline [Das 2000]. it also significantly increases their powers,
Indeed a case can be made that the current The fact that non-elected quasi official and hence could lead to capture of gov-
models observed in West Bengal and Keralabodies have the right to scrutiny, alter ernments
or by the local elites in societies
are both imperfect institutional ways of even veto plans and programmes prepared characterised by extreme poverty and
grappling with the costs and benefits of by the people or their elected representa- inequality such as in rural India. In this
decentralisation. tives may seem to be in contradiction sectionwith we briefly discuss how political
Suppose one takes an abstract look at the ideal of participatory governance. factors
But determined the initiation of these
the planning problem as one of mappingit does lend credence to the thesis that reforms in West Bengal and Kerala and
the preferences and needs of the peopledecentralisation has both costs and bene- their relative success compared to other
of a certain area (say, residents of a village)fits, and therefore needs some institutionalIndian states, and also how these shaped
to formulation and implementation ofchecks and balances just like centralised their subsequent contrasting developments.
projects while making'sure that the plansgovernance does. The key issue is to strikeWhile all political parties in India pay
of different areas are consistent with each a balance between popular participation lip-service to the virtues of empowering
other in terms of technology (forward and in the planning process and expertise. In panchayats no action was taken on this
backward linkages, positive and negative the case of West Bengal, with the intro- matter by any state till the late seventies
externalities) and resources (considerations duction of the village constituency meet- and early eighties when opposition parties
of equity would dictate transfer of resources ings, this has taken the form of experts defeated the ruling Congress Party in some
from richer to poorer areas). doing the planning and implementation states, notably West Bengal and Karnataka.
Given this planning problem, the costs and people's bodies having a consultative- Empowering the panchayat system was
and benefits of the centralised and and monitoring role. viewed as a strategy to enhance their elec-
decentralised institutional modes of imple- The second serious problem associated toral strength at the grass roots level. The
mentation can be summed up as follows. with decentralisation is that of coordina- success of these experiments created a
In the centralised model bureaucrats tionplan
across different plan units. We havedemand for making such reforms manda-
on behalf of the people, and are inalready charge mentioned the criticismof the Westtory in other states at the national level
of implementing these plans. This Bengal has themodel of partial devolution in termsresulting in the constitutional amendment
twin advantages of using the talents of lackofof coordination between villagein 1993 that envisaged empowering the
those with the required training, expertise level panchayat plans (which receive directthree levels of panchayats and reservation
and experience to take their decisions free
inputs from the people) and the plan pre-of seats for scheduled castes and tribes,

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
and women. Although all states were seen by some observers as a desperate 766
bid villages and intensively in 40 villages
required to pass or amend their panchayat on a pilot basis in Medinipur district of
to break out of Kerala's development crisis
legislation by i994, the extent of devolu- [Isaac 2000]. West Bengal in 1986, 10 years before the
tion of power and finances was left at the Secondly, the political environmentspeople's
in plan was launched in Kerala.6
discretion of individual states. Up until This was a result of collaboration between
these two states are very different. In Kerala
now, apart from West Bengal and the electoral competition between the the leftRural Development Centre of the Indian
Karnataka, only two major states, Kerala and the centrist coalition led by the Con-Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, the
and Madhya Pradesh have taken signifi- gress is much more intense. Almost zilla no parishad of the district panchayat and
cant action in this regard. The relative administration has had a long and continu-the District Planning Committee. Despite
success of West Bengal and Kerala within the tremendous potential of the experi-
ous tenure in Kerala. This is a far cry from
this group of states in terms of pro-poor West Bengal, where the Congress Party
ment, it fizzled out due to a host of reasons.
Those intimately associated with the ex-
outcomes is attributed to the greater com- governed continuously till the mid-1970s
mitment of leftist parties to the empow- (except for a short three-year period during
periment7 identified a few factors that were
erment of the poor, both for ideological the turbulent sixties) and ever since, the found to be obstacles to the experiment
and electoral reasons. In addition, as men- LF government has been re-elected for anda its further expansion. Firstly, the elected
tioned earlier, a common enabling factor record six consecutive times in state-level panchayat representatives felt threatened
has been successful land reform policies, elections. Gaining some electoral advan- that their newly acquired status would be
built on the political campaigns by leftist tage in this very competitive environmenteroded by direct empowerment of the
peasant organisations over the years. In was one motivating factor behind the 'big- people and their involvement in the plan-
contrast in Karnataka, where the centrist bang' approach to reform undertaken by ning process. Secondly, a large part of the
Janata Party undertook early attempts to the LDF when it was elected to power panchayat
in members as well as leaders and
empower the panchayats in the nineteen 1996. Indeed, redistributing power and functionaries of political parties were
employers of wage labour and they felt
eighties, critics have alleged that decentra- resources away from the state government,
lisation has led to political capture by where the hold of the LDF is uncertain, threatened by the prospect of the enpow-
middle peasants and rural elites, although to the local government can be viewed erment
as of the working people.
a mitigating factor has been the mandatory a rational political move. In West Bengal
reservation of seats for lower castes who IV (3) Some Common Problems
given the LF's secure tenure at the state
tend to be poor [Crook with Sverrisson government level, the need for such radical
1999]. In addition, leftist parties tend reform
to is much less from this point Accountability
of and Financial Discipline:
view. Recent state level election results
be more disciplined with little factional- While participatory governance of the kind
ism which dogs other parties such as the seem to bear this out. In the recently being experimented with in West Bengal
Congress and reduce the attractivenessconcluded
of state level elections in May and Kerala have undoubtedly improved
decentralisation [Crook and Manor 1998]. 2001, while in West Bengal the LF was the accountability of government officials
We now turn to the issue of why Kerala re-elected with a large majority for and the elected representatives, it has brought
sixth time since 1977, in Kerala the rival
that started these reforms much later, has about an accountability problem of a dif-
to the LDF, the United Democratic Front
been able to carry these much further than ferent kind. Panchayats depend almost
(UDF) led by the Congress Party woncompletely
West Bengal. First of all, the overall eco- by on the central and state gov-
nomic conditions of the two states have a large (two-thirds) majority. ernments for funds and raises a negligible
been very different. The rapid economic Third, the early success of the panchayat amount of revenue themselves. Even if
growth in rural West Bengal following the there is no leakage in the form of corrup-
reforms in West Bengal has generated some
initial round of reform (devolution topolitical forces that stand in the waytion, of the village councils as a whole have
panchayats and limited land reform) has less incentives to focus on the social re-
further, more radical, reform. The changed
improved standards of living dramatically, power structure in rural areas, and eco- turns from how they have spent these funds
and this has tempered popular demand for (or to assess their performance in this
nomic success has translated into signifi-
further reform. In contrast, in Kerala the cant electoral gains for the LF. In allregard)
of as they do not have to raise even
newly-elected LDF government faced the a five panchayat elections the LF has a fraction of these funds. The negative
severe economic crisis that has been brew- won with a large majority. A coalitionincentive
of effects of such a soft budget
ing for quite some time and called forwhite collar employees (school teachers, constraint is well known from the litera-
drastic measures. Despite having outstand-government employees) and middle peas- ture on public sector enterprises and so-
cialist economies [Kornai 1986].
ing literacy and life expectancy rates, Keralaants, the so-called rural middle strata have
has experienced very low growth rates ofemerged as an important power base in the
In this case of Kerala critics have pointed
per capita income, high unemployment,party and they resist further devolutionout of that the local bodies were burdened
and stagnant agricultural productivitypower that a true people's plan would with too much of money which they were
which stand in sharp contrast to Westentail. Echeverri-Gent's study of Midnapur ill-equipped to make use of. Traditionally
Bengal. As the remittance of migrant district showed that 65 per cent of cash-strapped
the panchayats suddenly found
workers in the Gulf countries of west Asia elected leaders of the gram panchayats themselves having more money than they
fell sharply in the early nineties, the ad- were white-collar employees (mainly could handle and in the first year could not
ministration was faced with a budgetary school teachers) [Echeverri-Gent 1992]. use the full amount of the allotted funds
crisis that threatened welfare programmes This argument is clearly confirmed by the despite being overly generous with the
that characterise the celebrated Kerala experience of the first major (action allocations.
re- There has so far been no
model. The radical decentralisation begun search) experiment in people's participa-
performance assessment of how these funds
in 1996, despite serious opposition by tion in development planning at the village
are being used by an independent body
government employees, has therefore been level that was carried out extensively[Dasin 2000].

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In West Bengal where the extent of fiscal West Bengal under which tube-wells were of funds. According to independent ob-
devolution from the state government to constructed with state funds which were servers, while many village panchayats
the village councils is lower than that of then handed over to poor farmers to managehave done an impressive job, more than
Kerala, this problem manifests itself in the half of all the village panchayats have not
and maintain completely on their own with
form of total dependence of the progress the help of user fees [Bardhan 2000]. been able to show much beyond spending
of all projects on the flow of outside funds. In both West Bengal and Kerala partici-
money on individual beneficiary-oriented
This is echoed in most of the responses patory governance essentially involves programmes such as distribution of seeds,
given by the village council officials in livestock, housing grants, books, umbrel-
greater involvement of villagers in decid-
response to questions about slow progress ing how to spend money received from las, shoes, and utensils. Of the total plan
of implementation of projects. The reluc- expenditure only 20 per cent is under the
outside, and ensuring it is spent well. This
tance of village councils to raise revenues is a huge improvement over the centralisedhead of infrastructure which almost
locally has been pointed out to be one of wholly consists of roads and bridges
bureaucratic model adopted elsewhere in
the main reasons for failure of fiscal [Kannan 2000].
India, and in these states during the earlier
decentralisation in India [Echeverri-Gentera.9 However if local governments raise Apart from having a bias towards con-
2000]. This stands in sharp contrast witha minimum amount of the resources from sumption as opposed to investment-
decentralised governance in other parts theoflocal area, this would give them a oriented such an allocation pattern of ex-
the world, including the well known degreecase of autonomy in relation to the central penditure leaves ample scope for political
of Porto Allegre in Brazil [Santos 1998].and the state governments (irrespective ofpatronage. In the case of West Bengal our
who comes to power) and also provide the,case study (as well as those of others, such
An analysis of the annual budgets of village
councils (gram panchayats) in West Ben- economic discipline that is required to as Lieten 1996) suggests that while direct
gal from which the 20 constituencies efficiently produce local services [Hommes corruption is not widespread, the selec-
covered in this study were chosen, show 1995, pp 345-46]. tion of beneficiaries is often along politi-
that a village council raises on its own It ancan be argued that in both Kerala andcal or social lines. This seems to be a
West Bengal there is evidence that in-kind problem for Kerala as well [Kannan 200
average of 2-4 per cent of the money spent
by it a year. A recent study showed resources
that especially unpaid labour time Das 2000].
funds raised by the gram panchayats are wasprovided locally, both in implementing In both cases non-beneficiaries have been
and monitoring panchayat projects. How-disillusioned with the process and have
only 8 per cent of its income. In contrast
funds from the central government ever, for unpaid labour or labour paid at ratesdistanced themselves from everything
less than the market rate cannot be a good including attending village constituency
financing work on all types of infrastructure
was 31 per cent and funds received from substitute for taxes raise locally. Apartmeetings. This brings us to the problem
the state government for the operating from other things, it is generally the poorer of low participation. We have already
expenses of the GP was 33 per cent.8 sections of the community who would end discussed in detail the problem of low
The main reason behind the panchayat's
up contributing most of free or partly paidattendance of village constituency meet-
reluctance to raise resources locally is
labour, allowing the relatively better offings in West Bengal. There a single-mem-
popular opposition to rural taxes whichsection
is free ride on them. ber constituency has, on an average, less
partly a consequence of the historical Populist Bias and Partisanship: Greater than 700 voters. Even though so few people
association between agricultural taxation
decentralisation of decision-making canare in involved, participation rates are low,
and colonial oppression. In the post-colo-
principle degenerate into decentralisation especially for women and other minority
of patronage and competitive adoptiongroups.
nial period through its extensive subsidies, of Those who do not belong to the
a good chunk of which has been corneredpopulist policies. Under a centralised ar- ruling political party mostly stay away.
rangement there is some outside monitor-
by the lobby of rich farmers, the govern- Those who do not see any direct benefit
ing of use of funds in terms of social
ment has created a popular attitude that for themselves stay away. Even a section
demands services without payment. This priority and technical and financial viabil-
of the poor stay away because they do not
is an area where reform is necessary ityforby official agencies. This is of coursebelong to the right political party or they
the long-term success of participatory subject to problems of corruption and are busy trying to earn their living. This
governance in terms of accountabilityinefficiencies
and that imply a large gap be-is a problem for the Kerala case as well.
efficient investment. Some economists tween ideal and realised allocation of The attendance in gram sabhas, while very
favour user fees in the case of infrastruc- resources. In the models of decentralisation
high initially has declined significantly,
ture delivery over local taxation. This isoffered by West Bengal and Kerala thereand there were many cases in which the
because, if capture by local elites is a majoris much less scope for this sort of leakagemeeting could not be held because of lack
concern, their control of the locally raised and indeed this supported by independent of quorum [Das 2000, p 4302]. Women
tax revenue could, lead to significant overobservers. But because political partiesand members of lower castes were insuf-
provision of services that they value rela-compete in panchayat elections, and the ficiently involved in spite of attempts to
tive to those valued by the poor. In thiswinner has direct control overthe substance ensure their participation [Isaac and Franke,
scenario, user fees represent a useful of the village level plan, as well as the selec- 2000, pp 227-28; see also Raju 1998].
compromise between the advantage of tion of beneficiaries, the panchayat system What are the solutions of the problems
decentralisation in making service deliv- in both states have been criticised for the noted above? We offer some conjectures
ery reflect local needs, and prevent leak-politicisation of the planning process andon the basis of reports about the experience
ages, yet make sure that the costs of these the implementation of public projects. of the panchayats that have been most
services are distributed efficiently and In the case of Kerala it has been pointedsuccessful in implementing the people's
equitably [Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000].out that there is a pronounced populist andplan programme in Kerala and the results
An innovative example of such reform iswelfare bias under the peoples' plans asof the recently concluded panchayat elec-
provided by an experimental scheme in opposed to asset creation in the allocationtions in the state. According to observers

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it was often the individual initiative of the voluntary organisations (NGOs). Other progress and is prone to anti-incumbent
respective panchayat presidents and other than the crucial role played by the volun- voting [Crook with Sverrisson 1999].
officials that made all the difference be- The experience of Kerala has created
tary technical committees in Kerala, it has
hind the success stories in Kerala (eg, thebeen pointed out [see Kannan 2000] that some peer pressure as well. It is now
Mattahur panchayat in Thirussur district) the wholehearted support of some NGOs explicitly recognised that the potential of
[Das 2000, p 4303]. These leaders tried (e g, the KSSP and COSTFORD) has also the village constituencies (gram samsads)
to reach across political, economic and been an important contributing factor to in institutionalising the community's ac-
social divides and pushed for programmes some of the success stories of the people's tive participation in planning, implemen-
that would create assets as opposed to planning programme. They contributed by tation and monitoring are yet to be fully
political patronage often going against mobilising
the people, conducting seminars utilised.11 The administration has drawn
and camps, organising training pro- up a strategy and an elaborate plan of
wishes of the local party leaders. These
success stories were largely in CPI(M)grammes, drawing up projects and develop- action, drawing from the earlier participa-
ment report and publishing a large number tory village level planning of Medinipur
controlled panchayats. However, the party
of books, manuals and guidelines [Kannan district and Kerala's People's Plan cam-
actually lost in most of these panchayats
in the recently concluded elections in 2000.
2000, p 96]. Yet their role is seldom paign. Pilot projects are in progress in four
Overall in the state, the performance of acknowledged
the in official accounts. The districts of West Bengal.12
LDF was very disappointing, especially left parties in India have a negative attitude This would be the first major initiative
given the high expectations following the
towards NGOs mainly for ideological at the state level to make the village con-
People's Plan campaign - while its share
reasons. Also, political parties in general stituencies the starting point of the plan-
of panchayat seats increased marginally,
are wary of NGOs because they think the ning process. The initial work starts at an
the number of local bodies under its con-
operation of these organisations under- even lower level. Each village constitu-
trol has dwindled sharply to 418 from 588mines their importance at the village level. ency would be divided into three to four
last time. Two explanations for this haveHowever, belatedly there is increasing 'para' (hamlet) units. Trained facilitators
recognition of the important role these would meet people in small groups sepa-
been offered in the popular press (includ-
ing the mouthpiece of the CPI(M), organisations can play in mobilisation and rately in each hamlet and collect data on
Ganashakti. The first one emphasises the training, as well as a check against the households and the village through the
wrath of disgruntled non-beneficiaries that politicisation of the planning process (or, participatory process. Such meetings would
is inevitable in any patronage distribution allegations of it). The current plans to take place after special campaigns and
system. The second one blames the refusal further reform the panchayat system in special efforts would be made to ensure
of the party to allow almost all those participation of women and members of
West Bengal, described in the next section,
incumbent officials who had worked tire-
explicitly recognise the positive role that lower castes. This will be supplemented
lessly for the success of the people's planNGOs can play in decentralised planning. by secondary data available on the area.
to run for a second term. This was either At the next stage, all the data would be
because these officials refused to toe the collated and analysed. For the purpose of
V
party line in terms of distribution of development planning, the following sec-
Looking Forward
patronage and the orientation of the spend- tors have been identified, namely, educa-
ing, or because local party leaders whoWe conclude by discussing some of the tion, health, women's development, agri-
played no role in the decentralised plan-
recent initiatives undertaken to expand the culture, irrigation, animal husbandry, fish-
ning initiative became late converts and
scope and power of the village constitu- ery, cottage and small-scale industry, trade,
jumped into the electoral bandwagon and infrastructure.
ency meetings in terms greater participa-
anticipating easy victory but the voters
tion of the people in the planning process, The village constituency meetings would
clearly were not deceived.l0 This offers be organised after adequate campaign,
as well as to expand the participation of
two important lessons. First, for successful
women and scheduled castes. ensuring large-scale participation of all
democratic decentralisation, there has to There is increasing realisation among
categories of voters, particularly women
be some decentralisation and devolution and those belonging to lower castes. There
policy-makers in the LF that the enthusi-
asm and energy of the people whichwill
of power in the political parties that are wasbe detailed discussion on each sector.
in charge of implementing these reforms. unleashed by the introduction of theAfter
em- initial discussion, those present would
Second, the greater is the extent of powered panchayats and institutionalalso meet in sectorwise groups. In every
decentralisation, the higher will be thechanges like protection of the rights ofdiscussion,
the emphasis would be on iden-
level of consciousness of the people andtenants and redistribution of land have tification of problems, prioritisation of
their expectations from elected officials.
started waning in recent years. This development
is initiatives, and mobilisatiop
As a result, they are more likely to vote of
beginning to be reflected in the political resources. Later these will be presented
on the basis of the performance of indi-fortunes of the LF in rural West Bengal.in a plenary session. In each sector, pos-
vidual officials and not blindly cast their sible sources of funding will be identified.
In the latest panchayat elections in 1998
votes for a party in gratitude for carrying the LF lost some ground to the main At the next stage, a task force will analyse
out the reforms. This is indeed desirable opposition party, the Trinamul Congress.and collate the plans that came from the
from the social point of view, but from the To some extent the LF has been a victim various village constituencies and prepare
concrete structure of the sectoral plans.
point of view of electoral success one can of its own success. Agricultural growth,
see some good reasons for the more cau- the breaking down of the power of the This will be followed by development
tious steps taken by West Bengal. seminars at the gram panchayat (village
landlord-moneylender class, and the em-
Another counterweight to reduce the powerment of panchayats have all contrib- council) level. Participants will be all
degree of politicisation of the people's uted to the creation of a new rural middle village council members, resource persons
planning process is the involvement of class that is impatient with the pace of of the area, 10-12 representatives from

27.63.208.153 on Sun, 11 Feb 2024 04:14:59 +00:00
each village constituency, government member as a whole. Floundering Experiment', Economic and
officials working at the village council and 5 Muslims, another economically backwardPolitical Weekly, December 2-8.
group, have a low presence in these Datta, Chandan and Prabhat Datta (1995): 'The
block (panchayat samity) level, represen- constituencies. West Bengal Panchayati Raj Act 1994' in
tatives of local NGOs, local expert/expe- 6 See 'The Crisis in the Village Based Planning State PanchayatActs: A Critical Review, Vani,
rienced people in development and repre- Movement', mimeographed note by Ajit p 175.
sentatives of all political parties. Narayan Bose circulated in Workshop on Dreze, Jean and Amartya Sen (1995): India:
The task force will prepare an outline People's Participation in Development held Economic Development and Social
on December 15-16 at Calcutta, organised by Opportunity, Oxford University Press.
development plan (ODP) for a span of five
the Government of West Bengal. Echeverri-Gent, John (1992):'Public Participation
years. Annual plans would be prepared on 7 Ibid. and Poverty Alleviation: The Experience of
the basis of the ODP. From next year 8 See Chattopadhyay and Duflo, (2001). The the Reform Communists in West Bengal',
onwards, only annual plans would be estimate is based on the 1999 balance sheets World Development, 20(10), pp 1401-22.
required. For the time being, the process - (2000): 'Globalisation and Decentralisation:
of 40 gram panchayats in the Birbhum district.
9 See Pranab Bardhan, 'Decentralised Develop-Lessons in Good Governance from China and
is being initiated for the village council ment', Indian Economic Review, Vol XXXI, India' (mimeo), Department of Government
level. Later this will be integrated with the No 2, 1996 for a discussion of the comparative and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.
next higher level, the panchayat samity. experience of other Indian states, and develop- Gazdar, H and S Sengupta (1997): 'Agrarian
The process of reform has already started. ing countries. Politics and Rural Development in West
It is likely to be continued given the 10 See Das, (2000), p 4303 and The Hindu, Bengal' in J Dreze and A Sen (eds), Indian
October 4, 2000. According to newspaper Development: SelectedRegional Perspectives,
successful performance of the Left Front
reports around 15 per cent of incumbent Oxford University Press, New Delhi and New
in the recent state level elections. One
officials had been given a chance to run for York.
should keep in mind that these initiativesa second term, although 85 per cent of the Government of Kerala (1998): Economic Review,
are an attempt to rationalise and improve incumbents who were allowed to run for a p 201.
upon theexisting model, with emphasis on second term won. See Frontline, Vol 17, Issue
Government of West Bengal (1995): The Recom-
21, October 14-27, 2000 and Ganashakti, mendations of the State Finance Commission,
greater participation of the people in the
November 6, 2000. 1990-95.
planning process and no radical plans for
11 'Towards Convergent Community Action in Hommes, Rudolf( 1995): 'Conflicts and Dilemmas
devolution of funds, finances and func- Rural West Bengal: A Strategy Framework', of Decentralisation', Annual World Bank
tionaries are on the table. Still it is a welcome
mimeographed paper by Society for Training Conference on Development Economics.
step. To what extent it can overcome theand Research on Panchayats and Rural Isaac, T M Thomas and Patrick Heller
type of obstacles which were faced by Development presented at Workshop on (forthcoming): 'The Campaign for Democrat
People's Participation in Development, Decentralisation in Kerala, India' in Archon
the earlier pilot experiment in Medinipur Calcutta, December 15-16, 1999 Fung and Eric Olin Wright (eds), Deepenin
district remain to be seen.[l3 12 Ibid. Democracy: Institutional Innovations in
Empowered Participatory Governance,Vol
Notes References in the Real Utopias Project, Verso Press.
Isaac, T M Thomas (with Richard W Franke)
[An earlier version of this paper was presented (2000): Local Democracy and Development:
at the conference 'Real Utopias V: ExperimentsBandyopadhyay, D (1997): .'Not a Gramscian People's Campaign for Decentralised
in Empowered Deliberative Democracy' held in Pantomime', Economic and Political Weekly, Planning in Kerala, Left World Books, New
March 22. Delhi.
Madison, WI (January 2000). We thank the
participants, and especially, Archon Fung and Banerjee, A V, P J Gertler and M Ghatak Jain, S P (1999): 'Devolution of Power, Functions
Erik Olin Wright, for very helpful comments that (forthcoming): 'Empowerment and Efficiency:and Authority to Panchayats in Different
improved the paper. We also thank Pranab Bardhan, Tenancy Reform in West Bengal', Journal of States', Working paper, National Institute of
D Bandyopadhyay, Asim Dasgupta, Prabhat Datta, Political Economy. Rural Development, Hyderabad.
and Dilip Ghosh for helpful discussions, and Lipi Bardhan, Pranab (2000): 'Local Governance and
Kannan, K P (2000): 'People's Planning, Kerala's
Ghatak for her help in conducting the field survey. Delivery of Public Goods' in Jean-Jacques 'Dilemma', Seminar, January.
We remain responsible for the views expressed Dethier (ed), Governance, Decentralisation,
Kornai, Janos (1986): The Soft Budget Constraint,
in the paperas well as any errors and shortcomings.] and Reform in China, India and Russia, KluwerKyklos, 39(1), pp 3-30.
Academic Publishers.
Mathew, George (2001): 'Panchayat Elections -
1 For example, Gazdar and Sengupta (1997) Bardhan, Pranab and Dilip Mookherjee (2000): Dismal Record', Economic and Political
cites various comparative assessments of the 'Corruption and Decentralisation of Weekly, January 20.
implementation of anti-poverty programmes of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Mookherjee, Dilip (1998): 'Information Systems
various states that found that the most bene- Countries', Working Paper, Department of and Public Policy in Developing Countries',
ficiaries in West Bengal were from the target Economics, Boston University. Background Paper to the World Development
groups whereas in other states they were oftenChattopadhyay, Ragahbendra and Esther Duflo Report.
well off relatives of the panchayat officials. (2001): 'Women's Leadership and Policy Raju, M R (1998): 'Panchayati Raj in Kerala:
2 The NGO is The Tagore Society for Rural Decisions: Evidence from a Nationwide Problems and Prospects', Kurukshetra, April,
Development, a very old and distinguished Randomised Experiment in India' (mimeo),
pp 70-71.
NGO working in areas of primary health and Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta, and
Ramachandran, V K (1997): 'Achievements in the
education in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Department of Economics, MIT. Countryside', Frontline, July 11.
3 These are, respectively, the Communist Party
Crook, R C and J Manor (1998): Democracy
Rawal,and
Vikas and Madhura Swaminathan (1998):
of India (Marxist) and the Revolutionary Decentralisation in South Asia and West 'Changing Trajectories: Agricultural Growth
Socialist Party. The former is the dominant Africa: Participation, Accountability andin West Bengal, 1950 to 1996', Economic and
partner of the coalition of the left wing parties
Performance, Cambridge University Press, Political Weekly, October 3.
that constitute the Left Front that have been Cambridge. Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (1998): 'Participatory
Crook, Richard with Alan Sverrisson (1999): To
in power at the state level for more than two Budgeting in Port Allegre: Toward a
decades. What Extent Can Decentralised Forms of Redistributive Democracy', Politics and
4 Although one-third of the seats in the village Government Enhance the Development of Pro- Society, Vol 26, No 4, December.
council are reserved for women, here we are PoorPolicies and Improve Poverty-AlleviationWebster, Neil (1992): Panchayati Raj and the
looking at the profiles of the members of a Outcomes? Institute of Development Studies, Decentralisation of Development Planning in
sample of village constituencies and not that University of Sussex. West Bengal: A Case Study, K P Bagchi,
of the village councils of which they areDas, a M K (2000): 'Kerala' s Decentralised Planning: Calcutta.

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Recent Reforms in the Panchayat

MAITREESH GHATAK, MAITREYA GHATAK

Economic and Political Weekly January 5, 200245

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[Bandyopadhyay 1997]. Empirical studiesOpposition 8 26 9 11 13

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*All per cent rounded off.

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representative is male, 40 years old and

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